Peter Baker and Dafna Linzer have an article that answers most of our questions on the genesis of the NIE. What they don’t say–though their article shows–is that Bush was much more cognizant of the development of the NIE than he has let on. Not only did he keep the US people in the dark about the new intelligence on Iraq, he also kept our European allies in the dark (and, I wonder, perhaps even Condi?), even while he was demanding they impose more sanctions.

The article starts with the news that not just Dick this time, but Bush himself, has been meeting with analysts on Iran directly.

They call them "deep dives," special briefings for President Bush to meet with not just his advisers but also the analysts who study Iran in the bowels of the intelligence world. Starting last year, aides arranged a series of sessions for Bush to "get his hands dirty," in the White House vernacular for digging into intelligence to understand what is known and not known.

Those deep dives led directly to the discovery of the new Iran intell. As with Dick Cheney, when he claimed he never got an answer to his questions about uranium in Niger, Bush has been telling us no one informed him of the answer to questions he, himself, posed. Uh huh.

Then the article goes back to April 2007, when the Administration first started pushing back against the conclusion that Iran wasn’t getting very far on its nukes program.

As analysts scrambled to finish by April, they were reaching the conclusion that Iran was still a decade away from nuclear weapons, senior intelligence and administration officials said. For three years, the intelligence community had not obtained new information on Project 1-11, vexing administration officials who worried that a cold trail would lead to doubts about the reliability of the laptop’s information.

Note, the laptop in question is the "Laptop of Death" that Linzer has been reporting on for years; I frankly think the reporting–and the laptop itself–is dubious. But I’ll try to deal with that in a follow-up post.

Then in June, as the debate over the now completed NIE got more intense, Michael Hayden and NSA head Keith Alexander all of a sudden (?) threw resources at enemy number one.

CIA Director Michael V. Hayden and National Security Agency Director Keith B. Alexander responded by directing vast manpower and technology toward spying on Iranians who may have been involved in the warhead effort.

This is what led to the collection of the communication intercepts that verified that the Iranian program had been mothballed since 2003.

And then, as I expected, Bush received an August PDB that informed him of the new information.

McConnell told Bush about the new information in August during a daily intelligence briefing, but did not provide much detail or anything on paper, White House officials said.

Note the source: we still don’t have McConnell’s version of how much information he gave Bush. But it doesn’t matter, because someone wants us to know that McConnell kept giving Bush information, all while Bush was invoking World War III.

Bush periodically asked McConnell for updates. "The president and his advisers were regularly and continuously appraised on new information as we acquired it," an intelligence official said.

Let me just say–this news (that Bush was asking for updates) makes it pretty clear that the White House claim that McConnell wasn’t providing any information is totally bogus. Not a surprise, but still.

Here’s a detail I’m really fascinated by given the apparent ignorance of Jello Jay and Silvestre Reyes of the NIE when it came out on Monday.

Officials also informed House intelligence committee members and key Senate intelligence committee staff members in September, although they were circumspect. "They said, ‘We’ve got new information. We want to make sure we get this thing as close to right as possible,’ " said Rep. Peter Hoekstra (Mich.), the House panel’s senior Republican.

Though I suspect this may be parsing: "House intelligence committee members," though no description whether that included all HPSCI members, or just those like Crazy Pete whom the Administration likes. And on the Senate side, they briefed "key Senate intelligence committee staff members," but not, apparently, Jello Jay or Kit Bond or anyone else. I wonder whether and how Jello Jay’s staffers relayed the news to him.

The article then describes two murder boards that are as interesting for their attendees as their existence. In September, Hayden and Steven Kappes vetted the intelligence (suggesting this was still heavily led by CIA), and in "late October or early November" Thomas Fingar (the guy Bolton hates so much) vetted it. And he would have been vetting it as debates about whether to declassify it raged.

Finally, here’s the description of what happened in the last three weeks:

By mid-November, the agencies were ready to deliver their conclusions to the White House. Intelligence officials gave a preliminary briefing Nov. 15 in the Situation Room to Vice President Cheney, national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley and other senior officials.

Notice they don’t mention Condi here–who was busy trying to persuade the Europeans to increase pressure on Iran. When did they tell Condi?

The process was climaxing just as Bush was convening a Middle East peace conference in Annapolis, a meeting designed at least in part to rally the region against Iran. No one told participants about the new information, but on the same day they were gathering in Annapolis on Nov. 27, the National Intelligence Board met to finalize the new NIE. McConnell and others briefed Bush and Cheney the next day. Even though intelligence officials planned to keep it from the public, Bush later that day passed it on to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Cheney told Defense Minister Ehud Barak.

So, this offers a different version than Sy Hersh got, and suggests Stephen Hadley was kinda sorta telling the truth when he said Bush was briefed on the 28th. It would also mean that Bush immediately briefed Olmert on the NIE, as soon as he himself was briefed on it. Apparently, Olmert and the Israelis did not take the news well.

Had they known before the summit, a senior Israeli official said, "I’m not sure we would have shown up."

Which I guess explains the head fake with Khalilzad’s resolution before the UN.

And as to informing our "allies," Bush did not, apparently, extend the same courtesy of an immediate briefing to Old Europe, who didn’t find out until the day the NIE appeared.

On Monday, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called counterparts in Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China, which have been negotiating a new set of sanctions against Iran. Foreign officials groused about how it was handled.

Once again, I’m curious whether anyone bothered to tell Condi this NIE was going to poop on her parties in Europe and Annapolis; I suspect Bob Woodward will tell us in a book published 3 years from today that Condi learned the NIE was coming out well after Olmert did, perhaps as late as Sunday or Monday. In any case, the sleight has apparently pissed off even Sarkozy.

That irritated European allies. "The administration is going to pay a price for not allowing allies in on it at an earlier date," said Robert J. Einhorn, a former State Department nonproliferation official. "The French had carried the administration’s water on this issue and really went out on a limb to get the European Union to adopt tough sanctions. And now the rug has been pulled out from under them."

Yup, Condi’s in a remarkably similar position as Powell used to be.

One final detail. This article kind of confirms (albeit in polite-speak) what Pat Lang informed us. Here’s the polite version.

By last weekend, an intense discussion broke out about whether to keep it secret. "We knew it would leak, so honesty required that we get this out ahead, to prevent it from appearing to be cherry picking," said a top intelligence official. So McConnell reversed himself, and analysts scrambled over the weekend to draft a declassified version.

Note the code. "We knew it would leak, , so honesty required that we get this out ahead, to prevent it from appearing to be cherry picking." Translation: we knew Dick was going to actually cherry-pick, so we pre-empted his NIE leaks.

Here’s how the same news appears when explain by someone with Lang’s frankness:

The "jungle telegraph" in Washington is booming with news of the Iran NIE. I am told that the reason the conclusions of the NIE were released is that it was communicated to the White House that "intelligence career seniors were lined up to go to jail if necessary" if the document’s gist were not given to the public. Translation? Someone in that group would have gone to the media "on the record" to disclose its contents.

Anyway, the article provides a whole bunch of details that will go unnoticed on a Saturday in which everyone is more interested in the disappearing torture tapes. A pity, though. Because it really reveals how much Bush was gaming who knew and who didn’t know about this intelligence.

We now know that Harriet Miers apparently knew about the torture tape destruction, though she counseled against it. And we know who–purportedly–ordered their destruction: Jose Rodriguez, then Deputy Director of CIA for Clandestine Operations. But you know what we don’t yet know?

The identity of the second top Al Qaeda figure whose torture tapes were destroyed. Update: now we do: from the NYT,

The tapes, which showed severe interrogation methods against two operatives from Al Qaeda, Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,

(h/t rfw) Which, since it’s coming from a reliable journalist (Lichtblau) I guess means the rest of this bloviating is pointless.

I’m going to make a wild-arsed guess the second detainee was Ramzi bin al-Shibh.

I say that, first of all, because the destruction of the tapes almost certainly was obstruction of justice for Moussaoui. ABC confirms that the tapes were destroyed in November 2005.

In 2002, the CIA videotaped the interrogations of two terror suspects, including top al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah. The tapes showed what the CIA calls "enhanced interrogation techniques," methods which critics call torture.

In February 2003, the CIA says it told the leaders of congressional intelligence committees about the tapes and that it planned to destroy them.

On Nov. 2, 2005, the Washington Post detailed the CIA’s secret prison program known as "black sites." It was November 2005 that the CIA destroyed the tapes. [my emphasis]

If it was November, it pretty much had to be obstruction of justice in Moussaoui’s case, because odds are very high they destroyed the tapes after Leonie Brinkema inquired whether the government had any tapes from the Al Qaeda detainees. From my timeline:

November 1, 2005: Dana Priest reveals the use of black sites in Europe.

November 3, 2005: Brinkema inquires whether govt has video or audio tapes of interrogations.

[snip]

November 14, 2005: Govt tells Brinkema it has no audio or video tapes.

In other words, there were only two days in November when they could have destroyed the tapes without it being clear obstruction of justice. Frankly, the only way they could have told the truth on the 14th is if they had already destroyed the tapes. And as good as Priest’s article was, I just don’t think that was enough to lead to the destruction of the tapes.

Now look at these earlier data points from the timeine:

January 2003: Leonie Brinkema grants Moussaoui right to interview Ramzi Bin-al-Shibh by video.

[snip]

September 10, 2003: Government refuses to let Moussaoui question Al Qaeda witnesses.

2003–the year when CIA first proposed destroying the tapes–was also the year when the government and Moussaoui’s team spent most of the year fighting over whether Moussaoui would get to question Al Qaeda detainees (and trust me, there were about 6 iterations of this fight between January and September). And the first person Moussaoui asked to question–the guy who Moussaoui insisted would exonerate him–was Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the real 20th hijacker.

Bin al-Shibh was detained on 9/11/2002 (if they didn’t make up that date for kicks after having caught him on an earlier, less auspicious date). So, early enough that he may have been captured before the CIA (Hayden claims) stopped taping interrogations. Or, if you believe Hayden’s lying about the claim that CIA no longer tapes interrogations (and I do), then the 2002 date offers a convenient explanation for why Zubaydah’s and Bin al-Shibh’s tapes were the only two that were destroyed.

That way, the CIA wouldn’t have to admit they destroyed tapes from the two men who could–and I suspect did–exonerate Moussaoui.

The claim they destroyed the tape to save CIA interrogators from harassment and probable legal troubles? That might be a smokescreen (though remember, this is a wildarsed guess) to hide the fact that they deliberately destroyed evidence that would have helped Moussaoui.

Congressmen Conyers, Delahunt, Scott, and Nadler would like Michael Hayden to provide a detailed description of how and why torture tapes got destroyed. Here are the key questions:

3. Did the CIA notify the Department of Justice of its intention to destroy the tapes and if so, when? Did the CIA receive a legal opinion from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, or any other entity, relating to the destruction of the tapes? Please provide copies of any such written materials.

4. In light of the fact that the September 11 Commission and a federal court requested information regarding these types of materials, why did the CIA decide not to provide information to these two entities concerning the existence or possible and actual destruction of the tapes?

5. When the CIA provided information to Department of Justice lawyers in 2003 and 2005 with respect to the request of the court in the Moussaoui case for evidence taken from interrogations of CIA prisoners, as stated in the Times article, what information concerning the tapes was provided to Department lawyers?

I’m especially interested in question number 3. As I said earlier, I think one of the two most likely times for the destruction of the tape is between May 10 and May 30, 2005, when OLC was busy writing torture opinions to override existing restrictions on torture. In fact, I wonder whether they have refused to turn over those particular torture memos (in addition to their desire to hide the ongoing torture) because they didn’t want anyone to know that (probably) Steven Bradbury deemed it legal.

In any case, I think there’s a high likelihood that Bradbury did deem it legal–given Hayden’s repeated claims that it was.

Anyway, things are getting interesting…

Marty Lederman has posted a copy of Michael Hayden’s letter to the CIA from yesterday. I wanted to riff further on it. The non-bold brackets below are Marty’s comments. The bold italics are mine. I know this may be hard to read, but I wanted to leave in Marty’s comments because he’s a lot smarter than I am.

Message from the Director: Taping of Early Detainee Interrogations

The press has learned that back in 2002, during the initial stage of our terrorist detention program, CIA videotaped interrogations, and destroyed the tapes in 2005. I understand Note the voice here and recall that they seem to never have fully briefed Mike McConnell on all the details of the illegal warrantless wiretap program. I’m wondering how Hayden "understands" this process? Does he have all the details? that the Agency did so only after it was determined they were no longer of intelligence value and not relevant to any internal, legislative, or judicial inquiries–including the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui. [What about the 9/11 Commission? What about the failure to tell the Moussaoui judge about these tapes? What about the obvious future legislative and judicial inquiries? (Note that the destruction likely occurred just after Dana Priest broke the story of the CIA black sites in 2005.)] I’m not sure I agree with Marty–I think other possible dates for the destruction of the tapes, given the timeline, are around the time when OLC was writing new opinions on torture (between May 10 and May 30, 2005). That said, if the tapes were destroyed after Priest’s story (November 1), then they were almost certainly destroyed after Brinkema asked for the damn things (November 3) but before the government said they didn’t have them (November 14), which would make the claim that they were not relevant to a judicial proceedings a bald-faced lie. The decision to destroy the tapes was made within CIA itself. The leaders of our oversight committees in Congress were informed of the videos years ago and of the Agency’s intention to dispose of the material. [Yes, and what did they say about that?] Our oversight committees also have been told that the videos were, in fact, destroyed. I love the timing on this. Given the reporting, I’m guessing the Intell Committees were informed in 2003 (when Jane Harman wrote her CYA letter), and then informed they had been destroyed in 2006 (when it was too late to do anything about it). I had thought yesterday that the heads of the Intell Committees were told in 2005, during the debates on torture and the fallout from Abu Ghraib. But apparently the CIA kept mum about that.

If past public commentary on the Agency’s detention program is any guide, we may see misinterpretations of the facts in the days ahead. Uh huh. If the manuals from Gitmo didn’t specify that Red Cross couldn’t see certain detainees, we wouldn’t all suspect the worst–it’s your own damn fault.

With that in mind, I want you to have some background now. Shorter Hayden: Here is the party line. Learn it, love it, and use it.

CIA’s terrorist detention and interrogation program began after the capture of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002. Zubaydah, who had extensive knowledge of al-Qa’ida personnel and operations, had been seriously wounded in a firefight. When President Bush officially acknowledged in September 2006 the existence of CIA’s counter-terror initiative, he talked about Zubaydah, noting that this terrorist survived solely because of medical treatment arranged by CIA. Under normal questioning, Zubaydah became defiant and evasive. It was clear, in the President’s words, that "Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped talking." Would you care to discuss Zubaydah’s mental illness? Because that might explain why he was evasive–reason itself was apparently unavailable to Zubaydah.

That made imperative the use of other means to obtain the information-means that were lawful, safe, and effective. To meet that need, CIA designed specific, appropriate interrogation procedures.

Before they were used, they were reviewed and approved by the Department of Justice and by other elements of the Executive Branch [why other "elements" of the Executive branch? Which ones? And doesn’t this confirm that OLC approved the CIA techniques — probably orally — even before the 08/01/02 Torture memo was promulgated?] I take those other elements have the initials O.V.P. Also, I wonder if they destroyed the 2002 videos because they were filmed before there was written guideance? Even with the great care taken and detailed preparations made, the fact remains that this effort was new, and the Agency was determined that it proceed in accord with established legal and policy guidelines. So, on its own, CIA began to videotape interrogations. Why the "on its own" part? I’d wager some money it’s a lie designed to protect either Dick or the President. Remember that one of the purposes of the photos and videos of high value detainees was for propaganda purposes, and I imagine they might have wanted to use tapes of Zubaydah praising Christian Jesus as a way to discourage Al Qaeda rank and file. Is that what this statement is in there for?

The tapes were meant chiefly as an additional, internal check on the program in its early stages. At one point, it was thought the tapes could serve as a backstop to guarantee that other methods of documenting the interrogations-and the crucial information they produced-were accurate and complete. The Agency soon determined that its documentary reporting was full and exacting, removing any need for tapes. [Can you imagine? No need for actual video and audio recordings of this vital gathering of "crucial information." No need for future trials, future investigations, future training, future investigations, etc.] Indeed, videotaping stopped in 2002. This is, I’m fairly certain, a bald-face lie. As scribe points out, the Gitmo manuals describe videotaping. As I pointed out in my timeline, the Administration was tweaking their policies on photos and videos all through 2005, and we know that Padilla’s interrogation was taped because they lost a tape of his from 2004. I think Hayden tells this lie because his claim that they destroyed the tapes bc they no longer needed them depends on it.

As part of the rigorous review that has defined the detention program, the Office of General Counsel Note the Office of General Counsel probably means "John Rizzo," who is not exactly the guy you want to exercise oversight over your torture program. examined the tapes and determined that they showed lawful methods of questioning. The Office of Inspector General also examined the tapes in 2003 as part of its look at the Agency’s detention and interrogation practices. [And it "determined," what, exactly? Did the IG say?: "Yeah, sure, go ahead and destroy the only primary evidence of my investigation."] Beyond their lack of intelligence value-as the interrogation sessions had already been exhaustively detailed in written channels [think about that — the U.S. government claiming that video "lacks value" once it is described in detail in a written version. Let’s just hope that’s not business-as-usual at the CIA. Yup, Jim, I’ve written down what was in those photos; you can throw them out now."]-and the absence of any legal or internal reason to keep them [hmm . . . legal or internal . . . interesting use of adjectives], the tapes posed a serious security risk. Were they ever to leak, they would permit identification of your CIA colleagues who had served in the program, exposing them and their families to retaliation from al-Qa’ida and its sympathizers. [Surely such identities could be redacted or hidden, no? Is it SOP for the CIA to destroy all its records containing agents’ identification, because of the prospect that they might one day be leaked?]

These decisions were made years ago. [Note the passive voice.] But it is my responsibility, as Director today, to explain to you what was done, and why. What matters here is that it was done in line with the law. [And where, exactly, is that law explaining how an agency can destroy evidence of possible wrongdoing?] Over the course of its life, the Agency’s interrogation program has been of great value to our country. It has helped disrupt terrorist operations and save lives. It was built on a solid foundation of legal review. [Oh, so that’s what they call the August 2002 OLC torture memo.] It has been conducted with careful supervision. If the story of these tapes is told fairly, it will underscore those facts.

Mike Hayden

Given how obvious it is that the CIA destroyed these tapes because they didn’t want to be held legally responsible for torture, this letter must really sound ridiculous to those at the CIA who don’t want to be known as torturers.

I’m just doing this because it’s like crack for Looseheadprop and she had a bad day yesterday. Lucky I had a lot of this lying around in a drawer somewhere.

Note, all the stuff on photographing detainees comes from this post, which is worth reading because I suspect it may become relevant to this discussion.

January 20, 2002: Bybee to Abu Gonzales memo specifying that common article 3 of the Geneva Convention does not apply to "an armed conflict between a nation-state and a transnational terrorist organization."

Late 2001 to early 2002: Ibn Sheikh al-Libi captured. After being tortured, al-Libi made up stories about Al Qaeda ties to Iraq.

January 2002: Supplemental Public Affairs Guidance on Detainees affirms Geneva Convention wrt media photographs.

March 2002: Abu Zubaydah taken into custody.

June 25, 2002: Moussaoui arraigned.

August 1, 2002: "Bybee Memo" (written by John Yoo) describes torture as that which is equivalent to :the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death."

September 11, 2002: Ramzi bin al-Shibh captured.

November 22, 2002: Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri captured.

January 2003: Leonie Brinkema grants Moussaoui right to interview Ramzi Bin-al-Shibh by video.

February 2003: CIA claims to have informed Intell leadership of torture tapes’ destruction; though SSCI has no records.

March 2003: Public Affairs Guidance for Media Coverage of EPWs and Detainees allows photos (within guidelines) but prohibits photographs of custody operations or interviews.

September 10, 2003: Government refuses to let Moussaoui question Al Qaeda witnesses.

April 28, 2004: Hamdi and Padilla argued before SCOTUS. Paul Clement assures the Court that we don’t torture. 60 Minutes breaks Abu Ghraib story and proves he’s wrong.

March 2, 2004: Padilla interrogation. The tape of the interrogation would later disappear.

May 10 2004: Sy Hersh’s Abu Ghraib story.

June 3, 2004: Tenet resigns as DCI.

June 8, 2004: WaPo reports details of Bybee Memo.

June 17, 2004: Jack Goldsmith announces his resignation.

June 22, 2004: In an off-the-record briefing, Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin renounce Bybee Memo.

June 24, 2004: Ted Olson announces his resignation, citing frustration that he did not learn of memos justifying legal decisions.

June 28, 2004: Hamdi decision.

September 22, 2004: Porter Goss becomes DCI.

November 2004: Steven Kappes resigns ; Jose Rodrigquez replaces him as Deputy Director of CIA for Operations. Rodriguez is reported to be the person who ordered the terror tapes’ destruction.

December 30, 2004: Daniel Levin writes new torture memo (he’s the guy who waterboarded himself so he could prove it was torture).

January 2005: Abu Gonzales renounces the Bybee Memo, sort of.

February 3, 2005: Gonzales confirmed.

February 4, 2005: Acting Assistant Attorney General of the OLC Daniel Levin writes to DOD General Counsel Haynes reminding him again of both Goldsmith’s opinion and Philbin’s testimony. He informs Haynes that the March 2003 Yoo memo has been formally withdrawn.

February 14, 2005: Gonzales sworn in.

April 20, 2005: DOJ announces Comey’s resignation.

April 22, 2005: Moussaoui pleads guilty.

May 2005: Jello Jay Rockefeller writes to CIA IG requesting terror tape investigation materials; he doesn’t receive them.

May 10, 2005: DOJ produces two memos allowing CIA to torture

May 25, 2005: Flanigan nominated for DAG

May 30, 2005: DOJ produces another memo superseding the two May 10 ones

July 2, 2005: Public Affairs Guidance for High Value Individual Capture permits photographing high value detainees (within guidelines).

July 21, 2005: House passes revised version of PATRIOT Act.

July 30, 2005: Senate passes revised version of PATRIOT Act.

July 21, 2005: Cheney attempts to persuade McCain and others not to restrict detention policies.

The Bush administration in recent days has been lobbying to block legislation supported by Republican senators that would bar the U.S. military from engaging in "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" of detainees, from hiding prisoners from the Red Cross, and from using interrogation methods not authorized by a new Army field manual.

August 1, 2005: 101st Airborne Division Detention SOP states that "detainees will not be photographed, humiliated or placed in positions with sexual overtones." Division General Order Number 1 (not clear if this is part of the SOP or not) prohibits soldiers taking photographs of detainees unless conducted pursuant to official duties, which include, intelligence gathering and official investigations." [my emphasis]

August 15, 2005: Comey’s Farewell Address.

May 2005: Jello Jay Rockefeller writes to Porter Goss requesting terror tape investigation materials; he doesn’t receive them.

October 5, 2005: McCain proposes anti-torture amendment to military funding bill. The amendment prohibits degrading treatment of prisoners.

October 7, 2005: Tim Flanigan withdraws from consideration for DAG.

October 20, 2005: The week before the House and Senate meet to resolve the bill, Cheney makes a third attempt to convince McCain not to restrict the use of torture, which McCain again rejects.

October 22, 2005: USCENTCOM Policy Prohibiting Photographing or Filming Detainees … or Posting Visual Images Depicting Human Casualties prohibits photographing or filming detainees as well as the possession, distribution, transfer or position … of visual images depicting detainees." [my emphasis]

November, unknown day: CIA destroys terror tapes from High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.

November 1, 2005: Dana Priest reveals the use of black sites in Europe.

November 3, 2005: Leonie Brinkema inquires whether govt has video or audio tapes of interrogations.

November 7, 2005: Detention Operations at Multinational Corps-Iraq prohibits coalition and Iraqi forces from photographing detainees.

November 14, 2005: Govt tells Brinkema it has no audio or video tapes.

November 22, 2005: DOJ brings charges against Padilla, avoiding an imminent hearing on the case before SCOTUS.

December 13, 2005: The Army approves new Field Manual, which seems to push the limits intended by McCain’s amendment.

December 14, 2005: PATRIOT Act reauthorization comes out of conference.

December 16, 2005: Risen and Lichtblau’s first story on the NSA domestic spy program. Cheney provides emergency briefings on program. PATRIOT Act reauthorization defeated in Senate.

December 19, 2005: The House passes the Conference Report on McCain torture bill.

December 20, 2005: The Administration writes the document clarifying its policy on photographing detainees.

December 21, 2005: The Senate passes the Conference Report on McCain torture bill.

December 22, 2005: House passes one month extension of PATRIOT Act

December 30, 2005: President Bush signs the Appropriations Bill, issuing a signing statement "interpreting" the McCain amendment.

May 4, 2006: Moussaoui sentenced to life in prison.

May 5, 2006: Porter Goss resigns as DCI; General Michael Hayden replaces him.

July 24, 2006: Steven Kappes returns to CIA as Deputy Director.

October 17, 2006: The Military Commissions Act signed into law.

November 2006: CIA claims SSCI was informed the Al Qaeda torture tapes were destroyed; SSCI claims it has no records to back that claim.

March 9, 2007: Padilla attorneys reveal March 2, 2004 tape missing.

September 30, 2007: Jose Rodriguez (purported to be the person that ordered the destruction of the tapes) retires.

November 9, 2007: CIA admits to Brinkema it did have audio and video tapes of Al Qaeda detainees.

December 6, 2007: NYT reports that CIA destroyed tapes.

I joked a few weeks ago, that the CIA needed a dedicated torture tape librarian. Well, it was no laughing matter. The NYT reports that the CIA intentionally destroyed the torture tapes of top Al Qaeda operatives.

The Central Intelligence Agency in 2005 destroyed at least two videotapes documenting the interrogation of two Al Qaeda operatives in the agency’s custody, a step it took in the midst of Congressional and legal scrutiny about the C.I.A’s secret detention program, according to current and former government officials.

The videotapes showed agency operatives in 2002 subjecting terror suspects — including Abu Zubaydah, the first detainee in C.I.A. custody — to severe interrogation techniques. They were destroyed in part because officers were concerned that tapes documenting controversial interrogation methods could expose agency officials to greater risk of legal jeopardy, several officials said. The C.I.A. said today that the decision to destroy the tapes had been made “within the C.I.A. itself,” and they were destroyed to protect the safety of undercover officers and because they no longer had intelligence value. The agency was headed at the time by Porter J. Goss. Through a spokeswoman, Mr. Goss declined this afternoon to comment on the destruction of the tapes.

Hmmm. Porter Goss. A partisan hack brought into CIA to destroy evidence. So he wasn’t tasked just to dismantle the agency?

I’m going to just throw some points out that you can think about when you read the article yourself–you really need to read the whole thing because it is breathtaking in its implications.

• The timing of this leak was clearly intended to have one effect: to make it impossible for Bush to veto the bill prohibiting the CIA from torturing. Now let’s see if it accomplishes that goal.
• Another note on timing? Paul Clement’s statements at SCOTUS yesterday were not proved wrong within 24 hours, as they were when he claimed, during the Padilla hearing, that we don’t torture. But this works about as well, I think, to make sure the Justices think long and hard about our gulag in Cuba.
• The Judge in Moussaoui’s case, Leonie Brinkema, is not going to like this one bit; these are some of the tapes government lawyers claimed didn’t exist, and she’s already steaming mad that they misled her once.
• General Hayden claims the leaders of Congressional Oversight committees were briefed. Who? Assuming they were briefed in 2005, it would be Pat Roberts and Crazy Pete Hoekstra, both up for re-election next year. Were Jello Jay and Jane Harman also briefed? Also–I presume they briefed these folks on the destroyed evidence in 2005, right in the middle of debates on torture. Any wonder why they didn’t brief Congress as a whole?
• General Hayden claims the CIA stopped videotaping interrogations in 2002. Given the big to-do over declassifying their change in policy on photographing detainees, consider me skeptical.
• Guess what? AG Mukasey has a mighty big headache on his hands, a clear case of obstruction of justice involving Goss and a bunch of other people. I guess we won’t have long to wait to see whether he’s willing to spike investigations for the Unitary Executive.

[Note, I’ve been making running updates, so this has changed.]