April 16, 2024 / by 

 

The Menendez Indictment: “how much is one kilo of gold worth” … “kilo of gold price”

The latest indictment of Robert Menendez almost seems like a personal challenge to Clarence Thomas, to see if there are bribes of a public official that Thomas and his cronies on the Supreme Court won’t find a way to deem constitutional.

After all, what if Thomas is getting gold bars on the side from his “friends,” as Menendez is alleged to have been?

The short version, though, is that after Menendez’ last corruption prosecution, Nadine Arslanian started dating then married Menendez. And he started doing favors for some of her friends, Wael Hanna and Fred Daibes, who had ties to Egypt, including sharing non-public information with Egyptian officials and helping Hanna secure the monopoly on halal certification for meat imported into Egypt.

The indictment alleges a lot of breath-taking stupidity on Menedez’ part, including twice searching for the price of gold after doing something incriminating.

On or about October 17, 2021, ROBERT MENENDEZ and NADINE MENENDEZ, a/k/a “Nadine Arslanian,” the defendants, returned from Egypt as described in paragraph 29.f, landing at John F. Kennedy International Airport. Upon their arrival, a driver for FRED DAIBES, the defendant (“DAIBES’s Driver”), picked up MENENDEZ and NADINE MENENDEZ from the airport and drove them to their home in New Jersey. The next day, MENENDEZ performed a web search for “how much is one kilo of gold worth.” As discussed herein, multiple gold bars provided by DAIBES were found during the court-authorized June 2022 search of MENENDEZ and NADINE MENENDEZ’s residence.

[snip]

d. On or about January 24, 2022, DAIBES’s Driver exchanged two brief calls with NADINE MENENDEZ. NADINE MENENDEZ then texted DAIBES, writing, “Thank you. Christmas in January.” DAIBES’s Driver’s fingerprints were later found on an envelope containing thousands of dollars of cash recovered from the residence of MENENDEZ and NADINE MENENDEZ in New Jersey. This envelope also bore DAIBES’s DNA and was marked with DAIBES’s return address. In or about the early afternoon of January 24, 2022— i.e., approximately two hours after NADINE MENENDEZ had texted DAIBES thanking him and writing “Christmas in January”—MENENDEZ called Official-4, in a call lasting for approximately 15 seconds. This was MENENDEZ’s first phone call to Official-4. On or about January 29, 2022—i.e., several days after NADINE MENENDEZ had texted DAIBES, thanking him and writing “Christmas in January”—MENENDEZ performed a Google search for “kilo of gold price.”

When the FBI searched Menendez’ home last year, they found over $100,000 in gold bars, as well as $480,000 in cash.

The gold bars and some of the envelopes had the fingerprints of their alleged co-defendants.

Some of these allegations will be harder to prove. Some will be easier to pin on Nadine, unless and until one of the spouses flips on the other.

But Menendez, who escaped justice the last time DOJ tried to prosecute him for his corruption in 2015, certainly seems to have pressed his luck.


Charles McGonigal’s Lonely Plea Deal

Former FBI Assistant Director Charles McGonigal pled guilty to one count of conspiring to violate sanctions today.

Tellingly, the Information doesn’t say with whom he conspired.

Remember, he was charged in January with former translator Sergey Shestakov. The acts to which he pled guilty — collecting business intelligence on Oleg Deripaska rival Vladimir Potanin, according to reports from the plea — he was alleged to have done with Shestakov and for Agent-1, understood to be Yevgeniy Fokin.

19 . In or about August 2021 , McGONIGAL, SHESTAKOV, and Agent-1 drafted and executed a contract (the “Contract”) . According to the Contract, a Cyprus corporation (the “Cyprus Corporation”) would pay a Corporation based in New Jersey (the “New Jersey Corporation”) $51 , 280 upon execution of the Contract and $41 , 790 per month for “business intelligence services, analysis, and research relevant to [the Russian Corporation], its business operations, and shareholders. ” Although the payments under the Contract in fact would be made to MCGONIGAL and SHESTAKOV at the behest of Deripaska , as negotiated by Agent-1 , none of those people was named in or was a si gnatory to the Contract . Pursuant to the Contract , on August 13, 2021 1 $51 , 280 was wired from a Russian bank (the “Russian Bank”) to the New Jersey Corporation, to be followed by monthly payments of $41, 790 between August 18 and November 18 , 2021.

20 . The New Jersey Corporation was owned by a friend of McGONIGAL (the ”Friend” ) . The Friend had arranged for McGONIGAL to participate in the business of the New Jersey Corporation while McGONIGAL was still serving as SAC with the FBI . The Friend provided McGONIGAL with a corporate email account and a cellphone under a false name, which McGONIGAL at times used, in order to conceal McGONIGAL’ s work for the New Jersey Corporation while still employed by the FBI. Wit h respect to the Contract, however, McGONIGAL told SHESTAKOV that he had not informed the Friend that he was using the New Jersey Corporation to receive payment on the Contract . SHESTAKOV subsequently forged the Friend’ s signature on the Contract without the Friend’ s knowledge or permission . When the Friend questioned McGONIGAL about why the Russian Bank was making payments to the New Jersey Corporation, McGONIGAL told the Friend, in substance and in part, that it was payment for “legitimate” work McGONIGAL was performing for “a rich Russian guy . ” The Friend acquiesced in the use of the New Jersey Corporation, and subsequently transferred funds obtained pursuant to the Contract at McGONIGAL’ s direction, including to McGONIGAL and SHESTAKOV.

21. From at least in or about August 2021 until in or about November 2021 and in return for the payments specified in the Contract, McGONIGAL sought to gather information about Oligarch-2 and the Russian Corporation . Among other things, McGONIGAL retained subcontractors to assist in this endeavor. With respect to one such subcontractor (“Subcontractor-ln) , McGONIGAL requested a “soup to nuts” investigation of Oligarch-2 and the Russian Corporation . McGONIGAL declined to t ell Subcontractor-1 the identity of his client, despite having an established relationship with Subcontractor- 1 in which McGONIGAL had identified his prior, lawful client.

Instead, his Information tersely describes that he and others worked for Deripaska.

From in or about August 2021 through in or about November 2021, McGONIGAL and others, acting at the behest of Oleg Deripaska, whom the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated as a Specially Designated National on or about April 6, 2018, sought to gather derogatory information about a rival of Deripaska, in violation of IEEPA.

From in or about August 2021 through in or about November 2021, McGONIGAL and others received and routed payments from Deripaska through two corporations, neither of which was registered in the name of McGONIGAL or Deripaska, in an effort to conceal that the payments originated from Deripaska.

Even the press release makes no mention of Shestakov. It only describes McGonigal’s conspiracy with Fokin.

In 2021, MCGONIGAL conspired to provide services to Deripaska, in violation of U.S. sanctions imposed on Deripaska in 2018.  Specifically, following his negotiations with an agent of Deripaska, MCGONIGAL agreed to and did investigate a rival Russian oligarch in return for concealed payments from Deripaska.  As part of their negotiations with Deripaska’s agent, MCGONIGAL and the agent attempted to conceal Deripaska’s involvement by, among other means, not directly naming Deripaska in electronic communications, using shell companies as counterparties in the contract that outlined the services to be performed, using a forged signature on that contract, and using the same shell companies to send and receive payment from Deripaska.

Nor is there any hint of cooperation, which you’d think a former FBI Agent might do if there were a co-conspirator still around to cooperate against. According to Innercity Press’ live tweet of the hearing, even though Seth DuCharme had recently suggested that both this and his DC case would be resolved in one agreement, this agreement doesn’t rule out consecutive sentences, meaning he could face more than the five years he’s facing in SDNY. Nor are tax charges off the table.

It’s not exactly the kind of sweet plea deal he must have imagined Bill Barr’s former fixer, Seth DuCharme might negotiate.


David Weiss Is Wrecking the Right Wing Story (and Likely Sandbagging Hunter Biden)

I confess I love William Shipley — AKA Shipwreckedcrew, or Wreck, for short — the prosecutor turned defense attorney for seeming zillions of Jan6ers.

Don’t get me wrong: in my opinion, he’s an utter whack and a douchebag.

But — and I mean this in good faith — because he’s batshit but also a real lawyer, it makes him the sweet spot among attorneys that Jan6ers will hire and (sometimes at least) retain, but who will give them decent and at times excellent legal representation. There are a lot of batshit grifters who are little more than parasites on Jan6 defendants. And while I want these mobsters to face justice, I also want them to have competent legal representation along the way. Many of them do not. So while I may find Wreck awful personally, I am grateful he is providing competent representation for the kind of Jan6ers who wouldn’t accept representation from superb public defenders that many Jan6ers believe are communists or pedophiles or whatever other conspiracy theory they vomit up.

I also love Wreck because it drives him insane that, even though my graduate degree is a mere PhD, my observations often are more accurate than his. My favorite is probably the time I correctly predicted that John Durham might successfully breach Fusion’s privilege but not be able to use any of those documents at trial (Durham used one to set an unsuccessful perjury trap anyway). When I do stuff like that Wreck waggles his legal experience around and sics his trolls on me and it’s funny every … single … time.

This may be another of those times. Because Wreck is about to make my case that David Weiss tried something noxious in the abandoned Hunter Biden plea the other day.

You see, I agree with what Popehat had to say about the failed Hunter Biden plea the other day. Judge Maryellen Noreika sussed out that there was a key structural problem with the deal and refused to approve it without some more consideration of whether her role in it is even constitutional.

Friends and neighbors, that is shitty drafting. And if you’re Hunter Biden’s lawyer and telling your client that he can’t be prosecuted for crimes related to those income sources because of that language, that’s reckless advice and bad lawyering. It’s a failure by both attorneys. If Judge Noreika spotted that issue, called it out, and asked for an explanation, then good for her — she’s doing her job, which is to make sure the defendant understands the deal they are accepting.

That said, I’m pretty sure it’s a Frankenstein of a deal, in part, for reasons neither side wants to address until it’s done (Politico posted a transcript of the hearing here). Hunter, probably because he was at real risk for felony tax crimes before the government bolloxed the case so badly. His lawyer, Chris Clark, possibly because Abbe Lowell is on the scene and may be pushing a much more confrontational approach to this investigation. And the government because — on top of the things in the emails that prosecutors thought might blow the entire caseother statutes of limitation are expiring, SCOTUS might soon rule the one felony against Hunter unconstitutional. It turns out, too, that for the contested year (the one Joseph Ziegler said was so damning), both sides agree that Hunter’s accountants overstated his income on his taxes, which makes it hard to argue that Hunter’s treatment of some personal expenses as business expenses was an intent to lie to the IRS.

When asked whether there was any precedent to support what Hunter’s lawyers and the government were trying to do, AUSA Leo Wise, who was brought in to replace the team that was too tainted to prosecute this case, admitted, “No, Your Honor. This was crafted to suit the facts and circumstances.”

In other words, because both sides had fucked up so badly, this agreement is a way to move forward. Or would have been if Judge Noreika hadn’t appropriately refused to be part of a plea that might not be constitutional.

But the Frankenstein plea was written on the back of a remarkable statement of facts, a statement of facts that could have been written by Peter Schweizer, which was completely untethered from the narrow crimes in the two deals. It was so untethered from the elements of the offense involved in the crimes in the plea that Judge Noreika had to direct Wise to explain how it actually met the essential elements of the offense.

I have grave concerns about the ploy that prosecutors may have been attempting — may have succeeded in doing — with that statement of facts.

And the statement of facts is where I get to have fun with Wreck again. He agrees with me it is totally unusual. But he’s sure that that’s because the defense attorneys — who he’s sure wrote it — are trying to get away with a fast one.

“There is a purpose behind it,” Wreck said, “and it’s written in a style that I have NEVER seen come from a prosecutor.”

Only, he’s wrong about who wrote it and so undoubtedly wrong about the purpose behind it.

Hunter Biden’s lawyers didn’t write it. At one point, Chris Clark said that explicitly: “Your Honor, we didn’t write this.” Several times, Hunter or Clark struggled to explain what they believed the government meant by something in the statement of facts, in one instance when they had to address that it was totally unclear what income Hunter earned.

Mr. Clark: My understanding, Your Honor, is that sentence picks up the work described in the last couple of sentences, not just the work for Boise Schiller.

The Court: Well, Mr. Biden actually knows.

The Defendant: Yeah, exactly, Your Honor. I believe what the government intended for that sentence was that it was the total income, not just as it relates to my capacity for Boise Schiller.

When asked why the statement of facts said his addiction problems were well-documented, Hunter responded,

Well, I believe the government is referring to a book that I wrote about my struggles with addiction in that period of my life. And quite possibly other news outlets and interviews and things that have been done.

That phrase — well-documented — had absolutely no place in a document like this, certainly without citations. Indeed, how well-documented his addiction is irrelevant to both the tax crimes and the gun diversion.

Yet no one cleaned it up before this attempted plea.

Perhaps the most remarkable exchange happened when Judge Noreika asked Hunter what the statement of facts meant when it said that his tax liability should not have come as a surprise. He seemed totally unfamiliar with the passage, and when asked, Hunter said that it was a surprise.

THE COURT: All right. On the next page, at the end of the second paragraph, starting four lines from the bottom in the middle of the line, the paragraph talks about your tax liability. And it says the end of year liability should not have come as a surprise. Do you see that?

THE DEFENDANT: I’m sorry, I’m just trying —

THE COURT: That’s okay. Take your time.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I see that here.

THE COURT: It says it should not have come as a surprise. It wasn’t a surprise, is that right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you knew —

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I don’t — I didn’t write this, Your Honor, so the characterization —

MR. CLARK: Can we elaborate the time there, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CLARK: So essentially there was a tax treatment that was undertaken in that year, and it changed the tax treatment at the very end of the year for a particular asset. And so I think the point is, and I didn’t write this either, there was substantial influx of income during that year. There was an issue with this last minute tax treatment change, and so there were expressions at times of surprise at that. I think the government’s point is you knew you made a lot of money, it shouldn’t have come as a surprise.

THE COURT: My only concern is when I read this as a lawyer, it shouldn’t have come as a surprise, that doesn’t preclude Mr. Biden from saying yes, it did.

MR. CLARK: Your Honor’s characterization is exactly right.

THE COURT: You’re saying it actually was a surprise?

MR. CLARK: In that year.

THE COURT: You guys are okay with that?

MR. WISE: Yes, Your Honor.

Hunter Biden was under oath for this colloquy (as all plea colloquies are), trying to explain why a document he didn’t write was riddled with ambiguous language and unsubstantiated claims.

And here’s the concern: When Hunter’s lawyers agreed to this, they believed that FARA charges were off the table. But about half the way through this hearing, Wise made it clear they were not.

THE COURT: All right. So there are references 6 to foreign companies, for example, in the facts section. Could the government bring a charge under the Foreign Agents Registration Act?

MR. WISE: Yes.

THE COURT: I’m trying to figure out if there is a meeting of the minds here and I’m not sure that this provision isn’t part of the Plea Agreement and so that’s why I’m asking.

MR. CLARK: Your Honor, the Plea Agreement —

THE COURT: I need you to answer my question if you can. Is there a meeting of the minds on that one?

MR. CLARK: As stated by the government just  now, I don’t agree with what the government said.

THE COURT: So I mean, these are contracts. To be enforceable, there has to be a meeting of the minds. So what do we do now?

MR. WISE: Then there is no deal.

I can’t speak to whether any FARA charges against Hunter are meritorious or not and if they are, without taint, by all means prosecute him. The admitted facts about Burisma and CEFC, while far smaller than laid out by Republicans (including, potentially, by Joseph Ziegler and Gary Shapley under oath), are interesting as much for the kind of information operation we saw being alleged in the Gal Luft prosecution as they are for the possibility they support a FARA prosecution (which is one of two things — the other being the loan that Hunter got from Kevin Morris to pay off his taxes in the first place — for which the statute of limitations would not have expired).

But that’s as much an information operation as it is a FARA violation.

It’s my opinion that this plea deal was crafted to give DOJ a way out of grave problems that exist in their existing case file — problems that Ziegler described in testimony — while kicking off a FARA investigation with sworn admissions made based on, at best, misunderstandings — and possibly outright misrepresentations — of the scope of the deal.

It’s my opinion that this statement of facts was intended to get Hunter to admit under oath to facts underlying FARA violations that DOJ otherwise couldn’t use because the way they got this evidence has been so tainted by Trump’s political influence and hacked computers and other poisonous tree they’d never get it admitted in court.

DOJ already admitted — to Joseph Ziegler at least — that they couldn’t prosecute any of this because of some kind of taint. And it sure looks like this “plea deal” is an attempt to sheepdip the entire prosecution to get Hunter Biden to clean the taint himself.


Rudy’s Corrupted Devices

In a remarkable set of filings, Robert Costello — Rudy Giuliani’s defense attorney and a key player in the effort to package up a doctored laptop and pitch it as Hunter Biden’s — has provided an explanation for why his client wasn’t charged for doing the bidding of Russian-backed Ukrainians without registering as a foreign agent: Because many of the devices seized on April 28, 2021 were “corrupted” (his word).

Here are the filings:

  • Joe Sibley’s response to Ruby Freeman’s motion for sanctions
  • Robert Costello’s declaration purporting to describe the Special Master process in Rudy’s Ukraine influence-peddling case
  • A nolo contendere declaration from Rudy stipulating that he will not contest that he made the defamatory statements about Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss or that the statements were false, but preserving his ability to argue the statements were opinion or otherwise protected speech

No contest that Rudy lied

The last of these, Rudy’s nolo contendere declaration, may be an attempt to put all these discovery disputes behind him by simply stipulating that the information he would have turned over had he complied with discovery would show that he made the defamatory claims about Freeman and Moss and there was no basis for them. His stipulation is limited to this case, so could not be used in an 18 USC 241 case against him.

Rudy is attempting to stop digging himself deeper in a hole.

Let’s see where we might go if we dig further, shall we?

Costello blames the government contractor for “corrupting” Rudy’s devices

Costello’s declaration claims that he encountered numerous technical problems with the data on the devices, and attributes those problems to the government’s vendor. Based on having blamed the government’s discovery vendor for any technical problems, he claims it is impossible for Rudy to have spoiled any of the materials on the phones.

In reviewing the materials, I encountered numerous non-user generated files and what I referred to as computer gibberish. In addition, there were many emails that contained the header with the sender and recipient addresses, but no text in the body of the email. With respect to this material, in September and October of 2021, I made inquiries of the Special Master’s electronic discovery people, and they informed me that this was exactly how they received the electronic materials. The Special Master’s lawyers informed me that they had made similar inquiries to the Government and the Government reported that any errors in the production of the electronic data, would have occurred when PAE, the Government vendor, performed their extraction procedure. I have attached some of the contemporaneous communications with the Special Master’s office in September and October of 2021. See Exhibit C attached.

As a result of that information, you can see that the allegations made by Mr. Gottlieb are false and not based upon any factual material. Mr. Giuliani has not spoliated any electronic evidence. What has been produced is what Mr. Giuliani received from the United States Government. Mr. Giuliani has never possessed the electronic materials since they were seized in April 2021. It was, and is, physically impossible for Mr. Giuliani to have spoliated any of this evidence as Mr. Gottlieb claims. [my emphasis]

Later, Costello outright claims that the government “had apparently corrupted some of the files as they were extracting the data,” and then wiped them.

There was no way for Mr. Giuliani or I, to know that the Government had apparently corrupted some of the files as they were extracting the data. Likewise, there was no way for Mr. Giuliani or I, to know, [sic] that when the devices were returned by the FBI, AFTER they concluded there would be no charges forthcoming, that the actual devices would be wiped clean. [my emphasis]

That, Costello claims, is proof that Rudy couldn’t have destroyed any electronic evidence.

In short, there is simply no factual basis for Mr. Gottlieb’s allegations of spoliation. It was physically impossible for Rudy Giuliani to do what Mr. Gottlieb swears to.

Except that’s not clear at all. That’s true because Costello’s own evidence doesn’t support his claim that the government attributed all of this to the vendor. That leaves the possibility that Rudy spoiled the evidence before SDNY seized his phones. If so, Costello’s claim that Rudy couldn’t have spoiled the evidence after Ruby Freeman’s lawsuit, in December 2021, is true, but it doesn’t rule out Rudy or someone else — perhaps his Russian spy friends — spoiling evidence before the search in April 2021, at which point he was already lawyered up for at least the Smartmatic suit.

Costello misrepresents review scope

Before I show that Costello’s own evidence about the evidentiary problems doesn’t support his claims, let me demonstrate something more basic.

Costello repeatedly claims (and Sibley repeats) that the government reviewed 26 years of electronic evidence. It’s true that there was evidence from 26 years on the devices. But as I’ve explained repeatedly, even the government asked to limit the scope of review to everything after January 1, 2018. And that’s what Judge Paul Oetken approved on September 16, 2021.

An email Costello included with his declaration — directing Rudy what to review next — shows that’s what the scope of the review was.

Costello may have a reason he wants to obscure the scope of the review, which I’ll return to. Or it may be that after discovering the “corruption” on Rudy’s phones, FBI’s technical experts had to look further, using a warrant that is not yet public. But at least given the public record, it is not an honest representation of what was reviewed, as distinct from what was extracted.

The corruption found on Rudy’s phones

Based on Costello’s evidence, there were five different problems found with Rudy’s devices:

  • The dates on emails adopted the date of extraction — July 2021 — as the last modified date
  • Some .jpg files could not be viewed
  • Emails from Rudy’s phone lacked the text of the email
  • There were unreadable files on the larger devices
  • The WhatsApp texts had gotten garbled

Costello includes some cherry-picked emails to substantiate those problems. I’ll put them in order.

The first identified problem was the last-modified date, which Costello wrote someone from Trustpoint to identify on September 15 and which I first noted days later. Costello does not mention whether or how that problem was fixed.

Then, Costello quoted from his own email sent on September 30, which described that everything on seven devices was non-readable non-user created.

The bottom line of which is that there is virtually No User Created Info on the first seven devices. The screen shots of data we observed was non- readable non user created data which is clearly non- responsive and so we shouldn’t raise any objections to it being turned over to the Government.

Additionally we are getting the Special Master to go to the Government and its vendor to see if they can eliminate all of the non- user created data from the 9 remaining devices to make our future work more manageable.

A response from the Special Master on October 1, 2021 describes the problems with those seven devices somewhat differently, this way:

  • .jpg files that cannot be viewed
  • missing email/text body issue
  • unreadable “computer files” on the larger devices

Those devices were reviewed for files through seizure, so they likely had contemporaneous records.

Then, an instruction email from the Special Master team, written on October 15, 2021 — regarding the iPhone from which the bulk of the files were turned over — suggests that on that phone only the missing email/text issue remained. This is one of the only communications that describes something the government represented. And at least per them, it’s not a matter of corruption, it’s a matter of how iPhones work.

It is our expectation that these documents can be reviewed quickly, given that many are very short, and others — as you’ve pointed out previously — contain no “body” text. We have asked the Government why many messages do not contain bodies, and their understanding is that this is the way the iPhone stores backup data.

Then, on October 21, 2021, Costello sent an email noting that the WhatsApp texts were muddled.

Trustpoint reports to us that within the field of approximately 25,000 data items there are approximately 7500 “WhatsApp” entries. The way the Government’s expert presented this evidence almost all the Whats App entries consist of garbled words in English. For example the phrase “In God we trust” would likely appear to us now as “God we trust in”.

[snip]

Frankly we do not know how to deal with this, and we wanted to alert you to his latest glitch which will be found on more than 25% of the items to be searched.

The Special Master responded the following week that they “hope to have a solution shortly.”

As noted above, the Special Master turned over virtually everything on that phone, so they found a way to deal with the WhatsApp issue.

Given the number of files found on the remaining 8 devices, may well have found the same problem on those devices as they did on the first seven.

In short, at least per the record Costello himself provides, he has no evidence the government attributed any of this to the vendor. Costello claimed that the government had told the Special Master that,

the government reported that any errors in the production of the electronic data, would have occurred when PAE, the Government vendor performed their extraction procedure.

But, unless I’m missing it, he provides no evidence of that.

It appears likely that 15 of 16 devices lacked substantive information, and the only thing he provides an explanation for is that some emails — emails that Rudy would have separate access to — weren’t downloaded onto a backup of his phone.

Costello spins on Rudy’s non-compliance on emails

According to Rudy’s own declaration, he helped Trump plot a coup attempt using three different emails, which other documents (including Costello’s own declaration!) reveal must be:

  • rudolphgiuliani at icloud
  • helen0528 at gmail
  • TruthandJustie4U at proton

Rudy’s own privilege log shows that he retained both the gmail and icloud emails — but for things after January 6 and before the seizure, which in the log are fairly presented as privileged.

Rudy’s own privilege log shows none of the protonmail accounts used, even though Bernie Kerik’s does (more on that later).

That’s why it’s so interesting that Costello attacks rather than addresses why Epshteyn (and Christina Bobb) had responsive records that Rudy didn’t turn over.

In paragraph 5 of Mr. Gottlieb’s affirmation, he states that they obtained a December 13, 2020 email from Defendant Giuliani to Boris Ephsteyn [sic] which ” reiterates Defendant’s false claims about Plaintiffs that: “Georgia has video evidence of 30,000 illegal ballots cast after the observers were removed.”” Note first, that the Plaintiffs in in this case were not mentioned, but further note, that when one reviews the citation for this email (ECF-56-7), there is a later email in that same exhibit from Jason Miller that reports: “Statement on hold until further notice, pending Rudy’s talk with the President.” In the spirit of lack of candor, Mr. Gottlieb failed to mention that email.

Here’s the email in question (which redacts which email it went to, but one Bobb turned over was sent to Rudy’s Gmail). But whichever one it came from, it’s an email that Rudy still had access to in 2021, as evidenced by the exhibits presented in this case.

There seems to be good cause to conclude Rudy deleted the email or refused to look for it.

Costello and Sibley’s exaggeration of the investigative closure

Again, 15 of 16 of these devices had some as yet unexplained data that was not user created. I don’t see where Costello substantiated that the government’s vendor did this. Short of doing that, he can’t rule out that Rudy — or, again, the Russian spies he was cozy with at the time — destroyed the data on the devices.

And that’s why I find it notable how Costello and Sibley misrepresent the nature of DOJ’s notice the grand jury investigation into Rudy’s Ukraine influence peddling had concluded.

At the same time as NY State was asking Barbara Jones to serve as the monitor over Trump Organization’s legal woes with the state, SDNY filed this letter, asking Judge Oetken to terminate the appointment of Jones.

The Government writes to notify the Court that the grand jury investigation that led to the issuance of the above-referenced warrants has concluded, and that based on information currently available to the Government, criminal charges are not forthcoming. Accordingly, the Government respectfully requests that the Court terminate the appointment of the Special Master, the Hon. Barbara S. Jones.

As I noted at the time, Costello ran to the press and claimed this meant Rudy would not be charged.

But Costello never claimed to have received a declination letter. And contemporaneous reporting made clear the case remained open.

We now know why: Instead of whatever prosecutors expected to find on at least 7 of Rudy’s phone, they found non-user generated non-readable files. Maybe their vendor fucked up. Maybe something else happened to the devices. But there was nothing there for them to build their case on.

Which is why Costello’s spin on what happened is so interesting. He faults Ruby Freeman’s lawyer for not mentioning that Rudy wasn’t charged.

In his Affirmation, Mr. Gottlieb referenced a criminal investigation run by the SDNY involving Mr. Giuliani, but conveniently failed to mention that it was resolved in Mr. Giuliani’s favor.

[snip]

First, let me state that after the Government, be it the FBI or the U. S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”) reviewed 26 years’  worth of electronic data, the SDNY, [sic] issued an unusual public statement declaring that it was not charging Mr. Giuliani with any violation of federal law.

But he overstates the filing, which only addresses the grand jury in question. And the only reason the statement was unusual is that it wasn’t a declination letter sent to Costello himself.

Given the revelation that at least 7 and possibly as many as 15 of these devices were — to use Costello’s word — “corrupted,” it makes other details of the Rudy investigation more interesting, including a request, reported in April 2022, for help accessing other phones.

If the vendor didn’t “corrupt” the data on 15 of 16 of Rudy’s devices — and I don’t see where Costello shows they did — I can imagine that the SDNY might pursue how they got corrupted.

And that may be why Rudy is attempting to end any further review of why he can’t even find emails that Boris Epshteyn had access to.


James Comer’s Imaginary Whistleblower Friend, Gal Luft, Was Charged Last November for Lying in that March 2019 Meeting

I wrote last week that James Comer and Jim Jordan and Jason Smith have been immunizing misconduct and crime in an effort to gin up a conspiracy theory against Joe Biden and his family.

Last night, that effort was demonstrated in spectacular fashion. For months, Comer has been squealing about a secret informant he had who had proof that Joe Biden engaged in graft with CEFC. But then his imaginary whistleblower friend disappeared.

In recent weeks, Comer’s imaginary whistleblower friend was identified as Gal Luft. He disappeared because he skipped bail in Cyprus on an arrest warrant from the US.

Here’s how NYPost’s Hunter propagandist described it:

Gal Luft, the “missing” witness in the House Oversight Committee’s Biden family corruption investigation, has told The Post he is alive and living as a fugitive in an undisclosed location.

The former Israeli Defense Force colonel vanished from Cyprus last month while on bail awaiting extradition to the US on seven charges.

He denies the allegations, which include five charges relating to the Arms Export Control Act of conspiring to sell Chinese products to the United Arab Emirates, Kenya and Libya, as well as a violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and of making a false statement.

Luft claims he was forced to skip bail because he is the victim of a political persecution by the US to protect Joe Biden and his son Hunter, and brother Jim.

A few days ago, Luft did a video, naming the prosecutors he met with at that meeting and daring DOJ to unseal his indictment. So they did. The November 1, 2022 indictment, by the same two prosecutors, charges Luft with a range of sanctions violations and serving as a Foreign Agent of China. The FARA violation alleges he insinuated someone who looks a lot like James Woolsey into the Trump Administration on the payroll of CEFC.

The date is important: He was charged before he started regaling dim-witted Chairmen about dirt on Hunter Biden. This prosecution can’t be about retaliation for the conspiracy theories he told Comer — the indictment precedes it all by months.

In any case, the indictment also lays out the false charges count against him.

He was charged with lying at that March 2019 meeting about his own ties to CEFC.

84. On or about March 29, 2019, in the Southern District of New York, Belgium, and elsewhere outside of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district of the United States, GAL LUFT, defendant, who is expected to be first brought to and arrested in the Southern District of New York, in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully made a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement and representation, to wit, LUFT falsely stated during an interview at the United States Embassy in Brussels, Belgium with federal law enforcement officers and prosecutors, in connection with an investigation being conducted in the Southern District of New York, that LUFT had tried to prevent CEFC China from doing an oil deal with Iran, that LUFT had been excluded from CEFC China meetings with Iranians, and that LUFT did not know of any CEFC China dealings with Iran while he was affiliated with the company–when in fact, including as described above in paragraphs Sixty-Six through Eighty, LUFT personally attended at least one meeting between CEFC China and Iranians and assisted in setting up additional such meetings for the purpose of arranging deals for Iranian oil, and also worked to find a buyer of Iranian oil while concealing its origin.

In other words, well before Luft told Comer anything, he had been charged for lying at the very meeting he’s now claiming he was retaliated for. Comer was duped.

Again.

Given the precedent of Eric Swalwell, who was removed from the House Intelligence Committee after having been cultivated by a Chinese agent, Comer should be stripped of his gavel and referred to the ethics committee.

Instead, Speaker McCarthy is going to let him continue to make a mockery of himself offering to immunize all range of grifters in hopes of finding dirt.


Paul Manafort Remains a Bigger Scandal than Hunter Biden

I haven’t had the time to dig into Gary Shapley’s purported whistleblower claims about the case against Hunter Biden, which several US Attorneys have already disputed.

My read, thus far, matches Andrew Prokop’s: after IRS investigators tried to take steps during a pre-election prohibition period last year, someone in their vicinity leaked to Devlin Barrett, as right-wingers do every pre-election period. That led Delaware US Attorney David Weiss to (justifiably) remove the suspected leakers from the case. As other right wing officials have before, they then ran to Congress and belatedly claimed whistleblower status.

The purported whistleblowers claim that investigative steps — pertaining to allegations about conduct after Biden left the Obama White House — were slow-walked in 2020, during Bill Barr’s tenure as Attorney General. The most serious claim made by the purported whistleblowers is that US Attorneys appointed by Joe Biden refused to file charges against Hunter in the venues where they occurred — MDCA and DC. Merrick Garland, David Weiss, and Matthew Graves have all denied that.

But even if that allegation is true, even if Weiss continues to investigate and substantiates some foreign influence peddling (at this point, limited to 2017, a time when Biden was not in office), the allegations against Hunter Biden would still be far less scandalous than the Paul Manafort case. That’s true because the scale of Manafort’s tax crimes were far worse. That’s true because Manafort has confessed to his foreign influence crime. And that’s true because Trump pardoned Manafort after his former campaign manager lied to investigators about what he did with (since confirmed) Russian agent, Konstantin Kilimnik, during and after the 2016 campaign.

Here’s my understanding of the comparison. The claims against Hunter, in bold, reflect the two Informations docketed as part of the plea deal. All but the pardon TBDs in his case reflect allegations from the so-called whistleblowers that remain unresolved.

Note: I have not listed “lied to protect the president” for Hunter because, as far as I am aware, the President’s son has not made sworn statements to law enforcement — true or false — about matters affecting his father. Manafort did make false statements about matters implicating Trump during his breached cooperation with Robert Mueller’s prosecutors.

A whole pack of DC journalists have chased the IRS allegations, like six year olds do a soccer ball, but with perhaps less consideration of what they’re chasing. They’re doing that even as Trump’s pardons remain largely unreviewed since he announced his run. This manic response to contested IRS claims reflects a choice. Just not a justifiable journalistic one, given the contested allegations to date.

Paul Manafort sources

Millions in tax avoidance: On August 21, 2018, an EDVA jury convicted Manafort of filing false tax returns each year from 2010 to 2014. On September 14, 2018, Manafort pled guilty to tax crimes spanning from 2006 through 2015. Between 2010 and 2014, he failed to report over $15M in income on FBAR.

FARA component: On September 14, 2018, Manafort pled guilty to serving as an unregistered foreign agent from 2006 through 2015.

Money laundering: On September 14, 2018, Manafort pled guilty to laundering over $6.5M in payments, from 2006 through 2016, as part of his FARA scheme.

Bank fraud: In August 21, 2018, an EDVA jury convicted Manafort of two counts of bank fraud, totalling $4.4M. On September 14, 2018, Manafort admitted to over $25M more in bank fraud.

Conspiracy with foreign spy: On September 14, 2018, Manafort pled guilty to a conspiracy to witness tamper with Konstantin Kilimnik. In a 2021 sanctions filing, Treasury stated as fact that Kilimnik is a Russian Intelligence Services agent.

Joint Defense Agreement with President: Before Manafort pled guilty, Rudy Giuliani confirmed that Manafort was part of a Joint Defense Agreement with the President.

Lied to protect President: On February 13, 2019, Amy Berman Jackson ruled that Manafort had breached his plea agreement by — among other things — lying about what he did in an August 2, 2016 meeting with Konstantin Kilimnik at which he described how the campaign planned to win swing states.

Intervention from Attorney General: On May 13, 2020, Manafort was given COVID release to home confinement, even though his prison was at that point low risk and his case did not meet the criteria laid out by Bureau of Prisons. He served less than two years of an over seven year sentence in prison.

Pardoned: On December 23, 2020, Trump pardoned Manafort.

Hunter Biden sources

Hundreds of thousands in tax avoidance: In both 2017 and 2018, Hunter failed to pay full taxes on $1.5M in income ($3M total).

Gun possession: For 11 days in 2018, Hunter possessed a gun in violation of a prohibition on gun ownership by an addict.

Update: Just to give a sense of scale, in his Ways and Means interview, Whistleblower X tried to explain how big the scale of Hunter Biden’s graft was by noting that he and his associates, over five years, got $17.3M.

But Manafort was doing more than that himself.


Seth DuCharme Really, Really Wants to Graymail Charles McGonigal’s Path to Freedom

I’m really not surprised that former Bill Barr flunky Seth DuCharme is trying to graymail the government in the SDNY case of his client, Charles McGonigal. That’s a legal strategy whereby you demand so many highly classified documents for trial that the government is faced with the prospect of dismissing a criminal case rather than going to trial.

As a reminder, former Special Assistant in Charge of Counterintelligence in FBI’s NY’s Field Office McGonigal was charged in two indictments: A DC indictment charging him for hiding some meetings with and payments from an Albanian associate while still at the FBI, and a SDNY indictment charging him and Sergey Shestakov with money laundering and conspiring to violate the sanctions imposed on Oleg Deripaska after McGonigal left theFBI.

Almost six months and maybe one or two sealed docket items in, there’s no public sign of a Classified Information Protection Act notice in the DC case (see this post for a background on CIPA).

Not so the SDNY case. That case has been headed for CIPA from the start.

But something funky is going on with the CIPA process, as if there’s a CIPA filter team backstopping the prosecution team.

SDNY must have planned this from the start, and it is driving McGonigal’s team nuts.

It started on February 8, when SDNY filed a CIPA letter, requesting a CIPA 2 conference.

Often, these letters review the entire CIPA process. The one Jay Bratt submitted in the Trump stolen documents case last week, for example, went through Section 1, Section 2, Section 3, Section 4, Section 5, Section 6 (broken down by sub-section), Section 7, Section 8, Section 9, and Section 10.

Not the SDNY one in the McGonigal case. It went through Section 2 — asking for a conference — and then stopped.

The Government expects to provide the Court with further information about whether there will be any need for CIPA practice in this case, and to answer any questions the Court may have, at the CIPA Section 2 conference.

In response, on March 1, McGonigal’s lawyers submitted their own CIPA letter, laying out Sections 1 through 8. Along the way, it described how important Section 4 is and informed Judge

Section 4, which is in many ways the heart of CIPA, governs the methods of disclosure of classified information by the government to the defendant, pursuant to its constitutional and statutory obligations. See 18 U.S.C. § App. III § 4. Section 4 is implicated when the head of the department with control over the matter, and after personal consideration of the matter, invokes the states-secrets privilege to withhold classified information from the defendant in the interests of national security. Doe v. C.I.A., No. 05 CIV. 7939 LTSFM, 2007 WL 30099, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007); see also United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2008). The states-secrets privilege however is not absolute: it “must—under some circumstances—give way . . . to a criminal defendant’s right to present a meaningful defense.” United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 141 (2d Cir. 2010). (internal quotations omitted).

Under Section 4, upon a “sufficient showing” by the government, the Court may authorize the government to “delete specified items of classified information from documents to be made available to the defendant . . . , to substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove.” 18 U.S.C. § App. III § 4. The government makes a sufficient showing that such alternatives are warranted through an ex parte submission to the Court. See id; see also United States v. Muhanad Mahmoud Al-Farekh, 956 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2020). Of critical importance to the fairness of the process, the Court may review, ex parte and in camera, the classified information at issue to determine whether and in what form the information must be disclosed to the defendant, and whether the government has truly satisfied its discovery obligations. See, e.g., United States v. Aref, No. 04 CR 402, 2006 WL 1877142, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July 6, 2006). To assist the Court in this analysis, the defense will provide the Court with its initial view of the scope of material that will be relevant and helpful in the preparation of the defense at the upcoming conference and will supplement that information as appropriate. [my emphasis]

This effectively flipped CIPA on its head, alerting Judge Jennifer Rearden they planned to tell the government what classified discovery should look like, not vice versa.

On March 3, Judge Rearden confirmed she would hold two separate CIPA conferences. The SDNY was held on March 6. On March 7, the day after SDNY’s CIPA conference and the day before McGonigal’s, SDNY wrote to note how McGonigal had flipped on its head.

Although much of McGonigal’s general discourse on CIPA is unobjectionable, the Government believes several points require correction or supplementation.

The whole thing is worth reading: for the description that the US Attorney’s Manual does not convey rights, for the observation that McGonigal had conflated the prosecution team and the Intelligence Community, for the challenge to McGonigal’s claim that the IC must have information about “a recently retired FBI intelligence official being corrupted by a Russian oligarch” (there’s even a long footnote distinguishing the Scooter Libby case, in both Circuit and victim, from this), and for McGonigal’s claim to do in an ex parte Section 2 hearing what normally comes later, in Section 5.

But notably SDNY’s response letter describes that while DOJ must comply with Brady, it doesn’t have to tell a defendant how it is doing so.

Second, although legal rules such as Brady and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 do obligate the Government to disclose particular information, they do not oblige the Government to explain to defendants how they have satisfied that obligation.

The next day, McGonigal had his CIPA hearing.

On May 8, SDNY filed a short letter informing Judge Rearden that they had declassified the material they had told her they would in their own CIPA 2 hearing and provided it to the defense.

At the March 6, 2023 ex parte conference held pursuant to Section 2 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”) in the above-referenced case, the Government described to the Court certain materials that the Government was seeking to declassify. The Government writes to confirm that those materials have been declassified and produced to the defendants. At this time, the Government does not anticipate making a filing pursuant to Section 4 of CIPA and believes it has met its discovery obligations with respect to classified information.

In saying they didn’t anticipate making a filing pursuant to Section 4, they were undercutting the premise McGonigal’s team had made back on March 1.

Given the letter McGonigal submitted last Friday, June 23, such an approach seems to be driving McGonigal nuts. It describes that it is puzzling and concerning and hard to imagine that there isn’t more.

With respect to the way forward as it pertains to classified discovery, as we noted at our last court appearance, the government has indicated that it “does not anticipate making a filing pursuant to Section 4 of CIPA and believes it has met its discovery obligations with respect to classified information.” See ECF No. 44 at 1. In a subsequent series of conversations, the government informed us, in a general way, that it has satisfied its discovery obligations relating to classified information. The government’s position is perplexing. While it is not surprising that the government does not wish to account for its each and every step in satisfying its constitutional obligations, it is puzzling and concerning that the government would, at this stage, determine that no CIPA Section 4 presentation to the Court is appropriate, when we are a year away from trial and the government’s discovery obligations with respect to Rule 16, the Jencks Act, Brady and Giglio are ongoing. The indictment and the U.S. Attorney’s press release include accusations that foreseeably implicate classified information within each of the four categories of discoverable information. With respect to the category of impeachment material alone, it is hard to imagine a world in which there are no classified materials that touch on the credibility of the government’s trial witnesses (or alleged unindicted coconspirator hearsay declarants), and which would require treatment under Section 4 of CIPA.

It explains that both McGonigal and Seth DuCharme can be trusted with the government’s classified information — after all, McGonigal was only indicted for cozying up to the Russian oligarch he had hunted for years!

Not mishandling classified information.

And Seth DuCharme was, until recently, trusted with Bill Barr’s most sensitive secrets.

Further, it is hard to understand why the government is so reluctant to be more transparent in explaining its discovery practices to the defense in this case. While many national security cases involve defendants with no prior clearances or experience with the U.S. Intelligence Community, and may involve only recently-cleared defense counsel who may be new to navigating the burdens and responsibilities of handling classified information, here, those concerns do not apply. Mr. McGonigal was one of the most senior and experienced national security investigators in the FBI with significant direct professional experience in the areas germane to his requests for assurances about the thoroughness of the government’s discovery analysis. In addition, before moving to private practice, the undersigned counsel served as the Chief of the National Security Section, the Chief of the Criminal Division and the Acting United States Attorney in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of New York as well as the Senior Counselor to the Attorney General of the United States for National Security and Criminal matters, and has responsibly held TS/SCI clearances with respect to some of the United States government’s most sensitive programs. As the Department of Justice has concluded in re-instating defense counsel’s clearances for the purpose of this case, we are trustworthy. So, here, we have a defendant and defense counsel who are highly respectful and experienced with regard to the protocols for handling and compartmentalizing sensitive classified information, and simply request comfort that the government has indeed done everything it would normally do in a case such as this, with sufficient detail to assess the credibility of the government’s position.

Notably, Mr. McGonigal has not been accused of mishandling classified information in the cases brought against him, and he maintains respect for the national security interests of the United States, as of course do we. In addition, we are not asking the government to disclose to the defense any sensitive sources and methods by which discoverable information was collected—only to provide greater transparency to us, and to the Court, as to how it views its procedural obligations, so that we may consider the fairness and reasonableness of the government’s approach. Mr. McGonigal is personally familiar with this process from his time at the FBI, and it is reasonable for him to expect to be treated no worse than the other defendants who have come before him. To adequately represent Mr. McGonigal, it seems only fair that we be allowed to hold the United States government to the same standards that the defendant upheld as a national security and law enforcement professional, and to make a record of the government’s position.

DuCharme then invoked the Nejad case where, under his former boss’ tenure, a sanctions case blew up because DOJ failed to meet its discovery obligations.

Given DuCharme’s helpful offer to meet in a secure hearing or to submit a more highly classified brief, he’s clearly got something specific in mind.

In sum, if the government could explain, in an appropriate setting, how it determined that it had obviated the need for a CIPA Section 4 proceeding, we likely can avoid speculative motion practice, and the parties and this Court may be assured that we can continue to litigate this case fairly and with the level of confidence to which we are entitled.

[snip]

To the extent the Court would like more detailed briefing on these issues prior to the conference, the CISO has provided to cleared defense counsel access to facilities that would allow us to draft a supplemental submission at a higher classification level.

To be sure: I’m not sure which side is right here, and CIPA always sucks for defendants.

But both sides are dancing around something awfully interesting, as if the circumstances that led to McGonigal’s compromise are different — potentially even significantly worse — than anyone is letting on.

McGonigal’s team repeatedly invoked State Secrets. And DuCharme was the Barr flunky who ran interference so that Rudy Giuliani (whose close associate implicated McGonigal) could seek out dirt from known Russian agents without getting arrested. So the background here could indeed be quite interesting.

Thus far, at least, SDNY is refusing to play that game.

Timeline

January 12: Indictment

February 8: DOJ requests a CIPA 2 hearing

March 1: Seth DuCharme sends his own CIPA letter

March 3: Judge Rearden orders a CIPA 2 hearing

March 7: SDNY writes to refute some of DuCharme’s claims

May 8: SDNY writes to confirm it has declassified the materials described at March 6 CIPA hearing and does not believe it will need a CIPA 4 hearing

June 23: DuChare writes again saying it’s not possible for SDNY to have fulfilled its obligations


Charles McGonigal and the Unclassified Oligarch Info

There’s a mildly interesting discovery dispute in the SDNY case of Charles McGonigal, the former FBI Special Agent in Charge indicted last month for sanctions violations connected to Oleg Deripaska.

His co-defendant, former Russian diplomat and approved translator Sergey Shestakov, wants to amend the protective order governing discovery in this case. As I said, this is only mildly of interest. Such challenges are not unusual, and his attorney, former Andrew Cuomo attorney, Rita Glavin, has agreed to be bound by the existing protective order while the dispute is settled, so the dispute is not holding things up (anymore).

The dispute pertains to two issues about which Glavin wants reciprocity with the government. One is whether witnesses must be bound by the discovery order.

The paragraph states: “The defense shall provide a copy of this Order to prospective witnesses and persons retained by counsel to whom the defense has disclosed Disclosure Material. All such persons shall be subject to the terms of this Order. Defense counsel shall maintain a record of what information has been disclosed to which such persons.”

[snip]

Shestakov’s counsel has claimed that the integrity of the proceedings requires that the Government, like the defense, maintain records about the persons to whom discovery materials are provided, and provide copies of the protective order to all such persons. But the Government is aware of no legal authority—nor any good cause under Rule 16(d)—supporting that request. And because the Government has long possessed much of this information, and appropriately used it for a variety of lawful purposes, such a log would be impractical at this stage.

The government’s point — that it has already interviewed so many people a log of those interviews would be meaningless (as well as its earlier point that the government is subject to grand jury secrecy rules but the witnesses before it are not) — is a perfectly reasonable point. Just as one example, McGonigal’s former mistress, Allison Guerriero, has already discussed issues that would be covered by the protective order with the press; SDNY has no way to oblige her to keep those details secret.

SDNY doesn’t say it, but it also likely wants to avoid keeping a list of all the witnesses it spoke with that might otherwise be discoverable by Shestakov; usually the government only has to provide details about witnesses who will testify.

The other dispute pertains to how discovery material must be treated — language that is, on its face, meant to prevent defendants from tweeting about confidential discovery information.

That sentence provides: “The defense shall not post any Disclosure Material on any Internet site or network site, including any social media site such as Facebook or Twitter, to which persons other than the parties hereto have access, and shall not disclose any Disclosure Material to the media or the public other than when such material becomes part of the public record in connection with court filings and court proceedings or as otherwise set forth herein.”

The government’s response is not as direct to this point. To Shestakov’s complaint that the government might leak (a complaint Glavin made repeatedly during the Cuomo case), the government responded only that he doesn’t have authority to complain in public.

More to the point, to the extent Shestakov has explained his objections to the challenged terms in the proposed order, those objections are not valid. In objecting to paragraph 3, for instance, counsel has told us that she will not agree to unilateral restrictions because she believes there is a risk that the Government will leak discovery material publicly. Courts have squarely rejected that argument. A defendant has no right to use discovery materials to influence public opinion about, or media coverage of, his case; as a result, the desire to publicly respond to perceived wrongs by the Government is no basis to oppose or modify a protective order. See, e.g., Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 540; United States v. Lindh, 198 F. Supp. 2d 739, 743 (E.D. Va. 2002). If Shestakov takes issue with public statements made by the Government, the remedy is supplied by Local Criminal Rule 23.1—which binds the Government and the defense alike—and there is no need to modify the proposed protective order.

Still, SDNY’s response that the Local Rules on extrajudicial statements would cover this does address why reciprocity here is sort of meaningless: SDNY is not going to comment outside of court proceedings unless they make a press statement at one of the milestones of a case, like the indictment, trial verdict, or sentencing. It violates not just local rules, but also DOJ rules.

That said, SDNY (or DOJ generally) might have cause to issue press releases on topics covered by the discovery in the case in other matters, such as the milestone of someone else charged in matters pertaining to Oleg Deripaska, or even new charges pertaining to him. That may be one unspoken reason why SDNY is balking at Shestakov’s complaint, though the main one is the likely the way in which the language might prohibit information sharing within the US government.

The government provides three reasons for the protective order in this case: two are to protect the identities of witnesses and the privacy interests of those whose materials are included in the discovery, which are, again, quite routine.

SDNY also cites the need to protect unclassified information about sanctions on oligarchs, Russia’s influence efforts, and documents relating to efforts to surveil them.

First, the materials include, among other things, information pertaining to the imposition of sanctions on Russian oligarchs, information from various sources about potential Russian influence in the United States, and documents relating to law enforcement’s surveillance efforts. None of the materials that will be subject to this protective order are classified—the Government has determined that they can appropriately be produced to the defendants in order to comply with the Government’s discovery obligations—but there would still be law enforcement consequences to their public disclosure.

This is the kind of stuff that SDNY — or other parts of the government — might have cause to include in other press releases, unrelated to this case.

It’s all unclassified, SDNY says.

It’s not surprising that SDNY would build a FARA and sanctions case around unclassified information. On its face, the indictment relies on emails between Shestakov and McGonigal, Evgeny Fokin, the NYPD, and the law firm involved in trying to reverse sanctions, Kobre & Kim, records pertaining to the payments alleged to have been laundered from a bank in Cyprus through a New Jersey company, as well as records pertaining to subcontractors McGonigal employed (in a repeat of Christopher Steele) to investigate a Deripaska rival.

But the indictment is tailored to avoid other, more interesting and potentially classified discovery. The indictment doesn’t charge Fokin, for example, which would implicate any communications he had directly with Deripaska and others.

FARA and sanctions violations provide crimes that are readily chargeable when other crimes — which may or may not be implicated here — would impose onerous discovery requirements on the government. The fact that SDNY maintains all the discovery in this case is unclassified is important background to questions about what more the government knows about McGonigal’s actions: by design, they’re not going to tell as part of this prosecution.

All that’s important background for the other reason I’m intrigued by an entirely unexceptional protective order dispute. As SDNY’s letter describes, between January 24 and February 6, SDNY and McGonigal’s legal team, which includes former Bill Barr aide Seth DuCharme, resolved their own “modifications” to the protective order.

The defendants were each arrested on January 21, 2023, and were presented before Magistrate Judge Sarah L. Cave on January 23, 2023. The next day, the Government proposed a standard protective order, based on those routinely used in this District, to counsel for both defendants. Over the ensuing days, the Government repeatedly discussed the proposed protective order with McGonigal’s counsel, and agreed to make certain modifications based on those discussions. The Government and McGonigal’s counsel reached agreement on a protective order with the terms contained in Exhibit A, and on February 6, 2023, McGonigal’s counsel returned a signed copy of the order.

Two days after the government and McGonigal’s team resolved their own protective order issues (which also happens to be two days after Shestakov’s legal team filed their notice of appearance, so before substantive discussions would have begun between SDNY and Glavin), SDNY triggered the CIPA process. Among other things, the CIPA process will give SDNY a chance to argue that other classified discovery can be withheld from the defendants if it is not relevant and helpful to their defense.

Some such classified material McGonigal would know about personally. As the indictment itself notes, while still at the FBI, McGonigal had access to information on investigations of Russian oligarchs.

As SAC, McGONIGAL served as the Special Agent in Charge (“SAC”) of the Counterintelligence Division of the FBI’s New York Field Office. As SAC, McGONIGAL supervised and participated in investigations of Russian oligarchs, including Deripaska. Among other things, in 2018, McGONIGAL, while acting as SAC, received and reviewed a then-classified list of Russian oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin who would be considered for sanctions to be imposed as a result of Russia’s 2014 conflict with Ukraine.

This list is no longer classified. But other materials McGonigal had access to while still at FBI undoubtedly are, including materials pertaining to the investigation of Deripaska’s role in the 2016 election interference operation.

And it’s not just these issues that McGonigal might know exist and might want to demand. According to Mattathias Schwartz, the investigation into McGonigal didn’t stem from the tip that his disgruntled mistress, Guerriero, gave to the head of NY’s FBI in 2019. Starting in 2018, the Brits were aware that McGonigal had suspect meetings with an unidentified Russian in London.

In 2018, Charles McGonigal, the FBI’s former New York spy chief, traveled to London where he met with a Russian contact who was under surveillance by British authorities, two US intelligence sources told Insider.

The British were alarmed enough by the meeting to alert the FBI’s legal attaché, who was stationed at the US Embassy. The FBI then used the surreptitious meeting as part of their basis to open an investigation into McGonigal, one of the two sources said.

Whenever the Brits picked this up (and subsequent meetings that Schwartz notes were referenced in the indictment), they would have happened before or during the time that DuCharme played a key role at DOJ, first as Barr’s counsel and then as PADAG. As I keep noting, DuCharme was centrally involved in Barr’s extensive efforts to prevent Rudy Giuliani — a close friend of McGonigal’s ex-mistress — from being prosecuted for his own dalliances with Russian agents. It is inconceivable that a senior FBI agent was under suspicion for suspect meetings with Deripaska or his associates and the matter wouldn’t arise to Barr and Jeffrey Rosen’s level. And DuCharme was personally involved in exceptional interference in investigations of Russia agents.

Even just based on his own knowledge of sensitive information pertaining to Russian investigations, McGonigal had the means to make this prosecution difficult, by demanding classified information he accessed while still at FBI, perhaps to argue that he had reason to believe that Deripaska was really just a nice guy who didn’t deserved to be sanctioned.

But DuCharme’s knowledge of such information would surely be even fresher than McGonigal’s. Indeed, given the reported tip from the Brits in 2018, DuCharme is likely to have firsthand knowledge pertaining to issues relating to McGonigal that might not otherwise be included among discovery (for example, of discussions among Russians about McGonigal that McGonigal himself would not be privy to). DuCharme likely knows what DOJ knew about McGonigal’s ties to Deripaska at least through the time he moved back to EDNY in July 2020, and at EDNY DuCharme would have presided over other sensitive Russian investigations, including the one into Andrii Derkach.

DOJ has not, at least not yet, triggered CIPA in the DC case. But it likely doesn’t have as much sensitive information about — and as much sensitivity surrounding — information on the Albanians involved in that case.

Given their shared knowledge of matters relating to Deripaska, McGonigal and DuCharme may make the prosecution plenty difficult as it is in SDNY.

Earlier posts

[From Rayne] The Other Albanian Stuff

A Close Rudy Giuliani Associate Alerted FBI’s Assistant Director to Charles McGonigal’s Alleged Albanian Graft

No, Charles McGonigal Likely Isn’t Responsible for that Part of the Russian Investigation You Hate

Former FBI SAC Charles McGonigal Indicted for Crimes Spanning from 2017 to 2021


A Close Rudy Giuliani Associate Alerted FBI’s Assistant Director to Charles McGonigal’s Alleged Albanian Graft

I know of two journalists who had reported on parts of the charges against former FBI Special Agent in Charge Charles McGonigal before he was indicted: In December 2021, Scott Stedman (with an assist from Wendy Siegelman) reported on the relationship between McGonigal, Oleg Deripaska, Sergey Shestakov, and Yevgenyi Fokin that was disclosed in a November 29, 2021 FARA filing.

And in September 2022, Mattathias Schwartz reported on a subpoena that (this was made more clear later) had been served ten months earlier, in November 2021. In the story, Schwartz claimed the documents he had in hand showed that McGonigal was under investigation for his Deripaska ties, which he only substantiated with a link to the FARA filing. The story itself pertained entirely to the Albanian side of the investigation, based off that subpoena, part of which he published.

Schwartz published that story a month after he won a lot of attention for getting Paul Manafort to confirm on the record the cover story someone had fed a NYT team including Maggie Haberman and Ken Vogel in February 2019: that Manafort had shared (just) campaign data with Konstantin Kilimnik. When first published in 2019, that cover story successfully distracted attention from outlines of a more substantive exchange pitched by Deripaska associate Kilimnik at an August 2, 2016 cigar bar meeting (and, indeed, from Deripaska’s involvement generally).

Manafort’s calendar showed that before he went to that meeting on August 2, 2016, he met with Trump and Rudy Giuliani. And while Manafort was serving his abbreviated prison term, Rudy reportedly consulted with him about his efforts to dig up dirt helpful to Trump.

In the wake of McGonigal’s indictments, Schwartz wrote a story about the person that he all but confirms was the one who received the subpoena: Allison Guerriero, who had a year-plus long affair with McGonigal that started sometime before October 2017 and lasted until late 2018, past the time McGonigal retired from the FBI in September 2018. According to the story, their relationship covered the most important period of the corruption described in the two indictments against McGonigal (meetings with Albania in the the DC indictment start in August 2017 and end in August 2018; favors for a Deripaska agent described in the SDNY indictment start in spring 2018; the favors continued through 2021, at which point the investigation into Deripaska had become overt).

In fact, Schwartz suggests that Guerriero may have tipped off FBI’s Assistant Director William Sweeney to McGonigal’s corruption in a drunken act of revenge after the affair ended.

In late 2018, McGonigal and Guerriero broke up. She remembers receiving an anonymous and hostile note in the mail. Soon after, McGonigal told her he was still married and had no plans to divorce his wife. “I was shocked,” she said. “I was very much in love with him, and I was so hurt.” She started drinking heavily to cope. A few months later, Guerriero, after a bout of drinking, dashed off an angry email to William Sweeney, who was in charge of the FBI’s New York City bureau, and who, she recalls, had first introduced her to McGonigal. She remembers telling Sweeney in the email that he should look into their extramarital affair, and also McGonigal’s dealings in Albania. McGonigal had already befriended Albania’s prime minister and traveled to the country extensively, dealings that would appear later in one of his indictments. Guerriero told Insider that she had deleted the email.

As Schwartz describes it, Guerriero told Sweeney he should look at not just McGonigal’s ties to Albania but also their affair, which is a nutty thing to say to an FBI official.

It’s a weird claim, because elsewhere, the story implies that Guerriero believed McGonigal’s stories about why he had bags of cash lying around, including a bag of cash that (Schwartz convincingly argues) is likely the one McGonigal is accused of receiving in a parked car on October 5, 2017.

That day in October wasn’t the only time that Guerriero remembers McGonigal carrying large amounts of cash. After he brushed her curiosity aside, she tempered her suspicions. She told herself it was probably “buy money” for a sting operation, or a payoff for one of McGonigal’s informants.

The story never describes that Guerriero learned of McGonigal’s ties to Albania, much less how or when she learned about them. And yet one takeaway from the story is that she might be the source of the entire investigation into her former boyfriend.

If she did send that email, it’s virtually certain an Assistant Director of the FBI would not delete it.

Schwartz describes Guerriero as,

a former substitute kindergarten teacher who volunteered for law-enforcement causes and was working as a contractor for a security company while living at home with her father.

The Facebook page for the charity for which she works shows the kind of NY law enforcement people she networks with.

Which partly explains the really remarkable detail about Guerriero. She’s close enough with Rudy Giuliani — who was himself being cultivated by Russian assets during the same period that McGonigal was — that the by-then discredited mayor put her up in his guest room after she suffered a burn injury in 2021.

Guerriero’s troubles worsened in early 2021, when she was badly burned during a fire at her father’s house. She asked friends for help through a GoFundMe. Former Mayor Rudy Giuliani of New York City, whom she knew from law-enforcement circles, let her stay in a guest bedroom. Since then, Guerriero has been a frequent on-air caller for Giuliani’s radio shows. She maintains that the 2020 election was marred by widespread voter fraud, a belief pushed by Giuliani that has been repeatedly debunked. “Whatever Giuliani says about the 2020 election is what I believe,” she said.

What a small world, that the woman who may have triggered the investigation into McGonigal was staying with Rudy as the investigation developed? Presumably, for example, some of Guerriero’s communications with Rudy would have been found on his phones after they were seized in April 2021 (though the investigation into McGonigal was already very advanced by the time the FBI actually started getting any communications from Rudy’s phones in November 2021, and emails with Guerriero would be out of scope of any known or suspected warrant targeting Rudy).

Schwartz doesn’t pursue the fact that McGonigal has such close ties to Rudy, though the connection would be even more interesting if McGonigal’s role in the Trump Russian investigation were as central as Schwartz presented it (he’s not alone in overstating McGonigal’s known role).

But there are two additional reasons the detail is particularly interesting.

First, as noted, Schwartz published part of the subpoena that, this second story clarifies, Guerriero received in November 2021.

Regardless, by November 2021, the FBI was looking into McGonigal. Two agents showed up at Guerriero’s door, she says, showed her a picture of McGonigal with the Albanian prime minister, and interviewed her about their interactions. She also received a grand-jury subpoena requesting all of her communications with McGonigal as well as information about any “payments or gifts” he may have given her.

It tracks the DC indictment closely (and was sent by the LA-based team investigating it). Four bullets ask for information about the Albanians that are the central focus of the indictment. Bullet f references McGonigal’s ties to Kosovo, which show up in ¶28 of the indictment. Bullet h and i ask for information on the Bosnians who appear in ¶¶45, 46 and 48 of the indictment; bullet j asks for information about the alleged access peddling to the UN described in ¶¶50-52 of the indictment.

But the subpoena — bullet g — asks about another country, Montenegro, where much of Deripaska and Manafort’s long history began and where Deripaska was still allegedly interfering as late as 2016. If Montenegro shows up in the indictment at all, it’s only as one of the other locations in Europe to which McGonigal was traveling with his Albanian contact (for example, a spring 2018 trip described in ¶44). That may simply reflect Montenegro’s relative import in McGonigal’s paid travel, the quality of evidence, or maybe DOJ didn’t want to include it for some other reason. But if Montenegro were a key part of McGonigal’s Balkans travels — on which, ¶22 of the indictment makes clear, he worked to persuade Albania not to sign oil contracts with Russian front companies — it would put him in a country where Deripaska likely still has a rich network of sources.

In any case, the only other thing that doesn’t map directly from the subpoena to the indictment are any payments or gifts McGonigal gave to Guerriero. The DC indictment never explained why, “no later than August 2017,” McGonigal allegedly asked his Albanian contact if he could provide him money, but Schwartz’ story reveals that the indicted former SAC was giving Guerriero gifts of cash and taking her to high-end restaurants during their affair, which started at least by October 2017 (her subpoena asked for records going back to April 2017). The indictment never mentions her, but the affair with her may explain part of McGonigal’s urgent need for cash in September 2017, something that would make McGonigal ripe to compromise by anyone who learned of it.

As I noted earlier, there’s one more remarkable player in this little network that includes Rudy Giuliani: Seth DuCharme, who spent much of the last year of the Trump Administration implementing Bill Barr’s bureaucratic efforts to ensure that Rudy Giuliani would not be prosecuted for his efforts to obtain benefit for Trump — including, but not limited to, dirt on Hunter Biden — from people that included several suspected Russian agents. DuCharme, who works at Rudy’s former firm, Bracewell, is part of the team representing McGonigal.

And to the extent that Guerriero is one of the witnesses from whom DOJ learned the specifics about how much cash McGonigal received in bags in parked cars (though, again, Schwartz’ story is inconsistent about whether she knew none of that or whether she knew enough to tip off William Sweeney) it would be part of DuCharme’s job to discredit Rudy’s former houseguest as a witness. He would do so, presumably, by pointing to all the things Guerriero told Schwartz she regrets, including harassment of McGonigal’s family that was serious enough to merit restraining orders in two states.

By her own account, Guerriero contacted one of McGonigal’s children despite being prohibited from doing so by a court order, an incident that led to her spending the night in a New Jersey jail. The court order stemmed from a 2019 police report, obtained by Insider, that McGonigal’s wife, Pamela, filed with the Montgomery County Police Department in Maryland. The report states that McGonigal and Guerriero “had a relationship” and that Guerriero had repeatedly harassed her with unwelcome emails and phone calls — including 20 calls in one day — despite her asking Guerriero to stop.

Guerriero confirmed that her contact with the McGonigal family led to a separate restraining order issued in New Jersey. “I am ashamed and embarrassed and sorry for my actions during the time that I was drinking,” she said.

In Schwartz’ story, Guerriero doesn’t say she regrets that email to Sweeney, which could well have sparked this entire investigation. She regrets the harassment of McGonigal’s family, which might come out if she were called as a witness.

All of which may provide insight into why the DC case against McGongial is charged as it is. Among the overt acts of which McGonigal is accused in DC are:

  • Networking with representatives of the government of Albania in late 2017 and early 2018 during the period when he used information from them to launch an investigation against the US citizen lobbyist for their rival.
  • Proposing that his prime Albanian contact be paid $500,000 (which may have been meant as repayment of money the Albanian gave McGonigal in 2017) to set up a high level UN meeting for some Bosnians.

Both of these overt acts could be charged under FARA and the Albanian tie, at least, could well have been charged under 18 USC 951. But McGonigal would likely offer the same kind of defense that Tom Barrack did in his EDNY trial: when McGonigal counseled the Albanian Prime Minister not to sign oil contracts with Russian on September 9, 2017, he could easily argue, he did so because he was genuinely opposed to Russian influence and not because he was seeking a benefit for his key Albanian contact.

Instead, DOJ charged him with inadequate disclosure to the FBI on forms FD-772b and OGE-278, with each inadequate disclosure charged as a false statement under either 18 USC 1001 or 1519 (though I don’t understand why McGonigal would not immediately challenge the three of the charges tied to filings submitted more than five years ago, especially if FBI had notice of all this in 2018). The 1001 charges would normally only get a few months sentence, though with a sentencing enhancement for abusing his official position, and by treating each inadequate disclosure as a separate crime, potential exposure could easily add up to years, or, with a plea deal, it could be pitched as “process crimes” meriting just months of prison time.

Charging it that way not only gives DC USAO more flexibility in plea discussions.

It would also make it a “paper case,” something that depends largely on documentation rather than the credibility of a witness like McGonigal’s primary Albanian contact (who seems to have told FBI that the cash payments were loans, not payments) or Guerriero. For each false form McGonigal submitted, DOJ will only have to show where he traveled, how his travel was paid, and that he didn’t properly disclose it. It would rely on travel records and bank statements and not the testimony of a witness who harassed McGonigal’s family out of jealousy.

I don’t want to make too much of Schwartz’ revelation that a key witness against McGonigal was staying in Rudy’s guest room as the investigation developed. Drunken jealousy is all the motive you need to explain her actions (though not, perhaps, inconsistencies about how much of the Albanian graft she knew about).

But once you throw Rudy and Montenegro into the mix, the trajectory on which McGonigal traveled, from arguing against Russian oil contracts in September 2017 to thinking he could manage ties to Deripaska in spring of 2018, gets a lot more interesting.


Former FBI SAC Charles McGonigal Indicted for Crimes Spanning from 2017 to 2021

When I said on Saturday that, “I wouldn’t be surprised if there were a few stray indictments [relating to Oleg Deripaska] we haven’t seen yet,” I wasn’t specifically thinking of former Special Agent in Charge of FBI’s New York Counterintelligence Office, Charles McGonigal, who was arrested that same day in SDNY for conspiring to hide that he was working for Deripaska.

Though I had noted Scott Stedman’s report, which itself piggybacked on a Wendy Siegelman catch of a FARA filing from McGonigal’s alleged co-conspirator, Sergey Shestakov, which laid out the relationship.

In fact, DOJ seems to be treating this case — and a DC indictment given less prominence in DOJ’s releases today — as a public integrity prosecution first, and only after that the kind of national security case that the other Deripaska cases have been. That is, this is about how Deripaska and his associates used McGonigal’s alleged corruption to harm national security, and not the way McGonigal made a corrupt decision to work with Deripaska.

DC US Attorney Matthew Graves even suggested that’s the trajectory by which McGonigal came to be working for one of the Russians he should have been hunting. “Covering up your contacts with foreign nationals and hiding your personal financial relationships is a gateway to corruption.”

The DC charges pertain to $225,000 in payments McGonigal took from a former Albanian security official while he was still at the FBI. After taking the payments, McGonigal initiated an investigation into someone lobbying for competing Albanian interests.

According to the nine-count indictment, unsealed today, from August 2017, and continuing through and beyond his retirement from the FBI in September 2018, McGonigal concealed from the FBI the nature of his relationship with a former foreign security officer and businessperson who had ongoing business interests in foreign countries and before foreign governments.  Specifically, McGonigal requested and received at least $225,000 in cash from the individual and traveled abroad with the individual and met with foreign nationals.  The individual later served as an FBI source in a criminal investigation involving foreign political lobbying over which McGonigal had official supervisory responsibility.  McGonigal is accused of engaging in other conduct in his official capacity as an FBI Special Agent in Charge that he believed would benefit the businessperson financially.

Effectively, a top CI official was on the take from someone who then used that influence to take out a rival.

The charges in DC include a bunch of false statements and obstruction counts (though the obstruction could amount to twenty years in prison).

The NY charges accuse McGonigal and Shestakov of working with someone else in an attempt to get Oleg Deripaska’s sanctions lifted.

Even before McGonigal left the FBI, he was doing favors for someone listed as Deripaska’s agent (I’ll come back to him, but I believe his identity, too, is public). Then starting in 2018, McGonigal and Shestakov started working with a law firm, which earlier reporting identified as Kobre & Kim, in an attempt to help Deripaska get his sanctions lifted. Then after K&K stopped pursuing that effort in 2020, McGonigal and Shestakov continued to work for Deripaska, laundering the funds through a Friend (who may be the Albanian, in which case that may be where they discovered the tie to him).

Because of the money laundering in the SDNY indictment, it may in practice include a stiffer sentence than the DC one.

As I said above, on paper (based, in part, on the prosecutors assigned) this is being treated as a public integrity problem that led to a huge counterintelligence one. There’s not even any mention of the KleptoCapture initiative started in response to the Russian war.

But like the Deripaska investigations, I expect this one will continue for a while.

Update: I want to talk a bit about what I mean that these are Public Integrity indictments with a CI twist.

The DC prosecution team consists of two DC USAO attorneys, with the assistance of a senior NSD executive.

The case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Elizabeth Aloi and Michael Friedman of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, with assistance from Acting Deputy Chief Evan Turgeon of the DOJ’s National Security Division Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, and the Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs.

In addition to a bunch of January 6 cases in the last two years, Aloi is on the Navarro team and the case against two guys who pretended to be DHS agents to get close to some FBI agents. Most if not all of her January 6 cases included cooperation agreements. Michael Friedman’s January 6 cases included two involving threats, and two involving movement right wingers, including Zeeker Bozell, the scion of the family.

The DC team seems like one you’d use to try to get McGonigal to cooperate to unwind whatever other fuckery he did at the FBI.

The SDNY prosecution team consists of three public integrity prosecutors and an NSD one.

The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit.  Assistant U.S. Attorneys Hagan Scotten, Rebecca T. Dell, and Derek Wikstrom are in charge of the prosecution with assistance from Trial Attorney Scott A. Claffee of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section.

All the SDNY prosecutors have been involved with very large multi-defendant conspiracies. Hagan Scotten was involved in the Rudy Giuliani and Parnas Fruman investigation. Derek Wikstrom was on the Build the Wall (Steve Bannon) team.

Scott Claffee has been involved in some of the highest profile Chinese counterintelligence prosecutions. But he’s also involved in at least one of the other Deripaska-related cases, the one involving dual use sourcing.

But by far the most interesting lawyer involved in this case is McGonigal’s defense attorney: Seth DuCharme, a top Billy Barr aide who was at the center of numerous Barr efforts to protect Trump associates.

Including Rudy.

Especially Rudy.

Finally, a word about timing.

The SDNY indictment came first. That indictment is dated January 12.

That press release hails the Border Patrol, and given that the arrest happened at JFK, that may be why SDNY went first.

DC got its indictment on January 18. That same day there was a sealed document placed in the SDNY docket, perhaps related to the other case

Update: Here’s his bio from when he was promoted to the NY position.

Charles McGonigal Named Special Agent in Charge of the Counterintelligence Division for the New York Field Office

FBI Director James B. Comey has named Charles McGonigal as the special agent in charge of the Counterintelligence Division for the New York Field Office. Mr. McGonigal most recently served as the section chief of the Cyber-Counterintelligence Coordination Section at FBI Headquarters.

Mr. McGonigal entered on duty with the FBI in 1996. He was first assigned to the New York Field Office, where he worked Russian foreign counterintelligence and organized crime matters. During his tenure in New York, Mr. McGonigal worked on the TWA Flight 800 investigation, was assigned to the task force investigating Wen Ho Lee, investigated the 1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and investigated the September 11, 2001 terror attacks.

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Mr. McGonigal was assigned to an investigative response squad, which focused on pending international terrorist threats in the New York City area.

Mr. McGonigal was assigned to the Cleveland Division where he investigated white-collar and violent crime matters. In 2002, Mr. McGonigal was promoted to a supervisory special agent in the Counter-Espionage Section at FBI Headquarters, where he handled several high-profile espionage investigations. In April 2004, Mr. McGonigal was promoted to chief of the Asia-Near East Counterintelligence Unit.

In 2006, Mr. McGonigal was promoted to field supervisor of a counter-espionage squad at the Washington Field Office. In this capacity, Mr. McGonigal was in charge of many high-profile espionage, economic espionage and media leak investigations resulting in criminal prosecution. In 2014, Mr. McGonigal was promoted to assistant special agent in charge of the Baltimore Field Office’s cyber, counterintelligence, counterespionage, and counterproliferation programs. Mr. McGonigal earned a Bachelor of Business Administration degree in 1990 and completed a master’s degree from Johns Hopkins University.

Mr. McGonigal will assume this new role at the end of October.

For those trying to assess whether he was a part of the Russian investigation, he largely missed it. I think he would have been in the loop after he moved to NY, but he didn’t show up in the Sussmann trial.

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