


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.,)
)
)
 Plaintiff,)
)
 v.)
)
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,)
et al.)
)
 Defendants.)

Case: 1:11-cv-00890

DECLARATION OF WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN

1. (U) I, William H. McRaven, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following information is true and correct: I am an Admiral in the United States Navy. I am currently serving as Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a Component of the Department of Defense (DoD), at MacDill Air Force Base, in Tampa, Florida, and have held that position since August 2011. USSOCOM ensures the readiness of joint special operations forces and, as directed, conducts operations worldwide. Its mission includes providing fully capable Special Operations Forces (SOF) to defend the United States and its interests; synchronizing the planning of global operations against terrorist networks; deterring disrupting and defeating terrorist threats; planning and conducting special operations; and fostering interagency cooperation.



2. (U) Through the exercise of my official duties and as a result of my personal knowledge, I am familiar with the request for photographs and video recordings in this case. I am also familiar with the declaration of John Bennett, Director of the National Clandestine Service, that includes his determination as the appropriate CIA official that the records responsive to this request are classified under sections 1.4 (a), (c) and (d) of Executive Order 13526. This declaration supplements that one to explain further how the responsive records contain sensitive information that pertains to military plans, weapons systems, or operations under Section 1.4(a) of the Executive Order and is specific to special operations. I have reviewed the records responsive to this request. This declaration describes the harm that release of the requested records could reasonably be expected to cause to the national security and supplements the declaration of John Bennett noted above.

3. (U) For the reasons set forth in this declaration, I have concluded that the official release of the responsive records could reasonably be expected to:

- a. (U) Make the special operations unit that participated in this operation and its members more readily identifiable in the future;
- b. (U) Reveal classified Sensitive Site Exploitation Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and other classified information specific to special operations; and

captured and killed personnel so that the enemy could develop counter-measures to defeat future military operations.

THE BASES FOR MY CONCLUSIONS

4. (U) My conclusions are based upon my years of service and experience in the United States military and in special operations units. In particular:

- a. (U) I have served in the United States Armed Forces for more than 30 years at various levels of command and staff. I am personally qualified in U.S. Navy Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) operations. Prior to assuming command of USSOCOM, I commanded the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), a Sub-Unified Command of USSOCOM, from June 2008 until 2011. I have commanded at every level within the special operations community, including assignments as Deputy Commanding General for Operations at JSOC, Commodore of Naval Special Warfare Group ONE, Commander of SEAL Team THREE, Task Group Commander in the Central Command area of responsibility, Task Unit Commander during DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD, Squadron Commander at Naval Special Warfare Development Group, and SEAL Platoon Commander at Underwater Demolition Team TWENTY-ONE/SEAL Team FOUR. As a result of my experiences, I have intimate, extensive knowledge of our

unconventional forces and capabilities of the enemies arrayed against us;

- b. (U) SOF units currently operate worldwide in more than 70 countries, including a significant number in Afghanistan. As the SOCOM Commander, I receive and review daily operations briefings, reports and intelligence analyses from Central Command, the Joint Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. Given my familiarity with current special force operations, I provide briefings to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. In short, my job requires me to be an expert in special forces operations; and
- c. (U) I have also considered and relied upon the analysis and assessments of DoD resident subject-matter experts on the Middle-Eastern region; and
- d. (U) In reaching my conclusions I have reviewed and relied upon the declaration of John Bennett noted above.

5. (S) The responsive records would reveal unique information about the unit, making members readily identifiable in the future and, therefore, placing them and their families at great risk of being specifically targeted by the enemy. Multiple photos depict equipment used by the particular special operations unit during this operation. Among what is shown are certain types of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] are unique to special operations forces, though not necessarily this unit. Combined [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] future.

6. (S) Classified Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) are also revealed in the photos. The unit that participated in the

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These TTPs are classified SECRET pursuant to the [REDACTED] Classification Manual 380-5, dated May 01, 2006. The release of the photos will cause damage to national security by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7. (S) In addition, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Specifically, the unit that conducted the
operation [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] This type of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] is classified SECRET. A careful review of the
relevant photos [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

CONCLUSION

8. (U) In light of my knowledge and experience, the additional information described herein, and given the sensitive information specific to special operations contained in the responsive records, I believe that the responsive records must be withheld in order to protect future military operations and the security of the special operations forces participating in them. It is my opinion that the release of the

responsive records could reasonably be expected to cause harm to the national security by making the special operations unit that participated in this operation and its members more readily identifiable in the future; providing the enemy information that will allow them to analyze the TTPs used during SSE, including the methods used for identification of captured and killed enemy personnel; and possibly provide them the opportunity to defeat SOF practices in the future.

(U) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 26 day of September, 2011



WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN
Commander
U.S. Special Operations Command
Tampa, Florida