HALF THE LOVEINT VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY NON-NSA EMPLOYEES

	Year	How Found	Non-NSA	Outcome
1	2004	poly	X	Referral, declination
2	2003	poly		Nothing (already retiring)
3	2004	self-report		Resignation
4	1998-2003	other report	X	Suspension, referral, resignation
5	2001-2003	other report	X	Referral, resignation
6	2006 invest	poly	X	Reprimand
7	2011	self-report	X	Referral, resignation
8	2005	audi		UCMJ, demotion, security clearance
9	2005-2006	review		Resignation
10	2008	audit		Reprimand
11	2009	audit		UCMJ, referral
12	2009	audit	X	access suspended

Chuck Grassley just released a summary of violations of NSA authority he requested back in August.

The data is pretty meaningless. As I have shown, NSA's own internal reporting shows about 9% (and up to 20% in some categories) of its violations are "due diligence" violations, which are violations of rules that an analyst knows (human error, intelligence error, and training are treated as distinct violations). If today's hearing was any indication, the Senate Intelligence Committee seems to have no understanding that 9% of all violations are willful violations of rules.

All that said, of the 12 incidents the NSA reported (there are 3 incidents still under investigation), fully half appear to be committed by members of different agencies (though one of those was a military person reported to NSA). That's a lot of other agency personnel abusing SIGINT authorities they're granted access to.

And note, DOJ has never prosecuted any of these. In just about all cases where DOJ gets a referral, the person resigns before being charged. The UCMJ does better — DOD has punished two people.