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As NATO Summit Approaches, Taliban Strength Accumulates

Violence in Afghanistan continues its steady increase.

NATO found it necessary yesterday to trot out a high-ranking spokesman to try to tamp down the suggestion from Dianne Feinstein and Mike Rogers over the weekend that the Taliban has increased in strength. Unfortunately for NATO, however, there are more reasons to believe that the Taliban is in a strong position than just statements emanating from Washington power players. The Taliban themselves seem also to sense their stronger position, as evidenced by their abandoning the “secret” negotiations that the US had entered into with them over the winter. The caution exhibited by Hamid Karzai as he prepares to accept the handoff of security control for more of Afghanistan also reflects a strengthening of the Taliban’s position.

It seems only fitting that since CNN was where Feinstein and Rogers made their claim that the Taliban is stronger that NATO would choose CNN for their push-back on the idea:

A top coalition official on Wednesday disputed lawmakers’ assertions that the Taliban are increasing their strength in Afghanistan.

“I’m afraid for the Taliban the evidence is rather different,” said British army Lt. Gen. Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, in a briefing with reporters from Kabul.

The Taliban’s ability to deliver attacks in Afghanistan was reduced by almost 10% in 2011, said Bradshaw, adding that the NATO-led force is seeing a similar trend early this year.

“We get reporting, reliable reporting of Taliban commanders, feeling under pressure with lack of weapons and equipment, with lack of finance,” he said.

Bradshaw is of course gaming the figures. The independent group Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, or ANSO, reported that for 2011 (pdf), attacks by Armed Opposition Groups (AOG, described as the Taliban, Haqqani Network and Hezb-i-Hekmatyar) continued its upward trend in 2011, as seen in the figure above, rather than going down as Bradshaw would have us believe.

Reuters reports on the concerns surrounding the next step in handing over security control in Afghanistan:

Afghanistan faces tougher security challenges in the next phase of a transition from foreign to Afghan forces as insurgents step up their attacks, Afghan officials said on Thursday.

President Hamid Karzai is expected to announce on Sunday the transfer of 230 districts and the centers of all provincial capitals to Afghan control in the third phase of a handover before most NATO troops pull out by the end of 2014.

/snip/

There are, however, few signs of improving security in Afghanistan. Read more

After Obama Slips into Afghanistan Under Cover of Darkness, Taliban Attack at Dawn

Obama chats with Ryan Crocker aboard a helicopter en route to Karzai's palace for the midnight signing ceremony. (White House photo)

Despite ongoing claims from the military that “progress” is being made in Afghanistan (but see this post for a direct contradiction to the claim violence fell 9% in 2011), the reality of the fragile security situation in Afghanistan dictated that President Obama’s trip to Afghanistan to sign the Strategic Partnership Agreement (which commits to exactly nothing) had to be unannounced and under cover of darkness. Obama and Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai signed the agreement around midnight in Karzai’s palace and then Obama left after a short visit with US troops at Bagram.

Just hours after Obama left before dawn on Wedesday morning, the Taliban attacked the Green Village around 6 am local time, killing at least seven people. This compound houses many foreign workers. Although the Taliban are claiming the attack was a direct response to Obama’s visit, it also seems likely the attack had been planned before the visit was known since it occurred on the one year anniversary of the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan (which Obama could not visit now, even under cover of darkness, and especially on the anniversary of bin Laden’s death).

The readiness and capabilities of Afghan security forces lie at the center of both the Strategic Partnership Agreement and the Taliban’s attack Wednesday morning. At the same time that Obama and Karzai signed their agreement that rests on Afghanistan taking the lead for security as the US exits, the Taliban attacked one of the primary housing compounds for foreign workers in the nation’s capital, just two weeks after another brazen attack in Kabul. If Afghan security forces are seen as unable to prevent attacks on foreigners in the capital, then there could be serious fallout for groups that would be anticipated to be necessary for the “rebuilding” phase once US troops are gone.

Groups trying to asses just how bad the attack was this morning will find confusing information. This report by AP claims the attackers made it inside the walls of the protected area:

The violence began around 6 a.m. in eastern Kabul with a series of explosions and gunfire ringing out from the privately guarded compound known as Green Village that houses hundreds of international contractors.

Shooting and blasts shook the city for hours as militants who had stormed into the compound held out against security forces, according to an official who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to release the information. Read more

Rohrabacher’s Team for Decentralizing Afghan Government: War Criminal, Thief and War Hawk

Portion of mass grave of Dostum's victims excavated in 2002 by Physicians for Human Rights. (Physicians for Human Rights photo)

Yesterday, I pointed out that Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai denied entry to his country by Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) over the weekend. At the end of that post, I posed a question:

Rohrabacher’s freedom-fighting then gave us a wonderful “hero” by the name of Osama bin Laden. Who will his latest adventures bring us?

It turns out that we can get a good handle on whom Rohrabacher wishes to promote in Afghanistan by going back to Rohrabacher’s own press release arising from his January 9 meeting in Berlin that brought his feud with Karzai to a head. Although Rohrabacher would like us to think that he is arguing for a more decentralized model of government in Afghanistan, his real motivation is revealed in the opening sentence of the press release, where he states he brought a group together “to discuss alternatives to Hamid Karazi’s consideration of including the Taliban in Afghanistan’s coalition government”.

Once again, we see Rohrabacher’s primary operating principle at work. His actions are determined by whom he has chosen as his enemy. Unfortunately, once Rohrabacher has chosen his enemy, all he seeks in an ally is someone who also opposes that enemy. As noted yesterday, that was the process that led him and his Freedom Fighters in the Reagan administration to ally us with Osama bin Laden against the Soviets when they were in Afghanistan. Now, with Karzai daring to negotiate with the Taliban, Rohrabacher has decided to team with anyone in Afghanistan whom he sees as opposing the Taliban. In doing so, he chose for his meeting in Berlin to present a group of “National Front Leaders” that contains the war lord responsible for the largest, most heinous war crime committed in Afghanistan since the turn of the century, a criminal former vice president of the country who was stopped with a suitcase containing $52 million and a former security chief described as an unapologetic hawk who advocates escalating the war in Afghanistan.

Batting leadoff for Rohrabacher’s All Stars is the notorious war criminal Rashid Dostum. Read more

Resistance Rabble-Rouser Rohrabacher Refused Entry to Afghanistan

Rohrabacher playing dress-up in Afghanistan. (Rohrabacher photo via Mother Jones)

Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) tried to pull a fast one over the weekend and sneak in as a “last minute replacement” on a Congressional delegation to Afghanistan. The problem was that, as BBC reported, the rest of the delegation had visas for entry but Rohrabacher did not. Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai learned that Rohrabacher had joined the group prior to it leaving Dubai for Kabul, and he instructed US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to ground the flight until Rohrabacher was removed.

I find it really hard to believe that Rohrabacher did not plan to be a part of the trip from the start, but wanted to avoid advance publication of his plans. Back in January, Rohrabacher, along with his usual co-conspirators Louie Gohmert (R-TX) and Steve King (R-IA), somehow managed to get Representative Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) to lend a patina of “bipartisanship” to a meeting held in Berlin that many viewed as a call to partition Afghanistan and to arm opposition groups such as the Northern Alliance. This meeting made Karzai “incredibly angry”, giving Rohrabacher good reason to try to stay below Karzai’s radar. Further, Rohrabacher also held a Congressional hearing on establishing an independent Balochistan, which, if drawn according to cultural lines, would take territory from Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.

The full list of Congressmembers on the weekend trip to Afghanistan has not been disclosed, but the fact Politico reports that it was headed by Gohmert supports my suspicion that Rohrabacher planned to attend all along. The timing for additional meddling in US-Afghanistan relations could not have been worse, because Sunday was when it was announced that the US and Afghanistan had finally reached agreement on the outlines of a long term agreement for US support after the withdrawal of fighting forces. Rohrabacher seems to be quite entertained by Karzai’s response. Returning to the Politico article: Read more

Disclosure of US Troops Posing With Body Parts Newest Threat to Afghanistan Stability

As I pointed out on Monday, the preferred story line surrounding the weekend Taliban attacks across Afghanistan was that Afghan security forces repulsed the attacks with little to no help from outside forces. In fact, Australia used this moment of public confidence in the capabilities of Afghan forces to announce that they would speed up withdrawal of their “forces” (with only 1500 troops there, the Australians hardly represent a true presence), joining NATO allies Canada and Norway, which already have withdrawn, and France, Germany and Britain, who have announced their withdrawal timetables.

Building on the weekend’s success story about Afghan capabilities, a major AP story this morning discusses US and NATO plans for the hand-off of security responsibility to Afghanistan:

The United States and its NATO allies are readying plans to pull away from the front lines in Afghanistan next year as President Barack Obama and fellow leaders try to show that the unpopular war is ending.

/snip/

This week’s sessions are meant to stitch together U.S. and NATO agreements on the pace of U.S. and allied combat withdrawal next year. U.S. and Afghan officials have already said they expect a shift to an Afghan military lead in combat operations by the middle of 2013, although the U.S. stresses that it will still have a large number of forces in Afghanistan as backup.

Afghan Defense Ministry spokesman Gen. Mohammad Zahir Azimi said Wednesday that the Afghans are on track to take the lead in securing the country by the end of 2013. Azimi said the Afghan Army has already reached its target number of 195,000 troops. Including police and other forces, Afghan security forces now number about 330,000.

A major test of the claim that conditions in Afghanistan are stabilizing will now come from the latest revelation of atrocities by US troops. The Los Angeles Times today published photos of multiple incidents of US troops posing with dismembered bodies of Afghan insurgents killed by roadside bombs:

The 82nd Airborne Division soldiers arrived at the police station in Afghanistan’s Zabol province in February 2010. They inspected the body parts. Then the mission turned macabre: The paratroopers posed for photos next to Afghan police, grinning while some held — and others squatted beside — the corpse’s severed legs.

/snip/

Two soldiers posed holding a dead man’s hand with the middle finger raised. A soldier leaned over the bearded corpse while clutching the man’s hand. Someone placed an unofficial platoon patch reading “Zombie Hunter” next to other remains and took a picture.

Given the recent responses to the disclosures of US troops urinating on dead insurgents and burning sacred books, this latest disclosure seems likely to generate a new round of violent protests. This also seems to be the sort of event that sparks further “green on blue” attacks (pdf) where Afghan forces kill NATO forces.

New green on blue killings would be a major setback to the claim that Afghan forces are nearing the ability to take over full responsibility for security, even though the official US line on such events is that they are “isolated incidents“. Similarly, increased attacks by the Taliban would go against Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s is explanation to his “brothers” that their attacks only increase the odds of foreign forces staying longer in Afghanistan.

Along with Vetos on US Interrogations, Afghanistan Gets a 10-Year Commitment

According to reports (VOA, AP, NYT) the US and Afghanistan have finalized their agreement on night raids. In addition to the night raid partnership detailed earlier in the week, the finalized agreement resolves the dispute over what happens to prisoners taken in night raids by giving Afghans authority to deny US interrogators access to detainees captured in night raids.

Also, Afghan authorities will have control over prisoners taken in night raids and will decide whether to allow U.S. interrogators access to detainees.

How long will it take for Karzai’s government to effectively put US Special Forces to work abusing his political enemies?

But look on the bright side! The news we’ve finally reached a night raids agreement  means we can look forward to 10 more years of propping up the Afghan Army.

General Allen said the signing meant that the two countries were “ready to look forward to a successful summit in Chicago in the wake of the signing of the strategic partnership agreement.”

The strategic partnership agreement commits the United States to another decade of involvement in the country in areas like economic development and education.

The meeting in Chicago is a NATO summit at which countries involved in the war are expected to commit to continuing financial contributions to Afghanistan as well as committing to train and equip the forces.

Not that I expect the Karzai regime (or whoever runs to replace him in 2014) to remain in power that long. But think about how many teachers in the US we’ll get to fire to pay for 10 more years in Afghanistan.

Another Attempt to Understand the Panjwai Victim Discrepancies

As I laid out here and here, there seems like there’s a discrepancy between the numbers and sexes of victims listed in Robert Bales’ charge sheet and those listed in public accounts. Whereas accounts like WSJ one report there were 8 male and 8 female victims, the charge sheet lists 10 female and 7 male victims.

I thought I might have found the source of the discrepancy–confusion about the sex of Ismatullah Wazir. Whereas WSJ lists Ismatullah as a 13-year old boy, Al Jazeera lists Esmatullah as Wazir’s daughter, not son. I believe Ismatullah is a male name, and Wazir has referred to losing multiple sons in the attack, so I suspect Ismatullah is male. But if the government treated Ismatullah as female, then the numbers might work out.

But they don’t. I asked Major Christopher Ophardt, a public affairs officer at Lewis-McChord if that was the source of the discrepancy. He said he neither has the unredacted version nor are names releasable. But he did say that the alleged murder victims consist of 4 adult males, 4 adult females, 3 male children, and 6 female children.

I don’t think that helps to resolve the problem.

Assuming WSJ’s report is correct but that Ismatullah was counted as female, here are the numbers:

Mohammed Dawood: adult male

Wazir’s family: mother, wife, sister-in-law (3 adult females); brother (1 adult male); 4 daughters plus Ismatullah (5 female children); son and nephew (2 male children)

Syed Jaan: wife (1 adult female); brother and brother-in-law (2 adult males); nephew (1 male child)

Which would be 4 adult females, 4 adult males, 5 female children, and 3 male children.

Now, as orionATL and others have reminded me, there’s one other unique claim of deaths (as I hope to show, I think the other stories intersect in a manageable way): that of Jan Agha, who described his father, mother, sister and–apparently though not explicitly–brother’s deaths to Reuters. Since he is 20, his siblings could easily be children. If his claims were added and Ismatullah were counted as female that woulds result in 5 adult male, 5 adult female, 4 male and 6 female children, which wouldn’t work either.

One other possibility is that Syed Jaan’s 6-year old niece, Zardana, who was shot in the head and was reportedly thought likely to die, has since passed away (although initial reports say that’s not how the number grew to 17), which without Agha’s claims and with Ismatullah counted as female would work out. Though one of the grievously wounded victims is a female child with a head wound, which could also be Zardana.

In short, the numbers still don’t add up.

US Source Contradicts CNN’s Reporting in Anonymous Leaks to CNN

Yesterday, CNN released detailed onsite reporting from Yalda Hakim from the massacre site in Panjwai. (h/t SH) Today, CNN posted a follow-up interview–accompanied by a story based largely on comments from an anonymous US official. It’s the latter story that Jim wrote about here, noting that:

  • Robert Bales was assigned to guard duty the night of the attack
  • The US has not had access to the sites of the massacre and therefore they have not been treated as a crime scene
  • Bales was spotted by an Afghan guard leaving the first time around 1, and not seen on return; he reportedly spent 30 minutes on base and told his roommate he had been shooting Afghans; a second Afghan guard spotted him leaving so alerted the Americans; in response they started the search party to look for him; they found him returning at 3:30
  • The US collected DNA samples from blood on Bales’ clothing

Though CNN doesn’t say it, some of the details contradict Hakim’s onsite reporting, notably, her interview with several of the Afghan guards starting at 9:44 and again at 11:26. Between them, the guards offer the following story:

  • One Afghan guard, Naimutallah (sp), said he saw Bales returning at 1:30 (and even cocked his gun in apparent alarm); he told the–presumably Afghan–duty officer, who “went to the interpreter to notify the foreign forces” of Bales’ return
  • Another Afghan guard said he saw Bales leave at 2:30; his “patrol” called the–presumably American–platoon commander to tell him an American had left

In other words, the Afghans say they at least tried to alert the Americans when Bales returned to the base, whereas today’s story says no one alerted Americans of Bales’ return the first time, The guards’ story also suggests Bales was  on base for a full hour. The American version claims not to know when Bales returned, but somehow is certain  that Bales was only on base for 30 minutes. And if the second guard is correct that Bales left at 2:30, it means that it took a FOB an hour to mount a search team, at which point Bales had already killed another 12 victims.

Read more

DOD’s Non-Denial Denial Suggests They May Consider Some Panjwai Dead Legitimate Targets

As I noted in this post, there is a discrepancy between the people Sergeant Robert Bales is accused of murdering and the people Afghans report to be victims. While DOD has redacted the names of Bales’ alleged victims, at least two women and one man are on that list but not among those named by Afghans. Which means that at least two men were killed that DOD does not, now, consider murder victims.

DOD spokesperson Commander Bill Speaks gave this non-denial denial when I asked whether that meant there were 20 victims (I followed up but have gotten no response yet):

The evidence available to the investigation team indicates 17 murder victims, as is outlined in the charge sheet. To suggest that Gen. Allen’s answers yesterday would be “consistent” with more victims ignores the fact that the questions posed to him were in the context of 17 rather than 16 victims.

Now apparently Speaks thinks I’m dumb. He suggests I ignored the journalists’ question, when Allen did so.

There is a — there was an increase in the number of what we believe to have been those who were killed tragically in this event. But this is — the number increased was based upon the initial reporting by the Afghans.  And so we should not be surprised that in fact, as the investigation went forward, that an — that an additional number was added to that.

Speaks suggests that Allen’s equivocation–his description of those “who were killed tragically” as opposed to those who died, his careful avoidance of any numbers, and his discussion of “an additional number,” which would seem to suggest more than one additional victim (consistent with the potentially 3 included in the charge sheet not described by Afghans)–directly answered the journalists’ question, when in fact all it did is suggest the numbers might continue to grow.

Further, Speaks, like Allen, appears to be parsing murder victims as opposed to total dead.

All of which leads me to further refine my speculation: I suspect the night of the murders started with a night raid launched in retaliation for the IED strike earlier in the week, during which at least two men considered to be legitimate targets were killed. But that along with those “legitimate” deaths–perhaps because the male head of family targets were not home during the raid (both Mohammed Wazir and Syed Jaan were out of the village during the attack)–a bunch of women and kids got killed as well.

Such an explanation would explain many of the seeming discrepancies in the story. It would account for the claims that at least 12 men were involved in the raid, used walkie talkies, and had helicopters. It would account for the stories that in a few cases, just one male was killed and women and children were left, as would happen in a night raid “properly” conducted. It would also explain why Bales made two trips off the base–perhaps the first time as part of the raid, and the second time to try to cover up, by burning, the illegal victims that resulted.

And it would explain both why Afghans made assertive requests about SOFA and why DOD is being so touchy right now. The US can’t really stay in Afghanistan if it can’t conduct night raids; otherwise, the local knowledge of Afghans would more than negate the advantage of our superior technology.Yet, this incident happened just after Karzai had already accelerated the prison transfer and was pushing back on night raids.

It is bad enough that an American solider is alleged to have gone a rampage killing 17 civilians. But if he did so as part of a night raid, it will give Afghans precisely the justification they need to prohibit any more night raids.

Which is why the government is trying so hard to pin this attack on Bales’ personal failings rather than our war’s.

Update: OK, I’m getting closer to a clear answer. In response to this question,

1) Are there are just 17 known murder victims, total?

2) Are there just 17 Afghans killed in the villages that night–whether by murder or other legal status, such as legitimate military target–total?

Speaks gave this answer:

1) Yes

2) I’m not aware of any military engagements in the vicinity of the alleged murders involving US or other coalition forces, but will verify with ISAF.

Somewhere–I’ll have to find it–Kabul-based reporting said that night raids are not always reported up the chain of command (I believe it was an ISAF based spokesperson saying they might not know if there were a raid, generally).

Update: See this post for an update from Speaks. The short answer? DOD says there were no military operations in the villages that night.

Time to Start Rethinking How We Define “Insurgent”

I was struck by this passage in the WSJ’s description of the three green on blue killings yesterday.

Since the year began, more coalition service members have been gunned down by Afghan troops than by insurgents. A total of 16 members of the U.S.-led coalition were killed this year in nine such “green on blue” incidents, representing nearly one-third of the 50 coalition fatalities caused by hostile action.

After all, at the point when the biggest danger to ISAF troops Afghan security forces, can we so easily define who is and who is not an insurgent? If Afghan security forces are increasingly using their proximity to attack coalition forces, how do we distinguish them from insurgents except in who buys their guns?

Particularly given this news, from Murdoch’s less respectable rag.

Afghan intelligence officials arrested 16 people after an apparent mass suicide bombing attack was foiled in Kabul, according to reports out Tuesday.

Some 11 suicide bombing vests were also seized from inside Afghanistan’s defense ministry, according to security officials, cited by news website Khaama Press.

A number of the suspects were members of the Afghan National Army, the security sources added.

It is believed the suspects planned to detonate the bombing vests on buses transporting more than 1,000 staff from one compound to the next, Sky News said.

Whether these recent attacks are simply a response to a series of US insults–like pissing on corpses, burning Qurans, and killing women and children. Or whether a significant number of Afghan security forces have decided it’s only a matter of time until the Taliban return and it’s better to prove fealty now, while there’s still time, it seems we may have passed the point where even the myths about training will be successful anymore.

Several weeks ago, TomDispatch published Ann Jones’s explanation why she’s always opposed training a big Afghan army. The whole thing is worth reading, but particularly what she says about how the history of Afghan security forces switching sides.

Second, take just a moment to do something Washington has long been adverse to — review a little basic Afghan history as it applies to Plan A.  Start with the simplest of all facts: in the country’s modern history, no Afghan national army has ever saved a government, or even tried.  More often, such an army has either sat on its hands during a coup d’état or actually helped to overthrow the incumbent ruler.

[snip]

In short, for their own safety and advancement, Afghans back a winner, and if he goes into decline, they ditch him for a rising star.  To spot that winner is the mark of the intelligent survivor.  To stick loyally to a losing cause, as any patriotic American would do, seems to an Afghan downright stupid.

Now, apply this to the ANA as American and NATO troops draw down in 2014.  Any army intended to defend a nation must be loyal to the political leaders governing the country.  Estimates among Afghan experts of how long the ANA would be loyal to Afghan President Hamid Karzai start at two weeks, and remember, 2014 is a presidential election year, with Karzai barred by the constitution from seeking another term.  In other words, Obama’s Plan A calls for urgently building up a national army to defend a government that will not exist before our own combat troops leave the country.

Now the plot to use suicide bombers to attack thousands may well be a matter of Taliban infiltration. But it appears increasingly likely that we’ve passed the time where Afghans have recalculated the long-time winners of this war, and have started to act accordingly. Hell, I bet even Hamid Karzai is doing the same.

And across the border, Pakistanis are demanding a return to the Reagan rules of engagement.

Pakistan’s military wants to go back to the “Reagan rules — the way the CIA operated with the ISI against the Soviets” inside Afghanistan, says former CIA officer Bruce Riedel, of the Brookings Institute. “We give them a big check, and they make every decision about how that is spent. Minimal American footprint in country, or involvement in actual fighting the bad guys.”

“We cannot trust the ISI to fight this war for us,” after finding bin Laden in a Pakistani military town, “showing the ISI was either clueless or complicit,” Riedel said.

This is, of course, how we built a bunch of mujahadeen who came back to haunt us.

Are we so sure we’re not already doing that ourselves in Afghanistan?