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[REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


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[REDACTED]

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Appendix G.




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
(U) THINTHREAD:



(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) Preliminary research on THINTHREAD was performed by the Test, Technology and Evaluation team in February 2002, but the formal evaluation was executed from March 1, 2002, through March 18, 2002.

(U) Summary of THINTHREAD




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(U) General Recommendations.

(U//FOUO) The [redacted] Assessment Study made the following recommendations:



- (U) generate user, system, technical, and programmatic documentation.




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(U) For further details, listed below are the seven key findings and related discussions in the THINTHREAD [redacted] Report.

(U) Finding 1 Discussion.

(U//FOUO) There were no technical issues that would prevent THINTHREAD [redacted]



- (U) Current THINTHREAD system development procedures were effective, and a cooperative development effort was proceeding smoothly with the pilot site.

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
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


(U) Recommendations. There were no recommendations.

(U) Finding 2 Discussion



(U) Recommendations. See the recommendations for THINTHREAD Findings 3 through 7 to address these risks.



- (U) some THINTHREAD files could not be viewed to pursue corrective actions.

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(U//FOUO) Recommendations. The issues previously mentioned would not

(U) Finding 3 Discussion

(U) There was minimal user, system, technical, or programmatic documentation. The existing documentation was insufficient to support the planned deployments.

- (U) There was no user documentation on how to use the tool. That was inefficient and could lead to a significant increase in user error. Difficulties using the tool can also lead to an increase in support calls that drained project resources.
- (U) THINTHREAD did not have a clearly stated, documented set of mission goals or objectives. There was no program plan, making it difficult to communicate information about THINTHREAD at a programmatic level.
- (U) A detailed schedule including all activities related to the system and deliverables before, during, and after deployment was not available. A high-level schedule containing the chronology of deployment was developed, but a detailed schedule was essential for proper resource management, costing, and prediction.
- (U) No installation and maintenance documentation was completed for site support personnel, although the team was working with the pilot site to develop installation documentation. Lack of installation and maintenance documentation [redacted]
- (U) There was no operational support documentation [redacted]. Lack of support documentation could adversely affect timely correction of problems and could lead to [redacted]

(U) The effects of minimal documentation could be overcome if an integrated team accomplished the development and deployment of THINTHREAD.

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[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Recommendations. Develop necessary documentation. That would necessitate an increase in the personnel devoted to documenting the system, but is essential to the successful deployment and operation of THINTHREAD. The lack of this documentation presented a serious risk to the successful deployment of THINTHREAD.

(U) Finding 4 Discussion

(U//FOUO) Deployment planning was slow to occur [REDACTED]

- (U//FOUO) Historically, the THINTHREAD Program Team focused on the prototype demonstration at the pilot site. The program's scope did not

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

- (U//FOUO) The THINTHREAD Program Team did not have a comprehensive planning process. The lack of planning activities with

[REDACTED] delayed deployment efforts and increased deployment costs.

- (U//FOUO) Work roles essential to system deployment and operation were not identified [REDACTED] The relationships between work roles throughout the system's life cycle were not defined. The authorities for each work role had not been identified. The organizational structure set forth by the THINTHREAD Program Team focused on system development, and did not address system

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(U//FOUO) deployment [redacted]

[redacted] The THINTHREAD Program Team was defining the additional work roles necessary for deployment activities.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

- [redacted]
- (U) THINTHREAD did not identify all the organizations requiring coordination through the various stages of deployment.

(U//FOUO) Recommendations. The findings presented a serious risk to successful deployment of THINTHREAD. To mitigate those risks, the following recommendations were suggested.

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(U) Finding 5 Discussion

(U//FOUO) The customer service and user support processes for THINTHREAD were manually intensive and directly involved the technical staff.

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- (U//FOUO) The quality of service and support received [redacted] using THINTHREAD was inconsistent. Some [redacted] interviewed by Test, Technology and Evaluation Team viewed the THINTHREAD Program Team to be unresponsive in general customer support, while [redacted] experienced good responsiveness to their requests for additions or modifications [redacted]
- (U//FOUO) There was no formal trouble ticket mechanism in place. If a user or operator had a problem with THINTHREAD, he contacted someone on the THINTHREAD Program Team. This contact depends on personal acquaintance, because no list of THINTHREAD personnel was readily available, and there was no mechanism to locate the proper THINTHREAD contact. Similarly, the status of the response to a request could only be learned by personal contact.
- (U//FOUO) There was no formal mechanism for managing externally generated requirements, to include submitting a new requirement to THINTHREAD or for following the progress of the work.

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- (U//FOUO) A single person on the THINTHREAD team was in charge of maintaining [REDACTED] With just a few users, that person was able to enter or change [REDACTED] according to user requests received on the telephone or by e-mail. However, as more users are added, one person may have difficulty meeting the increased demand. The lack of personnel may become a problem as THINTHREAD was scaled to handle an increased user load [REDACTED]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

- (U//FOUO) A list of Web interface functionalities proposed [REDACTED] was not incorporated into THINTHREAD.

(U//FOUO) Recommendations. The findings that led to the recommendations would not have prevented the successful deployment of THINTHREAD [REDACTED] The recommendations were made to improve the operational efficiency of THINTHREAD after it was deployed [REDACTED]

- (U) Institute an automated, formal THINTHREAD customer service and user support process.

• (U) [REDACTED]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

- (U//FOUO) Acquire and use a trouble ticketing tool, which can manage externally generated requirements as well as system problems. This tool should [REDACTED] The THINTHREAD Program Team should address high-priority requirements that fit within the program scope.
- (U) Develop a process to address Web interface functional enhancements requested [REDACTED]
- (U//FOUO) Address the lack of personnel depth in the THINTHREAD Program Team for maintaining [REDACTED] as THINTHREAD is scaled to handle more users [REDACTED]

(U) Finding 6 Discussion

(U//FOUO) There was no process for controlling and measuring operational, programmatic, and technical performance effectiveness of THINTHREAD, once deployed.

- (U//FOUO) THINTHREAD did not have a clearly stated set of system specifications or a method to validate the THINTHREAD concept or performance results. Thus, there was no way to determine if the system

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(U//FOUO) was successful or if it failed, which may lead to confusion in stakeholders' understanding of the success of THINTHREAD.

- (U//FOUO) THINTHREAD had mechanisms for assessing progress and status within the system development phase. However, there were no systematic, consistent mechanisms for overall program measurement, which included identifying test criteria, establishing program schedules, and documenting a system baseline to address progress. No feedback mechanisms had been identified such as risk management or contingency planning.
- (U//FOUO) Aside from schedule control, there were no tools to measure progress towards program objectives because there were no formalized program objectives.
- (U//FOUO) THINTHREAD did not have Standards of Performance established for personnel developing THINTHREAD. If future THINTHREAD development crosses organizational groups, a common set of Standards of Performance for personnel may become necessary.
- (U//FOUO) There was no configuration management process, which could pose a risk when reporting system problems and correcting them. In addition, the lack of a configuration management process could cause difficulty when upgrading or deploying versions, and also make rollback extremely risky.
- (U//FOUO) The fault or warning detection was automated but the necessary reactions and responses were not. software provided a simple way to check status of various system parameters through a Web interface. However, when an operator recognizes a problem, he must actively initiate corrective measures. Sometimes that action is a simple matter, such as restarting a process. At other times, physical hardware must be changed. No corrective action could be executed if an operator was not present to initiate a corrective action.

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- (U//FOUO) THINTHREAD had no established process for managing requirements.

(U//FOUO) Recommendations. The findings that led to the recommendations would not have prevented the successful deployment of THINTHREAD to

The recommendations were made to improve the operational efficiency of THINTHREAD after it was deployed

The following is a list of recommendations.

- (U//FOUO) Develop processes and acquire automated tools based on clearly stated specifications for controlling and measuring the programmatic, operational, and technical performance of THINTHREAD deployment

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

- (U//FOUO) Acquire a commercially available configuration control system to enable versioning, rollback, and configuration management. The system should interface with the trouble ticketing system and the requirements management system to provide full traceability.
- (U//FOUO) Develop Standards of Performance (if future THINTHREAD development crosses organizational groups).
- (U//FOUO) Automate reactions and responses to the existing fault and warning detection system [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- (U//FOUO) Establish a requirements management process for THINTHREAD that is linked to [REDACTED]

(U) Finding 7 Discussion

(U//FOUO) The number and skill mix of THINTHREAD personnel was inadequate [REDACTED]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

There were shortfalls with the numbers and skills of personnel required for planning and executing installations [REDACTED] Also, there was a lack of documentation, providing the necessary maintenance and help desk support, configuration management, and planning and scheduling. Collectively, those shortcomings created a serious risk to successful completion [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Recommendations. The finding presented serious risk to successful deployment of THINTHREAD. It was recommended to continue to identify and acquire the number and types of skilled personnel resources required for documentation. [REDACTED]

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(b) (5)

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Appendix H.

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(U) Introduction

(U) Needs Analysis Revisited



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
(U) System Capabilities Overviews

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
~~(U//FOUO)~~ The following section outlines the strengths



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


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


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(U) Optimal System





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
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(U) Cost Analysis

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(U) The following hypothetical scenarios illustrated how 
 may produce a more effective result in terms of both complexity and cost.
A few assumptions apply:




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
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(U) Conclusion




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Appendix I. Glossary (U)


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Consultative Committee for International Telegraph and Telephone (CCITT).
Consultative Committee for International Telegraph and Telephone is the International organization responsible for the development of communications standards. Now called the International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector.




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Electronic Industries Association (EIA). A group that specifies electrical transmission standards. The Electronic Industries Association and Telecommunications Industry Association have developed numerous well-known communications standards, including Electronic Industries Association and Telecommunications Industry Association -232 and Electronic Industries Association and Telecommunications Industry Association -449.



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International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T). International body that develops worldwide standards for telecommunications technologies. The International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector carries out the functions of the former Consultative Committee for International Telegraph and Telephone.


International Organization for Standardization (ISO). International organization that is responsible for a wide range of standards, including those relevant to networking. The International Organization for Standardization developed the Open System Interconnection reference model, a popular networking reference model.

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
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
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Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.3. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers LAN protocol that specifies an implementation of the physical layer and the MAC sublayer of the data link layer. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 802.3 uses Carrier Sense Multiple Access Collision Detect access at a variety of speeds over a variety of physical media. Extensions to the I Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 802.3 standard specify implementations for Fast Ethernet.



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Open System Interconnection (OSI). International standardization program created by International Organization for Standardization and International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector to develop standards for data networking that facilitate multi-vendor equipment interoperability.



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Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA). Organization that develops standards relating to telecommunications technologies. Together, the Telecommunications Industry Association and the Electronic Industries Association have formalized standards, such as Electronic Industries Association and Telecommunications Industry Association -232, for the electrical characteristics of data transmission.


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
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Appendix J. Response to Management Comments (U)

~~(S//SI) Management Comments.~~ A significant point of departure among Office of Inspector General Report assertions and NSA understanding, reflected within NSA's responses below, concerns [redacted]



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~~(C) Management Comments.~~ Although NSA will agree to conduct an independent assessment of TRAILBLAZER [redacted] we believe that it will validate all of the assertions made in our responses to the Office of Inspector General recommendations. Furthermore, we do not agree with the original Hot Line complaint that fraud, waste, and abuse occurred during the [redacted] which was conducted in an open fashion to provide the best benefit for Agency mission and customers. More importantly, there has been no evidence documented during this Office of Inspector General investigation that supports that complaint.

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
~~(S//SI) Audit Response.~~ The report documents that NSA spent approximately [redacted] million to develop the TRAILBLAZER [redacted]

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
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
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
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


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
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(U//FOUO) Management Comments. NSA recommended that the audit report emphasis NSA's cooperation and responsiveness to Congress.




(U//FOUO) Management Comments. NSA recommended that the audit report emphasis that the THINTHREAD capability is valued by NSA.



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


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
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~~(S//SI) Management Comments. NSA stated that the draft report omitted critical information~~




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


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
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
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~~(C)~~ Management Comments. TRAILBLAZER welcomes an open review of




~~(S//SI)~~ Management Comments. NSA management does not agree with the DoD
Office of Inspector General's assessment



~~(S//SI)~~ Audit Response. We acknowledge the fact that the current scope of the
TRAILBLAZER is to provide the information technology framework for the entire

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


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
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
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(e) Management Comments. NSA managements stated that TRAILBLAZER and the Technology Demonstration Platform have invested considerable effort to build a signal intelligence architecture that is open and scaleable, applies DoD, commercial, and NSA standards; and that is documented in DoD Architecture Framework views.



(C) Audit Response. NSA comments are inaccurate.

Information that we reviewed and previous Inspector General reports show that the NSA acquisition processes is not always consistent with the

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~~(C)~~ guidelines of DoD Directive 5000.2. [REDACTED]

~~(S//SI)~~ Management Comments. NSA management comments stated that the Executive Summary's assertion that NSA "disregarded solutions to urgent national security needs" is not accurate. [REDACTED]

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~~(S//SI)~~ Audit Response. NSA comments are inaccurate. Major issues raised in the management comments are addressed in the report, specifically the issue of [REDACTED]

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(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(C)~~ Management Comments. NSA management stated that the DoD Inspector General Report's citation of the NTA Study's recommendation [redacted] also needs clarification. [redacted]

~~(C)~~ Management Comments. NSA management comments stated that although the Executive Summary indicated that TRAILBLAZER [redacted]

(U//FOUO) Management Comments. NSA management comments stated that the TRAILBLAZER has long-established plans for external assessment of the Technology Demonstration Platform for preparation for Milestone B. The Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) of 29 Evaluation Criteria is being conducted by NSA's independent Office of Corporate Assessments' Test and Technical Evaluation element (TTE). The Early Operational Assessment and Operational Assessment will be performed by JITC, which had established a presence in TRAILBLAZER spaces by November 2003. Results of both activities will be provided to the Milestone Decision Authority before Milestone B.

(U//FOUO) Audit Response. TRAILBLAZER postponed Milestone B scheduled for December 2004 because of technical issues with the Technology Demonstration Platform. February 2005 is the earliest date that TRAILBLAZER will be ready for MILESTONE B.

(U//FOUO) Management Comments. NSA management comments stated that the results of the independent assessment of [redacted] will be provided to the MDA by Milestone B, currently scheduled for December 2004.

(S//SI) Management Comments. NSA management comments stated that the Executive Summary's statement that TRAILBLAZER development "wasted" [redacted]

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

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~~(S//SI)~~ of dollars" is not accurate. As the NTA Modernization Study observed, TRAILBLAZER is not only about digital network exploitation, but also encompasses cultural transformation (people, processes, and policies) [redacted]

[redacted] And, although TRAILBLAZER is currently in the developmental phase, it has already delivered significant capabilities.


~~(S//SI)~~ Audit Response. The NSA management comments are inaccurate. The report Executive Summary does not claim that TRAILBLAZER development "wasted [redacted] of dollars." Instead, this phrase is only used to accurately describe the specific hotline complaint allegation that initiated this audit.



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


~~(S)~~ **Management Comments.** NSA management comments also questions the Executive Summary's statement that 'NSA modified or suppressed studies and [redacted] and stated that the audit report did not identify where the information was obtained.

~~(S)~~ **Audit Response.** We have documented information to support this statement; however, because of fear of reprisal, we agreed to keep the sources anonymous.

~~(S//SI)~~ **Management Comments.** The Office of Inspector General Report's citations of [redacted]

were also incomplete and contained inaccuracies. The presentation of the results of the [redacted]




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~~(C)~~ Audit Response. Our wording reflects information received from our sources. We reviewed all of the comments below and checked our sources and made adjustments as required.



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Appendix K. Report Distribution (U)

(U)

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration

Other Defense Organization

Director, National Security Agency
Inspector General, National Security Agency
Inspector General, Defense Intelligence Agency
Inspector General, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Inspector General, National Reconnaissance Office

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

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National Security Agency/Central Security Service Comments (U)



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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

13 August 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ATTN: Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence Audits

SUBJECT: (U) Audit of the Requirements for the TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD Systems, dated June 18, 2004 (Project No. D2003AL-0100)

(U//FOUO) Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the referenced draft report. Consolidated management comments from our Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), Acquisition Organization (DA) and Information Technology Infrastructure Services Organization (ITIS) are enclosed. In addition, per your request, a security classification review of the draft report is enclosed. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact [redacted]

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[redacted]
Deputy Chief of Staff

Encl:
a/s

"This correspondence may be declassified
and marked 'UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE'
ONLY upon removal of restriction(s)."

Derived From: FOUO//COMINT//20291123
Date: 4/1/04
Declassify On: NND

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(U) Audit of the Requirements for the TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD Systems

(U//FOUO) Project No. D2003AL-0100

(C) This paper contains responses to recommendations made by the DoD OIG Audit of the Requirements for the TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD Systems (Project No. D2003AL-0100). It also includes discussion of key comments from the OIG report that NSA feels obligated to address.

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(S//NF)-A significant point of departure among OIG Report assertions and NSA understanding, reflected within NSA's responses below, concerns [REDACTED]

(C) Although NSA will agree to conduct an independent assessment of TRAILBLAZER [REDACTED] we believe that it will validate all of the assertions made in our responses to the OIG recommendations. Furthermore, we do not agree with the original Hot Line complaint that fraud, waste, and abuse occurred during the [REDACTED] which was conducted in an open fashion to provide the best benefit for Agency mission and customers. More importantly, there has been no evidence documented during this OIG investigation that supports that complaint.

DRV PM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
Date: 24 Feb 98
Doc: ON-74

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(U//FOUO) Project No. D2003AL-0100

(S//SI) DoD OIG Recommendation A.1:

(U) NSA Response: Nonconcur

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
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
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(U//FOUO) Project No. D2003AL-0100



(C) NSA recommends that the following items be highlighted within the OIG Project Report:

- NSA cooperates with and responds to Congress;
- THINTHREAD capability is valued by NSA;



(U) Target Date of Completion: Complete.



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Final Report
Reference

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(U//FOUO) Project No. D2003AL-0100

(S//SI) DoD OIG Recommendation A.2:

(U) NSA Response: Nonconcur

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(U//FOUO) Project No. D2003AL-0100

~~(TS//SI)~~ The OIG Report omits an absolutely critical element:

~~(S)~~ The OIG Report omits another critical element:

is not defined. NSA believes that

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
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(U//FOUO) Project No. D2003AL-0100



(U) Target Date of Completion: Complete.

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(U//FOUO) Project No. D2003AL-6100

(C) DoD OIG Recommendation A.3:

(U) NSA Response: Concur

(U) Target Date of Completion: Complete.

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Final Report
Reference

Revised
p.35

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(U//FOUO) Project No. D2003AL-0100

(C) DoD OIG Recommendation B.1: Designate a team to assess the ability of

(U) NSA Response: Concur, with comments

(C) TRAILBLAZER welcomes an open review of

(U//FOUO) At this time, it is necessary to address some misconceptions in the DoD OIG's Executive Summary and Draft Report, as follows:

1. (S//SI) First, NSA does not agree with the DoD OIG's assessment

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Final report
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(U//FOUO) Project No. D2003AL-0100

- (S) SIGINT Architecture and Documentation: TRAILBLAZER and TDP have invested considerable effort to build a SIGINT architecture that is consistent with current DoD emphasis on open architecture and scalability, that applies DoD/commercial/NSA standards, and that is documented in DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) architecture views.

2. (S//SI) The Executive Summary's assertion that NSA "disregarded solutions to urgent national security needs" is not accurate.

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(U//FOUO) Project No. D2003AL-0100

3. ~~(S)~~ The OIG Report's citation of the NTA Study's recommendation
also must be clarified.

4. ~~(S)~~ Although the Executive Summary indicated that TRAILBLAZER

(U//FOUO). Target Date of completion: Milestone B is currently scheduled for December 2004.

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(U//FOUO) Project No. D2403AL-0160

(U//FOUO) DoD OIG Recommendation B.2: Provide the results of the external assessment to the TRAILBLAZER Technology Demonstration Platform Milestone Decision Authority for use in making the Milestone B decision.

(U) NSA Response: Concur

(U//FOUO) As mentioned in the response to Recommendation B.1, the PEO and TRAILBLAZER intend to provide the results of the independent assessment to the TRAILBLAZER Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) for use in making the Milestone B decision. These results will also be sent to the DoD IG, the NSA IG, and NSA's Office of General Counsel.

(U//FOUO) It should also be noted that TRAILBLAZER has long-established plans for external assessment of the TDP for preparation for Milestone B. The Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) of 29 Evaluation Criteria is being conducted by NSA's independent Office of Corporate Assessments' Test and Technical Evaluation element (TTE). The Early Operational Assessment and Operational Assessment will be performed by JIIC, which had established a presence in TRAILBLAZER spaces by November 2003. Results of both activities will be provided to the Milestone Decision Authority before Milestone B.

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(C) Target Date of completion: Results of the independent assessment of [redacted] will be provided to the MDA by Milestone B, currently scheduled for December 2004.

(C) DoD OIG Recommendation B.3: [redacted]

(U) NSA Response: Concur

(U//FOUO) Target Date of completion: This action will be completed by the Milestone B target date, currently scheduled for December 2004.

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(U//FOUO) Project No. D2003AL-0100

(U) Comments on DoD IG Audit of Requirements for the TRAILBLAZER and
THINTHREAD Systems
Project No. D2003AL-0100

(U//FOUO) The following comments address technical and editorial items of concern in
the subject Project Report.

1. (S//SB) The Executive Summary's statement that TRAILBLAZER development
"wasted [redacted] of dollars" is not accurate. As the NTA Modernization
Study observed, TRAILBLAZER is not only about digital network exploitation, but also
encompasses cultural transformation (people, processes, and policies) [redacted]

[redacted] And, although TRAILBLAZER is currently in
the developmental phase, it has already delivered significant capabilities, such as:

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(U//FOUO) Project No. D2003AL-0100

2-(C) TRAILBLAZER also questions the Executive Summary's statement that "NSA modified or suppressed studies and [redacted] TRAILBLAZER has seen no evidence of either modification or suppression. It is not clear where this statement originated.

3. (S//SI) The OIG Report's citations of [redacted] were also incomplete and contained inaccuracies. The presentation of the results of the [redacted]

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(U//FOUO) Project No. D2003AL-0100

4. (U//FOUO) It should be noted that Initial Operating Capability of the TRAILBLAZER is FY2006, rather than FY2009 (as stated in page 1 of the Draft OIG report). Finally, the NSA IG concerns about the Program Engineering and Business Management contract mentioned in Appendix A did not center on TRAILBLAZER-specific practices but rather those of [redacted] Front Office. These issues have since been addressed by NSA management.

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(U//FOUO) ANNEX A:



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Annex A - 1

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(U//FOUO) Annex A

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Annex A-2

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(U//FOUO) Annex A

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(U//FOUO) Annex A

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Annex A - 5

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(U//FOUO) Annex A:


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Annex A - 6

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(D) Annex A:

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
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Annex A - 8

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(U//FOUO) Annex A:

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Annex A - 10

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(U//FOUO) Annex A:

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Annex A - 11

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403
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86-36

(U//FOUO) Annex A:

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86-36

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Annex A - 12

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(U//FOUO) ANNEX B:



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(U//FOUO) Annex B

(U//FOUO) The following table lists

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DOCID: 3253246
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

NSA STAFF PROCESSING FORM

RF/K
CC: D13 ✓

TO CoS	EXREG CONTROL NUMBER 9708 154	KCC CONTROL NUMBER DC09-017-05
THRU	ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	EXREG SUSPENSE KCC SUSPENSE ELEMENT SUSPENSE
SUBJECT (U) (TOP SECRET//COMINT) Office of the IG of the Department of Defense Report on TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD Systems		
DISTRIBUTION		

SUMMARY (U)

PURPOSE: (CONFIDENTIAL//20291123) Attached for your review and signature is the NSA consolidated response to the report from the DoD OIG on requirements for TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD systems.

Encl:
a/s

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
OFFICE	NAME AND DATE	SECURE PHONE	OFFICE	NAME AND DATE	SECURE PHONE	
	105	x3825				
	7/11/05	x5606				
	11 Feb 05	x3200				
	11 Feb 05	963-5021				
ORIGINATOR			ORG. DC09	PHONE (Secure) 963-5021	DATE PREPARED 11 February 2005	



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000


11 February 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INTELLIGENCE AUDITS

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) DoD OIG Audit Report Requirements for the TRAILBLAZER
and THINTHREAD Systems, dated December 15, 2004 (Report 05-INTEL-
03, Project No. D2003AL-0100) - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) In response to the DoD OIG request for additional information on the
TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD report, NSA/CSS provides consolidated corporate
comments from our Signals Intelligence Directorate, Acquisition Organization, and
Information Technology Infrastructure Services Organization (now the Information
Technology Directorate).


NSA/CSS Response:



~~(C)~~ Subsequent to the DoD OIG report, the TRAILBLAZER Milestone has been
scheduled for late in the fourth quarter of FY05 from the previously scheduled earlier
MS B. Accordingly, this now allows sufficient time for the conduct of the assessment
recommended by the DoD OIG. ~~As costs for the assessment will be covered by the PEO
and due to the revised schedule.~~

~~The assessment will be finalized~~
by May 2005.

If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact



Maria N. O'Connor

MARIA N. O'CONNOR
Chief of Staff

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-62~~
~~Dated: 23 November 2004~~
~~Declassify On: 20291123~~

~~DOCID: 3253346~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

NSA STAFF PROCESSING FORM

TO DC09	EXREG CONTROL NUMBER	KCC CONTROL NUMBER DA4-04-05
THRU SAE [redacted] D/SAE [redacted]	ACTION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	EXREG SUSPENSE KCC SUSPENSE ELEMENT SUSPENSE
SUBJECT (U//FOUO) THINTHREAD / TRAILBLAZER IG AUDIT REPORT		

DISTRIBUTION

SUMMARY

PURPOSE:

(U//FOUO) To provide the recommended PEO input to the consolidated NSA response regarding actions requested by the "final" Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General (OIG) report 05-INTEL-03, Requirements for TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD Systems of 15 December 2004.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

BACKGROUND / DISCUSSION:

(U//FOUO) In their June '04 Draft of the Audit Report, the DoD OIG made the following recommendation. "Designate a team to assess [redacted] the operational requirements of the TRAILBLAZER Technology Demonstration Platform."

(C) In response to this draft, in August, the Agency concurred "with comments." The following is an excerpt from those comments; "The Program Executive Office (PEO) is taking the lead in establishing an independent review team for performing this assessment, with the intention that its results will be completed in time [redacted] Milestone B documentation."

(C) At the time of this statement (Aug '04), the TRAILBLAZER Milestone B (MSB) was scheduled for December '04. When the final report was published, the PEO Assessment had not yet begun. Concerned that the assessment could not be completed in time to support a December milestone, the DoD OIG requested via the final report, that they be provided; "NSA plans to eliminate the cost and schedule risks for completing the assessment."

(C) Since release of the final Audit Report, a DIRNSA-Chartered Transformational Advisory Panel (TAP) recommended TRAILBLAZER be rebaselined. The MSB is now planned for late Fourth Quarter FY05.

COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
OFFICE	NAME AND DATE	SECURE PHONE	OFFICE	NAME AND DATE	SECURE PHONE
[redacted]	2/8/05	966-5200	[redacted]	2/8/05	966-5200
	7/2/05	963-8848		7/2/05	963-8848
		963-5214			
		POC:			963-8675
[redacted]		ORG. DA4	PHONE (Secure) 963-7368	DATE PREPARED 8 February 2005	

FORM A6-96 REV NOV 95
(Supersedes A6-96 FEB 94
which is obsolete)
NSN: 7540-FM-001-5485

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The development of this response has been coordinated with [redacted] and the TRAILBLAZER Program Management Office.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) A formal Risk Mitigation Plan is not recommended. The PEO is committed to conducting the assessment. The team is currently being formed, a kick-off mtg is planned for March, and the team is expected to report to Mr. [redacted] [redacted] NLT May 31st. The cost and schedule impact of conducting the assessment pose very low risk to the Transformational Programs.

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommend the response, provided as an attachment, be forwarded to the DoD OIG as part of the Agency's consolidated response to the Final Report.