Spencer and the Washington Independent have posted the documents.

There is significantly more in here. 

One thing to note: IG was complaining about water dousing in 2004. And then they wrote the 2005 memos to include water dousing, done on Hassan Ghul, sometime in 2004. Interesting timing.

The report started because of illegal techniques used with al-Nashiri, among others. Yet Durham hasn’t found any reason to show that the torture tapes were destroyed because of that?

It says CTC with Office of Technical Services came up with the techniques. I suspect Jeff Kaye will have a lot to say about that combination.

Note, it doesn’t say that OGC (John Rizzo) was also working with DOD’s GC (Jim Haynes) to come up with the torture techniques, thereby hiding SERE’s involvement.

"OGC briefed DO officers" at interrogation sites on what was legal. Doesn’t say whether OGC briefed the contractors. But in any case, Rizzo bears some responsibility here, right?

Okay, this is significant.

With respect to two detainees at those sites, the use and frequency of one EIT, the waterboard, went beyond the projected use of the technique as originally described to DoJ. The Agency, on 29 July 2003, secured oral DoJ concurrence that certain deviations are not significant for the purposes of DoJ’s legal opinions.

Remember, this is two days after they got the oral okay in the first place (based on the JPRA document), and two days before DOJ wrote the memo. Yet the memo still used restrictions that they had just orally okayed the torturers to exceed. 

This also suggests the techniques, as we suspected, preceded the authorization.

Page 7:

The DCI Guidelines … still leave substantial room for misinterpretation and do not cover all Agency detention and interrogation activities.

Also page 7:

Officers are concerned that public revelation of the CTC Program will seriously damage Agency officers’ personal reputations, as well as the reputation and effectiveness of the Agency itself.

No mention of international law or, more importantly, endangering Americans captured by others. That’s nice.

On page 11, they’ve kept two paragraphs describing the legal basis for the program redacted.

Page 12

OGC shared these "draft" papers [on techniques] with Agency officers responsible [for the interrogations?]

Page 13

…in late 2001, CIA had tasked an independent contractor psychologist, … to research and write a paper on Al-Qa’ida’s resistance to interrogation techniques.

Note this shifts the chronology SASC gives, suggesting CIA started it. It also doesn’t say who in CIA asked Mitchell and Jessen to develop the program.

Page 22: Rizzo got a follow-up document we haven’t seen yet, which basically says War Crimes are off the table. This is where they dismiss the 5th, 8th, and 14th Amendments.

Page 23: 

In early 2003, CIA officials, at the urging of the General Counsel, continued to inform senior Administration officials and the leadership of the Congressional Oversight Committees of the then-current status of the CRC Program.

Close to an admission that the Fall 2002 briefing was not on the then-current status. Goes onto claim that GC says that "none of the participants expressed any concern about the techniques or the program" even though Jane Harman did, to then GC, Scott Muller, in writing.

Page 31 fn 36 suggests that they didn’t put the medical guidelines in writing bc "Seventh Floor" would need to approve the promulgation of any further former guidelines." This was, of course, right after the month of KSM’s worst torture.

Page 37:

OIG found 11 interrogation videotapes to be blank. Two others were blank except for one or two minutes of recording. Two others were broken and could not be reviewed. OIG compared the videotapes to [redacted] logs and cables and identified a 21-hour period of time, which included two waterboard sessions, that was not captured on the videotape.

Note, CIA is trying to withhold precisely those logs from ACLU. I wonder what else is in that 21-hour gap.

Page 44

According to the General Counsel, the Attorney General acknowledged he is fully aware of the repetitive use of the waterboard and that CIA is well within the scope of the DOJ opinion and the authority given to CIA by that opinion. The Attorney General was informed the waterboard had been used 119 on a single individual.

Cables indicate that Agency interrogators [redacted] applied the waterboard technique to Khalid Shaykh Muhammed 183 [redacted]

Well, I guess that’s one explanation for why they didn’t prosecute…

Page 71: These guys couldn’t even stage a mock execution credibly. What morans.

Page 83

According to a number of those interviewed for this Review, the Agency’s intelligence on Al-Qa’ida was limited prior to the initiation of the CTC Interrogation Program. The Agency lacked adequate linguists or subject matter experts and had very little hard knowledge of what particular Al-Qa’ida leaders–who later became detainees–knw. This lack of knowledge led analysts to speculate about what a detainee "should know," vice information the analyst could objectively demonstrate the detainee did know.

Page 84

According to a senior CTC officer, the interrogation team [redacted] considered Abu Zubaydah to be compliant and wanted to terminate EITs. [redacted] believed Abu Zubaydah continued to withhold information [redacted] at the time it generated substantial pressure from Headquarters to continue use of the EITs. According to this senior officer, the decision to resume use of the waterboard on Abu Zubaydah was made by senior officers of the DO [redacted] to assess Abu Zubaydah’s compliance and witnessed the final waterboard session, after which, they reported back to Headquarters that the EITs were no longer needed on Abu Zubaydah.

Page 87, on KSM (note the focus on Americans, some of them on totally bogus charges)

He provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including Sayfullah Paracha and his son Uzair Paracha, businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh Muhammed planned to use to smuggle explosives into the United States; Saleh Almari, a sleeper operative in New York; and Majid Khan, an operative who could enter the United States easily and was tasked to research attacks [redacted] Khalid Shaykh Muhammed’s information also led to the investigation and prosecution of Iyman Faris, the truck driver arrested in early 2003 in Ohio.

Page 94

One officer expressed concern that one day, Agency officers will wind up on some "wanted list" to appear before the World Court for war crimes stemming from activities [redacted] Another said "Ten years from now we’re going to be sorry we’re doing this … [but] it has to be done." He expressed concern that the CTC Program will be exposed in the news media and cited particular concern about the possibility of being named in a leak.

And notes some will be unhappy that he has initiated the review. But doesn’t consider those of us who smell a whitewash.

I have reviewed the OPR report in depth. Moreover, I have closely examined the full, still-classified version of the 2004 CIA Inspector General’s report, as well as other relevant information available to the Department. As a result of my analysis of all of this material, I have concluded that the information known to me warrants opening a preliminary review into whether federal laws were violated in connection with the interrogation of specific detainees at overseas locations. The Department regularly uses preliminary reviews to gather information to determine whether there is sufficient predication to warrant a full investigation of a matter. I want to emphasize that neither the opening of a preliminary review nor, if evidence warrants it, the commencement of a full investigation, means that charges will necessarily follow.

Assistant United States Attorney John Durham was appointed in 2008 by then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey to investigate the destruction of CIA videotapes of detainee interrogations. During the course of that investigation, Mr. Durham has gained great familiarity with much of the information that is relevant to the matter at hand. Accordingly, I have decided to expand his mandate to encompass this related review. Mr. Durham, who is a career prosecutor with the Department of Justice and who has assembled a strong investigative team of experienced professionals, will recommend to me whether there is sufficient predication for a full investigation into whether the law was violated in connection with the interrogation of certain detainees.

There are those who will use my decision to open a preliminary review as a means of broadly criticizing the work of our nation’s intelligence community. I could not disagree more with that view. The men and women in our intelligence community perform an incredibly important service to our nation, and they often do so under difficult and dangerous circumstances. They deserve our respect and gratitude for the work they do. Further, they need to be protected from legal jeopardy when they act in good faith and within the scope of legal guidance. That is why I have made it clear in the past that the Department of Justice will not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal guidance given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the interrogation of detainees. I want to reiterate that point today, and to underscore the fact that this preliminary review will not focus on those individuals.

I share the President’s conviction that as a nation, we must, to the extent possible, look forward and not backward when it comes to issues such as these. While this Department will follow its obligation to take this preliminary step to examine possible violations of law, we will not allow our important work of keeping the American people safe to be sidetracked.

I fully realize that my decision to commence this preliminary review will be controversial. As Attorney General, my duty is to examine the facts and to follow the law. In this case, given all of the information currently available, it is clear to me that this review is the only responsible course of action for me to take."

And thus the whitewash starts.

Holder is poised to name John Durham, a career Justice Department prosecutor from Connecticut, to lead the inquiry, according to the sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the process is not complete.

Durham’s mandate, the sources added, will be relatively narrow: to look at whether there is enough evidence to launch a full-scale criminal investigation of current and former CIA personnel who may have broken the law in their dealings with detainees. Many of the harshest CIA interrogation techniques have not been employed against terrorism suspects for four years or more.

As I said in my panel at Netroots Nation, we’ll know a lot about whether Holder intends to do a real investigation, or just a whitewash investigating the Lynndie Englands, by the stature of the prosecutor he names. And while Durham is already neck deep in the investigation of torture on the torture tapes, he doesn’t necessarily have the stature to go after–say–Jim Haynes and John Rizzo for setting up the torture regime.

I guess Holder wasn’t that serious about investigating torture after all. 

I’m trying to find it, but some weeks back, there was a report of Rahm and Leon Panetta having a very contentious very public meal in DC. Which is what I assume this passage from the ABC story reporting (again) that Panetta may be on his way out at CIA refers to.

According to intelligence officials, Panetta erupted in a tirade last month during a meeting with a senior White House staff member. Panetta was reportedly upset over plans by Attorney General Eric Holder to open a criminal investigation of allegations that CIA officers broke the law in carrying out certain interrogation techniques that President Obama has termed "torture."

Assuming that the senior staffer was Rahm (always a good guess when tirades are involved), what does that say about the rest of the article (aside from the fact that the description of Panetta using "salty language" without reporting that it was probably a two-way flood of "fucks" suggests some bias)?

The article itself reports three kinds of complaints Panetta has regarding his position:

• The imminent appointment of a prosecutor to investigate torture and dealing with the Democrats in the House
• Panetta’s subordinate position with respect to Dennis Blair
• Panetta’s discomfort with "with some of the operations being carried out by the CIA that he did not know about until he took the job"

Of note, those are unlike things. Panetta’s frustration with the torture investigation and his former colleagues is undoubtedly related. But his pique at being bureaucratically bested by Blair is completely different. And the discomfort about ongoing operations–suggesting he’s less willing to push the limits than the "former top US intelligence official" reporting this complaint is another kind of problem altogether.

In other words, it’s unclear from the reporting whether Panetta’s complaining because he has been too protective of CIA, of his own turf, or of the law. 

Now add that range of complaints in with some of the guarantees from those who might be passing on mere observations or might be attempts to create the reality it claims to observe. In particular, I’m particular intrigued by the report that one of the runners-up to Panetta in getting the position is already being briefed to take over appearing in the same article citing a former high ranking intelligence officer.

"Leon will be leaving," predicted a former top U.S. intelligence official, citing the conflict with Blair. 

[snip]

Six other current and former senior intelligence officials said they too had been briefed about Panetta’s frustrations in the job, including dealing with his former Democratic colleagues in the House of Representatives.

One of the officials said the White House had begun informal discussions with candidates who were runners-up to Panetta in the CIA director selection process last year.

One of the candidates reportedly has begun a series of preparatory briefings.

Is the guy predicting Panetta’s demise the guy getting briefings in preparation for consideration for the job? And is that guy someone like John Brennan?

Someone (perhaps, but not necessarily in addition to the Blackwater-related people pissed at Panetta for briefing Blackwater’s role to Congress) is out to get Panetta. It’s unclear precisely why they’re out to get him.

(Today is CIA IG Report day. While we wait, I’m re-posting two posts I did in June describing what we already know is in the report.)

In this post, I reviewed the known contents of the CIA IG Report’s 6-page section on torture for those who seem to forget we’ve seen substantive bits from that in the Bradbury memos. In this post, I’ll look at what else shows up in the Bradbury memos. In a follow-up post, I’ll look at what IG Report contents we haven’t seen (and therefore are all but guaranteed not to see).

From what we can reconstruct, the report appears to include the following:

• Intro and summary
• A history of CIA’s involvement in torture
• A description of the development of the torture techniques as if they were developed for use for Abu Zubaydah
• A review of the legal authorization for the program, with the critique that doctors were not involved in the pre-authorization review and, probably, a description of the ways that torture as practiced exceeded the guidelines included in Bybee Two 
• An erroneous claim that everyone who should have been briefed was briefed
• Apparently a general review of how the program was implemented, including a description of the close involvement of medical personnel, and a description of what was done to which High Value Detainees
• A description of the decision to videotape and apparent reviews of what a review of the videotapes and cables revealed about whether the torture was what it was claimed to be
• Forty pages of completely redacted material
• The Effectiveness section
• A policy section that notes that the program includes many of the same techniques as the State Department qualifies as abusive
• Three pages of recommendations
• A number of Appendices–the CIA appears to be hiding the very existence of about five of these and most of the contents of the rest of them

While I couldn’t begin to guess what that 40 page completely redacted section includes, the stuff that has been made available show the IG was concerned about waterboarding (for a variety of reasons), believed the program to constitute the same kind of abuses the State Department condemned, and believed the approval process for the torture techniques (the Bybee Two memo) was inadequate.

Read the rest of the entry to see the more specific details of the program.

This post takes the Table of Contents of the IG Report and inserts known details into the section they appear (bold titles are first level headings, italics are second level headings, and underline are third level headings). It puts the references to the IG Report from the May 10, 2005 Techniques memo and May 30, 2005 CAT memo into the proper section; to see where these references occur in the Bradbury memos, see this post. As noted below, I have not replicated my discussion of what appears in the Effectiveness section from this post. The quotes below are, with one exception from the report itself as noted, Bradbury’s (with his direct citations of the report in quotation marks).

Introduction (1)

Summary (2)

The IG Report noted that in some cases the waterboard was used with far greater frequency than initially indicated. (5)

Background (9)

CIA interrogation practice appears to have varied over time. The IG Report explains that the CIA "has had intermittent involvement in the interrogation of individuals whose interests are opposed to the United States." IG Report at 9. In the early 1980s, for example, the CIA initiated the Human Resource Exploitation ("HRE") training program, "designed to train foreign liaison services on interrogation techniques." Id. The CIA terminated the HRE program in 1986 because of allegations of human rights abuses in Latin America. See id at 10. [The passage on CIA’s past use of torture goes on at some length, but is redacted.] 

Discussion (11)

Genesis of post-9/11 Agency Detention and Interrogation Activities (11)

The Capture of Abu Zubaydah and Development of EITs (12)

 Upon his capture on March 27, 2002, Zubaydah became the most senior member of al-Qaeda in United States custody.(12)

These techniques have all been imported from military Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape ("SERE" training, where they have been used for years on U.S. miliary personnel, although with some significant differences described below. (13-14)

As noted in the IG Report, "[a]ccording to individuals with authoritative knowledge of the SERE program, … [e]xcept for Navy SERE training, use of the waterboard was discontinued because of its dramatic effect on the students who were subjects." IG Report at 14 n14.

The IG Report noted that in some cases the waterboard … was used in a different manner [than originally indicated]. (14 n14; brackets mine)

In most applications of [the waterboard], including as it is used in SERE training, it appears that the individual undergoing the technique is not in fact completely prevented from breathing, but his airflow is restricted by the wet cloth, creating a sensation of drowning. See IG Report at 15. ("Airflow is restricted … and the technique produces the sensation of drowning and suffocation.") (brackets mine, parenthesis Bradbury’s; Bradbury goes on to note that after the IG Report, the CIA imposed new constraints on waterboarding)

The IG Report described the maximum allowable period of sleep deprivation at that time as 264 hours or 11 days. See IG Report at 15. (Bradbury goes on to state that after the IG Report, the CIA imposed new limits on sleep deprivation)

DOJ Legal Analysis (16)

Pages 16 through 19 are available largely unredacted here. Pages 16 though 18 consist of a general review of CAT and US 2340(a). Page 19 discusses the Bybee One memo. Page 20 introduces a discussion of the Bybee Two memo, after which the rest of the page is redacted.

We note that this involvement of medical personnel in designing safeguards for, and in monitoring implementation of, the procedures is a significant difference from earlier uses of the techniques catalogued in the Inspector General’s Report. See IG Report at 21 n26 ("OMS was neither consulted nor involved in the analysis of the risk and benefits of [enhanced interrogation techniques], nor provided with the OTS report cited in the OLC opinion [the Interrogation Memorandum].").

The Inspector General further reported that "OMS contends that the expertise of the SERE waterboard experience is so different from the subsequent Agency usage as to make it almost irrelevant. Consequently, according to OMS, there was no a priori reason to believe that applying the waterboard with the frequency and intensity with which it was used by the psychologist/interrogators was either efficacious or medically safe." Id at 21 n26.

Notice to and Consultation with Executive and Congressional Officials (23)

Page 23 of the report includes the following passage:

The DCI briefed appropriate senior national security and legal officials on the proposed EITs. In the fall of 2002, the Agency briefed the leadership of the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees on the use of both standard techniques and EITs. [note, this quote is from the report itself, not Bradbury’s memos]

[Long redacted section]

"Medical and, as appropriate, psychological personnel shall be physically present at, or reasonably available to, each Detention Facility. Medical personnel shall check the physical condition of each detainee at intervals appropriate to the circumstances and shall keep appropriate records." (28-29)

Medical and psychological personnel are on-scene throughout (and, as detailed below, physically present or otherwise observing during the application of many techniques, including all techniques involving physical contact with detainees) and "[d]aily physical and psychological evaluations are continued through the period of [enhanced interrogation technique] use." [brackets Bradbury’s] (30)

The CIA used the waterboard extensively in the interrogations of KSM and Zubaydah, but did so only after it became clear that standard interrogation techniques were not working. Interrogators used enhanced techniques in the interrogation of al-Nashiri with notable results as early as the first day. See IG Report at 35-36. Twelve days into the interrogation, the CIA subjected al-Nashiri to one session of the waterboard during which water was applied two times. See id. at 36. (Note this section immediately precedes the discussion of videotapes.)

Videotapes of Interrogations (in the middle of long redacted section, 36)

The IG Report noted that in some cases the waterboard … was used in a different manner [than originally indicated]. See id. at 37 ("[T]he waterboard technique  … was different from the technique described in the DoJ opinion and used in the SERE training. The difference was the manner in which the detainee’s breathing was obstructed. At the SERE school and in the DoJ opinion, the subject’s airflow is disrupted by the firm application of a damp cloth over the air passages; the interrogator applies a small amount of water to the cloth in a controlled manner. By contrast, the Agency Interrogator …  applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee’s mouth and nose. One of the psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the Agency’s use of the technique is different from that used in SERE training because it is "for real–and is more poignant and convincing.")

Waterboard Technique (in the middle of long redacted section, 44, the passage begins with a reference to the waterboarding of KSM)

The IG Report noted that in some cases the waterboard was used with far greater frequency than initially indicated. (44, 46)

This is not to say that the interrogation program has worked perfectly. According to the IG Report, the CIA, at least initially, could not always distinguish detainees who had information but were successfully resisting interrogation from those who did not actually have the information. See IG report at 83-85. On at least one occasion, this may have resulted in what might be deemed in retrospect to have been the unnecessary use of enhanced techniques. On that occasion, although the on-scene interrogation team judged Zubaydah to be compliant, elements with CIA Headquarters still believed he was withholding information. [Redaction of more than one full line] See id, at 84. At the direction of CIA Headquarters interrogators, therefore used the waterboard one more time on Zubaydah. [Redaction of ~3/4 of a line] See id, at 84-85.

This example, however, does not show CIA “conduct [that is] intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest,” or “deliberate indifference” to the possibility of such unjustifiable injure. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849. As long as the CIA reasonably believed that Zubaydah continued to withhold sufficiently important information, use of the waterboard was supported by the Government’s interest in protecting the Nation from subsequent terrorist attacks. The existence of a reasonable, good faith belief is not negated because the factual predicates for that belief are subsequently determined to be false. Moreover, in the Zubaydah example, CIA Headquarters dispatched officials to observe the last waterboard session. These officials reported that enhanced techniques were no longer needed. See IG Report at 85. Thus the CIA did not simply rely on what appeared to be credible intelligence but rather ceased using enhanced techniques despite this intelligence.

Effectiveness (85)

See this post and this post. Note, too, the unredacted discussion in the report–at least two of the six pages in this section pertain to waterboarding.

Policy Considerations and Concerns Regarding the Detention and Interrogation Program (91)

Policy Considerations (92)

Pages 92, 93, and half of 94 are unredacted in the report. They include a description of the Senate reservation on CAT. It notes the Senate’s use of the 5th, 8th, and 14th Amendments to fulfill the "cruel, inhuman, or degrading" requirement of CAT, but notes that CAT does not have a "no exceptions" clause as it does for the torture requirement. These passages then review State Department reports condemning similar practices to those used in the torture program, including hooding, making detainees lie on the floor, and stress positions. 

[One redacted subsection–must be "concerns regarding the program"–though the section must be no more than one page]

Endgame (95)

Conclusions (100)

The IG Report noted that in some cases the waterboard was used with far greater frequency than initially indicated. (103-04)

Recommendations (106)

Appendices (no page numbers)

A. Procedures and Resources

This one-page appendix describes is partly unredacted in the report, and consists of the procedures used for the review.

B. Chronology of Significant Events

[All other Appendices redacted; the report shows the existence of four more appendices, including one section on acceptable techniques, but appears to hide around 6 more appendices, which must be those of greatest length]

(Today is CIA IG Report day. While we wait, I’m re-posting two posts I did in June describing what we already know is in the report.)

Much of the focus on the now-delayed but upcoming release of the CIA IG Report on torture has been on whether the six page section on "Effectiveness"–the section that most challenges Dick Cheney’s claims–would be released.

What people seem to be oblivious to, however, is that much of this section has already been released–in two of the Bradbury Memos declassified in April. I first reported on the IG Report’s comments about efficacy here and a week later, McClatchy did effectively the same report. I’ve replicated the section describing the page-by-page contents, as revealed by the Bradbury memos, below. But here’s basically what the IG Report appears to have concluded about torture’s inefficacy.

• It could not be conclusively determined whether or not torture had prevented any attacks
• There is limited data on whether torture is effective or not
• Torture leads to an increased number of intelligence reports–it’s not clear whether the IG Report comments on the quality of those reports
• But you can’t learn everything form one detainee–even someone like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed; the information from more minor figures is important to challenge High Value Detainees
• The CIA waterboarded Abu Zubaydah and KSM a whole bunch of times

Note that last bullet: the report on the sheer number of times AZ and KSM were waterboarded shows up in the section on efficacy–suggesting that the number itself says something about the inefficacy of the technique.

So that’s it–that’s much what the Effectiveness section will show. And given the stinginess of the CIA of late, I expect we might just get exactly what was revealed in the Bradbury memos, and nothing more, once the IG Report is actually released.

I’m actually more interested in some other sections of the IG Report–which we also know of thanks to Steven Bradbury. But I’ll explain those in a follow-up post.

As Bradbury notes on page 10 of his memo, the IG Report discusses the efficacy of enhanced interrogation from page 85 though 91. Here are the topics that discussion covers, in order, with the Bradbury description of the reference:

Page 85: No direct reference

Page 86: A description of an increase in intelligence reports attributable to enhanced methods and a discussion arguing that you can’t measure the efficacy of interrogation by pointing to just the reports from one detainee..

See IG Report at 86, 90-91 (describing increase in intelligence reports attributable to use of enhanced techniques). 

---

According to the CIA Inspector General:

CTC frequently uses the information from one detainee, as well as other sources, to vet the information from another detainee. Although lower-level detainees provide less information than the high value detainees, information from these detainees has, on many occasions, supplied the information needed to probe the high value detainees further. … [T]he triangulation of intelligence provides a fuller knowledge of Al-Qa’ida activities than would be possible from a single detainee.

IG Report at 86.

Page 87: No direct reference

Page 88: A statement that it is difficult to determine whether interrogations have stopped specific attacks.

As the IG Report notes, it is difficult to determine conclusively whether interrogations have provided information critical to interdicting specific imminent attacks. See id. at 88.

Page 89: A statement noting that there is limited data on whether enhanced methods are effective (note–Bradbury pitches this as an observation that the techniques were used "sparingly," which from the context appears to be disingenuous).

And, because the CIA has used enhanced techniques sparingly, "there is limited data on which to assess their individual effectiveness." Id at 89.

Page 90: A comment on the increased number of reports tied to enhanced methods, along with a discussion of the number of times Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded.

See IG Report at 86, 90-91 (describing increase in intelligence reports attributable to use of enhanced techniques). 

---

The CIA used the waterboard "at least 83 times during August 2002" in the interrogation of Zubaydah. IG Report at 90, and 183 times during March 2003 in the interrogation of KSM, see id. at 91.  

Page 91: A comment on the increased number of reports tied to enhanced methods, along with a discussion of the number of times KSM was waterboarded.

See IG Report at 86, 90-91 (describing increase in intelligence reports attributable to use of enhanced techniques). 

---

The CIA used the waterboard … 183 times during March 2003 in the interrogation of KSM, see id. at 91.  

The AP and Politico have competing stories up speculating that–along with clearing brush this week–Obama might pay Ted Kennedy a visit. The AP, relying entirely on speculation, suggests a visit could be a big boost for Obama’s efforts to pass health care reform, one of Kennedy’s lifelong goals. The Politico, relying on an email from a Kennedy aide, says Obama is not and never was scheduled to visit Kennedy.

But a Kennedy aide said in an e-mail Friday that an Obama-Kennedy visit is not going to happen and was never in the works.

Given Kennedy’s apparent health struggles of late, it may be that he’s not up to meeting with Obama in the first place, and particularly not if Obama comes with press corps in tow.

That said, for the next week, Obama will be one 10 to 15 mile chopper ride away from the man who perhaps unexpectedly bestowed on Obama the Kennedy mantle–and in doing so, had a significant role in getting Obama elected. Obama owes Kennedy, Obama is flailing with legislation Kennedy cares deeply about, and this may be the last time Kennedy can collect on Obama’s debts to him.

Therein may be the problem.

After all, the AP is correct that even reports of an Obama visit to Hyannisport would boost Obama’s fortunes and presumably those of health care legislation. A visit followed by a call to "Do it for Teddy!" might inspire Democrats (and possibly some of Kennedy’s close friends on the other side of the aisle) to pull together to get this done.

But for what bill?

Discussions I’ve seen on a potential visit all focus on Obama’s current trajectory, which appears to be an attempt to pass insurance company reform under the cover of public option kabuki. None of that discussion on a potential Kennedy visit focuses on the HELP bill–Kennedy’s bill, shepherded through by Chris Dodd. One that resembles those passed through the House, including a public option. 

If I were Kennedy, I wouldn’t let Obama set foot in my house unless he promised to ditch the Rahm/Messina plan to follow the Baucus plan. If I were Kennedy, I’d use this opportunity to kick Obama’s ass for embracing that fraudulent kabuki after all the things Kennedy has done to help Obama.

And if I were Obama, I might take that opportunity to pivot. To adopt Kennedy’s bill, to ride the rising anger of the Democratic base and Kennedy’s legacy to pass real health care reform.

Politico says it won’t happen (though there’s just enough flexibility of schedule and close press events built into Obama’s transit to pull it off). But if it were, it’d be Obama’s opportunity to come away fighting a fresh battle–the battle to pass Ted Kennedy’s healthcare reform bill, to pass the Ted Kennedy Healthcare Reform Bill, rather than the corporatist crap for which he’s currently flailing.

Update: Major Garrett tweets:

WH Spox Burton: "no plans" for Obama to visit ailing Sen. Kennedy. Plans can change, tho. Many expect they will.

MadDog pointed to this passage in NYT’s story on the new revelations from the CIA IG report.

Besides the inspector general’s report, other documents expected to be released Monday are a 2007 Justice Department memo reauthorizing the C.I.A.’s “enhanced” interrogation techniques, documents that former Vice President Dick Cheney has said provide evidence that the interrogation methods produced valuable information about Al Qaeda; and Justice Department memos from 2006 concerning conditions of confinement in C.I.A. jails.

Best as I can tell, these are:

2007 Justice Department memo: The OLC memo Spencer was the first to report. From his Windy report:

As a result, according to the former senior intelligence official, after Bush issued the order, the CIA again asked the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel to review the techniques listed in the revised interrogation program in order to determine their legality, just as the Office of Legal Counsel had done in 2002 and 2005, after previous periods of challenge to the post-9/11 interrogation program.

2006 Justice Department memos: The SSCI Narrative describes these to be interpretations of the DTA and the Hamdan decision.

In June 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention applied to the conflict with Al-Qa’ida, contrary to the position previously adopted by the President. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions requires that detainees “shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,” and prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment” and “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.” At the time of the Hamdan decision, the War Crimes Act defined the term “war crime” to include “a violation of Common Article 3.”

In August 2006, OLC issued two documents considering the legality of the conditions of confinement in CIA facilities. One of the documents was an opinion interpreting the Detainee Treatment Act; the other document was a letter interpreting Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, as enforced by the War Crimes Act. These documents included consideration of U.S. constitutional law and the legal decisions of international tribunals and other countries.

Cheney’s documents: Reporting elsewhere suggests this will include more than just the two documents Cheney requested, but a few others. They will basically argue, for example, that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed provided a ton of information, but they will not consider whether torture was the most effective way of getting him to provide that information. As Spencer has reported, both Ron Wyden and Russ Feingold supported their release.

Okay, it looks like a busy week for us here.

But notice what is not on this list?

The Office of Public Responsibility report, which has been due out all summer, and last we heard was at the CIA being reviewed to protect (presumably) John Rizzo’s role in crafting OLC memos that claimed to authorize torture.

Which is all very convenient for Eric Holder’s reported plan to name a prosecutor to investigate torture (I’m guessing this will happen this week, if not tomorrow itself), but not to investigate the process that went into "authorizing" torture.

If it is, indeed, DOJ’s plan to release all the other torture documents save the OPR report, it will have the effect of distracting the media with horrible descriptions of threats with power drills and waterboarding, away from the equally horrible description of lawyers willfully twisting the law to "authorize" some of those actions. It will shift focus away from those that set up a regime of torture and towards those who free-lanced within that regime in spectacularly horrible ways. It will hide the degree to which torture was a conscious plan, and the degree to which the oral authorizations for torture may well have authorized some of what we’ll see in the IG Report tomorrow.

If it is, indeed, DOJ’s plan to release the IG Report and announce an investigation without, at the same time, releasing the OPR report, it will serve the goal of exposing the Lynndie England’s of the torture regime while still protecting those who instituted that regime.

After the insurance industry started squawking when Henry Waxman started demanding more details about their business practices, Jello Jay Rockefeller has gotten into the act (h/t Susie).

A U.S. Senate Democrat asked the top 15 health insurers to explain what portion of premiums go to profits versus patient care, putting further pressure on the companies to explain their business practices as Congress considers sweeping health reform legislation.

In letters to the companies on Friday, Sen. John Rockefeller also asked for information about how insurers disclose financial practices to customers.

If nothing else, Waxman and Jello Jay are keeping the AHIP schlep trying to accuse them of being mean busy. At some point, Robert Zirkelbach will have the credibility of Baghdad Bob.

"Some in Washington are trying to shift the focus to the insurance industry rather than talk about solutions to the health care concerns raised by the American people," Zirkelbach said.

Let’s just hope Jello Jay and Waxman figure out a way to collect—and use (or, barring them collecting it successfully, using that) this information as things heat up next month.

I might yet have to ditch the moniker Jello Jay.

My guess is no–my guess is that we’ve got disappeared detainees floating on some carrier somewhere. But this is important, but small, progress.

In a reversal of Pentagon policy, the military for the first time is notifying the International Committee of the Red Cross of the identities of militants who were being held in secret at a camp in Iraq and another in Afghanistan run by United States Special Operations forces, according to three military officials.

[snip]

The new Pentagon policy on detainees took effect this month with no public announcement from the military or the Red Cross. It represents another shift in detention policy by the Obama administration, which has already vowed to close the American military prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, by next year and is conducting major reviews of the government’s procedures for interrogating and detaining militants.

[snip]

Under Pentagon rules, detainees at the Special Operations camps can be held for up to two weeks. Formerly, the military at that point had to release a detainee; transfer him to a long-term prison in Iraq or Afghanistan, to which the Red Cross has broad access; or seek one-week renewable extensions from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates or his representative.

Under the new policy, the military must notify the Red Cross of the detainees’ names and identification numbers within two weeks of capture, a notification that before happened only after a detainee was transferred to a long-term prison. The option to seek custody extensions has been eliminated, a senior Pentagon official said.

 And credit to General Petraeus, who seems to have brought this approach from Iraq to Afghanistan.

There are still a lot of problems here. It sounds like ICRC gets the names and ID numbers of detainees, but not yet the access to talk to them. If so, then there is still not an outside monitor on detainee conditions. So the Breedlove review of the Special Operations prisons–described in the article–can’t be assumed to truly reflect the conditions in the prisons. And if the ICRC doesn’t get access, it still means we’re flouting the Geneva Conventions. 

But if we could be sure we were getting out of the disappearances business that would be small progress.