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emptywheel Makes CIPA History

Yesterday, Judge Aileen Cannon issued a surly order, acceding to Jack Smith’s request to protect witnesses. In reversing herself, Cannon scolded Smith for not making a more fulsome case to seal information.

Only now, after failing to meaningfully “raise argument[s] or present evidence that could have been raised” in these responses, Wilchombe, 555 F.3d at 957, the Special Counsel moves for reconsideration and argues, in no uncertain terms, that the Court committed “clear error” by applying an unobjected-to legal standard [ECF Nos. 267, 282]

Ultimately, Cannon argued the 11th Circuit precedent on this — but not on other — types of pretrial motions is undecided.

Having done so, the bottom line is this. The Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed the instant question: whether, in a criminal proceeding, the First Amendment qualified right of access attaches to discovery materials referenced or attached in support of a publicly filed Rule 12(b) motion to compel discovery under Rule 16. Nevertheless, the most faithful application of Supreme Court and available Eleventh Circuit authority is that Defendants’ MTC in this case is not subject to a public right of access, whether constitutional or common law in nature, because it is a still, ultimately, a discovery motion as distinct from a substantive pre-trial motion requiring judicial resolution on the merits.

Remember: One reason Trump has these materials to attempt to publicly release is because Smith was more generous in discovery than the rules require. Cannon did not permit Smith to seal information that would otherwise be Jencks, aside from information identifying witnesses.

The Court reaches a different conclusion as to the Special Counsel’s broad-based request to seal the substance of all substantive Jencks statements referenced in and/or attached to the MTC [ECF No. 278 p. 2 (arguing for wholesale sealing of potential witnesses’ statements to avoid “influenc[ing] the testimony of other witnesses or the jury pool”)]. By granting this sweeping and undifferentiated request—which the Special Counsel also raises in seal requests associated with Defendants’ substantive pretrial motions [See ECF No. 348 pp. 6–7]—the Court would be authorizing the categorical sealing of large portions of the record attached in support of critical
pretrial defense motions.

Meanwhile, in SDNY, I won (or rather, Judge Jesse Furman used my intervention (and that of Inner City Press) as an excuse to grant disclosure of something even more rare: Redacted transcripts from the CIPA 6 conference in the Josh Schulte case.

[T]he Court concludes that CIPA overrides any common law right of public access to the transcripts of a closed CIPA Section 6 hearing, at least where, as here, the court determines that the classified information may not be disclosed or used at trial. But the Court concludes that the public has a qualified right of public access to such transcripts under the First Amendment. It follows that the transcripts at issue here, redacted to protect national security or to preserve other higher values, must be unsealed.

As Furman noted, he had already disclosed some of this in a conference on jury instructions; he had distinguished those who disseminated already-released classified information if they knew it was classified (and therefore, by re-disseminating it, would confirm that it was classified) from those who did not have means to know.

I gave you two hypotheticals. I think one is where a member of the public goes on WikiLeaks today and downloads Vault 7 and Vault 8 and then provides the hard dive with the download to someone who is not authorized to receive NDI, and I posed the question of whether that person would be guilty of violating the Espionage Act and I think your answer was yes. That strikes me as a very bold, kind of striking proposition because in that instance, if the person is not in a position to know whether it is actual classified information, actual government information, accurate information, etc., simply providing something that’s already public to another person doesn’t strike me as — I mean, strikes me as, number one, would be sort of surprising if that qualified as a criminal act. But, to the extent that the statute could be construed to [] extend to that act one would think that there might be serious constitutional problems with it.

I also posed the hypothetical of the New York Times is publishing something that appears in the leak and somebody sharing that article in the New York Times with someone else. That would be a crime and there, too, I think you said it might well be violation of the law. I think to the extent that that would extend to the New York Times reporter for reporting on what is in the leak, or to the extent that it would extend to someone who is not in position to know or position to confirm, that raises serious constitutional doubts in my mind. That, to me, is distinguishable from somebody who is in a position to know. I think there is a distinction if that person transmits a New York Times article containing classified information and in that transmission does something that confirms that that information is accurate — right — or reliable or government information, then that’s confirmation, it strikes me, as NDI. But it just strikes me as a very bold and kind of striking proposition to say that somebody, who is not in position to know or does not act in a way that would confirm the authenticity or reliability of that information by sharing a New York Times article, could be violating the Espionage Act. That strikes me as a kind of striking proposition.

So all of which is to say I think I have come around to the view that merely sharing something that is already in the public domain probably can’t support a conviction under this provision except that if the sharing of it provides something new, namely, confirmation that it is reliable, confirmation that it is CIA information, confirmation that it is legitimate bona fide national defense information, then that confirmation is, itself, or can, itself, be NDI. I otherwise
think that we are just in a terrain where, literally, there are hundreds of thousands of people unwittingly violating the Espionage Act by sharing the New York Times report about the WikiLeaks leak.

Furman has given the government an opportunity to further redact the transcripts, but ordered them otherwise released on May 3 — meaning they’d be available before the follow-up hearing in the Assange extradition case, on which — because they pertain to the First Amendment — they may have bearing.

I’m not entirely sure this move is as unprecedented as Furman makes out. Some of the CIPA materials in the Scooter Libby case were released.

But particularly because this may affect the Assange extradition and particularly because the CIPA hearings in the Trump case are sure to be contentious, I would not be surprised if the government appeals this decision.

Thanks, again, to National Security Counselors’ Kel McClanahan to agreeing to argue this for me. You can support them here or here.

Update: Here’s my post explaining the High Court order inviting assurances about Assange’s First Amendment protections. DOJ has 6 more days to issue those assurances.

Bullshit and Also, Aileen Cannon, Post

I know you all probably want a thread where you can talk about Aileen Cannon’s 3-page order denying Trump’s motion to dismiss based on bullshit claims about the Presidential Records Act.

For these reasons, accepting the allegations of the Superseding Indictment as true, the Presidential Records Act does not provide a pre-trial basis to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3)(B)(v)—either as to Counts 1 through 32 or as to the remaining counts, all of which state cognizable offenses.

Separately, to the extent the Special Counsel demands an anticipatory finalization of jury instructions prior to trial, prior to a charge conference, and prior to the presentation of trial defenses and evidence, the Court declines that demand as unprecedented and unjust [see ECF No. 428]. The Court’s Order soliciting preliminary draft instructions on certain counts should not be misconstrued as declaring a final definition on any essential element or asserted defense in this case. Nor should it be interpreted as anything other than what it was: a genuine attempt, in the context of the upcoming trial, to better understand the parties’ competing positions and the questions to be submitted to the jury in this complex case of first impression [ECF No. 407]. As always, any party remains free to avail itself of whatever appellate options it sees fit to invoke, as permitted by law.

Fine, fine, have at it. She claims Jack Smith is the one making nutty requests, not herself.

Lee Kovarsky, who generally has a great read about the appellate posture of such things, warns that it’s unlikely Smith will ask for a writ of mandamus, but might ask for her recusal, which probably won’t work.

But really, I’m more immediately interested in this superb quote Will Oremus included in a WaPo article describing disgruntled new owners of a Xitter blue check, which may be my best ever quote in a mainstream publication.

Marcy Wheeler, an independent journalist covering national security who greeted her blue verification badge Wednesday by posting an expletive, said she remains on X mostly to monitor right-wing narratives and disinformation so she can push back on them. She said she believes the verification changes are part of an effort to restore X’s status as a “public square” so that Musk can use it to “mainstream far-right ideas.”

On Thursday, Musk amplified various posts from verified X users defending a Jan. 6, 2021, suspect, decrying a rise in the “foreign-born” population under President Biden, highlighting crimes by Syrian migrants, mocking diversity and inclusion programs, and suggesting that leftists want to disarm American citizens “because they intend to do things that American citizens would want to shoot them for.”

In between, he agreed with a post that said that “a blue checkmark is a stamp of authenticity.”

As I said, have at it!

Jack Smith to Aileen Cannon: Treating Non-Lawyer Tom Fitton’s Theories as Law Will Lead to Mandamus

Both Trump and Jack Smith have responded to Aileen Cannon’s whack order to write proposed jury instructions as if the Presidential Records Act says something it doesn’t. Neither are all that happy about it.

Trump used his response to claim that having the jury assess whether Trump really did make these documents personal records rather than simply steal them would put them in the role that, he’s arguing, only a (former) President can be in.

Smith — as many predicted — spent much of the filing arguing that Cannon cannot leave this issue until jury instructions because it must have an opportunity to seek mandamus for such a clear legal error; they cite the 11th Circuit slapdown of Cannon’s last attempt to entertain this fantasy in support.

Along the way, though, Smith also did something I had hoped he would do: explain where, and when, Trump’s own whack theory came from in the first place.

It came from Tom Fitton’s Xitter propaganda in response to the public report, in February 2022, that Trump had returned documents, including classified ones. But even after Fitton first intervened, Trump’s handlers continued to treat any remaining classified documents as presidential records for months.

On February 8, 2022, the day after the Washington Post article was published, the president of Judicial Watch posted the following two statements on Twitter5
:

Immediately after posting the second Tweet, the Judicial Watch president sent to an employee in Trump’s post-presidency office a link to the Tweet and offered to discuss the issue with Trump. A few hours later, the Judicial Watch president sent the same person his analysis of the case Judicial Watch v. NARA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.D.C. 2012). That evening, the Judicial Watch president circulated to the employee a proposed public statement for Trump’s consideration, which included language that the PRA and judicial decisions gave Trump the right to keep the documents he returned to NARA. The statement never issued.

Around this same time, the Judicial Watch president, who was not an attorney, told another Trump employee that Trump was being given bad advice, and that the records Trump possessed at Mar-a-Lago should have been characterized as personal. The second employee advised the Judicial Watch president that they disagreed with the Judicial Watch president’s analysis: in Judicial Watch, former President Clinton had made the designation of certain records personal while President, whereas Trump had not done so. The second employee further informed Trump that the Judicial Watch president was wrong and explained why. Nevertheless, on February 10, 2022, Trump released a statement claiming in part, “I have been told I was under no obligation to give the material based on various legal rulings that have been made over the years.”6 Before this time, the second employee had never heard this theory from Trump. No other witness recalled Trump espousing this theory until after the Judicial Watch president conveyed it to him in February 2022.

Smith doesn’t, however, draw out the implication of this explicitly.

Not only has Trump been falsely suggesting — without evidence — that he did designate these documents personal records. He couldn’t have done so, because he didn’t know of this theory until over a year after he stole the documents.

But Cannon is such a chump that she has been chasing a theory spun up by Fitton, someone who has only an English BA.

Cannon may well respond poorly to Smith’s use of 20-some pages to lay all this out. It’s the kind of thing that routinely elicits miffed responses from her.

At this point, though, it seems Smith is simply laying a record for a challenge at the 11th Circuit.

Jack Smith Is Not Amused

By Trump’s motions to dismiss the stolen document case.

Trump’s Other Immunity Claim: Stealing Boxes and Boxes of Classified Documents

Whatever else the SCOTUS grant of Trump’s immunity claim did, it provided the basis for scheduling clarity.

It seems likely SCOTUS has committed to deciding the immunity question by the end of term, in June.

That would present Tanya Chutkan with the decision of whether to try the January 6 case during the election season (it is her choice, not DOJ’s to make). She had been entertaining starting the trial in August, which would have bled into election season as it is, so she may decide to do this. If she does, it is unlikely a jury would reach a verdict before election day, but the trial would give voters opportunity to see the evidence before voting.

The decision to grant cert is as interesting for Trump’s other immunity claim — Trump’s even more frivolous claim that he can’t be prosecuted for stealing boxes and boxes of classified documents because his claimed decision to convert those government documents to his personal possession in violation of the Presidential Records Act is immune from prosecution, as well. I’ve seen some commentary that SCOTUS may have been trying to come up with a different solution but then decided to hear the case. If that’s true, the decision to hear the case came less than a week after Trump made that other claim of immunity, that he can steal classified documents with impunity. Who knows? It’s not before the court, but it may have affected their decision to hear the case.

The matter will be fully briefed by the time Jack Smith submits his brief to SCOTUS on April 8. So he can have two absurd claims of immunity to address, Trump’s claim he can steal the election with impunity, and Trump’s claim he can convert boxes and boxes of classified documents to do with as he pleases on the way out the door even if it violates the Presidential Records Act, a law passed specifically to apply to Presidents. One of the matters that had been hypothetical before the DC Circuit — that Trump might sell nuclear documents to our adversaries — has become concrete.

Given the question as posed by SCOTUS — Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office? — I think SCOTUS may have been uncomfortable with the DC Circuit’s thin treatment of Trump’s argument that, without immunity, former Presidents could be prosecuted for things like approving the drone strike on Anwar al-Awlaki (note, when Trump raises this, he never mentions that he himself killed Awlaki’s daughter).

Former President Trump argues that criminal liability for former Presidents risks chilling Presidential action while in office and opening the floodgates to meritless and harassing prosecution. These risks do not overcome “the public interest in fair and accurate judicial proceedings,” which “is at its height in the criminal setting.” Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2424.

Former President Trump first asserts that the prospect of potential post-Presidency criminal liability would inhibit a sitting President’s ability to act “fearlessly and impartially,” citing the “especially sensitive duties” of the President and the need for “bold and unhesitating action.”

There has to be something that distinguishes such actions from those charged against Trump. That something is likely the conversion of the Presidency to one’s own personal benefit. It’s not in the DC Circuit opinion and needs to be — all the more so given that, in Florida, Trump is claiming that he could legally simply convert boxes and boxes of classified documents to his personal property, even though the Presidential Records Act prohibits it.

It’s not in the DC Circuit opinion. But something like that has to be, some measure to distinguish the ordinary unlawful stuff Presidents are asked to authorize on behalf of the country and the venal stuff Trump did to benefit himself.

Tomorrow, Judge Cannon will hold a hearing to discuss how to schedule that trial. Her original schedule included six months of things after pretrial motions, which would put her schedule at September as well (though she’s obviously more likely to stall until after the election). But one thing she can expect is that, by June, Trump’s immunity claim will be resolved.

Update: Here’s the language from Trump’s brief that addresses this problem.

The panel opinion ignores the long history of real-world examples of Presidents engaging in actual behavior that political opponents viewed as egregious and “criminal.” Instead, keying on the Special Counsel’s arguments, the panel fretted about lurid hypotheticals that have never occurred in 234 years of history, almost certainly never will occur, and would virtually certainly result in impeachment and Senate conviction (thus authorizing criminal prosecution) if they did occur—such as a hypothetical President corruptly ordering the assassination of political rivals through “SEAL Team Six.” D.C. Cir. Oral Arg Tr. 10:19-21. Such hypotheticals provide fodder for histrionic media coverage, but they are a poor substitute for legal and historical analysis. Confronted with real-world hypotheticals—such as President Obama’s killing of U.S. citizens by drone strike—the Special Counsel conceded below that Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts likely exists and would apply, directly contradicting the “categorical,” App’x 20A, holdings to the contrary of both the appellate panel and the trial court. D.C. Cir. Oral Arg Tr. 49:18-22 (Special Counsel admitting that a “drone strike” where “civilians were killed … might be the kind of place in which the Court would properly recognize some kind of immunity”). Further, the logical presupposition of such speculative hypotheticals—i.e., that the Founders supposedly must have intended that no alleged Presidential misdeed could ever escape prosecution—is plainly incorrect and contradicts the basic premises of a system of separated powers. “While the separation of powers may prevent us from righting every wrong, it does so in order to ensure that we do not lose liberty.” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 710 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Jack Smith’s response doesn’t really deal with this issue in depth.

7 A sufficient basis for resolving this case would be that, whatever the rule in other contexts not presented here, no immunity attaches to a President’s commission of federal crimes to subvert the electoral process. See Amici Br. of John Danforth et al., at 7. The court of appeals’ analysis was “specific” to the allegations that applicant conspired to “overturn federal election results and unlawfully overstay his Presidential term,” Appl. App. 31A, and a stay can be denied on that basis alone, leaving for another day whether any immunity from criminal prosecution should be recognized in any circumstances. See Gov’t C.A. Br. 45-49 (explaining that foreign affairs are not implicated in this case); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707, 710, 712 n.19 (reserving whether an absolute presidential-communications privilege might exist for military, diplomatic, or national security secrets).

Trump’s Defense: He Intended to Steal Boxes and Boxes of Classified Documents

As I have been noting for months, in all of Jack Smith’s rebuttals to Trump’s claims that Presidents have absolute immunity, he floated scenarios that are pretty similar to stuff that Trump is known or suspected of doing.

One of those is, “a president who sells nuclear secrets to a foreign adversary.”

As I noted in response to Trump’s claim that that would be treason, Trump has done a whole lot that’s improper with classified information.

The closest thing on that list to treason is selling nuclear secrets to America’s adversaries. Not treason.

But Trump’s lawyers, including two of the lawyers representing him in the stolen documents case, lawyers who had their first good look at the documents Trump is accused of stealing last week, seem to suggest it could be.

To be clear: Trump has never been accused of selling nuclear secrets to America’s adversaries.

He undoubtedly gave Israel’s counterterrorism secrets to Russia — why, and whether there was a quid pro quo involved, we still don’t know.

He is known to have Tweeted out highly sensitive satellite information to dick-wag Iran, with the result that Iran learned about the satellites targeting their country.

To spite Mark Milley, he showed a plan to attack Iran to Mark Meadows’ ghost writers.

Ongoing reporting, first from ABC and then from NYT, reveals that after Australian billionaire Anthony Pratt paid millions for access to Trump, Trump shared details of a conversation he had about a call he had with Iraq’s president after bombing Iraq, described his perfect phone call with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and provided sensitive details of America’s nuclear subs.

And he is accused of leaving nuclear documents — documents that Trump’s lawyers may have reviewed for the first time last week — in unsecure ways at his beach resort, possibly even in his gaudy bathroom.

So, no. Trump has not (yet) been accused of selling nuclear secrets, to adversaries or anyone else. Though he did give away what he claimed to be nuclear secrets to a businessman from an allied nation after the guy paid a lot of money for access to Trump.

But as I noted, we don’t yet know what happened to some of the secret documents that Trump snuck away from Mar-a-Lago after hiding them from Evan Corcoran in June 2022, documents he took with him to host a golf tournament the Saudis paid an undisclosed sum to host at Bedminster.

Those documents have never been located.

Just so long as Trump didn’t sell any of these nuclear documents, but instead gave them away, I’m sure we’re all good.

That’s important background to Trump’s primary defense in his stolen documents case. Between his motion to dismiss because the Presidential Records Act doesn’t say what he claims it says and his motion to dismiss for absolute immunity, he is arguing that he intended to steal boxes and boxes of classified documents.

The latter argument is substantially the same garbage argument Trump has made to the DC Circuit and SCOTUS. The former is a real piece of work, even by Trump’s standards. Here his argument:

  • Before the Presidential Records Act was passed, Presidents treated presidential papers — which are different from government classified documents — as their personal property
  • Because NARA had no authority, after Bill Clinton left office, to reclassify tapes of personal conversations Clinton made so Tom Fitton could have them, it means NARA has no authority over what counts as a presidential or personal record
  • Bill Clinton’s personal tapes are exactly the same as the boxes and boxes of official documents Trump sent to Mar-a-Lago
  • Without providing any evidence Trump did classify all those official documents as personal documents, he will nevertheless claim he did so while still in office
  • Robert Hur’s report describing seizing all of Joe Biden’s diaries — which are specifically excluded from the PRA — is proof that Presidents control all official documents they stash away
  • Cmon, Judge Cannon, you made the ridiculous argument I own these documents once already, only to have the 11th Circuit rip you a new asshole, but why can’t you make precisely that argument again?
  • Charging Trump for actions he took after leaving the White House is the same as supervising his actions day-to-day
  • Because DOJ declined to second-guess Mark Meadows’ spectacular failure to declassify documents Trump wanted to give to John Solomon, it means DOJ must accept Trump’s vague assertion that he didn’t spectacularly fail to declassify boxes and boxes of documents either
  • These boxes and boxes of official documents, which are not excluded from the PRA, are just like Reagans diaries, which are specifically excluded
  • Clinton’s conversations about official stuff are just the same as the official documents documenting that kind of stuff
  • Because NARA had never made a criminal referral before February 2022, the fact that it has since made two means it couldn’t make any
  • Trump didn’t think he’d get busted, so it was improper for FBI to bust him
  • DOJ should have dealt with me like they did with Peter Navarro when he also blew off the PRA
  • Because DOJ refused to seize unclassified personal Clinton recordings so Tom Fitton could have them, it means DOJ could not seize classified official documents so NARA could have them

Ultimately, though, the two arguments together are very simple. First, from the PRA filing, Trump intended to take those boxes and boxes of classified documents.

The Special Counsel’s Office concedes that the “genesis” of this case dates back to at least “the tail end of the Trump Administration itself.” Compel Oppn. at 3.2 The Office alleges in the Superseding Indictment that President Trump “caused scores of boxes, many of which contained classified documents, to be transported” to Mar-a-Lago. ECF No. 85 ¶ 4 (emphasis added). The Superseding Indictment makes clear that this decision and the related transportation of records occurred while President Trump was still in office. Id. ¶ 25 (alleging that President Trump caused boxes of records to be packed and shipped “[i]n January 2021, as he was preparing to leave the White House” (emphasis added)). President Trump departed the White House prior to “12:00 p.m. on January 20, 2021,” and as such he is alleged to have made these decisions concerning the documents at issue while he was the Commander-in-Chief. Id. ¶ 4.

And, from the immunity filing, because Trump stole those boxes and boxes of classified documents while he was still Commander-in-Chief, he has immunity from prosecution for doing so.

Specifically, President Trump is immune from prosecution on Counts 1 through 32 because the charges turn on his alleged decision to designate records as personal under the Presidential Records Act (“PRA”) and to cause the records to be moved from the White House to Mar-a-Lago. As alleged in the Superseding Indictment, President Trump made this decision while he was still in office. The alleged decision was an official act, and as such is subject to presidential immunity.

[snip]

Even if the Special Counsel’s Office could establish that President Trump’s designation decision under the PRA was illegal or otherwise improper—and they cannot—“the President’s actions do not fall beyond the outer perimeter of official responsibility merely because they are unlawful or taken for a forbidden purpose.” Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 14. The Supreme Court has so held, repeatedly. After all, every claim of immunity is raised against charges of allegedly improper motive or purpose. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 756 (rejecting a rule that would permit “an inquiry into the President’s motives” as “highly intrusive”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) (“The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege.” (citation omitted)); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (holding that immunity does not turn on “any personal motive that might be alleged to have prompted his action”); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 354 (1871) (holding that immunity “cannot be affected by any consideration of the motives with which the acts are done”); see also, e.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.). In short, in assessing whether immunity applies, courts must look to the “nature of the act itself.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). The allegedly improper manner or purpose of the alleged acts is not relevant. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 756. Therefore, President Trump is entitled to immunity for this official act and that must include immunity from criminal prosecution.

This is, quite literally, an argument that it was totally legal for Trump to choose to steal boxes and boxes of classified documents.

Stolen Documents Motions to Dismiss

Trump and at least Carlos De Oliveira are filing motions to dismiss (some are being unsealed via a review process). I’ll post them here until I read in more detail.

De Oliveira MTD or Bill of Particulars

Trump’s claim of presidential immunity to steal documents

Trump’s claim that he’s too stupid ot understand 18 USC 793(e)

Trump’s Special Counsel claim (repeating Hunter Biden’s appropriation claim)

Trump’s claim the Presidential Records Act says the opposite of what it says with assist from John Solomon

Still to come: A motion to suppress the search of Mar-a-Lago

Notice of pretrial motions