Like me, Greg Sargent continues to focus on the messaging opportunities presented by recent developments in Stephen Miller’s deportation gulag. (In the wake of NYT’s coverage and Sargent’s interview with Carol Hui the other day, Hui has been released from detention.)

This post reacts to this NBC story which, in turn, follows up on the Washington Examiner (!!!) story reporting on Miller’s recent meltdown about the number of deportations. NBC added to the story about Miller’s meltdown by pointing to how Trump has shifted law enforcement’s focus from their day jobs — hunting child sex traffickers, hackers, spies, and terrorists — to instead hunt peaceful undocumented migrants.

It is the latest example of how President Donald Trump’s push for mass deportations is reshaping federal law enforcement as officials shift resources toward immigration-related cases — including nonviolent administrative offenses — leaving less time and attention for other types of criminal investigations.

The plan calls for using 3,000 ICE agents, including 1,800 from Homeland Security Investigations, which generally investigates transnational crimes and is not typically involved in arresting noncriminal immigrants; 2,000 Justice Department employees from the FBI, the U.S. Marshals Service and the Drug Enforcement Administration; and 500 employees from Customs and Border Protection. It also includes 250 IRS agents, some of whom may be used to provide information on the whereabouts of immigrants using tax information, while others would have the authority to make arrests, according to the operation plan.

Sargent argues that if Democrats (I would argue, Trump opponents generally) can explain how Trump is making the country less safe to hunt down people like Carol Hui, they’ll grow even more opposed to Miller’s deportation gulag.

It’s a good point — similar to the one I made about the extent to which Miller’s jihad is depriving Americans of cancer cures. There are a bunch of opportunity costs that come with Miller’s deportation gulag, including hunting child sex traffickers and curing cancer. All of them are bad. We need to tell that story.

Along the way to making that point, though, Sargent makes this claim about Miller’s beliefs. Miller believes, Sargent argues, that migrants poison the nation’s blood. He believes hunting down people like Carol Hui is an emergency.

Unlike Miller, that is, majorities are not ideologically hostile to the mere presence of peaceful unauthorized immigrants in this country; they just want the system to work. Yet Miller and Trump see that presence as itself posing a dire public emergency, or even a civilizational one. In this worldview, there can be no desirable pathway to lawful status here for these people, because they inherently represent a public threat—they are “poisoning” the nation’s “blood.” Making them legal wouldn’t change that. It would only make the threat they pose more insidious.

That’s why Miller is capable of tweeting that the House GOP budget bill is the “most essential piece of legislation” in “the entire Western World,” largely because it ramps up deportation resources. To him, saving the “Western World” rides on deporting all those unauthorized people, including all those “moms.”

All this gets at the deeper reason Miller and Trump are shifting extensive law enforcement resources away from serious crimes into deporting noncriminal immigrants: They simply do see the presence of these people as an extraordinarily urgent national emergency, perhaps more urgent than all those other serious crimes.

I want to suggest that Miller’s unrelenting obsession with his deportation gulag may be more than just uncontrolled racism (though I have no doubt it is that, at least).

When you shift law enforcement from the FBI to DHS, you do more than simply shift law enforcement from focusing on child sex traffickers, hackers, spies, and terrorists to focusing on nice ladies like Carol Hui.

You also shift from a law enforcement that must meet increasing evidentiary standards — first probable cause and then beyond a reasonable doubt — to jail people, to one that has a far more lower threshold, one that affords the claims of the Executive great deference. And even in that context, Miller keeps looking for ways to lower the burden of law enforcement still lower; that’s the reason he pursued his Alien Enemies Act project: because he believes and wants Judges to get no review of such deportations. Next up, Miller wants to eliminate habeas corpus, such that the Executive could detain anyone with no judicial review.

Shifting from the FBI, which must adhere to written rules developed over decades in the wake of past abuses, to DHS, frees you from a great many strictures on how you investigate people. (This would be one effect of making ICE a bigger law enforcement agency than FBI.)

Shifting from FBI to DHS shifts you from a legalized culture to thug culture.

And Stephen Miller has never hid that he wants to apply this abusive law enforcement approach to US citizens to. He’s just not sure how he’ll get there.

Miller explicitly wants to be able to jail and deport people — and he has swept up legal aliens and even American citizens — without any review. That’s the goal. False inflammatory claims about immigration is the means.

I would suggest that Miller’s fondness for deportation gulags is about more than racism (though, again, it is definitely about racism). Miller’s false claims about immigrants are the means he plans to use to lower or eliminate the legal protections that all people in America — citizen and migrant alike — have against abusive Executive power.

Stephen Miller both believes in white supremacy but also that the United States should eliminate due process for all enemies of Donald Trump.

As part of an Executive Order ordering Pam Bondi to start a witch hunt against Joe Biden’s aides, Donald Trump implied that the only reason Joe Biden was not prosecuted for harboring classified documents was “his incompetent mental state.”

The Department of Justice, for example, concluded that, despite clear evidence that Biden had broken the law, he should not stand trial owing to his incompetent mental state.

That’s a wild misstatement of the record, starting with the fact that the only documents that Robert Hur showed Biden wittingly took — his notebooks and a memo he sent to Barack Obama about withdrawing from Afghanistan — Biden believed he could take based on DOJ’s treatment of Ronald Reagan.

But let’s take the premise on its face.

Donald Trump — who was charged by a Special Counsel appointed on the same basis as Hur was — claims that Joe Biden would have been legitimately prosecuted if only he weren’t senile.

Wow, Donny, you just said that Aileen Cannon was wrong for dismissing the case against you!!!

Let’s go, baby!

This whole thing (especially the order to David Warrington to review which orders Biden signed with an autopen) is a grotesque nuisance. As with Trump’s apparent waiver of Biden’s Executive Privilege invocation on his own Special Counsel interviews, it presents a troubling breach of Executive equities of precisely the kind of that Trump never stopped wailing about when he was investigated.

But I really think this order, like so much of Trump and Eagle Ed Martin’s push to review what Biden did while serving as President in his late 70s, could backfire in spectacular ways.

For example, Trump is trying to criminalize White House aides lying to the public about the mental and physical state of the President.

Investigation. (a) The Counsel to the President, in consultation with the Attorney General and the head of any other relevant executive department or agency (agency), shall investigate, to the extent permitted by law, whether certain individuals conspired to deceive the public about Biden’s mental state and unconstitutionally exercise the authorities and responsibilities of the President. This investigation shall address:

(i) any activity, coordinated or otherwise, to purposefully shield the public from information regarding Biden’s mental and physical health;

(ii) any agreements between Biden’s aides to cooperatively and falsely deem recorded videos of the President’s cognitive inability as fake;

(iii) any agreements between Biden’s aides to require false, public statements elevating the President’s capabilities; and

(iv) the purpose of these activities, including to assert the authorities of the President. [my emphasis]

We don’t even have to consider what Trump has done — the incidences of mental breakdowns — in the past five months to get to things that Trump wants to treat as a crime. After all, Trump’s White House went to great lengths to lie to the public about how COVID nearly killed him. All the reports from Trump’s physicians are riddled with obvious false claims.

This order would make it a crime to lie about how fat Donny is!!

Plus there are a number of things — starting with the Alien Enemies Act declaration — that Trump claims he did not personally do. This EO would make it a crime for whoever did make that declaration (cough).

And the push to review whether Biden was cognizant for the pardons of his family members? Have at it. Particularly given some obvious errors made in the pardon for January 6ers (such as a commutation for Jeremy Bertino, who had not been sentenced), we’ll just start chipping away at the pardons for Trump’s cop assailants and adjudged terrorists.

The entire premise of this EO is that things Trump and his White Houses have done — from lying about his weight and height to his theft of classified documents — must be prosecuted.

It’s fashionable to focus reporting about Elon Musk’s attacks on Trump’s Big Awful on the spat within the Republican party.

Politico has separate stories on how “hard-liners” like Tom Massie and Rand Paul are “rejoic[ing]” over Elon’s tweets and parroting White House excuses for Musk’s comments, which both repeat four claims Marc Caputo first aired (half of which are dubious or dated) and demand that journalists view Elon’s comments as exclusively about the effect on his own business.

“When businessmen criticize legislation, journalists don’t take them at their word, they look at how the legislation would impact their business interests,” said a Republican close to the White House. “They should be doing that in this case.”

I wonder if this anonymous Republican close to the White House raised similar concerns about Elon’s business interests driving his decisions as he shredded regulators overseeing his own businesses? In a brilliant summary of 130 shitty things Elon did in his 130 days in government, Elizabeth Warren cited 29 Federal contracts and 34 instances where Elon fiddled with his regulators, of which this is just a selection:

55. Musk’s cost-cutting team is laying off workers at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the auto safety agency investigating Tesla for crashes stemming from its “full self-driving” and remote control features.

56. The Trump Administration first shut down NLRB altogether — which had cases against multiple Musk companies (including SpaceX, Tesla, and X).

57. Then President Trump removed independent NLRB members.

58. DOGE is gutting NOAA while Musk eyes privatization of NOAA weather satellites, which could present a business opportunity for Starlink.

59. President Trump signed an executive order halting operations of the Labor Department’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance, which had Tesla on its list of contractors scheduled for audits.

60. OSHA has 27 cases against Tesla for workers rights violations and investigated SpaceX for workplace injuries — and now DOGE is limiting the agency’s work.

61. President Trump tried to fire over 90% of National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), which put two Musk companies — Boring and Tesla — on its “dirty dozen” list of worst workplace safety offenders.

All that drama is amusing. All the tweets from House members like Scott Perry and Marjorie Taylor Greene disavowing their votes could become more interesting once this bill returns to the House, but probably won’t

I’m more focused in the extent to which Elon’s comments will unsettle the dynamic that otherwise would permit (as Politico also reported was the plan) John Thune to ram through changes and Mike Johnson in turn to ram through the changed bill.

Elon’s comments unsettle things. Who knows what could happen as a result.

Consider the several instances where local communities have stood up against Stephen Miller’s authoritarian dragnet. There was the backlash to a heavy-handed raid in San Diego where ICE agents deployed flash bangs before bystanders chased them off, chanting, “Shame, shame.” Then there was the spontaneous protest yesterday in response to a restaurant raid in Minneapolis.

A more controversial case involves Carol Hui, whose plight mobilized a conservative Missouri town, with a number of Trump voters claiming they didn’t vote to deport their sweet neighbor.

“I voted for Donald Trump, and so did practically everyone here,” said Vanessa Cowart, a friend of Ms. Hui from church. “But no one voted to deport moms. We were all under the impression we were just getting rid of the gangs, the people who came here in droves.”

She paused. “This is Carol.”

Whatever you think of such disavowals — Never Trumper JV Last is unimpressed; Greg Sargent did a great interview that conveys why she’s the kind of person non-liberals might rally behind — G Elliot Morris made a compelling argument that these Trump voters are precisely the kind of people you’d need to combat these policies.

The other way to say that — and the way Carol’s friends put it — is that millions of Americans voted for Trump, but they didn’t vote for this.

[snip]

If you are a Democrat, I know it is tempting to do schadenfreude and voter-bashing toward regretful Trump voters, who you see as enabling authoritarianism. But it is very important right now to make the point that people who voted for Trump did not support all of his policy agenda (the vast majority of which is unpopular) for four reasons.

First, internalizing that voting for someone is not an endorsement of their future policy agenda gives people data to fight the worst excesses of Trump’s agenda, especially on trade and immigration. Data can be a very powerful rhetorical tool in catalyzing opposition to unpopular policies.

In Trump’s first administration, for example, polling on his separation of families crossing the border was almost 50 points underwater. That data and related protests convinced the administration to change course.

The alternative to this is assuming that moderate Trump supporters actually support deporting non-criminal parents, which we know (given the data above) to be false. If you assume that, then there is a much smaller landscape of opinion on which to do battle about politics. You have to believe these people are persuadable to move them.

You will not defeat fascism with just the people who voted for Kamala Harris, or even just the people who voted for Joe Biden in 2020. You need some of Carol Hui’s neighbors to stand up for what is decent.

All the better if the process of standing up leads them to rethink their support for MAGAt.

The point being, we’re beginning to see real activism against Trump’s immigration dragnet, the same kind of activism that (Morris notes) led Trump to temper his plans in the first term.

And we’re seeing it before it’s too late to, one way or another, defeat (or at least impose a cost for) the vast expansion of Stephen Miller’s dragnet in the Big Ugly.

Yesterday, Miller listed the immigration provisions first among the reasons he likes the bill — ahead of giving Elon a tax cut, ahead of taking food from poor children.

There’s a reason Miller is so excited about the bill. It would dramatically expand ICE, ICE detention centers, and ICE’s ability to deputize cops, making ICE — rather than the FBI — the biggest federal law “enforcement” agency.

The House GOP-crafted bill includes some $45 billion that would go toward detaining immigrants until 2029.

That’s roughly $9 billion per year — an amount that far surpasses a previous record-high of $3.4 billion Congress appropriated for ICE detention a little over a year ago, under the Biden administration.

ICE currently has capacity to detain roughly 41,000 people. Under the GOP bill, that number would increase to some 100,000.

Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, a senior fellow at the American Immigration Council, says there’s not currently enough space to detain that many people.

“ICE would be forced to use this funding to build new detention centers, new soft-sided detention camps, where tents would be thrown up by detention contractors, where immigrants would be held, potentially en masse,” he said.

The bill includes over $150 billion for various components of immigration enforcement, including detention, border wall construction and deportation transportation.

“Taken together, this funding would make ICE the best funded federal law enforcement agency in U.S. history, with more detention bed funding that the entire Federal Bureau of Prisons and potentially more agents on board than the entire Federal Bureau of Investigations,” Reichlin-Melnick said.

He says the new bill also includes additional funds for ICE to hire new agents and increase collaboration initiatives with local law enforcement agencies — like 287-g agreements. But, no funding for DHS oversight.

ICE is the leading edge of Miller’s assault on the Constitution. His goons are already struggling to find as many migrants as he demands be arrested, leading to screaming sessions and threats (first reported in the Washington Examiner!!).

“They’ve been threatened, told they’re watching their emails and texts and Signals,” the first official said. “That’s what is horrible about things right now. It’s a fearful environment. Everybody in leadership is afraid. … There’s no morale. Everybody is demoralized.”

ICE’s top 50 field officials were given roughly a week’s notice of an emergency meeting in Washington.

ICE’s 25 Enforcement Removal Operations, or ERO, field office directors and 25 Homeland Security Investigations, or HSI, special agents in charge flew into Washington and descended on the agency’s Washington headquarters last Tuesday, May 20. There, they were met by Miller, ICE confirmed to the Washington Examiner.

“Miller came in there and eviscerated everyone. ‘You guys aren’t doing a good job. You’re horrible leaders.’ He just ripped into everybody. He had nothing positive to say about anybody, shot morale down,” said the first official, who spoke with those in the room that day.

“Stephen Miller wants everybody arrested. ‘Why aren’t you at Home Depot? Why aren’t you at 7-Eleven?’” the official recited.

One of the ERO officials in attendance stood up and stated that the Department of Homeland Security and the White House had publicly messaged about targeting criminal illegal immigrants, and therefore, ICE was targeting them, and not the general illegal immigration population.

“Miller said, ‘What do you mean you’re going after criminals?’ Miller got into a little bit of a pissing contest. ‘That’s what Tom Homan says every time he’s on TV: ‘We’re going after criminals,’” the ICE official told Miller, according to the first official.

The (un)intended consequences of this vast expansion, with Stephen Miller screaming that ICE has to go search places for people who are definitely not the criminal aliens he lied about during the election, are pretty obvious.

Now is the time for the people shaming ICE’s invasions of their neighborhood to make a stink about this bill.

To be clear: it won’t kill the bill. The only way the bill will die is if the conflict between hardliners and those who want to preserve health care reaches an impasse which, so far, it has not.

But it would be useful if the localized mobilization raised the cost of this bill going forward, especially if the bill happens to die via other means.

[NB: check the byline, thanks. /~Rayne]

Marcy shared this observation yesterday via Bluesky about Ukraine’s attack on Russian air bases:

emptywheel @emptywheel.bsky.social@bsky.brid.gy

The Ukrainian attack used RU telecom networks rather than Starlink.

Hard to guess whether this will drive Putin or Elon nuts first.

https://edition.cnn.com/2025/06/02/europe/inside-ukraine-drone-attack-russian-air-bases-latam-intl

Jun 02, 2025, 07:30 PM

The brazenness of using Russia’s telecom networks is noteworthy, especially after concerns that Ukraine’s military operations could be compromised by Russian access to Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite communications.

The avoidance of Starlink for this mission named Operation Spiderweb (Ukrainian: Operatsija Pavutyna) suggests Ukraine accepted this possibility as reality and deliberately worked around the compromised network.

The success of the mission may also suggest this was a solid assumption and avoiding Starlink an effective decision.

There are two points in reporting about Operation Spiderweb which haven’t been analyzed further:

— The specificity of the plan’s inception;

— The role of Ukraine’s security service, the Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrainy (SBU).

CNN and other outlets reported the number of drones Ukraine used to attack Russian military aircraft (117) and the amount of time the operation took from inception to the attack (one year, six months and nine days). The candor is rather shocking; perhaps cognitive dissonance explains why there haven’t been many analysts picking apart these openly shared details.

But these details may have messages within them considering how in-your-face they are. The number 117 seems peculiar because it’s an odd number though it’s not prime. Were all the drones that were smuggled in deployed? Was this another reason why the Trojan Horse wooden sheds were booby trapped — to eliminate any drones that did not deploy properly? Or perhaps the number simply is what it is on the face of it.

The exactness of the operation’s inception, though, seems deliberate, as if launch date meant something. Depending on how the one year, six months, and nine days are counted, the spiderweb began on November 22, 2023 or on December 23, 2023.

November 22 marked the beginning of the Orange Revolution in 2004.

December 23 marked the holiday observed by Ukraine’s Armed Forces — Operational Servicemen Day.

Just as importantly, June 1 on which the attack occurred was the anniversary of the day Ukraine transferred the last of its nuclear warheads to Russia in 1996 under the terms of the Budapest Memorandum to which the US was a party. In other words, this message might not have been intended just for Russia.

The Budapest Memorandum may also explain the role of SBU to effect this operation. While one source in CNN’s reporting attributed the successful mission to “Ukraine’s special services,” most reports credited the operation to the SBU.

SBU is Ukraine’s counterintelligence organization with paramilitary features. It does not have the same reporting structure as Ukraine’s Armed Forces. It’s also responsible for the security of Ukraine’s president and reports directly to him. The flat structure may have ensured the level of secrecy necessary to carry out Operation Spiderweb.

The not-quite-military role of the SBU may also have been critical to lawfare. An operation conducted by SBU may be construed as a counterintelligence operation and not a military operation, fuzzing the ability of the target to respond under terms of its own doctrine or terms of treaties. If a trigger for Russia to launch an escalated military response is the use of conventional kinetic weapons on its soil by another country’s armed forces, Operation Spiderweb skirts this threshold having used non-traditional weapons deployed by a counterintelligence function.

By its subtle emphasis on the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine made a point of Russia’s failure to comply with the memorandum’s terms after repeated threats of nuclear attacks against Ukraine and the west. Targeting long-range aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, Ukraine punctuated the Memorandum’s terms including nuclear non-proliferation.

Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyy has had a number of top military personnel swapped out during the course of the Russo-Ukraine war (ex. the commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces in June 2024, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces in February 2024, all regional military recruitment chiefs in August 2023), which might have suggested to outsiders cohesiveness could have been compromised by poor performance, disagreements with the conduct of the war, and plain old corruption. The personnel changes may have given the appearance Ukraine was not fully aligned toward repelling Russian aggression.

But as Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War, all warfare is based on deception.

The illusion these personnel changes created may have been relied upon as a head fake, allowing Vladimir Putin and the Russian military to feel excessively confident about the outcome of the war. That confidence was surely ruptured just as Russia and Ukraine entered a new round of negotiations to end the war this Monday in Istanbul. Russia opened by presenting a “memorandum” of terms but Ukraine has expressed its lack of faith in Russia’s compliance with co-signed memoranda.

Detonating explosives targeting the Kerch Strait bridge — a bridge one one likely use if driving from Turkey to Ukraine — added emphasis.

There is one more important facet to the timing of the operation’s inception. In February 2024, the Financial Times reported on leaked Russian military files:

When exactly were these documents leaked? To whom had they been leaked and how long was it before the Financial Times reported on them?

Is it possible the inception of Operation Spiderweb coincided with the leak of these documents which occurred after repeated attempts by Russia to blackmail Ukraine and the west using the threat of nuclear war?

Which brings up a third point not discussed in media coverage of Operation Spiderweb: by eliminating a sizeable portion of Russia’s capacity to deliver nuclear weapons, Ukraine has blunted Russia’s threat against the west and China.

This was worth all the military aid provided to Ukraine to date, and then some. Ukraine has more than earned a place in the European Community and NATO.

I may be alone in this opinion, but Scott Bessent’s response to Bret Baier’s question about how trade negotiations with China are going looked like a hostage video.

Bessent’s description that talks with China were “a bit stalled” has gotten a lot of attention, but not his robotic cadence and stuttering, a real shift from his fluid flow of bullshit before that, leading up to his hint of a call with Party … Chair … Xi.

Bessent: I, I, I would say that they are … uh, a bit stalled. I believe that we will be having more talks with them. Uh, in the next few weeks. And I believe we may at some point have a call between uh the President and Party. Chair. Xi.

Baier: So stalled. There was a time when the President thought that that was moving forward pretty significantly.

Bessent: I, uh, again I, I think that given, given the magnitude of the talks, given the complexity, that it, this is going to require both. leaders. to. weigh. in. uh with each other. They have a very good relationship and I am confident that. the. Chinese. will come to the table when President Trump makes his preferences known.

The interview was on Thursday. It was the day before Trump’s Truth Social post where he made false claims about how the interim deal with China came about before then claiming that China had violated that deal (this screen cap reflects my normal five hour time difference).

A series of stories in WSJ explain what really happened in advance of that (IMO) stammering hostage video from Scott Bessent.

A piece on Friday — written the same day as Trump’s post and explaining Bessent’s comment about a stall (but not mentioning his stammer) — described that Trump’s accusation pertained to China’s slow-walking of export licenses for rare earth metals, which China attributed to retaliation for what the US claims was a restatement of export controls put on chip technology under Biden.

A trade truce between the U.S. and China is at risk of falling apart, as China’s slow-walking on rare-earth exports fuels U.S. recriminations that China is reneging on the deal.

Getting the pact together in Geneva earlier this month hinged on Beijing’s concession on the critical minerals, according to people familiar with the matter.

The people say the U.S. trade negotiators presented their Chinese counterpart, Vice Premier He Lifeng, with a demand that Beijing resume rare-earth exports. In return, the U.S. would agree to a 90-day tariff truce. He agreed to the demand in the final hours of marathon discussions with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, the people said.

In the resulting deal, both sides suspended most of the tariffs they had imposed on each other—drawing cheers from global investors and businesses.

Since Geneva, however, Beijing has continued to slow-walk approvals for export licenses for rare earths and other elements needed to make cars, chips and other products.

[snip]

For He, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s economic gatekeeper, the willingness to comply with China’s rare-earth pledges faltered after the U.S. Commerce Department on May 12 issued a warning against the use of Huawei Technologies’s Ascend artificial-intelligence chips “anywhere in the world,” the people said.

Beijing viewed the warning as renewed U.S. aggression, and complained about it to Washington.

That same day, WSJ published a story describing that the US no longer has the tech advantage over China that might make this hardball work.

The U.S. has tried almost everything to win the tech race against China—across areas as varied as AI, energy, autonomous vehicles, drones and EVs. So far, none of it has worked.

China’s EVs are cheaper and by many measures better than America’s. The country dominates in consumer drones. Autonomous vehicles have rolled out on the streets of Wuhan and Beijing at a pace that Waymo and Tesla have yet to match. China produces the lion’s share of the world’s solar panels and batteries. And while the U.S. and its allies maintain a narrow lead in advanced microchips and AI, the gap appears to be closing faster than ever.

On Monday, a story about Vice Premier He Lifeng’s hardnosed negotiating approach described that he was the one slow-walking licenses.

In its deepening face-off with the Trump administration, Beijing’s trade negotiator has given a preview of Xi Jinping’s chief objective for this trade war: It won’t be like last time.

In Geneva in mid-May, Vice Premier He Lifeng extracted a 90-day trade truce from a Trump team that had until then declined to pause a tariff blitz on China the way it had for other countries. The deal calmed the nerves of investors and markets around the world.

Now, after both sides have complained that the other wasn’t upholding the terms of the deal, that trade truce is teetering, once again jolting global investors and businesses.

At the center of the storm is He, Xi’s economic gatekeeper, who has made clear China’s strategy in this trade war is nothing like the approach it had in Trump’s first term.

During the Geneva talks, He had removed a final sticking point by agreeing to U.S. demands that China resume rare-earth exports. Yet since then He has dug in his heels, slow-walking approvals of licenses to export the minerals critical in the manufacturing of modern cars and other products.

Beijing blames the U.S. for the breakdown, saying a warning against the use of certain artificial-intelligence chips from China’s Huawei Technologies was a renewal of U.S. aggression, and complained to Washington that it undermined the trade deal. It also took offense at the U.S. plan to aggressively revoke visas for Chinese students.

The U.S. said the Huawei warning was a restatement of a previous policy. Trump has expressed hopes to talk to Xi directly to break the impasse. A call could happen as early as this week, the White House said.

And a piece today describes what may have caused Bessent’s stammer. Auto companies are considering moving some production to China to get around the rare earth backlog.

Four major automakers are racing to find workarounds to China’s stranglehold on rare-earth magnets, which they fear could force them to shut down some car production within weeks.

Several traditional and electric-vehicle makers—and their suppliers—are considering shifting some auto-parts manufacturing to China to avoid looming factory shutdowns, people familiar with the situation said.

Ideas under review include producing electric motors in Chinese factories or shipping made-in-America motors to China to have magnets installed. Moving production to China as a way to get around the export controls on rare-earth magnets could work because the restrictions only cover magnets, not finished parts, the people said.

If automakers end up shifting some production to China, it would amount to a remarkable outcome from a trade war initiated by President Trump with the intention of bringing manufacturing back to the U.S.

“If you want to export a magnet [from China] they won’t let you do that. If you can demonstrate that the magnet is in a motor in China, you can do that,” said a supply-chain manager at one of the carmakers.

China in April began requiring companies to apply for permission to export magnets made with rare-earth metals, including dysprosium and terbium. The country controls roughly 90% of the world’s supply of these elements, which help magnets to operate at high temperatures. Much of the world’s modern technology, from smartphones to F-35 jet fighters, rely on these magnets.

In the auto industry, rare-earths are what allow electric-vehicle motors to function at high speed. They are also used in less exotic, though no less critical, functions from windshield wipers and headlights.

Aside from describing how Ford shut down an Explorer line for a week, WSJ doesn’t mention which four auto companies were considering this move. But in a few places, it focuses on the specific vulnerability for electric cars: they need the magnets for engines to work at high speed, and older engines that don’t rely on them are more expensive.

A key part of a NYT profile on recriminations Elon Musk is facing at Tesla for his neglect over the last four months focuses on supply chain vulnerabilities.

During the visit, Mr. Musk asked about the impact of Mr. Trump’s tariffs on Tesla and was briefed on the effects and the company’s supply chain vulnerabilities, two people familiar with the meeting said. The timing of his question raised concerns from some attendees, since Mr. Trump had begun announcing tariffs two months earlier in February.

Days after Mr. Musk’s visit, Tesla reported that its vehicle sales fell 13 percent in the first quarter from a year earlier, as profit plunged to its lowest level in four years. New tariffs on imported auto parts have added to the financial pressures facing the company.

Now, Bessent and Elon had the highest profile spat involving any of Trump’s cabinet members. Bessent likely doesn’t care, exclusively, about a hit to Elon’s business (though Elon’s petulance and self-regulation problems may explain why he’d lash out if Trump’s tariffs are killing the primary source of his wealth).

This is a far larger issue for Bessent. The issue that he’s got a weak hand. The issue that if this negotiation doesn’t work, it’ll crash the global economy, with the US in the lead. The issue that rather than isolating China, the Trump administration has found non-stop ways to make China stronger. The issue that if Bessent fails, far worse economic advisors, like Peter Navarro, will have the upper hand with Trump.

In the middle of all this, Whiskey Pete Hegseth, who didn’t know what ASEAN was at his confirmation hearing, flew to Singapore and dick-wagged about defending Taiwan, eliciting yet another backlash from China.

On Saturday Hegseth said China was “credibly preparing to potentially use military force to alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific”, and was rehearsing for “the real deal” of invading Taiwan.

“There’s no reason to sugar coat it. The threat China poses is real, and it could be imminent,” the US defence secretary said in a keynote address at the Shangri-la Dialogue defence forum, calling for Asian countries to increase defence spending.

On Sunday, China’s ministry of foreign affairs condemned his words, which it said were “filled with provocations and intended to sow division”.

“Hegseth deliberately ignored the call for peace and development by countries in the region, and instead touted the cold war mentality for bloc confrontation, vilified China with defamatory allegations, and falsely called China a ‘threat’,” it said.

“The remarks were filled with provocations and intended to sow division. China deplores and firmly opposes them and has protested strongly to the US.”

The statement also pushed back at Hegseth’s claim that China was trying to become a “hegemonic power” in the region.

“No country in the world deserves to be called a hegemonic power other than the US itself, who is also the primary factor undermining the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific,” it said.

Overnight, Trump is wailing about China again, complaining that Xi is “VERY TOUGH, AND EXTREMELY HARD TO MAKE A DEAL WITH!!!”

Which sounds like Trump is laying the groundwork to capitulate further to China.

Donald Trump is making American troops — and Americans generally — less safe from biohazards as part of his attempt to destroy Harvard University.

Among the details included in Harvard’s motion for summary judgement submitted yesterday in the university’s lawsuit challenging Trump’s effort to defund the university (there are two lawsuits — the one regarding Trump’s campaign to retaliate because Harvard refused to cede its independence, and the one responding to Kristi Noem’s denial of visa for Harvard students) is a description of how Pete Hegseth’s agency cut off DOD grants without informing DARPA that the “top performing team” on an effort to detect and deploy countermeasures to biohazards had been arbitrarily and immediately cut off.

The motion quotes the effort DARPA’s director of contracting made to reverse the cuts, to no avail.

Harvard is currently the top performing team on the AMPHORA program. Inadequate knowledge of the biological threat landscape poses grave and immediate harm to national security. Development of critical technologies that enables bio surveillance and biocollection in austere, field forward locations bolsters national security and warfighter safety and lethality by enabling medical countermeasure development to new and emerging threats and provides biological threat intelligence to the deployed warfighter. This technology is significantly outpacing the state-of-the art and provides a novel leap-ahead capability to the force. Harvard’s effort is at a pivotal juncture in Phase 1 as they are just starting the microfluidic experiments that will give first indications of whether the program goal is achievable. They are also a critical integrator of multiple technologies that enable this effort and could not be readily reproduced.

Pete Hegseth just did what Trump told him to do — cut off Harvard — with no consideration of how it undermines his claimed effort to make military more lethal.

National security took a back seat to Trump’s maniacal effort to get Harvard to bow down to his demand to turn the country’s most storied institution of higher learning into a bureaucracy replicating MAGAt ideology.

Harvard’s motion mentions — and a declaration from Harvard’s Vice Provost for Research, John Shaw, lists far more — of the other benefits to American taxpayers that Trump arbitrarily took away. As a breast cancer survivor, I would personally benefit from a $7 million grant supporting research “to find and describe early changes in breast tissue in women that may be at a higher risk of breast cancer.” As someone who lost a parent to Parkinson’s, I might personally benefit from efforts to “identify[] numerous modifiable risk factors for Parkinson’s disease.” We all would benefit from a $2 million effort to better understand resistance to antibiotics awarded by the (second) Trump administration.

Gone.

All of those benefits and many more have been stolen from taxpayers who’ve already sunk billions into this research.

And yet, with few exceptions (an important one is a NYT story, cited in the motion, describing how the cuts will disrupt efforts to prevent veteran suicides and otherwise improve healthcare for veterans) this is not how the story of Trump’s emotional tantrum against Harvard is being told.

“Harvard Digs In for Battle, but Trump’s Blows Are Landing,” WSJ described a boxing match when reporting the visa ban for Harvard students.

“Why is Trump going after Harvard?” WaPo promised to answer, instead explaining, “Here’s how the attacks have escalated,” even while treating wrestling booster Linda McMahon’s claimed pretense of fighting antisemitism in good faith. Their timeline missed several important details that show up in Harvard’s own timeline (submitted with the motion for summary judgement): notably:

• Harvard did a bunch of things to address antisemitism on campus
• Plans announced by Task Force on Antisemitism Senior Counsel, Leo Terrell, way back on October 24, 2024, to defund Harvard
• The Trump Administration’s persistent disinterest in the things Harvard had done to address antisemitism
• The Trump Administration’s persistent silence about any single instance of antisemitism on Harvard’s campus — the kind of due process to which Harvard would respond on Title VI

Having not presented the pretext of antisemitism as such, WaPo doesn’t ask how revoking the visas all foreign students at Harvard, including those of 61 Israeli students, combats antisemitism.

Politico similarly glosses the significance of all this in what is mostly a process story of Trump’s efforts to “brainstorm new Harvard measures.” Trump is seeking to “bring the storied institution to heel.” The Administration will need to “get more creative to keep squeezing the school.” When it contemplates the “Trump administration’s broader efforts to reshape not just American government but the institutions that have long surrounded it,” Politico did not mention how that effort included an ignorant effort to defund Politico subscriptions, to say nothing of Trump’s other assaults on the press.

NYT has been reporting a series of “escalations.” “[T]he administration appeared eager to escalate one of its civil investigations into a criminal inquiry,” Mike Schmidt and Michael Bender described a manufactured outrage that would backfire if it were criminally charged. The fight escalated, Mike Schmidt said in an interview. This was a sharp escalation, NYT set up another Schmidt interview. Cutting off visas was a major escalation, Schmidt and Michael Bender described. “Trump Administration Escalates Harvard Feud With New Justice Dept. Investigation,” another headline blared. Mike Schmidt, who always seems to reinforce Trump’s power, keeps insisting that, “Harvard Has No Way Out,” without thinking through what that would mean for the US, if true.

Schmidt apparently can’t imagine a political setback so significant — a backlash from taxpayers about the value Trump took from them, a value that Schmidt doesn’t consider — that Trump would realize he has to fund Harvard research just like he has to keep Air Traffic Controllers on the job.

Politico, at least, quotes one of several administration sources describing that the mere futility of Trump’s efforts when public opinion swung to Harvard when Trump revoked the student visas (it made no mention that that included visas for Israelis).

“We’re fighting a losing battle,” one of the administration officials said, acknowledging that the university has the narrative upper hand when it comes to the effort to revoke Harvard’s student visas. “We’ve taken one of the most evil institutions and made them the victim.”

But there remains no question about the way Trump has deliberately hurt Americans — not just elite Americans whose kids go to Harvard, or poorer Americans, whose Harvard tuition foreign students subsidize, but the Americans who benefit from the cancer cures and biohazard warnings and ways to combat antibiotic resistance.

Dan Drezner, from his perch just down the road from Harvard at Tufts, argues that Schmidt’s pessimism about Harvard is all wrong, that Harvard is winning this battle.

Over the weekend, however, some news stories have come out that reinforce a few points about how these attacks are going.

• The administration has already shot its wad in going after Harvard and has very little left in its cupboard.
• This anti-Harvard jihad is not going exactly as planned, either legally or politically.
• The Trump White House has now reached the same point in its dealing with Harvard that it previously reached in its trade negotiations with multiple countries: desperate for a victory that may never come.

This is not to say that Trump is not wreaking carnage. He’s wreaking a tremendous amount of carnage. What he is not doing, however, is winning.

Part of Drezner’s optimism is that academics, both within Harvard and across the institutions, have discovered collective action.

What Klein’s story omits is that after a stumbling start at collective action, the administration’s actions have galvanized a lot of universities to talk to each other about response strategies. The fundamental lesson to be learned from Trump’s actions to date is that no matter how a university responds, Trump will be coming after them anyway. That comes through loud and clear in all the coverage. And if university leadership knows this, they will choose standing their ground over backing down every day of the week.

From my own limited view of how higher education is responding, I see discussions about how to respond to further pressure from the Trump administration. I also see that none of the response strategies on the table include “cut a deal.”

Where I depart from Drezner’s optimism, and concede Schmidt has a point, is that unless this senseless battle imposes a cost on Trump, Harvard will ultimately lose, American taxpayers will ultimately lose the sunk costs in research and jobs that Trump decided to take away. Because until those resisting Trump — from the lawyers to the universities to the local nonprofits and yes even the media outlets — actually win the underlying battle, Trump remains in a position to take away those cancer cures.

And that — not Wharton grad Trump’s claim of Harvard snobbery and not the billionaire’s concerns about elitism and sure as fuck not a concern about antisemitism — is why Trump keeps doubling down.

Harvard has the means and the facts to win the legal cases before it. Without even telling the story of the cancer cures Trump took away, Harvard also has the means to look like less of an asshole than Trump.

But that’s a different thing from turning Harvard’s fight — and the collective action that has arisen — into a political win.

This is not about universities. Or — as I tried to visualize last week — universities are not what people think they are. Universities do a lot of the same kind of things Elon Musk does, but with nowhere near the grift, corruption, and — yes — the antisemitism.

This is not a boxing match, a wrestling match, or a series of escalations.

This is about a broader fight for civil society.

Perhaps journalists, from their very privileged position within civil society, will be the last to figure this out, to understand that all those escalations against Harvard are really inseparable from the — thus far — more successful escalations against the press.

But what is going on is a two-bit dictator is willing to take things away from the American people all so he can lord over an entity that dared stand up to him.

One reason — I laid out a week ago — I was interested in the ways that Trump’s DOJ keeps getting caught in false claims, is because they create, “the possibility that these prosecutions will backfire, not just by creating sympathetic political martyrs, but also by further exposing [Pam] Bondi and her top aides as liars violating legal ethics.”

Which Ras Baraka is attempting to facilitate by suing Alina Habba for false arrest and malicious prosecution.

There are several key details about the lawsuit that might sustain it beyond what would normally be prosecutorial immunity, at least far enough to get discovery (discovery that might also sink the prosecution against LaMonica McIver).

First, Baraka showed that even before she was sworn in, Habba made clear that she would abuse the office for political gain.

13. Days before being sworn in, Habba announced on Fox News that she would be “investigating” New Jersey’s Democratic Governor and his appointed Attorney General, claiming New Jersey’s lawful Immigrant Trust Directive is thwarting Trump’s immigration policies. Habba claimed that New Jersey’s Governor and Attorney General were interfering with her effort to take “all criminals out of the country” — apparently except for her former client, convicted felon Donald Trump.

Along with including all the other false claims made about Baraka (an interview Habba did with Fox, a CNN interview DHS propagandist Tricia McLaughlin did, as well as false claims in the arrest affidavit), he included the tweet that Habba sent from her personal Xitter account even before Baraka was charged.

And he described the exceptional efforts to exacerbate Baraka’s arrest, not just by arresting him rather than citing him, but by subjecting him twice to fingerprinting and a mugshot.

One thing Baraka doesn’t mention, however, is the imminent primary for New Jersey’s gubernatorial race. He Baraka was well behind in polls before his arrest, but he will be able to make a plausible claim that the arrest harmed his chances — all the more so given that Pam Bondi’s own DOJ dismissed the charges against Eric Adams precisely because of the damage it would allegedly do to him in the upcoming primary.

As Liz Dye noted on Bluesky, Baraka is represented by the same lawyer, Nancy Smith, who forced Habba into a settlement on behalf of a Bedminster staffer whom Habba tricked into a hush payment in conjunction with being sexuallly harassed. She knows Habba’s tricks well.

To succeed, authoritarians must weaken or co-opt civil society, those spheres of society via which people form social ties independent of government.

That’s what Trump has been trying to do with his attacks on universities, the press, and non-governmental organizations, among other targets.

Businesses — small and large — are an important subset of civil society, both because so much local, national, and international power is concentrated there, but also because corporations often favor certain trappings of authoritarianism, particularly if it comes (as Trump’s does) with a promise to let corporations commit crimes.

Businesses are often the easiest corners of civil society for budding authoritarians to co-opt.

Trump has attempted to co-opt businesses by trading thinly-disguised bribes for favorable government assistance, whether in the form of closing investigations into illegal business practices, approval for consolidation, or massive government contracts. These bribes have a lasting value for Trump, because they serve to corrupt businesses as an ongoing process, locking in a commitment to succeed not by competition, but by tribute. Businesses that buy into Trump’s corrupt quid pro quo will have a difficult time ever freeing themselves from it.

This has been a particularly useful tool with media corporations. While ABC continues to do important journalism in the wake of Disney’s capitulation, there’s a tacit understanding that Trump can repeat his coercion if future reporting really bothers him, and CBS has all but sacrificed its journalistic independence in advance of the expected Paramount settlement. WaPo’s plight in the face of Jeff Bezos’ obeisance to Trump is even more stark.

This dynamic is one reason why right wing opposition to Trump’s tariffs is so important: the tariffs are so destructive that at least some right wingers were and are willing to confront Trump publicly on them (and the rest of the business community is no doubt cheering silently from cowardly perches in executive suites).

And this dynamic is why I find WSJ’s report on the evolving response to Trump’s attempt to cow Big Law so interesting.

The entire piece presents a curious narrative arc, describing the stories that capitulating firms tell themselves to excuse their choice.

At Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, managing partner Pat Quinn grew emotional when he announced to fellow partners that their firm—the oldest in New York—had reached a deal for peace with the Trump administration. Days later, in a firmwide meeting, Quinn said Cadwalader’s leadership had strongly considered fighting the Trump administration but ultimately elected to reach a deal out of a sense of duty to the firm and its clients, according to people familiar with his remarks.

[snip]

Firms that struck deals hoped to find solidarity in numbers. The country’s largest firm, Kirkland & Ellis, which had about $9 billion in revenue last year, lobbied its peers to sign deals.

Some of this may be denial or cowardice. The WSJ specifically notes that Paul Weiss’ Brad Karp, who serves as a kind of villain in the piece, is “a longtime Democratic donor.” Given its longstanding right wing political posture, Kirkland’s pitch for solidarity in capitulation might be a corrupt bid to support authoritarianism.

As in all of these stories, GOP firm Jones Day is not mentioned.

The story contrasts that capitulation from Paul Weiss and Kirkland and others with examples of general counsels — Citadel appears in a splashy lede, and Oracle, Microsoft, McDonalds, and Morgan Stanley are named among ten or eleven other companies — that are specifically seeking out law firms that stood up to Trump, because they view that as indication that they’ll take a hard line in negotiations for their business.

At least 11 big companies are moving work away from law firms that settled with the administration or are giving—or intend to give—more business to firms that have been targeted but refused to strike deals, according to general counsels at those companies and other people familiar with those decisions.

Among them are technology giant Oracle, investment bank Morgan Stanley, an airline and a pharmaceutical company. Microsoft expressed reservations about working with a firm that struck a deal, and another such firm stopped representing McDonald’s in a case a few months before a scheduled trial.

In interviews, general counsels expressed concern about whether they could trust law firms that struck deals to fight for them in court and in negotiating big deals if they weren’t willing to stand up for themselves against Trump. The general counsel of a manufacturer of medical supplies said that if firms facing White House pressure “don’t have a hard line,” they don’t have any line at all.

In other words, the story portrays a very real spectrum of response to Trump’s threat, but a spectrum that may be shifting towards resistance to Trump.

Which is why two anecdotes at the end of the 1,900-word story are of such interest.

WSJ describes the role of Sullivan & Cromwell’s Robert Giuffra, in the seemingly conflicted role of representing Trump on two appeals at the same time as he negotiated Paul Weiss’ epic capitulation. Purportedly in an effort to tamp down objections to his role within the firm, Giuffra outsourced his own agency to judges who would block the attacks. These attacks on law firms are “likely unconstitutional,” he reportedly explained, but leave that for the judges to determine (this is precisely the stance that Senate Appropriations Chair Susan Collins has adopted towards Trump’s usurpation of her role).

At Sullivan & Cromwell, some lawyers have bristled at the role that co-chair Robert Giuffra played in facilitating a deal for Trump to drop an executive order against rival firm Paul Weiss. Giuffra, one of Trump’s personal lawyers, participated by phone in an Oval Office discussion with the Paul Weiss leader, who was there to work out a deal.

Giuffra is representing Trump in two New York appeals—one of them a challenge to his conviction in the Stormy Daniels hush-money case. Giuffra told his partners that taking on the cases would give the firm strong ties to the new administration.

Trying to quell discontent within his own firm, Giuffra told partners at an April meeting that he believed the orders were likely unconstitutional and would be blocked by judges, and that he hoped the White House would stop issuing them, according to people familiar with his remarks. White House aides said they weren’t aware of his opposition.

The story is full of anonymous sourcing, hiding even the identity of at least six companies that are moving business to the targeted firms. Some, but not all, of that can be attributed to protecting privileged relationships. The rest is likely testament that even the companies seeking out firms willing to stand up to Trump want to avoid antagonizing the president. Hilariously, though, WSJ informed the White House of Giuffra’s opposition to these attacks, which may undermine the stated purpose — securing strong ties to the White House — of his role in these negotiations, and may heighten the discomfort with his role at Sullivan & Cromwell.

Which is how we arrive at the final two paragraphs of the story.

The second-to-last paragraph attributes the logic and authorship of the Executive Orders to Stephen Miller, where so much of Trump’s authoritarianism arises.

Trump remains interested in the orders, and deputy White House chief of staff Stephen Miller and his allies want to keep the threats of more executive orders on the table because they think it dissuades the best lawyers from representing critics of the administration. Miller has repeatedly complained that some of the country’s top lawyers took on lawsuits against the Trump administration in the first term, which he and other Trump advisers view as stymying the agenda of a democratically elected president.

The White House’s appetite for a fight with the legal industry appears to have waned. There hasn’t been a new executive order since early April.

Miller (who started an NGO designed to fight liberal policies, especially those of Joe Biden) complained when top lawyers fought Trump in the first term, which WSJ credulously parrots amounts to thwarting a democratically-elected President.

And so, WSJ describes, Miller and “his allies” (although both Ryan Barber and Josh Dawsey are bylined on this report, it doesn’t mention their past scoop about Boris Epshteyn’s role in brokering the capitulation deals) want to keep alive the threat of such orders, which have been soundly rejected by Obama appointee Beryl Howell and George W Bush appointees John Bates and Richard Leon. They want to sustain that threat because they imagine that it’ll dissuade precisely the lawyers who are finding it is good for business to show you’ll take a hard line to defend yourself.

That may true in some cases, at least for politically exposed entities, as WaPo describes. Corporations will find legal representation, but migrants and trans people may have a harder time doing so.

In spite of the described ongoing commitment to this attack from Miller (and “his allies”), WSJ ends this remarkable story with the observation that Trump has not issued any new such orders. It doesn’t mention that, 31 days of a 60-day appeal window after Howell’s ruling later, Trump has also not (yet) appealed any of the judges’ orders rejecting these EOs, not even the part — the part stripping security clearances — most ripe for appeal.

Perhaps they’re waiting for the fourth case, Susman Godfrey’s challenge currently pending before Biden appointee Judge Loren AliKhan. Or perhaps people smarter about the law than Miller (and unnamed allies like Epshteyn) may have noticed that these orders risk undermining Executive authority and create an acute ongoing legal risk, particularly if Democrats were to win one or both houses of Congress at midterms.

In rejecting these orders, all three judges pointed to Trump’s flipflop on the Paul Weiss order to adopt a maximal ruling against Trump.

Leon did so in adopting WilmerHale’s request to treat the entire order, including the security clearance restriction, as a unified whole:

The President’s treatment of the Paul Weiss Order underscores the unified nature of the Order. The Paul Weiss Order largely tracks the WilmerHale Order, with a Background section and similar operative provisions. See generally Paul Weiss Order. When Paul Weiss struck a deal with the President, he rescinded the Paul Weiss Order in full, citing the firm’s “remarkable change of course.” Compl. ¶¶ 102–03; Paul Weiss Rescission Order. The President’s treatment of the Paul Weiss Order shows that he “intended” these Executive Orders “to stand or fall as a whole.” See Minn. v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 173 (1999) (finding that an Executive Order was designed “to stand or fall as a whole” because it “embodied a single, coherent policy”).

And both Howell…

While the Paul, Weiss Revocation Order summarized that firm’s agreement to, inter alia, “adopt[] a policy of political neutrality with respect to client selection and attorney hiring; tak[e] on a wide range of pro bono matters representing the full political spectrum; commit[] to merit-based hiring, promotion, and retention . . .; dedicat[e] the equivalent of $40 million in pro bono legal services during [President Trump’s] term in office . . .; and other similar initiatives,” none of these agreedupon policy or practice changes appear to explain or address how any national security concerns sufficient to warrant the Paul, Weiss EO could have changed so rapidly. Id. § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 13685. The speed of the reversal and the rationale provided in the Paul, Weiss Revocation Order, which focused only on agreements to advance policy initiatives of the Trump Administration, see id., further support the conclusion that national security considerations are not a plausible explanation for Section 2.

[snip]

The fact that Paul, Weiss quickly negotiated a deal, including an agreement to provide “the equivalent of $40 million” in free legal work, rather than face the potential injuries of the similar Executive Order targeting that firm, see Paul, Weiss Revocation Order, 90 Fed. Reg. at 13685, demonstrates the coercive power of such targeting by the Trump Administration.

… And Bates did so to reach the normally unassailable presidential authority to govern security clearances:

And if any doubt remains as to the sincerity of the invocation of national security, take a look at the Paul Weiss saga. Paul Weiss’s executive order imposed the same tailored process on its employees’ security clearances. See First Paul Weiss E.O. § 2. What it took to escape that process—denouncing a former partner, changing client selection and hiring practices, and pledging pro bono work to the President’s liking—had not even a glancing relationship to national security.

Put simply, this blunderbuss of an order does not engage in the sort of “legitimate consideration of speech,” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 668 (2012), that might sometimes be necessary to keep classified information in safe hands. Rather than ensuring that national secrets remain with those who will keep them, Section 2’s process “seek[s] to leverage” the Executive’s control over security clearances as a way to change speech. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, 570 U.S. 205, 214–15 (2013). Section 2, in other words, is about using another lever in the President’s arsenal to extinguish speech he dislikes. Cf. id. at 218 (“This case is not about the Government’s ability to enlist the assistance of those with whom it already agrees. It is about compelling a grant recipient to adopt a particular belief as a condition of funding.”). The First Amendment forbids that sort of speech manipulation by the government, even in an arguably national security-related setting.

These judges — particularly Howell, with her description of coercion — are describing bribery, of that thinly veiled quid pro quo used with direct payments now laid bare in the quick flip flop with Paul Weiss. The risk that Trump’s flipflop on Paul Weiss could be used to prove bribery, and the risk it poses to law firms going forward, was predicted in an amicus from ethics professors.

None of that, mind you, appears in the WSJ story.

WSJ is describing something simpler: the value proposition in hiring a law firm willing to stand up to a bully.

It’s just one response among many, even among many from corporations. But that value proposition has had the effect of getting key corporations to defend civil society.

Since I was traveling, I’m a bit late to  Trump’s fantastic 510-word Truth Social post, in which he calls Leonard Leo a sleazebag and blames the Federalist Society that Trump-appointed judges — including US Court of International Trade Judge Timothy Reif — have ruled against him and even suggests that people he calls “Radical Left Judges” are in cahoots with “very bad people” who by context must include Leo. 🤡🤡🤡

Simply fantastic.

I’ve annotated the post to unpack the treatise, which reads as if Peter Navarro and Mike Davis got together, chomped a bunch of hallucinogens, and stole the keys to Trump’s Truth Social account.

The key points are:

• The tariffs are — Trump lies, repeatedly — super duper good!
• The US Court of International Trade ruled they’re illegal, but the Federal Court of Appeals (which disappears later in this screed) put that ruling on hold
• Leonard Leo (and not Mike Davis, who played a central role in confirming judges during Trump’s first Administration) must be responsible every time a Trump-appointed judge rules against Trump, because it surely can’t be the law and surely can’t be Trump’s (or Mike Davis’) shitty picks
• And therefore (there’s really no therefore here — it does not logically follow at all) SCOTUS must reverse this decision

I’ve been tracking the significance of right wing support for these tariff challenges from the start.

It matters that not just a Leonard Leo-funded group but also a Koch-backed group opposed Trump’s tariffs — and his unconstitutional power grab in imposing them — even before Gavin Newsom and then a bunch of other Democratic states did (last week’s decision pertained to the Koch-funded effort; the one associated with Leo is still pending). It matters that there are some issues that are so dear to right wing jurisprudence (or pocketbooks) and are so clearly reserved for Congress that left, right, and centrist opposition to Trump can agree on those issues. It matters that the topic at hand, Trump’s tariffs, have already done so much damage to the US economy and stature in the world.

This treatise appears to be an attempt to deal with both those issues: Trump has been ruled to have violated the law over and over again, including (increasingly) by Trump-appointed judges and if SCOTUS sides with the Koch Foundation and Democratic states on this, it’ll be an enormous rebuke to Trump’s unlawful power grabs.

This legal case is one that threatens his entire bid to authoritarian power, not because it is key to codifying his police state, politicizing government, or destroying civil society — the other topics that SCOTUS has and will review in months ahead — but because it unifies left, right, and center.

And so Trump implores SCOTUS, a SCOTUS on which his two most reliable allies, Clarence Thomas and Sammy Alito, also happen to have benefitted from a lifetime of Leo’s lucrative attention, to “QUICKLY and DECISIVELY” side with him here. Poor Trump even whimpers, “I hope that is not so, and don’t believe it is!” that Leo controls SCOTUS, because if he did (the post implies) Trump would lose this case.

Perhaps Trump means this as a challenge to Clarence and Sammy’s self-respect.

As I said, I got to this fantastic post late. Much ink has been spilled about the extent to which this reflects a real break from Leo’s vetting of judicial candidates. Certainly Davis has promised to find real nutjobs in this second term. The screed appeared the day after Pam Bondi wrote the American Bar Association to tell them she believed their adherence to legal standards made them biased and so would exclude them from reviewing Trump’s judicial nominees. So it may well just be an effort to roll out a wider approach to installing hack judges.

That’s an interesting and important question; after all, Trump has yet to confirm any judge this term, so it’s possible that without Leo’s diligence, Trump simply won’t stack the courts like he did his first term. It’s also true that (as this post and his recent nomination of Emil Bove makes clear) Trump’s litmus test for judges going forward will be fealty to him, not the law.

But in the short term, I’m most interested in who gets Sammy Alito in the divorce. Who gets the hundreds of judges Trump appointed his first term. Who gets Aileen Cannon. Who gets everyone else who owes a decade of career advancement to Leo’s curation and care?

I imagine, in the short term, this is meant just like it reads. “Thank you for your attention to this matter!” Trump concludes, after giving SCOTUS an order. Don’t let Leonard Leo tell you what to do, that’s my job!

But it could well backfire among judges who do owe allegiance to the networks Leo built.

Listen on spotify (transcripts available)

Listen on Apple (transcripts available)