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UNITED STATES
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
WASHINGTON, DC

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CLERK OF COURT

IN RE ORDERS ISSUED BY THIS COURT
INTERPRETING SECTION 215 OF THE
PATRIOT ACT

Docket No. Misc. 13-02

**BRIEF OF *AMICI CURIAE* U.S. REPRESENTATIVES AMASH, BROUN, GABBARD,
GRIFFITH, HOLT, JONES, LEE, LOFGREN, MASSIE, MCCLINTOCK, NORTON,
O'ROURKE, PEARCE, SALMON, SANFORD, AND YOHO IN SUPPORT OF THE
MOTION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL, AND THE MEDIA FREEDOM
AND INFORMATION ACCESS CLINIC FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS**

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INTEREST OF *AMICI CURIAE*¹

U.S. Representatives Justin Amash, Paul Broun, Tulsi Gabbard, Morgan Griffith, Rush Holt, Walter Jones, Barbara Lee, Zoe Lofgren, Thomas Massie, Tom McClintock, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Beto O'Rourke, Steve Pearce, Matt Salmon, Mark Sanford, and Ted Yoho² respectfully submit this brief in support of the Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic for the Release of Court Records (the "Motion"), which was filed with this Court on June 10, 2013. This brief is addressed to the same subject as the Motion: to urge the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") to publish opinions—with classified information redacted—evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861. *Amici curiae* have worked extensively on issues surrounding government oversight and transparency. Rep. Amash has succinctly captured the interest of *amici* as follows: "We accept that free countries must engage in secret operations from time to time to protect their citizens. Free countries must not, however, operate under secret laws. Secret court opinions obscure the law. They prevent public debate on critical policy issues and they stop Congress from fulfilling its duty to enact sound laws and fix broken ones."

The opinions sought in the Motion are essential to the proper functioning of the legislative branch of government and an informed public debate. They provide a critical gloss—namely, judicial interpretation and construction—on the laws governing the nation's surveillance practices. Without access to this information, Congress and the public cannot have a meaningful debate about how these laws operate in practice. The need for informed discussion in Congress

¹ This brief is filed with the consent of the parties. *Amici curiae* certify that this brief was not written in whole or in part by counsel for any party, and no person or entity other than *amici curiae* and its counsel has made a monetary contribution to the preparation and submission of this brief.

² Brief biographies for each *amicus* appear in Appendix A to this brief.

regarding the implementation of surveillance laws is especially great now, as Congress is evaluating ways to ensure government operations are more effective, to streamline the government's budget, and to protect Americans' civil liberties in an age of rapid technological expansion. As Congress considers whether to reauthorize one of the government's principal surveillance tools—Section 215 of the Patriot Act—in two years, it is crucial for Congress to fully understand how the law is being utilized and where it can be clarified or improved. Moreover, the importance of meaningful debate on this issue has grown as the American people have become increasingly suspicious of their government's surveillance activities. To enable an open dialogue on these issues between and within Congress and the public, *amici curiae* urge this Court to disclose the secret opinions sought in the Motion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c, the proceedings of the FISC and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (“FISA Review Court”) are generally secret. FISA mandates that the “record of proceedings” of the Courts, including “applications made and orders granted,” is subject to “security measures established by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence.” 50 U.S.C. § 1803(c). As a practical matter, these security measures have resulted in virtually all of the FISC's and the FISA Review Court's opinions being kept secret, including from most Members of Congress.

Under FISA, the decisions of this Court are disclosed to Congress only to a limited extent. FISC Rule of Procedure 62(c) permits either the government or the Court to provide “copies of Court orders, opinions, decisions, or other Court records” to Congress. In particular, FISA requires that the Attorney General make semiannual reports only to several

Congressional committees³ and not to Congress as a whole. These reports must contain, among other things, (1) “copies of all decisions, orders, or opinions” of this Court or the FISA Review Court that contain “significant construction or interpretation” of FISA, and (2) “a summary of significant legal interpretations” under FISA involving matters before this Court or the FISA Review Court, including “interpretations presented in applications or pleadings” filed by the Department of Justice in either court. 50 U.S.C. § 1871(a)(4), (5). The statute further requires that the Attorney General submit to the same committees (1) “a copy of any decision, order, or opinion” issued by either court that contains “significant construction or interpretation” and any associated “pleadings, applications, or memoranda of law” not later than 45 days after the decision, order, or opinion issues, and (2) a copy of each such decision, order, or opinion issued during the five years prior to July 10, 2008, not previously submitted. 50 U.S.C. § 1871(c). FISA allows the Attorney General to redact the materials as necessary to protect national security. 50 U.S.C. § 1871(d).

As a consequence of the secrecy of FISA decisions and the limited disclosure of those decisions only to a few Members of Congress, most Members of Congress are not privy to the substance of FISC proceedings. Members of Congress who do not serve on the enumerated committees do not routinely receive information disseminated to committee members. *See, e.g.,* Molly K. Hooper & Jordy Yager, *Lawmakers can ask for intel info, but they still might not get it*, The Hill (June 12, 2013, 5:00 AM), <http://thehill.com/homenews/house/304937-lawmakers-can-ask-for-intel-info-but-they-still-might-not-get-it>; Reid J. Epstein, *Lawmakers rebut President Obama's data defense*, POLITICO (June 7, 2013, 9:40 PM),

³ The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate. 50 U.S.C. § 1871(a).

<http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/congress-nsa-prism-intelligence-briefing-92438.html>. In some cases, only four or eight Members of Congress, the top-ranking Intelligence Members and sometimes the House and Senate leadership, are fully briefed on the government's programs.⁴ See, e.g., Hooper & Yager, *supra* (detailing a "closed" process); Epstein, *supra* ("This 'fully briefed' is something that drives us up the wall, because often 'fully briefed' means a group of eight leadership; it does not necessarily mean relevant committees," [Sen. Barbara] Mikulski said.").

As important, whatever information Members of Congress learn about secret FISC opinions and orders, they are unable publicly to discuss or debate them because any disclosure is still subject to secrecy requirements. See, e.g., Hooper & Yager, *supra* ("Lawmakers learn a little more than what has been reported in the news, [Former Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Pete] Hoekstra said. But those members are barred from discussing the matter because technically they received the information at a classified briefing."); Jonathan Weisman, *Sounding the Alarm, but With a Muted Bell*, N.Y. Times (June 6, 2013), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/politics/senators-wyden-and-udall-warned-about-surveillance.html> ("Yet shackled by strict rules on the discussion of classified information, Mr. Wyden and Mr. Udall, members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence[,] could not—and still cannot—offer much more than an intimation about their concerns. They had to be content to sit in a special sealed room, soak in information that they said appalled and frightened them, then offer veiled messages that were largely ignored.").

⁴ When four Members of Congress are briefed, this group is only the highest-ranking Republican and Democrat in both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Hooper & Yager, *supra*. When eight Members of Congress are briefed, this group also includes the Speaker of the House, the House minority leader, and the Senate majority and minority leaders. *Id.*

In light of recent disclosures regarding the existence of a “classified intelligence program,” related to the “business records” section of FISA,⁵ the Director of National Intelligence has acknowledged that “it is important for the American people to understand” the limits of the program and the principles behind it. Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Statement on Recent Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information (June 6, 2013), *available at* <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/868-dni-statement-on-recent-unauthorized-disclosures-of-classified-information>. Notwithstanding the compelling public interest in an open debate about the scope and propriety of government surveillance programs authorized under FISA, even the *amici*—Members of the U.S. Congress—cannot meaningfully participate in that public debate so long as this Court’s relevant decisions and interpretations of law remain secret. They cannot engage in public discussion on the floor of the Senate and the House about the government’s surveillance programs. And they cannot engage in a dialogue with their constituents on these pressing matters of public importance.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The U.S. Constitution protects robust, open debate in Congress, and Congress must in turn be able to communicate freely and openly with its constituents, the American people. The Constitution also explicitly provides Congress with the power to make rules for the government and pass all laws necessary and proper to execute this power. To fulfill these responsibilities, Congress depends on accurate information regarding the implementation of laws, the activities of the government itself, and the will of the public. The very democratic process on which the United States was founded suffers in the absence of this information.

⁵ 50 U.S.C. § 1861, amended by Section 215 of the Patriot Act.

Congress's "informing function" is especially critical when the public suffers from a crisis of confidence in its government. Recent disclosures about the nature and scope of the government's surveillance practices have given many citizens cause for concern about their privacy and the infringement of civil liberties generally.

Congress's ability to legislate effectively depends on an open judiciary. Congress and the public cannot know how their laws operate in practice unless they have access to relevant information, such as court opinions, that interpret and construe those laws. Americans' need to know about this Court's actions has grown in tandem with the significance of the operations this Court approves. That is especially true now, as we approach the sunset of Section 215 of the Patriot Act. The text of U.S. surveillance statutes alone cannot provide necessary insight into the FISC's significant interpretations of the statutes.

Disclosure of this Court's opinions interpreting Section 215 is imperative to a meaningful debate in Congress and in the public about how the government conducts surveillance. That disclosure and debate will enhance, not diminish, national security. *Amici* respectfully ask this Court to release its relevant decisions to the maximum extent practicable so that this critical debate can occur in public, where it belongs.

ARGUMENT

I. TO FULFILL ITS CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE, CONGRESS MUST BE ABLE TO HAVE INFORMED, PUBLIC DEBATE

Informed, public debate is central to Congress's role as a coequal branch of the federal government. The Constitution acknowledges the unique importance of open debate to Congress's role in the Speech or Debate Clause. Debate in Congress serves not only the institution's internal goal of creating sound public policy. Courts have recognized a second

crucial purpose of informed, public debate in Congress: to inform the American people about the issues affecting their government.

A. The Speech or Debate Clause Underscores the Unique Importance of Open Debate to Congress’s Legislative Function

In the Speech or Debate Clause, the Constitution privileges Congress’s open exchange of ideas. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Congressmen] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”). The Speech or Debate Clause provides extraordinary protection for Congressmen’s statements. The Clause offers in some respects more generous protection than is found in the First Amendment alone so that Congress can engage in robust debate. *See, e.g.*, II Works of James Wilson 38 (Andrews ed. 1896) (“In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence.”), *quoted in Tenney v. Branhove*, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951). This constitutional protection of debate is meant to insulate the legislative branch from “possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary.” *United States v. Johnson*, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966) (quoting *Kilbourn v. Thompson*, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881)).

The inclusion of the Clause in the Constitution demonstrates that an essential function of Congress is robust legislative debate. There is no doubt that public debate among executive-branch officials or members of the judiciary is important to the execution of their constitutional roles. However, the Speech and Debate Clause applies only to Congress; there exists no analog to protect the other two branches. The unique protection of debate in Congress underscores the importance of that debate to fulfilling the institution’s constitutional role.

B. Congress Must Be Able to Perform its “Informing Function”

Informed, public debate serves not only Congress’s role in enacting sound public policy, but also the important role of Congress as a source of information to the public about the government’s operations. Congress’s “informing function” was recognized from the earliest days of the Republic. In a 1787 letter to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson posed the question “whether peace is best preserved by giving energy to the government, or *information to the people*,” and then answered, “[t]his last is the most certain, and the most legitimate engine of government.” 6 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 392 (Memorial ed. 1903) (emphasis added), *quoted in Gravel v. United States*, 408 U.S. 606, 641 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has similarly recognized that “from the earliest times in its history, Congress has assiduously performed an ‘informing function’ of this nature.” *Watkins v. United States*, 354 U.S. 178, 199 n.33 (1957). Indeed, a legislator’s duty to inform the public about matters affecting their government lies “at the heart of our democratic system.” *Gravel*, 408 U.S. at 649 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

In times of political controversy, it is crucial that Congress be able to carry out its informing function freely and without restriction. When the public experiences a “crisis in confidence” in its government, “[c]ommunication between Congress and the electorate tends to alleviate that doubt by exposing and clarifying the workings of the political system, the politics underlying new laws and the role of the Executive in their administration.” *Gravel*, 408 U.S. at 651–52 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By making information available to its constituents, Congress has great power to inform debate and shape public discussion. *See, e.g.*, Samuel Dash, *Congress’ Spotlight on the Oval Office: The Senate Watergate Hearings*, 18 *Nova L. Rev.* 1719, 1723 (1994) (discussing the “tremendous impact” the Senate Watergate hearings had on public opinion). This ability is clearly diminished, however, if Congress is prevented from making as

much information as possible publicly available. *Cf. Gravel*, 408 U.S. at 656 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[S]elf-government can succeed only when the people are informed by their representatives, without interference by the Executive or Judiciary, concerning the conduct of their agents in government.”); Ramsey Clark, *Attorney General’s Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act*, June 1967, available at <http://www.justice.gov/oip/67agmemo.htm> (“If government is to be truly of, by, and for the people, the people must know in detail the activities of government. Nothing so diminishes democracy as secrecy.”).

II. RELEASING THIS COURT’S OPINIONS WOULD ALLOW CONGRESS TO PROPERLY PERFORM ITS LEGISLATIVE AND INFORMING FUNCTIONS

A. Information on How Courts Interpret the Law Is Critical to Congress’s Legislative Function

Courts and commentators have long recognized the value of the dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature, rooted in the free exchange of information between the two institutions. The Supreme Court has recognized an “ongoing dialogue between and among the branches of Government” in the context of detention policy post-September 11, 2001. *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008). The Supreme Court acknowledged the effect of judicial opinions on informing and shaping legislation when it observed that its statutory interpretations allowed Congress to “make an informed legislative choice either to amend the statute or to retain its existing test.” *Id.* Federal courts have repeatedly acknowledged similar dialogues and their importance. *See, e.g., Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 697 F.3d 561, 563 (7th Cir. 2012) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); *Dotson v. Griesa*, 398 F.3d 156, 176 (2d Cir. 2005) (Civil Service Reform Act); *United States v. Angelos*, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1262 (D. Utah 2004) (“Presumably Congress no less than the President desires feedback on how its

statutes are operating.”), *aff’d*, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006); *Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.*, 955 F. Supp. 598, 601 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1997) (dialogue between court and legislature “is central to our legal system”).

Such a dialogue has already occurred between this Court and Congress. In the 1980s, Presiding Judge George Hart issued an opinion, publicly disclosed by Congress, in which he concluded that the FISC did not have jurisdiction to review and issue warrants for physical searches. S. Rep. No. 97-280, at 4, 16–19 (1981). In response, Congress subsequently enacted legislation granting such jurisdiction. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, § 807(a), 108 Stat. 3423, 3443–52 (1994) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1829).

To restart the dialogue between this Court and Congress, Congress and the public must have a greater understanding of the Court’s rulings. Congress as a whole is unable to make a considered judgment about the law governing surveillance without knowledge of what the law is—both the Executive’s litigation position and how the Court is interpreting the law. And the American people cannot evaluate the judgments of either this Court or Congress unless the debate occurs in public. Meanwhile, the Court’s work in interpreting Congress’s intent is made all the more difficult when the statute is not subject to vigorous and public debate.

B. The Expansion of FISA Makes Significant FISC Opinions Particularly Important and Weighs in Favor of Their Release

1. The Scope of Surveillance Under FISA Has Been Expanded Materially Over the Last Thirty Years

FISA began as a response to “the problem of unchecked domestic surveillance by the executive branch,” and was intended to “displace entirely the various warrantless wiretapping and surveillance programs undertaken by the executive branch” and “leave no room for . . . warrantless surveillance in the domestic sphere in the future.” *In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig.*, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1115–16 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Senate Select Committee to

Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities Book II: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S. Rep. No. 94-755, 290 (1976)).

In 1994, Congress expanded FISA to allow for physical searches, and expanded the jurisdiction of the FISC to grant orders approving a “physical search for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information anywhere within the United States.” Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, § 807(a), 108 Stat. 3423, 3443 (1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1829). In 1998, FISA was expanded again to empower the FISC to rule on applications for pen registers or trap-and-trace devices, as well as certain business records. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, §§ 601–602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404–12 (1998).

FISA was rewritten and expanded with the enactment of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, commonly known as the “Patriot Act.” Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Among the Patriot Act’s changes to FISA were: (1) Section 206 allowed the FISC to approve “roving” or multipoint wiretaps; (2) Section 214 modified several requirements relating to pen-register and trap-and-trace authority, including modifying the types of eligible investigative purposes, allowing for tracing of electronic communications, such as e-mail, and altering the certification requirement to apply for such authority; and (3) Section 218 changed the certification requirement for electronic surveillance and physical searches with respect to the “purpose” of the information gathering. *Id.*

Central to the Motion at issue here, Section 215 of the Patriot Act replaced the existing sections of FISA regarding business records. The new section allowed the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or his designee to apply for an order requiring the

“production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.” 50 U.S.C. § 1861. Section 215 was again modified extensively in 2006.

2. FISC Opinions Appear to Have Broken Significant New Legal Ground

From various public disclosures concerning FISC opinions, it appears that the FISC has broken significant new legal ground, which suggests that the nation’s surveillance laws may be operating in ways that are not obvious to Congress or the public. Examples of significant FISC opinions about which information has been disclosed to the public are:

- A released opinion dated May 17, 2002, in which the FISC found that new minimization procedures proposed by the Department of Justice were not “reasonably designed” consistent with FISA, and which modified the minimization procedures. *In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court*, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (FISA Ct. 2002), available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc051702.html>, *rev’d sub nom. In re Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
- An unreleased “meticulous opinion” from 2007 or 2008 following “amplitudinous briefing” in which the FISC compelled a communications service provider to assist the United States in gathering foreign intelligence notwithstanding the service provider’s legal challenges. *See In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act*, 551 F.3d 1004, 1008 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (reviewing and upholding the unreleased FISC opinion).
- An unreleased 86-page opinion dated October 3, 2011, in which the FISC held “that some collection carried out pursuant to the Section 702 minimization procedures used by the government was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment” and which reflected or concerned a FISC determination that the “government’s implementation of Section 702 of FISA has sometimes circumvented the spirit of the law.” Decl. of Mark A. Bradley ¶¶ 4–5, *Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Justice*, Civ. Action No. 12-1441-ABJ (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2013), available at

<http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/exhibit-2.pdf>. The opinion is currently the subject of a lawsuit brought by the Electronic Frontier Foundation against the Department of Justice.

This publicly disclosed information suggests that the FISC has issued increasingly complex and significant opinions over time. As the FISC accumulates a growing and increasingly complex body of decisional law, it becomes more urgent for Congress and the public to understand how the Court is interpreting and shaping the law.

C. Releasing this Court's Opinions Is Crucial to Enabling Congress to Resolve the Controversy Surrounding Section 215

The principles discussed in this brief—that Congress performs both legislative and informing functions and that open courts enable Congress to fulfill its duties—have timely application here. Recent disclosures concerning the government's surveillance programs have raised profound questions about Americans' security and liberty. Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which authorizes at least one of the programs, is set to expire on June 1, 2015. Whether and to what extent Congress will reauthorize Section 215 depends directly on Congress's—and its constituents'—knowledge about how Section 215 currently operates. Reading the law itself is not enough. The statutory text does not provide adequate clarity—to the public or to many in government—on the breadth of authority that intelligence and law-enforcement agencies evidently claim under those statutes, or how those claims of authority are consistent with other laws and constitutional restraints. Without full access to this Court's opinions interpreting and construing the law, Congress and the public cannot have a meaningful reauthorization debate, frustrating Congress's constitutional responsibility to make rules for the Executive Branch of government.

The disclosure sought by the Motion, moreover, will have no harmful effects on national security. The Motion explicitly does not ask for the disclosure of classified information.


Rather, it requests that the Court redact that information. The Motion seeks solely the Court's opinions interpreting and construing laws that govern the nation's surveillance practices. Disclosure of laws, and their interpretation and construction, is not the same as disclosure of government secrets. Americans can tolerate the continued existence of government secrets, but "[t]he idea of secret laws is repugnant." *Torres v. INS*, 144 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1998).

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, *amici curiae* respectfully request that the Court grant the Motion.

Dated: June 28, 2013

Respectfully submitted,


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APPENDIX A

Rep. Justin Amash represents Michigan's Third District in the 113th U.S. Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2010. He serves on the Joint Economic Committee and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

Rep. Paul Broun represents Georgia's Tenth District in the 113th U.S. Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2007. He serves on the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.

Rep. Tulsi Gabbard represents Hawaii's Second District in the 113th U.S. Congress. She was elected to her first term in 2012. She serves on the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Rep. Morgan Griffith represents Virginia's Ninth District in the 113th U.S. Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2010. He serves on the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Rep. Rush Holt represents New Jersey's Twelfth District in the 113th U.S. Congress. He was elected to his first term in 1998. He serves on the Committee on Education and the Workforce and the Committee on Natural Resources.

Rep. Walter Jones represents North Carolina's Third District in the 113th U.S. Congress. He was elected to his first term in 1994. He serves on the Committee on Armed Services.

Rep. Barbara Lee represents California's Thirteenth District in the 113th U.S. Congress. She was elected to her first term in 1998. She serves on the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee.

Rep. Zoe Lofgren represents California's Nineteenth District in the 113th U.S. Congress. She was elected to her first term in 1994. She serves on the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and the Committee on House Administration.

Rep. Thomas Massie represents Kentucky's Fourth District in the 113th U.S. Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2012. He serves on the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.

Rep. Tom McClintock represents California's Fourth District in the 113th U.S. Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2008. He serves on the Committee on Natural Resources and the Committee on the Budget.

Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton represents the District of Columbia in the 113th U.S. Congress. She was elected to her first term in 1990. She serves on the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

Rep. Beto O'Rourke represents Texas's Sixteenth District in the 113th U.S. Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2012. He serves on the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

Rep. Steve Pearce represents New Mexico's Second District in the 113th U.S. Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2002, served until 2009, and was elected again in 2010. He serves on the Committee on Financial Services.

Rep. Matt Salmon represents Arizona's Fifth District in the 113th United States Congress. He was elected to his first term in 1994, served until 2001, and was elected again in

2012. He serves on the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Education and the Workforce.

Rep. Mark Sanford represents South Carolina's First District in the 113th U.S. Congress. He was elected to his first term in 1994, served until 2001, and was elected again in 2013. He serves on the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

Rep. Ted Yoho represents Florida's Third District in the 113th U.S. Congress. He was elected to his first term in 2012. He serves on the Committee on Agriculture and the Committee on Foreign Affairs.