April 19, 2024 / by 

 

The Josh Schulte Trial Moves to Deliberations

Yesterday, the two sides in the Josh Schulte case presented their closing arguments.

It is always difficult to read how a jury will view a case, and in this case (in part for reasons I’ll lay out below) that’s all the more true. I could imagine any of a range of outcomes: full acquittal, acquittal on some charges, guilty on most but not all charges, or another hung jury (though I think it likely he’ll win acquittal on at least one or two charges).

This is what the jury will be deliberating about. The short version: Judge Furman seems very skeptical of the obstruction charge against Schulte, quite persuaded by the government’s CFAA charges, but very impressed by Schulte’s closing argument.

The charges

After his first mistrial, DOJ obtained a superseding indictment designed to break his alleged crimes into explicitly identifiable crimes, presumably to prevent the jury from getting confused about what specific actions allegedly constitute a crime, as the first jury appears to have done.

The indictment is generally broken into Espionage tied to files taken directly from the CIA’s servers (Counts One and Two), Espionage tied to stuff Schulte allegedly tried to send out from jail (Counts Three and Four), CFAA for hacking the CIA servers (Counts Five through Eight), and obstruction (Count Nine). I’ve put the legal code below, but here’s how Judge Furman described the charges in his draft jury instructions.

Specifically, Count One charges the defendant with illegal gathering of national defense  information or “NDI.” Specifically, it charges that, on or about April 20, 2016, the defendant, without authorization, copied backup files of certain electronic databases (what I will refer to as the “Backup Files”) housed on a classified computer system maintained by the CIA (namely “DEVLAN”).

Count Two charges the defendant with illegal transmission of unlawfully possessed documents, writings, or notes containing NDI. Specifically, it charges that, between April and May 2016, the defendant, without authorization, retained copies of the Backup Files and communicated them to a third party not authorized to receive them, the organization WikiLeaks.

Count Five charges the defendant with unauthorized access to a computer to obtain classified  information. Specifically, it charges that, between April 18 and April 20, 2016, the defendant accessed a 16 computer without authorization and exceeded his authorized access to obtain the Backup Files and subsequently transmitted them to WikiLeaks without authorization.

Count Six charges the defendant with unauthorized access to a computer to obtain information form a department or agency of the United States. Specifically, it charges that, on or about April 20, 2016, the defendant, accessed a computer without authorization or in excess of his authorized access, and copied the Backup Files.

Count Seven charges the defendant with causing transmission of a harmful computer command. Specifically, it charges that, on or about April 20, 2016, the defendant transmitted commands on DEVLAN to manipulate the state of the Confluence virtual server on DEVLAN.

Count Eight charges the defendant with causing transmission of a harmful computer command. Specifically, it charges that, on or about April 20, 2016, the defendant transmitted commands on DEVLAN to delete log files of activity on DEVLAN.

Counts Three and Four charge the defendant with crimes relating to the unlawful disclosure or attempted disclosure of NDI while he was in the Metropolitan Correctional Center (“MCC”), the federal jail.

Count Three charges that, in or about September 2018, the defendant had unauthorized possession of documents, writings, or notes containing NDI related to the internal computer networks of the CIA, and willfully transmitted them to a third party not authorized to receive them.

Count Four charges that, between July and September 2018, the defendant had unauthorized possession of documents, writings, and notes containing NDI related to tradecraft techniques, operations, and intelligence gathering tools used by the CIA, and attempted to transmit them to a third party or parties not authorized to receive them.

Finally, Count Nine charges the defendant with obstruction of justice. Specifically, it charges that between March and June 2017, the defendant made certain false statements to agents of the FBI during their investigation of the WikiLeaks leak.

Here’s that language with the legal statutes included:

Count One, 18 USC 793(d) and 2 (WikiLeaks Espionage), Illegal gathering of National Defense Information: For copying the DevLAN backup files on or about April 20, 2016.

Count Two, 18 USC 793(e) and 2 (WikiLeaks Espionage), Illegal transmission of unlawfully possessed NDI: For transmitting the backup files to WikiLeaks in or about April and May 2016.

Count Three, 18 USC 793(e) and 2 (MCC Espionage), Illegal transmission of unlawfully possessed NDI: For sending this information about DevLAN to Shane Harris in or about September 2018.

In reality, two groups — EDG and COG and at least 400 people had access. They don’t include COG who was connected to our DEVLAN through HICOC, an intermediary network that connected both COG and EDG. . . . There is absolutely NO reason they shouldn’t have known this connection exists. Step one is narrowing down the possible suspects and to completely disregard an ENTIRE GROUP and HALF the suspects is reckless. All they needed to do was talk to ONE person on Infrastructure branch or through ANY technical description / diagram of the network.”

Count Four, 18 USC 793(e) and 2 (MCC Espionage), Attempted illegal transmission of unlawfully possessed NDI: For staging a tweet and preparing to send out information about CIA’s hacking tools from at least July 2018 through October 2018. (Here’s the version of Exhibit 809 used at the first trial.)

Government Exhibit 801, page 3: “Which brings me to my next point — Do you know what my speciality was at the CIA? Do you know what I did for fun? Data hiding and crypto. I designed and wrote software to conceal data in a custom-designed file system contained with the drive slackspace or hidden partitions. I disguised data. I split data across files and file systems to conceal the crypto—analysis tools could NEVER detect random or pseudo-random data indicative of potential crypto. I designed and wrote my own crypto—how better to foll bafoons [sic] like forensic examiners ad the FBI than to have custom software that doesn’t fit into their 2-week class where they become forensic ‘experts.’”

Government Exhibit 809, page 8: “[tool from vendor report] — Bartender for [redacted] [vendor].”

Government Exhibit 809, page 10: “Additionally, [Tool described in vendor report] is in fact Bartender. A CIA toolset for [operators] to configure for [redacted] deployment.”

Government Exhibit 809, page 11: “[@vendor] discussed [tool] in 2016, which is really the CIA’s Bartender tool suite. Bartender was written to [redacted] deploy against various targets. The source code is available in the Vault 7 release.”

Count Five, 18 USC 1030(a)(1) and 2 (CFAA), Unauthorized access to a computer to obtain classified information: For hacking into the DevLAN backup files.

Count Six, 18 USC 1030(a)(2)(B) and 2 (CFAA), Unauthorized access of a computer to obtain classified information from a department or agency, for hacking into and copying the backup files.

Count Seven, 18 USC 1030(a)(5)(A) and 2 (CFAA), Causing transmission of harmful computer code: For the reversion of Confluence on April 20, 2016.

Count Eight, 18 USC 1030(a)(5)(A) and 2 (CFAA), Causing transmission of harmful computer code: For deleting log files on DevLAN on April 20, 2016.

Count Nine, 18 USC 1503, obstruction: For lying about having taken the backup files, keeping a copy of the letter he sent to the CIA IG, having classified information in his apartment, taking information from the CIA and transferring it to an unclassified network, making DevLAN vulnerable to theft, housing information from the CIA on his home computer, and removing classified information from the CIA.

The law

Based on orders Judge Jesse Furman issued and his response to Schulte’s Rule 29 motions for an acquittal after trial, it seems he views some of the charges to be stronger than others.

Espionage, WikiLeaks charges: Furman didn’t say much about the charges tied to Schulte allegedly obtaining and sharing the Vault 7 and 8 content with WikiLeaks. The transmission charge is the one that is most circumstantial (because the government made no claims about how Schulte got the stolen files out of the CIA and didn’t fully commit to how Schulte sent them to WikiLeaks), and so is one a jury might unsurprisingly find reasonable doubt on.

Espionage, MCC charges: There are two weaknesses to the MCC charges. First, Furman allowed Schulte to argue that because the Bartender information was already made public by WikiLeaks — a topic on which Schulte elicited helpful testimony — it was no longer National Defense Information (there’s more discussion on this issue here). There’s some question whether the Hickock information was NDI as well. But also, in the Bartender case, there’s a question about whether drafting a Tweet in a notebook is a significant enough step to be found guilty.

Obstruction: Furman seems quite skeptical the government has proven their case on obstruction and came close to ruling for Schulte on his Rule 29 motion on it. He ordered the two sides to brief whether the government had provided sufficient evidence of this charge. And in the conference on the instructions, he challenged whether things Schulte said on March 15, 2017 before receiving a grand jury subpoena could be included in an obstruction charge. As Schulte pointed out, too, his false statements from later interviews got less focus in this trial.

CFAA: Furman did rule against Schulte’s Rule 29 motions on the CFAA charges, suggesting he finds the evidence here much stronger. Schulte as much as admitted he had taken the steps DOJ claims he did to revert the confluence files, effectively admitting to one of the charges as written (and that’s what the government focused on in their rebuttal). That said, if he were found guilty on the CFAA charges, Schulte would mount an interesting appeal under SCOTUS’ Van Buren ruling, issued since his last trial, which held that you can’t be guilty of CFAA if you had authorized access. Schulte laid the groundwork to argue that while he didn’t have access to Atlassian, the CIA had not revoked his access as an Administrator to ESXi, which is what he used to be able to do the reversion.

Emotion

In Schulte’s first trial, it seems clear the jury hung based on nullification of one juror, who (according to some jurors) refused to deliberate fairly. DOJ stupidly presented the case in a way that emphasized the human resource dispute, and not the leak. And in a contest of popularity between the CIA and WikiLeaks, the CIA is never going to win 12 votes unanimously, certainly not in SDNY.

I had thought that Schulte would be able to recreate that dynamic with this trial, by once again portraying himself as the unfair victim of CIA bullying. But in at least one case, I think that attempt backfired (by showing Schulte to be precisely the insubordinate prick that the CIA claims him to be).

That said, given Furman’s response, Schulte did brilliantly portray the investigation into him as being biased. So he may win the emotional battle yet again. After he finished, Furman suggested that if Schulte were acquitted, he might have a future as a defense attorney.

THE COURT: You may be seated. All right. Mr. Schulte, that was very impressive, impressively done.

MR. SCHULTE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Depending on what happens here, you may have a future as a defense lawyer. Who knows?

Tactics

In a recent New Yorker profile of Schulte, Sabrina Shroff described how by going pro se, Schulte would be able to push boundaries that she herself could not.

When you consider the powerful forces arrayed against him—and the balance of probabilities that he is guilty—Schulte’s decision to represent himself seems reckless. But, for the C.I.A. and the Justice Department, he remains a formidable adversary, because he is bent on destroying them, he has little to lose, and his head is full of classified information. “Lawyers are bound,” Shroff told me. “There are certain things we can’t argue, certain arguments we can’t make. But if you’re pro se ”—representing yourself—“you can make all the motions you want. You can really try your case.”

Schulte did this repeatedly. He did so with classified information, as when he tried to get “Jeremy Weber” to admit to a report by a still-classified group that Weber was not aware of and which the government insists, to this day, does not exist undermined the attribution of the case (this is based off an out of context text that Weber was not privy to).

Q. Were there many forensic reports filed by AFD about the leak?

A. Not that I’m aware of.

Q. OK. But at some point you learned that AFD determined the backups from the Altabackups must have been stolen, correct?

MR. LOCKARD: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained. (Defendant conferred with standby counsel)

BY MR. SCHULTE: Q. You reviewed the AFD reports, correct?

MR. LOCKARD: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained. Let’s move on, Mr. Schulte. (Defendant conferred with standby counsel)

THE COURT: And please keep your voice down when conferring with standby counsel.

… with investigative details (both into his own and a presumed ongoing investigation into WikiLeaks) he has become privy to, such as when he suggested that a SysAdmin named Dave had lost a Stash backup.

Q. Speaking with the admins, you’re talking Dave, Dave C., right; he was one of those?

A. Yeah, Dave.

Q. And he was an employee who put the Stash on a hard drive, correct?

A. I know I’ve heard some of that. I don’t know exactly the situation around that, but —

Q. But that, basically this hard drive with Stash was lost, correct?

MR. DENTON: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

… with testimony presented as questions, as here when Schulte tried to get Special Agent Evanchec to testify that his retention of an OIG email was an honest mistake.

Q. So in your career, classifying documents, sometimes people make honest mistakes when they classify documents, correct?

MR. LOCKARD: Objection.

A. I think that’s —

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. SCHULTE: Q. Have you ever made a mistake classifying a document, sir?

MR. LOCKARD: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. SCHULTE: Q. Do you know if someone makes an honest mistake in classifying a document, if they can be charged with a crime?

MR. LOCKARD: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

… and with speculative claims about alternative theories, such as here when he mocked jail informant Carlos Betances’ claim that Schulte said he needed Russian help for what he wanted to accomplish.

Q. OK. Next, you testified on direct that I told you the Russians would have to help me for the work I was doing, right?

A. Yes, correct.

Q. OK. So the Russians were going to send paratroopers into New York and break me out of MCC?

MR. LOCKARD: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Over and over, prosecutors objected when Schulte made such claims, and most often their objections were sustained. But I think it highly unlikely jurors will be able to entirely unhear many of the speculative claims Schulte made, and so while some of the claims Schulte presented in such fashion were outright false, the jury is unlikely to be able to fully ignore that information.

The unsaid

There are three things that didn’t happen at the trial that I’m quite fascinated by.

First, after delaying the trial for at least four months so as to be able to use Steve Bellovin as his expert, Schulte didn’t even submit an expert report for him. There are many possible explanations for this — that Schulte didn’t like what Bellovin would have said, that Schulte used Bellovin, instead, as a hyper-competent forensic source to check his own theories but never intended to call him, or finally, that Schulte correctly judged he could serve as his own expert in questioning witnesses. That said, the fact that he didn’t use Bellovin makes the delay far more curious.

There are numerous instances — one example is a gotcha that Schulte staged about a purported error (but not a far more significant real error) one of the FBI agents in the case made about Schulte’s Google searches — that were actually quite incriminating. The government, unsurprisingly, didn’t distract from their main case to lay this out though. But I hope to return to some of these details because, while they are irrelevant to the verdict against Schulte (and I want to make clear are distinct from the jury’s ultimate decision about his innocence), they do provide interesting details about Schulte’s actions.

Finally, the government fought hard for the right to be able to present a Schulte narrative about what happened that he shared with his cousin, Shane Presnall, but didn’t introduce it at trial. Effectively, in the document Schulte exposed the real identity of one or more of his colleagues to his cousin. I’m not sure whether the government didn’t rely on this because they wanted to avoid the possibility Presnall would testify, they wanted to limit damage already done to the covert status of the CIA employees, or they didn’t want jeopardy to attach to the document (meaning they could use it in further charges in case of an acquittal). But I’d sure like to know why DOJ didn’t rely on it.

Note: As it did with the first trial, Calyx Institute made the transcripts available. This time, however, they were funded by Germany’s Wau Holland Foundation. WHF board member Andy Müller-Maguhn has been named in WikiLeaks operations and was in the US during some of the rough period when Schulte is alleged to have leaked these documents. 


On Josh Schulte’s Continued Attempts to Hack the Judicial System

Last June, I argued that accused Vault 7 leaker Josh Schulte’s decision to represent himself involved a plan to “hack” the judicial system, not with computer code, but by introducing commands into the legal system to make it malfunction.

Joshua Schulte attempted to complete a hack of the court system yesterday.

I don’t mean that Schulte used computer code to bring down the court systems. His laptop doesn’t connect to the Internet, and so he does not have those tools available. Rather, over the 3.5 years he has been in jail, he has tested the system, figured out which messages can be used to distract adversaries, and which messages have an effect that will lead the system to perform in unexpected ways. He identified vulnerabilities and opportunities — SDNY arrogance, the pandemic and related court delays, Louis DeJoy’s postal system, and even the SAMs imposed on him — and attempted to exploit them.

[snip]

It is almost without exception an insanely bad idea for a defendant to represent themselves, and this is probably not that exception. Still, there are advantages that Schulte would get by representing himself. He’s brilliant, and clearly has been studying the law in the 3.5 years he has been in prison (though he has made multiple errors of process and judgment in his own filings). He has repeatedly raised the Sixth Amendment problems with Special Administrative Measures, notably describing how delays in receiving his mail make it impossible for him to respond to legal developments in timely fashion. So I imagine he’d prepare a Sixth Amendment challenge to everything going forward. He’d be able to demand access to the image of the server he is alleged to have hacked himself. By proceeding pro se, Schulte could continue to post inflammatory claims to the docket for sympathetic readers to magnify, as happened with a filing he submitted earlier this year. And after the government has made clear it will reverse its disastrous strategy from the first trial of making the trial all about Schulte’s conflicts with the CIA, by questioning witnesses himself, Schulte would be able to make personality conflicts central again, even against the government’s wishes. Plus, by not replacing Bellovin, Schulte would serve as expert himself. In that role, Schulte would present the false counter story he has been telling since he was jailed, but in a way that the government couldn’t cross-examine him. So it would probably be insanely detrimental, but less so than for most defendants that try it. It certainly would provide a way to mount the defense that Schulte clearly wants to pursue.

I also noted the signs that what Schulte really wanted to do was act as co-counsel with his attorneys, something prohibited by precedent in the 2nd Circuit.

Much of this has held up (though not regarding Steve Bellovin, Schulte’s superb expert; Schulte has effectively just waited for Bellovin to become available again). Schulte has engaged in the legal equivalent of a DDOS attack, with dozens of motions in the last year, many serial repeats of the same arguments rejected already, and seventeen appeals of one sort or another.

It appears that Schulte may still be attempting to have hybrid counsel. In a New Yorker profile that came out this week, his attorney, Sabrina Shroff, described how by going pro se, Schulte will not be bound by the legal ethics she is (particularly if he’s willing to face further charges for whatever he does at trial — his potential sentence is already so long any additional contempt or leaking charges might make little difference).

When you consider the powerful forces arrayed against him—and the balance of probabilities that he is guilty—Schulte’s decision to represent himself seems reckless. But, for the C.I.A. and the Justice Department, he remains a formidable adversary, because he is bent on destroying them, he has little to lose, and his head is full of classified information. “Lawyers are bound,” Shroff told me. “There are certain things we can’t argue, certain arguments we can’t make. But if you’re pro se ”—representing yourself—“you can make all the motions you want. You can really try your case.”

Nevertheless, Schulte recently wrote a letter inquiring about whether Shroff could cross-examine some of the witnesses and issue objections for him.

I fully expect Schulte to make his contentious relationship with his colleagues a central feature of the trial (Schulte even attempted, unsuccessfully, to exclude the one CIA witness who remained on good terms with him, which would have made it easy to portray his targeting as a vendetta by colleagues who hate him). I expect Schulte to disclose information about his colleagues — perhaps including that Jeremy Weber, a pseudonym, appears under his real name in the Ashley Madison hack, an allegation Schulte seemed primed to make in 2018. Whatever else Schulte does, he will attempt to raise the costs of this trial on the CIA.

Stipulating stipulations

No doubt he has other stunts planned. Schulte claimed this week that the government is refusing to stipulate to things from official custodians (like Google).

This doesn’t make sense, unless Schulte is trying to undermine the regularity of this evidence with stipulations.

All that said, I think I may have underestimated Schulte when I suggested he only intended to use legal filings as the code with which he would hack the judicial system.

When dropping a laptop alters its BIOS

On June 1, Shroff wrote the court informing Judge Jesse Furman that a guard had accidentally dropped Schulte’s discovery laptop, but asking for no further relief.

We write to inform the Court that a guard at the MDC accidently dropped Mr. Schulte’s laptop today, breaking it. Because the computer no longer functions, Mr. Schulte is unable to access or print anything from the laptop, including the legal papers due this week. The defense team was first notified of the incident by Mr. Schulte’s parents early this afternoon. It was later confirmed in an email from BOP staff Attorney Irene Chan, who stated in pertinent part: “I just called the housing unit and can confirm that his laptop is broken. It was an unfortunate incident where it was accidentally dropped.”

Given the June 13, 2022 trial date, we have ordered him a new computer, and the BOP, government, and defense team are working to resolve this matter as quickly as possible. We do not seek any relief from the Court at this time.

I think Shroff is a formidable defense attorney and she has no patience for the carceral regime that her clients face, particularly someone under strict measures like Schulte. Which is why I find it so odd that she was so blasé about what might be viewed as intentional retaliation against Schulte, just days before trial, especially given Schulte’s recent complaints about his access to the law library. A month earlier, after all, Shroff had described that efforts at détente with the jail had failed.

I’m especially puzzled about Shroff’s response given the discrepancy between her explanation — sourced to Schulte’s parents and the prison attorney, not anyone who could  be held accountable for a false claim — and that of the government.

On June 6, DOJ explained its resolution of the laptop. Their explanation sounds nothing like a dropped laptop, at all. It sounds like an attempted hack.

First, with respect to the defendant’s discovery laptop, which he reported to be inoperable as of June 1, 2022 (D.E. 838), the laptop was operational and returned to Mr. Schulte by the end of the day on June 3, 2022. Mr. Schulte brought the laptop to the courthouse on the morning of June 3 and it was provided to the U.S. Attorney’s Office information technology staff in the early afternoon. It appears that the laptop’s charger was not working and, after being charged with one of the Office’s power cords, the laptop could be turned on and booted. IT staff discovered, however, that the user login for the laptop BIOS1 had been changed. IT staff was able to log in to the laptop using an administrator BIOS account and a Windows login password provided by the defendant. IT staff also discovery [sic] an encrypted 15-gigabyte partition on the defendant’s hard drive. The laptop was returned to Mr. Schulte, who confirmed that he was able to log in to the laptop and access his files, along with a replacement power cord. Mr. Schulte was admonished about electronic security requirements, that he is not permitted to enable or use any wireless capabilities on the laptop, and that attempting to do so may result in the laptop being confiscated and other consequences.

All the more so given one of the new details disclosed in the New Yorker profile: that in his moments of desperation to keep his contraband cell phone charged in jail back in 2018, Schulte figured out how to hot-wire the phone to the light switch.

Schulte figured out a way to hot-wire a light switch in his cell so that it worked as a cell-phone charger. (The person who knew Schulte during this period praised his innovation, saying, “After that, all M.C.C. phones were charged that way.”)

In recent months, Schulte has been making technical requests, such as for his own printer or a write-capable DVD which (he explicitly said) he wanted to use to transfer “other binary files” in addition to trial exhibits, that seemed an attempt to acquire equipment that could be used for other purposes. Here, in the guise of an accident caused by a guard, Schulte got his laptop, with its BIOS alteration, its encrypted compartment, and apparent attempts to use wireless capabilities, into the office of the people prosecuting him, then got it returned with a new power cord.

Among the things Schulte worked on at CIA was a tool to jump an air gap and compressing and exfiltrating data.

The expanding Pompeo subpoena

Then there’s the way information has gotten to Schulte, who is under strict Special Administrative Measures that would normally limit news about his own case from getting shared with him (the following is not a commentary about the humanity  or constitutionality of SAMs, which are arguably not either; it is an observation that they may not be working). In a filing purporting to represent Schulte’s views as to why he needs to call Mike Pompeo as a witness, his stand-by attorneys laid out the following justification:

Secretary Pompeo was Director of the CIA in May 2017 when WikiLeaks began disclosing Vault 7 and Vault 8. As noted in prior briefings to the Court, [1] Mr. Pompeo was immediately debriefed about the WikiLeaks disclosure and specifically informed that Mr. Schulte was an early suspect. He was also told that Mr. Schulte had a disciplinary history. Further, less than a week after the disclosure, Secretary Pompeo approved the substance of the first search warrant application, authorizing the FBI to make various statements therein, at least some of which later proved untrue.

As such, Secretary Pompeo took an active role in the investigation against Mr. Schulte and has non-hearsay information that is relevant to the charges. Mr. Schulte also seek to inquire of Secretary Pompeo whether he directed his staff to consider charges against Mr. Schulte to the exclusion of anyone else or contrary to existing exculpatory evidence

Further, while the government has sought to establish the grave harm caused by the leak, just months after it allegedly occurred, [2] Secretary Pompeo championed WikiLeaks’ publication of the stolen DNS [sic] emails on social media. This disconnect, too, is ripe for examination.

Finally, as recently as September 2021, [3] Secretary Pompeo continued to voice his views on the prosecution of leaks from WikiLeaks, see https://nationalpost.com/news/trump-pompeo-and-cia-agents-discussed-kidnappingassassinating-assange-in-revenge-for-vault-7-leak. Secretary Pompeo’s evolving stance on the prosecution of leaks is relevant to the issues at trial. Accordingly, Mr. Schulte asks this Court to deny the government’s application to preclude Secretary Pompeo’s testimony. [my numbering]

In the past, I have argued that calling Pompeo as a witness is a reasonable request, for what I’ve marked as reason 2, above. As House Intelligence Chair, Mike Pompeo cheered WikiLeaks’ release of emails by Russia from the DNC. He did so in July 2016, months after Schulte is alleged to have transmitted the CIA files in early May 2016. That Pompeo’s support of WikiLeaks, even when he had access to intelligence about them, did not prevent him from being confirmed as CIA Director undercuts claims about Schulte’s perception of the particular damage leaking to WikiLeaks might do.

But the other two reasons are more suspect. Reason one, Pompeo’s approval of early steps in the investigation, is only a measure of what he got briefed, and the briefer would be the more direct witness to the substance of that briefing (and given the seniority of some of the witnesses who testified at his first trial, likely already appeared as witnesses. But Pompeo’s presumed briefing of the case to Donald Trump — before Trump almost blew the case by sharing those details with Tucker Carlson on the very day the FBI first searched Schulte — is another issue. I’m acutely interested in Trump’s treatment of the attack on the CIA by a Russian-associated outlet in 2017, but it really doesn’t indicate anything about Schulte’s guilt or innocence.

The last reason — the claim published by Yahoo but never matched by another outlet that Pompeo responded to the initial Vault 7 release by asking about the possibility of assassinating Julian Assange — is a more dubious argument still. Remember: This is Schulte’s standby counsel writing this filing. They’re not under SAMs, Schulte is, but they’re only his standby counsel, and so should only be posting things he can be privy to. The rationale for calling Pompeo is presented as Pompeo’s comments, from September 2021, responding to the Yahoo story. Except the story linked — to a Canadian story on the Yahoo story published a day before Pompeo’s response — doesn’t reflect those 2021 comments from Pompeo at all. If Pompeo were really asked to testify about this, he would debunk parts of it, as his actual public comments about the story did. If the Yahoo story became an issue at trial, it might come out that the story repeats a claim (though nowhere near the most inflammatory claim of the story) made publicly by a WikiLeaks surrogate in 2020, but never (AFAIK) made publicly elsewhere, and that Michael Isikoff had persistently suppressed details from the Stone prosecution that debunk large parts of the Yahoo story. That is, if the Yahoo story became an issue at Schulte’s — or anyone else’s — trial, it could easily be discredited, like several of the other stories used in WikiLeaks’ campaign against Assange’s extradition. But Schulte, who has purportedly read about this in spite of his SAMs, would like to make it an issue at his trial.

A minute note in the docket may indicate that the two sides settled this issue on Friday. So we’re likely to be deprived of Pompeo’s testimony for a second Schulte trial.

The [redacted] discovery

I find reasons one and three particularly interesting given a series of documents that presumably relate to a broader-than-publicly understood investigation into WikiLeaks. Schulte was provided materials from that investigation in discovery on April 6 or 8. Schulte sent Judge Furman a request on April 29 (perhaps not coincidentally, after a UK judge approved Assange’s extradition, though the actual extradition decision remains pending before Priti Patel) asking to obtain all the discovery from that case, have it excluded from the protective order so he could use it at trial, and asking Furman to give Schulte an investigator so he could learn more about that investigation. In response to an order from Furman, the government responded on May 16. All the materials were docketed on May 25.

The materials are so heavily redacted as to offer little illumination to the subject. They do say, however, that the investigation “is neither known to the public nor to all of the targets of the investigation,” suggesting that at least one of those targeted is aware of it, and that DOJ is working with targets, not subjects. DOJ asserts that Schulte’s claims about the utility of the evidence for his trial conflict. It also describes that Schulte wants to argue — falsely, DOJ asserts — that this evidence proves the Vault 7 materials were obtained by hackers. Given the original discovery letter and subsequent treatment, it is unclear to me whether this information is considered classified, or just confidential. But the government, unsurprisingly, argues that the material shouldn’t be released.

[B]ecause the [redacted] Investigation Materials relate to an ongoing criminal investigation, and their disclosure could cause serious harms to that investigation and other law enforcement interests.

The argument for Pompeo’s testimony, above, came after DOJ responded to Schulte’s request for more information. That is, Schulte’s defense stretched beyond a completely legitimate claim that Pompeo’s actions prove that even the CIA did not consider support for WikiLeaks disqualifying at the moment Schulte allegedly leaked the files, to claims that are little more than repetitions of Trumpist and WikiLeaks propaganda.

Meanwhile, Schulte is asking for a two day adjournment of trial after jury selection starting tomorrow, partly on account of the laptop, partly because the government has shifted the order in which they’ll present witnesses, this time starting with Richard Evanchec, one of the FBI Agents who originally investigated the leak, rather than Schulte’s colleagues at the CIA (among other things, doing so will foreground Schulte’s easily debunked cover story, which he plans to tell himself in court).

Sometime this week, Schulte will have his moment in court, this time running his own defense and exploiting whatever hacks — digital or legal — he has succeeded in launching over the last year or four. As Shroff says, Schulte’s not bound by professional ethics in any way that would limit what arguments he makes. Schulte will undoubtedly attempt to feed the jury the kind of code that the legal system normally doesn’t expect. We will then get to see whether such code causes the system to malfunction.


FBI’s Russian Hack-and-Leak Investigation as Disclosed by the Sussmann Trial

Now that he has been acquitted, it’s easy to conclude the Michael Sussmann prosecution was a pointless right wing conspiracy theory. It was!

But the exhibits that came out at trial are a worthwhile glimpse of both the FBI’s investigation into the 2016 Russian hack of Democrats and the Bureau’s shoddy investigation of the Alfa Bank anomalies.

I’ve started unpacking what a shitshow the FBI investigation into the latter was here and collecting technical exhibits pertaining the investigation here (though that post is currently out of date).

As to the Russian hack-and-leak, Sussmann’s team facilitated the process with a summary exhibit they included showing a selection of FBI communications pertaining to the investigation that either involve or mention Sussmann. Sussmann introduced these documents to show how obvious his ties to the Democrats would have been to the FBI, including to some people involved in the Alfa Bank investigation. A few of these communications refute specific claims Durham made, showing that meetings or communications Durham argued must relate to the Alfa Bank effort could be explained, in one case far more easily, as part of the hack-and-leak response. That is, some of these documents show that Durham was taking evidence of victimization by Russia and using it instead to argue that Sussmann was unfairly victimizing Trump.

 

 

Below, I’ve grouped the communications by topic (though a number of these communications span several topics). Note that Latham & Watkins’ paralegal only used the last date on these communications, which I will adopt. But a number reflect a communication chain that extends months and includes dates that are far more important to the Durham prosecution.

Some of these files include topics that have attracted a great deal of often misleading coverage, such as the efforts to get server images from the Democrats. Importantly, by the time the FBI asked for server images, according to these communications, the only place to get them was at CrowdStrike.

I don’t believe DNC/DCCC have the images that CS took. Only CS have those. It’s like paying ATM fees to your bank to get your cash. DNC/DCCC will be charged to get the images back.

After some discussion about who would pay CrowdStrike to create a second image, the firm offered to do it for free.

These communications also give a sense of the extent to which Democrats faced new and perceived threats all through the election. Given the communications below and some details I know of the Democrats’ response to the attacks, I suspect these communications do not include real attempted attacks, either because they were not reported or because the report went to FBI via another channel. While CrowdStrike attempted to ensure Sussmann was always in the loop, for example, that discipline was not maintained. And we know CrowdStrike found the compromise of the Democrats analytics hosted on AWS in September, a compromise that may only show up in these communications mentioned in passing. Some in the FBI seemed entirely unsympathetic to the paranoia that suffering a nation-state attack during an election caused, which couldn’t have helped already sour relations between the FBI and Hillary’s people.

Perhaps the most interesting communications — to me at least — pertain to efforts to authenticate the documents that got publicly posted and to identify any alterations to them. At least as laid out in these communications, the Democrats were way behind the public in identifying key alterations to documents posted by Guccifer 2.0, and it’s unclear whether the FBI was any further ahead. But these discussions show what kind of alterations the Democrats were able to identify (such as font changes) as well as which publicly posted documents the FBI was sharing internally.

FBI public statements

160614 DX102 A discussion of Jim Trainor’s preparation for a meeting with Ellen Nakashima in advance of her June 14, 2016 reporting the hack and CrowdStrike’s attribution. Among other things, they note Nakashima’s confidence that GOP PACs were also targeted.

160725 DX112 This email chain between Sussmann and Trainor captured Sussmann’s frustration that FBI made an announcement of an investigation into the DNC hack without first running the statement by Sussmann.

160729 DX117 Before FBI sent out a statement about the DCCC hack, Jim Trainor sent Sussmann their draft statement. In response, Sussmann complained that FBI said they were aware of media reports but not of the hack itself. The timing of this exchange is important because Durham’s team repeatedly described a meeting between Marc Elias and Sussmann that day pertaining to a server as relating to the Alfa Bank anomaly.

Points of contact

160616 DX105 An email thread sent within FBI OGC (including to Trisha Anderson) discussing an initial meeting between Jim Trainor, Amy Dacey, Sussmann, and Shawn Henry.

160621 DX107 Starting on June 16, Amy Dacey thanked Assistant Director Jim Trainor for meeting with the Democrats about the hack. The thread turned into a confused request from the campaign for a briefing about whether they, too, had been compromised.

160725 DX114 This chain reflects Hawkins’ confused response after Sussmann provided the contact information for a Hillary staffer with a role in technical security. Hawkins stated, “Nothing concerning HFA has come up.”

160809 DX127 After Donna Brazile replaced Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Sussmann set up a meeting between her and Jim Trainor.

160811 DX128 An email chain among cyber FBI personnel discusses three Secret threat briefings for the DNC, DCCC, and Hillary campaign. Sussmann was scheduled to attend all three briefings, and Marc Elias was scheduled to attend the DCCC and Hillary briefings (though he testified that he did not attend).

160811 DX130 Sussmann sent the FBI notice of a public report of the DNC’s establishment of a cybersecurity advisory board. The report was passed on to Jim Trainor.

DHS outreach

160802 DX106 A Lync chain starting in the initial aftermath of the Nakashima story, referencing an Intelligence Committee briefing, and discussing how to facilitate DHS assistance to the Democrats through Sussmann.

160802 DX120 With the goal of reaching out to the Democratic victims to offer assistance, DHS asked who the point of contact for both would be.

160816 DX125 This email chain documents DHS’ “SitRep” of their understanding of the DNC/DCCC hacks and their efforts to reach out to help. This includes sharing of DNC/DCCC “artifacts” with NCCIC.

Authentication and venue

160708 DX109 An email chain seeking DNC help authenticating a document released by Guccifer 2.0.

160723 DX110 A discussion starting on July 21 about authenticating and extending after the initial WikiLeaks dump. Hawkins observed, “Looks like there will be multiple releases on that [the WikiLeaks] front.”

160802 DX118 After Adrian Hawkins asked CrowdStrike’s Christopher Scott a question about a public report that the Democrats’ analytics had been hacked, Scott explained that Sussmann had to be involved in any discussions between the FBI and their cybersecurity contractor. Hawkins also asked for specifics about the compromised servers that the FBI could use to establish venue.

160816 DX134 An email chain mentioning but not including Sussmann describes the efforts to establish venue (especially for Field staff who rely on laptops and travel a lot) as well as the efforts to authenticate documents.

160822 DX136 Two Lync messages describing a script that can be used to match WordPress documents with files stolen from the DNC.

160922 DX145 NSD’s Deputy Chief of  Cyber, Sean Newell, asks Sussmann to meet to discuss some information requests from NDCA. They set up a meeting for September 26.

160930 DX147 Hawkins follows up on Newell’s request for information with a much more detailed request from the San Francisco Division. This request includes details of the forensics NDCA was asking for, generally to include the CrowdStrike reports, network diagrams, logs, and images for the compromised hosts.

161004 DX148 In response to WikiLeaks promises about an upcoming file release, Newell follows up on a September 27 request he made of Sussmann for any files that were altered as well as a list of files that had been released but not circulated outside of the victim organizations first, including some indication whether those had been altered. Sussmann says they would have information available later that week.

161012 DX150 In another chain of responses to Newell’s information request, someone at Perkins Coie passes on a description from the DCCC about how an image posted by Guccifer 2.0 differed from the file structure as it appeared on their server, including as it pertained to a file named, “Pelosi Vote Email.”

161026 DX154 This chain is a follow-up to the Newell request, though it actually includes Guccifer 2.0 documents about Trump’s taxes discussed. It includes description of an altered document published by Guccifer 2.0, in which the font was changed. It also includes a DOJ NSD person asking FBI to print out the document because they don’t have any unattributable computers.

161024 DX165 This is yet another continuation of the Newell request, this one included the Trump Report altered by Guccifer 2.0. It includes some discussion of alterations to that document (as compared to unaltered ones released by WikiLeaks). It also describes documents that a DNC research staffer believes were taken from his local desktop.

CrowdStrike Reports

160815 DX132 Burnham to Farrar explaining there are two CloudStrike reports, one for the DNC and the other for the DCCC. The former is done, while the latter will be done soon.

160825 DX137 Hawkins asks Sussmann about the DNC CrowdStrike report, Sussmann explains it’s still a few days away, but then the next day says he’s reading “it” (which may be the DCCC report). Sussmann’s response gets forwarded to a few more people.

160830 DX 138 A Lync chain conveying that Sussmann had alerted the FBI that the CrowdStrike report was done and asking if WFO should pick it up.

Server images

161013 DX151 In another chain of responses to Sean Newell’s information request, the discussion turns from Sussmann’s effort to make sure the Democrats respond to all the FBI’s data request to how to obtain images (whether to have CrowdStrike spend 10 hours to do it or let FBI onsite to do it themselves). As part of this chain, Sussmann says that “in theory” the Democrats would be amenable to letting the FBI onsite to image the serves themselves, but then checks to see whether the data is at CrowdStrike or the DNC.

161013 DX152 This chain is follow-up to the request for server images. Sussmann connects the FBI and CrowdStrike, CS offers to image the servers for free, and the FBI provides the address where to send them.

161028 DX153 A Lync that starts with Newell requesting someone attend the October 11 meeting with Sussmann, continues through a discussion about how to get images of the compromised servers (including whether Sussmann may have misinterpreted the ask), and includes a discussion about a re-compromise.

Lizard Squad ransomware threat

160803 DX121 Late night on August 2, Sussmann reported a ransomware threat from the Lizard Squad. This email discusses the various equities behind such a threat and involves a guy named Rodney Hays, whom the Durham team would at one point insist must be Rodney Joffe.

160806 DX124 This chain reflects more of the response to Sussmann reporting a ransomware threat from Lizard Squad. As noted, it involves a guy named Rodney Hays that Durham’s team insisted must be Joffe.

160922 DX144 Over a month after the Democrats reported the Lizard Squad threat, Eric Lu wrote up the intake report, including the bitcoin address involved and Sussmann’s email to Rodney on August 9 thanking him for his assistance.

Other threats

160726 DX115 Sussmann set up a meeting with Hawkins and others so someone could report “some offline activity related to the intrusion.” This was around the time when Ali Chalupa believed she was being followed, though nothing in this chain describes the threat.

160908 DX140 On August 26, EA Hawkins wrote Sussmann directly alerting him to a new phishing campaign targeting Democrats. On September 7, he wrote back with three accounts that may have been targeted.

160916 DX141 Moore emailing Josh Hubiak — a cyber agent in Pittsburgh — asking for contact information for Michael Sussmann so she can obtain the contact information for a DNC bigwig whose Microsoft Outlook account was compromised, apparently by APT 28. Hubiak is one of the agents also involved in the Alfa Bank investigation.

160917 DX142 The day after the request for contact information for the DNC bigwig, there’s further discussion about how to contact him. The FBI also shares new files reflecting the network share for a different DNC person, a former IT staffer, that was uploaded to Virus Total.

160927 DX146 In response to public reports that some Democratic phones may have been targeted and a potential compromise of Powell’s phone (probably Colin, whose communications were posted to dcleaks), there’s some chatter about what information is available from Apple and Google. One of the key agents involved complains that, “it would be awesome if Google helped out, as I know they are at least 2 steps ahead of me and I’m in a sad, losing game of catchup.”

161011 DX149 This seems to be a collection of Lync notes from October 11, showing three different issues pertaining to Sussmann happening at once: the transfer of custody of the thumb drives to the Chicago office, a reference to a meeting with Sussmann, and a report of a new Democratic concern about exposed Social Security numbers.

161230 DX155 A Lync chain that goes from October 28 through December 30 covering the concern about a bug at DNC HQ, the response to the NYT article naming Hawkins, and another compromise alert.

161017 DX164 This may be a summary prepared for Mother Jones. Whatever the purpose (there is no date), it describes the timeline of FBI’s response to a request for a sweep of DNC headquarters in response to some anomaly. Sussmann permitted the sweep but asked that it be done covertly, so as not to alert DNC staffers.

Crossfire Hurricane

160804 DX123 On August 4, Joe Pientka forwarded the original June 14 Nakashima story to the agents who had just been assigned to the Crossfire Hurricane team with the explanation, “Just going through old — possibly pertinent emails.”


Technical Exhibits, Michael Sussmann Trial

Thanks to those who’ve donated to help defray the costs of trial transcripts. Your generosity has funded the expected costs of transcripts. But if you appreciate the kind of coverage no one else is offering, we’re still happy to accept donations. This coverage reflects the culmination of eight months work. 

Most of my coverage during the Michael Sussmann trial will be trial related, describing what witnesses and exhibits say about the case.

But there are good reasons to question the conduct of the investigation — and that’s a topic a lot of people have independent interest in. So I wanted to start a running post on technical issues.

If there’s a link that doesn’t work, it probably means I’ve forgot to set permissions to public (some of this needs redaction before posting). Leave a comment or tweet me at @emptywheel.

FBI investigation

160921 Allison Sands’ Lync Notes (thru 161012)

160922: Scott Hellman/Nate Batty assessment

160923: Electronic Communication opening investigation

160923: EC plus all three shared documents

160926: Curtis Heide Lyncs

160926: Heide to Hellman, Hope our assessment is good

160926: Ryan Gaynor notes (includes details on election protection efforts)

161004: Kyle Steere document contents thumb drives

161005: Investigative update from Allison Sands

Includes:

  • FBI conclusion on changing DNS records
  • FBI’s response to David Dagon’s defense
  • Logs from Cendyn, with Listrak still to come
  • Barracuda reference
  • Discussion of Tor node

161007: Sands Draft FD-1023 CHS Report

170118: Sands Closing Memo

170327: 302 interview Alfa Bank

Materials shared with FBI

White paper

DNS logs

62 pages of DNS logs

Trump Who Is

9 IP Addresses

15 Trump mail domains

160919 Expert White Paper

Joffe data requests (postdates original data in white paper)

160820: Antonokakis to DeJong requesting data (including dcleaks)

List of IP addresses

Alfa Bank script

160915: DeJong shares results with Joffe

170718: DeJong to Joffe: I have four jobs that look for Trump

Posts related to technical issues

The Methodology of Andrew DeFilippis’ Elaborate Plot to Break Judge Cooper’s Rules


The Methodology of Andrew DeFilippis’ Elaborate Plot to Break Judge Cooper’s Rules

Thanks to those who’ve donated to help defray the costs of trial transcripts. Your generosity has funded the expected costs. If you appreciate the kind of coverage no one else is offering, we’re still happy to accept donations for this coverage — which reflects the culmination of eight months work. 

When Michael Sussmann attorney Sean Berkowitz was walking FBI Agent Scott Hellman through the six meetings he had with Durham’s team on Tuesday — meetings he first had as a witness about the investigation into the Alfa Bank allegations and later in preparation for his trial testimony — Berkowitz asked Hellman about how, sometime earlier this year, Andrew DeFilippis and Jonathan Algor asked him whether he could serve as their DNS expert for the trial.

Q And then, more recently, you met with Mr. DeFilippis and I think Johnny Algor, who is also at the table here, who’s an Assistant U.S. Attorney. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. They wanted to talk to you about whether you might be able to act as an expert in this case about DNS data?

A. Correct.

To Hellman’s credit, he told Durham’s prosecutors — who have been investigating matters pertaining to DNS data for two years — that he only had superficial knowledge of DNS and so wasn’t qualified to be their expert.

Q. You said, while you had some superficial knowledge, you didn’t necessarily feel qualified to be an expert in this case, correct, on DNS data?

A. On DNS data, that’s correct.

It wasn’t until the third day of trial before Durham’s team presented any evidence about the alleged crime. Instead, Durham’s first two witnesses were their nominal expert, David Martin, and Hellman, who told Durham he wasn’t an expert but who offered opinions he neither had the expertise to offer nor had done the work to substantiate.

That’s important, because DeFilippis used him to provide an opinion only an expert should give. And virtually everything about his testimony — his claim to have relied on the data in the materials without looking at the thumb drives, an apparently made up claim about the timing of the analysis, and behaviors that the FBI normally finds suspicious — suggest he’s not only not a DNS expert qualified to assess this report, but his assessment of the white paper Sussmann shared also suffers from serious credibility issues.

The battle over an expert

The testimony of the nominal expert, David Martin, was remarkably nondescript, particularly given the fight that led up to his testimony. Durham’s team sprung even having an expert on Sussmann at a really late date: on March 30, after months of blowing off Sussmann’s inquiries if they would. Not only did they want Martin to explain to the jury what DNS and Tor are, Durham’s team explained, but they also wanted him to weigh in on the validity of conclusions drawn by researchers who had found the anomaly.

  • the authenticity vel non of the purported data supporting the allegations provided to the FBI and Agency-2;
  • the possibility that such purported data was fabricated, altered, manipulated, spoofed, or intentionally generated for the purpose of creating the false appearance of communications;
  • whether the DNS data that the defendant provided to the FBI and Agency-2 supports the conclusion that a secret communications channel existed between and/or among the Trump Organization, Alfa Bank, and/or Spectrum Health;

[snip]

  • the validity and plausibility of the other assertions and conclusions set forth in the various white papers that the defendant provided to the FBI and Agency-2;

As Sussmann noted in his motion to limit Martin’s testimony, he didn’t mind the testimony about DNS and Tor. He just didn’t want this trial to be about the accuracy of the data, especially without the lead time to prepare his own expert.

As the Government has already disclosed to the defense, should the defense attempt to elicit testimony surrounding the accuracy and/or reliability of the data that the defendant provided to the FBI and Agency-2, Special Agent Martin would explain the following:

  • That while he cannot determine with certainty whether the data at issue was cherry-picked, manipulated, spoofed or authentic, the data was necessarily incomplete because it was a subset of all global DNS data;
  • That the purported data provided by the defendant nevertheless did not support the conclusions set forth in the primary white paper which the defendant provided to the FBI;
  • That numerous statements in the white paper were inaccurate and/or overstated; and
  • That individuals familiar with these relevant subject areas, such as DNS data and TOR, would know that such statements lacked support and were inaccurate and/or overstated.

Based off repeated assurances from Durham that they weren’t going to make accuracy an issue in their case in chief, Judge Cooper ruled that the government could only get into accuracy questions if Sussmann tried to raise the accuracy of the data himself. But if he said he relied on the assurances of Rodney Joffe, it wouldn’t come in.

The government suggests that Special Agent Martin’s testimony may go further, depending on what theories Sussmann pursues in cross-examination or his defense case. Consistent with its findings above, the Court will allow the government’s expert to testify about the accuracy (or lack thereof) of the specific data provided to the FBI here only in certain limited circumstances. In particular, if Sussmann seeks to establish at trial that the data were accurate, and that there was in fact a communications channel between Alfa Bank and the Trump Campaign, expert testimony explaining why this could not be the case will become relevant. But, as the Court noted above, additional testimony about the accuracy of the data—expert or otherwise—will not be admissible just because Mr. Sussmann presents evidence that he “relied on Tech Executive-1’s conclusions” about the data, or “lacked a motive to conceal information about his clients.” Gov’s Expert Opp’n at 11. As the Court has already explained, complex, technical explanations about the data are only marginally probative of those defense theories. The Court will not risk confusing the jury and wasting time on a largely irrelevant or tangential issue. See United States v. Libby, 467 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2006) (excluding evidence under Rule 403 where “any possible minimal probative value that would be derived . . . is far outweighed by the waste of time and diversion of the jury’s attention away from the actual issues”).

Then, days before the trial, the issue came up again. Durham sent a letter on May 6 (ten days before jury selection), raising a bunch of new issues they wanted Martin to raise. Sussmann argued that Durham was trying to expand the scope of what his expert could present. Among his complaints, Sussmann argued that Durham was trying to make a materiality argument via his expert witness.

Third, the Special Counsel apparently intends to offer expert testimony about the materiality of the false statement alleged in this case. Indeed, the Special Counsel’s supplemental topic 9 regarding the importance of considering the collection source of DNS data is plainly being offered to prove materiality. But the Special Counsel did not disclose this topic in either his initial expert disclosure or Opposition, and the Court’s ruling did not permit such testimony. The Special Counsel should not now be allowed to offer an entirely new expert opinion under the guise of eliciting testimony regarding the types of conclusions that can be drawn from a review of DNS data.

Judge Cooper considered the issue Tuesday morning, before opening arguments. When asking why Martin had to present the concept of visibility, DeFilippis explained that Hellman–the Agent who’s not an expert on DNS but whom DeFilippis nevertheless had asked to serve as an expert on DNS–would talk about the import of knowing visibility to assess data.

THE COURT: Well, but isn’t the question here whether a case agent — is your case agent later going to testify that that was something that the FBI looked at or wanted to look at in this case and was unable to do so, and that that negatively affected the FBI’s investigation in some way? MR.

DeFILIPPIS: Yes, and I expect Special Agent Hellman, who will testify likely today, Your Honor, I expect that that is a concept that he will say was relevant to the determination that — determinations he was making as he drafted analysis of the data that came in. And, again, I don’t think we — for example, another way in which this comes up is that the FBI routinely receives DNS data from various private companies who collect that data, and it is always relevant sort of the breadth of visibility that those companies have. So it’s relevant generally, but also in this particular case the fact that the FBI did not have insight into the visibility or lack of visibility of that data certainly affected steps that the FBI took.

THE COURT: Okay. But Mr. Sussman has not been accused of misrepresenting who the source is. He’s simply — but rather who the client is. So how do you link that to the materiality of the alleged false statement?

MR. DeFILIPPIS: Because, Your Honor, I think we view them as intertwined. It was because — it was in part because Mr. Sussman said he didn’t have a client that made it more difficult for the FBI to get to the bottom of the source of this data or made it less likely they would, and so — and, again, I don’t think we expect to dwell for a long time on this, but I think the agents and the technical folks will say that that is part of why the origins of the data are extremely relevant when they took investigative steps here.

When Cooper noted Sussmann’s objection to Martin discussing possible spoofing of data, DeFilippis again answered not about what Martin would testify, but what Hellman would.

As DeFilippis explained, he claimed to believe that under Cooper’s ruling, the government could put in any little thing they wanted that they claimed had been part of the investigation.

And Special Agent Hellman, when he testifies today — now, Your Honor’s ruling we understand to permit us to put into evidence anything about what the FBI analyzed and concluded as its investigation unfolded because that goes to the materiality of the defendant’s statement. So Special Agent Hellman — through Agent Hellman we will offer into evidence a paper he prepared when the data first came in, and among its conclusions is that the data might — he doesn’t use the word “spoof” — but might have been intentionally generated and might have been fabricated. That was the FBI’s initial conclusion in what it wrote up.

So in order for the jury to understand the course of the FBI’s investigation and the conclusions that it drew at each stage, those concepts are at the center of it.

[snip]

MR. DeFILIPPIS: Okay. Your Honor, I’m sorry. We understood your ruling to be that the FBI’s conclusions as it went along were okay as long as we weren’t asserting the conclusion that it was, in fact, fabricated. You know, I mean, it’s difficult to chart the course of the FBI’s investigation unless we can elicit at each stage what it is that the FBI concluded.

Judge Cooper ordered that references to spoofing be removed — leading to a last minute redaction of an exhibit — but permitted a discussion of visibility to come in.

After all that fight, Martin’s testimony was not only bland, but it was recycled powerpoint. He not only admitted lifting the EFF description of Tor for his PowerPoint, but he included their logo.

Hellman delivers the non-expert expert opinion Durham was prohibited from giving

As I said, Martin was witness number one, Hellmann — the self-described non-expert in DNS — was witness number two.

Even though Hellman admitted, again, that he’s not a DNS expert, DeFilippis still had him go over what DNS is.

Q. How familiar or unfamiliar are you with what is known as DNS or Domain Name System data?

A. I know the basics about DNS.

Q. And in your understanding, on a very basic level, what is DNS?

A. DNS is basically how one computer would try and communicate with another computer.

After getting Hellman to explain how he purportedly got chain of custody signatures on September 20, 2016 for the materials Michael Sussmann dropped off with James Baker on September 19, DeFilippis walked Hellman through how, he claimed, he had concluded that the allegations Sussmann dropped off were unsupported. Hellman reviewed the data accompanying the white paper, Durham’s star cybersecurity witness claimed on the stand, and after reviewing that data, determined there was no allegation of a hack in the materials and therefore nothing for the Cyber Division to look at. And, as a report he wrote “within a day” summarized, he concluded the methodology was horrible.

As you read the following exchange, know that (as I understand it) some, if not most, of what Hellman describes as the methodology is wrong. Obviously, if Hellman’s understanding of the methodology is wrong, then the opinion that DeFilippis elicits from a guy who admitted he was not an expert on DNS but whom DeFilippis nevertheless asked to serve as his expert witness on DNS before inviting David Martin in to present slides lifted from the Electronic Frontier Foundation instead [Takes a breath] … If Hellman’s understanding of the methodology and the data he’s looking at is wrong, then his opinion about the methodology is going to be of little merit.

With that understanding, note the objection of Sean Berkowitz, who fought DeFilippis’ late hour addition of an expert that DeFilippis wanted to use to opine on the validity of the research, bolded below.

So we looked at the top part, which set out your top-line conclusion. You then have a portion of the paper that says, “The investigators who conducted the research appear to have done the following.” Now, Special Agent Hellman, it appears to be a pretty technical discussion, but can you just tell us, in that first part of the paper, what did you set out and what did you conclude?

A. It looks to be that they were looking for domains associated with Trump, and the way that they did that was they looked at a list of sort of all domains and looked for domains that had the word “Trump” in them as a way to narrow down the number of domains they were looking at.

And then they wanted to find, well, which of that initial set of Trump domains, which of them are email servers associated with those domains. And the way they did that was to search for terms associated with email, like “mail” or other email-related terms to then narrow down their list of domains even further to be Trump-associated domains that were email servers.

Q. And did you opine on the soundness of that methodology? In other words, did you express a view as to whether this was a good way to go about this project?

A. We did not — I did not feel that that was the most expeditious way to go about identifying email servers associated with the domain.

Q. And why was that?

A. You can name an email server anything you want. It doesn’t have to have the words “mail” or “SMTP” in it. And so by — if you’re just searching for those terms, I would wager to guess you would miss an actual email server because there are other — there are other more technical ways that you can use — basically look-up tools, Internet look-up tools where you can say, for any domain, tell me the associated email server. That’s essentially like a registered email server. But the way that they were doing it was they were just looking for key terms, and I think that it just didn’t make sense to me why they would go about identifying email servers that way as opposed to just being able to look them up.

Q. Was there anything else about the methodology used here by the writer or writers of this paper that you found questionable or that you didn’t agree with?

A. I think just the overall assumptions that were being made about that the server itself was actually communicating at all. That was probably one of the biggest ones.

Q. And what, if anything, did you conclude about whether you believed the authors of the paper or author of the paper was fairly and neutrally conducting an analysis? Did you have an opinion either way?

MR. BERKOWITZ: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Basis?

MR. BERKOWITZ: Objection on foundation. He asked him his opinion. He’s not qualified as an expert for that.

THE COURT: I’ll overrule it.

A. Sorry, can you please repeat the question?

Q. Sure. Did you draw a conclusion one way or the other as to whether the authors of this paper seemed to be applying a sound methodology or whether, to the contrary, they were trying to reach a particular result? Did you —

A. Based upon the conclusions they drew and the assumptions that they made, I did not feel like they were objective in the conclusions that they came to.

Q. And any particular reasons or support for that?

A. Just the assumption you would have to make was so far reaching, it didn’t — it just didn’t make any sense.

That’s how, as his second witness, Andrew DeFilippis introduced the opinion of a guy who admitted he wasn’t an expert on DNS that DeFilippis had asked to serve as an expert even though DeFilippis should have known that he didn’t have the expertise to offer expert opinions like this.

If Sussmann is found guilty, I would bet a great deal of money this stunt will be one part of a several pronged appeal, because Judge Cooper permitted DeFilippis to do precisely what Cooper had prohibited him from doing before trial, and he let him do it with a guy who by his own admission is not a DNS expert.

Cyber Division reaches a conclusion without looking at the thumb drives

Now let’s look at what Hellman describes his own methodology to be.

First, it was quick. DeFilippis seems to think that serves his narrative, as if this stuff was so crappy that it took a mere glimpse to discredit it.

Q. Special Agent Hellman, how long would you say it took you and Special Agent Batty to write this up?

A. Inside of a day.

Q. Inside of a day, you said?

Berkowitz walked Hellman through the timeline of it, and boy was it quick. There’s some uncertainty about this timeline, because John Durham’s office doesn’t feel the need to make clear whether exhibits they’re turning over in discovery reflect UTC or ET. But I think I’ve laid it out below (Berkowitz got it wrong in cross-examination, which DeFilippis used to attack his analysis).

As you can see, not only were FBI’s crack cybersecurity agents making a final conclusion about the data within a day but — by all appearances — they did so before they had ever looked at the thumb drives included with the white papers. From the record, it’s actually not clear when — if!!! — they looked at the thumb drives. But it’s certain they had their analysis finalized no more than one working day after they admitted they hadn’t looked at the thumb drive, which was itself after they had already decided the white paper was shit.

Timeline

September 20, 10:20AM: Nate Batty tells Jordan Kelly they’ll come from Chantilly to DC get the thumb drives

September 20, 10:31AM: Jordan Kelly tells Batty the chain of custody is “Sussman to Strzock to Sporre”

September 20, 12:29PM: Hellman and Nate Batty accept custody of the thumb drives

September 20, 1:30PM: Hour drive back to Chantilly, VA

September 20, 4:44PM: Hellman appears to explain the process of picking up the thumb drives to jrsmith, claiming to have spoken to Baker on the phone. jrsmith jokes about “doctor[ing] a chain of evidence form.”

September 20, 4:58: Hellman says the more he reads the report “it feels a little 5150ish,” suggesting (as he explained to Berkowitz on cross) the authors suffered from a mental disability, and Hellman complains that “it contains an absurd quantity of data” to which Batty responded, the data seemed “inserted to overwhelm and confuse the reader.”

September 21, 8:47AM: Batty tells Hellman their supervisor wants them to “write a brief summary of what we think about the DNC report.” Batty continues by suggesting that “we should at least plug the thumb drives into Frank’s computer and look at the files…”

9/22, 9:44AM: Curtis Heide, in Chicago, asks Batty to send the contents of the thumb drive so counterintelligence agents can begin to look at the evidence. The boys in Cyber struggle to do so for a bit.

9/22, 2:49PM: Batty asks Hellman what he did with the blue thumb drive.

9/22, 4:46PM: Batty sends “analysis of Trump white paper” to others.

In other words, the cyber division spent less than 28 hours doing this analysis.

Yes. The analysis was quick.

Hellman says his analysis is valid because he looked at the data

The hastiness of the analysis and the fact that Hellman didn’t look at the thumb drive before making initial conclusions about the research is fairly problematic, because when he discussed his own methodology, he described the data driving everything.

Q. Now, what principally, from the materials, did you rely on to do your analysis?

A. So it was really two things. It was looking at the data, the technical data itself. There was a summary that it came with. And then also we were comparing what we saw in the data, sort of the story that the data told us, and then looking at the narrative that it came with and comparing our assessment of the data to the narrative.

[snip]

Q. And in connection with that analysis, did you also take a look at the data itself that was underlying this paper?

A. Yes

[snip]

Q. And if we look at that first page there, Agent Hellman, what kind of data is this?

A. It appears to be — as far as I can tell, it looks to be — it’s log data. So it’s a log that shows a date and a time, a domain, and an IP address. And, I mean, that’s — just looking at this log, there’s not too much more from that.

Q. And do you understand this to be at least a part of the DNS data that was contained on the thumb drives that I think you testified about earlier?

A. Yes.

[snip]

A. It would have mattered — well, I think on one hand it would not have mattered from the technical standpoint. If I’m looking at technical data, the data’s going to tell me whatever story the data’s going to tell me independent of where it comes from. So I still would have done the same technical analysis.

But knowing where the data comes from helps to tell me — it gives me context regarding how much I believe in the data, how authentic it is, do I believe it’s real, and do I trust it. [my emphasis]

He repeated this claim on cross with Berkowitz.

I just disagreed with the conclusions they came to and the analysis that they did based upon the data that came along with the white paper.

When Berkowitz asked him why counterintelligence opened an investigation when Cyber didn’t, Hellman suggested that the people in CD wouldn’t understand how to read the technical logs.

A. Um, I think they’d probably be looking at it from the same vantage point, but if you’re not — you don’t have experience looking at technical logs, you may not have the capability of doing a review of those logs. You might rely on somebody else to do it. And perhaps counterintelligence agents are going to be thinking about other investigative questions. So I guess it would probably be a combination of both.

“If I’m looking at technical data,” DeFilippis’ star cybersecurity agent explained, “the data’s going to tell me whatever story the data’s going to tell me.”

Except he didn’t look at the technical data, at least not the data on the thumb drives, before he reached his initial conclusion.

Hellman makes a claim unsupported by the data in his own analysis

I’ll leave it to people more expert than me to rip apart Hellman’s own analysis of the white paper Sussmann shared with the FBI. In early consultations, I’ve been told he misunderstood the methodology, misunderstood how researchers used Trump’s other domains to prove that just one had this anomaly (that is, as a way to test their hypothesis), and misstated the necessity of some long-term feedback loop for this anomaly to be sustained. Again, the experts will eventually explain the problems.

One part of his report that I know damns his methodology, however, is where he says the researchers,

Searched “…global nonpublic DNS activity…” (unclear how this was done) and discovered there are (4) primary IP addresses that have resolved to the name “mail1.trump-email.com”. Two of these belong to DNS servers at Russian Alfa Bank. [my emphasis]

This is the point where every single person I know who assessed these allegations who is at least marginally expert on DNS issues stopped and said, “global nonpublic DNS activity? There are only a handful of people that could be!” See, for example, this Robert Graham post written in response to the original Slate story, perhaps the most influential critique of the allegations, probably even on Durham. Every marginally expert person I know has, upon reading something like that, tried to figure out who would have that kind of visibility on the data, because that kind of visibility, by itself, would speak to their expertise. Those marginally expert people did not have the means to identify the possible sources of the data. But a lot of them — including the NYTimes!! — were able to find people who had that kind of visibility to better understand the anomaly. When Hellman read that, he simply said, “unclear how this was done” and moved on.

Still, Hellman did not contest (or possibly even test) the analysis that said there were really just four IP addresses conducting look-ups with the Trump marketing server. Dozens of people have continued to test that result in the years since, and while there have been adjustments to the general result, no one has disproven that the anomaly was strongest between Alfa Bank and Trump’s marketing domain.

Where Hellman’s insta-analysis really goes off the rails, however, is in his assertion that, “it appears that the presumed suspicious activity began approximately three weeks prior to the stated start date of the investigation conducted by the researcher.”

I’m not a DNS expert, but I’m pretty good at timelines, and by my read here are the key dates in the white paper.

May 4, 2016: Beginning date for look-up analysis

July 28, 2016: Lookup for hostnames yielding Trump

September 4, 2016: End date for look-up analysis

September 14, 2016: Updated search for look-ups covering June 17 through September 14

The start date reflected in this white paper is July 28, 2016. Three weeks before that would be July 7, 2016, a date that doesn’t appear in the white paper. The anomaly started 85 days before the start date reflected in this white paper (and the start date for the research began months earlier, but still over three weeks after the May 4 start date).

I don’t understand where he got that claim. But DeFilippis repeated it on the stand, as if it were reflected in the data, I guess believing it makes his star cybersecurity agent look good.

DeFilippis’ star cybersecurity agent has some credibility problems

There are a few more problems with the credibility of Hellman, DeFilippis’ star cybersecurity agent who is not a DNS expert. One of those is that he compared notes with his boss before first testifying.

Q: And you also spoke with Nate Batty around that time, Right?

A: Yes.

Q: Did you talk to him before the first interview to kind of get ready for it?

A: I think so, but I don’t remember.

Q: Is that something that you encourage witnesses to do, to talk to other witnesses to see if your recollections are consistent?

A: No.

In addition, notwithstanding that Batty was told that Sussmann was in the chain of control, Batty claimed to believe the source was “anonymous” and Hellmann claimed to believe it was sensitive–a human source. Even after comparing notes their stories didn’t match.

There are other problems with Hellman’s memory of the events, notably that in his first interview — the one he did shortly after comparing notes with Batty — he claimed that Baker had told him he was unable to identify the source of the data.

Q. And when you went to Mr. Baker’s office, do you remember what, if anything, was said during that discussion or during that interaction?

A. I remember being in the office, but I don’t distinctly recall what the conversation was. I do remember after the fact, though, that I was frustrated that I was not able to identify who had provided these thumb drives, this information to Mr. Baker. He was not willing to tell me.

At the very least, this presents a conflict with Baker’s testimony, but it’s also another testament to how variable memories can be four years, much less six years, after the fact.

Hellman also claimed, when asked on cross, that the first time he had ever seen the reference to a “DNC report” in September 21 Lync notes he received was two years ago, when he was first interviewed.

A: The first time I saw this was two years ago when I was being interviewed by Mr. DeFilippis, and I don’t recall ever seeing it. I never had any recollection of this information coming from DNC. I don’t remember DNC being a part of anything we read or discussed.

Q: Okay. When you say, the first time you saw it was two years ago when you met with Mr. DeFilippis, that’s not accurate. Right? You saw it on September 21st, 2016. Correct?

A: It’s in there. I don’t have any memory of seeing it.

And when Sean Berkowitz asked about Hellman the significance of seeing the reference to a “DNC report” first thing on September 21, he described that DeFilippis suggested to him that it was likely just a typo for DNS.

Q. What’s your explanation for it?

A. I have no recollection of seeing that link message. And there is — I have absolutely no belief that either me or Agent Batty knew where that data was coming from, let alone that it was coming from DNC. The only explanation that popped or was discussed was that it could have been a typo and somebody was trying to refer to DNS instead of DNC.

Q. So you think it was a typo?

A. I don’t know.

Q. When you said the only one suggesting it — isn’t it true that it was Mr. DeFilippis that suggested to you that it might have been a typo recently?

A. That’s correct.

When asked about a topic for which there was documentary evidence Hellman had seen in real time that he claimed not to remember, Andrew DeFilippis offered up an explanation that Hellman then offered on the stand.

On the stand, DeFilippis also tried to get Hellman to call a marketing server a spam server, though Hellman resisted.

Once you look closely, I don’t think Hellman’s testimony helps Durham all that much. What it proves, however, is that DeFilippis attempted to coach testimony.

One final thing. DeFilippis got his star cybersecurity agent to observe that the researchers didn’t include their name or other markers on their report, as if that’s a measure of unreliablity.

Q. Now, let me ask you, were you able to determine from any of these materials who had actually drafted the paper alleging the secret channel?

A. No.

Q. In other words, was it contained anywhere in the documents?

Here’s what Hellman’s own report looks like:

There’s a unit — ECOU1 — but the names of the individual agents appear nowhere in the report. The report is not dated. It does not specifically identify the white papers and thumb drives by control numbers, something key to evidentiary analysis.

It has none of the markers of regularity you’d expect from the FBI. Hellman’s own analysis doesn’t meet the standards that DeFilippis uses to measure reliability.

This long-time Grand Rapids resident is furious that Hellman judged there was no hack

Everything above I write as a journalist who has tried to understand this story for almost six years. Between that and 18 years of covering national security cases, I hope I now have sufficient familiarity with it to know there are real problems with Hellman’s analysis.

But let me speak as someone who lived in Grand Rapids for most of this period, and had friends who had to deal with the aftermath of Spectrum Health appearing at the center of a politically contentious story.

Hellman had, as he testified, two jobs. First, he was supposed to determine whether there were any cyber equities, then he was supposed to do some insta-analysis of the data without first looking at the thumb drives.

According to Hellman, there was no hack.

I was asked to perform two tasks in tandem with Special Agent Batty, and our tasks were, number one, to look at this data, look at the data and look at the narrative that it came with and identify were there any what’s known as cyber equities. And by that it was, was there any allegation of a hacking. That’s what cyber division does. We investigate hacking. So was there an allegation that somebody or some company or some computer had been hacked. That was first.

[snip]

As I mentioned, the first piece was we had to identify was there any real allegation of hacking; and there was not. That was our first task by our supervisor. There was not.

[snip]

The allegation was that someone purported to find a secret communication channel between the Trump organization and Russia. And so we identified first that, no, we didn’t think that there was any cyber equity, meaning that there was probably nothing more for cyber to investigate further, if there was no hacking crime.

Except here’s what the white paper says about Spectrum, that Grand Rapids business that was swept up in this story.

The Spectrum Health IP address is a TOR exit node used exclusively by Alfa Bank. ie.,  Alfa Bank communications enter a Tor node somewhere in the world and those communications exit, presumably untraceable, at Spectrum Health There is absolutely no reason why Spectrum would want a Tor exit node on its system. (Indeed, Spectrum Health would not want a TOR node on its system because, by its nature, you never know what will come out of a TOR node, including child pornography and other legal content.)

We discovered that Spectrum Health is the victim of a network intrusion. Therefore, Spectrum Health may not know it has a TOR exit node on its network. Alternatively, the DeVos family may have people at Spectrum who know there is a TOR node. i.e.,  could have been placed there with inside help.

When faced with some anomalous activity that seemed to tie into the weird DNS traffic, the experts suggested that maybe the Spectrum hack related to the DNS anomaly.

To be clear, this Tor allegation is the the weakest part of this white paper. You will hear about this to no end over the next week. It was technically wrong.

But the allegation in the white paper is that maybe a recent hack of Spectrum Health is why it had this anomalous traffic with Trump’s marketing server. There’s your hack!!

Had the people at FBI’s cybersecurity side actually treated this as a possible compromise, it might have addressed the part of this story that never made any sense. And we might not, now, six years later, be arguing about what might explain it.

Let me be clear: I do think the white paper overstated its conclusions. I don’t think secret communication is the most obvious explanation here.

But there are hacks and then there are hacks in the testimony of DeFilippis’ star cybersecurity agent.

Update: Corrected an attribution to Batty instead of Hellman.

Update: Fixed my own timeline.

Update: Added link to Robert Graham’s analysis.

Update: This may be where Hellman gets his erroneous three week claim. There were two histograms included with the report. One, the close-up, does start around July 7.

But the broader scope shows look-ups earlier, very actively in June, but with a few stray ones in May.

The government didn’t include the pages and pages of logs that Batty complained about in this exhibit. Had they, it would be clear to jurors that this claim is false.

Update: Correction on two points. First, I think I’ve finally got the Lync exchange above correct between Batty and Hellman. As noted, Hellman complains that “it contains an absurd quantity of data” to which Batty responded, the data seemed “inserted to overwhelm and confuse the reader.”

Second, I was wading through exhibits this morning and found the exhibit of 19 pages of logs. Here’s just a subset of them, including logs that go back to May 2016. Hellman didn’t look even at the printed page of log files closely enough to realize his claim about three weeks was wrong. These data weren’t intended to overwhelm the reader. They were there to show how the anomaly accelerated during the election.


Confirmed: John Durham Has Withheld Discovery That DOJ Already Disproved His Claims of Political Malice

In his reply filing in the fight over what evidence will be submitted at his trial, Michael Sussmann confirmed something I’ve long suspected: John Durham has not provided Sussmann with the discovery Durham would need to have provided to present his own conspiracy theories at trial without risking a major discovery violation.

Were the Special Counsel to try to suggest that Mr. Sussmann and Mr. Steele engaged in a common course of conduct, that would open the door to an irrelevant mini-trial about the accuracy of Mr. Steele’s allegations about Mr. Trump’s ties to Russia—something that, like the Alfa Bank allegations, many experts continue to believe in, and about which the Special Counsel has tellingly failed to produce any significant discovery.

Sussmann dropped this in the filing without fanfare. But it is clear notice that if Durham continues down the path he is headed, he may face discovery sanctions down the road.

I explained why that’s true in these two posts. A core tenet of Durham’s conspiracy theories is that the only reason one would use proven cybersecurity methods to test certain hypotheses about Donald Trump would be for malicious political reasons. Here’s how Durham argued that in his own reply.

As the Government will demonstrate at trial, it was also the politically-laden and ethically-fraught nature of this project that gave Tech Executive-1 and the defendant a strong motive to conceal the origins of the Russian Bank-1 allegations and falsely portray them as the organic discoveries of concerned computer scientists.

There’s no external measure for what makes one thing political and makes another thing national security. But if this issue were contested, I assume that Sussmann would point, first, to truth as a standard. And as he could point out, many of the hypotheses April Lorenzen tested, which Durham points to as proof the project was malicious and political, turned out to be true. They were proven to be true by DOJ. Some of those true allegations involved guilty pleas to crimes, including FARA, explicitly designed to protect national security; another involved Roger Stone’s guilty verdict on charges related to his cover-up of his potential involvement in a CFAA hacking case.

DOJ (under the direction of Trump appointee Rod Rosenstein, who in those very same years was Durham’s direct supervisor) has already decided that John Durham is wrong about these allegations being political. Sussmann has both truth and DOJ’s backing on his side that these suspicions, if proven true (as they were), would be a threat to national security. Yet Durham persists in claiming to the contrary.

Here’s the evidence proving these hypotheses true that Durham has withheld in discovery:

The researchers were testing whether Richard Burt was a back channel to the Trump campaign. And while Burt’s more substantive role as such a (Putin-ordered) attempt to establish a back channel came during the transition, it is a fact that Burt was involved in several events earlier in the campaign at which pro-Russian entities tried to cultivate the campaign, including Trump’s first foreign policy speech. Neither Burt nor anyone else was charged with any crime, but Mueller’s 302s involving the Center for National Interest — most notably two very long interviews with Dmitri Simes (one, updated, two, updated), which were still under investigation in March 2020 — reflect a great deal of counterintelligence interest in the organization.

The researchers were also testing whether people close to Trump were laundering money from Putin-linked Oligarchs through Cyprus. That guy’s name is Paul Manafort, with the assistance of Rick Gates. Indeed, Manafort was ousted from the campaign during the period researchers were working on the data in part to distance the campaign from that stench (though it didn’t stop Trump from pardoning Manafort).

A more conspiratorial Lorenzen hypothesis (at least on its face) was that one of the family members of an Alfa Bank oligarch might be involved — maybe a son- or daughter-in-law. And in fact, German Khan’s son-in-law Alex van der Zwaan was working with Gates and Konstantin Kilimnik in precisely that time period to cover up Manafort’s ties to those Russian-backed oligarchs.

Then there was the suspicion — no doubt driven, on the Democrats’ part, by the correlation between Trump’s request to Russia for more hacking and the renewed wave of attacks that started hours later — that Trump had some back channel to Russia.

It turns out there were several. There was the aforementioned Manafort, who in the precise period when Rodney Joffe started more formally looking to see if there was a back channel, was secretly meeting at a cigar bar with alleged Russian spy Konstantin Kilimnik discussing millions of dollars in payments involving Russian-backed oligarchs, Manafort’s plan to win the swing states, and an effort to carve up Ukraine that leads directly to Russia’s current invasion.

That’s the kind of back channel researchers were using proven cybersecurity techniques to look for. They didn’t confirm that one — but their suspicion that such a back channel existed proved absolutely correct.

Then there’s the Roger Stone back channel with Guccifer 2.0. Again, in this precise period, Stone was DMing with the persona. But the FBI obtained at least probable cause that Stone’s knowledge of the persona went back much further, back to even before the persona went public in June 2016. That’s a back channel that remained under investigation, predicated off of national security crimes CFAA, FARA, and 18 USC 951, at least until April 2020 and one that, because of the way Stone was scripting pro-Russian statements for Trump, might explain Trump’s “Russia are you listening” comment. DOJ was still investigating Stone’s possible back channel as a national security concern well after Durham was appointed to undermine that national security investigation by deeming it political.

Finally, perhaps the most important back channel — for Durham’s purposes — was Michael Cohen. That’s true, in part, because the comms that Cohen kept lying to hide were directly with the Kremlin, with Dmitri Peskov. That’s also true because on his call to a Peskov assistant, Cohen laid out his — and candidate Donald Trump’s — interest in a Trump Tower Moscow deal that was impossibly lucrative, but which also assumed the involvement of one or another sanctioned bank as well as a former GRU officer. That is, not only did Cohen have a back channel directly with the Kremlin he was trying to hide,  but it involved Russian banks that were far more controversial than the Alfa Bank ties that the researchers were pursuing, because the banks had been deemed to have taken actions that threatened America’s security.

This back channel is particularly important, though, because in the same presser where Trump invited Russia to hack his opponent more, he falsely claimed he had decided against pursuing any Trump Organization developments in Russia.

Russia that wanted to put a lot of money into developments in Russia. And they wanted us to do it. But it never worked out.

Frankly I didn’t want to do it for a couple of different reasons. But we had a major developer, particular, but numerous developers that wanted to develop property in Moscow and other places. But we decided not to do it.

The researchers were explicitly trying to disprove Trump’s false claim that there were no ongoing business interests he was still pursuing with Russia. And this is a claim that Michael Cohen not only admitted was false and described recognizing was false when Trump made this public claim, but described persistent efforts on Trump’s part to cover up his lie, continuing well into his presidency.

For almost two years of Trump’s Administration, Trump was lying to cover up his efforts to pursue an impossibly lucrative real estate deal that would have required violating or eliminating US sanctions on Russia. That entire time, Russia knew Trump was lying to cover up those back channel communications with the Kremlin. That’s the kind of leverage over a President that all Americans should hope to avoid, if they care about national security. That’s precisely the kind of leverage that Sally Yates raised when she raised concerns about Mike Flynn’s public lies about his own back channel with Russia. Russia had that leverage over Trump long past the time Trump limped out of a meeting with Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, to which Trump had brought none of the aides who would normally sit in on a presidential meeting, looking like a beaten puppy.

Durham’s failures to provide discovery on this issue are all the more inexcusable given the fights over privilege that will be litigated this week.

As part of the Democrats’ nesting privilege claims objecting to Durham’s motion to compel privileged documents, Marc Elias submitted a declaration describing how, given his past knowledge and involvement defending against conspiracy theory attacks on past Democratic presidential candidates launched by Jerome Corsi and Donald Trump, and given Trump’s famously litigious nature, he believed he needed expertise on Trump’s international business ties to be able to advise Democrats on how to avoid eliciting such a lawsuit from Trump. (Note, tellingly, Durham’s motion to compel doesn’t mention a great deal of accurate Russian-language research by Fusion — to which Nellie Ohr was just one of a number of contributors — that was never publicly shared nor debunked as to quality.)

There are four redacted passages that describe the advice he provided; he is providing these descriptions ex parte for Judge Cooper to use to assess the Democrats’ privilege claims. Two short ones probably pertain to the scope of Perkins Coie’s relationship with the Democratic committees. Another short one likely describes Elias’ relationship, and through him, Fusion’s, with the oppo research staff on the campaign. But the longest redaction describing Elias’ legal advice, one that extends more than five paragraphs and over a page and a half, starts this way:

That is, the introduction to Elias’ description of the privilege claims tied to the Sussmann trial starts from Trump’s request of Russia to hack Hillary. Part of that sentence and the balance of the paragraph is redacted — it might describe that immediately after Trump made that request, the Russians fulfilled his request — but the redacted paragraph and the balance of the declaration presumably describes what legal advice he gave Hillary as she faced a new onslaught of Russian hacking attempts that seemingly responded to her opponent’s request for such hacking.

Given what Elias described about his decision to hire Fusion, part of that discussion surely explains his effort to assess an anomaly identified independently by researchers that reflected unexplained traffic between a Trump marketing server and a Russian bank. Elias probably described why it was important for the Hillary campaign to assess whether this forensic data explained why Russian hackers immediately responded to Trump’s request to hack her.

As I have noted, in past filings Durham didn’t even consider the possibility that Elias might discuss the renewed wave of hacking that Hillary’s security personnel IDed in real time with Sussmann, Perkins Coie’s cybersecurity expert.

It’s a testament to how deep John Durham is in his conspiracy-driven rabbit hole that he assumes a 24-minute meeting between Marc Elias and Michael Sussmann on July 31, 2016 to discuss the “server issue” pertained to the Alfa Bank allegations. Just days earlier, after all, Donald Trump had asked Russia to hack Hillary Clinton, and within hours, Russian hackers obliged by targeting, for the first time, Hillary’s home office. Someone who worked in security for Hillary’s campaign told me that from his perspective, the Russian attacks on Hillary seemed like a series of increasing waves of attacks, and the response to Trump’s comments was one of those waves (this former staffer documented such waves of attack in real time). The Hillary campaign didn’t need Robert Mueller to tell them that Russia seemed to respond to Trump’s request by ratcheting up their attacks, and Russia’s response to Trump would have been an urgent issue for the lawyer in charge of their cybersecurity response.

It’s certainly possible this reference to the “server” issue pertained to the Alfa Bank allegations. But Durham probably doesn’t know; nor do I. None of the other billing references Durham suggests pertain to the Alfa Bank issue reference a server.

Durham took a reference that might pertain to a discussion of a correlation between Trump’s ask and a renewed wave of Russian attacks on Hillary (or might pertain to the Alfa Bank anomaly), and assumed instead it was proof that Hillary was manufacturing unsubstantiated dirt on her opponent. He never even considered the legal challenges someone victimized by a nation-state attack, goaded by her opponent, might face.

And yet, given the structure of that redaction from Elias, that event is the cornerstone of the privilege claims surrounding the Alfa Bank allegations.

Because of all the things I laid out in this post, Judge Cooper may never have to evaluate these privilege claims at all. To introduce privileged evidence, Durham has to first withstand:

  • Denial because his 404(b) notice asking to present it was late, and therefore forfeited
  • Denial because Durham’s motion to compel violated local rules and grand jury process, in some ways egregiously
  • Rejection because most of the communications over which the Democrats have invoked privilege are inadmissible hearsay
  • The inclusion or exclusion of the testimony of Rodney Joffe, whose privilege claims are the most suspect of the lot, but whose testimony would make the communications Durham deems to be most important admissible

Cooper could defer any assessment of these privilege claims until he decides these other issues and, for one or several procedural reasons, simply punt the decision entirely based on Durham’s serial failures to follow the rules.

Only after that, then, would Cooper assess a Durham conspiracy theory for which Durham himself admits he doesn’t have proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As part of his bid to submit redacted and/or hearsay documents as exhibits under a claim that this all amounted to a conspiracy (albeit one he doesn’t claim was illegal), Durham argues that unless he can submit hearsay and privileged documents, he wouldn’t otherwise have enough evidence to prove his conspiracy theory.

Nor is evidence of this joint venture gratuitous or cumulative of other evidence. Indeed, the Government possesses only a handful of redacted emails between the defendant and Tech Executive-1 on these issues. And the defendant’s billing records pertaining to the Clinton Campaign, while incriminating, do not always specify the precise nature of the defendant’s work.

Accordingly, presenting communications between the defendant’s alleged clients and third parties regarding the aforementioned political research would hardly amount to a “mini-trial.” (Def. Mot. at 20). Rather, these communications are among the most probative and revealing evidence that the Government will present to the jury. Other than the contents of privileged communications themselves (which are of course not accessible to the Government or the jury), such communications will offer some of the most direct evidence on the ultimate question of whether the defendant lied in stating that he was not acting for any other clients.

In short, because the Government here must prove the existence of client relationships that are themselves privileged, it is the surrounding events and communications involving these clients that offer the best proof of those relationships.

Moreover, even if the Court were to find that no joint venture existed, all of the proffered communications are still admissible because, as set forth in the Government’s motions, they are not being offered to prove the truth of specific assertions. Rather, they are being offered to prove the existence of activities and relationships that led to, and culminated in, the defendant’s meeting with the FBI. Even more critically, the very existence of these written records – which laid bare the political nature of the exercise and the numerous doubts that the researchers had about the soundness of their conclusions – gave the defendant and his clients a compelling motive, separate and apart from the truth or falsity of the emails themselves, to conceal the identities of such clients and origins of the joint venture. Accordingly, they are not being offered for their truth and are not hearsay.

This passage (which leads up to a citation from one of the Georgia Tech researchers to which Sussmann was not privy that the frothers have spent the weekend drooling over) is both a confession and a cry for help.

In it, Durham admits he doesn’t actually have proof that the conspiracy he is alleging is the motive behind Michael Sussmann’s alleged lie.

He’s making this admission, of course, while hiding the abundant evidence — evidence he didn’t bother obtaining before charging Sussmann — that Sussmann and Joffe acceded to the FBI request to help kill the NYT story, which substantiates Sussmann’s stated motive.

And then, in the same passage, Durham is pointing to that absence of evidence to justify using that same claimed conspiracy for which he doesn’t have evidence to pierce privilege claims to obtain the evidence he doesn’t have. It’s a circular argument and an admission that all the claims he has been making since September are based off his beliefs about what must be there, not what he has evidence for.

Thus far the researchers’ beliefs about what kind of back channels they might find between Trump and Russia have far more proof than Durham’s absence of evidence.

Again, Durham doesn’t even claim that such a conspiracy would be illegal (much less chargeable under the statute of limitations), which is why he didn’t do what he could have had he been able to show probable cause that a crime had been committed: obtaining the communications with a warrant and using a filter team. Bill Barr’s memoir made it quite clear that he appointed Durham not because a crime had been committed, but because he wanted to know how a “bogus scandal” in which DOJ found multiple national security crimes started. ”Even after dealing with the Mueller report, I still had to launch US Attorney John Durham’s investigation into the genesis of this bogus scandal.” In his filing, Durham confesses to doing the same, three years later: using his feelings about a “bogus scandal” to claim a non-criminal conspiracy that he hopes might provide some motive other than the one — national security — that DOJ has already confirmed.

An absolutely central part of Durham’s strategy to win this trial is to present his conspiracy theories, whether by belatedly piercing privilege claims he should have addressed before charging Sussmann (even assuming he’ll find what he admits he doesn’t have proof is there), or by presenting his absence of evidence and claiming it is evidence. He will only be permitted to do if Judge Cooper ignores all his rule violations and grants him a hearsay exception.

But if he manages to present his conspiracy theories, Sussmann can immediately pivot and point out all the evidence in DOJ’s possession that proves not just that the suspicions Durham insists must be malicious and political in fact proved to be true, but also that DOJ — his former boss! — already deemed these suspicions national security concerns that in some cases amounted to crimes.

John Durham’s entire trial strategy consists of claiming that it was obviously political to investigate a real forensic anomaly to see whether it explained why Russia responded to Trump’s call for more hacks by renewing their attack on Hillary. He’s doing so while withholding abundant material evidence that DOJ already decided he’s wrong.

So even if he succeeds, even if Cooper grants him permission to float his conspiracy theories and even if they were to succeed at trial, Sussmann would have immediate recourse to ask for sanctions, pointing to all the evidence in DOJ’s possession that Durham’s claims of malice were wrong.

Update: The bad news I’m still working through my typos, with your help, including getting the name of Dmitri Simes’ organization wrong. The good news is the typos are probably due to being rushed out to cycle in the sun, so I have a good excuse.

Update: Judge Cooper has issued an initial ruling on Durham’s expert witness. It limits what Durham presents to the FBI investigation (excluding much of the CIA investigation he has recently been floating), and does not permit the expert to address whether the data actually did represent communications between Trump and Alfa Bank unless Sussmann either affirmatively claims it did or unless Durham introduced proof that Sussmann knew the data was dodgy.

Finally, the Court takes a moment to explain what could open the door to further evidence about the accuracy of the data Mr. Sussmann provided to the FBI. As the defense concedes, such evidence might be relevant if the government could separately establish “what Mr. Sussmann knew” about the data’s accuracy. Data Mot. at 3. If Sussmann knew the data was suspect, evidence about faults in the data could possibly speak to “his state of mind” at the time of his meeting with Mr. Baker, id., including his motive to conceal the origins of the data. By contrast, Sussmann would not open the door to further evidence about the accuracy of the data simply by seeking to establish that he reasonably believed the data were accurate and relied on his associates’ representations that they were. Such a defense theory could allow the government to introduce evidence tending to show that his belief was not reasonable—for instance, facially obvious shortcomings in the data, or information received by Sussmann indicating relevant deficiencies.

Ultimately, Cooper is treating this (as appropriate given the precedents in DC) as a question of Sussmann’s state of mind.

Importantly, this is what Cooper says about Durham blowing his deadline (which in this case was a deadline of comity, not trial schedule): he’s going to let it slide, in part because Sussmann does not object to the narrowed scope of what the expert will present.

Mr. Sussmann also urges the Court to exclude the expert testimony on the ground that the government’s notice was untimely and insufficiently specific. See Expert Mot. at 6–10; Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G). Because the Court will limit Special Agent Martin’s testimony largely to general explanations of the type of technical data that has always been part of the core of this case—much of which Mr. Sussmann does not object to—any allegedly insufficient or belated notice did not prejudice him. See United States v. Mohammed, No. 06-cr-357, 2008 WL 5552330, at *3 (D.D.C. May 6, 2008) (finding that disclosure nine days before trial did not prejudice defendant in part because its subject was “hardly a surprise”) (citing United States v. Martinez, 476 F.3d 961, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).

This suggests Cooper may be less willing to let other deadlines slide, such as the all-important 404(b) one.


Five Years after WikiLeaks Exposed CIA Identities in Vault 7, UK Moves Closer to Assange Extradition

Last November, in response to an order from Judge Jesse Furman, DOJ said that they were fine with accused Vault 7 leaker Joshua Schulte’s request for a delay before his retrial. In fact, they didn’t think a Schulte retrial could start before March 21.

Although the Government is available for trial at any time in the first or second quarters of 2022, the Government does not believe it would be practical to schedule the trial prior to March 2022. In particular, although the Government believes that the Court’s prior rulings pursuant to Section 6 of CIPA address the vast majority of questions concerning the use of classified information at trial in this matter, it appears likely that the defendant will seek to use additional classified information beyond that previously authorized by the Court. The process for pretrial consideration of that application pursuant to Section 6 is necessarily complex, entailing both briefing and hearings in a classified setting. To the extent the Court authorizes the defendant to use additional classified information, implementation of the Court’s rulings can also take time, such as through either declassification of information or supplemental briefing regarding the application of Section 8 of CIPA (authorizing the admission of classified evidence without change in classification status). The proposed trial date also takes into consideration matters discussed in the Government’s ex parte letter submitted on August 4, 2021. Accordingly, in order to afford sufficient time both for the likely upcoming CIPA litigation and for the parties to prepare for trial with the benefit of any supplemental CIPA rulings, the Government believes that the earliest practical trial date for this matter would be March 21, 2022.

Part of this delay was to revisit the Classified Information Procedures Act decisions from the first trial because, now that he’s defending himself, Schulte likely wanted to use more classified information than Sabrina Shroff had used in the first trial. It turns out March 21 was overly optimistic for CIPA to be done. Because of an extended debate over how to alter the protective order, the government will only file its CIPA motion tomorrow (it just asked to submit a much longer filing than originally permitted, and got permission to file a somewhat longer one).

It’s the other part of the government’s interest in delay — its references to “matters discussed” in a sealed letter from August 4 — that I’ve been tracking with interest, particularly as the Assange extradition proceeded. As I noted earlier, that August 4 letter would have been sent five years to the day after Schulte started searching on WikiLeaks, Edward Snowden, and Shadow Brokers (according to the government theory of the case, Schulte stole and leaked the CIA’s hacking tools earlier, in late April and early May 2016).

Since those mentions of a sealed letter last year, the government has asked for and gotten two meetings to discuss classified information with Judge Fruman under section 2 of CIPA, first for February 8 (after which a sealed document was lodged in Chambers), and the second one for March 9.

Section 2 provides that “[a]t any time after the filing of the indictment or information, any party may move for a pretrial conference to consider matters relating to classified information that may arise in connection with the prosecution.” Following such a motion, the district court “shall promptly hold a pretrial conference to establish the timing of requests for discovery, the provision of notice required by Section 5 of this Act, and the initiation of the procedure established by Section 6 (to determine the use, relevance, or admissibility of classified information) of this Act.”

That second CIPA Section 2 meeting, on March 9, would have taken place days after the five year anniversary for the first Vault 7 publication, and with it the publication of the names or pseudonyms and a picture of several colleagues Schulte had vendettas against.

Schulte acknowledged that publication in a recently-released self-justification he wrote to an associate after the Vault 7 release (it’s unclear when in 2017 or 2018 he wrote it), one he’s making a renewed attempt to suppress.

The names that were allegedly un-redacted were pseudonyms — fake names used internally in case a leak happened. Those of us who were overt never used last names anyway; This was an unwritten rule at the agency — NEVER use/write true last names for anyone. So I was convinced that there was little personal information revealed besides a picture of an old boss of mine that was mistakenly released with the memes.

Not long after he acknowledged the rule against using people’s names in that self-justification, Schulte used the names of the three colleagues he was most angry at: His boss Karen, his colleague “Jeremy Weber,” and another colleague, Amol, names that were also central to his efforts to leak from jail. If the FBI could ever develop evidence that Weber’s name was deliberately left in WikiLeaks’ Vault 7 publication, both Schulte and anyone else involved would be exposed to legal liability for violating the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, among other crimes.

On Monday, one week short of the day DOJ thought might be a realistic start day for the retrial, the British Supreme Court refused Assange’s bid to appeal a High Court decision accepting (flimsy) US assurances that Assange would not be held under Special Administrative Measures, finding that the appeal “does not raise an arguable point of law.”

Given the timing of the sealed filings in the Schulte case and the way the 2020 superseding indictment accuses Assange of “exhort[ing a Chaos Computer Club] audience to join the CIA in order to steal and provide information to WikiLeaks,” effectively teeing up Schulte’s alleged theft, I would be unsurprised if one of the things DOJ was delaying for weren’t this moment, some resolution to the Assange extradition.

To be sure: the Assange extradition is not over, not by a long shot. As a letter from his attorneys explains, this decision will go back to Vanessa Baraitser, who will then refer the extradition to Home Secretary Priti Patel. Assange will have four weeks to try to persuade Patel not to extradite him.

And, as the same letter notes in classically British use of the passive voice, Assange could still appeal Baraitser’s original ruling.

It will be recollected that Mr Assange succeeded in Westminster Magistrates’ Court on the issue subsequently appealed by the US to the High Court. No appeal to the High Court has yet been filed by him in respect of the other important issues he raised previously in Westminster Magistrates’ Court. That separate process of appeal has, of course, has yet to be initiated.

But an appeal on these issues would be decidedly more difficult now than they would have been two years ago.

That’s true, in part, because the Biden Administration’s continuation of Assange’s prosecution has debunked all the bullshit claims Assange made about being politically targeted by Donald Trump.

I also expect at least one of the purportedly exculpatory stories WikiLeaks has been spamming in recent months to be exposed as a complete set-up by WikiLeaks — basically an enormous hoax on WikiLeaks’ boosters and far too many journalist organizations. WikiLeaks has become little more than a propaganda shop, and I expect that to become clearer in the months ahead.

Finally, if the US supersedes[d] the existing indictment against Assange or obtains[ed] a second one in the last seven months, it will badly undermine any remaining claim Assange has to doing journalism. That’s true for a slew of reasons.

As I laid out here, the part of the Baraitser ruling that distinguished Assange’s actions from journalism based on his solicitation of hacks relied heavily on the language that directly teed up the hack-and-leak Schulte is accused of.

Mr. Assange, it is alleged, had been engaged in recruiting others to obtain information for him for some time. For example, in August 2009 he spoke to an audience of hackers at a “Hacking at Random” conference and told them that unless they were a serving member of the US military they would have no legal liability for stealing classified information and giving it to Wikileaks. At the same conference he told the audience that there was a small vulnerability within the US Congress document distribution system stating, “this is what any one of you would find if you were actually looking”. In October 2009 also to an audience of hackers at the “Hack in the Box Security Conference” he told the audience, “I was a famous teenage hacker in Australia, and I’ve been reading generals’ emails since I was 17” and referred to the Wikileaks list of “flags” that it wanted captured. After Ms. Manning made her disclosures to him he continued to encourage people to take information. For example, in December 2013 he attended a Chaos computer club conference and told the audience to join the CIA in order to steal information stating “I’m not saying don’t join the CIA; no, go and join the CIA. Go in there, go into the ballpark and get the ball and bring it out”. [emphasis Baraitser’s]

If the government proves what is publicly alleged, Schulte’s actions have nothing to do with whistleblowing and everything to do with vindictive hacking to damage the CIA, precisely what Assange was eliciting. Plus, even if such a hypothetical superseding indictment added just Vault 7/Vault 8 charges against Assange, it could put extortion and IIPA on the table (the latter of which would be a direct analogue to the UK’s Official Secrets Act), to say nothing of the still unexplained fate of the CIA source code which — as Schulte himself acknowledged — would have provided an unbelievable benefit had Russia had received it.

And that assumes that Vault 7/Vault 8 would be the only thing the US wanted to supersede with. When Jeremy Hammond asked prosecutors why they hadn’t charged Assange for helping Russia tamper in US elections, they appeared to respond by describing the long time it would take to extradite Assange, implying that they still had time to charge Assange. To be sure, Mueller concluded that he “did not have admissible evidence that was probably sufficient to obtain and sustain a Section 1030 conspiracy conviction of WikiLeaks [or] Assange.” But the implication was that Mueller had evidence, just not stuff that could be submitted at trial. The extradition of Vladislav Klyushin — whose lawyer believed the US was particularly interested in his knowledge of the 2016 operation — might change that. (Like Assange, Klyushin’s extradition was also pending when DOJ submitted that first sealed filing; Klyushin’s case has been continued to share more discovery.)

There are several other operations WikiLeaks was involved in in 2015 and afterwards that would undermine any claim of being a journalistic outlet — and would add to the evidence that Assange had, at least by those years, been working closely to advance the interests of the Russian government.

It would be very hard to argue that Assange was being prosecuted for doing journalism if the US unveiled more credible allegations about the multiple ways Assange did Russia’s bidding in 2016 and 2017, even in normal times. All the more so as Russia is continuing its attack on democracy with its invasion of Ukraine.

And that’s what Assange faces as he attempts to stay out of the US.


John Durham Says Election-Hack Victims Should Wait Until After the Election to Report Tips

Even as Russia assaults a peaceful democracy (which invasion, in a separate filing, Durham calls, “recent world events in Ukraine”), John Durham suggests that a political campaign victimized by Russia should expect to wait until after the election before the FBI opens an investigation into a cybersecurity anomaly potentially implicating her opponent.

Durham even asserts that such a cybersecurity anomaly is not a cybersecurity matter, but instead a political one.

Almost six years after Trump’s request, “Russia are you listening,” was met with a renewed Russian attack on Hillary Clinton, John Durham continues to treat Hillary’s attempts to run a campaign while being attacked as a greater threat than that nation-state attack by Russia.

Durham’s latest contortions come in a response to Micheal Sussmann’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

Sussmann argued that the alleged lie he told (motions to dismiss must accept the alleged facts as true), could not have affected the single decision facing the FBI when he shared information about a DNS anomaly: whether to open an investigation or not.

Following the Supreme Court’s clear instruction in Gaudin, in order to assess the materiality of the false statement that Mr. Sussmann is alleged to have made, this Court must ask what statement he is alleged to have made to the FBI; what decision the FBI was trying to make; and whether the false statement could have influenced that decision. Here, even accepting all the allegations in the Indictment as true—and the evidence would prove otherwise—the only decision the FBI was trying to make was the decision whether or not to commence an investigation into the allegations of suspicious internet data involving the Trump Organization and Russian Bank-1. Ample precedent—and the Special Counsel’s own allegations in this case—make clear that Mr. Sussmann’s purported false statement did not influence, and was not capable of influencing, that decision.

Predictably and reasonably, Durham’s response cited the precedent that leaves it up to juries to determine whether something is material or not.

In any event, the defendant’s arguments on the materiality of his statement are also premature. The Supreme Court in Gaudin held that materiality is an essential element of Section 1001 that must be resolved by a jury.

As I noted back in October, “Prosecutors will argue that materiality is a matter for the jury to decide.”

Prosecutors also noted what I did: a long list of precedents about materiality that Sussmann cited in his motion are all post-trial challenges to materiality, not pretrial motions to dismiss.

The defendant cites to multiple cases where the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts have held that the false statements and misrepresentations at issue were immaterial as a matter of law. See Def. Mot. at 7-10. But critically, all of those cases involved post-conviction appeals or motions to vacate the conviction after the Government presented its case at trial. Accordingly, none of these cases support the defendant’s requested relief here – that is, that the court dismiss the Indictment before trial because it fails to sufficiently allege that the defendant’s false statement is material. What the cases do show is that courts have routinely declined to usurp the jury’s role in making the determination on whether a false statement is material.

For those two reasons, Sussmann’s motion to dismiss is unlikely to succeed, and should instead be viewed as an opening bid to frame his defense and establish issues for appeal.

Those two arguments are all Durham really needed to respond to Sussmann’s motion to dismiss. Instead of leaving it with responsible lawyering, however, Durham instead launches into an illogical attempt to criminalize tip reporting.

Take his attempt to dismiss Rodney Joffe’s real cybersecurity expertise. In the three months since he charged Sussmann, Durham belatedly (at Sussmann’s request) discovered how closely Joffe had worked with the FBI on other investigations. As Sussmann scoffed in an earlier filing, “The notion that the FBI would have been more skeptical of the information had it known of Tech Executive-1’s involvement is, in a word, preposterous.” Now that Durham has discovered the close ties between Joffe and the FBI, he claimed that that history of reliability was itself something the FBI needed to know.

Namely, as the defendant’s motion reveals (Def. Mot. at 18-19, fn. 8), Tech Executive-1 had a history of providing assistance to the FBI on cyber security matters, but decided in this instance to provide politically-charged allegations anonymously through the defendant and a law firm that was then-counsel to the Clinton Campaign. Given Tech Executive-1’s history of assistance to law enforcement, it would be material for the FBI to learn of the defendant’s lawyer-client relationship with Tech Executive-1 so that they could evaluate Tech Executive-1’s motivations. As an initial step, the FBI might have sought to interview Tech Executive-1. And that, in turn, might have revealed further information about Tech Executive-1’s coordination with individuals tied to the Clinton Campaign, his access to vast amounts of sensitive and/or proprietary internet data, and his tasking of cyber researchers working on a pending federal cybersecurity contract.

Durham’s claim that “learning” how much data Joffe had access to (which is something the FBI undoubtedly knew — it is surely the reason why FBI partnered with him, because the volume of data Neustar had made their observations more useful) would make them more skeptical of the DNS tip is nonsensical. In fact, elsewhere (in tracking all the YotaPhone requests in the US over a three year period), Durham treated it as presumptively reliable.

Plus, Durham made no mention here of one of a number of the other things he belatedly learned: that the September 2016 tip Sussmann shared with FBI General Counsel James Baker was not the only one Joffe had shared via Sussmann anonymously. He shared a tip anonymously during this same time period with DOJ IG. Durham has no way of knowing, either, whether those two were the only ones, but his revised theory of materiality depends on an anonymous tip like this one being unique.

Similarly, Durham struggled to explain (including by citing an inapt precedent) why the FBI would need to be told that Sussmann represented Hillary when, in notes of Baker’s retelling of the meeting, Bill Priestap wrote that Sussmann represented the DNC and Clinton Foundation.

As he did with Joffe, Durham tried to flip Sussmann’s expertise, arguing that the former prosecutor’s recognized qualification as a cybersecurity expert, something that would help him assess whether DNS data were anomalous or not, is precisely why the Perkins Coie lawyer needed to disclose he was working for Hillary.

In an effort to downplay the materiality of this false statement, the defendant asserts that the FBI General Counsel was aware that the defendant represented the DNC. See Def. Mot at 18. But the Government expects that evidence at trial will establish that the FBI General Counsel was aware that the defendant represented the DNC on cybersecurity matters arising from the Russian government’s hack of its emails, not that he provided political advice or was participating in the Clinton Campaign’s opposition research efforts. Indeed, the defendant held himself out to the public as an experienced national security and cybersecurity lawyer, not an election lawyer or political consultant. Accordingly, when the defendant disclaimed any client relationships at his meeting with the FBI General Counsel, this served to lull the General Counsel into the mistaken, yet highly material belief that the defendant lacked political motivations for his work.

There are many crazy assumptions built into this statement: that, had Sussmann identified Hillary as his client, it would have required him to reveal her motives as political rather than security-related to the FBI, breaching privilege; that reporting an anomaly potentially involving Trump after Trump had begged Russia to further hack Hillary would not be a sound decision from a cybersecurity standpoint; that researching the context of an anomaly, such as Alfa Bank’s ties to Putin, is not part of cybersecurity. Effectively, Durham has unilaterally decided that pursuing this anomaly was a political act, with no basis in law or fact.

Which is how Durham espoused the claim that the FBI, facing an unprecedented attack by Russia on American elections in 2016, might have delayed investigation of a part of it that might have implicated one of the contestants.

The defendant’s false statement to the FBI General Counsel was plainly material because it misled the General Counsel about, among other things, the critical fact that the defendant was disseminating highly explosive allegations about a then-Presidential candidate on behalf of two specific clients, one of which was the opposing Presidential campaign. The defendant’s efforts to mislead the FBI in this manner during the height of a Presidential election season plainly could have influenced the FBI’s decision-making in any number of ways. The defendant’s core argument to the contrary rests on the flawed premise that the FBI’s only relevant decision was binary in nature, i.e., whether or not to initiate an investigation. But defendant’s assertion in this regard conveniently ignores the factual and practical realities of how the FBI initiates and conducts investigations. For example, the Government expects that evidence at trial will prove that the FBI could have taken any number of steps prior to opening what it terms a “full investigation,” including, but not limited to, conducting an “assessment,” opening a “preliminary investigation,” delaying a decision until after the election, or declining to investigate the matter altogether.

[snip]

Moreover, the Department of Justice and the FBI maintain stringent guidelines on dealing with matters that bear on U.S. elections. Given the temporal proximity to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the FBI also might have taken any number of different steps in initiating, delaying, or declining the initiation of this matter had it known at the time that the defendant was providing information on behalf of the Clinton Campaign and a technology executive at a private company.

[snip]

And the evidence will show that it would have been all the more material here because the defendant was providing this information on behalf of the Clinton Campaign less than two months prior to a hotly contested U.S. presidential election. [my emphasis]

The first paragraph here is really telling, given Durham’s public complaint that the Crossfire Hurricane team should have opened the investigation as a preliminary investigation, not a full investigation (the investigation into Mike Flynn, specifically, wasn’t opened as a full investigation, but none of the techniques used would have otherwise been unavailable, not least because there was already a full investigation opened on Carter Page). This is an argument Durham may reprise in his report: That it was unreasonable for Hillary Clinton to ask the FBI to inquire into Trump’s campaign after he publicly asked a foreign country for help (even ignoring the tip from Australia).

Durham seems to think Hillary should have had no assistance from law enforcement when her opponent publicly asked Russia to hack her some more if people close to her found more reason to be concerned. He even mocked Sussmann as too powerful to choose to use anonymity.

[W]hile the defendant’s motion seeks to equate the defendant with a “jilted ex-wife [who] would think twice about reporting her ex-husband’s extensive gun-smuggling operation,” this comparison is absurd. Def. Mot. at 24

Far from finding himself in the vulnerable position of an ordinary person whose speech is likely to be chilled, the defendant – a sophisticated and well-connected lawyer – chose to bring politically-charged allegations to the FBI’s chief legal officer at the height of an election season.”

This also betrays pure insanity. The anomaly involving Trump could always have reflected disloyal insiders compromising the candidate, as could the YotaPhones potentially in use in Trump headquarters. In fact, Page did compromise Trump when he went to Russia in December 2016 and tell Russians there that he was representing Trump on matters pertaining to Ukraine, just as Mike Flynn did by selling his access to Trump to Turkey, just as Tom Barrack is accused of doing with the Emirates. The reason why Sussmann was providing this information less than two months before an election is because cybersecurity researchers had gone looking because there was an ongoing multi-faceted cybersecurity attack, one that continued right through the election, one that could have victimized Trump as well as Hillary.

Which brings me to the one point Sussmann made that Durham completely ignored. In his response, Durham’s response uses the word “purported” to describe the DNS allegations from Sussmann five times:

  1. The defendant provided the FBI General Counsel with purported data and “white papers” that allegedly demonstrated a covert communications channel between the Trump Organization and a Russia-based bank
  2. the purported data and white papers
  3. the purported DNS traffic that Tech Executive-1 and others had assembled
  4. the defendant provided data which he claimed reflected purportedly suspicious DNS lookups by these entities of internet protocol (“IP”) addresses affiliated with a Russian mobile phone provider (“Russian Phone Provider-1”)
  5. examine the origins of the purported data

What Durham did not do is ever address this point from Sussmann:

Indeed, the defense is aware of no case in which an individual has provided a tip to the government and has been charged with making any false statement other than providing a false tip. But that is exactly what has happened here.

In the fall of 2016, Michael Sussmann, a prominent national security lawyer, voluntarily met with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to pass along information that raised national security concerns. He met with the FBI, in other words, to provide a tip. There is no allegation in the Indictment that the tip he provided was false. And there is no allegation that he believed that the tip he provided was false. Rather, Mr. Sussmann has been charged with making a false statement about an entirely ancillary matter—about who his client may have been when he met with the FBI—which is a fact that even the Special Counsel’s own Indictment fails to allege had any effect on the FBI’s decision to open an investigation.

[snip]

Again, nowhere in the Indictment is there an allegation that the information Mr. Sussmann provided was false. Nowhere is there an allegation that Mr. Sussmann knew—or should have known—that the information was false. And nowhere is there an allegation that the FBI would not have opened an investigation absent Mr. Sussmann’s purported false statement.

I could fund an entire Special Counsel investigation if I had $5 for every time in this prosecution Durham has used the word “purported.” For almost six months, his entire prosecution has been premised on this anomaly not being “real,” meaning unexplained traffic that might represent something serious.

And yet he has not charged that (though he seems to have bullied April Lorenzen, perhaps because he needs her to be something other than she was). Instead, he just keeps doing the work for which actual evidence is normally required by repeating the word “purported” over and over.

This motion to dismiss will likely fail, because juries get to decide what is material. But contrary to Durham’s claims, unless and until he can prove that Sussmann, Jofffe, and Lorenzen didn’t believe this was a real anomaly worth investigating given all the other attacks that, Sussmann especially, knew were ongoing, then he really will be prosecuting someone for reporting a valid national security concern.


Behind the Arrest of Putin’s Pen-Tester, Vladislav Klyushin

There’s a gratuitous passage in the March 20, 2021 complaint charging Vladislav Klyushin, Ivan Yermakov, Igor Sladkov, Mikhail Irzak, and Nikolay Rumyantev with conspiracy to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. It describes that Klyushin — the guy just extradited to the US on the charges — possessing a picture of Alexander Borodaev and Sergey Uryadov posing in front of Scotland Yard in London.

Thus far, it’s unclear who the guys in the picture are, other than customers of M-13’s “investment services,” for which they paid extortionate 60% commissions to benefit from the insider trading scheme allegedly run by Klyushin and Yermakov. But, in addition to alerting Klyushin to how many of his personal files the FBI has obtained, folks back in Russia will have a taste of the kind of information at risk now that Klyushin is in US custody.

That is, this passage, and a host of others in the charging documents, appear designed to maximize the discomfort of a number of people involved, as much as justifying the arrest and extradition of the guy who led a company that provided services that amount to information operations to Vladimir Putin. As the DOJ presser explained,

M-13’s website indicated that the company’s “IT solutions” were used by “the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation, federal ministries and departments, regional state executive bodies, commercial companies and public organizations.” In addition to these services, Klyushin, Ermakov and Rumiantcev also allegedly offered investment management services through M-13 to investors in exchange for up to 60 percent of the profit

The insider trader scheme works like this: Klyushin (the guy in US custody) and Yermakov (a key person involved in the 2016 DNC hack, described in DOJ’s press release as a “former” GRU officer), along with one other guy from M-13, area accused of hacking at least two US filing agents to obtain earnings reports before they were officially released. They conducted trades for a handful of clients — along with Borodaev and Uryadov, Boris Varshavskiy is mentioned. Klyushin also conducted trades for himself. The three M-13 figures were indicted on conspiracy, hacking, wire fraud, and securities fraud charges on April 6, 2021, an indictment that formalized the extradition request for Klyushin, who had already been arrested in Switzerland.

Then there are two apparent private citizens who live in St. Petersburg, Michail Irzak and Igor Sladkov. They were indicted on May 6, 2021 on conspiracy to hack and hacking charges, along with securities fraud. That indictment (like the complaint) focuses on some different trades than the Klyushin one (and because neither is likely to be extradited anytime soon, the second indictment may shield some portion of evidence from discovery).

Actions attributed elsewhere to Yermakov are attributed to Co-Conspirator 1 in that indictment, and it is on that basis that Irzak and Sladkov are exposed to the hacking charges. Irzak and Sladkov don’t appear to have been paying the extortionate 60% fees that the other M-13 clients were, which makes me wonder whether Yermakov was helping buddies get rich on the side. Worse still, Sladkov had some epically bad operational security; the indictment describes he had in his possession pictures showing:

  • A picture of a black Acer computer, with a blue Russian Olympic Committee sticker over the camera, showing a press release with Snap’s 2017 earnings that was not released publicly until 8 hours later.
  • A picture showing the same Acer computer with the same blue sticker showing his own trading activity on BrokerCreditService on May 2, 2018
  • A picture taken on July 24, 2018 at 2:05PM (ET) showing himself and Irzak sitting at a brown table; Irzak had Facebook running at the time, which showed him to be in the vicinity of Sladkov’s house
  • A picture dated July 25, 2018 showing him trading in a bunch of shares the earnings reports of which had been illegally accessed the day before
  • A picture dated October 14, 2018 showing a hand-written note instructing to “short” three shares, which Irzak did short two days later

In other words, Sladkov documented much of his insider training in photographs (perhaps to share the instructions with Irzak), and left all those photographs somewhere accessible to the US government.

If Yermakov was sharing this information with these guys without permission, then Sladkov’s role in providing the US government really damning information that would form the basis for an arrest warrant for Klyushin, then things might get really hot.

But it’s not like Klyushin or Yermakov did much better. In addition to the pictures of the clients, above, and some screencaps that got sent showing trading activity (though with less obvious evidence of insider trading), there’s a bunch of messaging from both, including an oblique reference to messages Yermakov and Borodaev sent on November 19, 2020 that have nothing to do with the context of the indictment but happens to be after the US election. There are even pictures Klyushin shared with Yermakov, “showing a safe that contained growing stacks of U.S. one hundred dollar bills.”

Yermakov appears to have used one of his messaging accounts via multiple devices, because on December 3, 2018, when he “forgot telephone at work,” he was still able to message Klyushin about closing out a trade. Using the same messaging app across platforms would offer one means of compromise, especially if the FBI had gotten into Yermakov’s device updates. The indictment doesn’t mention a warrant for such messaging that you would expect if it took place on Facebook.

Again, this indictment seems to aim to cause discomfort and recriminations based on information in US possession.

But then there’s the question of how it came about, how it landed in Massachusetts rather than DC (where the lead FBI agent is from) or NY (where the trades get done) or Pittsburgh, where one of the prior indictments against Yermakov was done.

The indictments and complaint base the MA jurisdiction on the fact that the culprits used a VPN that used a server in MA on several occasions. At a presser the other day, Acting US Attorney Nathaniel Mendell suggested the case had been assigned to MA because of its good securities prosecution teams.

As to how it came about, purportedly, the story starts in January 2020, when two filing agents allegedly hacked by the men, FA1 and FA2, reported being hacked at virtually the same time. Someone had used an FA1 employee’s credentials on January 21, 2020 to access the earnings data for IBM, Steel Dynamics, and Avnet before those results were publicly announced the following day, but no similar transaction noted with respect to F2 (indeed, a list of accesses involving F2 have a gap from November 2019 through May 2020). The investigation determined that FA1 had first been hacked by November 2018 and that FA2 had first been hacked by October 2017.

FA1 and FA2 discovered this compromise just months after the third M-13 employee, Rumyantev, was blocked by his Russian-based brokerage account for suspicious transactions. Months after FA1 and FA2 reported their compromise, Rumyantev and Klyushin lied to a Denmark bank that they were working entirely off of public information. By that point, in other words, banks in at least two countries were onto them.

Then, the story goes, the FBI investigated those hacks — through domains hosted by Vultr Holdings to a hosting company in Sweden to a user account under the name Andrea Neumann. From there, the FBI tracked back through some Bitcoin transactions made in October and November 2018 to the IP address for M-13 where they just happened to discover one of the very same hackers that was behind the 2016 hack of the DNC was also behind this hack. Mendell sounded pretty sheepish when he offered that explanation at the press conference.

Perhaps it’s true, but another key piece of evidence dates to actions Yermakov took on May 9, 2018, when he was under very close scrutiny as part of the twin investigations into his role in the hacks of the DNC and doping agencies, but before the first indictment against him was obtained.

Based on a review of records obtained from a U.S.-based technology company (the “Tech Company”), I have learned that on or about May 9, 2018, at 3:44 a.m. (ET), an account linked to ERMAKOV received an update for three native applications associated to the Tech Company. Records show that the May 9, 2018 application updates were associated to IP address 119.204.194.11 (the “119 IP Address”).

Based on my review of a log file from FA 2, I learned that on or about that same day, May 9, 2018, starting at 3:46 a.m. (ET)–approximately two minutes after ERMAKOV received application updates from the Tech Company–the FA 2 employee’s compromised login credentials were used to gain unauthorized access to FA 2’s system from the same 119 IP Address, and to view and/or download earnings-related files of four companies: Cytomx Therapeutics, Horizon Therapeutics, Puma Biotechnology, and Synaptics.7 All four companies reported their quarterly earnings later that day.

It would be rather surprising if the FBI agents investigating the DNC hack had not at least attempted to ID the IP associated with Yermakov’s phone (or other device) back in 2018. Whether or not they watched him engage in insider trading for years after that — all the while collecting evidence from co-conspirators flaunting the proof of their insider trading — we may never learn. The discovery on this case, featuring evidence explaining how the FBI tracked the insider trading of Putin’s pen-tester, will certainly feature a number of law enforcement sensitive techniques that Klyushin would love to bring back to Putin.

But it’s possible these techniques were what the FBI used to target these guys four years ago now, and the insider trading that Yermakov was doing in addition to whatever he spent the rest of his time doing has now provided a convenient way to bring Putin’s pen-tester to the United States for a spell.

Update: Included the pictures of the safe included with his detention memo, as well as earnings reports from Sladkov’s computer. Note the detention memo says the latter came from an ISP.


DOJ’s Ex Parte Classified Plans for Joshua Schulte — and Maybe, Julian Assange

Update: The High Court has overturned Baraitser’s ruling, finding that the US should have had an opportunity to give the assurances it has since given that Assange will not be subjected to solitary confinement. I expect Assange will appeal immediately.

Per a tweet from Stella Morris, the decision in the appeal of a Vanessa Baraitser’s decision denying the US extradition request for Julian Assange on humanitarian grounds will be announced Friday at 10:15 GMT. Because of something that happened in the High Court extradition hearing, I want to point to some things that happened in the Joshua Schulte docket in recent months.

On August 5, DOJ filed notice of an ex parte classified status letter in the Schulte case.

The Government respectfully submits this letter to provide notice of an ex parte, classified status letter submitted yesterday.

By filing an ex parte classified status letter, the government would have informed the judge (then Paul Crotty but the case has since been reassigned to Judge Jesse Furman) something about the case, without sharing it with Schulte or the public. The letter would have been filed five years to the day after the start date, August 4, 2016, for searches DOJ has described that Schulte did on WikiLeaks, Edward Snowden, and (as described elsewhere) Shadow Brokers.

In addition to the numerous searches for “wikileaks” which commenced on August 4, 2016, SCHULTE also conducted multiple related Searches, including: prior to the March 7, 2017 release of the Classified Information, “assange” (Julian Assange is the founder and “editor-in-chief’ of WikiLeaks.org), “snowden its time,” “wikileaks code,” and “wikileaks 2017”-and after the March 7, 2017 release of the Classified Information, “wikileaks public opinion,” and “officials were aware before the WikiLeaks release of a loss of sensitive information.”

On September 23, the government wrote a letter to Judge Crotty, voicing its support for adjourning Schulte’s trial date — which at that point was scheduled for October 25, two days before Assange’s extradition hearing — and revisiting the schedule after November 1, several days after the extradition hearing.

The Government respectfully submits this letter in response to the defendant’s request to adjourn the trial date, currently scheduled for October 25, 2021. (D.E. 495). As discussed at the pretrial conference held on September 15, 2021, the Government consents to the defendant’s request for an adjournment. We respectfully suggest that the Court enter an order adjourning the trial sine die, and the Government will provide an update with respect to our views on an appropriate trial date by November 1, 2021.

On September 26, Yahoo published a story that made claims about assassination discussions that, the story itself revealed, were overblown. The story debunked WikiLeaks’ claims that the charges against Assange were political retaliation pertaining to the Russian investigation from Trump. It corroborated the obvious temporal link between the initial charge against Assange and a Russian exfiltration attempt. And it provided details of CIA’s clandestine plans to limit the damage of the still (then, and now) unreleased Vault 8 source code of CIA’s hacking tools. There’s reason to believe WikiLeaks has known aspects of those damage mitigation plans for at least two years, via means they do not want to disclose.

Since its publication, WikiLeaks has used the story to try to suggest that the DOJ extradition should not go forward, but the British judges who heard the appeal seemed unimpressed by tales of CIA outrage about WikiLeaks’ hoarding CIA’s hacking tools.

As part of the extradition hearing on October 28, according to the WikiLeaks’ Twitter account, the lawyer representing the US in Assange’s extradition hearing, James Lewis, asserted that if this effort to extradite Assange fails, they can just start again with another extradition request.

Note: I looked for a more credible source for this quotation than WikiLeaks, which has been sowing more propaganda than usual in recent months, but did not find it quoted by other credible journalists. For the purposes of this post, though, I will accept this as accurate. A representative for US DOJ said that if this extradition attempt fails, Lewis seemed to suggest, DOJ can ask the UK to extradite on a different indictment.

Shortly after the extradition hearing, on November 5, in response to an order from Judge Furman, DOJ proposed March 21, 2022 as the earliest feasible trial date, largely because of expected CIPA proceedings, but in part because of whatever DOJ discussed in that August 4 ex parte classified status letter.

Although the Government is available for trial at any time in the first or second quarters of 2022, the Government does not believe it would be practical to schedule the trial prior to March 2022.

[snip]

The proposed trial date also takes into consideration matters discussed in the Government’s ex parte letter submitted on August 4, 2021. Accordingly, in order to afford sufficient time both for the likely upcoming CIPA litigation and for the parties to prepare for trial with the benefit of any supplemental CIPA rulings, the Government believes that the earliest practical trial date for this matter would be March 21, 2022.

March 21 would be two weeks after the five year anniversary of the first publication of Vault 7, the less harmful development notes stolen from the CIA, but with them, the names or pseudos of several colleagues that Schulte allegedly scapegoated. That would be the likely date for any statutes of limitation on another CFAA conspiracy to toll.

That is, this timing would provide DOJ an opportunity to learn the fate of Assange’s first, declassified charges through 2015, in case DOJ wanted to ask for extradition on a second case charging actions since 2015.

Admittedly, one explanation for that August 4 filing could be that DOJ obtained new evidence (though if it is evidence Schulte will ultimately get, it should not be ex parte). But given Lewis’ comment and the timing of DOJ’s various updates about trial schedule, one explanation is that DOJ would ask to extradite Assange for the Vault 7 publications (and related actions that have nothing to do with journalism) if the current extradition effort fails.

Ultimately, Schulte’s decisions have created a further delay than the one the government proposed. Because Schulte’s expert, Steve Bellovin, has limited availability due to his teaching schedule, the trial is scheduled to start on June 13, 2022, more than six years after Schulte allegedly stole the files in question.

Depends on what happens tomorrow, though, we may learn sooner what that ex parte filing was.

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Originally Posted @ https://www.emptywheel.net/cybersecurity/page/4/