

# YUP: THE GOVERNMENT IS SECRETLY HIDING ITS CRYPTO BATTLES IN THE SECRET FISA COURT

When I analyzed the [Wyden-Paul Section 702 reform bill](#), I [noted](#) language that suggested Wyden was concerned about the government using the secrecy of FISA Court proceedings to demand technical assistance from providers they otherwise couldn't get. Wyden's bill makes it clear he's concerned that the government would (or is) making technical demands without even telling the FISC it is doing so. His bill would explicitly require review of any technical demands by the court.

(B) LIMITATIONS.—The Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence may not request assistance from an electronic communication service provider under subparagraph (A) without demonstrating, to the satisfaction of the Court, that the assistance sought—

(i) is necessary;

(ii) is narrowly tailored to the surveillance at issue; and

(iii) would not pose an undue burden on the electronic communication service provider or its customers who are not an intended target of the surveillance.

(C) COMPLIANCE.—An electronic communication service provider is not obligated to comply with a directive to provide assistance under this paragraph unless

(i) such assistance is a manner or method that has been explicitly approved by the Court; and

(ii) the Court issues an order, which

has been delivered to the provider, explicitly describing the assistance to be furnished by the provider that has been approved by the Court.

I suggested the most likely use of such a “technical assistance” demand would be requiring a company (cough, Apple) to back door its encryption.

The most obvious such application would involve asking Apple to back door its iPhone encryption.

As a reminder, national security requests to Apple [doubled](#) in the second half of last year.

The number of national security orders issued to Apple by US law enforcement doubled to about 6,000 in the second half of 2016, compared with the [first half of the year](#), Apple disclosed in its biannual [transparency report](#). Those requests included orders received under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as well as national security letters, the latter of which are issued by the FBI and don’t require a judge’s sign-off.

We would expect such a jump if the government were making a slew of new requests of Apple related to breaking encryption on their phones.

In [his statement on the bill](#), Wyden made it clear that that’s precisely what he is concerned about.

It leaves in place current statutory authority to compel companies to provide assistance, potentially opening the door

to government mandated de-encryption  
without FISA Court oversight. [my  
emphasis]

And note: he is saying that the government will  
(that is, has already, most likely) done this  
without asking the FISC to review whether its  
technical demands are narrowly tailored and  
necessary.

Update: This post has been updated in response  
to comments to clarify that Wyden is not  
concerned about technical demands per se, but  
about technical demands with no FISC review.

Update: One more point to make clear: for  
“individual” orders, the court will review every  
facility, which will involve some review of what  
kinds of access the government will get (such as  
when, in 2015, the government [ordered](#) Yahoo to  
scan all its users for some kind of signature).

But under 702, the “assistance” language that  
the government could use to obligate back doors  
(or whatever else) is not tied to anything the  
court reviews. Annual certifications have to  
affirm *that* the collection requires domestic  
provider assistance (but does not require a  
description of what that assistance entails).

vi) the acquisition involves obtaining  
foreign intelligence information from or  
with the assistance of an electronic  
communication service provider; and

But then once that certificate is signed, the  
government can work at the level of directives,  
demanding, compensating, and indemnifying the  
provider for that assistance *all without any  
court review*.

(h) Directives and judicial review of  
directives

(1) Authority: With respect to an  
acquisition authorized under subsection  
(a), the Attorney General and the  
Director of National Intelligence may

direct, in writing, an electronic communication service provider to—

(A) immediately provide the Government with all information, facilities, or assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition in a manner that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such electronic communication service provider is providing to the target of the acquisition; and

(B) maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished that such electronic communication service provider wishes to maintain.

(2) Compensation

The Government shall compensate, at the prevailing rate, an electronic communication service provider for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with a directive issued pursuant to paragraph (1).

(3) Release from liability

No cause of action shall lie in any court against any electronic communication service provider for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with a directive issued pursuant to paragraph (1).

That's why the risk is that much greater for 702: because the court is never going to review the individual directives which is where the specific technical assistance gets laid out (unless a provider is permitted to challenge those directives).