KASPERSKY'S CARROT-AND-STICK TAO COMPROMISE INCIDENT REPORT

Last week, Kaspersky released its investigation into the reported collection of NSA hacking tools off an employee's computer. Kim Zetter did an excellent story on it, so read that for analysis of what the report said.

The short version, though, is that Kaspersky identified a computer in the Baltimore, MD area that was sending a whole slew of alerts in response to a silent signature for Equation Group software from September to November 2014 — a year earlier than the leaked reports about the incident claimed the compromise had happened. Kaspersky pulled in an archive including those signatures as well as some associated files in the normal course of collecting analysis (and, according to Zetter, did not pull other archives of malware also associated with the machine). Kaspersky IDed it as irregular, and — so they're claiming — the analyst who found it told Eugene Kaspersky (referred to throughout in the third person "CEO" here), who told told the analyst to destroy the source code and related documents immediately. The report claims Kaspersky subsequently instituted a policy mandating such destruction going forward.

As Zetter notes, the timing of events gets awfully murky about when the file got destroyed and the new destruction policy was instituted.

> The company didn't respond to questions about when precisely it instituted this policy, nor did it provide a written copy of the distributed policy before publication of this article.

Meanwhile, during the same period this machine was sending out all the Equation Group alerts,

someone hacked it.

> It appears the system was actually
> compromised by a malicious actor on
> October 4, 2014 at 23:38 local time,

The report explains this compromise at length,
providing (in addition to the precise time), the
C&C server URL, a list of 121 other virus
signatures found on the machine during the
period the Equation Group signatures were
alerting. It also links to Kaspersky's analysis
of the backdoor in question, which was developed
by Russian criminal hackers.

> "It looks like a huge disaster the way
> it happened with running all this
> malware on his machine. It's almost
> unbelievable," [Zetter quotes
> Kaspersky's director of the company's
> Global Research and Analysis Team Costin
> Raiu].

Thus far, consider what this report does: it
makes it clear that Kaspersky has far more
detail about the compromise than the anonymous
sources leaking to the press are willing to
share (all the time with Eugene Kaspersky
inviting them to provide more details). It
elaborates on the story it had already shared
about who the likely culprit was to have stolen
and used the files. And it suggests (though I'm
not sure I believe it), that it's entirely the
fault of the hacker who turned off Kaspersky's
AV in order to run a pirated copy of Windows
Office.

That's the carrot. Here, Kaspersky is saying,
we've figured out who stole those files your
idiot developer loaded onto his malware-riddled
computer. Go get them. Free incident response,
three years after the fact!

But it's the stick I'm just as interested in.

First, as part of its explanation of the process
Kaspersky used to hone in on the incident, the

report includes a list of hits and false positives on NSA signatures just from September 2014 — effectively providing a list of (dated) malware signatures. While the report notes many of these alerts are false positives, Kaspersky is nevertheless saying, here's a list of all the victims of your spying we identified for just one month out of the 40 months we just analyzed. Presumably, the hits after September 2014 would have come to include far more true victims.

Then, the report provides a list of all the Equation Group signatures found on the TAO engineers' computer, providing a snapshot of what one person might work on, a snapshot that would provide useful for those trying to understand NSA's work patterns.

Even while it provides lists of signatures that will provide others some insight into NSA activity, the report makes a grand show of concern for privacy, redacting the name of the archive as [undisclosed] and including a discussion about how it could have — but chose not to — include the complete file paths of the archive.

> Looking at this metadata during current investigation we were tempted to include the full list of detected files and file paths into current report, however, according to our ethical standards, as well as internal policies, we cannot violate our users' privacy. This was a hard decision, but should we make an exception once, even for the sake of protecting our own company's reputation, that would be a step on the route of giving up privacy and freedom of all people who rely on our products. Unless we receive a legitimate request originating from the owner of that system or a higher legal authority, we cannot release such information.

Mind you, FSB is the "higher legal authority" in Russia for such things.

Then, in the guise of claiming how little information Kaspersky has on the individual behind all this, the report makes it clear it retains his IP, from which they could reconstitute his identity.

> **Q3** — Who was this person?
>
> **A3** — Because our software anonymizes certain aspects of users' information, we are unable to pinpoint specifically who the user was. Even if we could, disclosing such information is against our policies and ethical standards. What we can determine is that the user was originating from an IP address that is supposedly assigned to a Verizon FiOS address pool for the Baltimore, MD and surrounding area.

In short, along with providing a detailed description of what likely happened — the hacker got pwned by someone else — Kaspersky lays out all the information on NSA's hacking activities that it could, if it so chose, make public: who NSA hacked when, who the developer in question is, and more details on how the NSA develops its tools.

But (in the interest of privacy, you understand?) Kaspersky's not going to do that unless some higher authority forces it to.

Of course, Kaspersky's collection of all that data on NSA's hacking is undoubtedly one of the reasons the NSA would prefer it not exist.

A carrot, and a stick.

At the end of her piece, Zetter quotes Rob Joyce laying out the more modest attack on Kaspersky (this stuff shouldn't be run on sensitive government computers, which it shouldn't), even while admitting that other AV products have the same privileged access to collect such information on users.

> Asked about Kaspersky's discovery of multiple malware samples on the NSA

> worker's home computer, Rob Joyce, the
> Trump administration's top cybersecurity
> adviser who was head of the NSA's elite
> hacking division when the TAO worker
> took the NSA files home and put them on
> his work computer, declined to respond
> to Kaspersky's findings but reiterated
> the government's contention that
> Kaspersky software should be banned from
> government computers.
>
> "Kaspersky as an entity is a rootkit you
> run on a computer," he told Motherboard,
> using the technical term for stealth and
> persistent malware that has privileged
> access to all files on a machine.
>
> He acknowledged that software made by
> other antivirus companies has the same
> potential for misuse Kaspersky has but
> said, Kaspersky is "a Russian company
> subjected to FSB control and law, and
> the US government is not comfortable
> accepting that risk on our networks."

We shall see if this report serves to halt all
the (inaccurate at least with respect to timing,
if this report is to be believed) leaks to the
press or even the other attacks on Kaspersky.

All that said, there are two parts of this story
that still don't make sense.

First, I share Zetter's apparent skepticism
about the timing of the decision to destroy the
source code, which the report describes this
way:

> Upon further inquiring about this event
> and missing files, **it was later
> discovered that at the direction of the
> CEO, the archive file, named
> "[undisclosed].7z" was removed from
> storage**. Based on description from the
> analyst working on that archive, it
> contained a collection of executable
> modules, four documents bearing
> classification markings, and other files

> related to the same project. The reason
> we deleted those files and will delete
> similar ones in the future is two-fold;
> We don't need anything other than
> malware binaries to improve protection
> of our customers and secondly, because
> of concerns regarding the handling of
> potential classified materials. Assuming
> that the markings were real, such
> information cannot and will not **[note
> this typo]** consumed even to produce
> detection signatures based on
> descriptions.
>
> This concern was later translated into a
> policy for all malware analysts which
> are required to delete any potential
> classified materials that have been
> accidentally collected during anti-
> malware research or received from a
> third party. Again to restate: to the
> best of our knowledge, **it appears** the
> archive files and documents were removed
> from our storage, and only individual
> executable files (malware) that were
> already detected by our signatures were
> left in storage.

The key sentence — "it was later discovered …
the archive file … was removed" — is a master
use of the passive voice. And unlike all the
other things for which the report offers
affirmative data, the data offered here is the
absence of data. "It appears" that the archive
is no longer in storage, without any details
about when it got removed. The report is also
silent about whether any of these events — the
removal and claimed destruction and the
institution of a new policy to destroy such
things going forward — were a response to the
Duqu 2 hack discovering such files, as well as
the one silent signature integrating the word
"secret" described elsewhere in the report, on
Kaspersky's servers.

Then there's the implausibility of an NSA
developer 1) running Kaspersky then 2) turning

it off 3) to load a bunch of malware onto his computer in the guise of loading a pirated copy of Office 4) only to have a bunch of other malware infect the computer in the same window of time, finally 5) turning the Kaspersky back on to discover what happened after the fact.

Really? I mean, maybe this guy is that dumb, or maybe there's another explanation for these forensic details.

In any case, the entire report is a cheeky chess move. I eagerly wait to see if the US' anonymous leakers respond.