

DOD USES SEQUESTER TO EXCUSE 5 YEAR DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING BASIC NETWORK SECURITY

More than 22 months ago, I [wrote a post](#) analyzing Congressional testimony describing the gaping holes in DOD network security 3 years after a nasty malware infection and a year after the publication of Collateral Murder by WikiLeaks.

Almost two years later, Assistant Secretary of Defense Zachary Lemnios [says](#) sequestration might hold up improving network security on classified and unclassified networks.

Zachary J. Lemnios, the assistant secretary of defense for research and engineering, [was asked](#) by Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio) to describe the “most significant” impacts on cybersecurity that could follow from the anticipated cuts to the Pentagon’s budget.

Mr. Lemnios [replied](#) that “cuts under sequestration could hurt efforts to fight cyber threats, including [...] improving the security of our classified Federal networks and addressing WikiLeaks.”

This is news not just for the specific details offered about how bad DOD’s network security remains ([click through for more details](#)). But also for the tacit admission that 3 years after a breach DOD considers tantamount to aiding the enemy, and 5 years after a malware infection that badly affected DOD’s networks in Iraq, DOD still hasn’t completed security enhancements to its networks.