Sheldon Whitehouse: Cybertheft Is [May Be] Biggest Transfer of Wealth in History

In an attempt to scare Congress into passing the cybersecurity legislation they failed to pass last year, Sheldon Whitehouse scheduled a hearing on cybersecurity today. In the hearing — and in this op-ed he penned with Lindsey Graham — he repeated a claim he has made before: cybertheft may be the biggest “illicit” transfer of wealth in history.

Almost every facet of American life is threatened when intruders exploit our cyber-vulnerabilities. And the risk is not from China alone. Foreign governments such as Iran and terrorist groups such as al-Qaida seek to worm into national infrastructure and threaten catastrophe here at home. Foreign agents raid companies, stealing plans, formulas and designs. Foreign criminal networks take money out of banks, defraud consumers with scams and sell illicit goods and products, cheating U.S. manufacturers. It may be the greatest illicit transfer of wealth in history. [my emphasis]

I think in the hearing itself, Whitehouse wasn’t as careful to always use that word “might.”

The greatest illicit transfer of wealth in history.

Don’t get me wrong: cyberattacks of all sorts are a real threat. They cost consumers a great deal of inconvenience and, at times, lots of money. They cost defense contractors far more (though of course, some of that is built into our model of defense). They cost sloppy companies as well.

But the biggest illicit transfer of wealth in history?

Ignore recent unpunished giant transfers of wealth in the wake of the financial crisis, which the Senate Judiciary Committee has largely ignored.

I guess the reason I find this so stunning is all the obviously huge transfers of wealth it ignores that were part of slavery and colonization.

Were those licit?

Those were, like Chinese or Iranian or Russian cyberattacks on the US, examples of states (and private entities) taking advantage of vulnerabilities elsewhere. They were certainly considered legitimate at the time, because Europeans got to write the history of colonization, and because they made up claptrap about “civilization” to justify it. But from a distance they look more like the kind of exploitation states often engage in if they’ve got an obvious advantage over another state or organization.

All that’s not to say Montezuma shouldn’t have resisted the Spaniards. That’s not to say we shouldn’t defend against cyberattacks.

But what really makes the US so vulnerable to cyberattacks are 1) that we’re so reliant on the Internet and 2) we’re so reliant on intellectual property (indeed, the very claim that cybertheft is the biggest transfer of wealth relies on a certain understanding of IP as wealth that itself depends on a legal infrastructure that is contingent on our relative world power). And also that so much of our critical infrastructure and IP holders are in private hands and therefore much harder to demand diligence from. That is, our vulnerability to cyberattacks is in part a fragility of our own bases for power (a vulnerability that will probably end up being less lethal than the fact that the immune systems of indigenous peoples hadn’t been exposed to European diseases).

Also, this entire discussion — which danced around the question of an international regime that might limit such attacks — completely ignored the StuxNet attack, the fact that a nation as vulnerable as we are pushed the limits of the offensive capability first. One of the witnesses (I think FBI Assistant Director Jonathan Demarast) even suggested that if our government were chartered to attack the private sector (cough, Echelon) of other countries we’d be damn good at it too — as if our attacks on the public infrastructure of Iran doesn’t count.

I get the value of a good fear campaign (I wish Whitehouse would fearmonger more in his regular addresses on climate change). But there’s fearmongering and there’s absurdity. And I think suggesting that cybertheft is worse than the stealing of entire continents is the latter.


Dick Durbin: The Targeted Killing Memo Is Like the Torture and Illegal Wiretap Memos

It took transcribing the debate in the July 19 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing for me to realize it, but Democrats are running very serious interference to keep the Anwar al-Awlaki targeted killing memo secret. Not only did Dianne Feinstein basically roll John Cornyn, telling him she’d introduce language that would accomplish his goal of getting all the oversight committees the memo when, if hers passes, it will only, maybe, get the Intelligence Committee the memo.  Not only did the Democrats vote on a party line vote to table John Cornyn’s amendment to require the Administration to share it–in classified or unclassified form–with the Judiciary and Armed Services Committees. Not only did Pat Leahy get pretty snippy with Cornyn for offering–and asking to speak on–the Amendment.

Most stunning, though, is Dick Durbin’s comment on it.

Durbin: Thank you Mr. Chairman. My staff briefed me of this on the way in, and I asked the basic question, “would I ask this of a Republican President? Of course. And I did ask it, in a different context, of the previous President, when it came to questions of interrogation, torture, and surveillance. I might say to the Senator from Texas I had no support from the other side of the table when I made that request. But I do believe it is a valid inquiry and I would join the Senator from Texas and any who wish in sending a letter to the Attorney General asking for this specific information on a bipartisan basis. And certainly we can raise it the next time the Attorney General appears before us. I do have to say that I’m going to vote to table because I think that as flawed as this [the FAA extension] may be without the Lee Amendment which I think would help it, I do believe we need to pass this and  bringing in these other matters are going to jeopardize it. But I think it is a legitimate question to be asked of Presidents of either party, and I will join you in a letter to this President and his Attorney General for that purpose. [my emphasis]

This partisan retort (one Leahy repeated) says, in part, that the Democrats aren’t going to cooperate with Cornyn’s effort to get the memo because Cornyn didn’t cooperate with Durbin’s efforts to get the torture and illegal wiretap memos. Durbin and Leahy are right: Cornyn and the rest of the Republican party did obstruct their efforts.

That doesn’t make obstructing Cornyn’s effort right, of course, particularly given that Durbin purports to support Cornyn’s intent.

But remember, Republicans obstructed the release of the torture and illegal wiretap memos because, well, they showed the Executive had broken the law. When we all got to see the torture memos, they made it clear CIA had lied to DOJ to get authorization for torture, had exceeded the authorizations given to them, had engaged in previously unimagined amounts of torture, and had ignored legal precedent to justify it all.

And while we’ve only ever seen part of Jack Goldsmith’s illegal wiretap memo (after the Bush Administration purportedly fixed the data mining and other illegal problems with it) and a teeny fragment of an earlier John Yoo memo, those showed that Yoo relied on gutting the Fourth Amendment, there is an additional secret memo on information sharing, they were hiding their flouting of the exclusivity provision, and–possibly–the illegal wiretap program violated an earlier decision from the FISA Court of Review. We also learned, through some Sheldon Whitehouse persistence, that these memos revealed the President had been pixie dusting Executive Orders and claiming the right to interpret the law for the Executive Branch.

The Republicans had good reason to want to help Bush bury these memos, because they showed breathtaking efforts on the part of the Bush Administration to evade the law.

And that’s the fight that Dick Durbin analogized this one to.


Sheldon Whitehouse Confirms FISA Amendments Act Permits Unwarranted Access to US Person Content

In the Senate Judiciary Committee’s markup of the FISA Amendments Act, Mike Lee, Dick Durbin, and Chris Chris Coons just tried, unsuccessfully, to require the government to get a warrant before it searched US person communications collected via the targeting of non-US person under the FISA Amendments Act. It was, as Dianne Feinstein said, not dissimilar from an amendment Ron Wyden and Mark Udall had tried to pass when FAA was marked up before the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The debate revealed new confirmation that the government is wiretapping American citizens in the guise of foreign surveillance.

DiFi argued that the amendment would have impeded the government to pursue Nidal Hassan by delaying the time when they could have reviewed his communication (presumably with Anwar al-Awlaki). Of course, the amendment included an emergency provision that would have permitted such a search after the effect.

More telling, though, was Whitehouse’s response. He referred back to his time using warrants as a US Attorney, and said that requiring a warrant to access the US person communication would “kill this program,” and that to think warrants “fundamentally misapprehends the way in which this program operates.”

Now, I’d be more sympathetic to Whitehouse here if, back when this bill was originally argued, his amendments requiring FISC oversight of minimization after the fact had passed. They didn’t. To make things worse, though Leahy repeatedly talked about Inspector General reporting overdue on this program, Congress is not going to wait for these reports before they extend the program for another three years, at least. So Whitehouse’s assurances that we can trust minimization to protect US person privacy seems badly misplaced.

In any case, this represents an admission, as strong as any we’ve seen, that this program is entirely about collecting the US person communication of those who communicate with people (DiFi used the term “person of interest,” which I had not heard before) overseas.

Update: Updated to explain this came in a markup hearing. Thanks to Peterr for pointing out my oversight on that point.


Udall Amendment Fails 37-61

In the battle of two wrong sides, the Democrats lost, with the Udall Amendment failing 37-61. The vote is interesting, first of all, as a read of Obama’s ability to sustain a veto. Right now, the militarists do not have a two-thirds majority to override.

Also of interest are some of the Democrats voting against the Udall Amendment, most notably Sheldon Whitehouse.

Rand Paul and Mark Kirk are the only two Republicans to vote in favor of Udall.

I’ll have a more complete discussion of the vote count shortly.

Update: Here’s the roll call. The Dems voting against are:

  • Casey
  • Conrad
  • Hagan*
  • Inouye
  • Kohl
  • Landrieu
  • Levin*
  • Lieberman*
  • Manchin*
  • McCaskill*
  • Menendez
  • Bad Nelson*
  • Pryor
  • Reed*
  • Shaheen*
  • Stabenow
  • Whitehouse

I’m interested in the way the Dem SASC members voted. I’ve put asterisks next to those people above; SASC members voting for Udall’s Amendment are Udall himself, Akaka, Webb, Gillibrand, and Blumenthal. Begich did not vote.

Update: Ron Paul corrected to Rand per skinla.


Does Treasury Believe Spreading Our Flawed Banking System Is a Solution to Terrorism?

Sheldon Whitehouse had a hearing on terrorist finance the other day. There was an interesting exchange that I think bears notice.

The hearing focused, in part, on hawalas, not least because DOJ recently prosecuted Mohammad Younis, the guy whose hawala Faisal Shahzad used to fund his terrorist attempt. Richard Blumenthal suggested (around 75:50 and following) that that funding may have come from Pakistani authorities (implicitly, the ISI). The FBI’s acting head of counterterrorism wouldn’t answer a question about that in public session.

A more interesting response came from Treasury’s Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, Daniel Glaser. Sheldon Whitehouse asked him (at 92:50 and following) whether we were making progress on solving the problem hawalas create for counterterrorism efforts. Here’s my transcription of Glaser’s response:

Daniel Glaser: The reason hawala and other forms of informal remittances and informal money services exist is because there’s large communities around the world that don’t have access to formal financial services or affordable financial services. So the long-term quote-unquote solution to hawala is a generational one and it is about building an international financial system that everybody around the world has access to. Now, since that’s a long-term solution, we need to address the problem in a shorter term way as well.

[snip]

The way we try to approach it beyond the long term effort to make financial services available to everybody is regulatory prong, enforcement, international standards, and general economic development.

While Glaser described a four-pronged approach in his written testimony (and described in more detail in the parts of his response that I’ve snipped), he said the ultimate solution would come when international financial services were available to everyone.

So the way to solve terrorism, then, is to make sure everyone banks at Jamie Dimon’s bank?

That’s an exaggeration, of course. And unless and until bankers get squeamish about the way the US government is accessing SWIFT, integrating everyone into the formal finance system would give counterterrror investigators transparency into terror financing. But given the state of the banking system–given how much more damage the international financial system has done to the world in the last decade than terrorism (leaving aside the effect of couter-terrorism and false counter-terrorism, like the Iraq War) it troubles me that a high ranking Treasury Department official believes one solution to terrorism is modern banking.

Now Glaser strikes me as an incredibly intelligent and sincere guy–coming from him this “generational solution” sounded like a completely sincere idea. So while this comment made my spidey sense tingle, it didn’t in the way it would have if, say, TurboTax Timmeh Geithner had said it.

Nevertheless, here are some issues it raises.

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DiFi’s Secret Law

Steven Aftergood linked to this colloquy on the PATRIOT Act which reveals a lot about Ron Wyden and Mark Udall’s efforts to force the government to admit how it’s suveilling Americans. The colloquy basically puts not just the agreement, but the circumstances that went into the agreement, into the Congressional record.

After some Senatorial blathering (mostly Wyden and Udall talking about how swell DiFi is for making this agreement), DiFi starts the colloquy by describing a meeting the night before (that is, on Wednesday night) between her, Wyden, Udall, Jeff Merkley, and Sheldon Whitehouse.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I wish to thank both Senator Wyden and Senator Udall for their comments. We did have a meeting last night. We did discuss this thoroughly. The decision was that we would enter into this colloquy, so I will begin it, if I may.

These Senators and I, along with the junior Senator from Oregon, Mr. Merkley, the Senator from Colorado, Mr. Mark Udall, and the Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Whitehouse met last night to discuss this amendment, the legal interpretation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provisions and how these provisions are implemented.

Note the presence of Merkley and Whitehouse, which I’ll return to.

DiFi then talks about how great the collection program in question is.

I very much appreciate the strong views Senator Wyden and Senator Udall have in this area, and I believe they are raising a serious and important point as to how exactly these authorities are carried out. I believe we are also all in agreement that these are important counterterrorism authorities and have contributed to the security of our Nation.

At which point Wyden interrupts and basically says (still speaking in Senate blather, mind you), “um, no.”

Mr. President, I have enormous respect for my special friend from California, the distinguished chairwoman of the Intelligence Committee. I have literally sat next to her for more than a decade. We agree on virtually all of these issues, but this is an area where we have had a difference of opinion.

Wyden and Udall basically both then repeat their warnings about how the government is doing something with PATRIOT not explicitly supported by the law. At which point DiFi pipes up to say, alright already, I’ve conceded you have a point but don’t talk about this here! Talk about it in my secret committee!

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, if I may respond, I have agreed that these are important issues and that the Intelligence Committee, which is charged with carrying out oversight over the 16 various intelligence agencies of what is called the intelligence community, should be carried out forthrightly. I also believe the place to do it is in the Intelligence Committee itself.

At which point she lays out the terms of the agreement: the Senate Intelligence Committee will have a hearing on the secret law right after the Memorial Day break, and if the Committee agrees to make a fix, they will amend the Intelligence Authorization.

I have said to these distinguished Senators that it would be my intention to call together a hearing as soon as we come back from the Memorial Day break with the intelligence community agencies, the senior policymakers, and the Department of Justice to make sure the committee is comfortable with the FISA programs and to make changes if changes are needed. We will do that.

So it would be my intention to have these hearings completed before the committee considers the fiscal year 2012 intelligence authorization bill so that any amendments to FISA can be considered at that time.

The fact is, we do not usually have amendments to the intelligence authorization bill, but I believe the majority leader will do his best to secure a future commitment if such is needed for a vote on any amendment. I have not agreed to support any amendment because at this stage it is hypothetical, and we need to look very deeply into what these Senators have said and pointed out last night with specificity and get the response to it from the intelligence committee, have both sides hear it, and then make a decision that is based not only on civil liberties but also on the necessity to keep our country safe. I believe we can do that.

Note DiFi’s mention of “specificity,” which I’ll return to.

After DiFi finishes, Wyden pipes in to say that if the Intelligence Committee doesn’t decide to make a fix, then Harry Reid has promised that Wyden and Udall can introduce their amendment on a different bill, one DiFi doesn’t have control over.

Senator Udall and I have discussed this issue with Senator Reid. Senator Reid indicated to the chairwoman and myself and Senator Udall that we would have an opportunity through these hearings–and, of course, any amendments to the bill would be discussed on the intelligence authorization legislation, which is a matter that obviously has to be classified–but if we were not satisfied, if we were not satisfied through that process, we would have the ability to offer an amendment such as our original one on the Senate floor.

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Did Thomas Drake Include Privacy Concerns in His Complaints to DOD’s Inspector General?

I’ve been reviewing the docket on Thomas Drake’s case to see whether it touches on the privacy concerns Drake had about NSA’s post-9/11 activities.

It appears it doesn’t, even while there was an ongoing dispute about whether or not Drake will have access to the materials he submitted to the DOD Inspector General in support of claims that the ThinThread program operated more effectively than the Trailblazer program that Michael Hayden chose to enrich SAIC with instead (the Judge ruled that material would be admissible, but not a formal whistleblower defense, which Drake wasn’t trying to do anyway).

There are a couple of reasons why the silence, in the legal filings, about privacy concerns is interesting (aside from the fact that it’s a focus of Jane Mayer’s article.

First, because the two-sentence summary of the conclusion of the DOD IG Report on Trailblazer and ThinThread that the defense provides in a filing doesn’t address privacy.

In 2004, after more than a year of fact-finding, the Inspector General issued its initial audit findings. In a report entitled, “Requirements for the Trailblazer and Thinthread Systems,” the auditors concluded that “the National Security Agency is inefficiently using resources to develop a digital network exploitation system that is not capable of fully exploiting the digital network intelligence available to analysts from the Global Information Network . . . (T)he NSA transformation effort may be developing a less capable long-term digital network exploitation solution that will take longer and cost significantly more to develop.” The NSA continued to support the “less capable” program and its successor.

Which suggests the IG Report may not have addressed the claim that, in addition to being less efficient at “connecting the dots” than ThinThread, Trailblazer also offered none of the privacy protections ThinThread had.

That’s important because the government argued that Drake couldn’t claim to be a whistleblower because, by 2007, the issues at hand were resolved. They’re arguing both that any whistleblower claims would be mooted because Turbulence, Trailblazer’s successor, integrated “significant portions” of ThinThread, and that the debate was “over” by 2007, when Drake was (according to the indictment) serving as a source for Baltimore Sun reporter Siobhan Gorman.

In or about December 2004, the DOD IG completed its audit of [Trailblazer], including the allegations raised in the complaint letter. The NSA responded in August 2004 and February 2005, stating that based on the judgments of NSA’s experienced technical experts, the allegations were unfounded. Nonetheless, NSA agreed to incorporate significant portions of [ThinThread] into [Trailblazer] as a result of the DOD IG recommendations, thus largely mooting the issues raised in the complaint. In addition, starting in late 2005 and early 2006, the NSA transitioned away from [Trailblazer] to [Turbulence], another corporate architecture solution for Signals Intelligence collection.

[snip]

Just as importantly, by 2007, the timeframe of the charges in this case, there was no imminent harm faced by the defendant, because [Trailblazer] had incorporated elements of [ThinThread], and also because NSA had transitioned away from [Trailblazer] to [Turbulence].

[snip]

The defendant’s actions had no impact in the debate regarding the efficacy of [Trailblazer and ThinThread], because NSA had begun transitioning to [Turbulence] by 2006. Put simply, the debate was over.

There’s a lot going on in this passage. Obviously, the government is trying to claim that since Drake was allegedly collecting information for Gorman in 2007, he couldn’t claim he was whistleblowing.

Mind you he was not claiming he was whistleblowing, in the legal sense. He was only trying to get the IG materials to prove that’s why he collected three of the documents he’s accused of willingly keeping; basically, he’s arguing that if he overlooked three documents out of 5 boxes worth originally collected for the IG–and did not retain the really classified materials–that he basically just overlooked the three documents, rather than willfully retained them.

And the government is playing funny with dates. After all, they say Drake served as a source for Gorman from February 27, 2006, to November 28, 2007. The key story about ThinThread Drake served as a source for was dated May 18, 2006. And one of the charges accuses Drake of obstruction for shredding other documents. So not only is the 2007 date bogus because it igonores debates ongoing in 2006, but the government suggests that either Drake would be guilty for illegally retaining information, or obstructing an investigation. Moreover, Drake maintains he inadvertently included the three IG-related documents in the several boxes of unclassified materials, so the fact the debate was over is pointless.

Moreover, the successor to Trailblazer, Turbulence, was suffering from the same management problems Trailblazer had, as the defense notes just after citing the IG Report. The government wants to pretend the shift from Trailblazer to Turbulence ended the complaints about management problems, but it didn’t.

But then there’s the way the government portrays the IG complaint: efficacy. As I laid out the other day, there are four ways, Gorman’s sources claim, that ThinThread was better than Trailblazer:

The program the NSA rejected, called ThinThread, was developed to handle greater volumes of information, partly in expectation of threats surrounding the millennium celebrations. Sources say it bundled together four cutting-edge surveillance tools. ThinThread would have:

* Used more sophisticated methods of sorting through massive phone and e-mail data to identify suspect communications.

* Identified U.S. phone numbers and other communications data and encrypted them to ensure caller privacy.

* Employed an automated auditing system to monitor how analysts handled the information, in order to prevent misuse and improve efficiency.

* Analyzed the data to identify relationships between callers and chronicle their contacts. Only when evidence of a potential threat had been developed would analysts be able to request decryption of the records.

In other words, privacy was just one of three ways ThinThread was better than Trailblazer, according to Gorman’s sources.

But that’s not the aspect the government seems to address. That is, the government seems to be saying that, because Turbulence adopted some of the approaches of ThinThread that made it more efficient at analysis, Drake can’t complain. The suggestion is (though we can’t know because of the secrecy) privacy is not, like efficacy, an adequate reason to blow the whistle. Neither privacy, nor the Constitution.

And that’s interesting for two more reasons. First, because the government references a notebook of documents Drake provided that had nothing to do with the IG Report.

There was, for example, a notebook of documents provided by the defendant, many of which had nothing to do with the IG’s audit, but this notebook was destroyed before the case began, and after the IG completed its audit.

Is it playing games with the scope of the audit? That is, did Drake provide materials on privacy, which the IG didn’t include within the scope of its report? If so, the IG’s destruction of the notebook, in violation of DOD’s document retention policy, is all the more interesting.

Then, finally, the debates about privacy continued into 2007 and 2008. In August 2007, specifically, Mike McConnell nixed a Democratic version of the Protect America Act because it required the government to tell FISA judges what the plan for minimizing US person data is and allowed the judges to review for compliance. Debates on how to fix PAA continued throughout the fall and into the following year, with Russ Feingold and Sheldon Whitehouse both trying to make real improvements on the minimization requirements.

The government seems to want to say that Drake’s privacy concerns aren’t a valid whistleblowing concern. Because, I guess, government officials aren’t allowed to whistleblow about citizens’ rights.


Congress’ 30-Day Deadline for Rubber-Stamping Exploration Plans

The other day, when Sheldon Whitehouse asked Secretary of Interior Ken Salazar why BP had gotten an exemption from the full-blown NEPA process from which it presumably should have been categorically excluded, Salazar referenced a 30-day deadline from Congress to approve exploration plans.

Senator, there has been significant environmental review, including Environmental Impact Statements that has been conducted with respect to this activity in the Gulf of Mexico. It is an area where we know a lot about the environment, we know a lot about the infrastructure that is there. The question of the categorical exclusion in part relates to the Congressional 30-day requirement that MMS has to approve or disapprove an exploration plan. [my emphasis]

Mineral Management Service Director Elizabeth Birnbaum elaborated on this 30-day deadline on Wednesday.

Under the National Environmental Policy Act we’re required to examine the environmental impacts of any major federal actions, certainly the oil and gas leasing is a major federal action. We have conducted many Environmental Impact Statements before we get to the point of an individual well drilling decision. We conduct an EIS on the full 5-Year Plan for oil and gas drilling, We have conducted EIS on the lease sales in the Gulf and then separately in Alaska. We also conducted some separate Environmental Impact Reviews on leasing in the particular area–drilling in the particular area in the Mississippi Canyon here in the Gulf. When we get to the point of deciding on an individual exploration plan for a particular permit, we are under a statutory obligation under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to make a decision within 30 days. That very much limits our ability to conduct environmental reviews. Many of our environmental reviews are categorical exclusions. We review that to determine whether there’s a trigger for us to do a full Environmental Assessment, which we did actually on exploration plans for Arctic drilling. But we’re still limited to that 30-day decision, and we have to still make a decision on whether to go forward with an exploration plan within 30 days, which limits the amount of environmental review we can conduct. In the package that the Administration sent up to provide additional appropriations, we also asked to lift that limit in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to allow 90 days or more to provide more full analysis of exploration plans before drilling.

Here’s a history of the OCSLA. The 30-day requirement itself is described in the plan approval process of the OCSLA.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, prior to commencing exploration pursuant to any oil and gas lease issued or maintained under this subchapter, the holder thereof shall submit an exploration plan to the Secretary for approval. Such plan may apply to more than one lease held by a lessee in any one region of the outer Continental Shelf, or by a group of lessees acting under a unitization, pooling, or drilling agreement, and shall be approved by the Secretary if he finds that such plan is consistent with the provisions of this subchapter, regulations prescribed under this subchapter, including regulations prescribed by the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (8) of section 1334 (a) of this title, and the provisions of such lease. The Secretary shall require such modifications of such plan as are necessary to achieve such consistency. The Secretary shall approve such plan, as submitted or modified, within thirty days of its submission, except that the Secretary shall disapprove such plan if he determines that

(A) any proposed activity under such plan would result in any condition described in section 1334 (a)(2)(A)(i) of this title, and

(B) such proposed activity cannot be modified to avoid such condition. If the Secretary disapproves a plan under the preceding sentence, he may, subject to section 1334 (a)(2)(B) of this title, cancel such lease and the lessee shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the regulations prescribed under section 1334 (a)(2)(C)(i) or (ii) of this title. [my emphasis]

And that sets the standard for rejecting an application in 1334 (a)(2)(A)(i) this way:

(i) continued activity pursuant to such lease or permit would probably cause serious harm or damage to life (including fish and other aquatic life), to property, to any mineral (in areas leased or not leased), to the national security or defense, or to the marine, coastal, or human environment;

Now, I would have to do a lot more review of legislative history of the OCSLA to see where that 30-day deadline came from, though so many of the deadlines in the OCSLA are set at 30 days, it might just have been arbitrary (or, it might have been what appeared to be a reasonable deadline to make sure the process kept moving forward–you gotta Drill Baby Drill, dontcha know).

But given Salazar’s and Birnbaum’s statements, the effect appears to be clear. That 30-day deadline appears to ensure that the MMS only looks closely at these exploration plans if there’s a blinking red flag in the plan, and not something trivial like drilling in extremely deep waters and/or innovative drilling plans–the things Whitehouse noted that should have prevented this exploration plan from being exempted from an individual assessment, the things that are causing such acute problems now.

And of course, to actually change this 30-day rubber stamp process, the legislation is going to have to get by industry shills like Lisa Murkowski and James Inhofe. Something to look forward to, I guess.

Oh, one more thing. The Congressman who raised concerns about the Arctic drilling? That’s the normally loathsome Heath Shuler. Just an indication of how a giant disaster can turn even the bluest of dogs into hippie environmentalists.


Sheldon Whitehouse Lists the NEPA Exclusions

At yesterday’s Environment and Public Works hearing on the BP disaster, Sheldon Whitehouse asked Interior Secretary Ken Salazar and Council on Environmental Quality Chair Helen Sutley why BP had been exempted from doing an Environmental Impact Study on the Macondo drilling site. He listed a number of things that should categorically exclude a project from receiving such an exemption. Two of those almost certainly applied to this well.

  • Areas of high seismic risk or seismicity, relatively untested deep water, or remote areas
  • Utilizing new or unusual technology

In response, Salazar spoke about how much we know about that area.

Senator, there has been significant environmental review, including Environmental Impact Statements that has been conducted with respect to this activity in the Gulf of Mexico. It is an area where we know a lot about the environment, we know a lot about the infrastructure that is there. The question of the categorical exclusion in part relates to the Congressional 30-day requirement that MMS has to approve or disapprove an exploration plan.

You think Salazar knows he’s going to be held responsible for all the exemptions approved since this disaster?

In any case, here’s how much BP knows about the area:

An emergency response plan prepared by BP shows the British energy giant never anticipated an oil spill as large as the one seeping through the Gulf of Mexico.The 582-page document, titled “Regional Oil Spill Response Plan — Gulf of Mexico,” was approved in July by the federal Minerals Management Service (MMS). It offers technical details on how to use chemical dispersants and provides instructions on what to say to the news media, but it does not mention how to react if a deep-water well spews oil uncontrollably.

[snip]

In a section titled “Sensitive Biological & Human-Use Resources,” the plan lists “seals, sea otters and walruses” as animals that could be impacted by a Gulf of Mexico spill — even though no such animals live in the Gulf. [emphasis]

Sure, we know a lot about the environment. We just have some crazy belief that the walruses have decided to vacation on the Gulf of Mexico.


OPR Report Timeline

In response to the news that David Margolis spiked the misconduct conclusion in the OPR Report on OLC justifications for torture, I wanted to put together a timeline of its construction. Two things stick out. First, the role of Mary Patrice Brown–who replaced Marshall Jarrett at a time when OPR was backing off its offer of transparency–deserves further scrutiny in this report. When she presented the report to Holder in August, she apparently recommended that he reopen investigations into torture.

Also, I still think the timing suggests DOJ delayed its release to protect Yoo in the Padilla suit.

January 4, 2008: Padilla sues Yoo.

February 12, 2008: Senators Durbin and Whitehouse request that OPR investigate torture authorizations

February 18, 2008: Marshall Jarrett informs Durbin and Whitehouse that torture authorizations included in OPR investigation of OLC, agrees to share report with them and–possibly–release an unclassified public version

Late December 2008: Draft of OPR submitted, Michael Mukasey and Mark Filip demand that Yoo, Bybee, and Bradbury get to respond

February 14, 2009: Isikoff reports that OPR report came to harsh conclusions of OLC lawyers’ work; reports Mukasey and Filip allowance for lawyer response

February 16, 2009: Whitehouse and Durbin inquire about process used with OPR report

March 6, 2009: Hearing in Padilla-Yoo law suit

March 25, 2009: OPR response (signed by M. Faith Burton, Acting AAG) to Whitehouse and Durbin states Mukasey/Filip comments already integrated, OLC lawyer counsel in process of reviewing report; it doesn’t mention “career prosecutor” review:

When the review and comment [from Yoo, Bybee, and Bradbury's lawyers] is concluded, OPR intends to review the comments submitted and make any modifications it deems appropriate to the findings and conclusions. OPR will then provide a final report to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General. After any additional review they deem appropriate, the department will determine what disclosures should be made.

The letter backs off Jarrett’s earlier promise to release the report:

In determining appropriate disclosures, we will be mindful of the considerable interest that Congress has previously expressed in connection with this matter and will seek to accommodate the information needs of our oversight committees in response to requests from their chairmen. While we appreciate your request for a disclosure commitment, we can only fully evaluate the scope of appropriate disclosures once the review process is completed. We trust you understand that those decisions depend in part on the content and conclusions of the OPR final report and the outcome of any further Departmental review.

March 31, 2009: Durbin and Whitehouse reply to OPR letter

April 8, 2009: Holder names Mary Patrice Brown to replace former OPR head, Marshall Jarrett

April 29, 2009: Leahy invites Bybee to testify to Senate Judiciary Committee; Bybee panics in response

May 4, 2009: According to AAG Ronald Welch, deadline for Yoo, Bybee, and Bradbury response to OPR report; on that day, Welch responds to Durbin and Whitehouse laying out the following as “normal” process for OPR reports:

In the past, former Department employees who were subjects of OPR investigations typically have been permitted to appeal adverse OPR findings to the Deputy Attorney General’s Office. A senior career official usually conducted that appeal by reviewing submissions from the subjects and OPR’s reply to those submissions, and then reaching a decision on the merits of the appeal. Under this ordinary procedure, the career official’s decision on the merits was final. This appeal procedure was typically completed before the Department determined whether to disclose the Report of Investigation to the former employees’ state bar disciplinary authorities or to anyone else. Department policy usually requires referral of OPR’s misconduct findings to the subject’s state bar disciplinary authority, but if the appeal resulted in a rejection of OPR’s misconduct findings, then no referral was made. This process afforded former employees roughly the same opportunity to contest OPR’s findings that current employees were afforded through the disciplinary process. While the Department has previously released public summaries of OPR reports under some circumstances, public release of the reports themselves has occurred only rarely. In the past, the release of a public summary occurred only after the subjects were afforded an opportunity to appeal any adverse findings.

The May 4 letter also informed the Senators of the CIA review.

May 6, 2009: WaPo reports OPR report still recommends sanctions against Yoo and Bybee

June 12, 2009: Judge rules Padilla suit can move forward

June 17, 2009: Whitehouse reveals that CIA conducting “substantive comment and classification review”

July 9, 2009: Yoo appeals decision on Padilla suit–and DOJ stops representing Yoo; Miguel Estrada would take on that role

July 12, 2009: Scott Horton reports that reading OPR Report was one thing that convinced Eric Holder to launch criminal review of torture

Prior to August 24, 2009: OPR submits report to Holder, recommends reopening criminal investigation into torture

August 24, 2009: Holder announces criminal investigation, citing (among other things) OPR report

November 16, 2009: Yoo submits opening brief in Padilla suit appeal

November 18, 2009: Holder announces OPR report due out “this month;” Court grants government extension to December 3 to submit amicus brief

November 20, 2009: Padilla requests extension–because of delay in government brief–until January 15

December: Margolis, purportedly reviewing OPR report, out sick (though reports say Yoo’s lawyer making last appeal for changes)

December 3, 2009: DOJ submits amicus brief claiming that OPR can address Padilla’s concerns

December 29, 2009: Yoo starts book publicity

January 18, 2010: Padilla submits response to appeal

January 29, 2010: Klaidman and Isikoff report OPR conclusions have been altered