Howie Kurtz worked all day yesterday trying to come up with a narrative that would make the WaPo’s Pay2Play scheme look less damning. His latest effort is notable for several reasons:

• He killed the anonymous quotations from Weymouth and Brauchli
• With those anonymous quotes, he also killed any description of what the Pay2Play dinners were supposed to be
• He let Weymouth spend 356 words claiming "everyone does it"
• He gave a list of the planned attendees

Nevertheless, the bottom line of the story is that Katharine Weymouth still appears to defend the concept of Pay2Play in her living room.

Killing the anonymous quotations from Weymouth and Brauchli

Perhaps Howie killed the anonymous quotes because, in an article trying to defend the WaPo’s "journalistic integrity" and "integrity of the newsroom" it just looked bad to grant the WaPo’s Publisher and Executive Editor anonymity to blame another employee and make vague claims about what the real intent here was. Perhaps Howie killed those quotes because I was already harping on him for them. But as I pointed out yesterday, Howie granted anonymity to WaPo executives who were almost certainly WaPo publisher Weymouth and WaPo Executive Editor Brauchli so they could blame this all on Charles Pelton and make claims about what the Pay2Play Dinners were supposed to be.

Two Post executives familiar with the planning, who declined to be identified discussing internal planning, said the fliers appear to be the product of overzealous marketing executives. The fliers were overseen by Charles Pelton, a Post executive hired this year as a conference organizer. He was not immediately available for comment. 

[snip]

Weymouth knew of the plans to host small dinners at her home and to charge lobbying and trade organizations for participation. But, one of the executives said, she believed that there would be multiple sponsors, to minimize any appearance of charging for access, and that the newsroom would be in charge of the scope and content of any dinners in which Post reporters and editors participated. [my emphasis]

Those anonymous quotations are now gone. Howie replaced the first with on the record quotes directly from Pelton, falling on his sword for not vetting the fliers (but not, it should be noted, for the plan itself).

The fliers were approved by a top Post marketing executive, Charles Pelton, who said it was "a big mistake" on his part and that he had done so "without vetting it with the newsroom."

[snip]

"We should never imply that there’s a possible link between coming [to dinners] and access, either to the leaders or the policymakers or the journalists," he said, conceding that he had been "sloppy . . . in my enthusiasm to get the salons up and running without properly thinking through the implications of what was written." 

Killing the description of what the dinners were supposed to be 

But Howie doesn’t really replace the executive-who-appears-to-be-Weymouth’s claims about what the Pay2Play dinners were supposed to be. There’s the description of what was on the fliers, of course. Mostly, though, he’s left with Weymouth’s now on-the-record excuses for why Pay2Play isn’t such a bad thing.

But precisely what would be acceptable remains unclear. Asked whether the forums she envisions might still be viewed as buying access to Post journalists, Weymouth said, "I suppose you could spin it that way, but that is not the way it would have been done." She said the situation would be comparable to a company buying an ad in the newspaper while knowing that it "might hate the content" on that page. 

What? Weymouth was going to serve "content"–rubber chicken or something–that attendees would hate? She was going to interrupt Kaiser’s attendees just as they started attacking a public option? Make sure they weren’t allowed to speak to the White House healthcare czar? How do you control the content of a dinner party?

Ultimately–and this is the lede that gets buried in this story–the WaPo’s publisher still maintains that a Pay2Play dinner giving lobbyists access to policy makers (and–though the Executive Editor won’t let this happen now–reporters) is no big deal.

Arguing "everybody does it"

Rather than a real recognition of the problem here, the WaPo’s publisher basically argues–and Howie spends 356 words arguing for her–that "everybody does it."

But she said other news organizations sponsor similar conferences and that she remains comfortable with the basic idea of lobbyists or corporations underwriting dinners with officials and journalists as long as those paying the fees have no control over the content. 

[snip]

A number of media companies charge substantial fees for conferences with big-name executives and government officials, but in many cases the sessions are open for news coverage.

This week, for instance, Atlantic Media is sponsoring the Aspen Ideas Festival, underwritten by Altria, Boeing, Booz Allen Hamilton, Ernst & Young, Mercedes-Benz, Philips, Shell and Thomson Reuters. Speakers include White House economic adviser Austan Goolsbee, U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, Education Secretary Arne Duncan, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer and Google CEO Eric Schmidt, along with journalists for Atlantic and other media outlets.

Atlantic Editor James Bennet said the festival, co-sponsored by the Aspen Institute, "is open to the press . . . and we’re videotaping it. We have editorial control over it. We decide what the panels are and who’s on them. There are absolutely no constraints put on it at all."

In March, the Wall Street Journal brought together global finance leaders — including Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd — for a two-day conference sponsored by Nasdaq and hosted by Robert Thomson, the Journal’s top editor, and other editors and reporters. Outside journalists were invited to the session, which was on the record and webcast by the Journal. Participants, who paid several thousand dollars to attend, also had a White House meeting with economic adviser Lawrence Summers, which was off the record at his request.

The Journal also holds conferences with its All Things Digital unit. A session in May, described as offering "unmatched access to the technology industry’s elite," was sponsored by Hewlett-Packard and Qualcomm, among others, and featured the CEOs of Microsoft, Yahoo, NBC Universal, AT&T and Twitter, as well as Weymouth.

The New Yorker hosts an annual festival in Manhattan featuring its editors and writers along with other journalists, authors and entertainers. The gathering planned for October is sponsored by American Airlines, Delta, Westin Hotels and Banana Republic. [my emphasis]

Apparently, the woman now running the WaPo sees no difference between an event in her living room targeted to the biggest policy fight of the year, and more general exchanges of ideas. Apparently, she also thinks that if ideologically driven papers like the WSJ hold such events, so can she–even while invoking journalistic integrity with her next breath. Apparently she thinks that because Larry Summers–a chief target of those decrying beltway influence peddling–demands an off-the-record chat, it’s okay for her to offer it up as well. 

Apparently, the WaPo’s publisher thinks that an "everyone does it" defense makes her own efforts to peddle influence okay.

Listing the planned attendees

And it’s clear–given the list of key players Howie gives us–that that was the plan. The key players, Howie reveals, were supposed to be White House health care reform czar Nancy-Ann DeParle, Blue Dog Jim Cooper, and Kaiser Permanente, all big players in the upcoming healthcare fight.

For her part, DeParle is denying she had received the invitation (though, particularly given her fondness for the revolving door, this could be an attempt to parse a distinction between receiving an invite and agreeing to attend).

But a White House spokeswoman said no senior administration officials had agreed to attend, and an aide to DeParle said she had received no such invitation. 

Blue Dog headache Jim Cooper says–through an aide–that he would not attend a "radioactive" event like this.

John Spragens, a spokesman for Cooper, said that once the Tennessee Democrat learned the details of the dinner, he would not have attended "a radioactive event. . . . You don’t want to be put in a position as a congressman where someone’s buying access to you."

And while both those Democratic fans of influence peddling appear to deny they were attending a Pay2Play dinner, Kaiser Permanente makes a more narrow distinction between "buying influence" and "a seat at the table."

Sybil Wartenberg, a spokeswoman for California-based Kaiser Permanente, said the company had not made a final decision to finance the dinner — no contract had been signed — and was not attempting to buy influence. "Our organization is not as well-known on the East Coast," she said. "We’re keenly interested in reform and want to be at the table for discussions."

I assume, however, that Kaiser was well aware of just how exclusive Katharine Weymouth’s table was set to be. 

Which, if you read between the lines of Howie’s latest effort to tell this story, is what we’ve got. Though Weymouth and Pelton disavow the flier they sent out (Brauchli disavows the plan itself), they appear to stand by the principle of getting the key players on a policy fight together in the publisher’s living room. For a price. 

The WaPay2PlayPo’s Jeffrey Smith is usually a much better reporter than this. In his report on DOJ’s latest attempt to keep the materials from Cheney’s Fitzgerald interview secret–published right under a link to all the evidence released in the trial–Smith "reports,"

A document filed in federal court this week by the Justice Department offers new evidence that former vice president Richard B. Cheney helped steer the Bush administration’s public response to the disclosure of Valerie Plame Wilson’s employment by the CIA and that he was at the center of many related administration deliberations.

Which, if you take "new evidence" to mean "a new list summarizing many of the events described in evidence introduced two years ago at the Libby trial," would be factually correct.

But this isn’t.

Barron also listed as exempt from disclosure Cheney’s account of his requests for information from the CIA about the purported purchase; Cheney’s discussions with top officials about the controversy over Bush’s mention of the uranium allegations in his 2003 State of the Union speech; and Cheney’s discussions with deputy I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, press spokesman Ari Fleischer, and Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. "regarding the appropriate response to media inquiries about the source of the disclosure" of Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity. [my emphasis]

Smith gets that last bit from this language in the filing.

Vice President’s recollection of discussions with Lewis Libby, the White House Communications Director, and the White House Chief of Staff regarding the appropriate response to media inquiries about the source of the disclosure of Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity as a CIA employee.

Now, the language used there–"the source of the disclosure of Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity"–ought to be a pretty big clue to Smith that this conversation happened after Plame’s identity was actually made public. That is, after July 14, 2003, which happened to be Ari Fleischer’s last day, meaning it’s pretty clear that Ari Fleischer (who was White House Spokesperson, not Communications Director) isn’t the guy referenced here. But you don’t really need clues like that to figure out that Smith is wrong here. Had Smith only clicked that link above his article and actually looked at the evidence released at trial, he would have seen the famous "meat grinder note," a note Cheney used as a talking point document for conversations with Andy Card (correctly identified by Smith as Chief of Staff) and Dan Bartlett (in his role as "White House Communications Director," the position listed in the filing) in early October 2003 to get them to force Scottie McClellan to exonerate Scooter Libby publicly. 

Has to happen today. 

Call out to key press saying same thing about Scooter as Karl.

Not going to protect one staffer and sacrifice the guy the Pres that was asked to stick his neck in the meat grinder because of the incompetence of others.

Perhaps I’m being pedantic, but the news that Scooter Libby and Dick Cheney orchestrated the statement exonerating Libby was a pretty central issue of the trial–and the meat grinder note was a shocking piece of evidence, not least because that crossed out "the Pres" implicated Bush directly. And it was reported in depth again in Scottie McClellan’s book. So it should be fairly clear what this language refers to.

But that’s not the piece of reporting that bugs me most in this article. It’s this bit:

The declaration also said Cheney had helped resolve disputes about "whether to declassify certain information," including portions of a National Intelligence Estimate related to Iraqi weapons programs that Libby leaked to then-New York Times reporter Judith Miller. 

Smith gets this from these two–separate–items listed in the filing.

Page 25, line 39-page 26, line 1: Vice President’s description of his role in resolving disputes about whether to declassify certain information.

Page 26, lines 8-10, 14-17, 24-26: Vice President’s description of government deliberations involving senior officials regarding whether to declassify portions of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate.

That is, Cheney’s comments about "resolving disputes about whether to declassify certain information" is treated as totally distinct in David Barron’s declaration from the declassification of the NIE, though it obviously was closely linked in time.

Smith’s conflation of the two is a problem for two reasons. First, it erroneously suggests that Judy Miller was the only one to whom Scooter leaked contents of the NIE; by the time Fitzgerald asked these questions, though, he knew Libby had leaked it to David Sanger and may have leaked it to Andrea Mitchell. As it turned out (though I’m not sure Fitz figured this out until after the indictment), Libby had also leaked the NIE to Bob Woodward, several weeks earlier. And that detail is important because it shows that Libby’s claim–given as an explanation for what Cheney ordered him to leak to Judy–was at least partly bogus.

Smith’s conflation of the two also suggests, falsely, that the NIE was the only thing Libby and Cheney were fighting over declassifying at the time–and squabbling with Tenet about leaking. We know, at a minimum, that they were also declassifying the report from Joe Wilson’s trip; that was formally declassified mid-week the week of the leak, though someone probably named Scooter Libby leaked contents of it to Bob Novak before it was declassified. We also know they were leaking the January 24 excerpt from the NIE to people at the WSJ. Most importantly, we know they were leaking Valerie Wilson’s identity–though I’m not sure whether Fitz had enough evidence by May 8, 2004 to ask Cheney whether he had insta-declassified her identity. 

The entire story of the leak of Plame’s identity is about–obviously–declassifying leaking classified information. Yet Smith conflates details presented in the filing in such a way that recreates precisely the myth that Scooter Libby and Dick Cheney mobilized to cover up their leak. 

I don’t think he’s doing it purposefully. But in his reporting of what is in the Cheney interview, Smith just happens to neutralize the most important questions we know Cheney got asked in this interview.

As I mentioned, DOJ did one crappy-ass job of trying to give Emmet Sullivan a better reason they can’t turn over Dick Cheney’s interview materials than that Jon Stewart would embarrass poor Dick. They trot out the same canard about needing cooperation from high level officials in the future. But there two big problems with their argument.

The Release of a Late-Investigation Interview of the Target of that Investigation Will Hurt Early Investigative Cooperation

First, they’re basically forced to argue that they won’t be able to get information early in an investigation if VPs and the like worry that their interviews with Special Counsels will eventually be made public.

For example, obtaining information through interviews early in an investigation “often assists law enforcement agents in obtaining important background information,” “help[s] law enforcement investigators determine where to concentrate or focus the investigation,” and may “obviate the need to convene a grand jury at all or circumscribe the focus of the grand jury’s inquiry.” Breuer Decl. ¶ 6. “A law enforcement investigation based upon interviews subject to an expectation of confidentiality also benefits from senior officials more inclined to provide identifiable leads, name percipient witnesses, offer credibility assessments of the accuser or other witnesses, and even articulate inferences, insight or hunches that can be invaluable to a law enforcement investigator.”

But of course this interview wasn’t about "obtaining important background information" about "where to concentrate or focus the investigation" that might "obviate the need to convene a grand jury." Neither Bush nor Cheney gave an interview at that early stage of the process. Rather, this was an interview conducted while there was an active grand jury, at a time when all major witnesses save journalists had already been interviewed.

This was an interview of the ultimate target of the investigation, not a mere bystander.

Meanwhile, the DOJ wants to pretend that a grand jury investigation of top White House officials might thwart an investigation.

Additionally, if a senior White House official were to require the investigators to go through the grand jury process, “[s]uch a decision could impose considerable practical difficulties and burdens upon investigators and prosecutors that at best could prolong investigations and at worst thwart investigations.”

Tell that to Karl Rove and his five grand jury appearances. Turdblossom couldn’t get enough of the grand jury (and he’s been before a grand jury since). Which, in turn, makes this claim all the more laughable.

Mr. Breuer also expresses a concern about politicization of law enforcement investigations: “In addition, forcing White House officials to be brought before grand juries could have the effect of injecting the law enforcement investigation itself into the political process, which could intrude upon government operations at the highest level of government, and which could risk the perception that the investigation itself was political, thus undermining public faith in the impartiality of the judicial system. Baseless, partisan allegations that easily could be investigated and dismissed through voluntary interviews now may have to be investigated through the specter of the grand jury process.

Aside from the obvious fact–which played out in this case–that White Houses are going to go to some lengths to avoid an investigation getting to the grand jury stage because it implies a seriousness that an FBI interview does not, again, Cheney’s interview happened after everyone had been before the grand jury already. Which makes the argument pretty nonsensical.

Here’s Evidence from a Library of Public Reports Proving We Can’t Release This Information Publicly

And then there’s the other big problem with their investigation. Judge Sullivan asked for a list of the other White House officials who have been interviewed in the past. And to make that list, DOJ referred to a whole slew of public reports basically revealing the contents of the interviews that–DOJ reports–were never released in FBI 302 form. The list of those reports includes:

• Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters
• Final Report of the Independent Counsel In Re: Janet G. Mullins 
• Report of the Independent Counsel In Re: Vincent W. Foster, Jr.
• Report of the Independent Counsel In Re: David Watkins
• Final Report of the Independent Counsel In Re: Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Ass’n
• Tenth Report by the Committee on Government Reform

DOJ also erroneously claims that Fitzgerald interviewed a slew of people in this investigation (they’re mistaking the earlier fall 2003 FBI interviews with Fitzgerald’s later interviews before the grand jury) and admits that Reagan’s interview transcript from Iran-Contra is public.

In other words, to support their argument that if interviews with top White House officials were to be made public, no one would cooperate, they name a bunch of interviews that–because there was a final public report for the investigation–were made public (though not the 302s)!

Not only that, but they list the five grossly political investigations of Clinton, and claim–with a straight filing-face!–that anything they could do would politicize investigations.

We Can’t Reveal Info Publicly That’s Already Been Released

And then, finally, there’s the fact that DOJ is basically claiming a bunch of things already released in the Libby trial to be exempt from FOIA. For example, here’s the list of things that DOJ says is exempt–with either the name, or a document showing very closely related evidence:

• Vice President’s discussion of his requests for information from the CIA relating to reported efforts by Iraqi officials to purchase uranium from Niger. Faxes, memo, and CIA’s version of VP request all released at trial or subsequent to trial.
• Vice President’s description of government deliberations, including discussions between the Vice President and the Deputy National Security Advisor, in preparation of a statement by the Director of CIA regarding the accuracy of a statement in the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address. Libby’s notes–with Cheney’s statements–introduced at trial.
• Vice President’s recollection of discussions with Lewis Libby, the White House Communications Director, and the White House Chief of Staff regarding the appropriate response to media inquiries about the source of the disclosure of Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity as a CIA employee. Cheney’s own note introduced at trial–with additional testimony from David Addington and in Libby’s Grand Jury testimony.
• Vice President’s description of government deliberations involving senior officials regarding whether to declassify portions of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. Described in Scooter Libby’s Grand Jury Testimony.
• Description of a confidential conversation between the Vice President and the President, and description of an apparent communication between the Vice President and the President. Described in Scooter Libby’s Grand Jury testimony.
• Names of non-governmental third-parties and details of their extraneous interactions with the Vice President. Andrea Mitchell, possibly Bob Novak.
• Name of a CIA briefer. Probably Craig Schmall.
• Names of FBI agents. Jack Eckenrode and Deb Bond.
• Names of foreign government and liaison services. Italy, the UK, and Niger.
• The name of a covert CIA employee. Valerie Plame Wilson.
• The methods CIA uses to assess and evaluate intelligence and inform policy makers. Sending Joe Wilson to Niger.

 As noted in that post, this information is all that is new:

• Vice President’s discussion of the substance of a conversation he had with the Director of the CIA concerning the decision to send Ambassador Wilson on a fact-finding mission to Niger in 2002.
• Vice President’s recollection of the substance of his discussions with the National Security Advisor while she was on a trip to Africa.
• Vice President’s description of his role in resolving disputes about whether to declassify certain information.

So DOJ is basically saying that a bunch of information released in one of the most publicized trials of the last several years cannot not be re-released because it is tied to the Vice President who was willing to testify at that trial about precisely these things and–partly because he didn’t testify, has had a cloud over his head ever since.

And, if I’m right that the covert CIA op that Cheney talked to Tenet about is Plame–as Libby claimed in his Grand Jury appearances–then it means DOJ says it can’t reveal Plame’s real name even though Cheney was instrumental in revealing Plame’s real name. Which is all the more problematic since in Cheney’s devious little mind, he was preparing to claim that he had insta-declassified Plame’s ID so Libby could leak it to Judy Miller.

You know? DOJ was making a less ridiculous argument back when they were arguing Cheney’s interview materials couldn’t be released because Jon Stewart would make fun of him.

Ut oh. The ACLU asked the CIA to stop stalling on production of the CIA IG report. And now the CIA has invented a reason to stall until the August 31 deadline that Hellerstein has given them–they want to review the 318 other documents it owes the ACLU first.

As we explained to the Court and Plaintiffs when Plaintiffs first raised the prospect of expediting the Special Review Report, the Report poses unique processing issues. It is over 200 pages long and contains a comprehensive summary and review of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program. The Report touches upon the information contained in virtually all of the remaining 318 documents remanded for further review. Although the Government has endeavored in good faith to complete the review of the Special Review Report first, as we have gone through the process, we have determined that prioritizing the Report is simply untenable.

In this instance, we have determined that the only practicable approach is to first complete the review of the remaining 318 documents, and then apply the withholding determinations made with respect to the information in those documents to the Special Review Report.

[snip]

One month into that process, we have concluded that we must review all of the documents together, and that the review will take until August 31, 2009.

Shorter the CIA: Obama said we have to make this stuff public. So we’re going to buy ourselves two more months until we make it public.

If Judge Hellerstein allows them.

Update: The ACLU’s Jameel Jaffer responds (via Spencer):

The CIA has already had more than five months to review the inspector general’s report, and the report is only about two hundred pages long. We’re increasingly troubled that the Obama administration is suppressing documents that would provide more evidence that the CIA’s interrogation program was both ineffective and illegal. President Obama should not allow the CIA to determine whether evidence of its own unlawful conduct should be made available to the public. The public has a right to know what took place in the CIA’s secret prisons and on whose authority. 

Mary pointed me to DOJ’s latest attempt to prevent CREW from accessing the materials relating to Cheney’s interview with Fitzgerald and the FBI. I’ll get into what a load of crap the DOJ argument is later. But first, I want to lay out what the FOIA declarations say about the Cheney interview itself.

First, the date. Rather than early June, as previously assumed, the CIA declaration included with this document reveals the documents were dated May 8, 2004–a month earlier in the investigation that we had  known (and therefore a month and a half earlier than Bush’s interview).

Otherwise, the declarations reveal the following contents of the interview:

• Vice President’s discussion of the substance of a conversation he had with the Director of the CIA concerning the decision to send Ambassador Wilson on a fact-finding mission to Niger in 2002.
• Vice President’s discussion of his requests for information from the CIA relating to reported efforts by Iraqi officials to purchase uranium from Niger.
• Vice President’s recollection of the substance of his discussions with the National Security Advisor while she was on a trip to Africa.
• Vice President’s description of government deliberations, including discussions between the Vice President and the Deputy National Security Advisor, in preparation of a statement by the Director of CIA regarding the accuracy of a statement in the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address.
• Vice President’s recollection of discussions with Lewis Libby, the White House Communications Director, and the White House Chief of Staff regarding the appropriate response to media inquiries about the source of the disclosure of Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity as a CIA employee.
• Vice President’s description of his role in resolving disputes about whether to declassify certain information.
• Vice President’s description of government deliberations involving senior officials regarding whether to declassify portions of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate.
• Description of a confidential conversation between the Vice President and the President, and description of an apparent communication between the Vice President and the President. 
• Names of non-governmental third-parties and details of their extraneous interactions with the Vice President.
• Name of a CIA briefer.
• Names of FBI agents.
• Names of foreign government and liaison services.
• The name of a covert CIA employee.
• The methods CIA uses to assess and evaluate intelligence and inform policy makers.

Now, as I’ll get into when I discuss what a load of crap this is, almost every single bit of this was already revealed at trial. The single event we don’t know significant details of already is this:

Vice President’s recollection of the substance of his discussions with the National Security Advisor while she was on a trip to Africa.

Given the location of the discussion–it appears on the same page as the description of the Cheney-Libby-Hadley discussions on the Tenet statement–it probably pertains to the perceived understanding of Condi’s role in sticking the shiv in Tenet’s back–and/or her willingness or not to admit fault in sticking the uranium claim in the State of the Union. Also remember–Condi passed word through Hadley that Bush was "comfortable" with their plan (which may have included outing Plame).

Another interesting detail not introduced at trial: schedules released during the trial and a CIA document released after the trial show Cheney had a meeting with John McLaughlin during the week of June 9, 2003–when Cheney learned of Plame’s identity. But this seems to confirm that Cheney also had a conversation with Tenet that week (Libby claimed Cheney learned of Plame’s identity from Tenet, though I think Cheney learned of it from reading two memos Plame wrote wrt the trip).

The one other piece of information that would be very interesting would be the "names of non-governmental third-parties and details of their extraneous interactions with the Vice President." Otherwise known as "media," including (at a minimum) Andrea Mitchell, but also Bob Novak.

For some reason, Obama’s DOJ doesn’t want us to see these things. But considering what a ridiculous argument they’re making here–and the degree to which these things are already declassified–I’m guessing we get to see some of this. 

After David Kay determined that there were no WMDs in Iraq, Charles Duelfer was brought in to create the appearance of a casus belli by focusing on Iraq’s ongoing intent to develop WMDs and on the Oil for Food scandal. Ultimately, Duelfer achieved the former goal with this claim.

Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.

• Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq’s principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary.
  
• Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role in crushing the Shi’a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire.
• The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them.

For that reason, it was critically important to Duelfer to get Saddam to personally admit his intention to develop WMD after sanctions. Here’s how Duelfer described that "admission" in his book.

It was the second week in June when [Saddam’s FBI interrogator George] Piro came to me, beaming. Something was up, because Piro generally was more measured. He related a thoughtful discussion on WMD by Saddam. In the discussion, Saddam clearly stated that it would be his goal to reconstitute his WMD, especially nuclear, to reassert Iraq’s place in the region and because it was necessary to match the military capabilities of Iraq’s neighbors. 

This was the clearest statement of his intentions we could have asked for. It was consistent with much of the physical and financial evidence we had collected. It was consistent with the opinions of many of the key ministers. In Saddam’s government, however, there was no tangible exposition of planning or intentions on security issues the way they exist in the West. What counted was what Saddam thought. After months of dialogue and the investment of his own physical and psychological energy, Piro had become close enough for Saddam to share his views on this pivotal subject. This was success. (408)

Mission accomplished! But with the NSA FOIA documents, we see what this success really looked like.

Hussein recognized that Iran continued to develop its weapons capabilities, to include its WMD, while Iraq had lost its weapons capabilities due to the UN inspections and sanctions. Hussen was asked how Iraq would have dealt with the threat from Iran once the UN sanctions were lifted. Hussein replied Iraq would have sought a security agreement with the United States to protect it from threats in the region. Hussein felt such an agreement would not only have benefitted Iraq, but its neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia. SSA Piro agreed that such an agreement would have assisted Iraq immensely. SSA Piro noted due to the history between the two countries, it would have taken some time before the United States would have entered into such an agreement with Iraq.

Further, SSA Piro advised Hussein that paragraph 14 of UN Resolution 687 states that the disarming of Iraq was part of a total disarmament of the entire region, however, that portion of the resolution was not enforceable. The threat from Iran would have loomed over Iraq, especially as Iran continued to advance its weapons capabilities. SSA Piro commented that under those circumstances, it would appear that Iraq would have needed to reconstitute its own weapons program in response. Hussein replied that Iraq would have done what was necessary and agreed that Iraq’s technical and scientific abilities exceeded others in the region.

Duelfer declared !mission accomplished! because, just weeks before custody of Saddam was handed over to the Iraqis, Piro got Saddam to admit that he might need to reconstitute his WMD programs.

But look at the actual content of this admission. Saddam’s first response to a question about the ongoing regional threat from Iran was an appeal to a security agreement with the US. But then Piro argued that the US would be unlikely to enter into such an agreement, pointed out a fundamental dissymmetry in the UN’s resolutions mandating Iraqi disarmament, and then posited that "it would appear that Iraq would have needed to reconstitute its own weapons program." In response, Saddam said Iraq "would have done what was necessary."

And that, for Duelfer, amounted to the necessary admission from Saddam. Saddam’s FBI interrogator all but said there were no means to ensure Iraq’s security save by reconstituting its WMD programs, to which Saddam replied he’d do what was necessary. And from that, Duelfer invented a casus belli ex post facto.

(Duelfer later describes the $2,500 pistol Piro bought with the award the CIA gave him for this little "success.")

The exchange is important not just because it confirms what we always suspected–that the Administration’s efforts to legitimate its war in the absence of WMD were a political stunt. But also because Piro put Saddam in precisely the place the US put Iran in 2003, when Iran was trying to ensure security without nukes. That is, even as we acknowledge that no one in the Middle East can feel secure (not least because of Israel’s nukes), we’re unwilling to create conditions that would ensure security without those nukes.

Because, of course, if they did that it’d eliminate their reason for war.

The WaPo now has its very own Howard Kurtz story reporting its very own pay-to-play scandal. But in my opinion, it raises as many questions as it answers.

For this story, Kurtz relied on interviews with Katharine Weymouth, the WaPo’s publisher, and Marcus Brauchli, WaPo’s Executive Editor. But he did not get an interview with Charles Pelton, the guy being blamed anonymously–by "Two Post executives" who may or may not be Weymouth and Brauchli–for the flier.

Weymouth, the chief executive of Washington Post Media, said in an interview. 

[snip]

Moments earlier, Executive Editor Marcus Brauchli said in a separate interview …

[snip]

Two Post executives familiar with the planning, who declined to be identified discussing internal planning, said the fliers appear to be the product of overzealous marketing executives. The fliers were overseen by Charles Pelton, a Post executive hired this year as a conference organizer. He was not immediately available for comment. 

Now, if you’re a newspaper trying to reassure readers that you’re not selling access, then don’t you think you owe it to readers to avoid any anonymous sourcing here? Instead, the appearance is that Weymouth and Brauchli are doing damage control by anonymously blaming Pelton for all of this, yet not allowing Kurtz to speak with Pelton directly to learn what his understanding of the conferences were.

On top of that, look at this amazingly decontextualized quote Kurtz gives us from Weymouth.

Washington Post Publisher Katharine Weymouth today canceled plans for a series of policy dinners at her home after learning that marketing fliers offered lobbyists access to Obama administration officials, members of Congress and Post journalists in exchange for payments as high as $250,000.

"Absolutely, I’m disappointed," Weymouth, the chief executive of Washington Post Media, said in an interview. "This should never have happened. The fliers got out and weren’t vetted. They didn’t represent at all what we were attempting to do. We’re not going to do any dinners that would impugn the integrity of the newsroom."

See the problem? Kurtz doesn’t tell us what Weymouth was responding to when she said she was disappointed! Is she disappointed that the fliers got circulated outside of intended clients? That they had to cancel the pay-to-play conferences? That their management system is so bad they sent these out unvetted? That they fired Dan Froomkin? That we haven’t yet invaded Iran? Okay–the last two are a stretch, but Kurtz doesn’t tell us precisely what Weymouth is disappointed about. 

And the rest of that paragraph doesn’t help things. Yes, Weymouth admits that the fliers shouldn’t have gotten out without being vetted. But Weymouth’s claim that the fliers didn’t represent what they "were attempting to do," followed by the claim–made in an ambiguous tense–that "[they]’re not going to do any dinners that impugn the integrity of the newsroom," still leaves uncertain precisely what they had been intending to do.

It’s only later in the story when–in a paragraph sourced both to Weymouth and that pesky anonymous executive who sure looks like Weymouth again–we get more claims about what the plan was.

Weymouth knew of the plans to host small dinners at her home and to charge lobbying and trade organizations for participation. But, one of the executives said, she believed that there would be multiple sponsors, to minimize any appearance of charging for access, and that the newsroom would be in charge of the scope and content of any dinners in which Post reporters and editors participated.  

Weymouth admits that they were going to have a pay to play in her home. But then someone who appears to be her, again, makes a comment that doesn’t deny that "multiple sponsors" may be no more than the two in question, and only claims the newsroom had control in that same anonymous voice. In any case, how does the presence of multiple sponsors–whether it be just two or ten–avoid the appearance of pay-to-play, so long as the idea is to get in the room with the decision-makers?

Now, Howie Kurtz deserves to be mocked, mercilously, for his granting of two executives who may or may not be Weymouth and Brauchli anonymity to squirm out of their pay-to-play problem. But he does admit that even if the newsroom did control how reporters participated, there remains the yet undenied appearance that Weymouth was–and perhaps remains–happy to charge for access to herself.

Access to Weymouth herself, a granddaughter of longtime publisher Katharine Graham who took over as chief executive of Washington Post Media last year, would be deemed valuable by those trying to influence The Post’s editorial policies and news coverage. 

And we know–because Anita Dunn is quoted admitting that the WaPo approached HHS executives to attend the conference–that the WaPo was going to invite the policy makers to this conference as well.

So even in the most charitable interpretation, Weymouth was going to charge lobbyists $25,000 to $250,000 to meet with–the WaPo hoped–executives from HHS in Weymouth’s living room.

Update: This is rich!! Howie Kurtz somehow couldn’t find Pelton for his article. Maybe that’s because this is what Pelton had to say when OmbudAndy found him.

The flier came out of the office Charles Pelton, who joined The Post recently to find ways to generate business through conferences and events. The Post, like many struggling newspapers, is desperately seeking new sources of revenue.

"There’s no intention to influence or pedal," Pelton said this morning. "There’s no intention to have a Lincoln Bedroom situation," referring to charges that President Clinton used invitations to stay at the White House as a way of luring political backing.

Pelton said newsroom leaders, including Brauchli, had been involved in discussions about the salons and other events.

"This was well developed with the newsroom," he said. "What was not developed was the marketing message to potential sponsors."

And for some reason, Weymouth was instantly available to Howie Kurtz, but not to the paper’s Ombud.

Weymouth is out of town. 

When Dan Froomkin described on Tuesday why the oldtimers at the WaPo had him fired, he spoke a lot about the Holy Grail of the impartial center. Granted, Froomkin described the now-departed Len Downie as that cult’s High Priest. Nevertheless, it sounds like that "impartial center" can be bought for $25,000 to $250,000 a shot.

For $25,000 to $250,000, The Washington Post is offering lobbyists and association executives off-the-record, nonconfrontational access to "those powerful few" — Obama administration officials, members of Congress, and the paper’s own reporters and editors.

The astonishing offer is detailed in a flier circulated Wednesday to a health care lobbyist, who provided it to a reporter because the lobbyist said he feels it’s a conflict for the paper to charge for access to, as the flier says, its “health care reporting and editorial staff."

The offer — which essentially turns a news organization into a facilitator for private lobbyist-official encounters — is a new sign of the lengths to which news organizations will go to find revenue at a time when most newspapers are struggling for survival.

Now, Mike Allen skewers his former employer, the WaPo, pretty seriously (and deservedly) for this.

"Washington Post Salons are extensions of The Washington Post brand of journalistic inquiry into the issues, a unique opportunity for stakeholders to hear and be heard," the flier says. "At the core is a critical topic of our day. Dinner and a volley of ideas unfold in an evening of intelligent, news-driven and off-the-record conversation. … By bringing together those powerful few in business and policy-making who are forwarding, legislating and reporting on the issues, Washington Post Salons give life to the debate. Be at this nexus of business and policy with your underwriting of Washington Post Salons."

But I want to know about the other side of the equation. Which members of Congress and the Administration have agreed to participate? Did they know of the payoffs the lobbyists will make to host the events? And did the politicians expect anything in return? Or will they just be able to order up some WaPo scolding every time citizens demand real health care reform of their elected representatives? In other words, what is clear from this is that the WaPo doesn’t give a shit about neutrality, they care only about an illusion of "objectivity." But what remains unclear is the rest of the equation–just how the WaPo managed to insert itself as the facilitator between lobbyists and our government–and the gatekeeper chasing citizens away at the same time.

Update: WaPo’s full CYA:

A flyer was distributed this week offering an “underwriting opportunity” for a dinner on health-care reform, in which the news department had been asked to participate.

The language in the flyer and the description of the event preclude our participation.

We will not participate in events where promises are made that in exchange for money The Post will offer access to newsroom personnel or will refrain from confrontational questioning. Our independence from advertisers or sponsors is inviolable.

There is a long tradition of news organizations hosting conferences and events, and we believe The Post, including the newsroom, can do these things in ways that are consistent with our values.

The National Security Archive has posted a bunch of FBI interview reports from Saddam’s interrogation. As the NSA notes, this record is not complete.

Not included in these FBI reports are issues of particular interest to students of Iraq’s complicated relationship with the U.S. – the reported role of the CIA in facilitating the Ba’ath party’s rise to power, the uneasy alliance forged between Iraq and the U.S. during the Iran-Iraq war, and the precise nature of U.S. views regarding Iraq’s chemical weapons policy during that conflict, given its contemporaneous knowledge of their repeated use against Iranians and the Kurds.

This series of interviews also does not address chemical warfare in Kurdish areas of Iraq in 1987-1988, although an FBI progress report says Saddam was questioned on the topic.  One interview, #20, is redacted in its entirety on national security grounds, although it is not clear what issues agents could have discussed with Saddam that cannot now be disclosed to the public.

While they don’t say it specifically, there are interview notes specifically excluded. Not noted by the NSA, for example, is that the CIA interrogated Saddam from the time he was captured in mid-December until when the FBI took over in February. As Charles Duelfer describes in his book, Hide and Seek, they weren’t the best equipped to conduct this interrogation.

While the team was expert, only one analyst had spent much time in Iraq and personally knew senior Iraqis. (389)

Furthermore, as NSA does suggest, there are more "Casual Conversations" than have been turned over to NSA. Duelfer, for example, describes Special Agent Piro, Saddam’s interrogator, finally getting Saddan to open up in April.

Saddam began to open up with Piro in April, at least in his informal meetings. (402)

As you can see from the NSA list of interview materials, there’s a gap in what NSA got from the end of March through May–precisely the period when Duelfer describes Saddam beginning to open up.

I’m still reading these reports, but for the moment I’m interested in a paragraph from the June 11 Conversation (it is mislabeled June 1 in the NSA list).

Hussen commented he allowed the UN inspectors back into Iraq to counter allegations by the British Government. Hussen stated this was a very difficult decision to make, but the British Government had prepared a report containing inaccurate intelligence. It was this inaccurate intelligence on which the United States was making their decisions. However, Hussein admitted that when it was clear that a war with the United States was imminent, he allowed the inspectors back into Iraq in hopes of averting war. Yet, it became clear to him four months before the war that the war was inevitable.

Though the report doesn’t acknowledge this, the British report was the September 24, 2002 White Paper on Saddam’s WMD–one that was very similar to our own NIE (this was the "sexed up" dossier, and it made the Niger uranium claim more strongly than our own NIE did). And the report also doesn’t acknowledge that Saddam concluded war was inevitable when the US released its own report on what Saddam had "left out" of his WMD declaration on December 19, 2002–precisely "four months before the war." In other words, what Saddam must have been saying is that it was clear the US was using faulty intelligence in September-October 2002, and it became clear with that December 2002 report that they continued to make false claims about his WMD.

Also note, the very last Conversation included here–from June 28, 2004–shows that the FBI was still trying to shore up a claim that Saddam had ties to Al Qaeda at that late date. Apparently, Saddam pointed out,

 HUSSEIN stated that the United States used the 9/11 attack as a justification to attack Iraq. The United States had lost sight of the cause of 9/11.

Funny–the dictator noticed what we all noticed too.

I hate that I’m now clinging to scraps like this to make myself happier about President Obama’s efforts to overturn torture, but this is an improvement over the Bush Administration. The acting head of OLC has determined that military commissions cannot use statements gotten through torture to convict detainees.

The Justice Department has determined that detainees tried by military commissions in the U.S. can claim at least some constitutional rights, particularly protection against the use of statements taken through coercive interrogations, officials said.

The conclusion, explained in a confidential memorandum whose contents were shared with The Wall Street Journal, could alter significantly the way the commissions operate — and has created new divisions among the agencies responsible for overseeing the commissions.

Of course, the WSJ finds the folks at DOD who are upset by this decision so as to push back against even this minimal improvement (there are those at DOD who don’t agree with this sentiment).

Defense Department officials warn that the Justice Department position could reduce the chance of convicting some defendants. Military prosecutors have said involuntary statements comprise the lion’s share of their evidence against dozens of Guantanamo prisoners who could be tried.

Also note, this decision (made in early May) should have been made by Obama’s nominee to head OLC, Dawn Johnsen. But her confirmation still languishes. Maybe Senator Franken can change that.