As I noted the other day, I’m working through documents submitted in EPIC’s FOIA for PRTT documents (see all of EPIC’s documents on this case here).
In addition to the documents released (the reports to Congress, the extensive reporting on the Internet dragnet), the government submitted descriptions of what appear to be two (possibly three) sets of documents withheld: documents pertaining to orders combining a PRTT and Section 215 order, and documents pertaining to a secret technique, which we’ll call the Paragraph 31 technique. In this post I’ll examine the “combined order” documents.
The Vaughn Index for this FOIA made it clear that a number of the documents Withheld in Full (WIF) pertained to orders combing the Pen Register and Section 215 (Business Record) authorities, as does this list from David Hardy’s second declaration.
Footnotes 3, 4, and 5 all note that these documents have already been successfully withheld in the EFF’s FOIA for Section 215 documents, and by comparing the page numbers in that Vaughn Index in that case, we can guess with some confidence that these orders are the following documents and dates:
As I’ll show, this correlates with what we can glean from the DOJ IG Reports on Section 215.
I’m less certain about Document 12. Both the EFF and ACLU Vaughn Indices show a 10/31/06 document (it is 82C in the EFF Vaughn) that is the correct length, 4 pages, that is linked with another 10/31/06 document (see 82B and 84, for example). For a variety of reasons, however, I think we can’t rule out Document 89S which appears only in the EFF FOIA (but not the ACLU FOIA), which is dated December 16, 2005 (intriguingly, the day after NYT exposed Stellar Wind), in which case the withheld portion might be the relevant 4 pages of a longer 16 page order.
I’m now being accused by USA Freedom Act champions of not providing constructive suggestions on how to improve USAF (even though I have, both via channels they were involved in and channels they are not party to) [oops, try this tweet, which is still active].
Now that it appears people who previously claimed I was making all this up now concede some of my critiques as a valid, here goes: my suggestions for how to fix the problems I identified in this post.
There is one application of connection chaining that I find legitimate, and two that are probably unconstitutional. The legitimate application is the burner phone one: to ask providers to use their algorithms (including new profiles of online use) to find the new phones or online accounts that people adopt after dropping previous ones, which is what AT&T offers under Hemisphere. To permit that, you might alter the connection chaining language to say providers can chain on calls and texts made, as well as ask providers to access their own records to find replacement phones. Note, however, that accuracy on this mapping is only about 94% per Hemisphere documents, so it seems there needs to be some kind of check before using those records.
The two other applications — the ones I’m pretty sure are or should be unconstitutional without a warrant — are 1) the use of cloud data, like address books, calendars, and photos, to establish connections, and 2) the use of phone records like Verizon’s supercookie to establish one-to-one correlations between identities across different platforms. I think these are both squarely unconstitutional under the DC Circuit’s Maynard decision, because both are key functions in linking all these metadata profiles together, and language in Riley would support that too. But who knows? I’m not an appellate judge.
To prevent the government from doing this without really independent judicial review — and more generally to ensure Section 215 is not abused going forward — the best fix is to require notice to defendants if any evidence from Section 215 or anything derived from it, including the use of metadata as an index to identify content, is used in a proceeding against them. Given that Section 215’s secret application is now unclassified, they should even get a fairly robust description of how it was used. After all, if this is just third party doctrine stuff, it can’t be all that secret!
I’m frankly of the opinion that ACLU’s Alex Abdo kicked DOJ’s ass so thoroughly in the 2nd Circuit, that unless that decision is mooted, it will provide a better halt to dragnets than any legislation could. But I get that that’s a risk, especially with Larry Klayman botching an even better setup in the DC Circuit.
But I do think the one way to make sure we don’t lose the opportunity for a judicial fix to this is to provide notice to defendants of any use or derivative use of Section 215. The government has insisted (most recently in the Reaz Qadir Khan case, but also did so in the Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and derivative cases, where we know they used the phone dragnet) that it doesn’t have to give such notice. If they get it — with the ability to demonstrate that their prosecution arises out of a warrantless mosaic analysis of their lives which provides the basis for the order providing access to their content — then at least there may be a limited judicial remedy in the future, even if it’s not Abdo fighting for his own organization. FISCR said PAA was legal because of precisely these linking procedures, but if they’re not (or if they require a warrant) then PRISM is not legal either. Defendants must have the ability to argue that in court.
USAF prohibits using a communications provider corporate person as a selector, but permits the use of a non-communications corporate person as a selector, meaning it could still get all of Visa’s or Western Union’s records. I understand the government claims it needs to retain the use for corporate person selectors to get things like all the guests at Caesars Palace to see if there are suspected terrorists there. The way to permit this, without at the same time permitting a programmatic dragnet (of, say, all Las Vegas hotels all the time), might be to temporally limit the order — say, limit the use of any non-communications provider order to get a month of records.
But this creates a problem, which is that it currently takes (per the NSL IG Report) 30-40 days to get a Section 215 order. The way to make it possible to get records when you need them, rather than keeping a dragnet, is to permit the use of the emergency provision more broadly. You might permit it to be used with counterintelligence uses as well as the current counterterrorism use (that is, make it available in any case where Section 215 would be available), though you should still limit use of any data collected to the purpose for which it was collected. You might even extend the deadline to submit an application beyond 7 days.
That exacerbates the existing problems with the emergency provision, however, which is that the government gets to keep records if the court finds they misused the statute. To fix this, I’d advise tying the change to the adoption of the existing language from the emergency provision currently in place on the phone dragnet order, specifically permitting FISC to require records be discarded if the government shouldn’t have obtained them. I’d also add a reporting requirement on how many emergency provisions were used (that one would be included in the public reporting) and, in classified form to the intelligence and judiciary committees, fairly precisely what it had been used for. I’d additionally require FBI track this data, so it can easily report what has become of it.
Given that the government may have already abused the emergency provisions, this requires close monitoring. So no loosening of the emergency provision should be put into place without the simultaneous controls.
I’d do two things to fix the current overly expansive immunity provisions. First, I’d put the language that exists in other immunity provisions requiring good faith compliance with orders, such that providers can’t be immunized for stuff that they recognize is illegal.
I’d also add language giving them an appeal if the government were obtaining proprietary information. While under current law the government should be able to obtain call records, they shouldn’t be able to require providers also share their algorithms about business records, which is (I suspect) where this going (indeed, the Yahoo documents suggest that’s where it has already gone under PRISM). So make it clear there’s a limit to what is included under third party doctrine, and provide providers with a way to protect their data derived from customer records.
This should be simple. Just include language letting the court review minimization procedures and review compliance, which is currently what happens and should happen as we get deeper and deeper into mosaic collection (indeed, this might be pitched as a solution to what should be a very urgent constitutional problem for the status quo practice).
Additionally, the bill should integrate the emergency provision currently applicable to the phone dragnet for all Section 215 use, along with reporting on how often and how it is used.
Both of these, importantly, simply codify the current status quo. If the government won’t accept the current status quo, after years of evidence on why it needs this minimal level of oversight from FISC, then that by itself should raise questions about the intelligence community’s intent going forward.
One minimal fix to the transparency provisions is to require reporting not just from all communications providers, but from all providers who have received orders, such that the government would have to report on financial and location dragnets, which are both currently excluded. This would ensure that financial and location dragnets that currently exist and are currently exempted from reporting are included.
As to the other transparency provisions, the biggest problem is that the bill permits both the NSA and FBI to say “omigosh we simply can’t count all this.” I think they’re doing so for different reasons. In my opinion, the NSA is doing so because it is conducting illegal domestic wiretapping, especially to pursue cybersecurity targets. It is doing so because it hasn’t gotten Congress to buy off on using domestic wiretapping to pursue cybertargets. I would impose a 2 year limit on how long ODNI can avoid reporting this number, which should provide plenty of time for Congress to legislate a legal way to pursue cybertargets (along with limits to what kind of cybertargets merit such domestic wiretapping, if any).
I think the FBI refusing to count its collection because it wants to passively collect huge databases of US persons so it can just look up whether people who come under its radar are suspicious. I believe this is unconstitutional — it’s certainly something the government lied to the FISCR in order to beat back Yahoo’s challenge, and arguably the government made a similar lie in Amnesty v. Clapper. If I had my way, I’d require FBI to count how many US persons it was collecting on and back door searching yesterday. But if accommodation must be made, FBI, too, should get just 2 years (and significant funding) to be able to 1) tag all its data (as NSA does, so most of it would come tagged) 2) count it and its back door searches 3) determine whether incoming data is of interest within a short period of time, rather than sitting on it for 30 years. Ideally, FBI would also get 2 years to do the same things with its NSL data.
Again, I think the better option is just to make NSA and FBI count their data, which will show both are violating the Constitution. Apparently, Congress doesn’t want to make them do that. So make them do that over the next 2 years, giving them time to replace unconstitutional programs.
In this post, I noted that the provision requiring the advocate have all the material she needs to do to do her job conflicts with the provision permitting the government to withhold information on classification or privilege grounds. If there is any way to limit this — perhaps by requiring the advocate be given clearance into any compartments for the surveillance under question (though not necessarily the underlying sources and methods used in an affidavit), as well as mandating that originator controlled (ORCON) documents be required to be shared. This might work like a CIPA provision, that the government must be willing to share something if it wants FISC approval (and with it, the authority to obligate providers).
But since that post, we’ve seen how, in the Yahoo challenge, the government convinced Reggie Walton to apply the ex parte provisions applying to defendants to Yahoo. That precedent would now, in my opinion, apply language on review to any adversary. To fix that, the bill should include conforming language in all the places (such as at 50 USC 1861(c)) that call for ex parte review to make it clear that ex parte review does not apply to an advocate’s review of an order.
I fully expect the IC to find this unacceptable (Clapper has already made it clear he’ll only accept an advocate that is too weak to be effective). But bill reformers should point to the clear language in the President’s speech calling for “a panel of advocates from outside government to provide an independent voice in significant cases before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.” If the IC refuses to have an advocate that can do the job laid out by statute, they should have to answer to the President, who has called for real advocates (not amici).
To recap — all this pertains only to the bill on its face, not to the important things the bill is missing, such as a prohibition on back door searches. But these are things that would make USA Freedom Act far better.
I suspect the intelligence community would object to many, if not all of them. But if they do, then it would certainly clarify what their intent really is.
On January 9, 2014, the government appealed Judge Richard Leon’s decision finding the phone dragnet in Klayman v. Obama to the DC Circuit.
The DC Circuit, of course, is the court that issued US. v Maynard in 2010, the first big court decision backing a mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment. And while the panel that ultimately heard the Klayman appeal included two judges who voted to have the entire circuit review Maynard, the circuit precedent in Maynard includes the following statement.
As with the “mosaic theory” often invoked by the Government in cases involving national security information, “What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.” CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985) (internal quotation marks deleted); see J. Roderick MacArthur Found. v. F.B.I., 102 F.3d 600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as does one‘s not visiting any of these places over the course of a month. The sequence of a person‘s movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a gynecologist‘s office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story.* A person who knows all of another‘s travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups — and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.
With that precedent, the DC Circuit is a particularly dangerous court for the Administration to review a dragnet that aspires to collect all Americans’ call records and hold them for 5 years.
On March 31, 2014, the government submitted a motion for summary judgment in EFF’s FOIA for Section 215 documents with an equivalent to the ACLU. One of the only things the government specifically withheld — on the grounds that it described a dragnet analysis technique it was still using — was an August 20, 2008 FISC opinion authorizing the technique in question, which it did not name.
Two days before FISC issued that August 20, 2008 opinion, the NSA was explaining to the court how it made correlations between identifiers to contact chain on all those identifiers. Two days is about what we’ve seen for final applications before the FISC rules on issues, to the extent we’ve seen dates, suggesting the opinion is likely about correlations.
Here’s how the government described correlations, in various documents submitted to the court in 2009.
They define what a correlated address is (and note, this passage, as well as other passages, do not limit correlations to telephone metadata — indeed, the use of “address” suggests correlations include Internet identifiers).
The analysis of SIGINT relies on many techniques to more fully understand the data. One technique commonly used is correlated selectors. A communications address, or selector, is considered correlated with other communications addresses when each additional address is shown to identify the same communicant as the original address.
They describe how the NSA establishes correlations via many means, but primarily through one particular database.
NSA obtained [redacted] correlations from a variety of sources to include Intelligence Community reporting, but the tool that the analysts authorized to query the BR FISA metadata primarily used to make correlations is called [redacted].
[redacted] — a database that holds correlations [redacted] between identifiers of interest, to include results from [redacted] was the primary means by which [redacted] correlated identifiers were used to query the BR FISA metadata.
They make clear that NSA treated all correlated identifiers as RAS approved so long as one identifier from that user was RAS approved.
In other words, if there: was a successful RAS determination made on any one of the selectors in the correlation, all were considered .AS-a. ,)roved for purposes of the query because they were all associated with the same [redacted] account
And they reveal that until February 6, 2009, this tool provided “automated correlation results to BR FISA-authorized analysts.” While the practice was shut down in February 2009, the filings make clear NSA intended to get the automated correlation functions working again,
While it’s unclear whether this screen capture describes the specific database named behind the redactions in the passages above, it appears to describe an at-least related process of identifying all the equivalent identities for a given target (in this case to conduct a hack, but it can be used for many applications).
If I’m right that the August 20, 2008 memo describes this correlations process, it means one of the things the government decided to withhold from EFF and ACLU (who joined Klayman as amici) after deciding to challenge Leon’s decision in a court with a precedent of recognizing a mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment was a document that shows the government creates a mosaic of all these dragnets.
It’s not just a phone dragnet (and it’s not just US collected phone records). It’s a domestic and internationally-collected phone and Internet and other metadata dragnet, and after that point, if it sucks you into that dragnet, it’s a financial record and other communications dragnet as well (for foreigners, I imagine, you get sucked in first, without an interim stage).
Even though both Janice Rogers Brown and David Sentelle voted to reconsider the mosaic theory in 2010, Sentelle’s questions seemed to reflect a real concern about it. Unsurprisingly, given that he authored a fairly important opinion in US v Quartavious Davis holding that the government needed a warrant to get stored cell site location data while he was out on loan to the 11th Circuit earlier this year, his questions focused on location.
Sentelle: What information if any is gathered about the physical location of wireless callers, if anything? Cell tower type information.
Thomas Byron: So Judge Sentelle, what is not included. Cell tower information is not included in this metadata and that’s made clear in the FISC orders. The courts have specified that it’s not included.
Note how Byron specified that “cell tower information is not included in this metadata”? Note how he also explains that the FISC has specified that CSLI is not included, without explaining that that’s only been true for 15 months (meaning that there may still be incidentally collected CSLI in the databases). Alternately, if the NSA gets cell location from the FBI’s PRTT program (my well-educated guess is that the FBI’s unexplained dragnet — the data from which it shares with the NSA — is a Stingray program), then that data would get analyzed along with the call records tied to the same phones, though it’s not clear that this location data would be available from the known but dated metadata access, which is known only to include Internet, and EO 12333 and BRFISA phone metadata).
Stephen Williams seemed even more concerned with the Maynard precedent, raising it specifically, and using it to express concern about the government stashing 5 years of phone records.
Williams: Does it make a significant difference that these data are collected for a five year period.
Byron’s response was particularly weak on this point, trying to claim that the government’s 90-day reauthorizations made the 5 years of data that would seem to be clearly unacceptable under Maynard (which found a problem with one week of GPS data) acceptable.
Byron: It’s not clear in the record of this case how much time the telephone companies keep the data but the point is that there’s a 90 day period during which the FISC orders are operative and require the telephone companies to turn over the information from their records to the government for purposes of this program. Now the government may retain it for five years but that’s not the same as asking whether the telephone company must keep it for five years.
Williams: How can we discard the five year period that the government keeps it?
Williams also, later, asked about what kind of identities are involved, which would also go to the heart of the way the government correlates identities (and should warrant questions about whether the government is obtaining Verizon’s supercookie).
Byron expressed incredible (as in, not credible) ignorance about how long the phone companies keep this data; only AT&T keeps its data that long. Meaning the government is hoarding records well beyond what users should have an expectation the third party in question would hoard the data, which ought to eliminate the third party justification by itself.
Janice Rogers Brown mostly seemed to want things to be easy, one bright line that cops could use to determine what they could and could not obtain. Still, she was the only one to raise the other kinds of data the government might obtain.
JRB: Does it matter to whom the record has been conveyed. For instance, medical records? That would be a third party’s record but could you draw the same line.
Byron: Judge Brown, I’m glad you mentioned this because it’s really important to recognize in the context of medical records just as in the context, by the way, of telephone records, wiretap provisions, etcetera, Congress has acted to protect privacy in all of these areas. For example, following the Miller case, Congress passed a statute governing the secrecy of bank records. Following the Smith case, Congress passed a statute governing wiretaps. HIPAA, in your example, Judge Brown, would govern the restrictions, would impose restrictions on the proper use of medical information. So too here, FISA imposes requirements that are then enforced by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. And those protections are essential to understanding the program and the very limited intrusion on any privacy interest.
While Byron had a number of very misleading answers, this probably aggravated me the most. After all, the protections that Congress created after the Miller case and the Smith case were secretly overridden by the FISC in 2008 and 2010, when it said limitations under FISA extended for NSLs could also be extended for 215 orders. And we have every reason the government could, if not has, obtained medical records if not actual DNA using a Section 215 order; I believe both would fall under a national security exception to HIPAA. Thus, whatever minimization procedures FISC might impose, it has, at the same time blown off precisely the guidelines imposed by Congress.
The point is, all three judges seemed to be thinking — to a greater or lesser extent — of this in light of the Maynard precedent, Williams particularly so. And yet because the government hid the most important useful evidence about how they use correlations (though admittedly the plaintiffs could have submitted the correlations data, especially in this circuit), the legal implications of this dragnet being tied to other phone and Internet dragnets and from there more generalized dragnets never got discussed.
Don’t get me wrong. Larry Klayman likely doomed this appeal in any case. On top of being overly dramatic (which I think the judges would have tolerated), he misstated at least two things. For example, he claimed violations reported at the NSA generally happened in this program alone. He didn’t need to do that. He could have noted that 3,000 people were dragnetted in 2009 without the legally required First Amendment review. He could have noted 3,000 files of phone dragnet data were not destroyed in timely fashion, apparently because techs were using the real data on a research server. The evidence to show this program has been — in the past at least — violative even of the FISC’s minimization requirements is available.
Klayman also claimed the government was collecting location data. He got caught, like a badly prepared school child, scrambling for the reference to location in Ed Felten’s declaration, which talked about trunk location rather than CSLI.
In substantive form, I don’t think those were worse than Byron’s bad evasions … just more painful.
All that said, all these judges — Williams in particular — seemed to want to think of this in terms of how it fit in a mosaic. On that basis, the phone dragnet should be even more unsustainable than it already is. And some of that evidence is in the public record, and should have been submitted into the record here.
Still, what may be the most important part of the record was probably withheld, by DOJ, after DOJ decided it was going to appeal in a circuit where that information would have been centrally important.
Update: See this post, which explains that I’m wrong about the timing of Verizon’s different approach to production than AT&T. And that difference precedes Verizon’s withdrawal from the FBI call record program in 2009 — it goes back to 2007.
I’m finally getting around to listening to the Klayman v. Obama hearing from the other day, which you can listen to here. I’ll have more to say on it later. But my impression is that — because of the incomplete reporting of a bunch of NSA beat reporters — Klayman may be improperly thrown out on standing because he is only a Verizon cell customer, not a Verizon landline customer.
Back on June 14, 2013, the WSJ reported that Verizon Wireless and T-Mobile don’t turn over records under the phone dragnet, but that the government obtains those records anyway as they travel across the domestic backbone, largely owned by AT&T and Verizon Business Services.
The National Security Agency’s controversial data program, which seeks to stockpile records on all calls made in the U.S., doesn’t collect information directly from T-Mobile USA and Verizon Wireless, in part because of their foreign ownership ties, people familiar with the matter said.
The blind spot for U.S. intelligence is relatively small, according to a U.S. official. Officials believe they can still capture information, or metadata, on 99% of U.S. phone traffic because nearly all calls eventually travel over networks owned by U.S. companies that work with the NSA.
Much of the U.S.’s telecom backbone is owned by two companies: AT&T and Verizon Business Network Services Inc., a U.S. subsidiary of Verizon Communications that it views as a separate network from its mobile business. It was the Verizon subsidiary that was named in the FISA warrant leaked by NSA contractor Edward Snowden to the Guardian newspaper and revealed last week.
When a T-Mobile or Verizon Wireless call is made, it often must travel over one of these networks, requiring the carrier to pay the cable owner. The information related to that transaction—such as the phone numbers involved and length of call—is recorded and can then be passed to the NSA through its existing relationships.
Then, on February 7, 2014, the WSJ (and 3 other outlets) reported something entirely different — that the phone dragnet only collects around 20% of phone records (others reported the number to be a higher amount).
The National Security Agency’s collection of phone data, at the center of the controversy over U.S. surveillance operations, gathers information from about 20% or less of all U.S. calls—much less than previously thought, according to people familiar with the NSA program.
The program had been described as collecting records on almost every phone call placed in the U.S. But, in fact, it doesn’t collect records for most cellphones, the fastest-growing sector in telephony and an area where the agency has struggled to keep pace, the people said.
Over the course of 8 months, the WSJ’s own claim went from the government collecting 99% of phone data (defined as telephony) to the government collecting 20% (probably defining “call data” broadly to include VOIP), without offering an explanation of what changed. And it was not just its own earlier reporting with which WSJ conflicted; aspects of it also conflicted with a lot of publicly released primary documents about what the program has done in the past. Nevertheless, there was remarkably little interest in explaining the discrepancy.
I’m getting a lot closer to being able to explain the discrepancy in WSJ’s reporting. And if I’m right, then Larry Klayman should have standing (though I’m less certain about Anna Smith, who is appealing a suit in the 9th Circuit).
fairly certain (let me caveat: I think this is the underlying dynamic; the question is the timing) the discrepancy arises from the fact that, for the first time ever, on July 19, 2013 (a month after the WSJ’s first report) the FISA Court explicitly prohibited the collection of Cell Site Location Information.
Furthermore, this Order does not authorize the production of cell site location information (CSLI).
We’ve learned several details since February that puts this in context.
First, the NSL IG Report revealed that one of the three providers who had been part of FBI’s onsite call records access from 2003 to 2006 did not renew the contract for that program in 2009.
Company A, Company B, and Company C are the three telephone carriers described in our Exigent Letters Report that provided telephone records to the TCAU in response to exigent letters and other informal requests between 2003 and 2006. As described in our Exigent Letters Report, the FBI entered into contracts with these carriers in 2003 and 2004, which required that the communication service providers place their employees in the TCAU’s office space and give these employees access to their companies’ databases so they could immediately service FBI requests for telephone records. Exigent Letters Report, 20. As described in the next chapter, TCAU no longer shares office space with the telephone providers. Companies A and C continue to serve FBI requests for telephone records and provide the records electronically to the TCAU. Company B did not renew its contract with the FBI in 2009 and is no longer providing telephone records directly to the TCAU. Company B continues to provide telephone records in response to NSL requests issued directly by the field without TCAU’s assistance.
The original WSJ, in retrospect, makes it fairly clear that Company B is Verizon (though I believe it provides the wrong explanation otherwise for Verizon’s inability to provide records, that it was partly foreign owned–though admittedly it only claims to be providing part of the explanation).
Unlike Sprint and AT&T, [Verizon Wireless and T-Mobile] also don’t perform classified work for the government. Such contracts require secure facilities that make cooperating with NSA programs simpler, people familiar with the matter said.
Verizon Associate General Counsel Michael Woods’ response to questions at a hearing earlier this year made it even more clear. He said that Verizon does not keep call detail records — as distinct from billing records — long at all (and they only keep billing records on the landline side for 18 months).
The contract with TCAU, the NSL IG Report (and the earlier Exigent Letters report) makes clear, would require providers to keep records for longer to facilitate some bells and whistles. That’s a big part of what the “make cooperating with NSA programs simpler” is likely about. Therefore, Verizon must be the provider that stopped retaining records in 2009 for the purpose of the government (It also just so happens to be the provider that doesn’t need the government cash as part of its business model). I suspect that TCAU remains closely related to Hemisphere, which may be why when I asked FBI about its participation in that unclassified project, FBI refused to comment at all.
If all that’s right, then AT&T and Sprint retain their call detail records because they have signed a contract with the government to do so. Verizon does not.
That means, at least since 2009, Verizon has been relying on actual call detail records to fulfill its obligations under Section 215, not a database that makes it easier to pull out precisely what the government wants (indeed, I suspect the end of the contract created the problems where Verizon was providing entirely foreign calls along with its domestic calls starting with the May 29, 2009 order). The business records that Verizon had on hand was a CDR that, in the case of cell phones, necessarily included CSLI.
Verizon is still (the Verizon-specific language remains in the dragnet orders, and they challenged the first order after Leon’s decision in this case) providing records of landline calls that traverse its backbone.
But when FISC made it a violation — rather than just overproduction they otherwise would have and have, in both this and other programs, approved — to provide CSLI, and made that public, it gave Verizon the opportunity to say it had no way to provide the cell data legally.
That’s sort of what the later WSJ report says, though it doesn’t explain why this would be limited in time or why NSA would have a problem when it collects CDRs internationally with CSLI with no problem.
Moreover, the NSA has been stymied by how to remove location data—which it isn’t allowed to collect without getting additional court approval—from U.S. cellphone records collected in bulk, a U.S. official said.
I’m not sure whether it’s the case that Verizon couldn’t very easily pull that CSLI off or not. But I do suspect — particularly for a program that offers no compensation — that Verizon no longer had a legal obligation to. (This probably answers, by the way, how AT&T and Sprint are getting paid here: they’re being paid to keep their CDRs under the old TCAU contracts with the FBI.)
The government repeats over and over that they’re only getting business records the companies already have. Verizon has made it clear it doesn’t have cell call detail records without the location attached. And therefore, I suspect, the government lost its ability to make Verizon comply. That is also why, I suspect, the President claims he needs new legislation to make this happen: because he needs language forcing the providers to provide the CDRs in the form the government wants it in.
If I’m right, though — that the government had 99% coverage of telephony until Claire Eagan specifically excluded cell location — then Klayman should have standing. That’s because Richard Leon’s injunction not only prohibited the government from collecting any new records from Klayman, he also required the government to “destroy any such metadata in its possession that was collected through the bulk collection program.”
Assuming Verizon just stopped providing cell data in 2013 pursuant to Eagan’s order, then there would still be over 3 years of call records in the government’s possession available for search. Which would mean he would still be exposed to the government’s improper querying of his records.
It is certainly possible that Verizon stopped providing cell data once it ended its TCAU contact in 2009. If that’s the case, the government’s hasty destruction of call records in March would probably have eliminated the last of the data it had on Klayman (though not on ACLU, since ACLU is a landline customer as well as a wireless customer).
But if Verizon just stopped handing over cell records in 2013 after Claire Eagan made it impossible for the government to force Verizon to comply with such orders, then Klayman — and everyone else whose records transited Verizon’s backbone — should still have standing.
Update: I provided this further explanation to someone via email.
I should have said this more clearly in the post. But the only way everyone is correct: including WSJ in June, Claire Eagan’s invocation of “substantially all” in July, the PRG’s claims they weren’t getting as much as thought in December, and WSJ’s claims they weren’t much at all in February, is if Verizon shut down cell collection sometime during that period. The July order and the aftermath would explain that.
As I noted earlier, I think the re-release of Jack Goldsmith’s May 6, 2004 OLC memo authorizing Stellar Wind is meant to warn Congress that the Executive does not believe it needs any Congressional authorization to spy on every American — just in time for the USA Freedom Act debate in the Senate. This is exactly parallel to similar provocations during the Protect America Act debate. In the past, such provocations led Congress to capitulate to Executive branch demands to tailor the program to their wishes.
That earlier post, however, implied that this warning pertains primarily to the phone dragnet.
It doesn’t. The warning also applies to the Internet dragnet (and I suspect that stories about the heroic hospital heroes shutting down the Internet dragnet have been dramatically overblown).
One of the very few things — aside from the name STELLAR WIND, over and over, as well as references to content collection that could have been released after President Bush admitted to that part of the program in 2005, and the title Secretary of Defense — that has been newly revealed is this bit of the Table of Contents (here’s the previous release for comparison).
It shows that the memo discusses content, discusses telephony metadata, discusses something else, then concludes that content and metadata are both kosher under the Fourth Amendment. That already makes it clear that part IV is about metadata. The last sentence of the first full paragraph on page 19 does, too. Page 7 makes it clear that Fourth Amendment analysis applies to “both telephony and e-mail.” Much later in the memo, it becomes clear this section — pages 96 to 100 — deals with Internet metadata.
In fact, the only substantive newly unredacted parts of the memo appear on 101 (PDF 69) and then from 106 to 108.
All of this new information makes it clear that Goldsmith asserted that Smith v. Maryland applied for metadata — and applied to both phone and Internet metadata. Remarkably, in that analysis, the government keeps at least one paragraph addressing phone metadata hidden, but reveals the analysis at 106-7 (PDF 74-75) that applies to Internet. (Goldsmith’s claim that Internet users can get providers to turn off spam, at the bottom of 107, is particularly nice.)
In perhaps the most interesting newly released passage (out of the roughly 5 pages that got newly released!), Goldsmith absolves himself of examining what procedures the government was using in its “metadata” collection.
As for meta data collection, as explained below, we conclude that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the interception of the routing information for both telephone calls and e-mails does not implicate any Fourth Amendment interests.85
85 Although this memorandum evaluates the STELLAR WIND program under the Fourth Amendment, we do not here analyze the specific procedures followed by the NSA in implementing the program. (101/PDF 69)
I find this utterly damning, given that we know that, for the following 5 years, the government would lie to FISC about whether their “metadata” contained content. Even the OLC opinion built in the Executive’s ability to collect content in the guise of metadata!
In any case, what is clear — again, just in time to impact the debate over USA Freedom, for which prospective call record collection might or might not be limited to telephone content — is that rather than legally shutting down the Internet dragnet in 2004, Jack Goldsmith authorized it.
And that authorization remains in place, telling the Executive it can collect Internet (and phone) “metadata” whether or not FISC or Congress rubberstamps it doing so. Not only that, but telling the Executive this analysis holds regardless of how inadequate their procedures are in implementing this program to ensure that no content gets swept up in the guise of metadata (which of course is precisely what occurred).
So the Administration, in releasing this “newly unredacted” memo did one thing. Tell Congress it will continue to collect phone and Internet “metadata” on its own terms, regardless of what Congress does.
Only one thing could alter this analysis of course: if the Courts decide that Smith v. Maryland doesn’t actually permit the government to collect all metadata, plus some content-as-metadata, in the country, if they say the Executive can’t actually collect “everything there is to know about everybody and have it all in one big government cloud,” as 2nd Circuit Judge Gerard Lynch described the implications of what we now know to be Goldsmith’s logic on Tuesday. But the courts are going to stop analyzing this question as soon as Congress passes USA Freedom Act. Moreover, the last check on the program — the unwillingness of providers to break the law — will be removed by the broad immunity provision included in the bill.
Not only didn’t Jack Goldsmith heroically legally shut down the Internet dragnet in 2004 (clearly President Bush did make several modifications; we just still don’t know what those are). But he provided a tool that is likely proving remarkably valuable as the Executive gets Congress and privacy NGOs to finish signing off on their broad authority.
The hospital heroes may have temporarily halted the conduct of the Internet dragnet — even while telling Colleen Kollar-Kotelly she had to rubber stamp ignoring the letter of the law because Congress couldn’t know about the dragnet — but they didn’t shut it down. Here it is, legally still operating, just in time to use as a cudgel with Congress.
Update: One other thing other reporting on this is missing — and not for the first time — is that whatever change they made to the Internet dragnet, it was by no means the only change after the hospital confrontation. They also took Iraqi targeting out (in some way). And there was a later April 2 modification that appears to have nothing to do with NSA at all (I have my theories about this, but they’re still theories). So it is too simple to say the hospital confrontation was exclusively about the Internet dragnet — the public record already makes clear that’s not the case.
Well into today’s argument over ACLU v. Clapper, the ACLU’s challenge to the government’s phone dragnet, one of the judges — Robert Sack — pointed out the discussion we’re having all stems from documents the government was forced to release after the Edward Snowden leaks.
It was itself telling — not least because DOJ Civil Division AAG Stuart Delery at times proclaimed not to know the answers to the questions the judges posed, questions I know the answer to. For example, Delery claimed, at first, not to know of instances when the FISA Court ruled more harshly than the government; and when he ultimately did admit to those instances, he didn’t admit that some of them involved systematic abuses. He also dodged questions about whether the government could get financial records, which we know they do (and James Cole has testified they could).
It was all the more telling, however, given that two of the judges on the panel — Gerard Lynch and Sack — had ruled against the government in Amnesty v. Clapper, ACLU’s challenge to the Section 702 program. As you’ll recall, to get SCOTUS to overturn that ruling, DOJ lied to the Supreme Court about what kind of notice it gave to defendants under Section 702. Snowden’s leaks led to a change in DOJ’s notice policy to actually come closer — but not actually match –what DOJ had claimed before SCOTUS (they’re still not giving notice to all defendants). At one point, Lynch said something like, “We weren’t as familiar [with 702] as the Supreme Court thought we should have been.”
These judges have reason to be skeptical about DOJ’s claims about their own surveillance programs. Which is probably why Sack asked (after 1:36), “That’s what you’ve let us know. What else haven’t you let us know?”
Much of the hearing went like I expected. ACLU’s Alex Abdo argued both that the court has the authority to overturn the dragnet based on statutory grounds, but also that it’s not reasonable and therefore constitutional. He used Obama’s decision to change the program to argue that the Administration recognizes that the program, as currently constituted, is not reasonable. To support an argument the program is reasonable, DOJ’s Delery claimed Congress had ratified it by reauthorizing it twice. On rebuttal, Abdo noted that Congress had never seen the legal basis (because there was none, until 2013) before they allegedly “ratified” the program.
Delery’s arguments were even weaker than I had expected. He argued that the courts can’t intrude here because the political branches had worked out reasonable limits for this program, pointing to the minimization procedures required by the statute. Except that — as he admitted later — the FISA Court had largely influenced the minimization procedures for the program. If a Court set the minimization procedures that make it reasonable, then can’t a court rule on whether that’s a proper balance?
Not to mention, the statute only requires FBI have minimization procedures, not NSA, so the minimization procedures in the statute are proof the government is actually using the statute with an agency Congress did not envision using it.
Abdo returned to the centrality of minimization procedures in his closing words. He noted that if, as the government claims, Section 215 is authorized by Smith v. Maryland, then, minimization procedures are constitutionally superfluous.
The minimization procedures that the government relies on would be constitutionally superfluous if Smith governed this case. They could collect the records without any of those protections in place. They could store all of them indefinitely. They could query them for any reason or no reason at all. And they could build the dossiers that they disclaim building in this case with no constitutional restrictions. A final point is that the government tries to explain why it’s only asking for a narrow ruling from this court. But the legal theories that it advances are a roadmap to a world in which the government routinely collects vast quantities of information about Americans who have done absolutely nothing wrong. I don’t think that’s the world that Congress envisioned when it enacted Section 215. And it’s certainly not the world that the framers envisioned when they crafted the Fourth Amendment.
But that would bring us to the scenario laid out by Judge Lynch (see from 59:00 to 1:06:50), in which the government could get anything held by a third party about everyone just because it could. The same argument applies to bank records and credit card records, Lynch walked Delery through the implications patiently.
… You can collect everything there is to know about everybody and have it all in one big government cloud.
I just don’t understand an argument as to what’s so special about telephone records that makes them so valuable, so uniquely interactive or whatever, that the same arguments you’re making don’t apply to every record in the hands of a third party business entity of every American’s everything.
As far as we know, the government has already done this with financial records, in part under Section 215, which is one of the reasons Obama won’t back off this challenge; even under USA Freedom, the government can continue to obtain Western Union’s records. Add in the EO 12333 collections, and the government is well on its way to the nightmarish scenario both Lynch and Abdo laid out.
In any case, Judge Lynch (more likely his clerks) seems to have done his homework. He seems to have a sense not only where this could go, but where it already has. And while he repeatedly talked about narrow rulings — if I had to guess, I think he might prefer to rule the “relevant” interpretation Bates-stamped by the FISA Court unconstitutional than ruling the entire program so — he gets that this program is a constitutional atrocity.
The question is whether he can write a ruling that will withstand SCOTUS review, this time.
Update: According to the DOJ IG NSL Report released today, the rise in number of Section 215 orders stems from some Internet companies refusing to provide certain data via NSL; FBI has been using Section 215 instead. However they’re receiving it now, Internet companies, like telephone companies, should not be subject to bulk orders as they are explicitly exempted.
WaPo’s MonkeysCage blog just posted a response I did to a debate between H.L. Pohlman and Gabe Rottman over whether Patrick Leahy’s USA Freedom includes a big “backdoor” way to get call records. The short version: the bill would prevent bulk — but not bulky — call record collection. But it may do nothing to end existing programs, such as the reported collection of Western Union records.
In the interest of showing my work, he’s a far more detailed version of that post.
Leahy’s Freedom still permits phone record collection under the existing authority
Pohlman argues correctly that the bill specifically permits the government to get phone records under the existing authority. So long as it does so in a manner different from the Call Detail Record newly created in the bill, it can continue to do so under the more lenient business records provision.
To wit: the text “carves out” the government’s authority to obtain telephone metadata from its more general authority to obtain “tangible things” under the PATRIOT Act’s so-called business records provision. This matters because only phone records that fit within the specific language of the “carve out” are subject to the above restrictions on the government’s collection authority. Those restrictions apply only “in the case of an application for the production on a daily basis of call detail records created before, on, or after the date of the application relating to an authorized investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism.”
This means that if the government applies for a production order of phone records on a weekly basis, rather than on a “daily basis,” then it is falls outside the restrictions. If the application is for phone records created “before, on, [and] after” (instead of “or after”) the date of the application, ditto. If the investigation is not one of international terrorism, ditto.
However, neither Pohlman nor Rottman mention the one limitation that got added to USA Freedumber in Leahy’s version which should prohibit the kind of bulk access to phone records that currently goes on.
Leahy Freedom prohibits the existing program with limits on electronic service providers
The definition of Specific Selection Term “does not include a term that does not narrowly limit the scope of the tangible things … such as–… a term identifying an electronic communication service provider … when not used as part of a specific identifier … unless the provider is itself a subject of an authorized investigation for which the specific selection term is used as the basis of production.”
In other words, the only way the NSA can demand all of Verizon’s call detail records, as they currently do, is if they’re investigating Verizon. They can certainly require Verizon and every other telecom to turn over calls two degrees away from, say, Julian Assange, as part of a counterintelligence investigation. But that language pertaining to electronic communication service provider would seem to prevent the NSA from getting everything from a particular provider, as they currently do.
So I think Rottman’s largely correct, though not for the reasons he lays out, that Leahy’s Freedom has closed the back door to continuing the comprehensive phone dragnet under current language.
But that doesn’t mean it has closed a bunch of other loopholes Rottman claims have been closed.
FISC has already dismissed PCLOB (CNSS) analysis on prospective collection
For example, Rottman points to language in PCLOB’s report on Section 215 stating that the statutory language of Section 215 doesn’t support prospective collection. I happen to agree with PCLOB’s analysis, and made some of the same observations when the phone dragnet order was first released. More importantly, the Center for National Security Studies made the argument in an April amicus brief to the FISC. But in an opinion released with the most recent phone dragnet order, Judge James Zagel dismissed CNSS’ brief (though, in the manner of shitty FISC opinions, without actually engaging the issue).
In other words, while I absolutely agree with Rottman’s and PCLOB’s and CNSS’ point, FISC has already rejected that argument. Nothing about passage of the Leahy Freedom would change that analysis, as nothing in that part of the statute would change. FISC has already ruled that objections to the prospective use of Section 215 fail.
Minimization procedures may not even protect bulky business collection as well as status quo
Then Rottman mischaracterizes the limits added to specific selection term in the bill, and suggests the government wouldn’t bother with bulky collection because it would be costly.
The USA Freedom Act would require the government to present a phone number, name, account number or other specific search term before getting the records—an important protection that does not exist under current law. If government attorneys were to try to seek records based on a broader search term—say all Fedex tracking numbers on a given day—the government would have to subsequently go through all of the information collected, piece by piece, and destroy any irrelevant data. The costs imposed by this new process would create an incentive to use Section 215 judiciously.
As I pointed out in this post, those aren’t the terms permitted in Leahy Freedom. Rather, it permits the use of “a person, account, address, or personal device, or another specific identifier.” Not a “name” but a “person,” which in contradistinction from the language in the CDR provision — which replaces “person” with “individual” — almost certainly is intended to include “corporate persons” among acceptable SSTs for traditional Section 215 production.
Like Fedex. Or Western Union, which several news outlets have reported turns over its records under Section 215 orders.
FISC already imposes minimization procedures on most of its orders
Rottman’s trust that minimization procedures will newly restrain bulky collection is even more misplaced. That’s because, since 2009, FISC has been imposing minimization procedures on Section 215 collection with increasing frequency; the practice grew in tandem with greatly expanded use of Section 215 for uses other than the phone dragnet.
While most of the minimization procedure orders in 2009 were likely known orders fixing the phone dragnet violations, the Attorney General reports covering 2010 and 2011 make it clear in those years FISC modified increasing percentages of orders by imposing minimization requirements and required a report on compliance with them
The FISC modified the proposed orders submitted with forty-three such applications in 2010 (primarily requiring the Government to submit reports describing implementation of applicable minimization procedures).
The FISC modified the proposed orders submitted with 176 such applications in 2011 (requiring the Government to submit reports describing implementation of applicable minimization procedures).
The ACLU and EFF normally do great work defending the Fourth Amendment. Both have fought the government’s expansive spying for years. Both have fought hard to require the government obtain a warrant before accessing your computer, cell phone, and location data.
But earlier this week, they may have taken action that directly undermines that good work.
On Wednesday, both civil liberties organizations joined in a letter supporting Patrick Leahy’s version of USA Freedom Act, calling it a necessary first step.
We support S. 2685 as an important first step toward necessary comprehensive surveillance reform. We urge the Senate and the House to pass it quickly, and without
making any amendments that would weaken the important changes described above.
ACLU’s Laura Murphy explained why ACLU signed onto the bill in a column at Politico, analogizing it to when, in 2010, ACLU signed onto a bill that lowered, but did not eliminate, disparities in crack sentencing.
Reform advocates were at a crossroads. Maximalists urged opposition despite the fact the bill would, in a very real way, make life better for thousands of people and begin to reduce the severe racial and ethnic inequality in our prison system. Pragmatists, fearing that opposition to the bill would preclude any reform at all, urged support.
It was a painful compromise, but the ACLU ultimately supported the bill. It passed, astoundingly, with overwhelming support in both chambers.
And then something amazing happened. Conservative lawmakers, concerned about government waste, increasingly came to the table to support criminal justice reform. Liberals realized they could vote their conscience on criminal justice without accusations of being “soft on crime.” It has not been easy and there have been many steps backward, but in recent years, we’ve seen greater public opposition to mandatory minimum sentences and real movement on things like reducing penalties for low-level drug offenses.
The analogy is inapt. You don’t end crack disparities by increasing the number of coke dealers in jail. But Leahy’s USA Freedom Act almost certainly will increase the number of totally innocent Americans who will be subjected to the full brunt of NSA’s analytical authorities indefinitely.
That’s because by outsourcing to telecoms, NSA will actually increase the total percentage of Americans’ telephone records that get chained on; sources say it will be more “comprehensive” than the current dragnet and Deputy NSA Director Richard Ledgett agrees the “the actual universe of potential calls that could be queried against is [potentially] dramatically larger.” In addition, the telecoms are unlikely to be able to remove all the noisy numbers like pizza joints — as NSA currently claims to — meaning more people with completely accidental phone ties to suspects will get sucked in. And USA Freedom adopts a standard for data retention — foreign intelligence purpose — that has proven meaningless in the past, so once a person’s phone number gets turned over to the NSA, they’ll be fair game for further NSA spying, the really invasive stuff, indefinitely.
But that’s not the reason I find ACLU and EFF’s early support for USA Freedom so astounding.
I’m shocked ACLU and EFF are supporting this bill because they don’t know what the NSA will be permitted to do at the immunized telecoms. They have blindly signed onto a bill permitting “connection chaining” without first understanding what connection chaining entails.
As I have reported extensively, while every witness who has talked about the phone dragnet has talked about chaining on phone calls made — all the calls Anwar al-Awlaki made, all the calls those people made — the language describing this chaining process has actually been evolving. Dianne Feinstein’s Fake FISA Fix last fall allowed the NSA to chain on actual calls — as witnesses had described — but also on communications (not just calls) “to or from any selector reasonably linked to the selector.” A February modification and the last two dragnet orders permitted NSA to chain on identifiers “with a contact and/or connection” with the seed, making it clear that a “connection” is something different than a “contact.” The House bill USA Freedumber adopted the same language in a legislative report. Leahy’s bill adopts largely the same language for chaining.
(iii) provide that the Government may require the prompt production of call detail records—
(I) using the specific selection term that satisfies the standard required under subsection (b)(2)(C)(ii) as the basis for production; and
(II) using call detail records with a direct connection to such specific selection term as the basis for production of a second set of call detail records;
Now, it’s possible that this language does nothing more than what NSA illegally did until 2009: chain on both the identifier itself, but also on identifiers it has determined to be the same person. Back in 2009, NSA referred to a separate database to determine these other identifiers. Though that’s unlikely, because the bill language suggests the telecoms will be identifying these direct connections.
It’s possible, too, that this language only permits the telecoms to find “burner” phones — a new phone someone adopts after having disposed of an earlier one — and chain on that too.
But it’s also possible that this language would permit precisely what AT&T does for DEA in its directly analogous Hemisphere program: conduct analysis using cell site data. The bill does not permit NSA to receive cell site data, but it does nothing to prohibit NSA from receiving phone numbers identified using cell site data. When Mark Warner asked about this, Ledgett did not answer, and James Cole admitted they could use these orders (with FISC approval) to get access to cell location.
It’s possible, too, that the telecoms will identify direct connections using other data we know NSA uses to identify connections in EO 12333 data, including phone book and calendar data.
The point is, nobody in the public knows what “connections” NSA will be asking its immunized telecom partners to make. And nothing in the bill or even the public record prohibits NSA from asking telecoms to use a range of smart phone information to conduct their analysis, so long as they only give NSA phone identifiers as a result.
In response to questions from Senators about what this means, Leahy’s office promised a letter from James Clapper’s office clarifying what “connections” means (No, I don’t remember the part of Schoolhouse Rock where those regulated by laws get to provide “clarifications” that don’t make it into the laws themselves). That letter was reported to be due on Tuesday, by close of business — several days ago. It hasn’t appeared yet.
I asked people at both EFF and ACLU about this problem. EFF admitted they don’t know what this language means. ACLU calls the language “ambiguous,” but based on nothing they were able to convey to me, insists getting smart phone data under the guise of connection chaining would be an abuse. ACLU also pointed to transparency provisions in the bill, claiming that would alert us if the NSA starting doing something funky with its connection language; that of course ignores that “connection chaining” is an already-approved process, meaning that existing processes won’t ever be need to be released. It also ignores that the Administration has withheld what is probably a directly relevant phone dragnet opinion from both ACLU and EFF in their dragnet FOIA.
I get Laura Murphy’s point about using USA Freedom to start the process of reform. But what I don’t understand is why you’d do that having absolutely no idea whether that “reform” codifies the kind of warrantless probable cause-free access to device data that ACLU and EFF have fought so hard to prevent elsewhere.
ACLU and EFF are supposed to be leaders in protecting the privacy of our devices, including smart phones. I worry with their embrace of this bill, they’re leading NSA right into our smart phones.
The ACLU is suing the Federal Government for the standards it uses in Suspicious Activity Reports, which can record completely innocent actions. A lot of people are citing James Prigoff — an 86-year old photographer and retired business executive, who got tracked to his Sacramento, CA home for taking a picture of a well-known Boston landmark.
But given the denials about the tracking of Muslims in response to the Intercept story on NSA’s surveillance of 5 Muslim leaders, the SAR complaint of of Wiley Gill, a convert to Islam, deserves as much attention.
Gill describes how the cops in Chico, CA, had been tracking him both online and at the local mosque, when they invented the pretense of a domestic violence complaint to search his home without a warrant. They found something on video games loaded on his computer and deemed it a flight simulator.
The SAR was created on or about May 23, 2012, and purports to document an encounter between Mr. Gill and the Chico Police Department (“CPD”) on or about May 20, 2012. The SAR states that a CPD officer was investigating a domestic violence incident and believed the suspect may have fled into Mr. Gill’s residence. The SAR states that this was later discovered to be unfounded. It acknowledges that the CPD officer searched Mr. Gill’s home. The SAR asserts that Mr. Gill’s computer displayed a screen titled something to the effect of “Games that fly under the radar,” which appeared to be a “flight simulator type of game.” The SAR concludes by describing Mr. Gill’s “full conversion to Islam as a young WMA [white, male adult],” “pious demeanor,” and “potential access to flight simulators via the internet” as “worthy of note.”
Admittedly, the bias inherent to Gill’s SAR came from local cops, not the FBI or NSA. But I’d be willing to bet it responded to alerts (FBI and DHS both release them) about white converts to Islam.
The Intercept story, remember, described an internal document referring to targets as “Mohammed Raghead.” NSA has disclaimed any tie to that — even more aggressively than FBI did its own totally racist documents.
And while I presume whatever alerts to local cops led them to track Gill’s non-suspicious behavior said nothing explicitly racist, at some point the system reinforces a system under which Muslims get tracked, and others do not.
Remember “the wall” that used to separate intelligence from criminal investigations and was used as an excuse for intelligence agencies not sharing intelligence they were permitted to share before 9/11?
It was demolished in 2001 — when the PATRIOT Act explicitly permitted what had been permitted before, sharing of intelligence information with the FBI — and 2002 — when the FISA Court of Review overruled presiding FISA Judge Royce Lamberth’s efforts to sustain some Fourth Amendment protections in criminal investigations using minimization procedures.
Nevertheless, the specter of a wall that didn’t prevent the Intelligence Committee from discovering 9/11 rising again is one of the things lying behind PCLOB’s weak recommendations on back door searches in its report on Section 702.
Of particular note, that’s what the Center for Democracy and Technology’s James Dempsey cites in his squishy middle ground recommendation on back door searches.
It is imperative not to re-erect the wall limiting discovery and use of information vital to the national security, and nothing in the Board’s recommendations would do so. The constitutionality of the Section 702 program is based on the premise that there are limits on the retention, use and dissemination of the communications of U.S. persons collected under the program. The proper mix of limitations that would keep the program within constitutional bounds and acceptable to the American public may vary from agency to agency and under different circumstances. The discussion of queries and uses at the FBI in this Report is based on our understanding of current practices associated with the FBI’s receipt and use of Section 702 data. The evolution of those practices may merit a different balancing. For now, the use or dissemination of Section 702 data by the FBI for non-national security matters is apparently largely, if not entirely, hypothetical. The possibility, however, should be addressed before the question arises in a moment of perceived urgency. Any number of possible structures would provide heightened protection of U.S. persons consistent with the imperative to discover and use critical national security information already in the hands of the government.546
546 See Presidential Policy Directive — Signals Intelligence Activities, Policy Directive 28, 2014 WL 187435, § 2, (Jan. 17, 2014) (limiting the use of signals intelligence collected in bulk to certain enumerated purposes), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities. [my emphasis]
Dempsey situates his comments in the context of the “wall.” He then suggests there are two possible uses of back door searches: “national security matters,” and non-national security matters, with the latter being entirely hypothetical, according to what the FBI self-reported to PCLOB.
Thus, he’s mostly thinking in terms of “possible structures [that] would provide heightened protection of US. persons,” to stave off future problems. He points to President Obama’s PPD-28 as one possibility as a model.
But PPD-28 is laughably inapt! Not only does the passage in question address “bulk collection,” which according to the definition Obama uses and PCLOB has adopted has nothing to do with Section 702. “[T]he Board does not regard Section 702 as a ‘bulk’ collection program,” PCLOB wrote at multiple points in its report.
More troubling, the passage in PPD-28 Dempsey cites permits bulk collection for the following uses:
(1) espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services against the United States and its interests;
(2) threats to the United States and its interests from terrorism;
(3) threats to the United States and its interests from the development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction;
(4) cybersecurity threats;
(5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces or other U.S or allied personnel;
(6) transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to the other purposes named in this section;
Ultimately, this represents — or should — an expansion of permissible use of Section 702 data, because its discussion of terrorism and cybersecurity do not distinguish between those with an international nexus and those without. And the discussion of transnational crime might subject any petty drug dealer selling dope from Mexico to foreign intelligence treatment.
That this is what passes for the mushy middle on PCLOB is especially curious given that Dempsey was one of the first PCLOB member to express concern about back door searches. He did so in November’s Section 215 hearing, and even suggested limiting back door searches to foreign intelligence purposes (which is not the standard for FBI, in any case) was inadequate. Nevertheless, in last week’s report, he backed only very weak protections for back door searches, and did so within the context of national security versus non-national security, and not intelligence versus crime.
Now, I don’t mean to pick on Dempsey exclusively — I’ll have a few more posts on this issue. And to be clear, Dempsey does not represent CDT at PCLOB; he’s there in his private capacity.
But I raised his affiliation with CDT because in that capacity, Dempsey was part of an amicus brief, along with representatives from ACLU, Center for National Security Studies, EPIC, and EFF, submitted in the In Re Sealed Case in 2002, in which the FISA Court of Review reversed Lamberth and permitted prosecutor involvement in FISA warrants. That brief strongly rebuts the kind of argument he adopted in last week’s PCLOB report.