Angler

Okay, now something totally frivolous about the Cheney piece (if you want real analysis, go here). The WaPo piece reveals Cheney’s secret service name:

"Angler," as the Secret Service code-named him,

Which is of course the name they’ve given the series.

Well, I think it perhaps ironic because, as I understand it, Cheney’s not that great a fisherman. At least that’s what a friend I was close to in the early 90s told me. You see, she (yes, she) fished against Cheney at the Jackson One Fly tournament. A whole day in a boat with no one else but Cheney (pre-Vice President days) and a guide. Now, my friend was a pretty good fly-fisher. Still, she kicked his ass.

Which I guess provides a nice irony to the title of the article. Here is Cheney trying to take over the world. But he–Angler–can’t even beat a girl in his eponymous sport!

Pity someone didn’t figure out he was a loser before the Iraq war.

Shorter Bush: I Wrote It in Invisble Ink

Kagro X says almost all that needs to be said about BushCo’s claims that Bush intended to exempt he and Cheney from rules on classification. I’ll come back later to expand on Kagro’s point about the insta-declassification theory of leaking Plame’s identity. But for now, I’d like to make a teeny tiny point. Even according to BushCo’s own flack, the Executive Order doesn’t say, in writing, what Bush is now claiming: that Bush and Cheney are exempt from all rules on classification. Here’s Tony Fratto:

"We don’t dispute that the ISOO has a different opinion. But let’s bevery clear: This executive order was issued by the president, and heknows what his intentions were," Fratto said. "He is in compliance withhis executive order."

Fratto conceded that the lengthydirective, technically an amendment to an existing executive order, didnot specifically exempt the president’s or vice president’s offices.Instead, it refers to "agencies" as being subject to the requirements,which Fratto said did not include the two executive offices. "It doestake a little bit of inference," Fratto said. [my emphasis]

So we’re to understand for this EO, at least, we’re just supposed to trust Bush. We’re just supposed to believe that Bush means what he didn’t say.

But why Read more

Sidney’s Imperial Presidency

Sidney Blumenthal and I were apparently making the same point at about the same time. Not long after I argued, on a panel on the Imperial Presidency, that there are those within the Administration who believe in the rule of law and can therefore be mobilized against it, Sidney was finishing up his column making that point in much more comprehensive fashion.

In private, Bushadministration sub-Cabinet officials who have been instrumental informulating and sustaining the legal "war paradigm" acknowledge thattheir efforts to create a system for detainees separate from dueprocess, criminal justice and law enforcement have failed. One of thekey framers of the war paradigm(in which the president in his wartime capacity as commander in chiefmakes and enforces laws as he sees fit, overriding the constitutionalsystem of checks and balances), who a year ago was arguing vehementlyfor pushing its boundaries, confesses that he has abandoned his beliefin the whole doctrine, though he refuses to say so publicly. If he wereto speak up, given his seminal role in formulating the policy and hisstature among the Federalist Society cadres that run it, his rejectionwould have a shattering impact, far more than political philosopherFrancis Fukuyama’s denunciation of the neoconservatism he formerlyembraced. But this figure remains careful to disclose hisdisillusionment with his own handiwork only in off-the-recordconversations. Yet another Bush legal official, even now at thecommanding heights of power, admits that the administration’s policiesare largely discredited. In its defense, he says without a hint ofirony or sarcasm, "Not everything we’ve done has been illegal." Headds, "Not everything has been ultra vires" — a legal term referringto actions beyond the law.

The resistance within the administration to Bush’s torturepolicy, the ultimate expression of the war paradigm, has come to an endthrough attrition and exhaustion. More than two years ago, VicePresident Dick Cheney’s then chief of staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libbyand then general counsel David Addington physically cornered one of thefew internal opponents, subjecting him to threats, intimidation andisolation.

Mercer’s Non-Move

Bill Mercer’s announcement that he’s stepping down is much more interesting than the other clique resignations for several reasons (thanks to TeddySF for the heads up). First, his "resignation" does not mean he leaves DOJ; rather, he simply avoids a nomination hearing. And that’s a nomination hearing that would have been challenging, to say the least.

William W. Mercer— who had been acting associate attorney general since September –withdrew his nomination for the job just days before he was scheduledto appear at a Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearing Tuesday.

[snip]

"After much consideration, I have concluded that it is highly unlikelythat both the Judiciary Committee and the Senate will take promptaction on my nomination in the near term, if ever," Mercer wrote.

[snip]

Justice officials said Mercer made the decision to withdraw, based onhis assessment of expected opposition from many Democrats and uncertainsupport from Republicans. No GOPmembers were expected to show up for Tuesday’s confirmation hearingbecause of the Senate immigration debate, one official said.

But note the word games! Mercer claims he was resigning because SJC wouldn’t act on his nomination–but there was a hearing scheduled for Tuesday, so it’s clear they were prepared to act on his nomination. Further, note that the official in the last paragraph here appears to be a Justice Department official. So while DOJ is spinning GOP Senators’ refusal to appear at a Mercer hearing as related to the immigration debate, that information is not coming from someone–such as a GOP Senator–who would know why the GOP was going to stand up Mercer.

Which all suggests we need to read this resignation as something different–not an attempt to leave DOJ, but a move to make sure Mercer can stay at DOJ, even if only in his role as USA for Montana. And I find that interesting for a few reasons–it raises questions about why it was so important for Mercer to remain USA in Montana, when he really hasn’t been focusing on his job there for about 3 years.

Hold > Get Agency to Answer That, Part Two

You may recall a theory I postulated a few weeks back that when Libby called Robert Grenier on June 11, 2003, he asked questions he already knew the answers to. He wasn’t really looking for information. Rather, he was hoping to get the information from a source he could use publicly; he was trying to get certain information about the Wilsons out while hiding Dick Cheney’s original source for the information (I’ll return to what I suspect was one of Cheney’s original sources for the information soon). Well, as I suggested in my first post on what Jeff Lomonaco and I found in the CIPA filings, there is further evidence of such an attempt to launder information. Before I show you one of three documents we found, let me remind you of the chronology:

June 8, 2003: Condi gets beat up on George Stephenopolous’ show when she claims no one knew the Niger claims were bunk

June 9, 2003: Libby relays to Cheney that Bush is interested in the Kristof article; that same day, Libby requests information from Craig Schmall on the intelligence, and Schmall sends three reports to Libby and John Hannah, to be delivered ASAP

Unknown day, almost certainly this week: Cheney shares information on the trip with Libby, telling Libby that Wilson’s wife works at CPD

June 10, 2003, late afternoon: The email below sent, along with a response

June 11, 2003, 12 PM: Libby in meeting with Marc Grossman where he probably gets a response on his inquiry about Wilson’s trip,

June 11, 2003, also 12PM, Cheney meets with John McLaughlin on Wilson trip

1:05 PM: Libby, Cheney, and Cathie Martin meet; during that meeting, Libby calls Robert Grenier to–he claims–gather preliminary information on Wilsons trip

The email below makes it almost certain that Cheney knew the information they said they were seeking from Grenier when they called him. That is, they were looking to use him to launder information about the Wilsons. The information Libby elicited from Grenier? That Plame worked at CIA and that State and DOD were interested in the Niger intelligence, as well as OVP.

The email below was sent late on June 10, among people at the CIA, in an attempt to answer very specific questions Cheney had asked, presumably of John McLaughlin. [Note, there are some transcription errors here; I’ll correct the obvious ones, and leave the ones I’m unsure about; I should have an actual document to link to in a few days.]

Shorter Fitz: Send Libby to Jail

Fitzgerald submitted his response to Libby’s request for bond pending appeal today. Basically, it reiterates the points he made in last week’s hearing on the issue, though in the written form that allows some snark.

Congress Doesn’t Need New Laws

The filing starts by undercutting Libby’s Appointments Clause complaint with a simple reading of the law.

Remarkably, defendant’s application, while suggesting that the AAG might have addressed the urgent conflict-of-interest issue by opting to seek new legislation from Congress … contains no mention of the statutory provisions under which AAG [Comey] acted. In fact, the delegation was made pursuant to the AAG’s statutory authority under 28 USC 510 to delegate any of the functions of the Attorney General to any other officer of the DOJ.

This is where Team USA adopts the same dismissive attitude that Libby’s new Appeals lawyer uses.

Defendant’s argument so lacks merit that it does not present a substantial issue.

While that’s not so persuasive, this bit of snarky logic is:

CIPA Fun, One

So Jeff Lomonaco and I were trying to figure out the best place for us to meet face to face after having emailed obsessively on the Plame case for two years. We thought of the best place to meet: at Prettyman Courthouse so we could read through the CIPA filings submitted last year in the case. This post will lay out some general items of interest. In a follow-up later this weekend (or maybe Monday), I’m going to talk about how the CIPA materials support the argument that Dick Cheney was trying to launder the information he had learned on June 10, 2003–information on DOD and State’s interest in the Niger intelligence, and information on Valerie Plame’s identity–so he could publish it. But first the general points.

Dorn Tidbits
Marilyn Dorn from the CIA wrote several statements over the course of the CIPA process describing the information that CIA needed to protect. In one of those, she provides the answer to a question bandied about for some time: whether the CIA did a damage assessment or not on the Plame leak. Dorn writes:

The CIA has not undertaken a “damage assessment”in this case. In accordance with its standard policy, the CIA does not conducta formal damage assessment to determine the actual damage to national securitycaused by an unauthorized disclosure while a criminal investigation orproduction of the matter is pending.

In other words, CIA didn’t do an assessment, but that doesn’t mean there was no damage. Rather, they simply didn’t do an assessment because they don’t, when there is a criminal investigation pending.

But Dorn does provide the following details, none of which are surprising, but describe some of the damage:

The CIA disestablished certain entities that had provided coversupport to Ms. Wilson, such as providing cover backstopping. These coverentities also provided cover support to other CIA personnel. These CIApersonnel were notified of the potential compromise of their identities and weremoved to other cover entities. The CIA notified cover providers whoseclandestine relationships with the CIA were potentially compromised by theWilson leak.

 

In other words, when Novak good and burned Brewster and Jennings in Fall 2003, a bunch of people had to get new cover.

Cohen Tries to Make Sense

I deliberately avoided Richard Cohen’s latest nonsense of the other day. But then watertiger sent me a tidbit from Cohen’s online chat today (dirty trick, watertiger), and I got sucked in. First, let me start with this passage:

Boston: If Bush felt he needed to respond to Wilson, why not do it openly, on-the-record, based on the merits?

Richard Cohen: Good question. I’m not sure Bush was involved in this at all, but in general I agree.

"I’m not sure Bush was involved in this at all." Well maybe, Cohen, that’s why you shouldn’t write about this case. Because you don’t know what the fuck you’re talking about. You see, evidence submitted at the trial made it clear that on June 9, Bush got involved. And later, on July 10, Condi passed on that "Bush is comfortable." Not to mention the fact that Dick Cheney claims to have asked Bush to declassify Plame’s identity the NIE. If Cheney did, in fact, have Bush unilaterally declassify Plame’s identity the NIE, I’d say that means he was involved.

Sentelle, Henderson, Tatel

It appears that we’ve got our panel for Scooter’s motion for release pending appeal–and we lucked out. Judges Sentelle, Henderson, and Tatel appear to be the panel–the same three judges that heard Judy’s and Cooper’s appeal on their subpoena. Sentelle is no liberal, not by any shade. But his decision on the appeal was reasonable. And Henderson and Tatel? They’re probably not invited to many cocktail parties at Laurence Silberman’s.

They’ve ordered the government to file its response to Libby’s request for bond by the 22nd, Friday. And Libby’s team must respond by the 26th.

So they’re expediting this. But they’re not the wingnuts who might have heard this motion …

One more thing: they’re not interested in hearing the Amici Illuminati’s brief.


Curbing the Imperial Presidency

Here is my presentation from the Take Back American panel on "Curbing the Imperial Presidency." I’m sure it didn’t come out this way. But it might be close.

One year after the publication of his book The ImperialPresidency, Arthur Schlesinger wrote the following for a column in Harpers:

We hear a great deal today aboutthe presumably grim consequences of the impeachment of the President—an endlesspublic trial, a people divided, a government paralyzed, a nation disgracedbefore the world. But suppose the House of Representatives should decide notto impeach Mr. Nixon. That would have its consequences, too—consequencesthat deserve at least as careful an examination.

For the refusal to impeach wouldbe a decision as momentous as impeachment itself. It would and could beinterpreted only as meaning that Congress does not think Mr. Nixon has doneanything to warrant impeachment. It would alter the historic relationship ofPresidential power to the constitutional system of accountability for the useof that power. The message our generationwould send to posterity would be that Mr. Nixon, whatever his other disasters,had conceived and established a new conception of Presidential accountability,and that his successors, so long as they take care to avoid the crudities of aWatergate burglary, can expect to inherit Mr. Nixon’s conception of inherentPresidential authority and to wield the unshared power with which he will haveendowed the Presidency. Failure to impeach would be a vindication of arevolutionary theory of Presidential accountability.

Now, I agree with Schlesinger. The fear of an endless publictrial, of government paralyzed, of international disgrace—those are notsufficient reasons to avoid impeaching a President (or Vice President orAttorney General) who has overstepped his constitutional authority.

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