September 26, 2021 / by 

 

Zip Tie Guy Eric Munchel Gets a Second Chance at Release

The DC Circuit just remanded the case of Zip Tie Guy Eric Munchel and his mother Lisa Eisenhart for reconsideration of their bid for release. Robert Wilkins wrote the opinion, joined by Judith Rogers; Gregory Katsas dissented in some but not all of the opinion.

I wrote here and here about how this was a close case. As such, this opinion will provide important guideposts for other January 6 making similar arguments.

The opinion agreed that January 6 posed an urgent risk to our democracy, generally presenting a broad authority to detain people. But it also emphasized that only some of the participants in the insurrection pose enough of a danger to afford exceptional authority to detain people.

It cannot be gainsaid that the violent breach of the Capitol on January 6 was a grave danger to our democracy, and that those who participated could rightly be subject to detention to safeguard the community. Cf. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748 (“[I]n times of war or insurrection, when society’s interest is at its peak, the Government may detain individuals whom the government believes to be dangerous.” (citations omitted)). But we have a grave constitutional obligation to ensure that the facts and circumstances of each case warrant this exceptional treatment.

In the case of Munchel and his mom, the opinion found that the analysis of the danger that Munchel and his mom present to the community was not forward looking, and because they had not done a number of things — actually broken through barricades, assaulted cops, planned the operation, or abetted that process — their dangerousness was not sufficient to make their unwillingness to follow release conditions a factor. In particular, without the special circumstances of the vote certification and the violent mob, the mother and son likely would not pose the same threat to our country.

Here, the District Court did not adequately demonstrate that it considered whether Munchel and Eisenhart posed an articulable threat to the community in view of their conduct on January 6, and the particular circumstances of January 6. The District Court based its dangerousness determination on a finding that “Munchel’s alleged conduct indicates that he is willing to use force to promote his political ends,” and that “[s]uch conduct poses a clear risk to the community.” Munchel, 2021 WL 620236, at *6. In making this determination, however, the Court did not explain how it reached that conclusion notwithstanding the countervailing finding that “the record contains no evidence indicating that, while inside the Capitol, Munchel or Eisenhart vandalized any property or physically harmed any person,” id. at *3, and the absence of any record evidence that either Munchel or Eisenhart committed any violence on January 6. That Munchel and Eisenhart assaulted no one on January 6; that they did not enter the Capitol by force; and that they vandalized no property are all factors that weigh against a finding that either pose a threat of “using force to promote [their] political ends,” and that the District Court should consider on remand. If, in light of the lack of evidence that Munchel or Eisenhart committed violence on January 6, the District Court finds that they do not in fact pose a threat of committing violence in the future, the District Court should consider this finding in making its dangerousness determination. In our view, those who actually assaulted police officers and broke through windows, doors, and barricades, and those who aided, conspired with, planned, or coordinated such actions, are in a different category of dangerousness than those who cheered on the violence or entered the Capitol after others cleared the way.

[snip]

The District Court also failed to demonstrate that it considered the specific circumstances that made it possible, on January 6, for Munchel and Eisenhart to threaten the peaceful transfer of power. The appellants had a unique opportunity to obstruct democracy on January 6 because of the electoral college vote tally taking place that day, and the concurrently scheduled rallies and protests. Thus, Munchel and Eisenhart were able to attempt to obstruct the electoral college vote by entering the Capitol together with a large group of people who had gathered at the Capitol in protest that day. Because Munchel and Eisenhart did not vandalize any property or commit violence, the presence of the group was critical to their ability to obstruct the vote and to cause danger to the community. Without it, Munchel and Eisenhart—two individuals who did not engage in any violence and who were not involved in planning or coordinating the activities— seemingly would have posed little threat. The District Court found that appellants were a danger to “act against Congress” in the future, but there was no explanation of how the appellants would be capable of doing so now that the specific circumstances of January 6 have passed. This, too, is a factor that the District Court should consider on remand.

I suspect mom, at least, will get bail on remand. And I suspect other defendants will try to argue (some with likely success) that they fit the same categories as Munchel and his mom — willing participants in an insurrection, but not key enough players to detain awaiting trial.

Among the principles it lays out:

January 6 was a Constitutional risk, but some defendants were only a threat on that day with that mob

As noted, the Circuit agrees that January 6 presented such a risk to the country that extraordinary detention authorities may be necessary. It included a list of circumstances — similar to the ones that Beryl Howell laid out — that reach this heightened level of risk. Some defendants (particularly the far right lone actors who did not engage in violence personally) will likely be able to ask for review of their own detention. But others — including some of the Oath Keepers — will have the case for their detention reinforced because of their role aiding and abetting a concerted attack on democracy.

DC District judges can review detention remotely

While dicta, a footnote complains that it took so long — until they had been transported to DC — for the two to have a detention review in DC. It asks why a District judge could not have conducted the review remotely.

While COVID-19 issues caused a delay in the appellants’ transport to the District of Columbia, the record does not indicate why a D.C. District Judge could not have heard this matter prior to February 17, even if the appellants were in another location. Ultimately, this issue, while troubling, is not presented as a ground for reversal in this appeal.

This is something that has come up in other cases, repeatedly. This panel, at least, seems to agree that a DC District judge can review detention remotely.

DC District judges don’t have to defer to the local Magistrates’ decisions if there’s new evidence

Munchel and his mother argued that once the Magistrate in Tennessee judged them not to be a danger, the District had no authority to review that determination. The Circuit disagrees, but only with regards to the circumstances of this case, where the government provides new evidence to the District.

The statute concerning review of a Magistrate Judge’s release order says nothing about the standard of the district court’s review, see 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), and we have not squarely decided the issue.3 We need not break new ground in this case, because as the appellants maintain in their briefing, Munchel Reply Mem. 8, n.3, the government submitted substantial additional evidence to the district judge that had not been presented to the Magistrate Judge, including the 50- minute iPhone video, a partial transcript of the video, and several videos from Capitol CCTV.4 As a result, this was not an instance where the District Court made its dangerousness finding based on the same record as was before the Magistrate Judge. Here, the situation was more akin to a new hearing, and as such, the issue before the District Court was not really whether to defer (or not) to a finding made by the Magistrate Judge on the same evidentiary record.

3 This court stated long ago, in dictum, in a case arising under the predecessor Bail Reform Act that district courts review such prior determinations with “broad discretion.” Wood v. United States, 391 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“Evaluating the competing considerations is a task for the commissioner or judge in the first instance, and then the judges of the District Court (where they have original jurisdiction over the offense) have a broad discretion to amend the conditions imposed, or to grant release outright, if they feel that the balance has been improperly struck.”).

Before we’re done, I wouldn’t be surprised if the DC Circuit is asked to weigh in directly on the standard of review here.

DC District judges can consider whether a defendant will abide by release conditions

Munchel and his mother had tried to limit when a District judge can consider whether they will abide by release conditions, not to reconsider bail but only to revoke it.

Second, we reject the argument that the District Court inappropriately relied on a finding that appellants were unlikely to abide by release conditions to detain them, because that factor is applicable only to revocation of pretrial release. The District Court’s finding as to appellants’ potential compliance is relevant to the ultimate determination of “whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) and (g). Indeed, other courts have found a defendant’s potential for compliance with release conditions relevant to the detention inquiry.

[snip]

While failure to abide by release conditions is an explicit ground for revocation of release in 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b), it defies logic to suggest that a court cannot consider whether it believes the defendant will actually abide by its conditions when making the release determination in the first instance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142.

This has come up with other defendants. That said, this opinion as a whole says that a refusal to abide by release conditions by itself is not enough to detain someone. This part of the ruling will be particularly impactful for those detained because either a belief in QAnon or Nazism suggests a general disdain for our existing government.

A taser counts as a weapon

Munchel and his mother also argued that their alleged crimes don’t merit detention because the taser Munchel brought with him is not a weapon. Not only did the Circuit disagree, but it also readily applied the analysis to Eisenhart’s abetting exposure.

Third, we reject Munchel and Eisenhart’s arguments that the charged offenses do not authorize detention. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(E), detention is permitted if the case involves “any felony . . . that involves the possession or use of a . . . dangerous weapon.” (emphasis added). Two of the charges in the indictment meet this description: Count Two— entering a restricted building “with intent to impede and disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business . . . while armed with a dangerous weapon,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1) and (a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting charge for Eisenhart); and Count Three—violent entry or disorderly conduct, again “while armed with a dangerous weapon,” in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1) and (e)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Indictment, ECF No. 21 at 2. The Bail Reform Act thus explicitly authorizes detention when a defendant is charged with committing certain felonies while possessing a dangerous weapon, as is alleged in this indictment.5

5 Eisenhart’s argument that a taser is not a dangerous weapon— which Eisenhart raises for the first time in reply, and which Munchel seeks to adopt in his reply—is without merit. The relevant statute, 40 U.S.C. § 5104(a)(2)(B), defines the term “dangerous weapon” to include “a device designed to expel or hurl a projectile capable of causing injury to individuals or property. . . .” While the record contains no evidence or proffer as to how Munchel’s taser operates, a taser is commonly understood as a device designed to expel a projectile capable of causing injury to individuals. See Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217, 1224–25 (11th Cir. 2020); Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 443 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] taser uses compressed nitrogen to propel a pair of ‘probes’—aluminum darts tipped with stainless steel barbs connected to the taser by insulated wires—toward the target at a rate of over 160 feet per second. Upon striking a person, the taser delivers a 1200 volt, low ampere electrical charge. The electrical impulse instantly overrides the victim’s central nervous system, paralyzing the muscles throughout the body, rendering the target limp and helpless.” (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted)). Thus, at this stage, the evidence sufficiently demonstrates that Munchel’s taser is a dangerous weapon under the statute.

This ruling matters specifically for Richard “Bigo” Barnett (who also brought a taser with him), but also holds that the weapons enhancement on the 1752 and 5104 charges that other defendants face will merit detention. The Circuit also readily approved Eisenhart’s exposure on account of Munchel’s taser. That matters because many defendants are charged with abetting certain conduct that merits detention.

Detention analysis remains individualized

Munchel and his mom, like virtually all defendants arguing for release, have compared their own case to that of others who got released. Because Munchel only raised this in his reply, the Circuit didn’t address the comparison per se. But said that the District Court is in better position to review such claims.

Finally, Munchel and Eisenhart argue that the government’s proffer of dangerousness should be weighed against the fact that the government did not seek detention of defendants who admitted they pushed through the police barricades and defendants charged with punching officers, breaking windows, discharging tasers at officers, and with planning and fundraising for the riot. See Munchel Reply Mem. at 9–12. Appellants did not raise this claim before the District Court and the government did not substantively respond to it on appeal because Appellants raised it for the first time in Munchel’s reply. Whatever potential persuasiveness the government’s failure to seek detention in another case carries in the abstract, every such decision by the government is highly dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of each case, which are not fully before us. In addition, those facts and circumstances are best evaluated by the District Court in the first instance, and it should do so should appellants raise the issue upon remand.

As several people watching the hearing for Connie Meggs’ attempt to get release, every detention fight going forward will have to account for this one. With its broad support for holding conspirators accountable for the violence of others, it may not help Meggs all that much. But it will crystalize these ongoing detention disputes.

Update: I’m wrong. Judge Amit Mehta just released Meggs.


Days after an Oath Keeper Event with Roger Stone, Kelly Meggs Described Having “Organized an Alliance” with the Proud Boys

I had been waiting for the moment when DOJ would unveil some of the Facebook content that Graydon Young attempted to delete when he shut down Facebook on January 7. I had similarly been waiting to see how DOJ rolled out Roger Stone as a key pivot between the Florida Oath Keepers (which Kelly Meggs led, and which Stone bodyguards Roberta Minuta and Joshua James were part of) and the Proud Boys (whose key leaders Enrique Tarrio and Joe Biggs live in Florida).

Overnight, in its response to Meggs’ attempt to get bail, the government did both. Ostensibly, they did so to show that Meggs’ interview with the FBI had not been entirely truthful about (among other things) being in DC to protect the cops and vetting Oath Keeper members.

On the first point, yes, Defendant Meggs made a statement to the FBI in the hours following his arrest. But that fact was known at the time of Defendant Meggs’s first detention hearing, and, regardless, simply speaking with law enforcement does not mean that a person is not a danger. This is especially so when some of the statements Defendant Meggs made to the FBI appear to be in conflict with the evidence.

[snip]

This sentiment appears in conflict with Defendant Meggs’s allegation in his motion (and what he stated to the FBI upon his arrest) that he was at the Capitol to help “protect” police officers. (ECF 82 at ¶ 15.)

[snip]

On the evening of January 3, 2021, co-defendant Steele sent an email to Defendant Meggs’s email account at Proton Mail,8 copying co-defendant Young. Steele attached her application and vetting form, and wrote: “My brother, Graydon Young told me to send the application to you so I can be verified for the Events this coming Tuesday and Wednesday.” Defendant Meggs appears to have provided instructions to co-defendant Steele, because the following day (January 4), Steele again sent her application and vetting form to another Oath Keepers email address at Proton Mail. On her email, she copied Defendant Meggs. In contrast to this evidence, Defendant Meggs inexplicably told the FBI that “the only person I’ve ever vetted” was a man six months earlier. Interview Tr. at 28-29.

In a filing that revealed details of Meggs’ Facebook, Signal, ProtonMail, and GoToMeeting use, it described Meggs writing on December 19 — five days after his wife and Young did “security” for Roger Stone at a Stop the Steal rally, evidence of which the government presented (the picture below) in their response to Meggs’ wife’s bid for bond — that he had “organized an alliance between the Oath Keepers, Florida 3%ers, and Proud Boys” to “shut this shit down.”

On December 26, Meggs called this insurrection (albeit in response to Trump’s order) explicitly.

On Christmas, Meggs specifically tied protection, almost certainly of Stone, and coordination with a Proud Boy, almost certainly Tarrio, in the same text.

DOJ included some (not all though: there was one called ““florida dc op planning chat” they don’t seem to have included) of the planning meetings on GoToMeeting.

A week ago, DOJ was content to prove that Connie Meggs’ claims that she didn’t know any of these people by introducing the picture where she and Graydon Young posed with Stone on December 14.

And Defendant Meggs obviously was acquainted with other members of the Oath Keepers group who stormed the Capitol with her on January 6; the photo below, which was shared on Facebook on December 15, 2020, shows Defendant Meggs (red oval) posing at a book signing with several other individuals, including co-defendant Graydon Young (green oval):

Yesterday, prosecutors in this case had to get chewed out because former Acting US Attorney Michael Sherwin blabbed his mouth (completely inappropriately) on 60 Minutes, discussing what at that point had been merely a suggestion, that DOJ’s conspiracy case would integrate three different militia groups.

And the bulk of those cases are federal criminal charges, and significant federal felony charges. Five, 10, 20-year penalties. Of those 400 cases, the majority of those, 80, 85%, maybe even 90, you have individuals, both inside and outside the Capitol, that breached the Capitol, trespassed. You also have individuals, roughly over 100, that we’ve charged with assaulting federal officers and local police officers. The 10% of the cases,  I’ll call the more complex conspiracy cases where we do have evidence, it’s in the public record where individual militia groups from different facets: Oath Keepers, Three Percenters, Proud Boys, did have a plan. We don’t know what the full plan is, to come to D.C., organize, and breach the Capitol in some manner.

By the end of the day (having had their secret blown), DOJ showed that not only had the guy in charge of the Stack been thinking in terms of “insurrection” for over a week, but was also thinking about coordinated action among the different militia.

There’s still a problem with this conspiracy, as constructed. The Oath Keepers had a plan — which DOJ has now presented evidence they coordinated with two other militia groups. But the plan wasn’t limited to preventing vote certification (in part, because when they traveled to DC, they still believed that Trump or Mike Pence might make such an action unnecessary). The plan was insurrection.

But that only makes it more likely DOJ will be forced to charge it as such.


Were Proud Boys Using Livestream for Command and Control … and Other Operational Questions

Mapping out both the four charged conspiracy indictments against the Proud Boys as well as some — not all — of those with links to the groups who have not been included in the conspiracy indictments, has raised specific questions for me about how the Proud Boys operated that day and how they’re being prosecuted.

Were the Proud Boys using livestreams for command and control?

I’ve had this question more generally: whether someone offsite from the Capitol was providing Command and Control guidance for the assault on the Capitol. But the new “Leadership conspiracy” indictment against Ethan Nordean and Joe Biggs mentions that Gabriel Garcia — along with Joshua Pruitt — were among those who charged on the Capitol in the first wave, along with Dominic Pezzola.

That, by itself, makes me wonder if DOJ is going to expand that “Front Door” conspiracy to include Garcia and Pruitt.

But the content of Garcia’s charging document raises more questions for me.

Garcia is a former Army Captain, so one of the higher ranking former veterans among the Proud Boy defendants. He may have been IDed by what we now know was a request that Facebook provide the IDs associated with all the livestream video uploaded during the insurrection from inside the Capitol (indeed, it was Garcia’s complaint that first led me to suspect the FBI had used one).

Based on information provided by Facebook, Facebook User ID (“UID”) 100000183142825 has a Facebook account under the name “GABRIEL GARCIA.” GARCIA uploaded to his Facebook account at least two “Facebook live” videos taken inside of the Capitol building on January 6, 2021. Additionally, GARCIA uploaded at least one video before entering the Capitol building.

[snip]

In the video, GARCIA is walking east on Constitution Avenue towards the Capitol building with a large group of people. 2

Approximately 20 minutes later, at 19:19:08 UTC, or 02:19pm, GARCIA uploaded to Facebook a video filmed from inside the Capitol building:

If you were following Garcia’s livestreams in real time — even from a remote location — you would have visibility on what was going on inside almost immediately after the first group of the Proud Boys breached the Capitol.

In a later livestream, Garcia narrated what happened in the minutes after the Proud Boys had breached the Capitol.

GARCIA states, “We just went ahead and stormed the Capitol. It’s about to get ugly.” Around him, a large crowd chants, “Our house!”

Then, as a standoff with some cops ensued, Garcia filmed himself describing, tactically, what was happening, and also making suggestions to escalate violence that were heeded by those around him.

At minute 1:34, a man tries to run through the line of USCP officers. The officers respond with force, which prompts GARCIA to shout, “You fucking traitors! You fucking traitors! Fuck you!” As the USCP officers try to maintain positive control of the man that just rushed the police line, GARCIA yells, “grab him!” seemingly instructing the individuals around him to retrieve the man from USCP officers. GARCIA is holding a large American flag, which he drops into the skirmish in an apparent attempt to assist the individuals who are struggling with the USCP officers.

USCP officers maintain control of the line, holding out their arms to keep the crowd from advancing. At least one USCP officer deploys an asp. GARCIA turns the camera on himself and offers tactical observations regarding the standoff. [my emphasis]

Garcia’s livestream was such that you would obtain crowd size estimates from it, as well as specific names of officers on the front line, as well as instructions to “keep ’em coming,” seemingly asking for more bodies for this confrontation.

At minute 3:26, GARCIA, who is still in extremely close proximity to the USCP officer line again yells, “Fucking traitors!” He then joins the crowd chanting “Our house!” At minute 3:38, GARCIA states, “You ain’t stopping a million of us.” He then turns the camera to the crowd behind him and says, “Keep ‘em coming. Keep ‘em coming. Storm this shit.” GARCIA chants with the crowd, “USA!”

Soon after, GARCIA stops chanting and begins speaking off camera with someone near him. At minute 4:28, GARCIA says, “do you want water?” Though unclear, GARCIA seems to be asking the person with whom he is speaking. GARCIA is so close to an officer that, as the camera shifts, the only images captured are those of the officer’s chest and badge. [my emphasis]

Remarkably, Garcia filmed himself successfully ordering the rioters to hold the line — which they do — and then filmed them charging the police.

GARCIA yells, “Back up! Hold the line!” Shortly thereafter, the crowd begins advancing, breaching the USCP officer line. GARCIA says, “Stop pushing.” The last moments captured in the video are of the crowd rushing the USCP officers.

In the arrest affidavit for the Kansas City Proud Boys, a footnote describes how Nicholas Ochs and Nicholas DeCarlo were similarly filming what was going on as the Kansas City Proud Boys successfully thwarted police efforts to shut down access to the tunnels.

Proud Boys Nicholas Ochs and Nicholas DeCarlo can be seen in the background recording the unlawful conduct with their phones and other devices.

While their arrest documents don’t show the two livestreaming on Facebook (and Ochs would later complain about the connectivity inside the Capitol), if they were livestreaming somewhere, it would mean live video of tactically important moments from the siege would have been available to someone outside the Capitol or even someone watching more remotely, from a hotel room or even Florida.

Certainly, Garcia’s stream would be operationally useful if someone were providing command and control remotely. Was someone?

Does DOJ now have a list of all the teams from the Telegram channels?

The latest detention motions for Ethan Nordean and Joe Biggs (as well as the Leadership Conspiracy indictment) describe the process of divvying up the Proud Boys in attendance into teams, which process involves an unindicted co-conspirator who presumably is cooperating.

January 4, 8:20 PM, unindicted co-conspirator: “We had originally planned on breaking the guys into teams. Let’s start divying them up and getting baofeng channels picked out.”

January 5, 9:30 to 9:32 AM, Biggs: “What are the teams. I keep hearing team [sic] are picked already.” A few minutes later, [Biggs] stated “Who are we going to be with. I have guys with me in other chats saying teams are being put together.”

January 5, 9:17 to 9:20 PM, Biggs: “We just had a meeting woth [sic] a lot of guys. Info should be coming out” … “I was able to rally everyone here together who came where I said” … “We have a plan. I’m with [Nordean]. [my emphasis]

The replication of these Telegram chats, from two different channels, stops at 10AM on January 6 (they presumably continued after that time, but we know that Nordean’s phone was turned off during the day).

That suggests DOJ is likely to know what the various teams were and who led them. There were 60 people on the participants’ Telegram channel from that day, which means they may have a lot more teams to indict.

Who paid for the vans from Florida to DC?

The detention memo for Christopher Worrell, a Proud Boy who sprayed law enforcement with pepper spray, reveals that he and his girlfriend traveled to DC on vans paid for by someone else and stayed in hotels also paid for by someone else.

According to Worrell’s live-in girlfriend, who was interviewed by law enforcement on March 12, 2021, she and Worrell traveled to Washington D.C. in the days leading up to January 6, 2021, with other Proud Boys in vans paid for by another individual. Their hotel rooms were also paid for by another individual.

Particularly given that these vans were from Florida — where Tarrio, Biggs, and the key figures from the Oath Keepers all hung out (and hung out with Roger Stone) — the person that paid for these things may be on the hook for any conspiracy ultimately charged as a whole.

What kind of cooperation will DOJ get from the Front Door co-conspirators?

As of right now, just Dominic Pezzola and William Pepe are charged in what I call the “Front Door” conspiracy — the group of people who first breached the Capitol on the west side of the building. As noted above, DOJ itself identified Garcia and Pruitt to have some tie to this group (which makes me wonder if an expanded conspiracy obtained Friday will be released before I’m done with this post!).

But DOJ has not included Robert Gieswein or Ryan Samsel, who were also part of this initial assault. Neither is described as a Proud Boy in their charging documents, but both were with the Proud Boys before the operation. Both men are also on the hook for fairly serious assault charges (a cop that Samsel pushed over got a concussion and Gieswein brought a bat he used). Samsel has not been indicted and the joint request for a continuance (filed way back on February 17) explaining why explicitly states the two sides are seeking a “resolution,” (that is, a plea deal).

The government and counsel for the defendant have conferred, and are continuing to communicate in an effort to resolve this matter.

As to Gieswein, he has been indicted. But his docket has none of the proceedings that cases moving towards trial would have, such as a motion for a protective order (though given the delays on PACER postings that doesn’t definitely mean anything). And well after his magistrate docket in Colorado was closed, he submitted several sealed filings to it.

If I were someone that the government had dead to rights with not just brutal assault, but assault that was tactically important to the success of the entire operation, particularly if I had a criminal record that would add to prison time at sentencing (as Samsel does), I would sure want to help prosecutors assign some responsibility for those assaults to those who guided my actions on that day. Thus far, assault is not included in any of the conspiracy indictments (it is individually charged against Pezzola and a threatened assault was charged against William Chrestman), but if it were, it would raise the stakes of them significantly.

I’m also interested in the case of Chris Kelly. He’s not a Proud Boy. But in advance of his trip, he made it public that he was traveling to DC from NY with some members of the Proud Boys.

I’ll be with ex NYPD and some proud boys. This will be the most historic event of my life.

Kelly also made it clear the NYPD officer was his brother.

The Kelly Facebook Account also shows on January 2, 2021 KELLY messaged another user and stated, “Me and [NAME] plus a couple of others are headed down the 5th and staying 2 nights. Ill be frequency 462.662 on a ham radio if cell service goes down.” Public records databases also revealed Christopher M Kelly has a brother (“S1”) of New City, New York with the same first name used in the above statement. New York City Police Department records confirm S1 is a retired police officer. Based on this statement, and the statement above about traveling with “ex NYPD and some proud boys” your affiant believes that this comment indicated that KELLY planned to travel to Washington, D.C. with S1.

We still don’t know who a cooperating witness against Pezzola and Pepe is, who described to the FBI, almost immediately, a conversation promising that the Proud Boys would have killed Mike Pence had they found him that day. Pezzola had suspected that it was the guy who first recruited him into the Proud Boys and further speculated the conversation reported by the witness occurred on the trip home (which would help to explain how Pepe, also from NY, got included in conspiracy charges with Pezzola). That is, Pezzola believed that the cooperating witness must have been in a car with him from DC to NY.

But the government revealed that they are not prosecuting this cooperating witness.

The defendant speculates that W-1 is a “cooperating witness” with deeper ties to the Proud Boys than the defendant. The defense is incorrect. W-1 has not been charged with a crime in connection with the events of January 6, 2021, and the government is unaware of any affiliation between W-1 and the Proud Boys or any indication that W-1 knew the defendant prior to January 5, 2021.

Kelly can’t be that witness. He had already been charged at the time. But unless I missed his arrest, Kelly’s brother might be. And if his brother were cooperating (which would require honest testimony about what brother Chris had done), then it would raise the chances that Chris Kelly would be too. And why not? If I had traveled to DC with the people who initiated the entire insurrection, I’d want to make damned clear that I wasn’t part of that. Like Samsel, Kelly has not been indicted (publicly) yet.

For some time, the government had been saying they weren’t prepared to make plea deals yet. The inclusion of Co-Conspirator 1 in the Leadership indictment strongly suggests that’s done. And if Samsel and the government were discussing a plea over a month ago, you can be sure he has already proffered testimony to the government.

So the government likely has some cooperators in the “Front Door” conspiracy. The question is only, how much?


There Were 60 Proud Boy “Boots on the Ground” on January 6; Around 23 Have Been Arrested

According to the conspiracy indictment against Ethan Nordean, Joe Biggs, and others, the Proud Boys used two Telegram channels to organize their January 6 insurrection: a “New MOSD” channel that seems to have been used by top leadership, and a “Boots on the Ground” channel for “Proud Boys members in Washington, D.C.” DOJ didn’t say how many people were members of the former, presumably smaller, channel. But the Boots on the Ground channel had over 60 members.

On January 5, 2021, at 1:23 p.m., a new encrypted messaging channel entitled “Boots on the Ground” was created for communications by Proud Boys members in Washington, D.C. In total, over sixty users participated in the Boots on the Ground channel, including NORDEAN, BIGGS, REHL, DONOHOE, and [an unindicted co-conspirator]. Shortly after the channel’s creation, BIGGS posted a message to the channel that read: “We are trying to avoid getting into any shit  tonight. Tomorrow’s the day” and then “I’m here with rufio and a good group[.]”

While this doesn’t say that every subscriber to the channel participated in the insurrection, surely people who subscribed in the less than 24 hours between the channel creation and the insurrection itself were closely tied to those events.

When I finish updates to this post listing all the random Proud Boys who’ve been charged individually in addition to the 14 charged in one of the four Proud Boy conspiracy cases, I’ll have 23 people who either identify as Proud Boys or operated with them on January 6. That’s consistent with GWU’s very useful report on participants, which showed 20 Proud Boys before about 3 more arrests.

That means there may be as many as 40 more Proud Boys who were actively involved in preparations for January 6 who remain at large. That’s consistent with the videos of large mobs of people marching together through DC that day.

If DOJ knows there were over 60, they presumably have names — either real or monikers — for them, possibly with device information as well.


The Three Key Details the Proud Boy Unindicted Co-Conspirator Likely Revealed to Prosecutors

By March 1, the government had three pieces of evidence that form a key part of a conspiracy indictment accusing Ethan Nordean, Joe Biggs, Zachary Rehl, and Charles Donohoe of conspiring to breach the Capitol and by doing so, delaying the certification of the vote:

  • The Proud Boys used Baofeng radios set to a specific channel (which channel prosecutors knew)
  • After Enrique Tarrio’s arrest, Ethan Nordean got put in charge of the January 6 operation
  • The gang had a plan to split up to optimize the chances of success

A detention motion for Nordean submitted on that day included all three of these details. It described how the Proud Boys distributed Baofeng radios to use in the operation.

Arrangements were made to program and distribute multiple Baofeng radios5 for use by Proud Boys members to communicate during the event. Baofeng is a Chinese communications equipment manufacturer. Baofeng radios can be programmed to communicate on more than 1,000 different frequencies, making them far more difficult to monitor or overhear than common “walkie talkie” type radios. Specific radio frequencies were communicated to the Proud Boys.

5 Law enforcement recovered a Baofeng radio from Defendant’s home during the execution of a search warrant—the Baofeng radio recovered from Defendant’s home was still tuned to frequency that had been communicated to the group.

[snip]

The group led by Defendant arrived at the east side of the Capitol before noon. Several of the men in the group were holding Baofeng radios. Others had them clipped to their belts or jackets.

It described how Nordean was put in charge after Tarrio’s arrest.

Moreover, following the arrest of the Proud Boys’ Chairman on January 4, 2021, Defendant was nominated from within to have “war powers” and to take ultimate leadership of the Proud Boys’ activities on January 6, 2021.

[snip]

On January 4, 2021, Henry “Enrique” Tarrio, the self-proclaimed “Chairman” of the Proud Boys was arrested shortly after arriving in Washington, D.C., pursuant to a warrant issued by D.C. Superior Court. In communications between Proud Boys members following Tarrio’s arrest, it was acknowledged that Defendant would be among those that led the Proud Boys on the ground on January 6, 2021.

And it described a decision to split people up in an effort to increase the likelihood of actually shutting down the certification of the vote.

As noted more fully below, Defendant—dressed all in black, wearing a tactical vest—led the Proud Boys through the use of encrypted communications and military-style equipment, and he led them with the specific plans to: split up into groups, attempt to break into the Capitol building from as many different points as possible, and prevent the Joint Session of Congress from Certifying the Electoral College results.

[snip]

In order to increase the odds that their plan would succeed, Defendant and those Proud Boys following him dressed “incognito” and spread out to many different locations from which they could force entry into the Capitol. Defendant and others responsible for the January 6 Proud Boys event likely knew from experience that their typical tactic of marching in “uniform,” and in unison, would draw a concentrated law enforcement response to their location. By blending in and spreading out, Defendant and those following him on January 6 made it more likely that either a Proud Boy—or a suitably-inspired “normie”—would be able to storm the Capitol and its ground in such a way that would interrupt the Certification of the Electoral College vote

Even after prosecutors shared these damning claims, their bid to keep Nordean in jail failed. Nordean’s wife filed a declaration stating in part that Nordean obtained the radio on January 7 and, to her knowledge, he did not possess such a radio before that date.

An indictment against Nordean obtained on March 3 to comply with the Speedy Trial Act (but not released publicly until after the detention hearing) mentioned none of that.

And at the March 3 detention hearing before Beryl Howell, according to Zoe Tillman, the government withdrew the claim that Nordean had the Proud Boys split into groups as a factor for that detention hearing. In what the WaPo described as, “a remarkable stumble for prosecutors,”Judge Howell released Nordean to home detention, saying there was little evidence that Nordean played that leadership role.

Nordean “was a leader of a march to the Capitol. But once he got there it is not clear what leadership role this individual took at all for the people who went inside,” Howell said. “Evidence that he directed other defendants to break into or enter the Capitol is weak, to say the least.”

Nordean’s release marked a stumble for prosecutors, who have cast him as a key figure based on what Howell agreed were “ominous” communications before Jan. 6 that they said indicated he and other Proud Boys were planning “violent action” to overwhelm police and force entry to the Capitol. The judge’s decision sets back for now the government’s efforts to establish that there was a wider plot to that end.

[snip]

“The government has backed down from saying that he directly told them to split into groups and that they had this strategic plan,” Howell remarked.

Howell said that although Nordean’s release was a “close call,” she agreed with the defense that “there’s no allegation that the defendant caused injury to any person, or that he even personally caused damage to any particular property.”

Prosecutors claimed they had this evidence on March 1. But after failing to present it at that March 3 hearing, Nordean got released.

On March 15, the judge assigned to the case after Nordean got indicted, Timothy Kelly, issued an order delaying the arraignment scheduled for the next day. He offered no explanation.

What didn’t become clear until this week is that, on March 10, the government obtained the superseding indictment against Nordean and others. And then, on March 12, the government asked Judge Kelly to delay Nordean’s arraignment on his original indictment because of the superseding indictment. Prosecutors explained that revealing the indictment ahead of time would risk alerting Rehl and Donohoe before they could be arrested and their houses searched.

On March 10, 2021, a federal grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia returned a Superseding Indictment charging Defendant, and three co-defendants (two of whom were not previously charged), with Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; Obstruction of an Agency Proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2), and 2; Obstructing Law Enforcement During a Civil Disorder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 231(a)(3), and 2; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1361, and 2; Entering and Remaining in a Restricted Building or Grounds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1); and Disorderly and Disruptive Conduct in a Restricted Building or Grounds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2).

The Superseding Indictment is under seal, pending the arrest of newly charged defendants and the execution of search warrants. Law Enforcement anticipates executing the arrests and search warrants of the new defendants in a coordinated operation on Wednesday, March 17, 2021. Once the arrests are executed, the Superseding Indictment will be unsealed.

The evidence the superseding indictment provides to substantiate claims first made on March 1 may explain an even bigger reason why prosecutors didn’t provide their evidence for those three claims in time to keep Nordean in custody: They had an unindicted co-conspirator (presumably someone cooperating with prosecutors) who was, along with the four conspiracy defendants, on an encrypted channel created after Enrique Tarrio’s arrest on January 4 that Proud Boy leaders used to continue planning for January 6. That unindicted co-conspirator was personally involved in all three details included in that detention memo against Nordean. He helped divvy up the Proud Boys to be spread out during the January 6 operation.

39. On after Chairman’s January 4, 2021, shortly after Proud Boys Chairman’s arrest pursuant to a warrant issued by D.C. Superior Court, DONOHOE expressed concern that encrypted communications that involved Proud Boys Chairman would be compromised when law enforcement examined Proud Boys Chairmans’ phone. DONOHOE then created a new channel on the encrypted messaging application, entitled, “New MOSD,” and took steps to destroy or “nuke” the earlier channel. After its creation, the “New MOSD” channel included NORDEAN, BIGGS, REHL, DONOHOE, and a handful of additional members.

40. On January 2021, at 7:15 p.m., DONOHOE posted a message on various encrypted messaging channels, including New MOSD, which read, “Hey have been instructed and listen to me real good! There is no planning of any sorts. I need to be put into whatever new thing is created. Everything is compromised and we can be looking at Gang charges.” DONOHOE then wrote, “Stop everything immediately” and then “This comes from the top.”

41. On January 4, 2021, at 8:20 p.m., an unindicted co-conspirator (“UCC-1”) posted to New MOSD channel: “We had originally planned on breaking the guys into teams. Let’s start divying them up and getting baofeng channels picked out.”

Note: If “New MOSD” was a channel of State leaders of the Proud Boys, it would likely have included Nicholas Ochs, who heads the Hawaii chapter of the Proud Boys. Ochs was the first senior Proud Boy to be arrested, on January 7, at the airport when he arrived back in Hawaii (and therefore carrying anything he had with him at the insurrection, potentially including his cell phone and any radios he kept). Kathryn Rakoczy, who has since moved onto the team prosecuting the Oath Keepers, was the original prosecutor on Ochs’ case. But now Christopher Berridge, who is on all the other Proud Boy cases but not the Nordean and Biggs one, is prosecuting Ochs. Ochs is charged in a parallel conspiracy indictment, with the very same goal and many of the same means as the Nordean and Biggs one, but which for some reason was not identified as a related case to the other three Proud Boy ones and so was not assigned to Judge Kelly; Judge Howell is presiding over Ochs’ case. Ochs has a superb defense attorney, Edward McMahon. Many of these details, which make the curious treatment of the Ochs-DeCarlo conspiracy indictment clear, are in this post or this expanded table.

Whoever the unindicted co-conspirator is, he’s the one who set the channel of the Baofeng radios the night before the insurrection. And he’s the one who stated that Nordean was in charge.

46. At 9:03 p.m., REHL notified NORDEAN, BIGGS, DONOHOE and others that he had arrived in Washington, D.C. DONOHOE responded by requesting one of the radios that REHL had brought.

47.  At 9:09 p.m., UCC-1 broadcast a message to MOSD and Boots on the Ground channels that read: “Stand by for the shared baofeng channel and shared zello channel, no Colors, be decentralized and use good judgement until further orders” UCC-1 also wrote, Rufio is in charge, cops are the primary threat, don’t get caught by them or BLM, don’t get drunk until off the street.” UCC-1 then provided a specific radio frequency of 477.985.

It is highly likely that prosecutors learned the three details included in that detention motion — that Nordean had been put in charge, that the Proud Boys were using Baofeng radios set to frequency 477.985, and that part of the plan was to disperse the men to increase chances of success — from the unindicted co-conspirator and or devices seized from him when he was first arrested.

And it took them less than two months to learn those details of the plot.

Update: The government has moved to detain both Nordean and Biggs now. Those motions cite from the Telegram chats the Proud Boys used to organize the day before the attack, including (I’ve combined them from both motions):

On January 5, between 9:30 – 9:32am [Biggs] stated “What are the teams. I keep hearing team [sic] are picked already.” A few minutes later, [Biggs] stated “Who are we going to be with. I have guys with me in other chats saying teams are being put together.”

On January 5, at 9:32am, a member of a Proud Boys Telegram group stated “It seems like our plan has totally broken down and rufio has taken control as a singke [sic] point of contact.”

On January 5, between 5:22 – 5:25pm, [Biggs] stated “Woth [sic] [coconspirator Ethan Nordean] trying to get numbers so we can make a plan.” Defendant then stated “Just trying to get our numbers. So we can plan accordingly for tonight and go over tomorrow’s plan.”

On January 5, at 5:52pm, [Biggs] stated “We are trying to avoid getting into any shit tonight. Tomorrow’s the day” and “I’m here with [co-conspirator Nordean] and a good group[.]”

On January 5, at 9:07pm, co-conspirator Charles Donohoe asked “Hey who’s boots on ground with a plan RN [ … ] Guys are asking.” A participant in the encrypted chat stated “Supposed to be Rufio.”

Within minutes, an unindicted co-conspirator broadcast a message to those in the group chat, “Rufio is in charge, cops are the primary threat, don’t get caught by them or BLM, don’t get drunk until off the street.”

On January 5, between 9:17 and 9:20pm, [Biggs] stated “We just had a meeting woth [sic] a lot of guys. Info should be coming out” and then “I was able to rally everyone here together who came where I said” and then, “We have a plan. I’m with [co-conspirator Nordean].”

On January 5, at 9:34pm [Biggs] told co-conspirator Charles Donohoe to communicate to Proud Boys members a message stating that the group in Washington, D.C. would meet at the Washington Monument at 10am on January 6.

On the morning of January 6, Donohoe stated that he was on his way to the Washington Monument, and “I have the keys until Rufio and [co-conspirator Zachary Rehl] show up.”

Update: As I note in a footnote to this post, Nicholas Ochs can’t be the unindicted co-conspirator. That’s true for two reasons. First, because DOJ does not believe UCC-1 was at the Capitol on January 6 (though doesn’t say where he was). DOJ knows Ochs was inside the Capitol. Also, DOJ has now started treating all the Proud Boy conspiracies as the same conspiracy. So Ochs could not, then, be considered un-indicted in that conspiracy.


The State of the Five Now-Intersecting January 6 Militia Conspiracies

Paragraph 64 of a new conspiracy indictment including Proud Boys Ethan Nordean, Joe Biggs, and the newly arrested Proud Boys Zachary Rehl and Charles Donohoe includes a seemingly gratuitous reference to the Oath Keepers. The paragraph describes how Biggs, after having entered the Capitol once already from the northwest side, then moved to the opposite side of the building and forced his way in on the east side. He did so right in front of a group of Oath Keepers.

Thirty minutes after first entering the Capitol on the west side, BIGGS and two other members of the Proud boys, among others, forcibly re-entered the Capitol through the Columbus Doors on the east side of the Capitol, pushing past at least one law enforcement officer and entering the Capitol directly in front of a group of individuals affiliated with the Oath Keepers.

This would have been around 2:44 PM. The Oath Keeper “stack” went in the east side of the Capitol at around 2:40.

That reference, along with the common use of the Zello application, brings two parallel conspiracies laid out over a month ago closer together, arguably intersecting. As of right now, DOJ has charged 25 people in five different conspiracy indictments, four of which share precisely the same goal: to stop, delay, and hinder Congress’s certification of the Electoral College vote, with many similar means and methods. Three conspiracy indictments also share roughly the same goal of obstructing law enforcement. Those indictments are:

Here’s what a simplified version of the five different conspiracies looks like:

This is not the end of it: there are three Oath Keepers not included in that conspiracy, and a random bunch of Proud Boys who might eventually be included, as well as anyone else who coordinated this effort [wink]. But these conspiracy indictments will remain separate only for prosecutorial ease. They are, for all intents and purposes, now-intersecting conspiracies.

Update: Last night, NYT’s visual team released new videos showing that the Oath Keepers Stack was involved in forcing entry into the East entrance of the Capitol. These videos depict what happened moments after Biggs reentered the Capitol, as described above.

Update: To see how the other pieces of any coordinated action fit, I will list the other Oath Keepers and Proud Boys that have played a part in this operation.

Oath Keepers

Stewart Rhodes: The Oath Keeper President. He is not charged, but implicated in the existing Oath Keepers indictment and the Minuta complaint.

Roberto Minuta: Minuta was arrested on March 8. An SDNY Magistrate judge released him on bail (he almost put up silver bars for his security, but ended up coming up with the money itself), ignoring the government request he stay the order. Minuta’s arrest affidavit–which was written 12 days before James’ but executed roughly the same day–focuses primarily on Minuta’s harassment of cops. It doesn’t mention, as James’ affidavit does, Minuta’s role in providing security, including for Roger Stone. Minuta also deleted his Facebook account on January 13, for which he was charged with obstruction.

Joshua James: James was arrested on March 9 and held without bail (in part because of a past arrest associated with claiming to be a military police officer in 2011). His arrest affidavit makes it clear he was a close contact with Minuta as well as Kelly Meggs. The affidavit repeatedly describes James offering security to VIPs we know to include Roger Stone. According to public reporting, James received payment for his “security” services on January 6, which Stone was publicly fundraising for in advance (then denied spending).

Jon Ryan Schaffer: The front man for the heavy metal band Iced Earth and an Oath Keeper lifetime member, Schaffer was arrested for spraying some police with bear spray. But two months after his arrest and detention, he has not been (publicly) indicted and only arrived in DC on March 17. The government has not publicly responded to his motion to dismiss his case on Speedy Trial grounds. All of which suggests there’s something more there that we can’t see.

Person Four: The James affidavit refers to Minuta as “Person Five.” It uses that number, it says, because “Persons Two [Caldwell’s spouse], Three [the NC-based Oath Keeper who might serve as a Quick Reaction Force], and Four are not included in this affidavit, but are already-numbered individuals associated with United States v. Thomas Caldwell, et al, Case No. 21-cr-28 (APM). To maintain consistent nomenclature, the referenced individual here will be defined as ‘Person Five.’” I haven’t been able to find the reference to Person Four (though it might be Watkins’ partner, references to whom are inconsistent).

Three more Stack participants and four others who operated with Minuta and James on January 6: This image, from James’ complaint, identifies three other Stack members (the second, third, and last yellow arrow) and four others who interacted with James and Minuta during the day on January 6.

Proud Boys

Enrique Tarrio: Tarrio is the head of the Proud Boys, but got arrested as he entered DC on January 4 on charges relating to vandalizing a Black church in December, onto which possession charges were added. He is referred to in all the Proud Boy conspiracies, repeatedly in the Leader one (because they scrambled to figure out what to do after his arrest). While it’s unlikely he was on the Telegram channels used to organize the insurrection, he was in touch with members via other, thus far unidentified channels.

Joshua Pruitt: Pruitt was arrested for a curfew violation on the night of the insurrection. He told the FBI he hadn’t engaged in any unlawful activity and was just trying to deescalate the situation. But he was indicted on his own weeks later for obstructing the vote count and interfering with cops, and abetting the destruction of property, along with trespassing. The Nordean conspiracy indictment notes that he went in the West entrance shortly after Dominic Pezzola breached it (suggesting the government may now know he was part of a cell with Pezzola). Pruitt is being prosecuted by the same prosecutor as on most Proud Boy cases, Christopher Berridge, and before the same judge, Timothy Kelly.

Gabriel Garcia: Garcia, a former Army Captain, appears to have originally been identified by the Facebook order showing who livestreamed from the Capitol. It’s possible his livestreams were intended to serve as live reporting for those coordinating outside (he catches the names of cops, the size of the crowd, and instructs, “keep ’em coming.” He incites a big push through a line of cops. Later, he calls for “Nancy” to “come out and play” and calls to “Free Enrique” [Tarrio]. He was charged by complaint on January 16 and by indictment on February 16 with obstruction and resisting cops during civil disorder. The Nordean conspiracy indictment notes he went in the West entrance shortly after Pezzola breached it.

Christopher Worrell: The government originally charged Worrell, a committed Proud Boy who traveled to DC in vans of Proud Boys paid for by someone else and wore comms equipment, with trespass crimes on March 10. Among his criminal background, he pretended to be a cop to intimidate a woman. He lied in his first interview with the FBI, hiding that he sprayed pepper spray on some police who were the last line of defense on the West side of the Capitol. According to a witness who knows him, he also directed other likely Proud Boys. After first being released, he was subsequently detained and is awaiting indictment on what the government suggests are likely to be assault charges.

Robert Gieswein: Ethan Nordean spoke to Giswein shortly before he and Pezzola launched the attack on the Capitol suggesting that Gieswein, who had known ties to the 3% movement, was coordinating with the Proud Boys that day. Over the course of breaking into the Capitol, he allegedly assaulted 3 cops with a bat or pepper spray, and broke a window to break in. He was first charged on January 16, indicted on January 27. His docket shows none of the normal proceedings, such as a protective order, but his magistrate’s docket shows two sealed documents placed there in recent weeks.

Ryan Samsel: There’s no indication I know of that ties Samsel to the Proud Boys. But he marched with them and initiated the assault on the West side of the Capitol with Dominic Pezzola and William Pepe. He was charged with assault and obstruction on January 29 and arrested on February 3. In his case, he allegedly did so by assaulting a cop at the first line of barriers, knocking her out. He and the government are in talks for a guilty plea.

Ryan Bennett: Bennett was IDed off his own Facebook livestreaming, while wearing a Proud Boys hat, of the event, including his direct witness to the shooting of Ashli Bennett, with his voice yelling “Break it down!” in the background. He was arrested on January 26 and charged in a still-sealed March 17 indictment over which James Boasberg will preside.

Bryan Betancur: Betancur was busted by his Maryland Probation Officer, to whom he had lied about distributing Bibles to get permission to go to DC. He wore a Proud Boys shirt to the insurrection and is a known white supremacist who espouses violence. He was charged with misdemeanor trespass charges. His defense attorney is already discussing a guilty plea.

Daniel Goodwyn: Goodwyn’s online identity is closely associated with the Proud Boys. He was identified via an interview he did with Baked Alaska during the insurrection and texts sent to an associate; he was arrested on January 29. He was originally charged with trespass, with obstruction added in his indictment on February 24. Charles Berridge was originally the prosecutor on this case but has been replaced on it.

Christopher Kelly: Kelly revealed on Facebook before he headed to DC that he would be going with, “ex NYPD and some proud boys.” While inside, he bragged that they had “stopped the hearing, they are all headed to the basement.” He was originally charged with trespass and obstruction on January 20; he has yet to be (publicly) indicted yet. He has the same defense attorney, Edward McMahon, as Nicholas Ochs.

Around 40 other people who used the Proud Boys “Boots on the Ground” Telegram channel: As I noted here, the government must have at least monikers for — and likely email and/or device identifiers — for around 40 people who used the organizing channel set up less than a day before the operation. It will be interesting to see if they attempt to track all of them down.

Rolling Updates:

Marc Bru, a Proud Boy with ties to Nordean, was charged on March 9.

Paul Rae, a Proud Boy from Florida who trailed Biggs both times he entered the Capitol.

Arthur Jackman: a Proud Boy from Florida who trailed Biggs both times he entered the Capitol, including into the Senate.

 


How to Arrest Someone (Almost) Entirely Off Social Media

Brandon and Stephanie Miller are, like Jeremy Groseclose, really minor players who entered the Capitol on January 6 while there was an insurrection going on around them. The one amusing tidbit in the arrest affidavit for the married couple quoted Brandon, stating on Facebook the day after the riot, that he hadn’t yet gotten into trouble, two months before he would get into trouble.

“Went in the capital [sic] building.” This user asked Brandon Miller, “You didn’t get into any trouble,” to which he responded, “No not yet anyway lol I’m home now I’m banded on Facebook for me going live while I was there we just walked down the main hallway we did see the blood trail from the girl that got shot and killed then I just seen a post saying 3 people died not sure on that one tho.”

What’s interesting about the affidavit is it shows how the FBI arrested the two largely off their social media use.

A Facebook geofence

The investigation started when the FBI obtained Brandon’s Facebook ID in response to a request for everyone who had live-streamed or posted video from inside the Capitol — a kind of Facebook geofence I described likely was used in this post. So at the very start, they didn’t know who Brandon was, but they knew he had trespassed and created his own record of doing so.

The Federal Bureau of Investigations sought information from Facebook as part of the federal investigation that began in the aftermath of the January 6, 2021 events at the U.S. Capitol Building. Specifically, the FBI requested that Facebook identify any “Facebook Live” videos which may have been streamed and/or uploaded to Facebook from physically within the building of the U.S. Capitol during the time on January 6, 2021 that the mob had stormed and occupied the Capitol Building.

Facebook responded by providing the Object IDs for multiple videos linked to specific Facebook accounts/user IDs. Among the accounts provided by Facebook was Facebook account number 100011360648175.

The FBI presumably obtained the Facebook ID for everyone who posted from inside the Capitol that day. I suspect they immediately got preservation orders for everyone whose account came up, which wasn’t a problem here (the Millers did not attempt to delete any of this), but likely explains why others were unsuccessful in their efforts to delete damning evidence on Facebook.

Warrant on Facebook

Remember, virtually every outsider who was in the Capitol that day was trespassing. That made it easy for the FBI to say that anyone who had, like Brandon, uploaded video from inside the Capitol had probably been committing a crime (to say nothing that such videos might provide evidence of other people committing a crime), because by being there to livestream the content, they were trespassing. The FBI got a warrant return from Facebook by January 14 (meaning turnaround and seeking those warrants was almost immediate after the riot). That gave the FBI Brandon’s credit card information, his address, his phone number, and Stephanie’s name and status as Brandon’s spouse.

On or about January 14, 2021, Facebook provided a response to a search warrant for Brandon Miller’s Facebook. Subscriber information provided by Facebook included credit cards associated with the account. The credit card had a zip code of 45308, which resolves to Bradford, OH. Brandon Miller’s Facebook account listed him as living in Bradford, Ohio. The registered phone number to the account is was (***) ***-6025.

[snip]

His Facebook profile as indicated that Brandon Miller was married to Facebook user Stephanie Miller.

The FBI used this information to obtain their driver’s license records, one of the few things that didn’t come directly from social media.

Public commentary on January 6 on Facebook

Both Brandon and Stephanie had their Facebook content accessible to the public (but the FBI would have obtained Brandon’s with their warrant anyway). In addition to the comment, above, where Brandon said he was not yet in trouble, they posted a bunch of other things confirming that they had entered the Capitol. Among other things, though, they posted content that showed they did not have the intent to prevent the vote count (thereby saving themselves the felony charge others have gotten off their pre-January 6 postings).

On or about January 5, 2021, Brandon Miller, in direct messages with another Facebook user wrote, “Heading to DC for tomorrow the 6th the really not sure if you have seen anything about it but me and Stephanie are going to witness history.”

On or about January 6, 2021, Brandon Miller’s Facebook timeline showed he was with Stephanie Miller at a hotel in Washington, D.C. with the accompanying message: “Cant’ wait to witness history”

They were in DC to witness history, not to upend it.

One live witness from Facebook — probably IDed on Facebook

FBI then did the one thing that isn’t obviously from Facebook, but probably is: interview one of the Millers’ family members, twice.

On or about January 26, 2021, a witness, (hereinafter referred to as “W-1”), was interviewed by the FBI. W-1 informed the FBI that he was a family member of Brandon and Stephanie Miller’s. W-1 had heard from another family member that Brandon and Stephanie Miller were at the Capitol and went inside. W-1 observed a Facebook Live video on Brandon Miller’s Facebook account that showed himself and Stephanie Miller inside the Capitol. W-1 provided both Brandon and Stephanie Miller’s phone number as (***) ***-6025. W-1 also provided an address for the Millers in Bradford, Ohio, which matched the Miller’s address in their respective BMV records.

In a subsequent interview, W-1 was shown the photograph above from Brandon Miller’s Facebook. W-1 identified the man in the foreground of the photo as “Brandon Miller” and the woman behind him as “Stephanie Miller” by writing their names next to their respective images. W-1 also viewed the below photograph taken inside the Capitol. W-1 identified the woman in the foreground of the photo as “Stephanie Miller” by writing her name next to her image.

This person honestly told the FBI that they knew the couple had been to the Capitol, had seen Brandon’s Live video, and corroborated all the other data the FBI had already collected off Facebook. The same witness subsequently confirmed the IDs of the pictures that would have been identifiable from Facebook anyway.

The FBI could have IDed this person via many means (such as public records). But Facebook would probably be the easiest and most likely way they did so. Moreover, by doing so using Facebook, the FBI would have known precisely what answers a particular witness could answer, such as their awareness that the couple had been inside the Capitol. Effectively, when they did those interviews, they knew every single answer they’d get, and they knew the witness knew the answers.

FBI could ID family members from tags, pictures, and Facebook content, and then get those family members to corroborate everything made clear in Facebook anyway.

A Google Geofence tour around the Capitol

Then the FBI took two steps to obtain a Google Geofence showing Stephanie (likely with Brandon at her side) wandering around the Capitol. First, by February 4, they got Brandon and Stephanie’s Google identities, using either their phone number and/or Google IDs that would have been returned by Facebook. This would have been a subpoena. Then they used that information to get a warrant for the Geofence showing where Stephanie went in the Capitol, likely with Brandon walking by her side.

Obtain cell site location within the Capitol

The FBI agent who did this work must be really anal (or maybe he’s just showing the work that every agent is doing), because after having obtained location data from Google and Facebook placing the couple inside the Capitol, he obtained cell site location data placing them … in the Capitol.

According to records obtained through a search warrant which was served on AT&T on January 6, 2021, in and around the time of the incident at the U.S. Capitol Building, the cellphones associated with phone numbers (***) ***-5898 and (***) ***-6025 were identified as having utilized a cell site consistent with providing service to a geographic area that included the interior of the U.S. Capitol Building.

The agent got this information two days after the subscriber information from Google, February 6, one month after the riot.

At this point, the agent had three pieces of evidence — the Facebook “geofence,” the Google geofence, and the AT&T location data — placing them inside the Capitol.

Match all that location data to security footage

Then, on February 11, the agent got security footage corresponding with all that location data. Sure enough, they were walking together through the Capitol, gaping at history, just like they said they were going to.

This is what you can do with the power of social media with two people who were doing nothing to hide their actions. Lucky for them, everything they said corroborated their claim they were just there to see history. The FBI has obligingly given them more souvenir pictures for their trouble … and two misdemeanor charges. Along with a very good lesson about how intrusive social media can be.

Remember: this entire process was predicated off the reasonable suspicion that someone live-streaming from the Capitol on January 6 was trespassing. The very act of live-streaming was, in virtually all cases, either evidence from victims or evidence of a misdemeanor. That’s what makes this reasonable rather than a privacy nightmare.

But it’s also a ready lesson about what kind of privacy nightmare it could be, if the FBI were to come up with some other, less obvious basis for probable cause.

Update: After I wrote this I realized I wasn’t as clear about something as I’d like. This data is not — as might be imagined from reading how it served to capture this couple in misdemeanor trespassing charges — worthless data for the larger project of figuring out what plans to overthrow democracy people had coming in. Not only was this social media approach really useful in collecting on the Oath Keepers, who have been charged in a conspiracy to prevent the vote certification, but many of these techniques were first obvious, though not explicitly explained, in the first William Chrestman cell affidavit. This same granular data helped the FBI identify precisely where Proud Boy Chrestman was at any given time he was in the Capitol, who was with him, and what measures they were taking that put members of Congress a significant risk. With the Millers this might seem like overkill. But with a bunch of militia groups that FBI should have had investigations on but didn’t, this data is proving key to being able to reconstruct what happened.


86 Minutes: Two Arrests Thwarted and Three Cops Disabled by “Bear Shit”

In the 86 minutes after the Capitol Police first asked for help from the National Guard on January 6, police had to drop two arrests of violent rioters, and three cops — including Brian Sicknick — were temporarily disabled after being sprayed with “bear shit.”

At 1:49 on January 6, Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund asked the Commander of the DC National Guard, General William Walker, for urgent help pushing back the riot attacking the Capitol. According to Walker’s testimony, he loaded Guardsmen onto busses to be able to respond as soon as he got authority, but that approval was not granted and communicated to him for over three hours. Walker testified that he could have reinforced the Capitol within 15 minutes, and indeed, once DOD granted approval, according to Walker’s testimony the Guard arrived within 20 minutes (DOD says it took almost 40 minutes).

At 1:49pm I received a frantic call from then Chief of U.S. Capitol Police, Steven Sund, where he informed me that the security perimeter at the Capitol had been breached by hostile rioters. Chief Sund, his voice cracking with emotion, indicated that there was a dire emergency on Capitol Hill and requested the immediate assistance of as many Guardsmen as I could muster.

Immediately after the 1:49pm call with Chief Sund, I alerted the Army Senior Leadership of the request. The approval for Chief Sund’s request would eventually come from the Acting Secretary of Defense and be relayed to me by Army Senior Leaders at 5:08pm – 3 hours and 19 minutes later. We already had Guardsmen on buses ready to move to the Capitol. Consequently, at 5:20pm (in under 20 minutes) the District of Columbia National Guard arrived at the Capitol.

Had DOD worked the way they had in the past then, the Capitol Police might have had reinforcements from the Guard at the Capitol by around 2:10 PM.

About five minutes after the time General Walker says the Guard could have arrived, around 2:15, Hunter Ehmke allegedly started trying to punch through a window from a ledge outside the Rotunda.

Officer Fluke observed Ehmke pointing towards the window, followed by looking at the crowd to his south and waving his hand as if to summon others over to his position. Ehmke repeated the sequence of gestures again. Officer Fluke shouted out, “They’re going to break the window” during this time in hopes to bring attention from fellow officers.

An officer who saw what Ehmke was doing looked at the hundreds of rioters he was trying to repel then back towards Ehmke, only to see that Ehmke had punched the window and broken it.

Officer Fluke looked east to focus back on the crowd pushing on the shields and gave orders for the growing crowd to get back. Officer Fluke turned to look north again and observed Ehmke with a balled fist, pulling his arm back and twisting his upper body. Ehmke then swung forward striking a pane of the window about shoulder level of Ehmke. Officer Fluke began to run toward Ehmke while continuing to hold his shield in both hands.

Officer Fluke managed to knock Ehmke down and two other officers came to help arrest him. Others attempted to set up a perimeter to protect the now-broken window and create space for an arrest. But as confrontations elsewhere grew more urgent and a crowd started demanding that the cops let Ehmke go, police released him and told him not to come back.

As the officers discussed an action plan, the disturbance caused individuals of the crowd facing the Rotunda doors to divert their attention towards the approximately 10 officers in the northwest corner of the landing. Individuals in the throng began to show aggression by pointing fingers and shouting obscenities. One unidentified individual threatened Officer Fluke and the other officers, stating “you’re not leaving with him”, while pointing in the direction of Officer Fluke and Ehmke. Due to the growing aggression of the large crowd that far outnumbered the officers and the exigent circumstances at the time, officers made the decision to allow Ehmke depart under his own power.

Eight minutes after the confrontation with Ehmke began, at 2:23, Julian Khater and others were wrestling with police over a set of bike rack barriers. Khater appears to have sprayed what he had called, “bear shit” towards the cops. Three cops, including Brian Sicnick, withdrew from their position. All three took at least 20 minutes recovering from the toxic spray before they could return to the fight against the insurrectionists.

Officer Chapman’s BWC shows that at 2:23 p.m., the rioters begin pulling on a bike rack to Chapman’s left, using ropes and their hands to pull the rack away. Seconds later, KHATER is observed with his right arm up high in the air, appearing to be holding a canister in his right hand and aiming it in the officers’ direction while moving his right arm from side to side. Officer Chapman’s BWC confirms that KHATER was standing only five to eight feet away from the officers.

[snip]

In reviewing the surveillance footage and BWC video, your affiant observes that Officers Sicknick, Edwards and Chapman, who are standing within a few feet of KHATER, all react, one by one, to something striking them in the face. The officers immediately retreat from the line, bring their hands to their faces and rush to find water to wash out their eyes, as described in further detail below and as captured in the following screen shots.

While Sicknick returned to his work, that spray may have contributed to his death.

About eight minutes after Khater sprayed Sicknick and two others, starting at 2:31, Mark Ponder appears on camera beating an officer’s shield with a pole. After he broke that pole, he found another more substantial one.

Moments later, shortly before 2:32 p.m. PONDER reemerges from the crowd holding another long pole. This second pole appears to be thicker than the first pole and is colored with red, white, and blue stripes.

17 minutes after Ponder first grabbed the pole, at 2:49, he started swinging it more aggressively at individual cops, striking one.

As PONDER swings the pole in the direction of the officers, he struck Officer #3 once in the left shoulder.

Officer 3 and others tackled Ponder and started moving to arrest him. They found his ID at 3:03, but Ponder apparently lied about where he currently lived. By 3:15 — 86 minutes after Sund first requested assistance — the officers learn there’s no transport available to complete the arrest of Ponder at that time. So, as happened with Ehmke less than an hour earlier, the cops let him go, instructing him not to come back.

Ponder remained at the riot for almost two more hours.

At 4:32, according to DOD’s timeline, Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller approved a deployment of the Guard to help at the Capitol. General Walker didn’t receive that order for another 30 minutes. Sometime between 5:20 (per Walker) and 5:40 (per DOD), the Guard arrived at the Capitol and started to help.

That is, in the first 86 minutes of the three hour period between when Sund asked for help and the Guard showed up, police moved to arrest two violent insurrectionists, only to be forced to let them go, and (as NYT had noted in a story some time ago), Brian Sicknick was sprayed with a toxic substance that may have led to his death.

It took 70 days for the FBI to track Ponder down after he was first released, and almost as long — 67 days — to arrest Julian Khater (likely delaying efforts to identify of the substance used against Sicknick in the process). Part of that delay must be attributed to the three hours it took DOD to provide relief to the Capitol Police.


The FBI Was Still Collecting Evidence Yesterday that Might Explain Brian Sicknick’s Death

I want to make some observations about timing that may help to explain why the government wasn’t prepared to charge Julian Khater and George Tanios in Brian Sicknick’s death, if indeed they ever will be able to, when they arrested the men yesterday.

The investigation really seems to have come together in recent weeks and the FBI seems to have spent much of the last ten days investigating Tanios, who brought the substance Khater allegedly sprayed at Sicknick to the Capitol.

The arrest affidavit suggests it would have been difficult to have IDed Khater (much less establish probable cause) without the footage from MPD Officer Chapman’s body camera.

On the video, KHATER continues to talk animatedly with TANIOS. At approximately 2:20 p.m., KHATER walks through the crowd to within a few steps of the bike rack barrier. KHATER is standing directly across from a line of law enforcement officers to include U.S. Capitol Police (“USCP”) Officers B. Sicknick and C. Edwards, and Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Officer D. Chapman, who was equipped with a functioning body worn camera (“BWC”) device.

Officer Chapman’s BWC shows that at 2:23 p.m., the rioters begin pulling on a bike rack to Chapman’s left, using ropes and their hands to pull the rack away. Seconds later, KHATER is observed with his right arm up high in the air, appearing to be holding a canister in his right hand and aiming it in the officers’ direction while moving his right arm from side to side. Officer Chapman’s BWC confirms that KHATER was standing only five to eight feet away from the officers.

That’s some of the video that has taken longest to exploit (or longest for the FBI to be willing to share publicly), not least because there wasn’t a publicly curated set like the Parler videos released by ProPublica that allowed open source investigation.

Chapman’s BWC video would permit the FBI to ID Khater (the guy who actually used the spray). Still, he’s got a fairly late FBI Be On the Lookout number: 190, meaning it took some time for the FBI to isolate a still to release.

Once the FBI IDed Khater, though, they would have seen that he was clearly working in tandem with Tanios (which is effectively what the arrest affidavit says). Not only was Khater working with him, but Tanios was the guy carrying the bear spray, and so is more likely to be the guy who’d have another can of the substance in his backpack at home or receipts to identify precisely what was used.

The FBI tweeted out Tanios’ BOLO on March 4 (they released it with the pictures of two other guys; I’m not sure what to make of that).

The arrest warrant for the two men was approved on March 6, which would be quick work if they really were working off a BOLO released March 4 (though they likely got a warrant as soon as they obtained probable cause in case they had to arrest the men quickly).

That said, the arrest warrant wasn’t executed until March 14. That’s not that surprising–the FBI would have wanted to get this arrest right, coordinating teams so that both men would be arrested at the same time. This warrant for Tanios’ house, business, car, and devices, shows that the FBI was physically surveilling Tanios from March 5 through March 8 to identify his movements, his home, his business, and his car.

As late as March 14, the day FBI obtained the warrant, they were still waiting to receive returns from a warrant served on AT&T for Tanios’ phone records. Interestingly, Tanios called Khater at 2:42PM on January 6, less than twenty minutes after Khater allegedly sprayed Sicknick and others (another cop sprayed Khater, so he may have been recovering from pepper spray himself, but Tanios didn’t stick around to help Khater — they were separated by then).

Still, the FBI has been working all of these January 6 cases on an arrest first, further investigate later basis, partly because of the timing of the attack, and partly because FBI had done so little investigation into almost all the subjects of investigation. As Chris Wray said in testimony recently, the arrest of these subjects (sometimes just for trespass crimes) is often just the beginning of the investigation into them. With virtually all the defendants, the FBI is getting enough to arrest them, then doing the kind of investigation that normally precedes in an arrest, such as subpoenaing social media, to say nothing of searching the smart phones where subjects store much of the evidence about intent.

All of which is to say that the FBI likely only obtained evidence that would be needed to charge Khater and Tanios in Sicknick’s death yesterday — including, possibly, identifying what substance Khater allegedly sprayed at Sicknick — and that will take some weeks to fully exploit.

So it’s too soon to know whether the FBI will be able to tie that bear spray to Sicknick’s death.


Two Arrested in Officer Sicknick Assault

On Sunday, the government arrested two men, Julian Elie Khater and George Pierre Tanios, on charges of conspiring to attack three police officers, including Brian Sicknick.

According to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint, Khater and Tanios were at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, and were observed in video footage working together to assault law enforcement officers with an unknown chemical substance by spraying officers directly in the face and eyes.  During the investigation, it is alleged that law enforcement discovered video that depicted Khater asking Tanios to “give me that bear s*it.” Tanios replied, “Hold on, hold on, not yet, not yet… it’s still early.”  Khater then retrieved a canister from Tanios’ backpack and walked through the crowd to within a few steps of the police perimeter.  The video shows Khater with his right arm up high in the air, appearing to be holding a canister in his right hand and aiming it at the officers’ direction while moving his right arm from side to side.  The complaint affidavit states that Officers Sicknick, Edwards, and Chapman, who were all standing within a few feet of Khater, each reacted to being sprayed in the face.  The officers retreated, bringing their hands to their faces and rushing to find water to wash out their eyes.

The substance Khater allegedly sprayed caused scabs on the face of one of the officers hit, Officer Edwards, for weeks. All struck with it said the substance was as strong as anything they’ve encountered in their experience as police officers. In addition to assault charges, both were charged with conspiracy to assault police reflecting a degree of planning and intentionality.

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Originally Posted @ https://www.emptywheel.net/january-6-insurrection/page/11/