



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330613

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

13 June 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9PK-010020DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Majid Khan
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Adnan, Yusif, Majid Shoukat Khan, Ammar
- Place of Birth: Pakistan (PK)
- Date of Birth: 28 February 1980
- Citizenship: Pakistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9PK-010020DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in excellent physical health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 8 December 2006.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is an al-Qaida operative who was directly subordinate to senior al-Qaida operational planner Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), aka (Mukhtar), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024). Upon meeting KU-10024 in Pakistan in early in 2003, detainee volunteered his services to KU-10024. KU-10024's vetting of the detainee consisted of two parts: a pseudo-suicide assassination attempt against Pakistani President Musharraf, and delivery of al-Qaida financing to senior al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) operative Riduan Bin Isomuddin, aka (Hambali), ISN US9ID-010019DP (ID-

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REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
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10019), in Thailand (TH) for the facilitation of the August 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia (ID).¹ KU-10024 intended to use detainee as an al-Qaida operative to conduct attacks against the US infrastructure within the continental US, and tasked detainee to research and then orchestrate attacks on gas stations and water reservoirs. In conjunction with this activity, KU-10024 plotted to utilize the import/export textile business of Saifullah Paracha, ISN US9PK-001094DP (PK-1094), to smuggle explosives into an al-Qaida cover business located in the US and managed by the detainee. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **LOW** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) **Summary of Changes:** The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Added aliases Yusif, Majid Shoukat Khan, and Ammar²

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) **Prior History:** In 1996, detainee moved to the US with his family and settled in Baltimore, Maryland (MD). Detainee graduated high school in 1999 and worked at the family gas station, but never obtained US citizenship.³

¹ TD-314/33834-04, Analyst Note: The JI is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 2 counterterrorism (CT) target. Priority 2 CT targets are issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests. The JI has been linked to several deadly attacks across Indonesia and is the most dangerous terrorist group to US interests in Southeast Asia. Since 2000, the JI has been involved in at least six bombings of civilian facilities and two embassies resulting in the death of over 250 and injuring hundreds more. Most recently the JI is noted in reporting linked to the planning of a suicide bomb attack in Manila, Philippines (TD-314/45913-06), and planning terrorist attacks against US interests in Indonesia and the southern Philippines (ACIC FPN06-0015 13-Apr-2006).

² ➤010020 BIO 04-OCT-2006, TD-314/26997-03, IIR 4 201 0055 05

³ 010020 BIO 04-OCT-2006, Analyst Note: Detainee reported having employment related to computers possibly at a time period between March 2002 and August 2002. See TD-314/29030-05.

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b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: From 1999, detainee spent about a year with the Jamaat al-Tablighi (JT) preaching Islam.⁴ However, after 11 September 2001, he heard more about violent jihad and began to doubt the teachings of the Tablighs. Detainee started to question the true meaning of jihad and became confused about Islam. Detainee said it was tradition in his family to marry a woman from the same tribe, so he traveled to Pakistan in January 2002 to attend numerous family weddings and to find a wife for himself. In Pakistan, detainee met his uncle Masoud Khan and cousin Mansour Khan, aka (Hassan al-Pakistani), both of whom were al-Qaida operatives. Detainee also met KU-10024.⁵ Detainee said when he was in his mid-teens, he and his siblings began to call KU-10024 “Chacha,” which was Urdu for “Uncle”. Detainee and his cousin only referred to KU-10024 as Chacha verbally. They did not use this form of address when they communicated with him via e-mail.⁶ Detainee began to study about jihad and was influenced by those around him. Detainee sought answers to his questions about Islam and would have followed anyone.⁷ On 15 March 2002, detainee returned to the US. In July 2002, detainee told his parents he wanted to return to Pakistan. His parents did not want him to leave and hid his passport so he could not depart the US. With the help of his friend Kamran, detainee opened a post office box, to which they both had access, so he could request a duplicate social security card and Pakistani passport. Detainee later told his parents he planned to remain in the US and his parents returned his passport to him. Detainee then used the passport to return to Pakistan. In Pakistan in September 2002, KU-10024 asked him to return to the US and settle down with his wife, lead a normal life, have children, work a regular job and wait until called upon. Detainee said KU-10024 did not give him any specific assignments or tasks, nor did KU-10024 hint at what he planned for detainee.⁸

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee said even though he was in Pakistan, he wanted to give the appearance to the US authorities that he was still in the US. In November 2002, detainee traveled to Kamran’s father’s home in Lahore, PK and tried to contact Kamran to extend the tenancy of their post office box but was unsuccessful. Detainee decided to open a new post office box and enlisted the assistance of a woman named Aafia Siddiqui whom he met with Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali, aka (Ammar al-Baluchi), ISN US9PK-

⁴ Analyst Note: JT is an NIPF Priority 3 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 3 TSE have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups. Affiliation with the JT has been identified as an al-Qaida cover story. Al-Qaida used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travels of its members. For additional information see: IIR 2 227 0131 03, Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover as of 20051228, and JITFCT Special Analysis US Jamaat Tabligh. More recently, the JT has been linked to the 11 July 2006 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India in which at least 207 people were killed and over 800 injured. See US Naval Criminal Investigative Service Special Analytic Report (SAR) 191429ZJUL06.

⁵ TD-314/33834-04, TD-314/25217-04, TD-314/35571-02

⁶ TD 314/35571-03, TD-314/25217-04

⁷ TD-314/33834-04

⁸ TD-314/48825-04, TD-314/43516-03

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010018DP (PK-10018). At a second meeting, detainee provided her a completed application for an "asylum travel document" which, according to detainee, looked and functioned like a passport. Detainee also provided her with photos of himself and money to submit along with the request form. Siddiqui returned to the US and opened a post office box in detainee's name, using her driver's license information. Detainee said when he returned to Pakistan on 15 August 2002, he considered his options of staying with his wife in Pakistan, or return to the US as KU-10024 wanted him to do. Detainee said when he met with KU-10024 in September 2002, he told KU-10024 he wanted to work with the fighters. He asked KU-10024 to find him work that did not involve the US. Detainee said KU-10024 talked to him at length and told him it was Allah's way, telling him he should make sacrifices. In January 2003, Siddiqui, using this new post office box, sent in detainee's request for a new travel document because his previous travel document, which was valid for one year, expired on 25 December 2002. Uzhair Paracha, PK-1094's son, was to then go to the post office, pretend he was detainee, and give them a change of address. Additionally, PK-1094 was to deposit money in detainee's account and later call the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to inquire about the travel document. Detainee stated this was to be done to lead US authorities to believe that he was in the US when he was actually in Pakistan. KU-10024 convinced detainee to return to the US and await orders. However, detainee was arrested before he could return.⁹

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S/NF) There are few details of detainee's actual capture. Detainee was arrested in Karachi, PK on 5 March 2003, likely as a result of his connections to KU-10024.¹⁰

b. (S) Property Held: None

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 4 September 2006

d. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: Detainee was transferred to JTF-GTMO to face prosecution for terrorist activities against the US.

6. (S/NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's account is partially truthful. Based on available reporting, detainee has provided a corroborated account of his activities and associations with al-Qaida. Detainee admitted his uncle and cousin were al-Qaida members, but has yet to provide details of their activities. Detainee admitted his role, including vetting and

⁹ TD-314/48825-04, Analyst Note: Siddiqui is the subject of an FBI BOLO (Be On the Look Out Alert) and remains at large. See CIR-316-11015-03. Uzhair was sentenced in the US to 30 years in prison for his assistance to al-Qaida.

¹⁰ TD-314/30874-03, TD-314/44115-04

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recruiting operatives, and discussed the gas station bombing plot. Detainee's statement of having minimal interest in the poisons plot is possibly an attempt to conceal knowledge and involvement related to planned activities against water reservoirs.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is an al-Qaida operative who was directly subordinate to senior al-Qaida operational planner KU-10024. Detainee volunteered to conduct terrorist operations in the US for KU-10024 and was a willing suicide operative. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, detainee was introduced to KU-10024 in Pakistan and requested to work for him. KU-10024's vetting of detainee included a pseudo-suicide assassination attempt against Pakistani President Musharraf, and the delivery of al-Qaida financing to senior al-Qaida/JI operative ID-10019 in Thailand for the facilitation of the August 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel. KU-10024 intended to use detainee as a US-based al-Qaida operative to conduct attacks against the US infrastructure. KU-10024 tasked detainee to research and then orchestrate attacks on gas stations and water reservoirs within the US. In conjunction with this activity, KU-10024 intended to utilize PK-1094's import/export textile business to smuggle explosives into an al-Qaida cover business located in the US and managed by detainee to be used for the attacks.

- (S//NF) Detainee is an admitted al-Qaida operative who voluntarily worked for KU-10024. Detainee completed a testing and evaluation period controlled by KU-10024, and vetted potential operatives on behalf of KU-10024.
 - (S//NF) Detainee speculated KU-10024 selected him as an operative mainly because he had experience inside the US and spoke English "like an American."¹¹
 - (S//NF) PK-10018 verified detainee joined al-Qaida in 2002.¹²
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated KU-10024 and PK-10018 assessed him during his initial visit to Pakistan, although he did not realize it at the time. Detainee said KU-10024 often asked him questions about various issues to test his knowledge and intelligence.¹³
 - (S//NF) KU-10024 vetted detainee with two tests. The first test was one of detainee's willingness to die for the cause. When asked by KU-10024 if he was willing to martyr himself, detainee responded affirmatively.¹⁴

¹¹ TD-314/33834-04

¹² TD-314/24351-04

¹³ TD-314/33834-04

¹⁴ TD-314/17995-03

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- (S//NF) Detainee reported KU-10024 gave him an explosives vest to wear at a mosque where Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf would visit on 8 March 2002. During the visit, detainee would kill himself in a suicide attack against Musharraf.¹⁵
- (S//NF) KU-10024 advised detainee to get as close to Musharraf as he could before closing the switch sewn into his pocket. Detainee went along with the plan and donned the waist coat before being driven to the mosque by KU-10024 and Mansour. KU-10024 drove the men to a mosque which was about twenty minutes away from the house located in Baba Faridi.¹⁶
 - ◆ (S//NF) Mansour Khan informed detainee this would only be a test and to remain calm and do whatever KU-10024 asked. According to detainee, the man believed to be Hassan Ba Attash, aka (Umayr al-Gharib), made an explosive laden waist coat for detainee to wear.¹⁷ (Analyst Note: Ba Attash is assessed to be Hassan Muhammad Ali Bin Attash, aka (Umayr al-Gharib), ISN PK9SA-001456DP (SA-1456). Detainee stated SA-1456 instructed an electronic timer class which detainee attended.)
 - ◆ (S//NF) Detainee said he checked the vest and did not see any explosives inside, and also noticed there was no increase in security at the mosque as would be expected during a presidential visit.¹⁸
- (S//NF) KU-10024's second test was detainee's 24 to 29 December 2002 trip to deliver \$50,000 US to ID-10019 in Thailand (TH), to facilitate al-Qaida's financial support of JI's August 2003 bombing of Jakarta's Marriott Hotel.¹⁹
 - (S//NF) Detainee confirmed KU-10024 discussed the trip in September and December 2002. PK-10018 provided specific details of the trip two days before travel.²⁰
 - (S//NF) Detainee's uncle, Masoud Khan Qyam Khani, arranged for the financial transfer from Pakistan to Bangkok, TH where detainee was to pick the money up from a *hawala* (banking system external of established international system) office.²¹
 - (S//NF) When detainee traveled to Thailand, PK-10018 gave him two telephone numbers: one for the *hawala* dealer in Bangkok and one for al-Qaida operative Mohd Farik Bin Amin, aka (Zubayr), ISN US9MY-010021DP (MY-

¹⁵ TD-314/33834-04

¹⁶ TD-314/17995-03

¹⁷ TD-314/17995-03

¹⁸ TD-314/33834-04

¹⁹ > IIR 2 227 0261 06, TD-314/32870-03, TD-314/19005-02

²⁰ > TD-314/19005-02, TD-314/48473-03

²¹ TD-314/48473-03, Analyst Note: Hawala is a banker using an underground banking system based on trust, whereby money can be made available internationally without actually moving it or leaving a record of transaction; terrorists make frequent use of the hawala system.

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10021), who ultimately would receive the money. Detainee contacted the *hawala* dealer who took detainee's hotel name and room number and brought the money to him.²²

- ◆ (S//NF) Detainee said the demeanor of the *hawala* dealers on the phone and their delivery of the money to the hotel suggested to him they were simply unwitting business people. Detainee gave his true name and showed his passport to the dealers in order to receive the money.²³
- (SBU) ID-10019's brother and former head of JI's Karachi-based al-Ghuraba cell, Rusman "Gun Gun" Gunawan, described his role in facilitating the financial transaction that paid for the JIs' August 2003 Marriott Hotel attack. Gunawan testified he requested, on ID-10019's behalf, for PK-10018 to send \$50,000 US to ID-10019. He confirmed the money was received.²⁴
 - ◆ (S//NF) Detainee was present during a February 2003 meeting in Karachi between PK-10018 and Rusman Gunawan.²⁵ (Analyst Note: In addition to delivering the funds used for the Marriott Hotel attack, detainee may have had prior knowledge of the operation.)
- (S//NF) According to the Indonesia National Police Chief, General Sutanto, \$130,000 US was sent from Pakistan in May 2003 to fund the bombing of the JW Marriott Hotel and the Australian Embassy. ID-10019 sent the money in American Dollars to Lilik, aka (Lap Bashir), ISN US9MY-010022DP (MY-10022), in Bangkok where it was exchanged for Malaysian Ringgit and Australian Dollars. The money was then given to Johan, a courier from Malaysia, who took it to Dumai, ID where it was received by individuals named Ismail and Noordin.²⁶
- (S//NF) PK-10018 stated KU-10024 tasked detainee to conduct research supporting the planning of terrorist attacks within the US.
 - (S//NF) Detainee's involvement in the gas stations plot began in March 2002 after he asked KU-10024 about the 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee and KU-10024 discussed the effect the fuel in the aircraft had during these attacks, which led detainee to inform KU-10024 of his family's gas station in Baltimore. KU-10024 appeared interested in this topic and asked detainee about his work at the gas station.²⁷
 - (S//NF) Before detainee left Pakistan on 15 March 2002, KU-10024 tasked him to conduct research for attacks against gas stations while in the US. Detainee stated in the US he did a small amount of internet research and also asked his brother for

²² TD-314/48473-03, TD-314/26997-03

²³ TD-314/48473-03

²⁴ 010020 AMEMBASSY JAKARTA DTG 091130Z DEC 04

²⁵ >TD-314/44122-04

²⁶ FBIS SEP20060210112002, TD-314/49954-06

²⁷ TD-314/38254-03, TD-314/43516-03

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information about gas stations. Detainee asked his brother for a gas station manual, but his brother did not give him the manual and told him to ask the gas station supervisor for more information.²⁸

- (S//NF) Detainee planned to recruit his brother, located in the US, to assist with his research for the plot to blow up multiple US gas stations. Detainee's brother was impressed with detainee's al-Qaida contacts and appeared eager to assist with his research. Another of the detainee's brothers declined to assist.²⁹

- (S//NF) Detainee admitted he was assessing possible al-Qaida recruits.

- Detainee thought it was his responsibility to build an initial cell for the gas station attack plan. Detainee recruited at least four individuals, including his brother.³⁰

- (S//NF) Detainee reported telling KU-10024 that the underground tanks at gas stations did not have locks and anybody could place something in those tanks. KU-10024 appeared interested in this information, and asked detainee if he was familiar with timing devices.³¹

- (S//NF) Detainee stated KU-10024 wanted to use Jaffar al-Tayyar,³² Zuhayb, and two to three unknown African-American Muslim converts who were training in Afghanistan to conduct the attacks against the gas stations. Detainee claimed KU-10024 was interested in using individuals with US status to assist with this operation, but would not necessarily use detainee to conduct the attack.³³

- (S//NF) KU-10024 tasked detainee to conduct research to support unspecified poisons attacks against US water reservoirs.³⁵

- (S//NF) KU-10024 discussed plans to target the infrastructure of the US. KU-10024 stated he wanted to target water reservoirs and water treatment plants in the US. KU-10024 had not worked out the details of this plan and admitted determining the appropriate contaminant would require further research. KU-10024 was interested in having detainee work on the water supply project, as well as a project targeting nuclear reactors.³⁶

- (S//NF) KU-10024 knew there were at least two ways to tamper with the water supply. The first method would be to permanently damage the hydraulic pumps and back-up pumps of a major reservoir. Even if the pumps could be replaced within a

²⁸ TD-314/43516-03

²⁹ TD-314/17995-03

³⁰ >TD-314/19005-03

³¹ TD-314/43516-03

³² TD-314/35571-03, Analyst Note: Detainee met Tayyar at the Baba Afridi's guesthouse in Karachi.

³³ TD-314/17995-03, Analyst Note: Jaffar al-Tayyar is assessed to be Adnan G. al-Shurkrijumah who is sought by the FBI in connection with possible terrorist threats against the US. The term "US status" is assessed to refer to those individuals, US citizens or foreigners, who have a valid and legal purpose for traveling to and within the US, and who could do so with relative ease and without raising the suspicions of US authorities. See TD-314/85346-06.

³⁴ TD-314/45038-04

³⁵ TD-314/17995-03

³⁶ TD-314/18688-03

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- week, crippling a large-scale reservoir would leave hundreds of thousands of citizens without water, and would leave them feeling vulnerable to further terrorist attack. KU-10024's second approach for attacking water supplies involved introducing poison into the water.³⁷
- (S//NF) Detainee admitted he had little interest in this type of attack and instead focused on his plan to target gas stations. Detainee completed a small amount of research on poison attacks via the internet from his family's home computer in Maryland.³⁸
 - (S//NF) KU-10024 planned to utilize PK-1094's import/export textile business to smuggle explosives into an al-Qaida cover business located in the US and managed by detainee.
 - (S//NF) KU-10024 commented on an al-Qaida plan to smuggle explosives into the US. KU-10024 stated al-Qaida had a relationship with PK-1094, who was in Karachi and owned an import-export textile business with a branch in New York City. PK-1094's son, Uzhair, worked in his father's business in New York. KU-10024 explained PK-10018 and detainee had discussed with PK-1094 a plan for al-Qaida to use PK-1094's textile business to smuggle explosives into the US.³⁹
 - (S//NF) KU-10024 stated the explosives would be shipped in the standard 20 to 40 foot containers PK-1094 used to ship textiles he sold in the US. KU-10024 specified C4 would be the type of explosive he hoped to send.⁴⁰
 - (S//NF) PK-10018 also made statements he had a plan to open an import/export business in the US and use it as a front to ship explosives. The intent would be to operate an import/export business in Karachi and another one in the US, with detainee managing the US store. Detainee agreed to set up the cover business with the assistance of PK-1094, Abu Issa al-Britani, and Aafia Siddiqui. Siddiqui's assignment would be to rent houses and provide administrative support for the operation.⁴¹
 - ◆ (S//NF) Analyst Note: In his explanation of the US-based business, PK-10018 identified detainee as an al-Qaida associate. KU-10024's plan and PK-10018's plan are assessed to be inter-woven and apparently was a work in progress prior to their capture. There are at least two individuals sharing the alias Abu Issa al-Britani. KU-10024 identified one he tasked in late 1999 or early 2000 to find suitable economic targets in Brooklyn, New York.⁴² The other al-Britani is aka (Issa al-Hindi), aka (Saajid Badat), who PK-10018

³⁷ TD-314/18688-03

³⁸ TD-314/17995-03

³⁹ TD-314/16519-03

⁴⁰ TD-314/39628-04

⁴¹ >TD-314/32538-03, TD-314/30874-03

⁴² >TD-314/14673-03

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reported was a shoe bomb operative along with Richard Reid and who was also associated with KU-10024.⁴³

◆ (S//NF) The entire explosives smuggling operation was contingent upon detainee getting into the US. Detainee was told not to have contact with any members of his family located in the US because this would cause problems for the operation. Once in the US, if he was able to set up the company, the explosives would be shipped from the import/export company created in Karachi to the US location. Upon receipt of the explosives, his plan was to blow up several gas stations simultaneously. It was up to detainee to identify the targets. The plan was sufficiently simple and could easily be changed if detainee developed further ideas or better targets.⁴⁴

○ (S//NF) KU-10024 commented PK-1094 knew all the details of the plan and said while Uzhair understood PK-10018 and detainee were associated with al-Qaida, KU-10024 was unclear on how much Uzhair knew about the smuggling plan. KU-10024 said detainee was to rent a storage space in whatever area in the US he chose, not necessarily close to New York City, and the explosives would be used in al-Qaida's campaign against economic targets in the US.⁴⁵

○ (S//REL US, GBR) PK-1094 recalled a meeting in Karachi where detainee met with PK-10018, Uzhair, and PK-1094. Detainee asked Uzhair to check on detainee's immigration status and to keep detainee's bank account active. Uzhair was to deposit and withdraw money from detainee's bank account.⁴⁶ (Analyst Note: It is assessed the bank account detainee transacted with was held in the US. This activity clearly shows detainee was well acquainted with PK-1094 and Uzhair, and undertook activities to mislead US law enforcement and intelligence agencies.)

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a **LOW** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been generally compliant. He currently has 22 reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 23 May 2008, when he was heard yelling in a loud voice in his cell and banging on the cell door. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, kicking his cell door, possession of contraband in his cell, unauthorized communications, and use of provoking words and gestures. Detainee has made several allegations of abuse, such as being denied a daily newspaper, guards asking him to open his Quran for search, organized crime and corruption, and cell cameras making abnormal noise. All allegations were documented and investigated, and were found to have no basis or merit.

⁴³ >TD-314/56431-03

⁴⁴ TD-314/30874-03

⁴⁵ TD-314/16519-03

⁴⁶ IIR 4 201 0067 05

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8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee spent a year with the JT in Pakistan, probably at the JT Center in Raiwind near Lahore. Detainee completed two testing operations for KU-10024. Detainee received explosives training from possibly PK-1456. Detainee traveled to Thailand and delivered funds associated with the Marriot Hotel bombing to ID-10019. Detainee was involved in the speculation of transporting explosives through PK-1094's import/export business, gas station plot, and poisoning of US water reservoirs. Detainee's uncle and cousin are al-Qaida operatives.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has knowledge of the JT and their course curriculum at the JT Center. Detainee has at least rudimentary explosives training. Detainee planned and began recruiting his portion of the gas station plot, and at least conducted research on the poisoning plot. Detainee should have biographical information on KU-10024, as KU-10024 is an associate of detainee's uncle. Detainee possesses the ability to falsify ones location through the use of bank accounts and false immigration travel documents. Detainee possibly had prior knowledge of the Marriot Hotel bombing. Detainee has information on smuggling explosives and chemicals into the US.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Terrorist attacks against the US
 - Recruitment and operational planning
 - Operational details and key individuals involved in the August 2003 Marriot Hotel terrorist attacks in Jakarta
 - Gas station plot; recruiting and training details
 - Poisoning US water reservoirs
 - Smuggling explosives into the US
- KU-10024 and PK-1094 associations with detainee's family
- PK-10018
- Aafia Siddiqui
- Al-Qaida recruiting, vetting, and planning process
- JT and Raiwind Center
- Biographical data of al-Qaida leaders
- Communication methods and computers as used by al-Qaida

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9PK-010020DP (S)

- Identity fraud



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Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.