DOD USES SEQUESTER TO EXCUSE 5 YEAR DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING BASIC NETWORK SECURITY

More than 22 months ago, I wrote a post analyzing Congressional testimony describing the gaping holes in DOD network security 3 years after a nasty malware infection and a year after the publication of Collateral Murder by WikiLeaks.

Almost two years later, Assistant Secretary of Defense Zachary Lemnios says sequestration might hold up improving network security on classified and unclassified networks.

> Zachary J. Lemnios, the assistant secretary of defense for research and engineering, was asked by Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio) to describe the "most significant" impacts on cybersecurity that could follow from the anticipated cuts to the Pentagon's budget.
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> Mr. Lemnios replied that "cuts under sequestration could hurt efforts to fight cyber threats, including […] improving the security of our classified Federal networks and addressing WikiLeaks."

This is news not just for the specific details offered about how bad DOD's network security remains (click through for more details). But also for the tacit admission that 3 years after a breach DOD considers tantamount to aiding the enemy, and 5 years after a malware infection that badly affected DOD's networks in Iraq, DOD still hasn't completed security enhancements to its networks.