Quasi-Governmental Entities AT&T and Verizon Blocking Wikileaks Sites

We know the government is blocking Wikileaks sites: the Air Force, the Library of Congress, the Department of Education, as well as orders from the State Department that its employees should not read the leaked cables.

Which is why I find it so interesting that AT&T and Verizon are blocking Wikileaks sites internally, too. From Greg Mitchell’s liveblog:

Just received email tip from man purporting to be Verizon employee at a headquarters and offering to send screen shots.  Here’s an excerpt:  “Last week, I was browsing several news sites at work when I noticed something strange: any time I tried to read a story about Wikileaks, the site was blocked. Typically, our intranet blocks the usual ‘time-waster’  sites…. In these cases, the entire domain is blocked and any content offered up by that domain on a separate site (such as videos embedded from YouTube) would be blocked on the other site as well.”In this case, though, only specific URLs were being blocked, while the rest of the site was fine. In the screenshots, you can see I can access, for example, the Guardian front page, as well as another, non-Wikileaks related article. But if I tried to go to any of the cable articles, I received the block message…. It appears there’s a blanket URL block for any URL containing the word “wikileaks” no matter what the context. Also, I’ve confirmed with a friend of mine who works for AT&T that they’re doing similar blocking.   I have screen shots available.”  He also claims that a friend at AT & T says same thing going on there.

I wonder whether the block has anything to do with the large amount of domestic and international spying these telecoms do for the government, effectively making them high security quasi-governmental entities. Is it possible that these telecoms are working under governmental orders not to access anything to do with WikiLeaks, in the same way actual governmental agencies have been told that accessing the cables might constitute a security violation.

Maybe we can just find out who is spying for the government based on which companies implement these kinds of blocks on Wikileaks?

[bmaz here – We have received word from a trusted source at AT&T that they are not blocked, at least not consistently or completely; so consider the post so updated]

Throwing our PATRIOT at Assange

Last week, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder admitted what bmaz laid out yesterday — the problems with prosecuting WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange under the Espionage Act. But at the same time, he said, the Espionage Act may play a role in a possible Assange indictment.

“I don’t want to get into specifics here, but people would have a misimpression if the only statute you think that we are looking at is the Espionage Act,” Mr. Holder said Monday at a news conference. “That is certainly something that might play a role, but there are other statutes, other tools that we have at our disposal.”

So even with all the problems in applying the Espionage Act to Assange, Holder is still invoking the provision in his discussion of the “tools that we have at our disposal” to combat Assange.

Legally, the stance could have import beyond the question of whether or not they can indict him.

Consider, for example, this language on the National Security Letter provision of the PATRIOT Act, which allows the FBI, with no court oversight, to require financial service and telecommunications providers to  turn over data pertaining to any investigation the Department of Justice asserts is an espionage investigation:

A wire or electronic communication service provider shall comply with a request for subscriber information and toll billing records information, or electronic communication transactional records in its custody or possession made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under subsection (b) of this section.

The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or his designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director, may—

request the name, address, length of service, and local and long distance toll billing records of a person or entity if the Director (or his designee) certifies in writing to the wire or electronic communication service provider to which the request is made that the name, address, length of service, and toll billing records sought are relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States; [my emphasis]

Or this language from Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which allows the FBI, with FISA Court approval, to require private businesses to secretly turn over a broad range of business records or tangible items pertaining to any investigation DOJ asserts is an espionage investigation.

The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the Director (whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make an application for an order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution. [my emphasis]

Between these two provisions, the government can collect a wide range of information on US persons — things like donations via credit card and server data — simply by claiming the investigation involves spying. They don’t have to even claim there’s a connection between those US persons making those donations or accessing the particular server and the alleged spy. They don’t have to prove that the case involves spying or that they have the ability to indict under the Espionage Act. They only have to claim they are pursuing an authorized — ultimately, the AG does the authorizing — investigation to protect against spying.

Which is what the Attorney General is suggesting here, that they are investigating Assange and the Espionage Act might play a role.

Mind you, they’d also have to claim (to themselves, in the case of the NSL, to FISC in the case of Section 215) that they were collecting data on a US person for reasons above and beyond that person’s First Amendment right to read stuff on the InterToobz or donate to people the government is loosely alleging may be sort of like a spy. Mind you, if the government did collect — say — the names of Americans donating to WikiLeaks via MasterCard or Visa or Paypal, or the names of Americans accessing the WikiLeaks site for the day Amazon hosted it, those people might have a great lawsuit claiming they had been targeted for First Amendment protected activities.

If they ever found out they were targeted.

But of course, we don’t have any way of knowing whether the government decided to use the PATRIOT Act provisions allowing them to collect data on Americans so long as they assert a connection to an Espionage investigation. Because that all remains secret.

Now, I have no idea whether the government is doing this (though I could imagine that if financial service providers like MasterCard and Visa got a really onerous request from DOJ, they might choose to end their relationship with Assange rather than provide ongoing compliance with the DOJ request).

But it seems these PATRIOT provisions are just the tip of the iceberg of potential investigative techniques they could have access to (FISA wiretaps are another) based on the stance that DOJ is investigating Assange for spying, whether or not they ever intend to charge him with spying.

Vampire Squid Pissy about Response to Data Octopus Demands

We’ve discussed US negotiations with Europe over the SWIFT database at length here. Basically, after the Lisbon Treaty went into effect last year, the EU Parliament balked at giving Americans free run of the SWIFT database. The EU and US put an interim agreement in place. Which the EU Parliament then overturned in February. The US then granted EU citizens privacy protections Americans don’t have. But then the US started negotiating unilateral agreements with countries, using the Visa Waiver as blackmail to force individual countries into submission (and, some in Europe suggested, drumming up a terrorist threat to add to the pressure).

Alexander Alvaro, the home affairs spokesman of the Germany’s Free Democratic Party (FDP) in the European Parliament, likened the US demands for data sharing to a “data octopus.”

One of the cables from yesterday’s WikiLeaks dump offers a window into the US perspective on the negotiation, in a cable from the US Embassy to Germany to the Secretary of State’s Office. The cable speaks disparagingly of the FDP.

Germany has become a difficult partner with regards to security-related information sharing initiatives following the September 27 national elections, which brought the FDP into the governing coalition. The FDP sees themselves as defenders of citizens’ privacy rights and these views have led the FDP to oppose many of Germany’s post-9/11 counterterrorism legislative proposals (see reftels). At times, the FDP’s fixation on data privacy and protection issues looks to have come at the expense of the party forming responsible views on counterterrorism policy.

[snip]

The FDP returned to power after a ten-year foray in the opposition and key leaders lack experience in the practical matters of tackling real-world security issues in the Internet age. In our meetings we have made the point that countering terrorism in a globalized world, where terrorists and their supporters use open borders and information technology to quickly move people and financing, requires robust international data sharing. We need to also demonstrate that the U.S. has strong data privacy measures in place so that robust data sharing comes with robust data protections.

So Ambassador Philip Murphy’s office bad mouths a party that had been in opposition for ten years to his colleague–including Hillary Clinton–who had been in opposition for eight, suggesting the Germans were too naive to understand what was good for them.

But there’s one more detail that makes this disdain of those who dislike the data octopus cute.

Before Ambassador Philip Murphy was the DNC’s Finance Chair for its last two years of apparently ignorant opposition, he spent 23 years at the Vampie Squid, Goldman Sachs.

So this amounts to one of the geniuses who crashed the global economy–not least with some pretty tricky international financial flows–badmouthing the Germans for not understanding the crime that can happen using those flows.

We Will Always Be at War against Everyone

As Spencer reported yesterday, the incoming Chair of the House Armed Services Committee Buck McKeon wants to revisit and expand the 2001 AUMF authorizing our war against al Qaeda.

The objective wouldn’t the “drop a new Authorization to Use Military Force, but to reaffirm and strengthen the existing one,” says an aide to McKeon who requested anonymity, “recognizing that the enemy has changed geographically and evolved since 2001.”

I’m thoroughly unsurprised by this. As I pointed out the other day, if we’re going to hold Khalid Sheikh Mohammed solely using the justification of the AUMF, then we’re going to want to make sure that AUMF is designed to last forever; otherwise, KSM would be entitled to get out when–for example–we withdraw from Afghanistan. Frankly, I expect the Administration will be happy to be forced to accept another AUMF, because it’ll get them out of some really terrible arguments they’ve been making as they try to apply the AUMF to detention situations it clearly doesn’t apply to.

But there are two other aspects to a “reaffirmed and strengthened” AUMF. As McKeon’s aide notes, the enemy has changed geographically, moving to Yemen and Somalia. A new AUMF will make it easier to build the new bases in Yemen they’re planning.

The U.S. is preparing for an expanded campaign against al Qaeda in Yemen, mobilizing military and intelligence resources to enable Yemeni and American strikes and drawing up a longer-term proposal to establish Yemeni bases in remote areas where militants operate.

And I would bet that the AUMF is drafted broadly enough to allow drone strikes anywhere the government decides it sees a terrorist.

Which brings us to the most insidious part of a call for a new AUMF: the “homeland.” The AUMF serves or has served as the basis for the government’s expanded powers in the US, to do things like wiretap Americans. Now that the Republicans know all the powers the government might want to use against US persons domestically, do you really think they will resist the opportunity to write those powers into an AUMF (whether through vagueness or specificity), so as to avoid the quadrennial review and debate over the PATRIOT Act (not to mention the oversight currently exercised by DOJ’s Inspector General)? The only matter of suspense, for me, is what role they specify for drones operating domestically…

Remember, John Yoo once wrote an OLC memo claiming that because of the nature of this war the military could operate in the US with no limitations by the Fourth Amendment. That memo remained in effect for seven years. We know where they want to go with this permanent war against terror.

It’s Safer When You Don’t Let the President Reflect for Himself

I am very very grateful that Ryan Grim exposed Bush as a plagiarist on Thursday.

When Crown Publishing inked a deal with George W. Bush for his memoirs, the publisher knew it wasn’t getting Faulkner. But the book, at least, promises “gripping, never-before-heard detail” about the former president’s key decisions, offering to bring readers “aboard Air Force One on 9/11, in the hours after America’s most devastating attack since Pearl Harbor; at the head of the table in the Situation Room in the moments before launching the war in Iraq,” and other undisclosed and weighty locations.

Crown also got a mash-up of worn-out anecdotes from previously published memoirs written by his subordinates, from which Bush lifts quotes word for word, passing them off as his own recollections. He took equal license in lifting from nonfiction books about his presidency or newspaper or magazine articles from the time. Far from shedding light on how the president approached the crucial “decision points” of his presidency, the clip jobs illuminate something shallower and less surprising about Bush’s character: He’s too lazy to write his own memoir.

You see, I was traveling yesterday, and had almost prepared myself to pay full price for Bush’s memoir so I could do a close reading of the Iraq intelligence, torture, and illegal wiretapping bits. But Ryan’s piece gave me a convenient excuse to put that off until I can get the book for a dollar or so online. After all, if I want to read what Bush’s memoir says, I can just go re-read Woodward, right?

But I’m curious whether there’s another reason than the one Ryan suggests–laziness–that explains Bush’s plagiarism.

For some of the sections that appear to be lifted, is it possible that Bush plagiarized the existing carefully crafted narrative of an event to make sure his “memoir” matched that narrative? After all, Karen Hughes and others did a lot of work on those narratives in the first go-around, so why not lift them?

And for passages such as the following one that Ryan suggests may have been lifted, that may be more important given the underlying legal issues.

From Decision Points, p. 105: “In one of our final meetings, I informed Dick that I would not issue a pardon. He stared at me with an intense look. ‘I can’t believe you are going to leave a soldier on the battlefield,’ he said. The comment stung. In eight years, I had never seen Dick like this, or even close to this.”

Or did Bush pull this from Time magazine, “Legacy Fight: Inside Bush and Cheney’s Final Days,” July 24, 2009: “A day later, Cheney gave an interview to a conservative magazine, saying he disagreed with the President’s decision on the Libby pardon. Other Libby backers were quoted in the article, calling Bush ‘dishonorable’ and saying he had left a soldier on the battlefield, language Cheney had used throughout the debate over the pardon.”

After all, the decision not to pardon Libby was made after consulting with his personal defense lawyer, so I imagine Bush wants to get this one right.

Now, granted, Bush admitted to war crimes in his book, so he did exhibit a general lack of caution in his presentation of some of the touchy legal issues dealt with in the book. But unlike Cheney (who has explicitly said that the statute of limitations will have expired on some of the crimes he’ll describe in his upcoming memoir), Bush may well need to finesse these issues.

Feingold

The Senate just lost its most principled member, Russ Feingold. Consider it a beacon of our money- and fearmonger- drenched politics. Feingold was the perfect politician for America as our founders envisioned it. But a terrible politician when seats go to the highest (foreign) bidder or those screaming the loudest about heebie jeebies.

But as with Alan Grayson, I believe Feingold will continue to lead progressives and–especially for Feingold–civil libertarians going forward. Hell, given how corrupt and dysfunctional the Senate his, he may well find a way to be more effective.

But in the meantime, we have lost our biggest check on the assault on civil liberties in this country.

Unconstitutional Surveillance & United States v. United States District Court: Who the Winner is may be a Secret – Part 3

[Part 1 & Part 2 have been the conventional parts of the Keith case analysis. Now we are going to get into areas that involve less what has happened, and more what is happening and opinion as to how what has happened might have an impact, depending upon the arguments raised to the court. So keeping in mind that on the opinion front, you get what you paid for, let’s see where this takes us. To evaluate the impact of the Keith case in a states secrets context, we have to back up and look at the Reynolds case.]

Parameters of the State Secrets Privilege Recognized in the Reynolds’ Case

The Reynolds’ case, United States v. Reynolds took place during World War II. The Government was sued for negligence resulting in the crash of a B-29, killing three civilians. When the families brought a lawsuit for damages, the DOJ sought to block any access to information relating to the crash. After a failed claim that Air Force regulations made the information privileged from disclosure, the Secretary of the Air Force tried a different argument.  He filed a document called a “Claim of Privilege” and, while he made the regulations argument again, this time he added another argument and a few carrots to the widows to try to win the court over:

[The Secretary] then stated that the Government further objected to production of the documents “for the reason that the aircraft in question, together with the personnel on board, were engaged in a highly secret mission of the Air Force.” An affidavit of the Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force, was also filed with the court, which asserted that the demanded material could not be furnished “without seriously hampering national security, flying safety and the development of highly technical and secret military equipment.” The same affidavit offered to produce the three surviving crew members, without cost, for examination by the plaintiffs. The witnesses would be allowed to refresh their memories from any statement made by them to the Air Force, and authorized to testify as to all matters except those of a “classified nature.”

(emph. added)

The District Court ruled that the Government would have to show the court in camera why national security was at risk if the witnesses were given information on how their husbands died. The DOJ countered that it would make witnesses available to the widows to examine, but it was not going to produce documents. The District Court then ruled that the appropriate response to the obstruction of discovery was to treat the issue of negligence as being decided against the Executive. On appeal, the Circuit Court agreed.

Cut now to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court created a privilege (or if you believe in international law ;-) it recognized an exception used in other countries) for the Executive to protect military secrets even in cases where this meant that a litigant would lose their opportunity to pursue a claim against the government. The Court believed that the military testing nature of the information and the fact that we were currently in a state of war counterbalanced the rights of the litigants, especially since they were being provided with the alternative opportunity of interviewing witnesses.

In the instant case we cannot escape judicial notice that this is a time of vigorous preparation for national defense. Experience in the past war has made it common knowledge that air power is one of the most potent weapons in our scheme of defense, and that newly developing electronic devices have greatly enhanced the effective use of air power. It is equally apparent that these electronic devices must be kept secret if their full military advantage is to be exploited in the national interests.

The Court then described the procedures the Executive would need to follow to successfully raise the privilege.

It is not to be lightly invoked.[18] There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter,[19] after actual personal consideration by that officer.[20] The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege,[21] and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.[22]

If such a formal claim of privilege (here, a “Reynolds’ Affidavit”) was filed by the government in a civil setting and there was a chance that military secrets would be revealed, the Reynolds Affidavit procedure could be used to not only bar a court from demanding that the government turn over information, but to prevent the court from ruling that allegations against the government be deemed admitted in light of the failure to provide discovery. Emphasis on the “could” because the court went on to provide a preliminary standard for review for a Reynolds’ Affidavit that involved weighing various interests:

In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake. A fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege, made under the circumstances of this case, will have to prevail.

While the court on the one hand said that “even the most compelling necessity” is outweighed if military secrets are at stake, it still attempted to carve out as an exception cases where the use of the privilege would be “unconscionable,” as in a criminal setting:

Respondents have cited us to those cases in the criminal field, where it has been held that the Government can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free.[27] The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense. Such rationale has no application in a civil forum where the Government is not the moving party, but is a defendant only on terms to which it has consented.

So the judicial review analysis from Reynolds (some of which was dicta, as it did not involve a case before the court)was that:

a) there is no privilege unless the Executive properly invokes it;

b) if the privilege is properly invoked, the court weighs necessity to the litigant (or, as I might argue later, to the judicial system) versus need for the privilege;

c) if military secrets in a time of war are involved, no amount of necessity can overcome the privilege (with a possible exception for [unconscionable activity – edited]);

d) if necessity is “dubious” (as in Reynolds, since the widows were being given access to the witnesses) then a mere formal claim of privilege will prevail without further weighing the interests;

e) if the privilege is properly invoked, the court will not determine the non-disclosed facts against the government in civil litigation against it; but

e) if the privilege is properly invoked in a criminal case, then the government is required to release the defendant and drop the prosecution.

[In 2000, information relating to the Reynolds case was declassified, revealing that the crash resulted from a fire that started in the engine. Attempts were made to have the Supreme Court reopen the case by filing a writ of coram nobis (fraud on the court) but this was denied with no opinion. Plaintiffs then refiled in the lower courts, seeking to set aside the 50 year old settlement, but the Third Circuit decided that it did not believe that there had been a fraud on the court and that it might have been necessary to keep information about the workings of the B-29 secret or to keep details of the craft’s mission secret]

Reynolds at Work in the Keith Case.

In the Keith case, Attorney General Mitchell filed an affidavit that met the Reynolds’ requirements. As the head of the Department of Justice, who had control over the warrantless surveillance program and who had given personal consideration to and authorized the surveillance, Mitchell filed a formal claim that the information from the surveillance could not be released to a criminal defendant because of national security interests, despite Alderman (which had not involved a formal invocation of the privilege) and despite the Reynolds dicta that criminal cases involving a claim of national security privilege would be required to be dismissed.

Mitchell’s claims went well beyond what the Reynolds dicta had contemplated and asked that the court look beyond “legality” of surveillance in a criminal setting and instead elevate national security above the Fourth Amendment in the area of “intelligence” surveillance.  This is where the Keith case and how the Supreme Court handled that case offers insight into the states secrets privilege. Mitchell and the DOJ were claiming that the Executive’s “national security” function was so separate and severable from its law enforcement function that when it said it was acting for national security purposes, its actions were not reviewable by the judiciary and law enforcement cases could not be impeded based upon the acts of the Executive in pursuing its “national security” function.

Justice White and the “on the statute” Argument.

I think here the most interesting place to start is the separate concurrence of Justice White. Justice White wanted to handle the Keith case, not on Fourth Amendment grounds, but rather as a case of conflict between the Reynolds’ Affidavit Mitchell had given, and the requirements of the Congressional statute. Trevor Morrison, in an article found at the Columbia Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers siteThe Story of (United States v. United States District Court (Keith): The Surveillance Power expands on the context of the Keith case. In this draft (beginning on page 22), Morrison describes Supreme Court bargaining involving  the Keith case opinions. In part, he discloses that Justice White’s position originally had support from Justices Burger and Blackmun as well.

Justice White’s “on the statute” argument was that, because of the fairly recent Congressional statute governing wiretaps, which spelled out what was required to be exempt from the statute, an affidavit invoking “national security” was not enough to sustain privilege. Rather, the Attorney General was required, because of the statute, to affirm within his affidavit the specific exemption provided by Congress and that the Executive’s actions fell within that exemption.

Morrison notes in his discussions that the Justice White approach could have reduced the Keith case to being about drafting rather than about the underlying issue of warrantless surveillance, and would have been followed quickly by a new affidavit from the Attorney General.

A statutory holding would simply tell future Attorneys General that their affidavits must more closely track the language in Title III’s disclaimer provision. It would amount to little more than a lesson in affidavit drafting.

p. 23.

I believe, though, that Morrison sells the drafting requirements a bit short with that analysis. In Reynolds, neither Congress nor the Constitution had spoken as to the government actions (military test flights) at issue. By contrast, in the Keith case, both Congress and the Constitution had spoken, at least in some fashion, to the government actions (seizing and searching private communications) at issue. In the Keith case, the Court was looking at a comprehensive statutory scheme that provided some exemptions for Executive “security” actions, but only limited exemptions.

White argued was that the first analysis should be whether the Attorney General affirme compliance with the statute.

Congress had established two branches of Executive action that it said was exempt from the statutory wiretap requirements. The first branch involved possible or potential hostile acts by foreign powers, collecting foreign intelligence essential to the national security or protecting national security information against foreign intelligence. The second branch involved overthrow of government and dangers to the structure and existence of government. The affidavit provided in the Keith case failed to specifically claim that the Executive’s warrantless surveillance of Plamdon, and hence its national security claim, fell under either branch of exemption.

Justice White’s opinion layered a second level of requirements on the national security privilege when there was a Congressional statute on point.  The first level was Reynolds and applied for military secrets and in the absence of Congressional input.  The second test, per Justice White’s approach, involves requiring the Executive to affirm compliance with applicable statutes including recitations as to the exemptions that applied if exmptions were relied upon.  Under Justice White’s approach, where Congressional statutes sspeak to activities the Executive is using to “collect intelligence,” then the Executive would be required to comply with both tests.

However, since Justice White’s opinion was only a separate concurrence, though, let’s look at the impact of the majority opinion on the invocation of states secrets.

The Powell Decision Impact on State Secrets.

Powell and the majority of the court met the Executive branch’s warrantless surveillance of Americans with a constitutional, rather than statutory, argument.  The focus of the opinion was that (unlike Reynolds) the Keith case involved a set of government conduct that was specifically covered by the Constitution. The Powell majority argued that even if Congress had authorized the Executive’s warrantless surveillance by statute, it would not matter because the Constitution and Fourth Amendment controlled over both Congressional statute and Executive national security claims.

In the case before it, the Court’s only remedy for the unconstitutional behavior was to affirm Judge Keith’s right to retain the illegal surveillance records and require that they be turned over to the defense, even over a national security interest claim by Mitchell. This aspect of Keith gets lost, but its clear holding was that when a procedurally proper  Reynolds invocation attempts to apply a state secrets privilege to actions barred by the Constitution, it fails.

But Powell was obviously troubled by the need for the government to at times engage in domestic surveillance for a domestic security need separate from law enforcement. The Powell majority collectively engaged in dicta to speculate as to how Congress (not the Executive internally) migh address the warrant requirement in a domestic security situation. That dicta is worth examining for its impact on states secrets invocations as well.

While the Powell majority dismissed the impact of Congressional acts if they attempted to overcome the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, it did want to encourage Congress to act to authorize domestic surveillance in a way that would be consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the Court’s judicial review holding in Keith.  The warrantless Plamondon surveillance was held clearly unconstitutional, but Powell speculated that wide latitude might be shown for surveillance involving only “foreign powers” or their agents: “We have not addressed and express no opinion as to the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents.” Powell signaled, as had lower courts, that where there was no Congressional effort to address surveillance involving only foreign powers, that kind of surveillance would likely fall within Executive power and outside of the Fourth Amendment.

Powell then went on to discuss more generically domestic security intelligence surveillance v. criminal surveillance and provided a speculative list of actions that Congress might attempt to create a situation whereby the Executive could engage in domestic security intelligence surveillance in a manner that would allow that intelligence surveillance to be in compliance with the Fourth Amendment and exempt from Alderman production during a criminal trial.

Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the [domestic security surveillance] which differ from those already prescribed for specified crimes

It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that the application and affidavit showing probable cause need not follow the exact requirements of [criminal surveillance warrant applications] but should allege other circumstances more appropriate to domestic security cases; that the request for prior court authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any member of a specially designated court (e. g., the District Court for the District of Columbia or the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit); and that the time and reporting requirements need not be so strict as those in [criminal surveillance warrant applications.]

. . . We do not attempt to detail the precise standards for domestic security warrants … We do hold, however, that prior judicial approval is required for the type of domestic security surveillance involved in this case and that such approval may be made in accordance with such reasonable standards as the Congress may prescribe. (emph. added)

The takeaway from the Powell decision is that, even under a claim of national security privilege, the Fourth Amendment required prior judicial approval for the Court to hold that such surveillance for domestic security purposes was constitutional. The Court felt Congress might be able to come up with a statutory scheme which could provide for prior judicial approval of domestic security surveillance and that the Court might deem such a judicially authorized seizure and search of communications based on less than criminal probable cause to comply with the Fourth Amendment.

The combined takeaway from the White and Powell opinions is that every member of the Court who considered the case believed the Reynolds invocation of national security interests failed – Justice Powell and the majority because it did not comply with Constitutionally required prior judicial approval; Justice White because the Reynolds affidavit did not clearly state, on its face, compliance with Congressional statutes or exemptions (which he wanted to resolve before looking at the Constitutional argument).

Next up – Congressional efforts with FISA to first rein in, and now reel out, Executive power while avoiding judicial review and options that may still be open .

“Then We Turned the Illegal, Legal, AND Made the White House MORE Snuggly”

Sometimes the only thing you can do is laugh.

And if you want to know more than that, it’s a state secret, so you must be a terrorist.

The American Data Octopus

Data octopus. That’s how one European Parliament official described the US’ continued grab for unfettered access to more and more European data. (h/t WM)

“The Americans want to blackmail us,” said an agitated Alexander Alvaro, home affairs spokesman of the Germany’s Free Democratic Party (FDP) in the European Parliament. The Americans have become “like a data octopus,” he said, as if their tentacles were reaching out to all the world’s data.

Alvaro’s reference to “blackmail” refers to the US’ link of the Visa Waiver program–which allows citizens from a particular country to enter the US without a visa–with access to criminal investigation databases.

“Participation in the United States’ ‘Visa Waiver’ program,” Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann wrote in a letter to the Viennese parliament, has been “linked to additional requirements for the exchange of information,” including “an agreement to exchange data relating to the detection of terrorists.” In other words, no data, no visa waiver.

The US is negotiating such deals, one by one, with individual countries. It seems to be an effort to undercut demands for more stringent protection of European data from the EUP, which previously demanded concessions from the US on the SWIFT program (though one of those concessions–for an approved EU bank data overseer who would monitor US access of SWIFT data–seems to be held up at the nominating stage).

I’m rather curious by this use of leverage. After all, to a point, the visa waiver program is a matter of convenience to international travelers, particularly business travelers. But after a point, it would just be a disincentive to do business with the US. We’ve already lost large numbers of the best researchers, as visa restrictions simply convinced them to study elsewhere. Is the US risking the same with business travelers?

Perhaps the most interesting revelation in this Spiegel article on the current tensions is that European investigators have repeatedly forced private companies to turn over their complete databases.

This attitude, [Sophie in ‘t Veld] said, is now beginning to rub off on European investigators. Time and again executives come to in ‘t Veld in her role as chair of the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs committee to tell her confidentially that they have been illegally forced to hand over “their complete customer data.”

This would seem to follow the pattern used under Dick Cheney’s illegal wiretap program. But given the higher data protection laws in Europe, would seem to be even more incendiary.

At least one EU expert voiced the same thought I had as I traveled through Europe during what was purportedly a time of heightened security–the security warnings of a terrorist threat to Europe sure seem like they are being treated as scaremongering.

Last weekend, the US issued a travel warning for Europe on the basis of possible imminent terrorist attacks. Germany Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière, however, has warned against scaremongering. There is apparently no concrete evidence of imminent attacks in Germany. But perhaps, speculates one European Union security expert, it was just a little “background music” for the real questions to be discussed in the trans-Atlantic talks: How deeply can American terrorism investigators peer into European computers, how extensively can they monitor European bank accounts, tap into Blackberrys or listen in on Skype calls?

When Brian Ross first reported this, even he admitted that the US had no details of a real attack (I’m still looking for that video). But continued leaks to the ever-useful but unreliable Ross focused on tourists in major European airports. I just flew through Heathrow, undoubtedly one of the targets of any plot targeted at US tourists in major European airports. While American Airlines appeared to have heightened security, Delta had none, not even for those flying, as I was, on the same flight that the underwear bomber attempted to take down in December. Frankly, no one at the airport seemed even aware that there was a heightened alert. And if the fearmongering is designed to make European countries worried about the travel trade, then why not raise concerns about airports?

Ultimately, if the US achieves (or, more likely, continues to sustain) what it is seeking in these negotiations–unilateral control over much of the world’s data–then it can fearmonger like this at will, since only it will be able to claim to have a view of all the data points. Yes, there are undoubtedly real benefits to terror investigators to have access to data (balanced, no doubt, by the problem of having too much data to adequately scan). But this unquenchable thirst for more data sure seems to be as much about power as anything else.

Of Course the Intelligence Authorization Would Have a Signing Statement

Because that’s just how these carefully crafted bills are treated by Presidents guarding their Executive Power.

DDay pointed me to the signing statement that Obama issued in conjunction with the new Intelligence Authorization. There are three key points, IMO.

Presidents still control all the secrets

One thing Obama does is reaffirm the President’s right to control all the secrets.

Section 331’s requirement to provide a “general description” of a covert action finding or notification provides sufficient flexibility to craft an appropriate description for the limited notification, based on the extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States and recognizing the President’s authority to protect sensitive national security information. [my emphasis]

I’m not all that surprised or bugged by this. Basically, he seems to be saying that the members of the Intelligence Committees who just won the right to be briefed on covert operations will have to be very creative to understand the statements crafted with “sufficient flexibility” to keep them in the dark. But hell, this is still a damn sight better than it was.

Note, though, that Obama insists–as most of the legal filings we read here do–that the President retains all of the authority over secrets (presumably including deciding when to leak them broadly to people with no clearance).

Congress still won’t get to see OLC memos

I’m rather more intrigued by this statement, which I take to suggest that the Administration will share the “legal basis” (as in, “the AUMF”) for covert ops, but won’t share documents over which the Administration claims a privilege (which in the past has included OLC documents).

Also, as previously indicated, my Administration understands section 331’s requirement to provide to the intelligence committees “the legal basis” under which certain intelligence activities and covert actions are being or were conducted as not requiring disclosure of any privileged advice or information or disclosure of information in any particular form.

This is pretty important, given that last we heard there were OLC documents authorizing FBI wiretaps and drone strikes that–as far as we know–remain totally secret. Which still means the President will insist on writing law for himself until the Courts tell him differently.

Congress may never know the results of John Durham’s investigation

Then there’s this bit, which would clearly include John Durham’s investigation of the former and some still current members of the intelligence community (heck, it might even include John Brennan’s role in Dick Cheney’s illegal wiretap program).

In accordance with longstanding executive branch policy, my Administration understands section 405’s requirement that the Inspector General make an immediate report to congressional committees regarding investigations focused upon certain current or former IC officials as not requiring the disclosure of privileged or otherwise confidential law enforcement information.

Not only does this say that Obama refuses to let the Inspector General tell Congress whether there will be any accountability for torture, or even (given the broad claims the Administration made to shield Dick Cheney’s Plame testimony) what Durham found after he has closed his investigation, but it also suggests that the IC IG may not tell Congress things that CIA’s IG told Congress in the past. For example, this would cover some of the deaths by torture which were investigated but not prosecuted. So long as DOD or DOJ could claim to be investigating them, it seems, the IC IG would not necessarily tell Congress of the investigation.

Perhaps more troubling, this statement would seem to shield all of FBI’s investigative work–things like surveilling peace activists and conducting data mining of its massive databases.

I’m going to do some more research on what Obama’s trying to do with his statement about whistleblowers.

Moreover, the whistleblower protection provisions in section 405 are properly viewed as consistent with President Clinton’s stated understanding of a provision with substantially similar language in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.  See Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999:  Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1998 (p. 1825).

But I assume it sharply limits the rights of intelligence community whistleblowers.

This is not as bad as some of Cheney’s signing statements.  But it’s clear that the President wants to avoid oversight of his super duper powers.

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