Posts

Jeff Wall: It Would Cause Attorney General Barr Irreparable Harm If He Had to Reveal His Secret Reason He Moved to Dismiss Flynn’s Prosecution

Before I explain the most important takeaway from the Mike Flynn hearing, let me note two points.

First, the Department of Justice is quite clear that none of the materials turned over recently to Mike Flynn were Brady material showing exculpatory evidence. DOJ has disclaimed any prosecutorial misconduct in Judge Sullivan’s courtroom. Bill Barr even said as much, under oath, before the House Judiciary Committee. DOJ has falsely claimed they were “new,” but some of the actual details weren’t even new to Flynn, much less new to DOJ, even if some of the documents were. That’s important because a number of the judges today seem to believe that DOJ wants to dismiss this case because they believe there was misconduct.

Nope.

The government disclosed approximately 25 pages of documents in April and May 2020 as the result of an independent review of this case by the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri. While those documents, along with other recently available information, see, e.g., Doc. 198-6, are relevant to the government’s discretionary decision to dismiss this case, the government’s motion is not based on defendant Flynn’s broad allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. Flynn’s allegations are unfounded and provide no basis for impugning the prosecutors from the D.C. United States Attorney’s Office.

They want to dismiss the case because they don’t believe calling up the country that just attacked us and secretly undermining the punishment on them, then lying about it, is any big thing.

Second, in the second-to-last release to Flynn of materials that aren’t new but that Billy Barr used to invent a reason to dismiss the prosecution, DOJ either betrayed breathtaking ignorance of the investigation into Flynn, or they lied. In turning over notes from Peter Strzok that clearly memorialize a January 5, 2017 meeting that has been the subject of public disclosure going back years (well before Flynn reallocuted his plea deal), DOJ claimed not to know their date.

The enclosed document was obtained and analyzed by USA EDMO during the course of its review. This page of notes was taken by former Deputy Assistant Director Peter Strzok. While the page itself is undated; we believe that the notes were taken in early January 2017, possibly between January 3 and January 5.

That professed uncertainty led the frothy right to claim that Joe Biden suggested Flynn be prosecuted for the Logan Act, which led to FBI reopening the investigation, which led to his prosecution. It was obvious the notes were from January 5, and I’ve since confirmed that. That DOJ claimed not to know the date of these notes is either evidence that they’re using this process to invent campaign dirt, or evidence that all the people reviewing this material have no grasp on the facts.

Which is to say, the judges have the very mistaken impression that DOJ withheld material they should have turned over, and that DOJ itself has suggested (in the less damning reading of their actions) to have no grasp of basic facts about the investigation into Flynn or even basic physics about time. No. Both claims are, at best, reason to further scrutinize this case.

Even ignoring the fact that DOJ has presented two different explanations for why they want to dismiss a case that they, months earlier, argued merited prison time, taking just the original motion to dismiss on its face value (ignoring the obvious lies in it), three months later, no one understands why DOJ moved to dismiss the case.

That’s important, because Acting Solicitor General Jeff Wall claims it would cause irreparable harm to the Executive Branch if DOJ had to answer any questions about why they dismissed the case.

That matters for two reasons. First, as the attorney representing Judge Emmet Sullivan, Beth Wilkinson, pointed out, what distinguishes this case from a Dick Cheney case that SCOTUS has said threatened the prerogatives of the Executive branch, DOJ has already proven willing to offer up reasons for their motion to dismiss, even if they are, partly, transparently false. DOJ is not claiming that they can’t respond to these questions, they’re offering up explanations unasked, and then objecting aggressively when asked question about those claims.

Indeed, Wall offered up a crazy new detail in this hearing: He implied that, in addition to believing that material lies are not the same for Flynn as other people and that secretly calling up the country that just attacked us to say, “no big deal,” is not alarming, there is also non-public information from other investigations that led Billy Barr to tank the Flynn prosecution.

The Attorney General sees this in a context of non-public information from other investigations.

[snip]

I just want to make clear that it may be possible that the Attorney General had before him that he was not able to share with the court and so what we put in front of the court were the reasons that we could, but it may not be the whole picture available to the Executive Branch.

[snip]

It’s just we gave three reasons; one of them was that the interests of justice were not longer served, in the Attorney General’s judgment, by the prosecution. The Attorney General made that decision, or that judgment, on the basis of lots of information, some of it is public and fleshed out in the motion, some of it is not.

[snip]

If all we had to do was show up and stand on our motion, no, we’ve already said that to the District Court.

Billy Barr has a secret. And that, Acting Solicitor General Jeff Wall suggested, is why a mere hearing on this motion to dismiss would irreparably harm DOJ (even while Wall alluded to the information without being asked).

Wow.

The revised explanation why DOJ can’t prosecute Flynn that Flynn prosecutor Jocelyn Ballantine has offered (one in which the Solicitor General’s Office has also participated) is that DOJ can’t “prosecute” Mike Flynn because DOJ has collected so much impeaching evidence against those who investigated Flynn that they can’t prove the case he has twice pled guilty to even though witnesses like KT McFarland and Mike Pence support their case.

Furthermore, since the time of the plea, extensive impeaching materials had emerged about key witnesses the government would need to prove its case. Strzok was fired from the FBI, in part because his text messages with Page revealed political bias against the current administration and “implie[d] a willingness to take official action to impact the presidential candidate’s electoral prospects.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election xii (December 2018). The second interviewing agent has been accused of acting improperly in connection with the broader investigation. McCabe, who authorized Flynn’s interview without notifying either the Department of Justice or the White House Counsel, was fired for conduct that included lying to the FBI and lying under oath. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Report of Investigation of Certain Allegations Relating to Former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe 2 (February 2018). In addition, significant witnesses have pending investigations or lawsuits against the Department of Justice, which could create further questions about their testimony at trial. See Strzok v. Barr, Civ. No. 19-2367 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2019); McCabe v. Barr, Civ. No. 19-2399 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2019); Page v. Dep’t of Justice, Civ. No. 19-3675 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2019). Those developments further support the government’s assessment about the difficulty it would have in proving its case to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

That is, Ballantine says DOJ can’t sentence Flynn for his admitted crimes because they’ve also laid out how DOJ has trumped up investigations against all the people who investigated Flynn, and at least three of those people have credible legal claims against DOJ for those trumped up investigations.

That suggests one of several things.

It’s possible the secret Billy Barr doesn’t want to reveal deals with how 30-year intelligence veteran Mike Flynn sold his services to the government of Turkey while working for Trump, while trying to hide that fact, all without knowing why that’d be a problem. DOJ has not yet backed off the facts Flynn gave the grand jury (another basis for perjury charges against him, in addition to his plea allocutions, which the Circuit judges appeared to miss), and indeed has doubled down on the Bijan Kian investigation. So maybe DOJ is claiming that poor Mike Flynn was compromised by his non-professional partner out of naiveté?

Another possibility is that there are other secret investigations ongoing, whereby poor 30-year defense intelligence veteran General Flynn was targeted by Russian intelligence but was helpless to rebuff their entreaties and so must be forgiven for lying about all that.

A third possibility is that DOJ has been ordered by the President to make sure none of the people who protected him do prison time. Secret reason. Can’t be shared with judges. Checks out!

The most likely secret information Billy Barr is hiding — particularly given Wall’s reference to other investigations — is the Durham investigation, the possibility that John Durham will find something in his investigation into  Trump’s people where DOJ IG found nothing. That means either that Billy Barr took actions in May that John Durham has not charged in the interim three months. Or, that Billy Barr is trying to pre-empt Flynn’s prosecution believing — or expecting — that an investigation that has not yet completed will end up in criminal charges.

If that’s what’s happening, it would suggest that Barr has already decided what the outcome of the Durham investigation will be, prejudging its outcome and effectively neutering Durham, making his prosecutorial decision an afterthought.

Which is why I focused on DOJ’s false claim — possibly attributed to Jeffrey Jensen, the US Attorney Billy Barr directed to find reasons to blow up the Flynn prosecution while Durham continued to work — that Joe Biden raised the Logan Act before the FBI (and ODNI) raised it themselves. In that case, at least, Barr’s selected flunkies have proven themselves to either be willing to misrepresent evidence or to be painfully stupid about it. In that case, a US Attorney deputized into Billy Barr’s projects has admitted to either knowing fuckall or inventing facts for political purpose. That, by itself, raises questions about the presumption of regularity that Barr might otherwise be afforded.

DOJ claims they’ve given abundant reason why they wanted to dismiss the prosecution against Flynn, even though their reasons conflict with all precedent and the record that Bill Barr’s DOJ has established in this case.

But today we learned there’s another, secret, reason why Billy Barr wanted to dismiss the case against Flynn. Even while DOJ has made it clear they are either misrepresenting the record or unfamiliar with it.

Which is all the more reason why Judge Sullivan should have a hearing, and which likely explains why DOJ has claimed, multiple times now, that that would do irreparable harm to DOJ.

Jeff Wall Admits that Any Scrutiny of DOJ’s Motion to Dismiss Flynn Prosecution Will Cause Irreparable Harm to Bill Barr

The hearing in Mike Flynn’s petition for a writ of mandamus just ended.

The key takeaway, given the make-up of the court, is that for the majority of the hearing, Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson seemed clear that it was too early to overturn any action Judge Emmet Sullivan has made. He has the authority to hold a hearing, she was clear. But if he decides not to grant the motion to dismiss, she seemed to indicate, she would favor a writ of mandamus overturning Sullivan’s decision. Henderson clearly believes that Gleeson’s filing, thus far, is intemperate, which is pretty funny given what Sidney Powell has done in this case.

At the very end of the hearing, she invited Principal Deputy Solicitor General Jeff Wall to address a claim made in DOJ’s brief: that DOJ should be permitted to self-correct the harm of a bad faith prosecution. So she may have been reserving that as a reason to rule for Flynn — ultimately ruling instead for DOJ. But her comments through the rest of the hearing suggest this petition will fail.

But the notion this might involve ruling for DOJ is the most interesting part of this hearing. Flynn filed the petition, not DOJ. Powell’s argument for Flynn was predictably flimsy, self-contradictory, and false. Even Judge Neomi Rao, who will clearly rule for Flynn, seemed to be struggling to find a way to agree with Flynn.

The more interesting argument came from Wall. He argued, repeatedly, that DOJ will be irreparably harmed if Sullivan is permitted to hold a hearing on DOJ’s motion to dismiss. In particular, he seemed horrified that Sullivan might require sworn declarations of affidavits.

As Beth Wilkinson, arguing for Sullivan, mentioned, neither Sullivan nor Amicus John Gleeson has called for such a thing. Both are simply moving towards a hearing scheduled for July 16. Wilkinson also noted that District courts hold such hearings all the time. (And they predictably will have to in another case where DOJ has moved to end a prosecution recently, in which — unlike this case — there appears to have been prosecutorial misconduct, Ali Sadr Hashemi Nejad, which I’ll return to).

Wall is literally arguing that DOJ will be permanently damaged if it has to show up and answer for its actions in this case (in particular, to explain why the prosecutors in this case didn’t sign the motion to dismiss).

That Wall argued so forcibly as to the injury that DOJ would suffer if it had to show up and defend its motion to dismiss is all the crazier given that they didn’t file the petition. The only harm that matters here procedurally is any harm to Flynn, not DOJ, and Powell really made no such case.

When Robert Wilkins pointed out that DOJ had not filed this petition, Wall basically asked for a mulligan, the opportunity to file their own mini-writ of mandamus. Judge Henderson responded by asking (as she had more generally) why this case shouldn’t proceed under regular order, in which when DOJ missed the opportunity to file their own writ, they can’t be granted a mulligan to do so after the fact.

Along the way, Wall and Powell both repeatedly misrepresented the status of the case. More importantly, both claimed DOJ’s motion was very detailed, without noting that it also made false claims, claims on which DOJ has reversed itself at the Circuit level. That will matter in a hearing, which may be why Wall was so insistent that a hearing would do real damage to DOJ.

As noted, given Henderson’s questions for the bulk of the hearing, the Circuit will likely deny this petition. But the most striking takeaway is how panicked Wall was that DOJ might be asked to explain itself.

Setting the Scene: Today’s Flynn Hearing

I’m still doing household chores so haven’t read the Judge Emmet Sullivan response and government and Flynn reply briefs at the DC Circuit in Mike Flynn’s petition for a writ of mandamus as closely as I would have liked.

But before today’s hearing, I wanted to recall what the posture is.

The question before the Circuit should be whether Flynn is entitled to any help at the DC Circuit. It should be whether Sullivan has taken an action that is so egregious — and so injures Flynn — that it merits the DC Circuit weighing in to overturn Sullivan’s action.

The only action Sullivan has taken, though, is appointing an amicus, something that is soundly within normal judicial discretion.

The Circuit — with a panel including the shamelessly hackish Neomi Rao — ordered the sides to brief whether Sullivan had to grant DOJ’s motion to dismiss right away, what should be a premature question in any case. Effectively, Flynn has argued that DOJ had a reason to dismiss the prosecution and DOJ has argued that this is a separation of powers issue (in both its response and reply, the government has argued against what it argued before Sullivan and what Bill Barr has conceded publicly). Even while strictly arguing the mandamus issue (including the DC Circuit’s approach to Roger Stone’s similar premature petition for mandamus, which was properly rejected), Sullivan’s response also raised the outstanding allegations against Flynn on his Turkish influence peddling.

All of which is to say the arguments (Flynn, DOJ, and Sullivan will have have 15 minutes to argue) likely won’t be addressing the legal issues that should be before the court, and Flynn and DOJ have already made claims that aggressively conflict with the record in this case. One detail Flynn has relentlessly obscured is what information was available before Flynn allocuted to his guilt a second time; basically everything that is public already was known to him.

Add in the fact that DOJ is now claiming that a judge cannot stop DOJ from dismissing a prosecution of the President’s buddy for no good reason, and we should expect that today’s hearing will pose a grave risk to the rule of law in this country.

You can stream the hearing here.

In a Motion Claiming that Appointing an Amicus Is “Unprecedented,” Billy Barr Argues Against Billy Barr Twice More

DOJ has availed itself of the opportunity to provide a response to Mike Flynn’s petition for a write of mandamus at the DC Circuit.

As I’ll show, I think the reason they did so was to make yet another argument that Mike Flynn can lie wherever and about whatever, but those lies may never be deemed material to a proceeding, and therefore he must go scot-free. Along the way, however, DOJ argues that merely appointing an amicus is a totally unprecedented act. And to get there, DOJ twice argues against DOJ.

DOJ says only DOJ can determine if Flynn can lie and lie and lie

I’ve long believed that Sullivan’s order that amicus John Gleeson consider whether Flynn should be held in contempt for perjury made Flynn’s challenge more airtight. Indeed, the DC Circuit didn’t even include that among the things it asked to be briefed. Nevertheless, Sullivan included it, mostly to point out that even if the Circuit resolved the motion to dismiss, the question of whether Flynn should be held in contempt remains. Sullivan argues along the way that contempt is part of the court’s inherent authority.

Regardless how this Court resolves the Rule 48 issue, questions remain whether Mr. Flynn should be subject to any sanction pursuant to statute, the Federal Rules, and federal courts’ inherent authority to discipline those who fail to tell the truth under oath and obstruct justice in the courtroom. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 401–402; Fed. R. Crim. P. 42; Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 41–44 (1991) (upholding court’s inherent authority to punish “acts which degrade the judicial system, including … misleading and lying to the Court” (quotations omitted)). This factbound inquiry involves well-established Article III powers, and the district court should be permitted to address it in the first instance.

The contempt power is “settled law” that “is essential to the administration of justice.” Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795 (1987). It springs from the court’s Article III responsibility to protect its essential functions, including preserving the integrity of courts and the truthseeking process. See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994). Under this inherent power, “a court may issue orders, punish for contempt, vacate judgments obtained by fraud, conduct investigations as necessary to exercise the power, bar persons from the courtroom, assess attorney’s fees, and dismiss actions.” United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 1993).

To be clear, a contempt finding or sanction against Mr. Flynn may prove unwarranted. If the representations in his January 2020 declaration are true, they present attenuating circumstances for his prior, contrary statements. But the nature and extent of Mr. Flynn’s reversals under oath—from whether he lied to the government in January and March 2017, to whether he was coerced into pleading guilty, misled by his former attorneys, or improperly dissuaded from withdrawing his guilty plea in 2018 when Judge Sullivan offered that option—raise questions that any judge should take seriously. They thus provide a basis for invoking the district court’s authority to “conduct investigations as necessary.” Id.7

7 Contrary to Mr. Flynn’s suggestion (Pet. 11–17), Judge Sullivan’s appointment of an amicus to brief the contempt power is appropriate. Because contempt implicates core Article III powers, “Courts cannot be at the mercy of another Branch in deciding whether [contempt] proceedings should be initiated.” Young, 481 U.S. at 796. That is why the Federal Rules explicitly authorize the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate contempt. See id.; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a)(2). Judge Sullivan’s amicus order is more restrained: It does not appoint Judge Gleeson to prosecute any contempt charge, but merely to address whether initiating a contempt proceeding here would be appropriate, and gives Mr. Flynn the last word on the question

The government must have anticipated this, because it argues at length that Flynn’s lies didn’t obstruct anything, without ever explaining why not. Along the way, they bizarrely argue there’s no evidence of he lied out of contempt for the court, suggesting that this happens all the time.

Petitioner also cannot be prosecuted for contempt because there is no evidence of “contumacious intent.” Brown, 454 F.2d at 1007. Even assuming that petitioner had the intent to commit perjury, that would not establish that he had the “inten[t] to obstruct the administration of justice.” Sealed Case, 627 F.3d at 1238. There is no indication that petitioner pleaded guilty and then moved to withdraw his plea as “part of some greater design to interfere with judicial proceedings.” Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 93. Rather, the record shows that petitioner—like other defendants who enter pleas they later seek to withdraw— pleaded guilty with the intent to resolve the allegations against him on the best terms he thought possible at the time. Doc. 160-23, at 8-9. Our adversarial system treats plea colloquies and later motions to withdraw as an accepted part of normal judicial proceedings. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b), (d). An intent to acquiesce in the prosecution’s charges, even falsely, is not an intent to interfere with judicial proceedings themselves for purposes of contempt under Section 401(1).

DOJ then argues that only DOJ could prosecute Flynn for perjury.

I have zero doubt that Neomi Rao will adopt this view, for present purposes, because she has never met a ridiculous argument she didn’t like. But it would be shameful for any self-respecting judge to do so, as it effectively eviscerates judicial authority.

Appointing an amicus is unprecedented

DOJ then argues that Judge Sullivan did something unprecedented, which is what they use to justify issuing a writ.

III. A Writ Of Mandamus Is Appropriate And Necessary Relief In Light Of The District Court’s Unprecedented Order

Several pages later, after laying out the very high bar for a writ of mandamus, the government describes what Sullivan has done: appoint an amicus.

For the same reasons that the mandamus factors were met in Fokker and In re United States, those factors are met here. The only distinction between the cases is that, in Fokker and In re United States, the district court had entered an order denying the motion, while here the district court has entered an order providing for further proceedings and contemplating additional, court-initiated criminal charges.

The government is basically arguing that even appointing an amicus amounts to deciding against Flynn. Nowhere does the government claim that Flynn would be injured by this amicus, and Flynn’s only claim to injury is the delay (he himself is responsible for over a year of delay on this case).

Billy Barr argues against Billy Barr

Appropriately, for a DOJ that has refuted its repeated claims that Flynn’s lies were material by arguing they weren’t material, Billy Barr once against argues against Billy Barr.

This brief does so in two ways.

As I’ve noted, DOJ needs some kind of explanation for what changed their opinion. In front of Sullivan, they argued they had gotten “new” information, none of which is new.

Jocelyn Ballantine is (inexplicably) on this brief. She cannot argue those other things are new, because she knew all of them when she argued, in the past, that Flynn’s lies were material.

So this brief, while presenting all that other not-new information (without making any of the arguments necessary to justify DOJ’s flip-flop), doesn’t argue that it is new.

Instead, this brief argues that the investigation into Peter Strzok and Andrew McCabe is “new.”

Thereafter, new information emerged about essential participants in the investigation. Strzok was removed from the investigation due to apparent political bias and was later terminated from the FBI. The second interviewing agent was criticized by the Inspector General for his tactics in connection with the larger investigation. See Doc. 169, at 6-7. And McCabe was terminated after the Department of Justice determined that he lied under oath, including to FBI agents. Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, A Report of Investigation of Certain Allegations Relating to Former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe 2 (Feb. 2018).

There are several problems with this.

First of all, DOJ never managed to indict McCabe for his alleged lies, and whether he lied is currently being litigated. Also, DOJ IG has reviewed Strzok’s conduct at great length — including the documents that at the District level DOJ claimed falsely were new — and it affirmatively stated that any bias Strzok have did not affect any decision reviewed.

But the most important reason this is outright absurd is that both of these things were public and known to Flynn on December 18, 2018 (indeed, the investigation into Strzok was known to Flynn when he pled the first time). As Beth Wilkinson noted in Sullivan’s response, Flynn disclaimed those things under oath!!!

After being placed under oath again, Mr. Flynn confirmed that (1) he did not wish to “challenge the circumstances” surrounding his FBI interview; (2) by pleading guilty he would be giving up “forever” his right to challenge that interview; (3) he knew at the time of his interview that lying to the FBI was a crime; and (4) he was “satisfied with the services provided by [his] attorneys.” Id. at 7–9. Mr. Flynn also disclaimed any reliance on revelations that certain FBI officials involved in the interview were being investigated for misconduct. Id. at 9.

We’re five months past the time Billy Barr appointed Jeffrey Jensen to go come up with some excuse to dismiss the Flynn prosecution, and DOJ still can’t decide (or find anything) what is new to justify the flip-flop.

But there is an even bigger Billy Barr belly flop in this response. As Wilkinson noted in the Sullivan response, in its motion to dismiss, DOJ acknowledged that it can only dismiss the prosecution with leave of the judge.

The government’s motion acknowledges that Rule 48 does not require Judge Sullivan to serve as a mere rubber stamp.

[snip]

First, the motion acknowledges that a Rule 48(a) dismissal requires leave of the court. Id. at 10. While the government argued that the court’s discretion was “narrow” and “circumscribed,” id., it did not argue that the court lacked discretion altogether.

Barr reiterated this point in his interview with Catherine Herridge.

Does Judge Sullivan have a say?

Yes. Under the rules, the case can be dismissed with leave of court. Generally, the courts have said that that provision is in there to protect defendants, to make sure the government doesn’t play games by bringing a charge and then dismissing it; bringing another charge, dismissing it. But he does have a say.

Now, after Bill Barr’s DOJ has twice said that the Judge has a say, Billy Barr’s DOJ argues that the District Court has no authority to reject it.

Simply put, the district court has no authority to reject the Executive’s conclusion that those reasons justify a dismissal of the charges.

Again, Neomi Rao will have no embarrassment in agreeing even with a seemingly schizophrenic argument that will help Trump out, and she may well bring Karen Henderson along.

But this is an embarrassment. Bill Barr keeps shredding the credibility of the Justice Department by arguing against past arguments he has personally approved, even very recent ones. There’s no longer any pretense they have to make and sustain an argument, only provide words on a page for captive judges to rubber stamp.

In Opposing Mandamus, Judge Sullivan Notes Schrodinger’s Materiality

Beth Wilkinson, the attorney representing (with the approval of the Office of US Courts) Judge Emmet Sullivan in Mike Flynn’s mandamus petition has submitted her brief making a very strong case opposing the petition. The brief argues what I have: that DOJ argued repeatedly and forcefully that Mike Flynn’s lies were material — and Judge Sullivan twice agreed — before DOJ flip-flopped and claimed the lies were not material.

Wilkinson lays out three instances where the government has argued Flynn’s lies were material and the District has agreed.

December 1, 2017

The statement of offense recounted three sets of materially false statements. Two involved lies Mr. Flynn told to the FBI, in a January 24, 2017 interview, regarding his contacts with Russia and other countries regarding U.S. foreign policy. Id. at 2–5. The remaining statements involved lies to the DOJ, in documents Mr. Flynn filed on March 7, 2017, about work that he and his consulting firm did for Turkey. Id. at 5.

[snip]

At this hearing, the government represented the basis for its charge. Among other things, the government claimed that “the defendant made material false statements and omissions during an interview with the [FBI] on January 24, 2017” regarding his interactions with Russia, id. at 14; that “[a]t the time of the interview, the FBI had an open investigation into Russia’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election,” id. at 14–15; and that “on March 7, 2017, the defendant filed multiple documents with [DOJ] … pertaining to a project performed by him and his company for the principal benefit of the Republic of Turkey” where “the defendant made materially false statements and omissions,” id. at 17. The government also provided a detailed description of why each statement was materially false. See id. at 15–18.

December 18, 2018

A full year after Mr. Flynn originally pleaded guilty, the parties filed sentencing memoranda. The government’s memorandum reiterated that Mr. Flynn’s false statements in both the January 2017 FBI interview and the March 2017 DOJ filings were “material” under § 1001. Dkt. 46 at 2–4. Mr. Flynn “d[id] not take issue” with the government’s description of his offense. Dkt. 50 at 7.

[snip]

Only after these repeated offers and colloquies did Judge Sullivan accept Mr. Flynn’s guilty plea to making materially false statements to the government. Id. at 16.

January 7, 2020

In January 2020, the government filed a supplemental sentencing memorandum, reiterating its representations about Mr. Flynn’s guilt. See Dkt. 150 at 5–14. The government again asserted that “this case is about multiple false statements that the defendant made to various DOJ entities.” Id. at 5; see also id. at 9, 12–13, 17 (explaining bases for materiality). The government recommended that Mr. Flynn be sentenced to 0 to 6 months in prison, noting that he had committed a “serious” offense, in a position of “public trust,” that undermined “[t]he integrity of our criminal justice [system, which] depends on witnesses telling the truth. That is precisely why providing false statements to the government is a crime.” Id. at 2, 26, 31.

After claiming Flynn’s lies were material three different times, the brief notes, DOJ and Flynn claimed they weren’t.

May 7, 2020

After spending more than two years claiming that Mr. Flynn’s “false statements to the FBI on January 24, 2017, were absolutely material,” Dkt. 132 at 10, the government now claimed that any lies by Mr. Flynn in the same interview were “not … material,” Dkt. 198 at 2.

This flip-flop is one of four things Wilkinson points to that questions any presumption of regularity here. First, she notes that the government has not withdrawn its past filings, including those asserting Flynn’s lies were material.

Fourth, the government has not moved to withdraw any of its prior pleadings in the case, including its sentencing memoranda, or any of the representations it previously made in open court regarding the purported materiality of Mr. Flynn’s false statements.

Then she notes that the government is now claiming that all those past statements, made under the Rules of Professional Conduct requiring accurate representations to the court, were not true.

The relevant facts are set forth in detail above. For several years, the government represented to the district court, across multiple court filings and appearances, that Mr. Flynn was guilty of making materially false statements. As recently as January of this year, the government maintained those representations. And Mr. Flynn repeatedly affirmed his guilt, under oath and penalty of perjury, despite being given multiple opportunities to disclaim it. It was not until this year that Mr. Flynn, and then the government, told the district court that its finding of guilt should be reversed and that the government’s prior solemn representations were legally and factually untrue.

I’ve argued that DOJ has put itself in a position where their current stance may be estopped by all their prior stances. Wilkinson has certainly laid out the record to make that case.

Update: Corrected that Wilkinson only included the times DOJ and Flynn agreed the lies were material, a total of three times. Judge Sullivan has found them to be one more time.