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The Institutional Subjectivity of the White Affluent US Nation

In a really worthy read, Bill Keller and Glenn Greenwald debate the future of journalism.

Sadly, however, in his first response to Keller’s self-delusion of belonging to the journalistic tradition of “newspapers that put a premium on aggressive but impartial reporting[] that expect reporters and editors to keep their opinions to themselves,” Greenwald seemed to cede that such journalism constitutes, “concealing one’s subjective perspectives.” That permitted Keller to continue his self-delusion that his journalism — at both the level of reporter and that reporter’s larger institution — achieved that silence about opinions until they started fighting about the role of national allegiance and national security.

That argument developed this way.

Greenwald: Former Bush D.O.J. lawyer Jack Goldsmith in 2011 praised what he called “the patriotism of the American press,” meaning their allegiance to protecting the interests and policies of the U.S. government. That may (or may not) be a noble thing to do, but it most definitely is not objective: it is quite subjective and classically “activist.”

[snip]

Keller: If Jack Goldsmith, the former Bush administration lawyer, had praised the American press for, in your words, “their allegiance to protecting the interests and policies of the U.S. government” then I would strongly disagree with him. We have published many stories that challenged the policies and professed interests of the government. But that’s not quite what Goldsmith says. He says that The Times and other major news outlets give serious consideration to arguments that publishing something will endanger national security — that is, might get someone killed.

For what it’s worth, I think Keller is clinging to the first thing Goldsmith said,

Glenn Greenwald complained that “the NYT knew about Davis’ work for the CIA (and Blackwater) but concealed it because the U.S. Government told it to” (my emphasis).  That is inaccurate.  The government asked the Times not to publish, as it often does, and the Times agreed to the request, which it sometimes does.  The final decision rested with the Times, which listens to the government’s claims about national security harm and risk to individual lives, and then makes its own decision.   The Timesdoes not, in my opinion, always exercise this discretion wisely.

And ignoring what Goldsmith went on to say,

I interviewed a dozen or so senior American national security journalists to get a sense of when and why they do or don’t publish national security secrets.  They gave me different answers, but they all agreed that they tried to avoid publishing information that harms U.S. national security with no corresponding public benefit. Some of them expressly ascribed this attitude to “patriotism” or “jingoism” or to being American citizens or working for American publications.   This sense of attachment to country is what leads the American press to worry about the implications for U.S. national security of publication, to seek the government’s input, to weigh these implications in the balance, and sometimes to self-censor.  (This is a natural and prudent attitude in a nation with the fewest legal restrictions in the world on the publication of national security secrets, but one abhorred by critics like Greewald.)  The Guardian, al Jazeera, and Wikileaks, by contrast, worry much less, if at all, about U.S. national security interests.

That is, Goldsmith noted both that at an institutional level US news outlets entertained the requests of the government, and that at a reportorial level, individuals prioritized US “national security.”

And from there, Keller repeatedly ignored or dismissed the efforts Greenwald, in his Edward Snowden reporting, or WikiLeaks, in its Cablegate publications, made to protect lives of individuals.

It’s not until Greenwald’s response where he gets to the crux of the issue.

As for taking into account dangers posed to innocent life before publishing: nobody disputes that journalists should do this. But I don’t give added weight to the lives of innocent Americans as compared to the lives of innocent non-Americans, nor would I feel any special fealty to the U.S. government as opposed to other governments when deciding what to publish. Read more

The Spooks Will Never Have Their Software Self-Spying Working

Mark Hosenball seems to have gotten as obsessed with the Intelligence Community’s inability or unwillingness to implement the automated Insider Threat tracking software mandated by Congress (see here and here). After reporting last week that the Hawaii NAS location where Edward Snowden worked didn’t have insider threat detection software installed because of bandwidth problems, he reported earlier this week that DOD will miss the new Congressionally mandated deadlines to have it working, again partly for bandwidth reasons.

But the intelligence agencies have already missed an October 1 deadline for having the software fully in use, and are warning of further delays.

Officials responsible for tightening data security say insider threat-detection software, which logs events such as unusually large downloads of material or attempts at unauthorized access, is expensive to adopt.

It also takes up considerable computing and communications bandwidth, degrading the performance of systems on which it is installed, they said.

[snip]

The latest law requires the agencies to have the new security measures’ basic “initial operating capability” installed by this month and to have the systems fully operational by October 1, 2014.

But U.S. officials acknowledged it was unlikely agencies would be able to meet even that deadline, and Congress would likely have to extend it further. One official said intelligence agencies had already asked Congress to extend the deadline beyond October 2014 but that legislators had so far refused.

If the Intelligence Committees were unable to get the IC to take this mandate seriously after the Chelsea Manning leaks, I don’t see any reason they’ll show more focus on doing so after Edward Snowden. They seem either unable to back off their spying bandwidth draw far enough to implement the security to avoid another giant leak, or unwilling to subject their workers (or themselves?) to this kind of scrutiny.

This is why I made the Ozymandias joke the other day. Parallel with our headlong rush toward destruction via climate change, the IC doesn’t seem able to reverse the manic demand for more data long enough to protect the collection systems they’ve got, or at least the mission critical ones. That is not a sign of an organization that can survive long.

Does This Provide Insight into Obama’s Relative Silence?

The US Ambassador to Britain, Matthew Barzun, went on the Beeb and declined to criticize Edward Snowden.

Asked if he shared the UK security services’ concerns about the threat to national security from the leaks, he said he wanted to focus on the “importance of having this debate about what the trade-offs are between security and privacy, between transparency and secrecy, and to do so in a way that protects whistleblowers – which is different, by the way, from wholesale releasing of information, hundreds of thousands of documents”.

This is a remarkable statement from someone at the heart of what must be touchy relations between the NSA and GCHQ and the US and Brits more generally (if complaints about prior US leaks serve as predictor).

Moreover, it might vocalize some of the reluctance on President Obama’s part to aggressively defend the NSA’s violation of laws authorizing surveillance.

Don’t get me wrong. I don’t believe Obama welcomes any real debate. The conduct James Clapper’s Committee to Make Us Love the Dragnet makes that all too clear. Rather, I suspect Obama believes he can win the debate, and convince us all that we need an even bigger dragnet. (Which might explain the inclusion of Cass Sunstein on the Committee to Make Us Love the Dragnet.)

I suspect Obama, having been convinced by partial briefings the dragnet is great for America, also believes he can persuade the rest of us (who aren’t stuck in his partial briefing bubble) to love it too.

Certainly, his Ambassador to Britain seems to have been permitted to adopt the same stance.

My name is US Bandwith, king of kings:

“My name is US Bandwith, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!”
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away

I’m thinking of planting a sphinx in UT in front of the UT Data Center. What other appropriate response is there to this?

The U.S. National Security Agency failed to install the most up-to-date anti-leak software at a site in Hawaii before contractor Edward Snowden went to work there and downloaded tens of thousands of highly classified documents, current and former U.S. officials told Reuters.

[snip]

The main reason the software had not been installed at the NSA’s Hawaii facility by the time Snowden took up his assignment there was that it had insufficient bandwidth to comfortably install it and ensure its effective operation, according to one of the officials.

Due to the bandwidth issue, intelligence agencies in general moved more slowly than non-spy government units, including the Defense Department, to install anti-leak software, officials said.

This is precisely the excuse they used after Chelsea Manning absconded with several databases on a Lady Gaga CD. They’re still using it.

Then there’s this:

The NSA’s Utah data center is still struggling to get up and running. The Wall Street Journal reported earlier this month that the site slated to hold exabytes of NSA spy data has been suffering from lightning arcs and meltdowns that have destroyed hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of equipment and prevented the NSA from using the center for its intended purpose: massive data storage and mining. The WSJ reported there had been ten incidents thus far. A source familiar with the project says the center underwent yet another shutdown over the weekend after electrical problems on Thursday and Friday.

The data center was shut down through Tuesday. The source says there aren’t “arcs and fires anymore” but that the experts on the site still haven’t figured out what’s causing the problems. They have figured out how to prevent flashes of lightning, though.

“They’re seeing a pattern of where it gets to the meltdown point and they stop it before it blows again,” says the source. The source says that contractors have been injured and taken to the hospital due to electrocution, but not in the most recent shutdown.

At least they’ve stopped electrocuting contractors.

Our empire needs the intelligence, you see, but apparently can’t ensure an adequate supply of power, of any type.

Update: Argh. As Morris Minor notes, it’s bandwidth, not bandwith. But I’ve grown fond of it, so I’m going to leave it as is, calling it poetic license, while I hang my head in shame.

NSA’s Dissenters

I tweeted a bunch of details from this James Risen interview with Edward Snowden. That comparing the NSA to China’s People’s Liberation Army is not perceived as funny by NSA brass. How Snowden’s professed commitment to whistleblowing came from reading the 2009 Draft NSA IG Report ought to disqualify Michael Hayden — whose criminal actions the report details — from commenting on Snowden from here on out. And that ignoring the security vulnerabilities in a CIA personnel database seems kind of stupid.

But I found this paragraph most interesting.

Mr. Snowden added that inside the spy agency “there’s a lot of dissent — palpable with some, even.” But he said that people were kept in line through “fear and a false image of patriotism,” which he described as “obedience to authority.”

Two times since the Snowden leaks started, NSA has done touchy feely things to reassure employees. First, Keith Alexander’s call that “there is no substitute for victory,” even while suggesting NSA employees should leave the debate about their work to others. And then the group hug to them and their families.

I believe those are the comments of a General who is genuinely worried that learning what the NSA has been doing — aside from targeting terrorists — might lead to more dissent among NSA employees.

If Snowden’s comment is true, that all makes sense.

As I have said, many NSA employees might have an image of the NSA as a foreign codebreaker organization that would never target Americans. If they do, they may well be in for a rude awakening.

Remarkably Timed Spamouflage, Scary Iran Plot Edition

Screen shot 2013-10-14 at 8.36.40 PMWaPo has its latest Snowden scoop out, describing how the NSA collects hundreds of thousands of email contact lists daily.

The National Security Agency is harvesting hundreds of millions of contact lists from personal e-mail and instant messaging accounts around the world, many of them belonging to Americans, according to senior intelligence officials and top secret documents provided by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.

I’ll come back to this part of the story later.

But further down in the story, it describes how a hack-spam attack on a member of Iran’s Quds Force overwhelmed NSA, forcing it to conduct emergency detasking of that person and several others between September 20 and October 20, 2011.

Spam has proven to be a significant problem for NSA — clogging databases with data that holds no foreign intelligence value. The majority of all e-mails, one NSA document says, “are SPAM from ‘fake’ addresses and never ‘delivered’ to targets.”

In fall 2011, according to an NSA presentation, the Yahoo account of an Iranian target was “hacked by an unknown actor,” who used it to send spam. The Iranian had “a number of Yahoo groups in his/her contact list, some with many hundreds or thousands of members.”

The cascading effects of repeated spam messages, compounded by the automatic addition of the Iranian’s contacts to other people’s address books, led to a massive spike in the volume of traffic collected by the Australian intelligence service on the NSA’s behalf.

After nine days of data-bombing, the Iranian’s contact book and contact books for several people within it were “emergency detasked.”

This means that this target and “several people” within this Quds Force target’s contact books (and possibly the primary target’s email) were detasked in precisely the same time period as our informant, Narc, was entrapping Manssor Arbabsiar, of Scary Iran Plot fame.

Remember, if you read the plain language of some of the transcripts and other materials, it appears possible the money for this op involved another government.

There’s a similarly odd passage in the quotations purportedly showing that Shahlai was being funded for this by Iran.

[Arbabsiar] this is politics, ok … it’s not like, eh, personal … This is politics, so these people they pay this government … [Shahlai’s] got the, got the government behind him … he’s not paying from his pocket. [ellipses original]

Now this passage, unlike the last two (which are translations from Farsi), might best be explained by Arbabsiar’s less than perfect English. With that caveat, though, the bolded passage appears to suggest not that Iran was paying QF, but that QF was paying some other government (or someone else was paying Iran).

There are later details that also don’t make sense if this was an Iranian op.

In other words, during precisely the period when the most bizarre, improbable plot to hit Hollywood in years happens, some of the potential targets have their surveilled communications spamouflaged by an outside entity. (h/t to Frank N Furters for first calling this spamouflage.)

But I think our Intelligence Community is too dull to find that worthy of more consideration.

Surveillance Logic: Snowden Is Bad because AQAP Conference Call Leak Was

McClatchy did an interview with former national security official Ken Wainstein. He focuses on leaks, explaining how sometimes the “good leaks” don’t get prosecuted and admitting that overclassification is a problem.

But in response to McClatchy’s suggestion that Edward Snowden’s leaks are good, Wainstein responds in a bizarre fashion — by bringing up an entirely different leak.

Q: Do you weigh the public’s interest in the information that was leaked and whether it served the public good? For example, would you weigh whether Snowden’s actions triggered a broader debate about classified programs that the public should have known more about?

A: I think prosecutors would look at the intent of the leaker and what that person was intending to do.

But you wouldn’t have consensus that (the Snowden leak) was the best way to bring about this debate and that there hasn’t been damage. Just last week, for example, there was talk about how al Qaeda has shut down some of its communications because of aleak. I wouldn’t say it’s a given that it’s in the public interest that these disclosures are out there.

Wainstein’s talking, of course, of the NYT report that the public reports about the AQAP conference call story caused the terrorists to start using other communication methods.

But there are several problems with his claim. First, as I’ve pointed out, there’s a significant likelihood the leak in question came from AQAP sympathizers in the Yemeni government; in any case the leak was sourced to a broadly known fact in Yemen, not the US.

More importantly, the entire point of the story was that that AQAP leak had done more damage than all of Edward Snowden’s leaks. In fact, when criticized for the story, NYT’s editor pointed to that comparative fact as the entire point of the story.

He also said that many of the critics of the story “are missing part of the news here – that Snowden has not given away the store” in terms of harming national security or counterterrorism efforts.

The article, Mr. Hamilton said, “told an important and surprising story given the focus on Edward Snowden and the N.S.A. leaks. It had the kind of detail about terrorist operations that only reporters with long experience in national security coverage – and sources they can trust – can uncover.”

In other words, in response to a suggestion that Snowden’s leak did more harm than good, Wainstein points to a story that, even if the emphasis was wrong, pointed out that Snowden hadn’t done much damage.

Maybe Wainstein brought it up to suggest that McClatchy had better watch out; the AQAP story was also a McClatchy story. He’d be better off thanking McClatchy for making it clear someone in Yemen doesn’t keep our secrets very well.

But I guess that would ruin his entire scold about Edward Snowden.

Our Yemeni “Allies” Did More Damage than Edward Snowden

The NYT reports that some counterterrorism analysts think the reports of the Ayman al-Zawahiri call with Nasir al-Wuhayshi have done more damage to our SIGINT collections than all of Edward Snowden’s leaking.

As the nation’s spy agencies assess the fallout from disclosures about their surveillance programs, some government analysts and senior officials have made a startling finding: the impact of a leaked terrorist plot by Al Qaeda in August has caused more immediate damage to American counterterrorism efforts than the thousands of classified documents disclosed by Edward Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor.

Since news reports in early August revealed that the United States intercepted messages between Ayman al-Zawahri, who succeeded Osama bin Laden as the head of Al Qaeda, and Nasser al-Wuhayshi, the head of the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, discussing an imminent terrorist attack, analysts have detected a sharp drop in the terrorists’ use of a major communications channel that the authorities were monitoring. Since August, senior American officials have been scrambling to find new ways to surveil the electronic messages and conversations of Al Qaeda’s leaders and operatives.

[snip]

The drop in message traffic after the communication intercepts contrasts with what analysts describe as a far more muted impact on counterterrorism efforts from the disclosures by Mr. Snowden of the broad capabilities of N.S.A. surveillance programs. Instead of terrorists moving away from electronic communications after those disclosures, analysts have detected terrorists mainly talking about the information that Mr. Snowden has disclosed.

Reading between the lines, the story suggests one reason Snowden’s leaks haven’t hurt counterterrorism that badly is because they’re targeted at (or most effective with) non-terrorist targets.

Senior American officials say that Mr. Snowden’s disclosures have had a broader impact on national security in general, including counterterrorism efforts. This includes fears that Russia and China now have more technical details about the N.S.A. surveillance programs.

But I’m perhaps most interested in the way NYT points to McClatchy as the first report of the leak, not the NYT itself.

McClatchy Newspapers first reported on the conversations between Mr. Zawahri and Mr. Wuhayshi on Aug. 4. Two days before that, The New York Times agreed to withhold the identities of the Qaeda leaders after senior American intelligence officials said the information could jeopardize their operations. After the government became aware of the McClatchy article, it dropped its objections to The Times’s publishing the same information, and the newspaper did so on Aug. 5.

Remember, whereas the NYT sourced this leak to US officials, McClatchy very clearly sourced it to a Yemeni official. In fact, McClatchy’s editor, James Asher, said that the reporter (Adam Baron) said the intercept was “common knowledge” known in Yemen.

Our story was based on reporting in Yemen and we did not contact the administration to ask permission to use the information. In fact, our reporter tells me that the intercept was pretty much common knowledge in Yemen.

None of this excuses the US officials who leaked this to brag about the NSA’s capabilities at a politically sensitive time. (In fact, the intercept was discovered by an Air Force unit stationed at NSA’s Fort Meade.)

But even before that, someone in Yemen was leaking broadly enough about this intercept that it was “common knowledge.”

Which, given the divided loyalties of many within the Yemeni government may well mean AQAP got details of the intercept firsthand, not via McClatchy or NYT.

Those same Yemeni allies have long blabbed about our infiltration of AQAP. Now, apparently, they’ve alerted AQAP to the precise means of wiretapping them. Perhaps this should tell us something about those Yemeni allies?

Bill Binney Told You So

Remember when Bill Binney said NSA was compiling dossiers of Americans, but Keith Alexander said that wasn’t true?

A former NSA official has accused the NSA’s director of deception during a speech he gave at the DefCon hacker conference on Friday when he asserted that the agency does not collect files on Americans.

William Binney, a former technical director at the NSA, said during a panel discussion that NSA Director Gen. Keith Alexander was playing a “word game” and that the NSA was indeed collecting e-mails, Twitter writings, internet searches and other data belonging to Americans and indexing it.

“Unfortunately, once the software takes in data, it will build profiles on everyone in that data,” he said. “You can simply call it up by the attributes of anyone you want and it’s in place for people to look at.”

[snip]

Binney was contradicting statements made on Friday by Alexander, who told the crowd of hackers and security professionals that his agency “absolutely” does not maintain files on Americans.

“And anybody who would tell you that we’re keeping files or dossiers on the American people,” Alexander continued, “knows that’s not true.”

The tantalizing reporting duo of Laura Poitras and James Risen (writing at NYT) report the NSA is … compiling graphs that show Americans’ connections with foreign targets, using both communications metadata and public resources like bank, insurance, Facebook, flight, voting property, and GPS information.

Since 2010, the National Security Agency has been exploiting its huge collections of data to create sophisticated graphs of some Americans’ social connections that can identify their associates, their locations at certain times, their traveling companions and other personal information, according to newly disclosed documents and interviews with officials.

[snip]

The policy shift was intended to help the agency “discover and track” connections between intelligence targets overseas and people in the United States, according to an N.S.A. memorandum from January 2011. The agency was authorized to conduct “large-scale graph analysis on very large sets of communications metadata without having to check foreignness” of every e-mail address, phone number or other identifier, the document said. Because of concerns about infringing on the privacy of American citizens, the computer analysis of such data had previously been permitted only for foreigners.

The agency can augment the communications data with material from public, commercial and other sources, including bank codes, insurance information, Facebook profiles, passenger manifests, voter registration rolls and GPS location information, as well as property records and unspecified tax data, according to the documents. They do not indicate any restrictions on the use of such “enrichment” data, and several former senior Obama administration officials said the agency drew on it for both Americans and foreigners.

It sure sounds like a dossier to me.

But then, the safe bet was always to assume Keith Alexander (and James Clapper, who also denied this) was lying.

Dilma Throws Obama a BRIC

Screen shot 2013-09-17 at 2.57.28 PMI was actually surprised, back in May, when the White House announced a State Visit for Brazil’s President, Dilma Rousseff.

After all, not long after Obama visited Brazil in March 2011, the real started gaining value against the dollar, significantly slowing the boom Brazil had enjoyed in the wake of our crash.

When she was here in April 2012, Dilma explicitly blamed US Quantitative Easing for the reversal in currencies, and suggested the policy was meant to slow growth in countries like Brazil. Before that, Brazil’s boom and its advances in energy independence had put Brazil in a position to assume the global stature a country of its size might aspire to. And Dilma (partly correctly) blamed US actions for undercutting that stature.

I interpreted the State Dinner to be an attempt to woo Brazil away from natural coalitions with the Bolivarist governments of Latin America and the BRICS (Brazil, Russsia, India, China, and South Africa).

Fast forward to today, when the Brazilian government announced that it has postponed the visit that had been scheduled for October 23.

The usual suspects are mocking Dilma’s decision, insisting that everyone spies, and that Brazil is just making a stink for political gain. The White House statement echoes that, suggesting that it was the revelation of US spying, and not the spying itself, that created the problems.

The President has said that he understands and regrets the concerns disclosures of alleged U.S. intelligence activities have generated in Brazil and made clear that he is committed to working together with President Rousseff and her government in diplomatic channels to move beyond this issue as a source of tension in our bilateral relationship.

There is something to that stance. Dilma’s government faces a lot of unrest and the tensions of preparing for the World Cup. The portrayal that the US was taking advantage of Brazil caught her at a politically sensitive time.

All that said, those poo-pooing Brazil’s complaints ignore the specific nature of the spying as revealed. As I noted, even James Clapper’s attempt to respond to concerns raised by the original reports in Brazil didn’t address (and indeed, may have exacerbated) concerns that the US is engaging in financial war, including manipulating its currency to undercut other countries as they rise in relative power. If the US is using its advantages in SIGINT to engage in such financial war, Brazil has every reason to object, because it’s not something Brazil’s currency or telecommunications position make possible.

US disclaimers of industrial espionage no longer matter if the US is collecting SIGINT that would support substantive financial attacks, especially since Clapper in March made it clear the US envisions such attacks (even if they only admit to thinking in defensive terms).

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