A number of you have pointed to smintheus’ excellent post on Bush’s new classification, Controlled Unclassified Information.

On Friday afternoon, with George Bush in Texas for his daughter’s wedding, the White House finally released its new Executive Branch rules for designating and disseminating what used to be known as "sensitive" information. The most common term in the past for such material has been "Sensitive But Unclassified" (SBU), though there was an alphabet soup of competing classifications in various agencies. In part, the new rules create a uniform standard across the Executive by replacing SBU etc. with a new classification, "Controlled Unclassified Information" (CUI).

The Friday memo states that its purpose "is to standardize practices and thereby improve the sharing of information, not to classify or declassify new or additional information." The initial impetus for change came in a December 2005 memo in which Bush called for a new policy for information sharing between agencies. The alphabet soup of "sensitive" designations too often played into the hands of officials who sought to hoard information rather than to share it.

[snip]

Though the material to be regulated is nominally "unclassified", this new system is in fact a much more sweeping program for keeping information secret than the ostensibly higher grades of secrecy for "classified" material. And at the same time, the system for designating "unclassified" information is in significant ways far less regulated than for "classified" information. This new memo represents the opposite of reform.

I agree with smintheus that this classification is simply an invitation for bureaucratic games that result in less information sharing rather than more.

But at the same time, with the increasing evidence that it doesn’t matter what Bush says the classification guidelines are, key players in his Administration will just do as they please anyway, I’m not sure the CUI is the worst of our worries.

Consider the example offered by Bill Leonard in his statement for Russ Feingold’s April 29 30 [thanks selise] hearing on Secret Law. Leonard focused most of his attention on the improper classification of the Yoo Torture Memo authorizing the military to torture; he offered quite a striking soundbite about the memo:

To learn that such a document was classified had the same effect on me as waking up one morning and learning that after all these years, there is a "secret" Article to the Constitution that the American people do not even know about.

But I found the details of Leonard’s discussion even more interesting. He lists the several ways in which the classification of the memo violates the guidelines for classification (much of which he had already explained–as noted in this post).

• The original classifier of the memo was not identified
• The original classifier may not be one of the 4000 people authorized to classify information
• The memo lacked declassification instructions
• The memo lacked an explanation for why it was classified
• The memo did not indicate which portions of the memo were classified and which were unclassified
• DOD declassified a memo apparently originally classified by DOJ

But it was not just the original classifier and eventual declassifier that violated the written rules on classification. So did Jim Haynes, Alberto Gonzales, and David Addington.

In addition, the memo was addressed to the most senior legal official within the DoD and was reportedly shared with some of the most senior officials in the Executive branch, including the then White House Counsel as well as the then Counsel to the Vice President. Like all people with a security clearance, per the President’s direction in the governing Executive Order, each of these government officials had the affirmative responsibility to challenge the inappropriate classification of information.

[snip]

… the President’s governing Executive Order makes it abundantly clear that people who "classify or continue the classification of information in violation of [the] order or any implementing directive … shall be subject to sanctions … [to] include reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, termination of classification authority, loss or denial of access to classified information, or other sanctions…" There is no evidence to suggest that such sanctions have been imposed in this instance. Failure to apply sanctions makes it increasingly difficult to preserve the integrity and credibility of the classification system, a process that is an essential national security tool. [first ellipsis mine, remaining brackets and ellipses original]

If the Scooter Libby trial taught us anything (aside from the fact that Dick Cheney apparently ordered Libby to expose a CIA spy), it’s that the Administration is not going to punish its own for violating rules on classification and declassification.

But Leonard’s statement goes on to illustrate the fundamental hypocrisy of the Administration when it comes to classification. Leonard points out (as I also did) that all these fancy Administration lawyers violated the EO on classification they were writing even as they were improperly classifying the Yoo Torture Memo.

What is most disturbing is that at the exact time these officials were writing, reviewing, and being briefed on the classified nature of this memorandum, they were also concurring with the President’s reaffirmation of the standards for proper classification, which was formalized the week after the OLC memo was issued when the President signed his amended version of the Executive Order governing classification.

Leonard is too polite to say it, but basically the Administration was reiterating rules about classification for others that they had absolutely no intent of following themselves.

Such rank hypocrisy is only possible when you’ve got a lackey like John Yoo around to do your dirty business. As Leonard also points out, this improperly classified memo happened to be written by the same people who were responsible for interpreting that same EO on classification.

What is equally disturbing is that this memo was not some obscure, meaningless document written by a low-level bureaucrat who did not know any better and had inadequate supervision. Rather, the memo was written by the Deputy of the OLC, the very entity which has the responsibility to render interpretations of all Executive Orders, a responsibility that includes interpretating the governing order that distinguishes between the proper and improper classification of information.

Now I don’t yet have proof that Bush’s top lawyers formally used Pixie Dust to exempt themselves from the EO on classification even while they were writing it. Or whether they just don’t care, whether they simply believe that rules are for other people and it doesn’t matter what rationale they invent for ignoring their own rules, they’ll find some way to squirm out of responsibility just as they did with the CIA Leak.

But one thing is clear. No one should accept a memo on classification from George Bush as anything more than a bunch of hypocritical posturing. This President doesn’t give a damn what happens to information so long as he can selectively expose or hide information in ways that hurt his political enemies and hide his own law-breaking.

Update: transcription error fixed per MarkusQ. 

Marty Lederman links to the important opinion disqualifying General Thomas Hartmann from any involvement in Salim Ahmed Hamdan’s–Osama bin Laden’s driver–military tribunal. (Kudos to Marty Lederman for thwacking the traditional media for touting an opinion’s limited availability–and then not providing a link to that opinion.)

As Marty notes, the opinion does much more than the traditional press coverage of the opinion lets on–though as always, Carol Rosenberg’s coverage of the show trials is quite good. The opinion basically affirms that the Gitmo show trials under Hartmann have been just that–trials driven by political motivations rather than legal evidence. Go read the opinion, written by Judge Keith Allred, for the timeline it offers of Hartmann’s (and others’) attempts to tailor the show trials to political considerations.

I’m particularly interested in the coincidence of timing the opinion reveals. The Bush Administration started crafting its show trials at precisely the same time–fall 2006–when it was engineering the firing of 8 US Attorneys for political reasons.

5. About 28 September of 2006, [Colonel Morris Davis] attended a meeting of the Senior Oversight Group, held in the office of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England. During one of these meetings, Mr. England said "there could be strategic political value in getting some of these cases going before the [November 2006–editorial comment original] elections. We need to think about who could be tried" or words to that effect. The commission takes judicial notice that the Supreme Court issued Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in June 2006 and that the Military Commissions Act was not signed until late October 2006. Consequently, there was no possible way in which any military commission case could be referred, much less brought to trial, before the November 2006 elections.

[snip]

Colonel Davis viewed [England’s] remark as an opinion, rather than a command. Colonel Davis affirmatively denies that this statement had any effect on any decision he made with respect to Mr. Hamdan’s case.

7. During the same meeting, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Mr. Steve Cambone opined that Department of Defense (DoD) attorneys were not sufficiently experienced to handle these cases, and that they needed to get some Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys involved. Although no DOJ attorney had made an appearance in a military commission hearing before that date, they have since been assigned to military commission trial teams.

Now, this fall 2006 meeting was not the first moment the show trials were conceived as such. After all, Jim Haynes’ famous statement that "We can’t have acquittals. We’ve got to have convictions" occurred in September 2005, when Haynes first interviewed Davis for the job of Chief Prosecutor. And Hartmann didn’t get involved until much later–he started as the Legal Advisor to the trials on July 2, 2007, after which he started calling for "sexy" trials and the use of evidence gained through torture. The bulk of Allred’s opinion focuses on how, by inserting Hartmann into Morris’ chain of command and then reinforcing that chain of command in October 2007, the Administration required Davis to meet Hartmann’s political and legally suspect demands. (Note, much of Allred’s opinion pertaining to Hamdan will have much broader effect over other Gitmo detainees. Allred points out that Hamdan was already charged before Hartmann started mucking things up. For those who weren’t yet–but have since been–charged, this opinion will have much greater consequences because it’ll mean Hartmann’s influence may be more central to the decision to charge. Rosenberg, for example, reminds that Hartmann just signed off on the plan to prosecute Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.)

But I find it instructive that at this meeting in fall 2006, top Administration officials were concerned not about complying with SCOTUS’ ruling in Hamdan, but with a way to gain political advantage from the show trials. Further, I find it mighty interesting that–at precisely the same time as Bush was trying to purge DOJ of the US Attorneys who wouldn’t bring politically sensitive cases on demand–Stephen Cambone was getting DOJ more involved in the Gitmo show trials.

There’s one more very fascinating detail in the opinion. In the explanation why Judge Susan Crawford–the Convening Authority–didn’t need to be removed from the Hamdan case, Allred argues that Crawford had not been given detailed instructions about individual cases. The opinion also notes that Crawford had little interaction with Jim Haynes about the cases. But then it goes on to note that Crawford has had no interactions with two people outside the chain of command that led to problems for Morris Davis.

She has never met Stephen Cambone or had any communications with him. She has never spoken to the Vice President or anyone in his office about military commissions.

Mind you, the sole reference to Cambone in this opinion is the one I noted above–discussing the September 2006 meeting. There are no references to Dick Cheney at all.

Yet for some reason, Allred goes out of his way to note that Crawford (who started more than a month after Cambone resigned) had not been tainted by Cambone, Cheney, or anyone else in Cheney’s office. I find that particularly interesting given the allegation that OVP did some selective leaking (just like they did with Judy Miller) to make sure evidence about a different Gitmo show trial defendant would be released to the public.

I wanted to focus some attention on one tiny part of the interchange I highlighted yesterday. In the guise of explaining to Administraton apologist David Rivkin the Kafkaesque process by which he has gotten some of the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinions declassified, Sheldon Whitehouse revealed he has been trying to get one more opinion declassified–one relating to exclusivity:

I’d be delighted to show you the whole rest of the opinion [stating that the President tells DOJ how to interpret law] but I’m not allowed to. It’s classified. I had to fight to get these declassified. They made me take … they kept my notes. They then delivered them to the intelligence committee where I could only read them in the secure confines of the intelligence committee and then I had to, again, in a secure fashion, send this language back to be declassified. I’m doing it again with a piece of language that relates to exclusivity. There is a sentence that describes whether or not the FISA statute’s exclusivity provision is really exclusive enough for the OLC and that is, we’re still going through this process. I’d like to be able to tell you more about this.

Exclusivity, you’ll recall, refers to the language in the original FISA bill that requires that FISA be the only means under which the executive branch conducts domestic surveillance. Here’s Anonymous Liberal on exclusivity:

Perhaps the most important provision in the entire FISA legal framework is 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f)–commonly known as the exclusivity provision–which states that the "procedures in this chapter or chapter 121 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted."

It is through this provision that Congress made it clear that FISA’s warrant requirement and other procedures were mandatory and that it did not intend to leave the president with any residual authority to conduct warrantless surveillance outside of the FISA framework.

Now, as AL points out, the Protect America Act introduced a loophole by which the Administration could get around the exclusivity provision, one DiFi has been trying to ensure stays closed in the amended FISA, and which the Administration hopes to keep open. But what Whitehouse seems to be pointing to is the means by which the Administration dismissed the clear requirement that FISA be the only (that is, exclusive) means by which the Administration could tap Americans. We know the Administration, when pushed, claimed that the Authorization for Military Force was legislation that superseded FISA, but Tom Daschle has clearly debunked that cute little legal theory.

Given this little tidbit from Whitehouse, it appears there’s some more John Yoo (presumably) sophism designed to suggest that exclusivity doesn’t mean exclusivity.

Updated with Selise’s YouTube. Thanks Selise!

As a number of you pointed out in comments discussing Russ Feingold’s secret law hearing that took place while I was on my trip, NYT believes that Pixie Dust–the process by which the President can "modify" his own executive orders by simply ignoring them–has never before been publicized.

At the hearing, a department official, John P. Elwood, disclosed a previously unpublicized method to cloak government activities. Mr. Elwood acknowledged that the administration believed that the president could ignore or modify existing executive orders that he or other presidents have issued without disclosing the new interpretation. [my emphasis]

By "unpublicized," I guess they mean "never before scarred a dead tree," because Sheldon Whitehouse gave a great speech about it, I wrote a whole series of posts about it, and Selise’s YouTube of Whitehouse’s speech got a whole bunch of views.

Which, I guess, is a great way to introduce the news I just got today: my Guardian column on Pixie Dust is a finalist for Project Censored from last year–one of the twenty-five most important but under-covered stories from last year.

Woohoo!

Which makes the following exchange all the more ironic. When I reviewed the Senate webcast from the hearing, I couldn’t help but appreciate the drama of Sheldon Whitehouse discussing the shoddy bases on which Bush’s three assertions of Presidential super-legality depend. As designated Adminsitrative Unitary Executive David Rivkin apologist tried to defend these opinions, he complained that he couldn’t see the whole opinion.

Uh huh. Now you’re getting it!

Here’s Whitehouse, describing the precedents on which these opinions rely (my transcript, all mistakes my own).

Then you see something like this [points to the Executive Order opinion]; I won’t go through it it’s been in the testimony already. That’s a pretty alarming proposition, that an executive order is just ignorable willy-nilly with no reporting. And when it became apparent that I was going to release this and I had it declassified, I was told it stands on precedent, and when they told me what the precedent was, the precedent was a Griffin Bell opinion that said the President can legally revoke or supersede an executive order at will.

Of course the President can legally revoke or supersede an executive order at will! There’s a process for doing that. That’s a completely different proposition than saying that the executive can use the executive orders of this country as a screen behind which they can operate programs directly contrary to the text of the executive order.

So there’s one example. The other one that I declassified was the proposition that the President has … exercising its constitutional authority under Article II can determine whether an action is a lawful exercise of the President’s authority under Article II. I mean, aside from the pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps nature of that argument it stands on an earlier opinion that says the executive branch has an independent constitutional obligation to interpret and apply the Constitution. Well, of course they do in the exercise of their duties. But among the things that that opinion goes on to say is that it requires deference to legislative judgments. Once you hang it off Article II, which the executive under this Unitary Executive theory claims is immune from either legislative or judicial intrusion, you’re now saying a very different thing. When you actually see the opinion and see how the extra steps have been taken, you know, you know it’s a little bit, something else is going on other than just plain legal interpretation.

The last one, this is my justice bound, the Department of Justice is bound by the President’s legal interpretations. I thought we’d cleared that when President Nixon told an interviewer than if the President does it, it’s not illegal. That stands on the proposition that the President has the constitutional authority to supervise and control the activities of subordinate officials within the executive branch. But the idea that the Attorney General of the United States and the Department of Justice don’t tell the President what the law is and count on it, but that rather it goes the other way opens up worlds for enormous mischief.

It’s a sweeping proposition, and the three of them as precedent open enormous avenues for further mischief if you’re going to climb out and out and out further on your own precedent.

Rivkin states that he sees no cost to making these propositions public, and–attempting to recuperate them–complains that he has only one sentence to use to assess the opinions. To which, of course, Whitehouse responds that he’d love to give Rivkin the full opinions (thus proving the central point of the entire hearing).

I’d be delighted to show you the whole rest of the opinion but I’m not allowed to. It’s classified. I had to fight to get these declassified. They made me take … they kept my notes. They then delivered them to the intelligence committee where I could only read them in the secure confines of the intelligence committee and then I had to, again, in a classified fashion, send this language back to be declassified. I’m doing it again with a piece of language that relates to exclusivity. There is a sentence that describes whether or not the FISA statute’s exclusivity provision is really exclusive enough for the OLC and that is, we’re still going through this process. I’d like to be able to tell you more about this.

John Elwood, the OLC lackey, pipes in at this point, to try to salvage the opinion on executive orders.

You should also have been provided an opinion that has been public for twenty years and was put out by the office and provided to Congress in 1987 which reads as follows: EO 12333, like all executive orders, is a set of instructions from the President to his subordinates in the executive branch. The activities authorized by the President cannot violate an executive order in any legally meaningful sense because this authorization creates a valid modification of or exception to the executive order. So this is not secret law, this is as public as it can get.

Whitehouse, once again using the Republican shills to make his point, responds,

There’s an important piece missing from that.

Which is, not telling anybody.

And running a program that is completely different from the executive order without ever needing to go back and clean it up.

But that’s okay. Elwood makes it all right!

This opinion involved a secret modification. It involved Iran-Contra.

Oh, okay. That worked out so well. That was such a constitutionally sound action. And twenty years later, as the Administration continues to skulk around meeting with the same joker that robbed them blind during Iran-Contra, I can totally see the value of keeping that game secret. Not.

Hopefully, with the NYT and Project Censored picking up on Pixie Dust, it won’t remain such a mysterious concept anymore. Secret law, I’m hoping, won’t be so powerful a tool anymore if it is no longer secret.

I’m going to revise what I said yesterday when I suggested there was no method to Scott Bloch’s madness. After reading the longer document summarizing the Office of Special Counsel’s Task Force investigations, several key patterns stick out:

• For investigations pertaining to DOJ, the Task Force’s investigations got caught up in the turnover between Alberto Gonzales and Michael Mukasey
• For the investigations pertaining to the politicization of federal agencies, the Task Force was presented with real jurisdictional issues that presented challenges for the inevstigation

This doesn’t mean Bloch is a particularly good manager or investigator. It appears, rather, that he got in over his head when he attempted to take on this high level investigation in May 2007 and, certainly by November 2007, had made these investigations personal.

Timing

The timing reflected in the document reveals some of the problems with the Task Force itself. It was formed in May 2007 to conduct larger investigations–primarily the politicization of government agencies (arising out of Henry Waxman’s own investigation of Lurita Doan), and the politicization of DOJ. Thus, it was started after both those events had significantly played out and (in the case of DOJ) many of the players had quit. The Task Force also inherited a couple of investigations started earlier–primarily an investigation into Rove’s travel started in March 2006.

That means the Task Force didn’t really get started until June 2007. On August 27, 2007, Alberto Gonzales resigned. Michael Mukasey was nominated on September 17, 2007, and approved by the Senate on November 8, 2007. Then this document was drafted on January 18, 2008. So what we’re seeing in the document–particularly as it relates to anything pertaining to DOJ–are the activities taking place after the trauma resulting from the USA Purge and through the period of transition between Gonzales and Mukasey. This explains at least some of the issues surrounding the investigations into DOJ.

For example, OSC had already begun an investigation into the Iglesias firing on May 4, 2007. Remember–that investigation was originally started because the Administration stated publicly that they fired Iglesias because he was an "absentee landlord" because he traveled so much in connection with his service in the Naval Reserve. Firing Iglesias for such a reason would violate the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, which prohibits firing a service member for absences due to military service. Somehow, by May 17, the newly-created Task Force was also investigating his firing as a possible Hatch Act violation, and by May 22, it was investigating the firing of all the USAs. So the OSC took an investigation over which OSC had clear jurisdiction and broadened it into one in which it didn’t.

As early as May 4 (that is, even before the Task Force was created), this investigation conflicted with DOJ’s joint Inspector General (OIG)/Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigation into the firings. On May 4 and May 29, DOJ complained about jurisdictional issues, even involving unnamed people in Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).

Now, at this point, I don’t necessarily fault Bloch for pursuing this investigation. Alberto Gonzales was attempting to bury the investigation by giving OPR sole jurisdiction, meaning the investigators would report directly to him and not produce a public report. And given the crap that has come out of the Bush OLC, who knows what OLC was saying to Bloch to justify their argument that he should drop his investigation?

The problem, though, is that OSC only would have jurisdiction if Bloch could prove that an executive branch employee–as distinct from a legislative branch employee or a local politico–pressured the USAs to conduct politicized investigations. In other words, if it was clear that Monica Goodling was pressuring Iglesias et al to prosecute Democrats, then Bloch would have jurisdiction; but if Senator Domenici and Heather Wilson did so, Bloch wouldn’t have jurisdiction. And the only way Bloch might get evidence that executive branch employees were involved would be to get the kind of information that DOJ and–especially–the White House refused to turn over to Congress.

As it happens, OSC requested those documents on August 13, 2007, just two weeks before Gonzales resigned. DOJ didn’t turn anything over by the OSC due date, September 13, after Gonzales resigned and just after Mukasey was nominated. The Task Force and Bloch spent the next several months wavering about whether to negotiate cooperation with DOJ or whether to subpoena documents. By the time they actually got into a real conversation with the now-Mukasey led DOJ about cooperating on January 16, DOJ was (according to public reports) deep into an OIG-led investigation into the firings. Since this document was published on January 18, just two days after DOJ asked OSC once again to hold off, we don’t know from the document what has happened in the last four months.

Now, the timing concerning the politicized hiring (Monica Goodling’s "over the line" stuff and civil rights hiring) is a little more curious. The Task Force apparently did not consider investigating this crystal clear violation of the Hatch Act until August 20. For some indication of how late that was, I first figured out that Goodling was issuing loyalty oaths on March 29, and Goodling testified to "crossing the line" on May 23. Bloch told the Task Force not to open an investigation into the politicized hiring on August 29, just two days after Gonzales resigned. Now, it appears that OSC did not move on the investigation because of the DOJ investigation into these issues. But it also appears they were learning about the DOJ investigation second-hand, via David Iglesias. In other words, unlike with the USA purge investigation, Bloch did not choose to fight with DOJ over this investigation, even though this one fits more squarely into OSC’s jurisdiction.

That obviously ought to raise questions–why investigate the firings, when jurisdiction is a stretch, and not the hirings, where jurisdiction is clear? That’s where I stop understanding Bloch’s decision. Still, given all the rest of his decisions, it wouldn’t surprise me if he was just struggling to turn these investigations into something meaningful with little real consideration of what his real mandate was.

There are two more investigations that fall under this timing: Siegelman and Schlozman. Both, though, fall into that grey transition time between the resignation of Gonzales and the start of Mukasey. The Task Force started investigating the Siegelman case in September 2007, and was told not to convene the investigation in October 2007. The Task Force started investigating the Schlozman case in November 2007 and was told not to open a case a week later.

Jurisdiction

The decisions surrounding OSC’s investigation of the politicization of executive branch agencies seem to come from jurisdictional issues created by the way BushCo hid their politicization on the RNC server.

The short history of the OSC investigation into the politicization of executive branch agencies goes like this:

June 2007: The Task Force begins the investigation by requesting information from 25 executive branch agencies and the White House

September 2007: The Task Force begins to receive information in response to requests to agencies

October 2007: The Task Force receives information from White House

November 14, 2007: Bloch directs the Task Force to do some consolidation of investigations–and to close some other investigations

November 14, 2007: Bloch directs the Task Force to go after RNC emails–the Task Force registers an objection based on jurisdictional grounds

November 14, 2007: Bloch directs the Task Force to go after a large range of information wrt the Office of Public Affairs (Rove’s old shop)–"the Special Counsel wants us to draft a ‘hard hittting’ [request] that will explain everything there is to know about OPA"–the Task Force again expresses concerns about the breadth of the requests

November 21, 2007: Bloch tells the Task Force to request all grant awards–Task Force objects that there is no evidence that suggests such information is necessary

November 26, 2007: The Task Force begins to go after RNC emails released to Congress pertaining to the USA purge

November 28, 2007: WSJ reports on Office of Personnel Management investigation of Bloch (updated per WO’s comment)

December 14, 2007: The Task Force submits a draft subpoena for the RNC emails released to Congress pertaining to the USA purge

January 16, 2008: Bloch tells the Task Force to go much broader with its request for RNC emails–to cover 10 different topics

January 18, 2008 (the day this summary was completed): The Task Force subpoenas all RNC emails concerning grants and other executive branch agencies

I find this investigation a lot more curious than the investigations related to DOJ. At one level, after the OSC started receiving a bunch of information in November, it appeared that investigators judged there wasn’t much there, and got uncomfortable with the scope of the requests Bloch was forcing them to submit. That suggests that Bloch was determined to find something, even if there was no evidence there. At around the same time, Bloch was pushing the Task Force to push a second investigation into Lurita Doan, so it appears that in November, Bloch was desperate to prove that his signature investigations had real substance.

There’s one thing I don’t particularly buy about that reading, though. One of the biggest smoking guns from the Lurita Doan/GSA investigation was the treatment of email from Scott Jennings (Rove’s lackey) to Doan. The email, remember, went through the RNC server. And those involved wanted to keep it hush hush. In other words, BushCo deliberately tried to hide the way it was politicizing agencies by keeping all communication about it off of government servers.

Which is why I find the investigators’ proposed actions surrounding the RNC emails inexplicable. While I respect their contention that asking for all emails sent by OPA employees using the RNC server may be too much, I also think there’s ample reason to believe that those emails were deliberately used to hide stuff. And remember, we already knew by this time–in November 2007–that the RNC said it didn’t have a bunch of these. So part of me wonders whether the investigators–and not Bloch–were trying to cover up BushCo Hatch Act abuses. Add in the fact that the Task Force’s first request was even more inexplicable. How are emails turned over relating to the USA purge going to reveal anything about political briefings? In other words, after complaining that the Bloch’s request for emails from the RNC was too broad, investigators then tried to request only emails that had nothing to do with the subject of the investigation!

So I don’t know what to make of Bloch’s big requests in November 2007. On one hand, they appear to be the work of a man obsessed, who found nothing on first glance and then decided to make hugely ambitious requests. On the other hand, his investigators seem–either out of genuine concern for their jurisdiction or because they don’t want to find anything–unwilling to go after the most likely evidence of politicization.

And since they only made the big request from the RNC on January 18, 2008–the day this draft was written–we can’t tell from the document what happened after they made that request.

Update: I was too deep into the timeline of the document. As William Ockham points out, Bloch starts ramping up this investigation in November just as it becomes clear the Office of Personnel Management was investigating him. That doesn’t explain why his investigators wouldn’t pursue the most likely potential evidence of Hatch Act violations, but it does explain why he ramped up his investigations in November. Thanks WO.

Update: Spelling typo fixed per MadDog. 

I am still catching up on events of the last week and so I don’t have a really good sense of WTF is going on with the FBI raid of Scott Bloch’s house and–according to NPR, via Sara–body cavities. But I wanted to point you to this analysis of a document drafted by a bunch of Office of Special Counsel investigators, listing their complaints about Bloch’s intervention into their investigations. I hoped that, by reading the analysis, I could figure out whether Bloch was in the bag for the Administration or opposed to the Administration. And, for the life of me, I can’t really discern any logic to Bloch’s action.

Go read the analysis. But here’s a scorecard of what the analysis seems to suggest:

Office of Political Affairs (Karl Rove’s shop at the White House)

Bloch consistently forced the task force conducting the omnibus investigation into whether the White House illegally used agency resources to help Republicans to expand its scope, even beyond the mandate of OSC.

Score: Anti-Bush

US Attorney Firing

Bloch refused repeated DOJ Inspector General demands that he drop his investigation into whether the Administration fired David Iglesias for political reasons, even while he insisted that the Iglesias firing was not a Hatch Act violation. Bloch seems to have insisted on keeping the case either because it was so high profile or to stymie DOJ IG’s investigation.

Score: Pro-Bush if done to stymie DOJ IG’s investigation

Monica Goodling’s Use of Political Tests in DOJ’s Hiring Practices

Bloch repeatedly refused to allow investigators to open an investigation into Goodling’s admitted Hatch Act violations. When he finally allowed investigators to open such an investigation, he allocated no resources to that investigation.

Score: Pro-Bush

Don Siegelman Prosecution

Bloch ordered investigators to close their investigation into the politicized prosecution of Don Siegelman.

Score: Pro-Bush

Politicized Prosecution of ACORN for Voting Fraud

Bloch refused to allow investigators to open an investigation into whether the timing of Missouri US Attorney Office indictments of ACORN voter registration employees was politically motivated.

Score: Pro-Bush

Lurita Doan

After completing an investigation into Lurita Doan which concluded that she had violated the Hatch Act, Bloch ordered investigators to open a second investigation into Doan, from a time before she worked in the Administration involving her husband. This second investigation sounds like a personal witch hunt against Doan.

Score: Anti-Bush

Karl Rove

After investigators determined that, since all of Rove’s travel was billed to the RNC (and therefore no White House resources–aside, presumably, from his salary–were devoted to Rove’s political events, his actions did not constitute a Hatch Act violation, Bloch ordered investigators to expand their investigation into Rove.

Score: Anti-Bush

See what I mean? I intend to come back and read the complete document. But from this summary, it appears there’s no consistent pattern, at least not on a typical partisan scale. You might argue that Bloch kept expanding the investigation into Rove and OPA to hide illegitimate activities behind the legitimate ones. But then why the second investigation into Doan, particularly when Bloch knew Bush wasn’t going to to fire her anyway–at least not until last week? Similarly, you might assume that Bloch was simply trying to expand his turf and potential glory for successful investigations. But then why spike a slam dunk investigation into Goodling’s political hiring practices?

I’m beginning to think that Bloch–with his thumb drives stuck in some bodily cavity–is simply crazy or dumb.

Update: OSP turned to OPA per WO. 

Apparently, while I’ve been on my Haggis and Beamish pilgrimage, Steny Hoyer has been busy brokering a compromise on FISA.

House Majority Leader Steny H. Hoyer (D-Md.) said Wednesday a FISA deal is “still in flux” but he described the latest developments as “promising” and said he hoped to have a solution soon.

[snip]

Sen. Kit Bond of Missouri, the top Republican on the Intelligence committee and one of the GOP’s top negotiators on the issue, said he met with Hoyer to discuss the issue on Monday, but did not say a breakthrough had been achieved.

“This is still a ping-pong match,” said Rep Jane Harman (D-Calif.), referring to the back and forth on the bill between the two chambers.

Harman said the latest developments signify "positive movement" on the bill and praised the job Hoyer has been doing on the issue.

Hoyer has been the strongest proponent of a compromise in the Democratic leadership and has worked hard to broker a deal on the issue. He often acts as an intermediary between liberal House Democrats unwilling to grant the telecom companies immunity and conservative Senate Republicans and the White House, both of whom will not accept any FISA bill without immunity.

Now, before I say what I’m about to say, let me reiterate that I believe we should not compromise. The telecoms broke the law when they accepted a letter authorizing the spying on Americans signed by the White House Counsel in lieu of the Attorney General in March 2004, and they should be held accountable for breaking the law.

That said, let me make some points about what basis for compromise Steny might be negotiating, and how such a compromise might be an avenue for transparency about the Administration’s (as distinct from just the telecom’s) lawbreaking with the illegal wiretap program.

Remember that Steny is not just the chief broker currently on FISA. He was also the chief broker on the House bill that passed on March 14. And that bill had one provision that seems to have been forgotten in recent discussions of compromise, but was clearly intended, even in March, to serve as the kernel of any future compromises: the call for a commission to investigate the illegal wiretap program.

Here’s what the bill–as passed by the House–calls for:

SEC. 301. COMMISSION ON WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES.

(a) Establishment of Commission- There is established in the legislative branch a commission to be known as the `Commission on Warrantless Electronic Surveillance Activities’ (in this section referred to as the `Commission’).

(b) Duties of Commission-

(1) IN GENERAL- The Commission shall–

(A) ascertain, evaluate, and report upon the facts and circumstances relating to electronic surveillance activities conducted without a warrant between September 11, 2001 and January 17, 2007;

(B) evaluate the lawfulness of such activities;

(C) examine all programs and activities relating to intelligence collection inside the United States or regarding United States persons that were in effect or operation on September 11, 2001, and all such programs and activities undertaken since that date, including the legal framework or justification for those activities; and

(D) report to the President and Congress the findings and conclusions of the Commission and any recommendations the Commission considers appropriate.

(2) PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY- The Commission shall carry out the duties of the Commission under this section in a manner consistent with the need to protect national security.

(c) Composition of Commission-

(1) MEMBERS- The Commission shall be composed of 9 members, of whom–

(A) 5 members shall be appointed jointly by the majority leader of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and

(B) 4 members shall be appointed jointly by the minority leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(2) QUALIFICATIONS- It is the sense of Congress that individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent United States citizens with significant depth of experience in national security, Constitutional law, and civil liberties.

(3) CHAIR; VICE CHAIR-

(A) CHAIR- The Chair of the Commission shall be jointly appointed by the majority leader of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives from among the members appointed under paragraph (1)(A).

(B) VICE CHAIR- The Vice Chair of the Commission shall be jointly appointed by the minority leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the House of Representatives from among the members appointed under paragraph (1)(B).

(4) DEADLINE FOR APPOINTMENT- All members of the Commission shall be appointed not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(5) INITIAL MEETING- The Commission shall hold its first meeting and begin operations not later than 45 days after the date on which a majority of its members have been appointed.

(6) SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS- After its initial meeting, the Commission shall meet upon the call of the Chair.

(7) QUORUM- A majority of the members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number may hold hearings.

(8) VACANCIES- Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers and shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

(d) Powers of Commission-

(1) HEARINGS AND EVIDENCE- The Commission or, on the authority of the Chair, any subcommittee or member thereof may, for the purpose of carrying out this section, hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, and administer such oaths as the Commission, such designated subcommittee, or designated member may determine advisable.

(2) SUBPOENAS-

(A) ISSUANCE-

(i) IN GENERAL- The Commission may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence relating to any matter that the Commission is empowered to investigate under this section. The attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence may be required from any place within the United States at any designated place of hearing within the United States.

(ii) SIGNATURE- Subpoenas issued under this paragraph may be issued under the signature of the Chair of the Commission, the chair of any subcommittee created by a majority of the Commission, or any member designated by a majority of the Commission and may be served by any person designated by such Chair, subcommittee chair, or member.

(B) ENFORCEMENT-

(i) IN GENERAL- If a person refuses to obey a subpoena issued under subparagraph (A), the Commission may apply to a United States district court for an order requiring that person to appear before the Commission to give testimony, produce evidence, or both, relating to the matter under investigation. The application may be made within the judicial district where the hearing is conducted or where that person is found, resides, or transacts business. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as civil contempt.

(ii) JURISDICTION- In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under subparagraph (A), the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order requiring such person to appear at any designated place to testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of that court.

(iii) ADDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT- In the case of the failure of a witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this paragraph, the Commission, by majority vote, may certify a statement of fact attesting to such failure to the appropriate United States attorney, who shall bring the matter before the grand jury for its action, under the same statutory authority and procedures as if the United States attorney had received a certification under sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192 through 194).

(3) CONTRACTING- The Commission may, to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in appropriations Acts, enter into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its duties under this section.

(4) INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES-

(A) IN GENERAL- The Commission is authorized to secure directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Government documents, information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the purposes of this section. Each department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality shall furnish such documents, information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission upon request made by the Chair, the chair of any subcommittee created by a majority of the Commission, or any member designated by a majority of the Commission.

[snip]

(f) Security Clearances for Commission Members and Staff-

(1) EXPEDITIOUS PROVISION OF CLEARANCES- The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to the Commission members and staff appropriate security clearances to the extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and requirements, except that no person shall be provided with access to classified information under this section without the appropriate security clearances.

(2) ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION- All members of the Commission and commission staff, as authorized by the Chair or the designee of the Chair, who have obtained appropriate security clearances, shall have access to classified information related to the surveillance activities within the scope of the examination of the Commission and any other related classified information that the members of the Commission determine relevant to carrying out the duties of the Commission under this section.

(3) FACILITIES AND RESOURCES- The Director of National Intelligence shall provide the Commission with appropriate space and technical facilities approved by the Commission.

[snip]

(i) Reports and Recommendations of Commission-

(1) INTERIM REPORTS- The Commission may submit to the President and Congress interim reports containing such findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members.

(2) FINAL REPORT- Not later than one year after the date of its first meeting, the Commission, in consultation with appropriate representatives of the intelligence community, shall submit to the President and Congress a final report containing such information, analysis, findings, conclusions, and recommendations as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members.

(3) FORM- The reports submitted under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(4) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DECLASSIFICATION- The Commission may make recommendations to the appropriate department or agency of the Federal Government regarding the declassification of documents or portions of documents.

Best as I can tell, here’s what this provision calls for: a commission, which will have a majority of members picked by the majority (that is, Democratic) party, with the ability to investigate not just the illegal wiretap program, but also,

all programs and activities relating to intelligence collection inside the United States or regarding United States persons that were in effect or operation on September 11, 2001, and all such programs and activities undertaken since that date, including the legal framework or justification for those activities

That is, not just the warrantless wiretap program, but the National Security Letters, CIFA, and anything else they’ve been doing. This commission is intended to be Church Committee II.

Furthermore, it includes several provisions designed to thwart Republican efforts to undermine it:

• The staffers get security clearances (so Bush can’t refuse to give investigators security clearances, as he did with OPR at DOJ originally)
• The Committee can subpoena people–and it can enforce the subpoena either in the city where the hearing is intended to be held, where the person lives or conducts business
• The Committee has several means available to enforce subpoenas, both by contempt of court or referral to the US Attorney for the jurisdiction in question (with some flexibility on which jurisdiction you refer it to)
• The Committee must submit an unclassified report (though a classified annex is permissible)

Now, this proposal is not perfect. I would include several more provisions. Most notably, I would make any immunity offered to telecoms contingent upon the formation of this commission, and the sworn, transcribed testimony of the first set of witnesses (which would include at least Bush, Cheney–testifying separately, Alberto Gonzales, Andy Card, Jim Comey, Jack Goldsmith, and David Addington). In addition, I’d put another set of requirements for the membership, ruling out those with a conflict (people like Jamie Gorelick, who not only served under Clinton when he was establishing some of the legal and technical framework for this program, but who has since gone on to lobby for the telecoms). In addition, I’d rule out Lee Hamilton, collaborationist extraordinaire and a close friend of Dick Cheney, by name; it is time to end Lee Hamilton’s career as the happy bipartisan who repeatedly gets rolled on these committees. I’d also require that there be some carry-over from staffers who have seen some of these documents on either the intelligence or judiciary committees; having such carry-over on the 9/11 Commission prevented the Administration from burying information it otherwise would have.

But let’s take the commission as currently described. Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that it would be included in any compromise bill. What would it mean?

First and foremost, it might mean calling Republicans’ bluff. If this commission were included as is, I suspect BushCo might get awfully squirmy about whether their concern is–as they’ve been claiming for over a year–immunity. Or whether it is, in fact, saving Bush and Cheney’s own ass. I suspect, in fact, that the Republicans would reject such a compromise (or at least Bush would). Which would mean we could pass an extension to PAA, and go on to fix FISA under President Obama, with a much more heavily Democratic Congress.

But let’s suppose they accept this commission as part of a compromise solution. What are the trade-offs?

If we continue as is, and if the plaintiffs in the suits get by the problems of standing and state secrets, then we might hold the telecoms accountable. I think that’s increasingly likely in the al-Haramain case, but less likely in the others–and it would surely be reviewed by Scalia and his nutso friends first. If one of these cases goes to trial, we are likely to get confirmation of what we already know: that AT&T has splitters on its backbones so the government can access communications traffic directly, and that for the period immediately following March 10, 2004, the telecoms operated under an authorization signed by the White House Counsel rather than–as dictated by law–the Attorney General. But our discovery will be largely limited to what we already know. Anything else will be presented in camera, if the plaintiffs even get a meaningful review of it.

But if we get the commission, we have a shot at getting testimony on the record or–just as likely–pursuing contempt charges against Cheney, Addington, and Bush (after the time, it should be said, when Bush can pardon them). And some of the key players–for example, on CIFA–aren’t muckety mucks like Cheney. They’re contractors who have an interest in staying on the right side of the law.

The Church Committee was not, by itself, sufficient to punishing Nixon for his domestic spying. Though, in fact, impeachment wasn’t enough either. And 30 years later, those who fought the legislation that came out of the Church Committee are still fighting it–they’re the same people who would be subpoenaed by this Commission.

Still, for all that I don’t want any compromise with the Republicans on FISA, I am wondering whether this Commission is an active part of the discussions. And at the very least, I’d like to see Democrats talking about this commission as prominently as they’re talking about FISA.

A number of people (including Senator Whitehouse) have pointed out how much the Mary Gade firing resembles the US Attorney firing. As the Chicago Tribune reported (before the Administration released the standard "spending time with her family" statement), Gade was told to resign because she expected Dow Chemical to clean up its pollution in the Saginaw-Midland MI area.

On Thursday, following months of internal bickering over Mary Gade’s interactions with Dow, the administration forced her to quit as head of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Midwest office, based in Chicago.

Gade told the Tribune she resigned after two aides to national EPA administrator Stephen Johnson took away her powers as regional administrator and told her to quit or be fired by June 1.

[snip]

Gade, appointed by President Bush as regional EPA administrator in September 2006, invoked emergency powers last summer to order the company to remove three hotspots of dioxin near its Midland headquarters.

She demanded more dredging in November, when it was revealed that dioxin levels along a park in Saginaw were 1.6 million parts per trillion, the highest amount ever found in the U.S.

Dow then sought to cut a deal on a more comprehensive cleanup. But Gade ended the negotiations in January, saying Dow was refusing to take action necessary to protect public health and wildlife. Dow responded by appealing to officials in Washington, according to heavily redacted letters the Tribune obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

[snip]

On Thursday, Gade said of her resignation: "There’s no question this is about Dow. I stand behind what I did and what my staff did. I’m proud of what we did."

What I haven’t heard mentioned in any of this coverage, though, is whether John McCain supports the firing of Mary Gade.

It’s relevant, I figure, for two reasons. First, with his half-measures global warming initiative, McCain likes to fancy himself a bit of an environmentalist. More importantly, McCain is banking heavily on winning MI in November. There is no way that McCain becomes President without winning MI.

So don’t you think it a relevant question–whether McCain supports the firing of Mary Gade because she tried to end the poisoning of a bunch of MI voters on whose votes McCain is counting?

Either he thinks the firing extremely inappropriate–in which case it’ll make it easier to hammer the Bush Administration for this firing. Or, he thinks firing Gade is all well and good, presuming he’ll get MI’s votes before those voters die of diseases relating to the dioxin in their water.

In either case, McCain’s answer seems rather pertinent to this year’s presidential elections.

Our good friends at EFF have a big announcement. They have bagged a big win against the Bush Government on the improper use of National Security Letters.

The FBI has withdrawn an unconstitutional national security letter (NSL) issued to the Internet Archive after a legal challenge from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). As the result of a settlement agreement, the FBI withdrew the NSL and agreed to the unsealing of the case, finally allowing the Archive’s founder to speak out for the first time about his battle against the record demand.

"The free flow of information is at the heart of every library’s work. That’s why Congress passed a law limiting the FBI’s power to issue NSLs to America’s libraries," said Brewster Kahle, founder and Digital Librarian of the Internet Archive. "While it’s never easy standing up to the government — particularly when I was barred from discussing it with anyone — I knew I had to challenge something that was clearly wrong. I’m grateful that I am able now to talk about what happened to me, so that other libraries can learn how they can fight back from these overreaching demands."
…
The NSL included a gag order, prohibiting Kahle from discussing the letter and the legal issues it presented with the rest of the Archive’s Board of Directors or anyone else except his attorneys, who were also gagged. The gag also prevented the ACLU and EFF from discussing the NSL with members of Congress, even though an ACLU lawyer who represents the Archive recently testified at a congressional hearing about the FBI’s misuse of NSLs.

"This is a great victory for the Archive and also the Constitution," said Melissa Goodman, staff attorney with the ACLU. "It appears that every time a national security letter recipient has challenged an NSL in court and forced the government to justify it, the government has ultimately withdrawn its demand for records. In the absence of much needed judicial oversight – and with recipients silenced and the public in the dark – there is nothing to stop the FBI from abusing its NSL power."

You can read the entire press release here. When they say "there is nothing to stop the FBI from abusing its NSL power" that is not quite right; there is something, and it is the invaluable work of the EFF and ACLU. Make no mistake though, this is a big deal both in terms of timing and substance. It is an excellent fact situation for discussion both as an example to hold up and the full ability to discuss all aspects of the case. That is huge. But also the timing coming right as we gear up for another FISA battle is crucial. Kudos to the EFF.

For all the outstanding work and efforts put forth every day, both here and around the blogosphere, we would be nowhere without organizations like the EFF and ACLU doing the hard work of challenging the wrongs of the government in court. When you get around to making your various charitable donations, please keep them in mind; if there is a better bang for your buck place to donate your hard earned cash, other than the hostess of this blog, I cannot imagine what it is.

Many of you have been asking many different questions about the OSC kerfluffle. I am fairly deep into this now and hope to have a serious piece ready by tonight. Unfortunately, day job and spring family responsibilities (there’s a different school concert every night!) keep intruding. Tomorrow, there is actually one I am looking forward to; I get to help chaperone my daughter’s class field trip to tour, learn about and see in action the county courthouse.

Back to the OSC mess. This is just a short post to run by all of you my current thoughts and ask you to post in comments any links to new and probative information you have run across (for other topics too if they are really noteworthy). So, here goes.

Bloch appears to be a bit of a nondescript, but deeply religious, party level toady that they pulled out of the mid-west, to serve as Associate Director and then Deputy Director and Counsel to the Task Force for Faith-based and Community Initiatives at the U.S. Department of Justice. (Why exactly is there even such an office in the DOJ at all???). The Bushies then wanted to plug a Regent like theobot toady into the OSC, and decided Bloch fit the bill. Bloch then went about doing his job, which was effectively to do nothing and fill up the ranks with incompetent theobot types, just like they were doing all over the government and, as we know so well, especially the DOJ. But Bloch got a little ham fisted in his efforts to weed his office of teh gay in the process, which caused an amount of scrutiny and heat.

About that time, Bloch’s office started being forced into relevance because of all the Hatch Act violations and other things that the Bushies have done to create whistleblowers that are supposed to fall under Bloch’s office’s parameters. This created a confluence of events for Bloch; he morally/religiously really believes in his purge of teh gay and, just maybe, he actually has some moral convictions on the impropriety of much of the Bushco creed. So, he starts actually doing his job on the Bushco ills, just a little, both because he knew there were ills and to push back and protect himself for what he had done. Picture a John DiIulio and/or David Kuo that, instead of just leaving, stayed and fought.

Because of the Rove, Doan, and then the USA Purgegate scandals, this little internecine battle erupted into the public consciousness, and neither side backed off. Bloch was preparing some stinging reports that would really be a poke in the eye to the Bushies, and they wanted to squelch those. The Bushies determined that it would be necessary to take out Bloch, but they didn’t want it to be alleged that they did it to cover and protect Lurita "Cookies" Doan and wanted it to look like they did it for cause against Bloch. So they cooked Doan (she was a pain in the ass anyway by then, so no loss to them) as a preemptory strike in preparation for going after Bloch. Then, they went after Bloch to put the kabosh, as much as they can, on his reports on Bushco. And that is where we are at now.

Again, this is just my best take on it so far. Please give your feedback and criticism, and especially your tips, news cites and thoughts. Bloch is not a sympathetic character in many regards, I would prefer not to be concerned with him; but I think this little sideshow is likely a fairly important cog in the greater scheme of what we do here, so we need to get a grip on it and put a stop to the Bushco power play that is in process. Thanks folks.

UPDATE: Here is a document fro POGO entitled "Summary of Task Force Activities and Recommendations” dated January 18, 2008. Extremely interesting, it details the various high profile cases of the OSC and the task force that was working on them. Sure paints schizophrenic picture of the office, Bloch and the task force. None of them look particularly good to me, but the task force, overall, probably comes off best. Take a look at it.

Hat tip to Phred for this reference!