I will have more to say on specific details revealed in my Ghorbanifar Timeline in the coming days. But for now, I wanted to make my main point more strongly by focusing on particular dates in the timeline.

The timeline strongly suggests that the hawks within the White House sustained the contacts with Ghorbanifar as part of a (mostly successful) campaign to prevent the Administration from building a closer relationship with Iran.

Before I get into actual dates, recall Flynt Leverett’s argument (which was so dangerous the Administration censored it heavily). Leverett argues that the only workable solution to our relations with Iran is to forge a "grand bargain," trading security for more constructive Iranian engagement throughout the Middle East.

In the current regional context, issue-specific engagement with Iran is bound to fail. The only diplomatic approach that might succeed is a comprehensive one aimed at a “grand bargain” between the United States and the Islamic Republic.

[snip]

Iran will only cooperate with the United States, whether in Iraq or on the nuclear issue, as part of a broader rapprochement addressing its core security concerns. This requires extension of a United States security guarantee — effectively, an American commitment not to use force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic — bolstered by the prospect of lifting United States unilateral sanctions and normalizing bilateral relations.

The parts of Leverett’s op-ed that got censored reveal that, in fact, Iran has attempted to foster such a grand bargain several times during the Bush Administration. Colin Powell and Richard Armitage cautiously supported those attempts. But each time those efforts started developing, the Administration scuttled the efforts–usually based on inflammatory claims.

And at least some of those claims may have come from Manucher Ghorbanifar.

In other words, top Administration officials kept letting Ghorbanifar’s fraudulent "intelligence" get inserted into the government because it provided critical–albeit fraudulent–support for a policy of regime change in Iran.

Now look at the known dates:

December to February 2001

Michael Ledeen says he first started putting this meeting together "soon after September 11, 2001, probably in the October 2001 timeframe." The first documented discussions about the meeting occurred on November 7, and the meeting occurred from December 10 through 13.

Thus, the meeting was set up during the time period when the US was engaging Iran closely–and productively–in context of its Afghan war.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration used the cover of the “6+2” process to stand up what was effectively a freestanding bilateral channel with Iran, with regular (for the most part, monthly) meetings between U.S. and Iranian diplomats.

U.S. engagement with Tehran over Afghanistan provided significant and tangible benefits for the American position during the early stages of the war on terror. At a minimum, U.S. engagement with Tehran helped to neutralize the threat of Iranian actions on the ground, either by Afghan proxies or by Iranian intelligence and paramilitary assets, which could have made prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom and subsequent post-conflict stabilization more difficult. More positively, engagement elicited crucial diplomatic cooperation from Iran, both during the war and afterwards. Over years, Iran had cultivated extensive relationships with key players on the Afghan political scene, including important warlords in northern and western Afghanistan. Iranian influence was critical for arming and managing these players during the U.S.-led coalition’s military operations. After the war, Iranian influence induced these players to support the political settlement enshrined at the Bonn Conference in December 2001, when the Afghan Interim Authority under Hamid Karzai was established.

Most striking, the Rome meeting with Ghorbanifar took place on the days immediately following a December 9 public statement from Colin Powell expressing an openness to negotiate with Iran.

SECRETARY POWELL: On Iran, setting aside pipelines. I am open to explore opportunities. We have been in discussions with the Iranians on a variety of levels and in some new ways since September 11. Jim Dobbins spoke with Iranians in Bonn as we put together the new interim administration in Afghanistan, and I had a brief handshake and discussion with the Iranian Prime Minister in the UN. So there are a number of things going on and we recognize the nature of that regime and we recognize that the Iranian people are starting to try to find a new way forward and we are open to exploring opportunities without having any vaseline in our eyes with respect to the nature of the government or the history of the past 22 years.

Finally, there’s the issue of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Within the framework of cooperation with Iran and following the Bonn Conference that set up the Afghan government, the US asked Iran to hold Hekmatyar in Iran. The US asked Iran to hold Hekmatyar–one of the most effective warlords, going back to the anti-Soviet campaign–partly to keep close track of him, and partly to prevent him from returning to Afghanistan and destabilizing the fragile country. Iran consented to hold Hekmatyar, "so long as the Bush administration did not criticize it for harboring terrorists;" basically, they didn’t want the US to simultaneously request they hold Hekmatyar and then label that action as the sheltering of terrorists.

In short, the US and Iran were cooperating productively, based on the hope that the US might grant Iran a security guarantee and premised on the understanding, in the short term, that the US wouldn’t accuse Iran of support for terrorism.

So now look at the list of "intelligence" Ghorbanifar offered Ledeen, Rhode, and Franklin:

• Iranian "hit teams" targeting U.S. personnel in Afghanistan
• Iran’s long standing relationship with the Palestinian Liberation Organization
• Tunnel complexes in Iran for weapons storage or exfiltration of regime leaders
• Iran’s perception on Saddam Hussein’s grip on Iraq
• Iranian regime attitudes toward the U.S.
• Internal rivalries among Iran’s intelligence agencies

Of these pieces of "information," Franklin took action on the "hit teams" claim, informing a Special Forces Commander of it. The Commander then turned "the tables on these Iranians," presumably undermining any cooperation they had in Afghanistan.

In addition, there was Ghorbanifar’s cocktail napkin plan for regime change, in which $5 million of traffic disruption would result in the overthrow of the regime, which Ledeen passed on directly to Hadley, Luti, and Rodman.

At a time when the State Department was testing the possibility of closer ties to Iran, a known fraud provided information that suggested Iran was trying to undermine US efforts in Afghanistan and continued to have ties to terrorists (PLO). This meeting happened with the approval of Stephen Hadley, who the following year, at least, would play a key role in drafting the State of the Union speech. Further, in early 2002, someone from OVP was following up with Franklin on the information. In the SOTU in 2002, Bush included Iran among the Axis of Evil. Just weeks later, Iran expelled Hekmatyar; Hekmatyar would go on to be one of the strongest leaders in the Afghan insurgency fighting against the US. While it’s not clear how important Ghorbanifar’s "intelligence" was in the Administration’s adoption of a hard line against Iran in the face of meaningful cooperation, key players within the Administration willingly pursued such information.

June 2003

The second planned Ghorbanifar meeting took place on June 30 to July 1, 2003, in Paris. As with the first meeting, this one took place not long after Iran had tried to reach out to the US again.

This timing is a little confusing. Iran was reported to have sent a proposal to the US via Geneva "just after" the US conquered Baghdad in April 2003. The US complained to the Swiss Ambassador who had forwarded the document. But the US and Iran did enter into negotiations, lasting until May 21, when the Administration made unsubstantiated claims that Iran-hosted Al Qaeda leaders had planned a recent bombing in Saudi Arabia and shut down negotiations.

So, in the period following another attempt to negotiate with Iran, Harold Rhode once again met with Ghorbanifar. Significantly, this meeting appears to have been one set up by OVP–two OVP people sent Rhode instead after they were unable to make the meeting themselves (more on OVP’s involvement in a future post). At the meeting, Ghorbanifar told Rhode things that played into notions of Iran as a sponsor of terrorism and of the counter-insurgency in Iraq.

The purpose of Mr. Rhode’s meeting with Mr. Ghorbanifar was to receive "an update on the current political situation and conditions in Iran." Based on Mr. Rhode’s notes, the subjects covered included the current situation in Iran, Iranian relations with Syria, the state of Islam in Iran, and Iran’s activity in Iraq.

And, of course, another iteration of Ghorbanifar’s cocktail napkin plan for regime change in Iran.

In the aftermath of this meeting, Senators Kyl, Santorum, Brownback, and Roberts started pressuring Tenet to act on Ghorbanifar’s "intelligence." Meanwhile, Rhode continued to communicate with Ghorbanifar. And Michael Ledeen starting claiming that Ghorbanifar could bring weapons inspectors to Iraq’s uranium, now hidden in Iran. This was also the period when OVP was taking raw intelligence from Ghorbanifar–some of it grievously incorrect–and demanding that David Kay follow up on the intelligence in Iraq.

Now, perhaps OVP was willing to meet with Ghorbanifar (or have Rhode do so in its stead) out of desperation with the WMD hunt. But it came in the wake of another attempt to establish closer relations between Iran and the US.

October 2003

Finally, there was a possible meeting between Harold Rhode and Ghorbanifar in early October 2003. While we don’t know whether this actually happened, if it did, it would have occurred in another period of debate about the Administration’s Iran policy. Just weeks after the potential meeting, Stephen Cambone halted CIFA’s investigation into the meetings, preventing CIFA from investigating (among other things) the role of OVP in the meetings. And, just weeks after the possible meeting, the State Department once again announced it was prepared to restart negotiations with Iran.

Now, I frankly think we’re dealing with an incomplete picture. We don’t have a map of how often Ledeen was meeting with Ghorbanifar or whom he was sharing that "intelligence" with. Further, the fact that two OVP people were prepared to meet with Ghorbanifar in June 2003 suggests they may have had other meetings with him. That is, these three dates may represent a very incomplete picture of when the hawks in the Administration went to Ghorbanifar to get further useful "intelligence" to undercut closer ties to Iran.

But the dates we do know suggest there may be a connection between periods of increasing debate within the Administration about its Iran policy and formal meetings with Ghorbanifar. As with Chalabi, Ghorbanifar appeared to be providing the neocons the information they needed, when they needed it, all to support a grandiose strategy of empire in the Middle East.

Despite the wall to wall coverage, not just on NBC and MSNBC, but all the networks, the hand wringing, the eulogizing, the lionization, the body lying in state at the Kennedy Center, and the funeral worthy of royalty, not enough has been said about the recent passing of a giant. Probably because all that bleating was about Saint Tim of Russert. I am talking about a different giant. A giant in my own family has passed. Granpa Pricky.

Granpa Pricky was our 24 foot tall saguaro cactus that majestically guarded the east entrance to Casa de bmaz since at least several decades before Casa de bmaz was built, and our house is almost fifty years old. Just woke up one morning and there it was, keeled over into the road. Saguaros are truly grand and majestic entities, standing tall as the guardians of the Sonoran desert. Granpa Pricky was not just a centurion, he was a home as well. There are now a couple of homeless woodpeckers. Actually these peckars don’t even peck wood that much. They like to perch on my chimney and wail on the metal vent cover on the top. Sounds like a freaking machine gun or jackhammer in the house. Very annoying. Metalpeckers.

At any rate, an autopsy was conducted. Any and all of these photos can be enlarged by clicking on them.

The whitish material in the center is very squishy. There is simply a ton of moisture in saguaros. And we don’t even have the cacti on drip systems; all they get is rain water, and it does not rain that much here. It is kind of fibrous pulp like stuff. People trying to survive in the desert desperate for water cut up that pulp and put chunks in their mouth to suck the water (and there is a lot) out. The cactus does produce a red, bulbous, pretty sweet fruit that is fully edible and not bad. Granpa Pricky died on June 5. Here is a photo just taken of the same cross section depicted above.

Note how the pulp is shrinking as opposed to the outer shell and especially the spine. The spine is the circle of dowel like looking things in the middle. When you tap on the outer surface of the pulp, which has hardened, you can tell from the sound that there is still simply a ton of water in there. It has been really hot here lately (112 degrees today), this thing is dead and cut up into pieces; yet it still holds that much water. Pretty remarkable. Saguaros have a relatively long life span. They take up to 75 years to develop a side arm. Granpa Pricky had three arms. The arms themselves are grown to increase the plants reproductive capacity (more apices equal more flowers and fruit). The growth rate of saguaros is strongly dependent on local precipitation patterns, and saguaros in drier western Arizona grow only half as fast as those in and around Tucson, Arizona. The night blooming flowers appear April-May and the sweet, ruby-colored fruit matures by late June. Each fruit can contain up to 2,000 seeds. Saguaro flowers are self incompatible and require a pollenizer to supply viable pollen. For more information, see here and here.

Well, that is the end of the desert discussion for today. If you are interested in knowledge of the desert ecosystem and all it’s different species, as well as some other Southwest, Pacific and Pacific Northwest ecologies, please visit the site of the Center for Biological Diversity. The center was founded decades ago by a friend, Dr. Robin Silver, and it really is a remarkable organization, the EFF or ACLU of Southwest ecology. Their website is also a superb resource of information.

In closing, a photo of Camelback Mountain Western Camel Head’s Face/Praying Monk Rock, taken from close to the exact spot of ground where Granpa Pricky once stood guard. In the previous Sunset Musings post, I was forced to use a picture culled from the web that was actually taken at sunrise. This is the real deal taken during "golden hour". Last week was fast, furious, and a bitter disappointment. We got some incredible and fascinating substantive work in this weekend thanks to Marcy’s Ghorbanifar Meetings Timeline post. But I also wanted to do a couple of general, and lighter, things to give everybody a chance to vent, decompress, and recharge their batteries. So, the same rules from yesterday’s The Sun Always Rises post are in effect. Chat and comment away on any of the things we do or you want. If there was/is stuff in the news that is noteworthy, give a link and let’s discuss it (I haven’t even done my daily reading yet). Tomorrow, it is back to the war. FISA is not a done deal until the Senate sends it out in a form that Bush signs. But our backs are to the wall, and the road steeply uphill from here. Got some more effort left in you? I do.

The SSCI report on the Rome meeting has a really funny footnote.

Mr. Franklin is currently awaiting direction from the Department of Justice to report to prison on matters unrelated to those discussed in this report. He was indicted in August 2005 along with two employees of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) for conspiring with each other to unlawfully disclose classified national defense information. Mr. Franklin subsequently pled guilty, and was sentenced in January 2006 on three felony counts: conspiracy to communicate national defense information to persons not entitled to receive it; conspiracy to communicate classified information to an agent of a foreign government; and the unlawful retention of national defense information.

The footnote is funny (in addition to the fact that it misstates when Franklin was first indicted) because Franklin pled guilty to dealing information about Iran to AIPAC. The reason Franklin did so was not because of money or blackmail, but because he disagreed with US policy on Iran, and was happy to work with AIPAC to pressure the government into a more hawkish policy on Iran. Which is pretty much what was happening with the Ghorbanifar information. As DOD’s own Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) report suggested,

Ghorbanifar or his associates are being used as agents of a foreign intelligence service to leverage his continuing contact with Michael Ledeen and others to reach into and influence the highest levels of the U.S. Government.

Along with a lot of other crappy "intelligence," Ghorbanifar was floating plans to overthrow the regime in Iran, so the end goal of both the AIPAC effort and Ledeen and Ghorbanifar’s efforts was regime change in Iran.

The suggestion that Franklin’s indictment is unrelated to the Ghorbanifar meetings is also funny because, while Franklin claimed he did not know Ledeen in 2001 when Ledeen selected him to attend the Rome meeting, by fall 2004, Ledeen was intervening to get Plato Cacheris to represent Franklin in the AIPAC scandal. Thus, while there’s no reason to believe the Israelis were involved in the Rome meeting, the same group of Neocons were involved in parallel efforts to undercut US efforts to establish closer relations with Iran.

Now, as Laura Rozen revealed, it appears that this thing is not over–she reports that Harold Rhode has lawyered up. Rhode refused to cooperate with the SSCI’s most recent efforts to investigate this meeting last fall, which suggests he has gotten much more reluctant to talk about what happened (and DOD says he has forgotten what he said in 2004, displaying the forgetfulness all Bush Administration criminals seem to share). But if you think about it, there are only two logical explanations for why–two and a half years after Larry Franklin pled guilty to sharing defense information–he is still "awaiting direction from DOJ to report to prison." Either someone high up in the Administration intervened to keep Franklin out of the pokey (OVP is named in the SSCI report, and we know Dick Cheney has prevented allies from going to prison before), or Franklin has been cooperating with investigators for two and a half years. (His docket just shows a "delayed reporting date."

With all that said, I decided to look more closely at the timeline involved. What follows combines several timelines: the timeline of both the meetings and the investigations into those meetings from the SSCI report, key details from Franklin’s indictment, and details of attempts to foster closer relations with Iran detailed in this Flynt Leverett op-ed. I’ll say more about what this timeline shows in follow-up posts.

---

September 9. 2001: Condi demands an investigation into a leak that ended up in NYT story; the leak would lead to AIPAC investigation

Before November 7, 2001: Ledeen calls Rodman; Rodman says no to Rome meeting

Before November 7, 2001: Ledeen calls Hadley, claims Iranians want to defect

November 7, 2001: Hadley calls Wolfowitz, who instructs Rodman to approve the meeting

November 15, 2001: Rodman checks with DOD General Counsel Haynes on whether DOD can accept defectors

December 9. 2001: Powell publicly mentions meetings with Iran

December 2001: US requests Iran prevent Gulbuddin Hekmatyar from returning to Afghanistan

December 10-13, 2001: First Rome meetings

December 12, 2001: Sembler and Ledeen meet

December 23, 2001: Sembler hosts Ledeen; Ledeen says US should support deal with Ghorbanifar’s Iranians

January 2002: Franklin report on meeting

Early 2002: Franklin contacted by "official from the Office of the Vice President" regarding Ghorbanifar

January 7, 2002: Rodman drafts–but doesn’t send–summary of meeting for Wolfowitz

January 14, 2002: Meeting with DCI reveals details of meetings

January 16, 2002: Ledeen meeting with Hadley

January 29, 2002: Bush names Iran in "axis of evil"

January 31, 2002: Handwritten note exchange between Rodman and Wolfowitz, with the latter stressing secrecy

February 1, 2002: Marc Grossman inquires about meeting after learning of Ledeen summary for Hadley; does not identify Rhode as one of the participants

February 2, 2002: Rodman meeting with DIA Director Wilson

February 5, 2002: Rodman prepares draft memo from Wolfie to Rummy

February 8, 2002: State Department cable on meetings

February 9, 2002: CIA and State oppose further meetings

February 2002: CIA’s Deputy Director of Operations Pavitt establishes channel for Ledeen to contact agency about any further contacts

February 12, 2002: Rodman summary on meeting (mentioning oil contracts); drafted with Franklin assistance

Early 2002: Luti and another DOD official tell Rhode activity had been shut off

April 2002: "Executive referral" from OSD to Defense HUMINT to meet with Ledeen

May 10, 2002: Newt Gingrich faxes Ledeen memo to Rumsfeld

June 27, 2002: Rumsfeld documented as having read Ledeen memo (DOD claims the memo "passed through" Rumsfeld’s office)

July 4, 2002: Ledeen contacts Sembler about further meetings with Ghobanifar in Italy

July 13, 2002: Wolfowitz assistant tells Rodman Tenet supported contacts; Charles Allen to coordinate

July 15, 16, 2002: CIA cables on meeting

July 18, 2002: Sembler alerts Marc Grossman that Ledeen contacted him on July 4 regarding further meetings in Rome in August

July 19, 2002: Rodman action memo (citing multi-million dollar business deals) in response to Ledeen memo recommends ongoing contact with CIA coordination

July 25, 2002: Feith reviews Rodman action memo

July 25, 2002: CIA cable reflecting Powell’s lack of approval for contacts

August 8, 2002: CIA cable reflecting NSC legal advisor stating Hadley had "chastised" Ledeen for ongoing efforts on this matter

August 15, 2002: Franklin returns Steve Rosen contact about discussing Iran

August 21, 2002: Franklin and Rosen postpone meeting

September 4, 2002: Sembler in DC told Ledeen’s activities would not continue

December 2002: Rhode has "chance meeting" with Iranians while attending Iraqi opposition conference in London; Rhode informs his supervisor of meeting, but does not document it

January 2003: Pat Roberts becomes Chair of SSCI

February 12, 2003: Franklin and Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman discuss draft internal policy document regarding "Middle Eastern country"

March 13, 2003: Rosen discloses information on policy document to "senior fellow" at DC think tank (Ledeen?)

March 17, 2003: Franklin faxes Rosen contents of appendix from internal policy document

March 18, 2003: Rosen leaks details of policy document to WaPo’s Michael Dobbs, saying "I’m not supposed to know this"

April 2003: Iran proposes re-establishing relations; US rejects proposal because Iranian government "on the verge of collapse"

May 3, 2003: US and Iran in negotiations in Geneva

May 7, 2003: Rhode apparently stages "find" of anti-Israel materials in Iraq (and uranium document) with Ahmed Chalabi; Judy Miller reports it

Late May, 2003: Ledeen sends new letter outlining Ghorbanifar plan to Feith, including promise of finding "Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that had been moved to Iran"

May 21, 2003: US cancels Geneva meeting with Iran, accusing Iran of harboring Al Qaeda leaders

May 25, 2003: Report (quoting Rummy elsewhere) that US considering using MEK to launch attack on Iran

June 2, 2003: Feith forwards Ledeen letter to Cambone; "let’s discuss"

June 2003: While in Istanbul at conference on US/Turkish relations, two Middle East experts from OVP asks Rhode to meet with Iranian Professor, Palestinian, and others in Paris in lieu of them

June 15, 2003: WaPo publishes article based on policy document leaked on March 18; the article quotes both Ledeen and Leverett

June 26, 2003: Franklin meets with Rosen and Weissman, gives information about potential attacks in US troops in Iraq

June 28, 2003: Feith writes letter to Pat Roberts on "the cell set up in his office to review intelligence"

June 30 and July 1, 2003: While in Paris filling in for OVP employees, Rhode meets with Ghorbanifar (Ledeen arranges meeting)

July 14, 2003: Roberts informs Tenet that he met with Ledeen "at the urging of Senators Santorum, Kyl and Brownback"; Roberts asks Tenet for comment

July 2003: FBI begins investigation of Larry Franklin

August 2003: DOD IG Rome review

August 2003: Rhode continues to receive contacts from Ghorbanifar

August 6, 2003: Ledeen meets with several DOD intelligence figures to "discuss a source who knew where enriched uranium was buried in Iraq"; Ghorbanifar was conduit to this source

August 8, 2003: Newsday reports on Paris meeting

August 9, 2003: WaPo reports on Rome and Paris meeting

August 9, 2003: Rhode recalled from Iraq, where he had been liaising with Ahmad Chalabi

August 9, 2003: According to Ledeen, Rhode and Franklin ordered to stop talking to Ledeen about Iran; Franklin and Rodman do not recall such an order

August 11, 2003: Rodman prepares chronology of Iran contacts for Rumsfeld, leaving out details of June 2003 Paris meeting because it "[took] place without the knowledge" of DOD International Security Affairs or Policy

Before 2003 (unspecified): Franklin’s faxed correspondence with Ghorbanifar destroyed

September 11, 2003: Rumsfeld requests details from Wolfowitz, nothing Powell and Rice interested in response; Wolfowitz writes memo

September 2003: Wolfowitz instructs Rodman to make clear to Rhode to get "potentially sensitive contacts with foreigners approved by Policy."

September 19, 2003: At request of Wolfowitz and Feith, Cambone orders CIFA review of Ghorbanifar contacts

September 23, 2003: CIA response to Pat Roberts on Ledeen’s information stating, "none of these leads has resulted in information of significant intelligence value."

September 25, 2003: CIFA interview of Rhode

Early October 2003: Possible Rhode meeting with Ghorbanifar in Rome

October 2003: SSCI reviews Rome meetings but does not yet add it into Iraq intelligence review

October 21, 2003: Cambone orders CIFA investigation halted; report notes:

Pursuant to direction from the offices of DoD General Counsel [Haynes] and USD(I) [Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Cambone] the inquiry has been limited in scope. The inquiry has been restricted to interviews of some of the principal DoD personalities identified in news articles as being associated with this matter and their supervisors, review of material voluntarily provided by interviewees, review of all records from DoD agencies, and open source information.

Analysis of the information obtained by this limited scope inquiry, suggests there are several interviews of people both internal to DoD and external to DoD that have not been completed and would likely corroborate and/or enhance the information obtained to date. Analysis also suggests there are records and information possessed by the CIA that would likely corroborate and/or enhance the information obtained to date. The offices of the USD(I) and DoD General Counsel have advised CIFA not to conduct the key interviews CIFA has recommended. The DoD Office of General Counsel has not forwarded CIFA’s letter to the CIA, which was drafted dof DoD General Counsel review and dissemination.

The report lists five unresolved issues:

• A National Security Counsel staff report of a possible third meeting between Mr. Rhode and Mr. Ghorbanifar in early October 2003
• The lack of follow-up with the CIA
• The lack of understanding of the role of the Office of Vice President or the role of the National Security Counsel in the Rome and Paris meetings
• No independent corroboration of the information or timelines provided by DoD personnel involved in the two known meetings with Mr. Ghorbanifar
• The lack of information on the involvement of the foreign government in the Rome meeting

October 24, 2003: Franklin tells a foreign official that work on the policy document had been stopped

October 29, 2003: SSCI staff meeting with DOD officials

October 29, 2003: State Department ready to resume negotiations with Iran

February 2004: SSCI adds OUSD(P) activities into scope of Iraq intelligence review

February 2004: DOD puts together chronology of meeting including inaccurate description of June 2003 Ghorbanifar meeting (basically hiding the role of OVP personnel)

April 16, 2004: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs letter backgrounding the meeting; the letter hides the role of OVP in the meeting

April 20, 2004: Harold Rhode interview with SSCI

April 21, 2004: Michael Ledeen interview with SSCI, claims he learned of Paris meeting by "read[ing] about it in the papers"

April 23, 2004: Larry Franklin interview with SSCI

May 2004: FBI catches Franklin leaking sensitive information and flips him

May 20, 2004: US raids Chalabi’s Iraqi compound

June 2, 2004: NYT reports that Chalabi alerted Iran that US had SigInt code

June 8, 2004: SSCI staff imterview with DIA employees

June 10, 2004: SSCI staff interviews former DIA Director Wilson

July 9, 2004: Franklin passes information on US intelligence about Middle Eastern country to Weissman

July 21, 2004: Franklin passes on information about foreign government’s covert actions in Iraq to Weissman

August 3, 2004: FBI contacts Weissman and Rosen

August 24, 2004: State Department QFRs

Week of August 22, 2004: FBI interviews American not in government about Franklin

An American not in government who was interviewed by the FBI last week described the line of questioning as a "fishing expedition" that did not include any mention of Franklin or Iran.

The FBI appeared more concerned about people this person knows who were looking for access to intelligence or classified information.

"I was left startled that in a town of award-winning journalists, law enforcement officials were asking if anyone I knew might be interested in classified information," the person said. "It was a fishing expedition. It was an extremely odd conversation."

August 27, 2004: Rosen and Weissman interviewed by FBI; Rosen warns Israeli of investigation 

August 27, 2004: News of AIPAC investigation leaked; Paul McNulty put in charge of case

August 29-20, 2004: Feith, Luti, Rodman interviewed about whether they had authorized Franklin’s leaks to AIPAC

September-October 2004: Through Michael Ledeen’s intercession, Plato Cacheris agrees to represent Franklin pro bono

May 3, 2005: Franklin charged with espionage in sealed complaint

August 2005: Feith leaves DOD

September 2005: Roberts requests DOD IG investigation into "unlawful" activities of OUSD(P)

September 2005: Levin requests DOD IG investigation into "improper" activities of OUSD(P)

November 1, 2005: Harry Reid shuts down Senate in effort to restart Phase II

November 2005: DOD OIG begins investigation into Feith, stalling the SSCI investigation into Feith

January 2006: Jello Jay becomes Chair SSCI (Pat Roberts quits Committee, Kit Bond becomes Ranking Member)

January 2006: Franklin sentenced

July 13, 2006; Patton Boggs writes letter to DOD IG on behalf of Feith

February 2007: DOD OIG report on Feith’s intelligence analysis

March 6, 2007: DOD OIG report on involvement with the Rendon group

July 2007: SSCI asks DOD for details on content of and response to CIFA investigation; receives nothing

September 2007: Jello Jay asks DOD for copies of CIFA materials; receives nothing

2007: Rhode refuses to interview with SSCI

September 27, 2007: SSCI interviews Rodman

October 3, 2007: SSCI interviews Franklin

October 22, 2007: CIA QFR on Iranians at the meeting

October 24, 2007: Ledeen interview, admits he may have arranged Paris Ghorbanifar meeting

November 28 , 2007: CIA QFR on Iranians at meeting

December 19, 2007: Staff interview of DIA Analyst (about whether Iranians identified were real)

March 10, 2008: Phone interview with Tenet

March 12, 2008: DOD QFR on Rhode, Ledeen

The sun always dawns a new day, and so it has again. The day after a disappointing yesterday. Possibly we get so wrapped up in all the swirling malevolence and scorched trail of destruction by the Administration that is Cheney/Bush, the ravenous corporate robber plunderers, and the feeble enabling Democratic Leadersheep, that we forget that there is still a whole lot that is good, that still maintains, and that is worth feeling warm and fuzzy about and fighting for. Let’s all remember that it does maintain and, as Roberto Benigni would say, Life Is Beautiful.

Marcy is going to take a couple of days off to chill, do some gardening, and have a couple of pints of Beamish with Mr. Wheel. Good, she deserves it. She puts absolutely a ton of heart and effort into both this blog and the common effort as a whole. I probably don’t have to tell you this, but she does a heck of a lot more than you see on the surface, and we are all better for it. And I can tell you, in fact, I think you all personally know from your own passion, that the constant battle seeps inside of you and can consume a great deal of your soul along the way. Disappointment burns, and sometimes you just need to step back so you can realize the tremendous value and beauty of all that you are fighting for.

So, I will be minding the store for the weekend. Marcy may drop by, she may not, but trust me she knows we are all here; and I assure you she is having some much needed fun (and pulling weeds from the yard is way fun!), is working on some great stuff, and will be back Monday and raring to go. In the meantime, I will put up some substantive posts here and there and all here should feel free to use this post, and any this weekend, as a free floating discussion forum on whatever is of interest. If there is anything uniquely significant, then we will deal with that too.

Lastly, several people turned off their cloaking devices and delurked in the last couple of days to say hi and relate their thoughts. That is a good thing. If you are smart enough, and passionate enough, to read this blog religiously, you are plenty good to contribute. Myself excluded, there are some of the finest minds available that participate here, and from some incredibly diverse backgrounds. We are all strong and opinionated people, and there are no sacred lambs that cannot be picked apart, not even Marcy, and certainly not me. From the outside looking in, it might seem sharp elbowed, testy and intimidating. But that is true only from the analytical perspective, not the compassionate. Everyone’s theories, positions, thought and comments are subject to the scrutiny; as well they should be. That is why this, overall, is the best, most rational, and most elegant blog in the blogosphere. If I do say so myself; and I do. It is because of you. All of you. So if you are a regular but have been hesitant to jump in, hop to it. You will be fine and we will all be better as a result.

To quote the type of leader we could have used in the last couple of days, Jean Luc Picard, "Engage!"

Well, we got Mr. Obama’s reply to all of us. Everybody has a lot to say to Mr. Obama. Here is the place. Now is the time. Trash talk is allowed. I heard the Lakers, er Celtics just won something. Also heard Curt Schilling is done, how the Sawx gonna win without him? And hey circus freak, the French Grand Prix is this weekend. Migny-Cours is the track? Chat away.

To my letter to him. He told me to fuck off.

Statement of Senator Barack Obama on FISA Compromise

Given the grave threats that we face, our national security agencies must have the capability to gather intelligence and track down terrorists before they strike, while respecting the rule of law and the privacy and civil liberties of the American people. There is also little doubt that the Bush Administration, with the cooperation of major telecommunications companies, has abused that authority and undermined the Constitution by intercepting the communications of innocent Americans without their knowledge or the required court orders.

That is why last year I opposed the so-called Protect America Act, which expanded the surveillance powers of the government without sufficient independent oversight to protect the privacy and civil liberties of innocent Americans. I have also opposed the granting of retroactive immunity to those who were allegedly complicit in acts of illegal spying in the past.

After months of negotiation, the House today passed a compromise that, while far from perfect, is a marked improvement over last year’s Protect America Act.

Under this compromise legislation, an important tool in the fight against terrorism will continue, but the President’s illegal program of warrantless surveillance will be over. It restores FISA and existing criminal wiretap statutes as the exclusive means to conduct surveillance – making it clear that the President cannot circumvent the law and disregard the civil liberties of the American people. It also firmly re-establishes basic judicial oversight over all domestic surveillance in the future. It does, however, grant retroactive immunity, and I will work in the Senate to remove this provision so that we can seek full accountability for past offenses. But this compromise guarantees a thorough review by the Inspectors General of our national security agencies to determine what took place in the past, and ensures that there will be accountability going forward. By demanding oversight and accountability, a grassroots movement of Americans has helped yield a bill that is far better than the Protect America Act.

It is not all that I would want. But given the legitimate threats we face, providing effective intelligence collection tools with appropriate safeguards is too important to delay. So I support the compromise, but do so with a firm pledge that as President, I will carefully monitor the program, review the report by the Inspectors General, and work with the Congress to take any additional steps I deem necessary to protect the lives – and the liberty – of the American people.

In case you couldn’t parse the three bolded sentences yourself, here’s my take on them.

1. I will make a showy effort in the Senate on Monday to get them to take out immunity. I will lose that effort 32-65. But hey! I can say I tried!
2. But don’t worry, little boys and girls, Inspectors General are an adequate replacement for our third co-equal branch of government!
3. Nice little bloggers! Aren’t you cute! After you demanded accountability we gave you piggy lipstick and fig leaves and told you it was time to move on while we important Senators told you–in polite terms–to fuck off.

I confess to being underwhelmed with the work HJC did with Scott McClellan’s appearance before the committee today. I’ll do a post later (once I’ve recovered from a terrible day for Democracy) on what I think was missed. But I’ll start with the positive–what I consider the highlights of the hearing.

Conyers started the hearing right, IMO, by introducing the meat-grinder note, showing that as Cheney was pressuring Bush to have Libby exonerated, Cheney was thinking of Bush’s order that Libby "put his neck in the meat-grinder." Conyers also made the case–which I made here–that Mukasey should turn over the reports from the Bush and Cheney interviews (doing anything else is really cooperating the ongoing attempts to cover-up the Libby case). Of course, HJC could have made a more compelling case that it needs the reports had they don’t a better job of explaining why the reports would be the only way to answer urgent questions about the leaks. But, aside from Chairman Conyers, no one on the committee made a concerted effort to present the abundant evidence that Cheney and Bush were involved in the leak of Plame’s identity. For example, when Jerrold Nadler asked McClellan whether Bush and Cheney had any knowledge of Libby’s involvement in the leak, he didn’t introduce that evidence that Cheney, at least, did, and Bush may have as well.

NADLER: Do you know when the president gave instruction to cover Libby’s rear end, did he know about Libby’s involvement? Scott didn’t know that.

Perhaps the best use of the hearing time came from (unsurprisingly–he usually excels in hearings) Artur Davis. Davis, who is from Don Siegelman’s state, got McClellan to admit that Rove not only would–but has–lied to protect himself from legal jeopardy and political embarrassment.

Artur Davis Let me circle around a person, Rove. You stated Rove encouraged you to repeat a lie. Indicated you’ve known him for some time. Committee extended invitation to Rove. I’m willing to talk, only if no oath, no cameras, no notes. Based on what you know does it surprise you that Rove wants limitations on circumstances.

SM An effort to stonewall the whole process.

Davis Would you trust Rove to tell the truth if not under oath.

SM Can’t say I would

Davis Not under oath.

SM I would hope he would. I’d have concerns about that.

Davis Did testify before GJ under oath. You don’t believe he told the complete truth to the GJ.

SM I don’t know.

Davis Karl only concerned about protecting himself from possible legal action. Do you believe he is capable of lying to protect himself from legal jeopardy.

SM He certainly lied to me.

Davis Do you believe he is capable of lying to protect himself from political embarrassment.

SM he did in my situation, so the answer is yes. [my emphasis]

While this may not help the Plame-related oversight, it’s an important admission, especially as HJC moves to get Rove to testify to the committee about Siegelman and other related issues.

Hank Johnson did a good job of getting McClellan to admit that the Libby commutation was unusual and could rightly raise suspicions about why Bush had commuted Libby’s sentence.

Hank Johnson Over 5000 requests for commutation. Of those, prior to Libby, Bush granted 3 petitions for commutation. He actually denied 4108 of those, others closed without presidential action. Reluctance to grant mercy is consistent with Bush’s conduct wrt death penalty cases. All of a sudden we’ve got White House confidant Libby. An attempt to silence Libby. A misleading of American public. On the same day that Libby found out that Appeals Court would not reverse the judge’s decision, Bush issued a commutation, without consultation of his own DOJ he decided to issue consultation of that prison sentence. Do you believe that?

SM I can understand why people view it that way.

Johnson Any reason to think that would not be reasonable scenario.

SM We haven’t had any answers to those questions.

Finally, one other good use of the hearing was unrelated to Plame: when Betty Sutton got McClellan to admit that Cheney’s rationale for the war may have been a desire to get control over Iraq’s oil.

Sutton VP may have viewed removal of Saddam opportunity to give US more control over Iraq’s oil reserves.

SM Hard to know what VP’s rationale was. If Iraq didn’t have large reserves, wouldn’t have been on the national security radar.

Sutton Anything specific?

SM VP’s involvement in energy issues.

Well there you have it–confirmation of two things we’ve known all along. Rove is a liar, and Cheney an oil-hungry war-monger.

At least we accomplished that much.

Shoot, they snuck in and restarted the hearing while I was vomiting after the FISA vote. Watch along on CSPAN3 or the HJC feed.

Ric Keller is complaining that Scottie raised Bush’s forgetfulness about his use of cocaine in the book.

Robert Wexler up. Your book raises questions about Admin, avoids accountability. How Scooter revealed identity of Plame. Inconceivable that Libby acted alone. President and VP have denied ordering this leak. You state that you cannot believe Bush ordered the leak. You do not defend Cheney in your book. Why not.

SM He keeps things close. I do not know his involvement. Cloud over VP. There’s a lot of suspicion there. Questions not answered.

RW VP could have authorized the leak.

SM Can’t rule it out.

RW We know Cheney tried to cover up leak. Cheney called you. VP starts to write, President asked Libby to stick neck in meat-grinder. Cheney is the only one left. The only suspect to have ordered the leak. More than enough to open up impeachment hearings. Pardon power to deflect investigation. Would be an abusive crime of highest order. Thank you for exposing some of the lies.

Goodlattte: Were you fired?

SM Three proposals for book.

Goodlatte: number of TV appearances? Should you have raised the allegations in the book earlier?

Linda Sanchez: Firing US Attorneys, pressure US Attorney PatFitz. To your knowledge, when Rove suggest to fire USAs, he had already appeared before GJ in Plame. Aware of conversations about firing Fitz?

SM No

Sanchez Bush’s promise to fire people. What prompted Bush to raise the bar?

SM Rove’s involvement.

Sanchez Who should he have fired?

SM Rove

Sanchez Was Libby involved in getting you to vouch for him in press?

SM Yes. He talked to me, he also did talking points.

Sanchez Campaign to sell war, fall 2002. When did Bush decide US would go to war against Iraq.

SM Late November 2002. (Using Woodward as source.)

Issa Not going to be easy on you not going to be hard on you. It’s a good read. You said you reflected for a period of time before you wrote the book. Had you reacted sooner you could have had an effect on the Administration. If you don’t say anything, you’re not going to have an effect on Administration. Had you reflected until November 5, then had the book come out. Would you have had an effect without affecting the election in process.

[Surprisingly, Issa isn’t making any of the hits he might on intelligence, he’s just whining that McC is going to make the Republicans lose the election.]

Issa Why can’t you be George Will and write the essay early enough to affect the policy debate in real time?

SM I needed to give the full context.

Issa Not a timely fashion to affect this administration.

SM It could.

Issa My statement will stand. (Shorter Issa; the Administration is not going to start telling the truth now.) Next Administration will put a spokesperson. What guidance? Not part of spin? Report only prepared statement?

Sheila Jackson Lee Proud of you as a fellow Texas. Series of questions. Have you been paid to come to this hearing. Oath seriously? Truth? Distinguish payments made for book and willingness to come before us? Do you believe that Pres in instances of sincerity or belief misrepresented to American people facts? Iraq war?

SM less than candid, less than honest.

SJL telling an untruth?

SM Not completely truthful

SJL Hearings that would be in context of impeachment would be warranted on basis of untruth

SM Do not support impeachment

SJL instances of untruth being spoken.

SM Permanent campaign

SJL Wilson. Prior to leak of Plame’s status, did you participate in discussion about Wilson and charges he had made?

SM Not directly involved. Talking points.

SJL What did you represent to public?

SM Still Deputy PS.

SJL Was Wilson treated fairly?

SM Wrong to start with anonymous effort to discredit him.

SJL Issue with Libby with issue of leaking. Intentional action inside White House?

SM I don’t think President involved. In terms of intentional effort with Libby? A lot of suspicion.

SJL Leak did generate out of WH

SM At least three from WH

SJL Do American people need an airing?

SM Better to have the truth. Suspicion wouldn’t be there. Bad strategy to keep info from public.

SJL WMD became singular prong to be frightened into conceding to war on Iraq. How much misrepresentation of threat of WMD?

SM Massive marketing effort on WMD and Al Qaeda. Reality not as urgent or serious as potrayed.

Lungren What your purpose is, being here? Not subpoenaed?

SM To shed light on this episode.

Lungren My colleagues refer to impeachment 4 different times. Impeachment off table. Whether what we’re doing is Kucinich light? Asking you questions and extrapolate statements that members can infer lead to impeachment. You’re not here for this purpose?

SM No.

Lungren Not here in AUMF on Iraq. Violation of sovereignty of Kuwait. [yadda yadda yadda, other reasons we went to war]

SM Larger chief rationale were WMD and Al Qaeda. Where the emphasis was. Senate Intelligence Committee reflected that in recent report.

Steve Cohen Bush came with great potential. What events or people led him astray.

SM Saw this that the Washington game is played. Partly based on what he saw happen with his father.

Cohen VP put on team bc of experience in Washington. Was VP most responsible for deterring Bush from being great President.

SM Some negative influences, including VP. I don’t know if I could judge between Cheney and Rove. Cheney foreign policy and economic, Rove political operation.

Cohen Any decisions or people that used blackberries so as to not

SM I knew people who had RNC emails. I believe I would have sent emails to both of Rove’s accounts.

Cohen Any policies to avoid govt oversight? Indirectly?

SM No.

Cohen Focus on Iran?

SM Views of people within the Admin pretty well known.

Cohen President no funerals of soldiers killed. Privvy to any discussions of why not.

SM He didn’t want to pick or choose one funeral over another.

Cohen Previous Presidents attended funerals. So there was a decision to attend none?

SM Where do you draw the line? That’s the way he decided to approach it.

Cohen When did he give up golf?

SM No discussion of it.

Cohen Swiftboating Kerry?

SM I wouldn’t have been involved?

Cohen Firing USAs?

SM After I left.

Cohen What did people edit out of book that we should know about? You said number of civilian casualties you should have spoken up. What else?

SM Lockstep on policy, You’re not encouraged to speak up about it.

Tom Feeny Regardless of motives, inference and speculation. In terms of speculation and opinion. When press secretary goes out, shortly after leaves WH, this book will set precedent for Press Secretaries to have more or less access to what behind decision making.

SM If they take the right lessons, more access.

Feeny Did the President have any knowledge of Libby or Rove.

SM I don’t believe so based on my conversations with the President.

Delahunt I don’t think McC is suggesting we share info with the enemy. Important to share info with American people. Much for all of us to learn. What struck me the most was your statement, Bush Administration lacked real accountability bc Bush did not embrace openness. I concur with that. This committee and my own have had constant problems. Currently a significant international agreement discussed between Iraq and US, significant implications, despite their own rules, there has been zero, 1/100 consultation with Congress. Secret declassification that no one else knew about. Is this how we operate a democracy.

SM One of the problems, how compartmentalized.

Delahunt You and Paul O’Neill come after the election to give an account of the process?

Steve King I pray we’ll never be a democracy, I pray it remains a representative govt. Mistake or lie. "The British govt has learned" blah blah blah. Mistake or lie?

SM I think President thought it to be credible. I don’t know what every individual knew as they passed it on.

King CIA report from Wilson. This report directly contradicts Joseph C Wilson. References Ibrahim Mayaki.

SM I don’t know if I’ve seen it before. In October 2002, CIA Director said take out Niger information.

King Recognizing backpedaling on part of WH. If you had to trust Wilson or Bush, where would you put your trust. What is your advice to your successors. At what point they should tell the world. Does Pres have to put Press Sec into cubicle. Could you not have taken some of this to the grave with you and done the country a favor.

Hank Johnson Over 5000 requests for commutation. Of those, prior to Libby, Bush granted 3 petitions for commutation. He actually denied 4108 of those, others closed without presidential action. Reluctance to grant mercy is consistent with Bush’s conduct wrt death penalty cases. All of a sudden we’ve got White House confidant Libby. An attempt to silence Libby. A misleading of American public. On the same day that Libby found out that Appeals Court would not reverse the judge’s decision, Bush issued a commutation, without consultation of his own DOJ he decided to issue consultation of that prison sentence. Do you believe that?

SM I can understand why people view it that way.

Johnson Any reason to think that would not be reasonable scenario.

SM We haven’t had any answers to those questions.

Johnson Lament permanent campaign culture. What were real strategic motives in misleading us into war in Iraq.

SM In president’s view, transform Middle East.

Johnson Any mention of vast oil reserves?

SM No

Betty Sutton War only when necessary, Iraq not necessary. Did war become inevitable?

SM Yes.

Sutton Talk about momentum.None of negative repercussions considered. Any discussions about cost and lost life?

SM Lindsey’s comment

Sutton Did you ever become aware of those discussions.

SM Not something emphasized.

Sutton Not about making the case. Any concern about what would be unacceptable loss of life?

SM No.

Sutton VP may have viewed removal of Saddam opportunity to give US more control over Iraq’s oil reserves.

SM Hard to know what VP’s rationale was. If Iraq didn’t have large reserves, wouldn’t have been on the national security radar.

Sutton Anything specific?

SM VP’s involvement in energy issues.

Brad Sherman Not on how Valerie Plame’s name exposed, but why. Goal to discredit Wilson. Question legitimacy of how he was selected. Another to punish him. Did anyone make the statement that VP revealed to teach Wilson a lesson or VP’s name revealed to undermine credibility of Wilson.

SM Undermine credibility.

Sherman Nov 2004 Gitmo detainees treated humanely. When did you learn that waterboarding being used?

SM Maybe after I left, discussion beforehand. In terms of my knowledge, I was using Admin talking points.

Sherman So long as you were PS, you thought they were being treated humanely. A few occasions where info turned out false. I wonder whether any occasions not revealed where statements false or misleading.

SM I think I included everything.

Sherman Any advice on how to reduce partisan nature.

SM Embrace of openness and forthrightness.

Artur Davis Let me circle around a person, Rove. You stated Rove encouraged you to repeat a lie. Indicated you’ve known him for some time. Committee extended invitation to Rove. I’m willing to talk, only if no oath, no cameras, no notes. Based on what you know does it surprise you that Rove wants limitations on circumstances.

SM An effort to stonewall the whole process.

Davis Would you trust Rove to tell the truth if not under oath.

SM Can’t say I would

Davis Not under oath.

SM I would hope he would. I’d have concerns about that.

Davis Did testify before GJ under oath. You don’t believe he told the complete truth to the GJ.

SM I don’t know.

Davis Karl only concerned about protecting himself from possible legal action. Do you believe he is capable of lying to protect himself from legal jeopardy.

SM He certainly lied to me.

Davis Do you believe he is capable of lying to protect himself from political embarrassment.

SM he did in my situation, so the answer is yes.

Davis: Admin came up with reasons to go to war. So conscious of spin, that it would shade facts. You know this committee has been investigating USAs. Is the Bush Administration capable of coming up with false cover story.

SM Hesitate, no direct knowledge. No broad sweeping statement.

Davis if it were suggested that Admin come up with cover story to conceal its true motives. Have you seen them do that before.

SM In VP Leak episode, instead of hidnig behind cover of legal proceedings, interested in stonewalling.

Davis WRT Rove, allegations Rove may have attempted to influence prosecution of at least one person. How long have you known Rove?

SM Early 90s.

Davis Sense of politics and people on other side?

SM Bare-knuckled politics.

Davis Capable of influencing prosecution.

SM Hesitate to speculate.

Davis Delahunt, to announce that no criticism of president, unpatriotic and servile. Teddy Roosevelt. I end with that bc I suspect there are some who tell you you read yourself out of your party. There is another tradition in Republican party.

Tammy Baldwin: Bush came to Washington and playing game by existing rules rather than transforming them. President intentionally broken the rules. I mean laws and Constitution. I believe his conduct raises serious questions in relation to principle elements of democracy. How were you prepped for briefings with the Press. With whom did you speak? For example, the war, Abu Ghraib? Potus and VP?

SM Depends on situation, sometimes directly with Potus, sometimes getting info from policy person. Or participate in meetings.

Baldwin Do you believe you were used to intentionally mislead.

SM Part of permanent campaign. Washington accepts spin and manipulation.

Baldwin During tenure stated on more than one occasion, President does not condone torture. Care to comment on torture.

SM Would not make today knowing what I know today. Relying on assurances from others.

Baldwin Were you intentionally used to mislead the public.

SM Certain individuals who believe those words are the case.

Baldwin Any conversations in violation of federal law, not obstruction or perjury.

SM No direct knowledge.

Franks There’s a feeling in my heart that if you thought you were misleading, you should have spoken up at that time. I’m having a real struggle about that. Comments in your book, Fleischer, something doesn’t make sense. Not once did Scott approach me with misgivings. If you really thought you were doing something that was wrong, that was the time to say it.

SM Buildup to war, given Admin benefit to doubt. My role was to speak to the President, not for myself. In regards to intelligence, not a question of whether pressured, how it was used, that was a problem. Not open about caveats, case was greatly overstated.

Franks In your original book proposal, fairness is defined by establishment media. Defend their reporting as fair bc both sides covered. In your book you state differently.

SM I talk about these issues on bipartisanship. I was looking to put responsibility everywhere else but where it belonged.

Franks Very simple, do you believe Bush is honest and decent man.

SM Decent man. [did not say honest]

Wasserman Schultz Wasn’t the crime, but the coverup. The real crime the way the war was packaged. Reference to Bush’s philosophy to coercive democracy. Do you think there was a conclusion at the outset, fit facts to convince public and press and Congress that Saddam imminent threat. Who involved in deception, who distortion?

SM Can’t get in the heads.

Wasserman-Schultz  A minute ago implied some did not intentionally deceive.

SM I can’t rule that out.

W-S Who can you indicated engaged in deception.

SM No direct knowledge.

W-S You musth have an idea.

SM No direct knowledge.

W-S DO you think that Karl Rove lied to the President. Do you think Cheney lied?

SM Rove, yes.

W-S Rove lied on other policy matters.

SM We’d have to go on issues.

W-S who should be brought before this committee,

SM VP, not shared publicly. SL, Rove, Fleischer, others that have not shared everything.  It would be a benefit if everything was known.

Ellison Has this damaged some of your personal relationships

SM Yes

Ellison Some people not talking to you

SM And a number still good friends

Ellison other lucrative opportunities, just trying to help your country.  What are the lessons here?

Ellison Part of solution active Congress?

SM White House committed to government in sunshine willing to be accountable to the people

Ellison Circle the wagons. Tolerance for dissident points of view.

SM Once policy set, not tolerance for different views.

Ellison Daniel Levin, Do you know him? Rewrote Addington or Yoo

SM  Dealt with Counsel’s office on that.

Ellison Addington and Yoo gave license to these enhanced interrogation methods. Any conversations before drafting of policies.

SM No I shared it.

Conyers: A week to submit for the record.

Senator Obama:

In his recent opinion on the Boumediene case, conservative Justice Anthony Kennedy reminded the Executive and Legislative branches that we cannot suspend the Constitution in times of crisis.

The laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of the law. The Framers decided that habeas corpus, a right of first importance, must be a part of that framework, a part of that law.

He went on to remind "the political branches" that the Article III Courts must not be turned into a mere rubber stamp for the Executive Branch–particularly when, as with habeas corpus, those Courts review laws designed to serve as a check on the Executive Branch.

For the writ of habeas corpus, or its substitute, to function as an effective and proper remedy in this context, the court that conducts the habeas proceeding must have the means to correct errors that occurred during the CSRT proceedings. This includes some authority to assess the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence against the detainee. It also must have the authority to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that was not introduced during the earlier proceeding.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court found aspects of the Military Commissions Act unconstitutional because it tried to limit the review of Article III Courts to mere review of whether the Administration had complied with its own procedures, and not a real review of the legality of the detention of men at Gitmo.

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction not to inquire into the legality of the detention generally but only to assess whether the CSRT complied with the “standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense” and whether those standards and procedures are lawful.

Yet this is precisely the kind of procedural review that the current FISA bill envisions. The "political branches" are attempting to limit court review of wiretaps on Americans to a procedural review in three ways:

• The Court can only certify that the current Attorney General has claimed the warrantless wiretap program was legal; it cannot assess the representations to the telecoms, nor review the legality of the underlying program.
• The Court can only approve the procedures planned in a given wiretap program, it cannot review whether the actual program is legal.
• The Court can only review proposed minimization procedures intended to protect US persons’ data; it cannot review whether the Administration is actually following its own minimization procedures.

The Courts’ role in protecting Americans’ Fourth Amendment rights is just as important a check on unrestrained executive power as its review of habeas corpus. After all, the Fourth Amendment, just like habeas corpus, is a foundational principle of this country designed to guard against the abuse of power familiar before our Forefathers revolted against the rule of Kings. As Justice Kennedy said, we cannot suspend these principles simply because the country faces a crisis.

Senator Obama, you are asking voters to choose you to become the President of the United States. You had to as Senator–and will as President–swear an oath to protect and defend the Constitution.

You cannot remain silent on this issue and at the same time fulfill your promise, the one you have made, and the one you will make, to defend the Constitution. Remaining silent rejects the separation of powers. Remaining silent presumes that the "political branches" can simply legislate the Courts into submission. And remaining silent communicates that you–the next President of the United States–believes checks on executive power like habeas corpus and the Fourth Amendment are mere niceties and not foundational principles of this great nation.

As the presumptive leader of the Democratic Party, you can lead your fellow Senators in rejecting this unconstitutional law. But without your leadership, the Constitution will suffer a dangerous blow.

ABC reports something that had been somewhat clear for some time. Daniel Levin was ousted from the Office of Legal Counsel after he wrote a memo that limited the use of torture.

Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, now under investigation for allegedly politicizing the Justice Department, ousted a top lawyer for failing to adopt the administration’s position on torture and then promised him a position as a U.S. attorney to placate him, highly placed sources tell ABC News.

Gonzales, who was just taking over as attorney general, asked Justice Department lawyer Daniel Levin to leave in early 2005, shortly after Levin wrote a legal opinion that declared "torture is abhorrent" and limited the administration’s use of harsh interrogation techniques.

At the time, Levin was in the middle of drafting a second, critical memo that analyzed the legality of specific interrogation techniques, like waterboarding.

Gonzales, however, was concerned about how it would be perceived if Levin were ousted immediately after issuing the opinion — and just before he finished another — so he offered Levin a less significant job outside the Department of Justice at the National Security Council, sources tell ABC News.

[snip]

Levin took the NSC job in March 2005. The U.S. attorney position never materialized, and sources close to Levin say he never believed Gonzales was serious.

As ABC points out, Kyle Sampson floated Levin’s name to replace Kevin Ryan in San Francisco.

But what ABC only hints at is what happened next: the trial run of Stephen Bradbury for the position of OLC head. Within months after Levin was ousted, we know, Bradbury wrote three new memos on torture, endorsing the combined use of harsh techniques.

When the Justice Department publicly declared torture “abhorrent” in a legal opinion in December 2004, the Bush administration appeared to have abandoned its assertion of nearly unlimited presidential authority to order brutal interrogations.

But soon after Alberto R. Gonzales’s arrival as attorney general in February 2005, the Justice Department issued another opinion, this one in secret. It was a very different document, according to officials briefed on it, an expansive endorsement of the harshest interrogation techniques ever used by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The new opinion, the officials said, for the first time provided explicit authorization to barrage terror suspects with a combination of painful physical and psychological tactics, including head-slapping, simulated drowning and frigid temperatures.

Mr. Gonzales approved the legal memorandum on “combined effects” over the objections of James B. Comey, the deputy attorney general, who was leaving his job after bruising clashes with the White House. Disagreeing with what he viewed as the opinion’s overreaching legal reasoning, Mr. Comey told colleagues at the department that they would all be “ashamed” when the world eventually learned of it. [my emphasis]

And see here for another of Bradbury’s early torture opinions.

As the NYT points out, Bradbury wrote these memos during a period that Harriet Miers considered a trial run for Bradbury, basically to see whether Bradbury would give the Administration precisely the opinions it wanted.

Among his first tasks at the Justice Department was to find a trusted chief for the Office of Legal Counsel. First he informed Daniel Levin, the acting head who had backed Mr. Goldsmith’s dissents and signed the new opinion renouncing torture, that he would not get the job. He encouraged Mr. Levin to take a position at the National Security Council, in effect sidelining him.

Mr. Bradbury soon emerged as the presumed favorite. But White House officials, still smarting from Mr. Goldsmith’s rebuffs, chose to delay his nomination. Harriet E. Miers, the new White House counsel, “decided to watch Bradbury for a month or two. He was sort of on trial,” one Justice Department official recalled.

So not only did the Administration oust Daniel Levin, knowing that he wouldn’t authorize torture for them, they held out a kind of quid pro quo to Bradbury, dangling the OLC nomination contingent on these new opinions authorizing inhumane treatment.