In his House Ways and Means Committee testimony, when Gary Shapley was first asked about the discussion of leaks in the October 7, 2022 meeting at which — he claims he understood (though his notes make it quite clear he didn’t understand what he was hearing) — David Weiss said he was not the final decision-maker for charging Hunter Biden, Shapley professed not to know what outlet published the leaked information.

Q In No. 1 on this email you prepared, says: “Discussion about the agent leak — requested the sphere stay as small as possible…DOJ IG will be notified. FBI — HQ is notified.”

What was the specific leak?

A So there was a leak, I’m not sure what outlet, on October 6th of 2022 — it appeared to come from the agent’s level, who was critical of the prosecutors for not charging the case.

Q Okay. Talking about the Hunter Biden case?

A Yes, not charging the Hunter Biden case.

So, obviously that was part of the discussion at the beginning. And there have been multiple leaks in this case going back, and this one was handled a lot differently because I guess it was purportedly from the agent’s level.

So this drastic — you know, they used that as an excuse to kind of — to do what they were doing. [my emphasis]

It was an interesting claim — not to know what outlet published the leaked information — then.

It’s a more interesting claim now that his attorneys have released hand-written notes that are, in key respects, inconsistent with the notes he emailed to his colleague later that day (which I’ll lay out in more depth shortly). Those notes make it quite clear the leak was to the WaPo.

He didn’t include that detail — that the WaPo had identified the source as Agents — in his email to his supervisor later that day.

His handwritten notes don’t describe that there will be a criminal referral of the leak, either.

It’s unclear what the last line of his notes on the leak said (“WBers,” suggesting whistleblowers?).

But the important discrepancy is that Shapley told House Ways and Means he didn’t know something he clearly had recorded in hand-written notes he chose not to share with the Committee.

And that’s not the only oddity about Shapley’s testimony about the leak.

I have already noted that while the email he wrote suggests Darrell Waldon would make a referral to TIGTA, in his Oversight testimony, Shapley claimed he had done so. That’s weird, but it’s certainly possible both referred the leak or that Shapley rushed to do it before Waldon did.

And — also at that Oversight hearing — Shapley spun wildly about whether the leak was from Agents or not, with his attorneys saying something to him both times it came up.

Goldman: So it’s pretty clear, you would agree, that this was a leak to the Washington Post by law enforcement agents since it describes what Federal agents believe, right?

Shapley: So it wasn’t actually clear to me that it was because usually they’ll say that it’s a law enforcement source that provided it, and if you see at the bottom it says they corroborated independently and they did not mention law enforcement. [Shapley’s attorney leans over to whisper to him]

Goldman: You don’t think it’s a Federal agent, agents, who leaked this when the headline says, Federal agents see chargeable tax gun purchase case against Hunter Biden? [my emphasis]

Shapley remained squirrely about whether this was a leak from an agent or not later in the same hearing.

Goldman: Gentlemen, I want to return to the Washington Post October 6 article and I’d ask unanimous consent to enter it into the record. In your testimony, Mr. Shapley, before the Ways and Means Committee, you stated, quote, there was a leak, it appeared to come from the agents level, who was critical of the prosecutors for not charging the case. What you testified earlier was a little different. Which one do you stand by today?

[pause]

Shapley: I’m sorry, could you repeat that?

Goldman, quoting: “There was a leak, it appeared to come from the agents level, who was critical of the prosecutors for not charging the case.”

Shapley: Yeah, I said it appeared, because I said it came from the agents’ level, but the source was a source familiar with the topic and it didn’t say it was a law enforcement source.

Goldman: Okay, that seems to be a distinction without a difference. And then, you understand that, obviously leaks of grand jury information is a felony, right?

Shapley: Leaking investigative information including 6103 would be a felony, yes.

Goldman: Well that’s true as well. So would you agree that there would be some skepticism from prosecutors about which of the agents may be the source of a leak?

Comer: Gentleman’s time is expired but feel free to answer the question.

Shapley: Since there have been multiple leaks in this investigation, and the one on December 8 or December 9, 2020, it appears to come from someone, as Lesley Wolf stated —

Goldman: I was just asking about October 6, 2022.

Shapley: So I

Goldman: It would cause anyone suspicion, right?

Shapley: If it says it comes from an agent level. [His attorney leans over, whispers something.]

Goldman: That’s what you said.

Comer: Gentleman’s time has expired. [my emphasis]

Shapley is really really determined to prove that his impression — that David Weiss said he didn’t have final charging authority — was accurate, but read in conjunction it’s actually clear he simply didn’t know what the fuck he was hearing and made up the most damning explanation.

But along the way, his testimony about the leak itself has acquired more and more inconsistencies.

Most importantly, before House Ways and Means he played dumb about something that he recorded in his own notes: the outlet for the leak.

Back in July, as part of an effort to understand whence the IRS obtained WhatsApp texts that weren’t on the “Hunter Biden” “laptop” made available by Rudy Giuliani, I noted that those WhatsApp texts appear to have come from an iPhone backed up to a different iCloud account than the one the laptop was synched to.

On the laptop itself, the iPhone content was encrypted.

That meant anyone without a warrant accessing that content was likely violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

In part four of Dimitrelos’ report, he describes that there were, indeed, WhatsApp messages on the iPhone, registered to that entirely different iCloud account, seemingly backed up to iTunes on the [email protected] account.

I can’t be sure about this, because I’m not a forensics expert, both Shapley and Dimitrelos are deliberately unreliable narrators, and even they don’t have all the data to understand what went on here. But it appears that the reason why there were no WhatsApp texts on the laptop itself, which had all the content in the [email protected] iCloud account, is that they weren’t used by a device registered to the [email protected] iCloud account. They were used by a device registered to the [email protected] account, which was (as Shapley’s notes reflect) stored in encrypted fashion on the laptop.

There’s one more very important point about this.

The government had a warrant. If they really did find a business card (one not described anywhere I’ve seen in Dimitrelos’ report) with a password, they were able to get the encrypted content (though oftentimes prosecutors will recommend you go back and get a second warrant for that). From there, it seems, the IRS got another warrant for the other iCloud account, the [email protected] one. That’s how they got a legally sound copy of the WhatsApp texts in August 2020.

But for people like Rudy Giuliani or Garrett Ziegler or John Paul Mac Isaac, taking a laptop they purport to have been abandoned, and then using a password found on that laptop to access an encrypted container — especially one of a different iCloud account — is legally another level of conduct.

Hunter Biden’s newly aggressive legal team appears to agree. They’ve just sued Garrett Ziegler. One of the key claims is that he hacked the “laptop” to access encrypted data.

28. Plaintiff further is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at least some of the data that Defendants have accessed, tampered with, manipulated, damaged and copied without Plaintiff’s authorization or consent originally was stored on Plaintiff’s iPhone and backed-up to Plaintiff’s iCloud storage. On information and belief, Defendants gained their unlawful access to Plaintiff’s iPhone data by circumventing technical or code-based barriers that were specifically designed and intended to prevent such access.

29. In an interview that occurred in or around December 2022, Defendant Ziegler bragged that Defendants had hacked their way into data purportedly stored on or originating from Plaintiff’s iPhone: “And we actually got into [Plaintiff’s] iPhone backup, we were the first group to do it in June of 2022, we cracked the encrypted code that was stored on his laptop.” After “cracking the encrypted code that was stored on [Plaintiff’s] laptop,” Defendants illegally accessed the data from the iPhone backup, and then uploaded Plaintiff’s encrypted iPhone data to their website, where it remains accessible to this day. It appears that data that Defendants have uploaded to their website from Plaintiff’s encrypted “iPhone backup,” like data that Defendants have uploaded from their copy of the hard drive of the “Biden laptop,” has been manipulated, tampered with, altered and/or damaged by Defendants. The precise nature and extent of Defendants’ manipulation, tampering, alteration, damage and copying of Plaintiff’s data, either from their copy of the hard drive of the claimed “Biden laptop” or from Plaintiff’s encrypted “iPhone backup” (or from some other source), is unknown to Plaintiff due to Defendants’ continuing refusal to return the data to Plaintiff so that it can be analyzed or inspected.

Of course, this means that DOJ should have been investigating Ziegler for hacking the President’s son rather than spending five years pursuing misdemeanor tax charges.

Perhaps that will become more clear going forward.

Update: These kinds of videos will be of interest to Hunter’s team.

Yesterday morning, in a desperate bid to keep his gavel, Speaker McCarthy directed three committees, including the House Judiciary Committee, to begin an impeachment query.

As Philip Bump laid out, only one of McCarthy’s justifications for impeachment — that Biden knew more about his son’s business than he stated publicly (but not under oath) — has been substantiated; several of the rest have no basis in fact.

More importantly, just one relates to Biden’s current term as President: the allegation that his Administration has interfered in the investigation into his son. When Bump wrote his column, he noted that David Weiss — the Trump appointed US Attorney whom Biden retained precisely to give independence to the investigation — had disputed the claim.

“Finally, despite these serious allegations,” McCarthy continued, “it appears that the president’s family has been offered special treatment by Biden’s own administration, treatment that not otherwise would have received if they were not related to the president.”

This allegation does have one advantage over the preceding four: It’s actually related to Biden’s time in office as president.

The suggestion here is that the handling of Hunter Biden’s tax and gun case was unfairly lenient, thanks to pressure from the Justice Department. This was alleged by whistleblowers from the IRS who offered testimony in front of Congress. The U.S. attorney leading the Hunter Biden investigation, David Weiss, disputed the allegations.

Only, according to a report from the WaPo, by the time McCarthy made this allegation, it had been even further debunked.

Last Thursday, FBI’s Baltimore Special Agent in Charge Thomas Sobocinski appeared before the House Judiciary Committee. He testified that his memory of a key October 7 meeting conflicts with claims that purported whistleblower Gary Shapley made about the meeting.

Shapley said Weiss told FBI and IRS agents during that meeting that Weiss was not the “deciding official on whether charges are filed.” But Sobocinski, who was also there, said he did not hear Weiss say that and “never felt that [Weiss] needed approval” to bring charges.

Sobocinski, who is the special agent in charge of the FBI’s Baltimore field office, noted there was “bureaucratic administrative process” Weiss had to work through to bring charges outside Delaware but that his understanding was “that [Weiss] had the authority to bring whatever he needed to do.”

“I never thought that anybody was there above David Weiss to say no,” he said.

Pressed again on the issue later in the interview, he said, “I went into that meeting believing he had the authority, and I have left that meeting believing he had the authority to bring charges.”

Gary Shapley’s claims of politicization have been debunked twice now. The key claim of favoritism at the core of impeachment keeps crumbling.

Jim Jordan, at least, knew all this before McCarthy’s impeachment decision.

And yet McCarthy went forward anyway, with even less basis for the inquiry.

I don’t, yet, have the stomach to write up the shittiness of the Hill reporting on Kevin McCarthy’s embrace of James Comer’s wet dreams of dick pics and SARs.

Suffice it to say access merchants like Jake Sherman are transcribing Big Kev’s preordained decision to back impeachment without mentioning that he is supporting an inquiry because he has no evidence of wrongdoing on Biden’s part, a constitutional abomination.

This WaPo story is the rare story on the development that makes the corruption behind McCarthy’s decision — and his own weakness in adopting it — the story, as it should be.

To appease those lawmakers, Republican leaders are weighing whether to use a potential impeachment inquiry vote as a bargaining chip in the funding negotiations. But even if the inquiry is included in the talks, it’s not certain that Republicans have the necessary 218 votes to pass it. Some lawmakers are staunchly against it, and McCarthy has said that an impeachment inquiry would occur through a vote on the House floor, as opposed to his unilateral decision-making.

“I think it’s abusing the process,” Rep. David Joyce (R-Ohio) said, lamenting how political impeachments have become. “We’ve been good about letting [the] Judiciary and Oversight [committees] run their course, and I’ve not seen a compilation of facts or evidence that had been put together that would convince me or anybody else at the moment that the next step is an impeachment inquiry.”

House Republicans have been investigating whether Biden benefited from his son Hunter’s business dealings, but they have yet to discover evidence directly connecting the two. While they have uncovered allegations that the Justice Department stymied the investigation into Hunter Biden’s financial misdeeds, along with testimony about his penchant for touting the family brandto reel in business deals, investigators on the House Oversight and Judiciary committees have not unearthed any evidence of wrongdoing by the president.

The fact that McCarthy is capitulating to the most radical members of his own party out of desperation makes developments in Brooklyn more significant.

On August 15, EDNY indicted George Santos’ fundraiser, Samuel Miele, for impersonating McCarthy’s former Chief of Staff, Dan Meyer, in conversations with fundraisers.

That case was reassigned, as a case related to Santos‘ own fraud prosecution, to Judge Joanna Seybert. Within a week of the charges, the Miele case shifted to discussions of “possible dispositions,” code for a plea agreement, as suggested in a letter asking for a continuance of even an initial hearing to September 5.

Since that date, the parties have engaged in meaningful discussions about possible dispositions of this matter without the need for a trial. The parties are jointly requesting that the Court exclude the time from today’s date through September 5, 2023, to allow the parties to focus on those discussions instead of trial preparation.

Last week, after EDNY had provided some discovery to Miele, both sides joined in asking for another longer continuance to discuss what was explicitly described as a plea.

The parties now write to advise the Court that the government has made two substantial discovery productions in accordance with Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and that negotiations concerning a potential resolution of this case without the need for a trial are active and ongoing. Under these circumstances, the parties respectfully submit that excluding additional Speedy Trial time to accommodate the defendant’s ongoing discovery review and facilitate plea discussions will serve the ends of justice and outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

The day after the continuance in Miele’s case, prosecutors in Santos’ case asked for a continuance of a status hearing that had been scheduled for Thursday, in part, to “discuss possible paths forward in this matter.”

Further, the parties have continued to discuss possible paths forward in this matter. The parties wish to have additional time to continue those discussions.

By all appearances, Santos is further from a plea than Miele is, probably for good reason. Miele has testimony against Santos to offer as leverage; Santos has his seat in the House (though depending on the precise nature of his relationship with Andrew Intrater and Viktor Vekselberg, Santos might be able to trade testimony as well).

But this is a public integrity case, and as such, a resignation is one of the things that prosecutors are permitted to use in negotiating a plea deal.

And EDNY is discussing very short timelines, with Miele’s next hearing currently scheduled for October 6, and Santos’ next status hearing scheduled for October 27.

Which is to say that Big Kev may lose the deciding vote that made him Speaker even before discussions of impeachment and shutdowns are resolved.

John Lauro is the Trump lawyer who submitted and signed the motion for recusal in Trump’s January 6 case, and so virtually all commentators are attributing the motion to him. But Todd Blanche also appears on the document.

That means one of Trump’s lawyers from the stolen documents case, in which Aileen Cannon — confirmed in the period after Trump lost the election and cozy with Leonard Leo — chose not to recuse herself after a blistering reversal over her earlier decision to butt in last summer, in which Aileen Cannon has done nothing (nothing public, at least) to preserve the Sixth Amendment rights of Trump’s co-defendants, but has instead served the interests of the Trump-paid lawyers representing them, has remained silent about any conflict in that case but signed onto a claim of conflict with Tanya Chutkan.

There is an overwhelming public interest in ensuring the perceived fairness of these proceedings. In a highly charged political season, naturally all Americans, and in fact, the entire world, are observing these proceedings closely. Only if this trial is administered by a judge who appears entirely impartial could the public ever accept the outcome as justice.

Todd Blanche’s willingness to sign onto this motion only underscores the bad faith of it.

The substance of the claimed conflict is remarkably thin: In the sentencing hearings of Robert Palmer and Christine Priola, Chutkan said something about those who planned the riot. Between the two hearings — the first in December 2021 and the second in October 2022 — Trump’s lawyers claim they show that Chutkan has already formed an opinion about Trump’s guilt, even while they acknowledge that Chutkan’s language addresses claims of incitement with which Trump has not been charged.

These are cherry picks. From Palmer’s for example, Trump’s lawyers found a line in which Chutkan said she had opinions about whether those who planned the riot should be charged, even while she said her opinions are not relevant.

He went to the Capitol because, despite election results which were clear-cut, despite the fact that multiple court challenges all over the country had rejected every single one of the challenges to the election, Mr. Palmer didn’t like the result. He didn’t like the result, and he didn’t want the transition of power to take place because his guy lost. And it is true, Mr. Palmer — you have made a very good point, one that has been made before — that the people who exhorted you and encouraged you and rallied you to go and take action and to fight have not been charged. That is not this court’s position. I don’t charge anybody. I don’t negotiate plea offers. I don’t make charging decisions. I sentence people who have pleaded guilty or have been convicted. The issue of who has or has not been charged is not before me. I don’t have any influence on that. I have my opinions, but they are not relevant.

***

So you have a point, that the people who may be the people who planned this and funded it and encouraged it haven’t been charged, but that’s not a reason for you to get a lower sentence.

This is a colloquy that goes on in many January 6 sentencing hearings, because many defendants — up to and including Enrique Tarrio and Joe Biggs — like to blame Trump for their woes. After that happens, whatever judge is presiding, whether appointed by a Republican or Democrat, notes that people are still responsible for their own actions.

This is, in fact, a pretty mild version, even among some Republican appointees.

But Trump’s team ignored Judge Chutkan’s more general commentary about how everyone should treat others with more humanity.

I feel certain that if people would expose themselves to a variety of opinions and sources of information, we might not have had January 6th. But people get very siloed and listen to an echo chamber of information and opinion, and you get a very warped view of what’s really going on in the world; and that may be part of it, but in doing so, you fail to see other people as human beings. And that is one of the things I see here as a judge, is there is a failure to acknowledge other people’s humanity.

From the Priola sentencing, Trump’s lawyers focused on Chutkan’s observation that the person to whom rioters were loyal remained free.

[T]he people who mobbed that Capitol were there in fealty, in loyalty, to one man — not to the Constitution, of which most of the people who come before me seem woefully ignorant; not to the ideals of this country; and not to the principles of democracy. It’s a blind loyalty to one person who, by the way, remains free to this day.

This is remarkably thin gruel on which to hang a claim that Chutkan is biased against Trump but not Trump appointed Judges Dabney Friedrich or Tim Kelly, who’ve engaged in similar colloquies.

And it seems tactical. It was coming at some point, but Trump’s team has, after remaining silent for 42 days after this case was assigned to Chutkan, suddenly asked her to assess her own biases in expedited fashion, before ruling on the pending motion about Trump’s own threats against Judge Chutkan and others.

Additionally, given the overriding public interest in ensuring the appearance of fairness in this proceeding, President Trump requests the Court consider this Motion on an expedited basis and, pending resolution, withhold rulings on any other pending motion.

This is a tactical and cynical motion. And Todd Blanche’s participation in it makes it crystal clear that Trump doesn’t give a flying rat’s ass about the bias of Cannon or any appearance of bias they can wring out of Chutkan’s prior comments.

Rather, they’re doing this to claim that her future attempts to preserve the integrity of this proceeding — including to minimize death threats from Trump’s own supporters — instead itself evinces bias on her part.

Update: Here’s the full Priola sentencing transcript.

Mark Meadows immediately appealed the decision Judge Steve Jones issued Friday not to remove the Georgia prosecution of the former White House Chief of Staff to federal court, so the decision will not be final until at least one right wing court has had a chance to reverse it.

The most important decision from the 11th Circuit and SCOTUS in the meantime will be whether to stay the proceedings in Georgia as this appeal goes forward, which is not supposed to happen under removal, but the appeals courts may view the appeal as something different procedurally.

For now, then, I want to map out how Jones unwound the difficult issues of federalism and separation of powers to get to his decision, because they lie at the core of both January 6-related prosecutions of Trump. This is a decision that weighs the supremacy of federalism over the state, the reservation to states to conduct elections, and the separation of powers between the executive and the legislative. Meadows’ appeal is likely to be the second or third time SCOTUS gets to weigh in on Trump’s conduct on January 6 (the first being his attempt to use Executive Privilege to prevent the Archives from sharing documents with the January 6 Committee, another being appeals of the civil lawsuits out of DC), so the logic Jones applied here may influence later criminal proceedings against Trump and others.

After laying out that 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) is one exception to the precedent that the federal government does not intervene in state prosecutions, Judge Jones noted that the standard for removal is low. Meadows doesn’t need to prove his case; he needs to prove that the prosecution is “closely connected with” his role as a federal officer.

The Supreme Court has cautioned that “an airtight case on the merits in order to show the required causal connection” is not required and that courts are to “credit” the movant’s “theory of the case” for the elements of the jurisdictional inquiry.5 Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 432 (1999). “The point is only that the officer should have to identify as the gravamen of the suit an act that was, if not required by, at least closely connected with, the performance of his official duties.” Id. at 447 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Having acknowledged the standard is low, Jones nevertheless found that Meadows had not met that bar, because the actions he is accused of taking as part of the RICO conspiracy served the ultimate goal of affecting state election activities and procedures on behalf of the Trump campaign.

The Court concludes that Meadows has not met even the “quite low” threshold for removal. Again, what the Court must decide for purposes of federal officer removal is whether the actions Meadows took as a participant in the alleged enterprise (the charged conduct) were related to his federal role as White House Chief of Staff. The evidence adduced at the hearing establishes that the actions at the heart of the State’s charges against Meadows were taken on behalf of the Trump campaign with an ultimate goal of affecting state election activities and procedures. Meadows himself testified that working for the Trump campaign would be outside the scope of a White House Chief of Staff. Hearing Tr. 113:2–6.

Based on this formula — that Meadows’ activities were taken on behalf of the Trump campaign with the goal of affecting state election activities — Jones distinguished Meadows’ activities from his job as Chief of Staff in two ways.

First, while Meadows made expansive claims about his role as Chief of Staff that he attempted to use to claim he had to set up the meetings Trump had with Georgia (and other state) officials, Jones noted that both sides agreed the Hatch Act prohibited White House employees, including Meadows, from using his official position to engage in election activity.

Meadows also testified that as White House Chief of Staff he was bound by the Hatch Act11 and he could not engage in political activity. Hearing Tr. 39:7– 25; 135:21–136:5. As discussed more fully below, the Hatch Act prohibits “an employee” from “us[ing] his official authority or influence for the purpose of affecting the result of an election.” 5 U.S.C. § 2732(a)(1). This includes, “[u]sing his or her official title while participating in political activity.” 5 C.F.R. § 734.302(b)(2). And political activity is defined as, “activity directed toward the success or failure of a political party, candidate for partisan political office, or partisan political group.” Id. § 734.101.

The Court finds that the color of the Office of the White House Chief of Staff did not include working with or working for the Trump campaign, except for simply coordinating the President’s schedule, traveling with the President to his campaign events, and redirecting communications to the campaign. Thus, consistent with his testimony and the federal statutes and regulations, engaging in political activities is exceeds the outer limits of the Office of the White House Chief of Staff.

[snip]

When questioned about the scope of his authority, Meadows was unable to explain the limits of his authority, other than his inability to stump for the President or work onbehalf of the campaign. Hearing Tr. 111:12–113:6. The Court finds that Meadows did not adequately convey the outer limits of his authority, and thus, the Court gives that testimony less weight.12

12 In this case, Meadows was the main witness presenting testimony for his case. Thus, the Court must determine the appropriate amount of weight to assign to his testimony when evaluating it, the same as it does any other witness in an evidentiary hearing. However, given the nature of the motion, and the pending criminal proceedings the Court makes these decisions with great caution. The determinations here do not go to Meadows’s propensity to be truthful as a general matter. However, the Court cannot undertake the task assigned by 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(5) without assigning the appropriate weight to the testimony.

[snip]

The Hatch Act prohibits executive branch employees from “us[ing] [their] official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(1). The federal regulation governing political activities of federal employees prohibits the same. 5 C.F.R. § 734.302(a). The regulation, moreover, broadly defines “political activity” to be “activity directed toward the success or failure of a political party, candidate for partisan political office, or partisan political group.” Id. § 734.101. The types of behaviors that Meadows is alleged to be involved in included post-election activities and election outcomes in various States pertaining to a particular candidate for office. If these potentially political activities indeed come against the Hatch Act, its regulations limit such efforts. These prohibitions on executive branch employees (including the White House Chief of Staff) reinforce the Court’s conclusion that Meadows has not shown how his actions relate to the scope of his federal executive branch office. Federal officer removal is thereby inapposite. [my emphasis]

Meadows had tried to argue that the overt acts accuse him of nothing more than those permitted activities, organizing Trump’s schedule and redirecting communications to the campaign. But Jones only bought that argument in the context of one of the overt acts attributed to Meadows (getting a phone number from Scott Perry). For the rest, Jones ruled that Meadows was engaged in activities for the campaign.

The Hatch Act doesn’t apply to the President and Vice President. So if Jones’ ruling relied exclusively on the application of the Hatch Act, it would have no relevance for Trump.

But Jones also relied on the Elections Clause of the Constitution that reserves the conduct of elections to the states.

The Constitution does not provide any basis for executive branch involvement with State election and post-election procedures. The Elections Clause expressly reserves the “Times, Places, and Manner” of elections to state legislatures. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also Shelby Cnty. v. Holder 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013) (“[T]he Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections.” (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1991)); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833–34 (1995) (“[T]he Framers understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority [to state legislatures] to issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional restraints.”). States have been tasked under the Elections Clause to “provide a complete code” for elections which ought to include “regulations ‘relat[ing] to . . . prevention of fraud and corrupt practices [and] counting of votes . . . .’” Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. —-, 143 S. Ct. 2065, 2085 (2023) (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)). This is not a power incident to a State’s police powers but “derives from an express grant in the Constitution.” Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 727 (10th Cir. 2016).

[snip]

Thus, the executive branch cannot claim power to involve itself in States’ election procedures when the Constitution clearly grants the States the power to manage elections under the Elections Clause. [my emphasis]

Note that Jones relied on both Shelby County (rejecting part of the Voting Rights Act) and Moore v. Harper (rejecting the Independent State Legislature theory) in this passage, both opinions authored by Chief Justice Roberts and the more recent one joined by Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett. There’s nothing controversial or surprising about this. But in both cases, there’s fierce Republican support at SCOTUS for the states’ authority in conducting their own elections — on paper, at least, even more fiercely among SCOTUS’ more radical right wing members.

Meadows’ appeal will have to argue positions directly the reverse of those that the Trump campaign floated during the campaign.

Meadows had tried to invoke two other bases for the White House Chief of Staff to butt into state elections: the Take Care Clause and the executive’s ability to offer advice to Congress.

13 The only potential constitutional authority, the Take Care Clause, does not enable the type of election oversight to which the State’s Indictment pertains. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed[.]”). Yet, executive authority under the Take Care Clause “does not extend to government officials over whom [the Executive] has no power or control.” Thompson v. Trump, 590 F. Supp. 3d 46, 78 (D.D.C. 2022). The Court accordingly rejects Meadows’s suggestion that the Take Care Clause provides a basis for finding executive authority over state election procedures. Doc. No. [45], 9–10.

The Court is also unpersuaded by Meadows’s contention that his acts involving state election procedures are within executive power to advise Congress. Doc. No. [45], 10. It would be inconsistent with federalism and the separation of powers, to find that activities which are delegated to the states are also within the scope of executive power because the executive branch may advise Congress. Cf. Fish, 840 F.3d at 725–26 (“The [Elections] Clause is a default provision; it invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices.” (quoting Foster, 522 U.S. at 69). The Court will not find that the executive branch has some advisory authority in this space in light of the express constitutional grant over elections to the States.

But here, too, Jones noted that the executive simply had no role here.

Here’s how this analysis works in practice, as Jones applied it to Meadows’ visit to Cobb County to monitor the vote count.

Similarly, Overt Act 92 alleges that Meadows traveled to Cobb County, Georgia where he “attempted to observe the signature match audit being performed there by law enforcement officers from the Georgia Bureau of Investigations and the Office of the Georgia Secretary of State.” Doc. No. [1-1], 44. Meadows testified that his actions with respect to this allegation were:

in line with [his duties], because what I did was go to the Cobb County convention center to look at the process that they were going through. And in doing so was trying to, again, check that box to say, all right, everything is being done right here, and so if there’s allegations of fraud, we need to move on to something else.

Hearing Tr. 152:4–17. The Court factually finds that Meadows overseeing State election recount processes related to President Trump’s reelection campaign. Meadows failed to provide sufficient evidence that these actions related to any legitimate purpose of the executive branch. Accordingly, the Court finds Meadows has not met his burden in establishing that Overt Act 92 is related to scope of the Office of White House Chief of Staff.

The executive has no role in such vote counts. And so the only purpose for Meadows to observe the count was on behalf of Trump’s campaign.

As Trump’s federal prosecution proceeds, there will be (and has been, in appellate consideration of the application of the 18 USC 1512(c)(2) to the vote certification) similar analysis about the Electoral College Act that reserves certain roles to Congress, not the executive. In his post-election activities, Trump (and Meadows) were simply intervening in one of the few areas where, thus far, judges have ruled that the executive has no role.

The analysis will be different for Jeffrey Clark because DOJ — but not its civil division — does have a role in investigating any federal election crime. Georgia has focused their response to Clark’s bid to remove his prosecution by presenting the testimony of the people who were in charge at DOJ, who slapped down Clark’s intervention.

But as to Meadows, Judge Jones has found that the things he did to intervene in Georgia’s elections on Trump’s behalf had no valid federal purpose.

Update: Meadows has asked Judge Jones for a stay, not (yet) the 11th Circuit.

There’s something missing from coverage of the claim, made in the second-to-last sentence of a Speedy Trial filing submitted Wednesday, that David Weiss will indict Hunter Biden before September 29, when — according to calculations laid out by prosecutor Leo Wise in the filing — the Speedy Trial Act mandates an indictment.

None of the coverage has considered why David Weiss hasn’t already charged the President’s son.

The filing was submitted in response to an August 31 order from Judge Maryellen Noreika; its very last sentence politely asked her to butt out: “[T]he Government does not believe any action by the Court is necessary at this time.” Given the unusual nature of this legal proceeding, there may at least be question about Wise’s Speedy Trial calculations. One way or another, though, the Speedy Trial clock and the statute of limitations (which Wise said in July would expire on October 12) are ticking.

It would take probably half an hour to present the evidence for the weapons charge — which would consist of the form Hunter signed to purchase a gun, passages from Hunter’s book, a presumed grand jury transcript from Hallie Biden, and testimony from an FBI agent — to a grand jury. It would take maybe another ten minutes if Weiss wanted to add a false statements charge on top of the weapons charge. There certainly would be no need for a special grand jury.

Any tax charges would be more complicated, sure, but they would be in one or another district (probably Los Angeles), ostensibly severed from the weapons charge to which the misdemeanors planned as part of an aborted plea deal were linked.

So why wait? Why not simply indict and avoid any possible challenge to Speedy Trial calculations?

The answer may lie in something included in a long NYT story citing liberally from an anonymous senior law enforcement official who knew at least one thing that only David Weiss could know. That story explains that Weiss sought Special Counsel status, in part, to get, “added leverage in a revamped deal with Mr. Biden.”

If Weiss indeed sought Special Counsel status to get leverage for a deal, then at least last month when he asked for it, he wasn’t really planning on indicting Hunter Biden. He was hoping to get more tactical leverage to convince Hunter Biden to enter into a plea agreement that would better satisfy GOP bloodlust than the plea that failed in July.

Now he has used the opportunity presented by Noreika’s order to claim he really really is going to indict Hunter, a claim that set off predictably titillated reporting about the prospect of a Hunter Biden trial during the presidential election.

Again, if you’re going to charge Hunter Biden with a simple weapons charge, possibly a false statements charge, why not do it already, rather than threatening to do it publicly? Why not charge him in the week after Noreika entered that order, mooting all Speedy Trial concerns?

Abbe Lowell appears unimpressed with Weiss’ promised indictment. He repeated in both a separate filing and a statement to the press that Weiss can’t charge Hunter because he already entered into a diversion agreement pertaining to the charge.

We believe the signed and filed diversion agreement remains valid and prevents any additional charges from being filed against Mr. Biden, who has been abiding by the conditions of release under that agreement for the last several weeks, including regular visits by the probation office. We expect a fair resolution of the sprawling, five-year investigation into Mr. Biden that was based on the evidence and the law, not outside political pressure, and we’ll do what is necessary on behalf of Mr. Biden to achieve that.

I think few stories on this have accounted for the possibility that that statement — “we’ll do what is necessary … to achieve” a fair resolution of the case — is as pregnant a threat as DOJ’s promise to indict in the next several weeks. That’s because everything leading up to David Weiss obtaining Special Counsel status actually squandered much of any leverage that Weiss had, and that’s before you consider the swap of Chris Clark as Hunter’s lead attorney for the more confrontational Lowell, making Clark available as a witness against Weiss.

As Politico (but not NYT, working off what are presumably the same materials) laid out, Hunter’s legal team has long been arguing that this investigation was plagued by improper political influence.

But even before the plea deal was first docketed on June 20, the GOP House started interfering in ways that will not only help Abbe Lowell prove there was improper influence, but may well give him unusual ability to go seek for more proof of it.

It appears to have started between the time the deal was struck on June 8 and when it was docketed on June 20. AUSA Lesley Wolf, who had negotiated the deal, was replaced by Leo Wise and others. When Weiss claimed, with the announcement of the deal, that the investigation was ongoing and he was even pursuing dodgy leads obtained from a likely Russian influence operation, it became clear that the two sides’ understanding of the deal had begun to rupture. This is the basis of Lowell’s claim that Weiss reneged on the deal: that Weiss approved an agreement negotiated by Wolf but then brought in Wise to abrogate that deal.

Whatever the merit of Lowell’s claim that the diversion agreement remains in place — the plea deal was such a stinker that both sides have some basis to defend their side of that argument — by charging Hunter, Weiss will give Lowell an opportunity to litigate the claim that Weiss reneged on the diversion agreement, and will do so on what may be the easier of the two parts of the plea agreements to make a claim that Weiss reneged on a deal, with Judge Noreika already issuing orders to find out why this stinker is still on her docket. I’m not sure how Lowell would litigate it — possibly a double jeopardy challenge — but his promise to do what’s necessary likely guarantees that he will litigate it. He’ll presumably do the same if and when Weiss files tax charges in California. It’s not necessarily that these arguments about reneging on a deal will, themselves, work, but litigating the issue will provide opportunity to introduce plenty more problems with the case.

That’s part of what was missed in coverage of this development this week. Weiss promised to indict. Lowell responded, effectively, by challenging the newly-minted Special Counsel to bring it on, because it will give Lowell opportunity to substantiate his claim that Weiss reneged on a deal because of political influence.

And those IRS agents claiming to be whistleblowers have only offered gift after gift to Lowell to destroy their own case. In their own testimony they revealed:

• From the start, a supervisor documented concerns about improper influence and Sixth Amendment problems with this investigation
• Joseph Ziegler, the IRS agent who improbably claims to be a Democrat, treated such concerns as liberal bias, evincing political bias on his own part
• DOJ didn’t do the most basic due diligence on the laptop and may have used it in warrants, creating poisonous fruit problems
• Ziegler treated key WhatsApp messages obtained with a later warrant with shocking sloppiness, and may even have misidentified the interlocutors involved
• Ziegler didn’t shield himself from the taint of publicly released laptop materials (and Shapley was further tainted by viewing exhibits during his deposition)
• Gary Shapley is hiding … something … in his emails

These two self-proclaimed whistleblowers have made evidence from this case public — all of which would never have seen the light of day if Weiss had honored the plea agreement — without the filter of a prosecutor to clean it up in advance.

All that’s before you consider the rampant leaking.

In both their depositions and their giddy public testimony before the House both Shapely and Ziegler did plenty of things that will provide basis to impeach them, not just as witnesses, but even as investigators, as did their anonymous FBI agent colleague’s laughable claim in his deposition that this was not an investigation riddled with leaks. James Comer seems intent on inviting all the other investigators who have complained they weren’t able to bulldoze rules designed to protect sensitive investigations to be deposed in an adversarial setting, which will provide still more surface area that Lowell can attack.

The gun charge is simple. But what investigative witnesses would present any tax case against Hunter Biden and would their testimony be impressive enough to sustain a case after Lowell serially destroyed Ziegler as the key investigator? And because Weiss has left Lowell with a viable claim that the diversion remains valid, he may be able to introduce the taint of the tax case into any gun prosecution.

Some of this shit goes on in any case, though not usually this much with politically exposed people like the President’s son. But prosecutors have a great number of tools to prevent defendants from learning about it or at least keeping it off the stand. Many of the IRS agents’ complaints were really complaints about Lesley Wolf’s efforts to preserve the integrity of the case. By bitching non-stop about her efforts, the IRS agents have ensured that Hunter Biden will get access to everything that Wolf tried hard to stave off from the investigation.

And there’s something more. Ziegler provided the name of his initial supervisor, who documented concerns that this case was politicized from the start. Both IRS agents identified for Lowell a slew of irregularities he can use to undermine any case. Republicans in Congress have bent over backwards to expose witnesses against Hunter to adversarial questioning (and both IRS agents got downright reckless in their public testimony). The way in which this plea collapsed provides Lowell reason to challenge any indictment from the start.

But the collapse also provided something else, as described in the NYT story: a David Weiss associate told the NYT that Weiss told them that any other American would not be prosecuted on the evidence against Hunter.

Mr. Weiss told an associate that he preferred not to bring any charges, even misdemeanors, against Mr. Biden because the average American would not be prosecuted for similar offenses. (A senior law enforcement official forcefully denied the account.)

If this witness makes themselves available to Lowell, it provides him something that is virtually unheard of in any prosecution: Evidence to substantiate a claim of selective prosecution, the argument that Weiss believes that similarly situated people would not have been prosecuted and the only reason Hunter was being prosecuted was because of non-stop GOP bloodlust that originated with Donald Trump. It is darn near impossible for a defense attorney to get discovery to support a selective prosecution claim. Weiss may have given Lowell, one of the most formidable lawyers in the country, a way to get that discovery.

And all that’s before Lowell unveils whatever evidence he has that Joseph Ziegler watched and did nothing as Hunter Biden’s digital life was hijacked, possibly by people associated with the same Republicans driving the political bloodlust, possibly by the very same sex workers on which the case was initially predicated. That’s before Lowell unveils evidence that Ziegler witnessed what should have been clear alarms that Hunter Biden was a crime victim but Ziegler chose instead to trump up a weak criminal case against the crime victim. I suspect that Weiss doesn’t know what Lowell knows about this, either, adding still more uncertainty to any case he charges.

Over four weeks ago, Leo Wise asked Noreika to dismiss the misdemeanor tax charges against Hunter so they could charge them in another venue.

In light of that requirement, and the important constitutional rights it embodies, the Government moves the Court to dismiss the information without prejudice so that it may bring tax charges in a district where venue lies.

Now he and Weiss have made promises of another upcoming indictment, without yet charging it. At the very least, that suggests that there are a number of challenges to overcome before they can charge Hunter.

They likely still have time on any 2019 tax charges — the ones where, reportedly, both sides agree that Hunter overstated his income, which will make a tax case hard to prove. I’m not saying that Weiss won’t charge Hunter. Indeed, he has backed himself into a corner where he likely has to. But with each step forward, Lowell has obtained leverage to make Weiss’ own conduct a central issue in this prosecution (and even Wise may have made himself a witness given the centrality of his statements during the plea colloquy to Lowell’s claim that the diversion remains valid).

The Speedy Trial filings seem to have hinted at an intense game of chicken between Weiss and Lowell. And thus far at least, Weiss seems more afraid of a Hunter Biden indictment than Lowell is.

Judge McBurney has released the report from Fani Willis’ special grand jury.

The grand jury recommended charges against a number of people who weren’t charged. Most attention has focused on the recommendations to charge David Purdue, Kelli Loeffler, and Lindsey Graham. I had always thought that Lindsey wouldn’t be charged because he is protected by Speech and Debate (a judgment that may be supported by the DC Circuit’s still-sealed partial reversal of Beryl Howell’s ruling permitting DOJ to access some Scott Perry records from his phone). But it seemed there was less support for those charges, generally, than for others. On the main RICO charge, four grand jurors voted against charging Purdue, six voted against charging Loeffler, and seven voted against charging Graham. There was broad support for charging Purdue for pressuring GA officials, but one of the grand jurors who voted against charging the GA Senators believed they were simply pandering to their base. And the foreperson said that Lindsey was charming in his grand jury appearance.

Those votes may be a read of how an eventual grand jury would vote on these cases. Only the votes against charging the alternate electors was less supportive.

Which is why I find the Cleta Mitchell recommendations far more intriguing. By wide margins, the grand jury voted to charge Cleta in conjunction with the January 2 call to Brad Raffensperger, the fake electors plot, and the RICO charge. But she — a prominent Georgian — was not charged.

It’s possible that some of Willis’ ultimate decisions were influenced by her perception (or that of her prosecutors) of the political will for charging prominent Georgians. It’s possible she has made charging decisions that limit the amount of institutional GOP pushback. Or it’s possible that Cleta testified in a way that made other charges — potentially including Mark Meadows — viable.

But one of the most toxic Georgians skated on this prosecution.

Update: Corrected spelling of Willis’ first name.

Update: Anna Bower’s review of the report is typically excellent.

Index to posts in this series

My book club chose Beloved by Toni Morrison for our last meeting, so I was reading it along with the cases I’ve been discussing in this series. It’s a marvelous book, beautifully writtent. One piece of that craftsmanship is that although the events are not in chronological order we don’t have a problem following along because she gives a a few key words that place things in time.

This book can take different shapes for different people. I read it as stories about the people who endured the physical and psychological horrors of enslavement.

Kermit Roosevelt and Eric Foner describe the efforts of Black people to end slavery, by participating in abolition movements, by writing for themselves and for White people, and by the dangerous work of helping escapees. Some of these people appear in Beloved: John and Ella, for example, and Stamp Paid. The entire community helps newly freed people come to grips with their new status.

We know something about the cruelty of slavers from oral histories compiled by writers during the Depression and other sources. We have some first person accounts of slavery and escape. There’s some of that in the book. But for me, the power of Beloved lies in Morrison’s imagining of the reaction of newly freed people to freedom, and her instantiation of the psychic injuries inflicted by the slavers on her characters.

None of the psychological damage was discussed at the time as far as I know. And it’s certain that the voices of former slaves, their children, and their communities were never heard by the Supreme Court, which couldn’t even be bothered discussing the Colfax Massacre in US v. Cruikshank. I’ll discuss just two aspects of this powerful work.

1. Baby Suggs and Sethe react to being freed.

Baby Suggs was purchased by Mr. Garner from a slaver in North Carolina and taken with her children to Garner’s farm in Kentucky, Sweet Home. He was a decent slaver, who didn’t beat or mistreat his property. Years later he allowed Halle, Baby Suggs’ son, to buy her freedom. Garner takes her to Cincinnati. Morrison writes:

Of the two hard things—standing on her feet till she dropped or leaving her last and probably only living child—she chose the hard thing that made him happy, and never put to him the question she put to herself: What for? What does a sixty-odd-year-old slavewoman who walks like a three-legged dog need freedom for? And when she stepped foot on free ground she could not believe that Halle knew what she didn’t; that Halle, who had never drawn one free breath, knew that there was nothing like it in this world. It scared her.

Something’s the matter. What’s the matter? What’s the matter? she asked herself. She didn’t know what she looked like and was not curious. But suddenly she saw her hands and thought with a clarity as simple as it was dazzling, “These hands belong to me. These my hands.” Next she felt a knocking in her chest and discovered something else new: her own heartbeat. Had it been there all along? This pounding thing? She felt like a fool and began to laugh out loud. P. 166.

Sethe is Halle’s wife. A few years after Baby Suggs is freed, Sweet Home has been taken over by a vicious overseer, Schoolteacher. Sethe is pregnant, and is sexually assaulted and whipped senseless by Schoolteacher’s nephews. Sethe escapes. Just before crossing the river into Ohio, she gives birth to a daughter, Denver, and the last part of the trip is terrible. Then she reaches the safety of the home of Baby Suggs.

Sethe had had twenty-eight days—the travel of one whole moon—of unslaved life. … Days of healing, ease and real-talk. Days of company: knowing the names of forty, fifty other Negroes, their views, habits; where they had been and what done; of feeling their fun and sorrow along with her own, which made it better. One taught her the alphabet; another a stitch. All taught her how it felt to wake up at dawn and decide what to do with the day. … Bit by bit … she had claimed herself. Freeing yourself was one thing; claiming ownership of that freed self was another. P. 111-2.

The freedom Baby Suggs and Sethe share is touching in its smallness and fragility. I write about the abstract idea of freedom, as here, but this is so much more meaningful. In the long run, it’s not enough, but for these people in these moments it’s everything they can imagine.

2. Beloved.

Sethe’s 28 days of freedom end when Schoolteacher and other slavecatchers and the local sheriff find her. Sethe kills her two-year old daughter and tries to kill her two boys rather than let them suffer under slavery. Schoolteacher realizes she’s of no use as a slave, and leaves her in the hands of the sheriff. It’s unclear why, perhaps because of the intervention of anti-slavery advocates, but she only serves three months in jail and then is freed. This aspect of the story is loosely based on the life of Margaret Garner.

Sethe’s house is haunted. Everybody thinks it’s the murdered child. The community thinks it’s frightening, and cuts off Baby Suggs, Sethe, the two boys and Denver. Years later a strange woman appears, calling herself Beloved, the name engraved on the headstone Sethe purhased for her dead child. Beloved seems to exist as a separate, physical entity, but she has no history. The introduction of this character suggests she’s come back from the dead.

This is from the Wikipedia discussion of this part of the book:

Because of the suffering under slavery, most people who had been enslaved tried to repress these memories in an attempt to forget the past. This repression and dissociation from the past causes a fragmentation of the self and a loss of true identity. Sethe, Paul D., and Denver all suffered a loss of self, which could only be remedied when they were able to reconcile their pasts and memories of earlier identities. Beloved serves to remind these characters of their repressed memories, eventually leading to the reintegration of their selves. Fn. omitted.

I wonder about that first sentence. Morrison seems to confirm this reading in the forward to the Kindle edition.

In trying to make the slave experience intimate, I hoped the sense of things being both under control and out of control would be persuasive throughout; that the order and quietude of everyday life would be violently disrupted by the chaos of the needy dead; that the herculean effort to forget would be threatened by memory desperate to stay alive. To render enslavement as a personal experience, language must get out of the way. P. xvii.

The community of free Black people share the experience of haunting and sense the danger around Beloved. I assume they share some of the same psychic fragmentation. The community is there for the denoument, when the fragmentation seems to heal for all of them.

Now recall the offhand comment of Joseph Bradley in The Civil Rights Cases:

When a man has emerged from slavery, and, by the aid of beneficent legislation, has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen or a man are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected.

Just shake it off, like a hard hit in a soccer match. And Black people are expected to call Bradley “Mr. Justice”.
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Featured image credit.

There’s a passage in Stan Woodward’s surreply to DOJ’s motion for a conflicts hearing in the stolen documents case that goes to the core of Woodward’s conduct in his representation of multiple witnesses in Trump investigations.

Woodward claims that because Yuscil Taveras testified in a July 20 grand jury appearance that he had not been coached (by Woodward, presumably) to lie about whether he had any conversation with Carlos De Oliveira, it’s proof that Taveras’ original grand jury testimony that he did not was not perjurious.

[T]he foregoing Surreply is necessary to correct the record with respect to the Special Counsel’s Office’s conduct in this matter. Specifically, defense counsel played no role in Trump Employee 4’s voluntary testimony before the grand jury resulting in the Superseding Indictment in this action.5 Superseding Indictment (July 27, 2023) (ECF No. 85). Moreover, when Trump Employee 4 testified, for the first time, before a Grand Jury in this District, Trump Employee 4 was unequivocal that, with respect to his prior testimony, he, “wasn’t coached,” and that nobody, “suggest[ed] to [him], influence[d] [him to say that th[e] conversation with Carlos De Oliveira didn’t happen.” G.J. Tr. at 50 (July 20, 2023). To that end, Trump Employee 4 did not retract false testimony and provide information that implicated Mr. Nauta, “[i]mmediately after receiving new counsel.” Reply at 4 (Aug. 22, 2023) (ECF No. 129) (emphasis added). Rather, after the Special Counsel’s Office issued a target letter on June 20, 2023, threatening Trump Employee 4 with prosecution, see Reply at 3 (Aug. 22, 2023) (ECF No. 129) (“[O]n June 20, 2023, . . . [a] target letter . . . identified . . . criminal exposure . . . entirely due to [Trump Employee 4’s allegedly] false sworn denial before the grand jury in the District of Columbia that he had information about obstructive acts that would implicate Nauta (and others).” [my emphasis]

Woodward provided no evidence — not one shred — to support his claim that Taveras didn’t change testimony. All he provided was inconclusive evidence that Taveras did not blame Woodward for his original, allegedly false, testimony.

And based off that unsupported claim, Woodward suggested that dealing with alleged perjury delivered in a DC grand jury in DC to support additional charges amounted to abuse of grand jury rules.

The argument of the Special Counsel’s Office, that it did not use the D.C. grand jury for the purpose of adding to the store of witnesses in the instant case, is unpersuasive.10 The theory the Special Counsel’s Office offers, that having called a witness before a distant grand jury to answer questions about events in this District and having nominally created an additional venue in which to claim that the witness was untruthful, should not be condoned. The approach taken by the Special Counsel’s Office – which unquestionably affected the presentation of evidence in the existing Southern District of Florida case – is a tactic inconsistent with precedent barring the use of a grand jury for trial purposes.

All of this is transparent garbage.

But he’s writing for Aileen Cannon, and so his unsubstantiated claim, on which he builds his renewed demand that Cannon exclude Taveras’ testimony altogether, might well work!

Woodward also plays temporal games by using comments Michelle Peterson and James Boasberg made on June 30, in the first conflict hearing, to claim he did nothing wrong.

5 As both the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the First Assistant Federal Public Defender acknowledged:

[First Assistant Federal Public Defender]: Your Honor, one other thing. I did want to say for the record, I should have started with this, have seen no reason to believe that either Mr. Woodward or Mr. Brand or anyone else associated with this has done anything improper. This just came up at this point in time, and based on the status of the record, I’ve given [Trump Employee 4] my best counsel, and he will be making a decision based on everything he knows now.

THE COURT: Right. And thank you. And certainly my reading of the government’s motion for his hearing did not suggest that Mr. Woodward or Mr. Brand had done anything improper either. The government’s was a prophylactic measure to comply with the law as it exists regarding conflicts and to make sure that [Trump Employee 4] is aware of his rights. Hr’g T. at 6 (June 30, 2023) (Attached hereto as Exhibit C).

Those comments were made after just an hour of consultation between Peterson and Taveras. It’s not a comment Peterson made at the second conflicts hearing, on July 5, where Taveras said he wished to have Peterson represent him, much less after Taveras changed his testimony.

And while the exhibits Woodward included purport to support his false claims, they also reveal that the approach to the conflict hearing before Cannon is similar to what he tried — unsuccessfully — to pull before Judge Boasberg.

In an email to Boasberg’s chamber on June 28, Woodward accused the government — which filed this conflict motion with no advance notice to Woodward — of stalling on a conflicts hearing when Taveras testified in March and then played for more time and briefing.

[I]nsisting on a hearing on such short notice prejudices [Taveras] and any appointed conflicts counsel. Although the government alludes to an ex parte submission, neither the Court nor any potential conflics counsel has had the benefit of any submission on behalf of [Taveras]. Effectively, the government would have Mr. [Taveras] through counsel, present his defense to the government’s puported allegation of perjury in just a few days. Of note, the government filed its motion after meeting with us earlier today — a meeting at which we challenged the government’s evidence contesting the veractiy of [Taveras’] testimony. Among other things, government counsel conceded that the government did not believe [Taveras] engaged in obstructive conduct; and, in the heated colloquy that followed, government counsel blurted out that they believed Mr. Nauta had been untruthful to his colleagues concerning certain events related to [Taveras’] testimony, a fact wholly irrelevant to whether [Taveras] had committed perjury and evidencing the government’s clear motive in filing this motion.

Third, although we do not, as a general matter, oppose the appointment of conflicts counsel to consult with and advise [Taveras,] given the serious nature of the matters under investigation by the government, we also believe he deserves — is entitled to the benefit of — a brief responding to the government’s filing in which dozens, perhaps more than a hundred, cases are cited for the Court. Again, more than three months have passed since [Taveras’] testimony with just days’ notice on the Friday before a holiday weekend when travel to and from South Florida is has already proved problematic this week is not just unnecessary, it is unfair.

Again, none of that makes sense — we know DOJ was still obtaining new evidence, including of Nauta’s phone — that would have led to increased certainty that Taveras’ initial testimony conflicted with known evidence.

In June, Woodward tried to buy time and make his own case (and claimed it benefitted Taveras to make that case).

In August, Woodward bought an entire month. In his first response, he equivocally embraced a conflict review three pages in.

Nevertheless, defense counsel does not now – and would not ever – oppose an inquiry of Mr. Nauta by the Court to assure the Court that Mr. Nauta has been advised of all his rights, including the right to conflict-free counsel, so long as such inquiry is conducted ex parte and under seal.

This time around, having spent another month consulting with Nauta, Woodward led with support for a hearing at which Nauta would be asked if he had been advised of his right to conflict-free counsel.

This Court should hold a hearing pursuant to United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975), to conduct an ex parte inquiry1 of Defendant Waltine Nauta as to whether he has been apprised of his rights, including the right to conflict-free counsel.

And in spite of the fact that Woodward bought this delay, in part, by claiming that DOJ had raised new information — they hadn’t; It was in a sealed filing — Woodward didn’t address one of the newly public details in DOJ’s filing: that they had raised his payment by Trump’s PAC in the conflict motion.

That said, this whole process likely isn’t for Woodward’s benefit, or Nauta’s. It is for Judge Cannon.

Among the things Woodward’s exhibits revealed is that DOJ had already alerted Judge Cannon to the conflicts twice before they filed their motion for a Garcia hearing.

We would also note that the court is already aware of the conflicts issue given that the government previously called this to the court’s attention – twice.

Cannon was already aware of these potential conflicfts.

And she did nothing.

Update: DOJ filed a reply in the parallel motion with Carlos De Oliveira, insisting on a hearing even if John Irving has gotten the other witnesses new lawyers.