Posts

The Last Time NSA Submitted Secret Authorities, It Was Actively Hiding Illegal Wiretapping

Via Mike Masnick, I see that in addition to submitting a new state secrets declaration and a filing claiming EFF’s clients in Jewel v. NSA don’t have standing, the government also submitted a secret supplemental brief on its statement of authorities, which EFF has challenged.

The secret supplemental brief is interesting given the government’s outrageous state secrets claim in the lawsuit against United Against a Nuclear Iran, in which it refuses to explain why it must protect the intelligence sources and methods of an allegedly independent NGO. It seems the government’s state secrets claims are getting even more outrageous than they already were.

That’s particularly interesting given what appears to be the outlines of a claim that if the court recognizes Jewel’s standing, then all hell will break loose.

Due to the failings of Plaintiffs’ evidence described above, the Court need not consider the impact of the state secrets privilege on the standing issue. However, if the Court were to find Plaintiffs’ declarations admissible and sufficiently probative of Plaintiffs’ standing to raise a genuine issue meriting further inquiry (which it should not), adjudication f the standing issue could not proceed without risking exceptionally grave damage to national security (a threshold issue on which the Court requested briefing). That is so because operational details of Upstream collection that are subject to the DNI’s assertion of the state secrets privilege in this case are necessary to address Plaintiffs’ theory of standing. The Government presented this evidence to the Court in the DNI’s and NSA’s classified declarations of December 20, 2013, and supplements it with the Classified Declaration of Miriam P., NSA, submitted in camera, ex parte, herewith. Disclosure of this evidence would risk informing our Nation’s adversaries of the operational details of the NSA’s Upstream collection, including the identities of electronic-communications-service providers assisting with Upstream collection.

Behind these claims of grave harm are the reality that if US persons started to get standing under the dragnet, then under John Bates’ rules (in which illegal wiretapping is only illegal if the government knows US persons are targeted), the entire program would become illegal. So I suspect the government is ultimately arguing that Jewel can’t have standing because it would make the entire program illegal (which is sort of the point!).

But the biggest reason I’m intrigued by the government’s sneaky filing is because of what happened the last time it submitted such a sneaky filing.

I laid out in this post how a state secrets filing submitted in EFF’s related Shubert lawsuit by Keith Alexander on October 30, 2009 demonstrably lied. Go back and read it–it’s a good one. A lot of what I show involves Alexander downplaying the extent of the phone dragnet problems.

But we now know more about how much more Alexander was downplaying in that declaration.

As I show in this working thread, it is virtually certain that on September 30, 2009, Reggie Walton signed this order, effectively shutting down the Internet dragnet (I’m just now noticing that ODNI did not — as it has with the other FISC dragnet orders — release a copy with the timestamp that goes on all of these orders, which means we can’t determine what time of the day this was signed). Some time in the weeks before October 30, DOJ had submitted this notice, admitting that NSA had been violating the limits on “metadata” collection from the very start, effectively meaning it had been collecting content in the US for 5 years.

Precisely the kind of illegal dragnet Virginia Shubert was suing the government to prevent.

Mind you, there are hints of NSA’s Internet dragnet violations in Alexander’s declaration. In ¶59, Alexander says of the dragnet, “The FISC Telephone Business Records Order was most recently reauthorized on September 3, 2009, with authority continuing until October 30, 2009” (Walton signed the October 30, 2009 phone dragnet order around 2:30 ET, which would be 11:30 in NDCA where this declaration was filed). In ¶58, he says, “The FISC Pen Register Order was most recently reauthorized on [redacted], 2009, and requires continued assistance by the providers through [redacted] 2009” (this is a longer redaction than October 30 would take up, so it may reflect the 5PM shutdown Walton had imposed). So it may be that one of the redacted passages in Alexander’s declaration admitted that FISC had ordered the Internet dragnet shut down.

In addition, footnote 24 is quite long (note it carries onto a second page); particularly given that the tense used to describe the dragnets in the referenced paragraph differ (the Internet dragnet is in the past tense, the phone dragnet is in the present tense), it is possible Alexander admitted to both the compliance violation and that NSA had “voluntarily” stopped querying the dragnet data.

Further, in his later discussions, he refers to this data as “non-content metadata” and “records about communication transactions,” which may reflect a tacit (or prior) acknowledgment that the NSA had been collecting more than what, to the telecoms who were providing it, was legally metadata, or, if you will, was in fact “content as metadata.”

To the extent that the plaintiffs “dragnet” allegations also implicate other NSA activities, such as the bulk collection of non-content communications meta data or the collection of communications records, see, e.g., Amended Compl ¶58, addressing their assertions would require disclosure of NSA sources and methods that would cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.

[snip]

Accordingly, adjudication of plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the collection of non-content meta data and records about communication transactions would risk or require disclosure of critical NSA sources and methods for [redacted] contacts of terrorist communications as well as the existence of current NSA activities under FISC Orders. Despite media speculation about those activities, official confirmation and disclosure of the NSA’s bulk collection and targeted analysis of telephony meta data would confirm to all of our foreign adversaries [redacted] the existence of these critical intelligence capabilities and thereby severely undermine NSA’s ability to gather information concerning terrorist connections and cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.

So it seems that Alexander provided some glimpse to Vaughn Walker of the troubles with the Internet dragnet program. So when after several long paragraphs describing the phone dragnet problems (making no mention even of the related Internet dragnet ones), Alexander promised to work with the FISC on the phone dragnet “and other compliance issues,” he likely invoked an earlier reference to the far more egregious Internet dragnet ones.

NSA is committed to working with the FISC on this and other compliance issues to ensure that this vital intelligence tool works appropriately and effectively. For purposes of this litigation, and the privilege assertions now made by the DNI and by the NSA, the intelligence sources and methods described herein remain highly classified and the disclosure that [redacted] would compromise vital NSA sources and methods and result in exceptionally grave harm to national security.

I find it tremendously telling how closely Alexander ties the violations themselves to the state secrets invocation.

The thing is, at this point in the litigation, the only honest thing to submit would have been a declaration stating, “Judge Walker? It turns out we’ve just alerted the FISC that we’ve been doing precisely what the plaintiffs in this case have accused of us — we’ve been doing it, in fact, for 5 years.” An honest declaration would have amounted to concession of the suit.

But it didn’t.

And that state secrets declaration, like the one the government submitted at the end of September, was accompanied by a secret statement of authorities, a document that (unless I’m mistaken) is among the very few that the government hasn’t released to EFF.

Which is why I find it so interesting that the government is now, specifically with reference to upstream collection, following the same approach.

Do these secret statements of authority basically say, “We admit it, judge, we’ve been violating the law in precisely the way the plaintiffs claim we have. But you have to bury that fact behind state secrets privilege, because our dragnets are more important than the Fourth Amendment”? Or do they claim they’re doing this illegal dragnettery under EO 12333 so the court can’t stop them?

If so, I can see why the government would want to keep them secret.

Update: I originally got the name of Shubert wrong. Virginia Shubert is the plaintiff.

The Other Authority for the Phone Dragnet

Back in February, I noted Ron Wyden’s question for then acting OLC head Caroline Krass (she’s now CIA’s General Counsel) about Jack Goldsmith’s 2004 OLC opinion authorizing the dragnet.

In the follow-up questions for CIA General Counsel nominee Caroline Krass, Ron Wyden asked a series of his signature loaded questions. With it, he pointed to the existence of still-active OLC advice — Jack Goldsmith’s May 6, 2004 memo on Bush’s illegal wiretap program — supporting the conduct of a phone (but not Internet) dragnet based solely on Presidential authorization.

He started by asking “Did any of the redacted portions of the May 2004 OLC opinion address bulk telephony metadata collection?

Krass largely dodged the question — but did say that “it would be appropriate for the May 6, 2004 OLC opinion to be reviewed to determine whether additional portions of the opinion can be declassified.”

In other words, the answer is (it always is when Wyden asks these questions) “yes.”

This is obvious in any case, because Goldsmith discusses shutting down the Internet dragnet program, and spends lots of time discussing locating suspects.

Wyden then asked if the opinion relied on something besides FISA to conduct the dragnet.

[D]id the OLC rely at that time on a statutory basis other than the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act for the authority to conduct bulk telephony metadata collection?

Krass dodged by noting the declassification had not happened so she couldn’t answer.

But the 2009 Draft NSA IG Report makes it clear the answer is yes: NSA collected such data, both before and after the 2004 hospital showdown, based solely on Presidential authorization (though on occasion DOJ would send letters to the telecoms to reassure them both the metadata and content collection was legal).

Finally, Wyden asks the kicker: “Has the OLC taken any action to withdraw this opinion?”

Krass makes it clear the memo is still active, but assures us it’s not being used.

This is an exchange Center for National Security Studies Kate Martin brings back into the discussion of whether USA Freedumber actually ends bulk collection.

[W]e don’t know whether the Justice Department has opined that other statutory authorities – not now addressed in the USA Freedom Act – could authorize the NSA’s bulk collection.  Without this knowledge, we can’t be certain whether the proposed amendments to section 501 (215) will in fact be sufficient to prohibit the NSA from engaging in bulk collection of metadata using some other hitherto unidentified authority.

This is not a fanciful concern.  There is in fact a still partly secret OLC opinion by the Justice Department that may address precisely this question.

CNSS is using the debate over USA Freedumber to demand the Administration declassify the rest of that opinion.

When the government declassified the statements submitted in the Jewel v. NSA case last December, it basically declassified everything that should be in that memo. So what’s the holdup on releasing the memo itself?

DOJ’s Idea of an Appropriate Passive-Aggressive Response to Accusations They Destroyed Evidence: Destroy More Evidence

On Friday May 30, as I reported, EFF filed a motion accusing the government of destroying evidence it was obligated to keep in EFF’s NSA lawsuits.

Later that day, EFF Legal Director Cindy Cohn emailed her contact at DOJ, Marcia (Marcy) Berman, saying,

Jewel plaintiffs are okay with [a deadline extension] if the government can assure us that no additional information will be destroyed in the meantime.

As you can see, we went ahead and filed [the motion on spoliation].

The following Monday, after Cohn asked Berman, “Does that mean no additional information will be destroyed in the meantime?” Berman answered,

What it means is that we have already explained in our opening brief that we are in compliance with our preservation obligations and do not feel that we should have to make any further assurances or undertakings to accommodate plaintiffs’ need for additional time.

Later that day, Cohn reminded Berman that the Temporary Restraining Order covering destruction of information “including but not limited to … telephone metadata” remained in place. Cohn continued,

You appear to be saying that routine destruction of post-FISC material is continuing to occur regardless of the TRO; please confirm whether this is correct.

Berman responded, obliquely, yes.

The Court is presently considering whether the Government must preserve material obtained under Section 702 of FISA in the context of the Jewel/Shubert litigation. In the meantime, pending resolution of the preservation issues in this case, we have been examining with our clients how to address the preservation of data acquired under the Section 702 program in light of FISC imposed data retention limits (even though we disagree that the program is at issue in Jewel and Shubert).

Hoffman wrote a bunch more about “technical” “classified” blah blah blah, which I’ll return to, because I think it’s probably significant.

But for now, EFF filed for an emergency order to enforce the TRO issued back in March. Judge Jeffrey White has demanded a response from the government by noon tomorrow (they had wanted a week).

I can’t think of a more relevant NSA practice to a suit that relies significantly on Mark Klein’s whistle-blowing about the room where AT&T diverted and copied large amounts of telecom traffic than upstream 702 collection, in which AT&T and other telecom providers divert and copy large amounts of telecom traffic. While I’m not certain this evidence pertains to upstream — and not PRISM — EFF suggests that is included.

In communications with the government this week, plaintiffs learned to their surprise that the government is continuing to destroy evidence relating to the mass interception of Internet communications it is conducting under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This would include evidence relating to its use of “splitters” to conduct bulk interceptions of the content of Internet communications from the Internet “backbone” network of AT&T, as described in multiple FISC opinions and in the evidence of Mark Klein and J. Scott Marcus, ECF Nos. 84, 85, 89, 174 at Ex. 1

If it is, then it seems all the more damning, given that upstream collection is the practice that most obviously violates the ban on wiretapping Americans in the US.

EFF filed a motion accusing the government of illegally destroying evidence. And the government’s response was to destroy more evidence.

Update: The government has asked for an emergency stay of the Court’s June 5 order (which is actually a March 10 order, but the government doesn’t admit that) because NSA says so.

Undersigned counsel have been advised by the National Security Agency that compliance with the June 5, 2014 Order would cause severe operational consequences for the National Security Agency (NSA’s) national security mission, including the possible suspension of the Section 702 program and potential loss of access to lawfully collected signals intelligence information on foreign intelligence targets that is vital to NSA’s foreign intelligence mission

There’s something funky here — perhaps that some of this actually belongs to GCHQ? I dunno — which is leading the government to be so obstinate. Let’s hope we learn what it is.

Update: And EFF objected to DOJ’s request for a stay, pointing out what I did: that what they’re really asking for is blessing for ignoring the March 10 order.

Wyden and Udall Accuse DOJ of Misleading SCOTUS about Upstream Even as NSA Misleads NDCA about Upstream

As Charlie Savage reported this morning, Senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall continue their ceaseless efforts to get NSA and DOJ to tell the truth. They (along with Martin Heinrich) wrote a letter to DOJ in November complaining about representations made in the Amnesty v. Clapper case. DOJ responded. And now Wyden and Udall have just written another response.

In addition to complaining about the government’s notice to defendants, Wyden and Udall claim DOJ improperly hid Section 702 upstream collection from SCOTUS by claiming the Amnesty plaintiffs could only be swept up in the dragnet if they communicated with a target.

These statements — if taken at face value — appear to foreclose the possibility of collection under section 702 intercepting any communications that are not to or from particular targets. In other words, the Justice Department indicated that communications that are merely “about” a target would not be collected. But recently declassified court opinions make it clear that legitimate communications about particular targets can also be intercepted under this authority. Since this fact was classified at the time, the plaintiffs did not raise it, but in our view this does not make these misleading statements acceptable.

The Justice Department’s reply also states that the “about” collection “did not bear upon the legal issues in the case.” But in fact, these misleading statements about the limits of section 702 surveillance appear to have informed the Supreme Court’s analysis. In writing for the majority, Justice Alito echoed your statements by the Court by stating that the “respondents’ theory necessarily rests on their assertion that the Government will target other individuals — namely their foreign contacts.” This statement, like your statements, appears to foreclose the possibility of “about” collection.

[snip]

[W]hile the Justice Department may claim that the Amnesty plaintiffs’ arguments would have been “equally speculative” if they had referenced the “about” collection, that should be a determination for the courts, and not the Justice Department, to make.

After laying this out, they conclude by accusing the Executive of making “misleading statements to the public, Congress and the courts.”

They don’t name all the Courts, though.

They might want to start collecting a list of all the courts DOJ and NSA have lied to, though. Because even as the Senators and DOJ were having this squabble in DC, NSA was continuing to misinform courts on the other side of the country.

Consider how then Acting NSA Deputy Director Frances Fleisch described upstream collection — and the collection of entirely domestic communications that FISC deemed illegal — in a then-sealed declaration in the EFF Jewel case submitted 4 days before DOJ responded to the Senators.

Once a target has been approved, the NSA uses two means to acquire the target’s electronic communications. First, it acquires such communications directly from compelled U.S.-based providers. This has been publicly referred to as the NSA’s PRISM collection. Second, in addition to collection directly from providers, the NSA collects electronic communications with the compelled assistance of electronic communications service providers as they transit Internet “backbone” facilities within the United States.

[snip]

In an opinion issued on October 3, 2001, the FISC found the NSA’s proposed minimization procedures as applied to the NSA’s upstream collection of Internet transactions containing multiple communications, or “MCTs,” deficient. In response, the NSA modified its proposed procedures and the FISC subsequently determined that the NSA adequately remedied the deficiencies such that the procedures met the applicable statutory and constitutional requirements, and allowed the collection to continue.

That is, Fleisch doesn’t even hint that the problem on which Bates ruled — the MCTs — consisted of entirely domestic communications unrelated to those mentioning the “about” selector. She doesn’t even hint that in addition to those MCTs, upstream collection also includes over 4 times as many completely domestic communications — SCTs — as well. She doesn’t reveal that John Bates threatened NSA with sanctions over distributing illegally collected domestic person content. And all of these issues are central to the Jewel complaint, which has always focused on telecoms collecting US person content at circuits. (I believe earlier declarations to NDCA were even more incomplete or downright dishonest on this issue, though will need to show that in a later post.)

In fact, EFF complained about this omission its response to the government’s declarations, noting that upstream about collection is precisely what whistleblower Mark Klein revealed back in 2006.

Public disclosures over the past six months, however, provide substantially more information about these collection practices than the government’s passing references. In particular, the government has publicly released an opinion of the FISC confirming that “‘upstream collection’ refers to the acquisition of Internet communications as they transit the ‘internal backbone’ facilities” of telecommunications firms, such as AT&T. Mem. Op. at 26, Redacted, No. [Redacted] (FISC Sep. 25, 2012) (emphasis added) (Ex. 1).

[snip]

These descriptions of upstream Internet surveillance are functionally identical to the surveillance configuration described by the [Mark] Klein evidence: a system designed to acquire Internet communications as they flow between AT&T’s Common Backbone Internet network to the networks of other providers.

The FISA Court ruled that NSA had been breaking the law and violating the Constitution for at least 3 years leading up to the 2011 decision. And neither DOJ nor NSA have bothered telling courts ruling on the legality of the program about that fact.

It’s pretty impressive that the Executive can mislead courts about the same subject in so many places at once.

But I guess that’s just the flip side of an omnipresent spying agency, that it can also serve as an omnipresent lying agency.

Turns Out the NSA “May” Destroy Evidence of Crimes before 5 Years Elapse

The metadata collected under this order may be kept online (that is, accessible for queries by cleared analysts) for five years, at which point it shall be destroyed. — Phone dragnet order, December 12, 2008

The Government “takes its preservation obligations with the utmost seriousness,” said a filing signed by Assistant Attorneys General John Carlin and Stuart Delery submitted Thursday in response to Presiding FISA Court Judge Reggie Walton’s accusation they had made material misstatements to him regarding the question of destroying phone dragnet data.

Recognizing that data collected pursuant to the Section 215 program could be potentially relevant to, and subject to preservation obligations in, a number of cases challenging the legality of the program, including First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles  v. NSA,

… Signals Intelligence Division Director Theresa Shea wrote in her March 17 declaration (starting at page 81) explaining what the government has actually done to protect data under those suits.

At which point Shea proceeded to admit that the government hadn’t been preserving the data they recognized was potentially relevant to the suits at hand.

… since the inception of the FISC-authorized bulk telephony metadata program in 2006, the FISC’s orders authorizing the bulk collection of telephony metadata under FISA Section 501 (known also as the Section 215 program) require that metadata obtained by the NSA under this authority be destroyed no later than five years after their collection. In 2011, the NSA began compliance with this requirement (when the first metadata collected under the FISC authority was ready to be aged off) and continued to comply with it until this Court’s March 10 order and the subsequent March 12, 2014 order of the FISC.

Thursday’s filing added to that clarity, not only saying so in a footnote, but then submitting another filing to make sure the footnote was crystal clear.

Footnote 6 on page 5 was intended to convey that “[c]onsistent with the Government’s understanding of these orders in Jewel and Shubert, prior to the filing of the Government’s Motion for Second Amendment to Primary Order, the Government complied with this Court’s requirements that metadata obtained by the NSA under Section 215 authority be destroyed no later than five years after their collection.”

The significance seems clear. The Government admits it could potentially have a preservation obligation from the filing of the first Section 215 suit, Klayman v. Obama, on June 6, 2013. But nevertheless, it destroyed data for 9 months during which it recognized it could potentially have a preservation obligation.  That means data through at least March 9, 2009 and perhaps as late as September 10, 2009 may already be destroyed, assuming reports of biannual purging is correct. Which would perhaps not coincidentally cover almost all of the phone dragnet violations discovered over the course of 2009. It would also cover all, or almost all, of the period (probably)  NSA did not have adequate means of identifying the source of its data (meaning that Section 215 data may have gotten treated with the lesser protections of EO 12333 data).

And the amount of data may be greater, given that NSA now describes in its 5 year age-off requirement no affirmative  obligation to keep data five years.

This all means the government apparently has already destroyed data that might be implicated in the scenario Judge Jeffrey White (hypothetically) raised in a hearing on March 19, in which he imagined practices of graver Constitutional concern than the program as it currently operates five years ago.

THE COURT: Well, what if the NSA was doing something, say, five years ago that was broader in scope, and more problematical from the constitutional perspective, and those documents are now aged out? And — because now under the FISC or the orders of the FISC Court, the activities of the NSA have — I mean, again, this is all hypothetical — have narrowed. And wouldn’t the Government — wouldn’t the plaintiffs then be deprived of that evidence, if it existed, of a broader, maybe more constitutionally problematic evidence, if you will?

MR. GILLIGAN: There — we submit a twofold answer to that, Your Honor.

We submit that there are documents that — and this goes to Your Honor’s Question 5B, perhaps. There are documents that could shed light on the Plaintiffs’ standing, whether we’ve actually collected information about their communications, even in the absence of those data.

As far as — as Your Honor’s hypothetical goes, it’s a question that I am very hesitant to discuss on the public record; but I can say if this is something that the Court wishes to explore, we could we could make a further classified ex parte submission to Your Honor on that point.

According to the NSA’s own admissions, until just over 5 years ago, the NSA was watchlisting as many as 3,000 Americans without doing the requisite First Amendment review required by law. And that evidence — and potentially the derivative queries that arose from it — is apparently now gone.

Which puts a new spin on the narratives offered in the press about DOJ’s delay in deciding what to do with this evidence. WSJ described the semiannual age-off and suggested the issue with destroying evidence might pertain to standing.

As the NSA program currently works, the database holds about five years of data, according to officials and some declassified court opinions. About twice a year, any call record more than five years old is purged from the system, officials said.

A particular concern, according to one official, is that the older records may give certain parties legal standing to pursue their cases, and that deleting the data could erase evidence that the phone records of those individuals or groups were swept up in the data dragnet.

FP’s sources suggested DOJ was running up against that semiannual deadline.

A U.S. official familiar with the legal process said the question about what to do with the phone records needn’t have been handled at practically the last minute. “The government was coming up on a five-year deadline to delete the data. Lawsuits were pending. The Justice Department could have approached the FISC months ago to resolve this,” the official said, referring to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

There should be no February to March deadline. Assuming the semiannual age-off were timed to March 1, there should have already been a September 1 deadline, at which point NSA presumably would have destroyed everything moving forward to March 1, 2009.

Which may mean NSA and DOJ put it off to permit some interim age-off, all the out of control violations from 2009.

We shall see. EFF and DOJ will still litigate this going forward. But as I look more closely at the timing of all this, DOJ’s very belated effort to attempt to preserve data in February seems to have served, instead, to put off dealing with preservation orders until the most potentially damning data got destroyed.

All of this is separate from the dispute over whether DOJ violated the preservation order in Jewel, and that case may be coming up on the 5 year destruction of the last violative Internet metadata, which might be aged off by April 30 (based on the assumption the Internet dragnet got shut down on October 30, 2009).

But even for he more narrow question of the phone dragnet, for which the government admits it may have data retention obligations, the government seems to have already violated those obligations and, in the process, destroyed some of the most damning data about the program. 

Why Did 3 Top DOJ Officials Feed Their Dog DOJ’s Homework?

DOJ has submitted what it claims is an explanation for why it materially misstated facts to Reggie Walton in discussions about destroying phone dragnet data. (See this post and this post for background.)

As you recall, Walton had read EFF’s emails closely enough to realize that EFF had asked Civil Division lawyers why they had claimed there was no protection order when they believed they had one.

A review of the E-mail Correspondence indicates that as early as February 26, 2014, the day after the government filed its February 25 Motion, the plaintiffs in Jewel and First Unitarian indeed sought to clarify why the preservation orders in Jewel and Shubert were not referenced in that motion. E-mail Correspondence at 6-7. The Court’s review of the E-mail Correspondence suggests that the DOJ attorneys may have perceived the preservation orders in Jewel and Shubert to be immaterial to the February 25 Motion because the metadata at issue in those cases was collected under what DOJ referred to as the “President’s Surveillance Program” (i.e., collection pursuant to executive authority), as opposed to having been collected under Section 215 pursuant to FISC orders — a proposition with which plaintiffs’ counsel disagreed. Id at 4. As this Court noted in the March 12 Order and Opinion, it is ultimately up to the Northern District of California, rather than the FISC, to determine what BR metadata is relevant to the litigation pending before the court.

As the government is well aware, it has a heightened duty of candor to the Court in ex parte procedings. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(d) (2013). Regardless of the government’s perception of the materiality of the preservation orders in Jewel andShubert to its February 25 Motion, the government was on notice, as of February 26, 2014, that the plaintiffs in Jewel and First Unitarian believed that orders issued by the District Court for the Northern District of California required the preservation of the FISA telephony metadata at issue in the government’s February 25 Motion. E-mail Correspondence at 6-7. The fact that the plaintiffs had this understanding of the preservation orders–even if the government had a contrary understanding–was material to the FISC’s consideration of the February 25 Motion. The materiality of that fact is evidenced by the Court’s statement, based on the information provided by the government in the February 25 Motion, that “there is no indication that nay of the plaintiffs have sought discovery of this information or made any effort to have it preserved.” March 7 Opinion and Order at 8-9.

The government, upon learning this information, should have made the FISC aware of the preservation orders and of the plaintiffs’ understanding of their scopre, regardless of whether the plaintiffs had made a “specific request” that the FISC be so advised. Not only did the government fail to do so, but the E-mail Correspondence suggests that on February 28, 2014, the government sought to dissuade plaintiffs’ counsel from immediately raising this issue with the FISC or the Northern District of California. E-mail Correspondence at 5.

DOJ’s excuse for not telling Walton EFF believed they had a protection order is roughly as follows:

1. Notwithstanding a past comment about preservation orders in the matters before Judge Walton, the government claims EFF’s suits are unrelated to the phone dragnet.

[T]he Government has always understood [EFF’s suits] to be limited to certain presidentially authorized intelligence collection activities outside FISA, the Government did not identify those lawsuits, nor the preservation order issued therein, in its Motion for the Second Amendment to Primary Order filed in the above-captioned Docket number on February 25, 2014. For the same reasons, the Government did not notify this Court of its receipt of plaintiffs’ counsel’s February 26, 2014, e-mail.

Note, to sustain this claim, the government withheld both the state secrets declarations that clearly invoke the FISC-authorized dragnets as part of the litigation, even though the government’s protection order invokes it repeatedly, as well as Vaughn Walker’s preservation order which is broader than DOJ’s own preservation plan. Thus, they don’t give Walton the things he needs to be able to assess whether DOJ’s actions in this matter were remotely reasonable.

2. It explains that it never provided EFF with its own 2007 preservation plan (which did not meet the terms of Walker’s order) until March 17, 2014 because Stellar Wind — but not the FISC-authorized programs that the preservation plan excluded — was classified until December 2013.

A classified submission was necessary at that time [in 2007] because the existence of the presidentially-authorized program was classified and remained so until December 2013.

Note, it doesn’t mention that 19 days passed between the time EFF formally raised concerns about the protection order and the date DOJ actually provided the declassified protection plan to them, during which time, it appears, NSA destroyed one of the most damning half year’s worth of data in the program’s history (which I’ll return to in a later post).

3. In spite of EFF telling DOJ their earlier suits were relevant (and not having received the preservation plan which could have been declassified in December), DOJ claims they didn’t think they were relevant so it didn’t tell FISC about EFF’s beliefs.

Because the Government’s Motion for Second Amendment already had sought relief from this Court based on a list of BR metadata pursuant to FISC authorization, see Motion for Second Amendment at 3-5, counsel did not appreciate — even after receiving the email from plaintiffs’ counsel in Jewel — that it would be be important to notify this Court about Jewel and Shubert or the email from counsel for the Jewel plaintiffs about those cases with which the Government disagreed. Rather, counsel viewed any potential dispute about the scope of Jewel and Shubert preservation orders as a mater to be resolved, if possible, by the parties to those cases (though a potential unclassified explanation to plaintiffs’ counsel) or, failing that, by the district court.

Note what DOJ is not mentioning here? That EFF has a Section 215 lawsuit too, and that its understanding of the impact on that suit may have been influenced by the Shubert and Jewel protection orders.

4. DOJ’s Civil Division lawyers did not forward EFF’s email to DOJ’s National Security Division lawyers, they claim, because the Civil Division lawyers did not agree with EFF’s interpretation of the protection order.

For these reasons, counsel did not think to forward the email from Jewel Plaintiffs’ counsel to the attorneys with primary responsibility for interaction with this Court before the Court ruled on the Motion for Second Amendment. The Department wishes to assure the Court that it has always endeavored to maintain close coordination within the Department regarding civil litigation matters that involve proceedings before this Court, and will take even greater care to do so in the future.

5. DOJ told EFF to hold off formally alerting any Court in the belief that it could tell EFF about the preservation plan which could have been declassified in December but did not get declassified until 10 days after FISC issued its initial order requiring DOJ to destroy data, and that would solve everything.

In particular, the request in its February 28 email that counsel for the Jewel plaintiffs “forbear from filing anything with the FISC, or [the district court], until we have further opportunity to confer” was a good faith attempt to avoid unnecessary motions practice in the event that the issue could be worked out among the parties through the Government’s provision of an unclassified explanation concerning its preservation in Jewel and Shubert.

Read more

DOJ’s Multiple Authorities for Destroying Evidence

It seems like aeons ago, but just a week ago, EFF and DOJ had a court hearing over preserving evidence in the EFF lawsuits (Shubert, Jewel, and First Unitarian Church v. NSA). As I noted in two posts, a week ago Monday DOJ surprised EFF with the news that it had been following its own preservation plan, which it had submitted ex parte to Vaughn Walker, rather than the order Walker subsequently imposed. As a result, it has been aging off data in those programs (notably the PATRIOT-authorized Internet and phone dragnets) authorized by law, as opposed to what it termed Presidential authorization. DOJ’s behavior makes it clear that it is  trying to justify treating some data differently by claiming it was collected under different authorities.

Remember, there are at least five different legal regimes involved in the metadata dragnet:

  • EO 12333 authority for data going back to at least 1998
  • Stellar Wind authority lasting until 2004, 2006, and 2007 for different practices
  • PATRIOT-authorized authorities for Internet (until 2011) and phone records (until RuppRoge or something else passes)
  • SPCMA, which is a subset of EO 12333 authority that conducts potentially problematic contact chaining integrating US person Internet metadata
  • Five Eyes, which is EO 12333, but may involve GCHQ equities or, especially, ownership of the data

At the hearing and in their motions, EFF argued that their existing suits are not limited to any particular program (they didn’t name all these authorities, but they could have). Rather, they are about the act of dragnetting, regardless of what authority (so they’ll still be live suits after RuppRoge passes, for example).

EFF appears to have at least partly convinced Judge Jeffrey White, because on Friday he largely sided with EFF, extending the preservation order and — best as I can tell — endorsing EFF’s argument that their suits cover the act of dragnetting, rather than just the Stellar Wind, FISA Amendments Act, or phone and Internet dragnets.

With that as background, I want to look at a few things from the transcript of last Wednesday’s hearing. Read more

The October 30, 2009 Statement of Authorities: The EFF Document Fight Could Get Very Interesting

If the Chief FISC Judge accuses the government of material misrepresentations but no one but a dirty fucking hippie blogger reports it, did it happen?

On Friday, I reported on Judge Reggie Walton’s cranky opinion asking for an explanation about why the government didn’t tell him EFF believed they had a protection order in cases relevant to the dragnets. And while it overstates the resounding silence to say that only your esteemed DFH host reported it — TechDirt had a good reportsome of the other reporting on it thus far seems to have missed the whole material misrepresentation judgement in Walton’s order.

But I think it’s not yet clear — to anyone — how interesting this document fight could get.

Just as one example of why (I’ll develop some of the others over the next couple of days, I hope), consider the October 30, 2009 statement of authorities.

Earlier this month, I noted that EFF had submitted a list of filings that the government had not released in spite of what they believed to be Judge Jeffrey White’s order to declassify everything.

  • April 9, 2007 notices indicating FISC Judge rejected early bulk orders
  • October 25, 2007 government challenge to motion to protect evidence, with ex parte NSA official declaration submitted in Shubert
  • April 3, 2009 supplemental memorandum in Jewel
  • October 30, 2009 supplemental memorandum on points of authority in Shubert
  • November 2012

In last Wednesday’s hearing, the government claimed they didn’t have to release these because they engaged in a colloquy limiting White’s orders to the state secrets declarations. And for the moment, I’ll take that as accurate.

But since then, the government has released one of these — the October 25, 2007 challenge to the protection motion — as part of their filing on Monday fighting a protection order in EFF’s phone dragnet suit. And that document was pretty stunning. Not only did it show the government had redefined the Multidistrict Litigation suits so as to exclude any of the FISA-authorized metadata dragnets that EFF of course had no way of knowing about yet. But in the filing, the government revealed that because of this filing and in defiance of Vaughn Walker’s November 2007 protection order, it has been destroying the metadata dragnet data in the interim.

In other words, the government is withholding these filings because they’re fairly damning.

Which got me thinking about the timing and significance of the October 30, 2009 supplemental memorandum on points of authority supporting a motion to dismiss the Shubert suit based on sovereign immunity and state secrets.

At one level, the memorandum is not all that suspicious. As you can see above, the government filed what is presumably roughly the same filing at the analogous time in Jewel, just as it was making its state secrets bid.

But I find the timing of the October 30 filings in Shubert to be of particular interest. That’s because a 2011 NSA training program seems to indicate that the Internet dragnet shut down at almost precisely that time, as it indicates that Internet dragnet data collected prior to November 2009 requires some sort of special treatment.

In addition, in the source information at the end of the line, the SIGAD [redacted] BR data can be recognized by SIGADs beginning with [redacted] For PR/TT, data collected after October 2010 is found [redacted] For a comprehensive listing of all the BR and PR/TT SIGADs as well as information on PR/TT data collected prior to November of 2009, contact your organization’s management or subject matter expert.

Remember, Shubert was suing for illegal wiretapping. And while Judge John Bates did not fully assess what NSA was doing — which appears to be collecting data that counts as content in the guise of collecting metadata — until the following year (some time between July and October 2010), when he did so, he implied the government had to comply with the laws in which they were claiming, in 2009, they had sovereign immunity. And the government had to know by that point they had serious legal problems with the Internet dragnet.

Indeed, the government kept asking for extensions leading up to this filing — at the time they claimed it was because of DOJ’s whats-old-is-new state secrets policy. Altogether they got an extra 22 days to file this filing (which should have been substantially similar to the ones they filed in April). They were almost certainly having still-undisclosed problems with the phone dragnet (probably relating to dissemination of data), as the October 30, 2009 phone dragnet orders is one of the ones the government has withheld even though it is obviously responsive to ACLU and EFF’s FOIA. But the discussions on the Internet dragnet must have been even more contentious, given that the FISC (probably either Reggie Walton or John Bates) refused to reauthorize it. (Note, October 30, 2009 was a Friday, so if FISC formally didn’t approve the Internet dragnet in October 2009, it would have been that day).

And the thing is, from Keith Alexander’s state secrets declaration, submitted perhaps hours and almost certainly no more than a month before the Internet dragnet got shut down because it was illegally collecting metadata that was legally content, it’s not at all clear that the government fully disclosed details they knew about those legal problems with the dragnet. Look closely at ¶¶ 27 and 28, ¶¶48-56, ¶¶58-62 with footnotes.

The phone dragnet description hides the problems with ongoing dissemination problems (which the Administration hid from Congress, as well). It also makes no mention that the phone dragnet had US persons on an alert list without reviewing those selectors for First Amendment review, something that should be central to the suits against NSA (see in particular ¶60). And while there are redacted sentences and footnotes — 13 and 24 — which could include notice that the government was (and had been, since the inception of the FISC-authorized Internet dragnet) collecting metadata that counted as content, those are all very brief descriptions. Moreover, the unredacted descriptions clearly claim that the Internet dragnet program collects no content, which legally it almost certainly did. Moreover, note that the references to the Internet dragnet speak of it in the present tense: “Pursuant to the FISA Pen Register, …. NSA is authorized to collect in bulk.”But there doesn’t seem to be the parallel structure in ¶28 where you’d expect the government to confess that the program was imminently shutting down because it was illegally collecting Internet content.

Note, too, how the declaration refers to the reauthorizations. ¶59 describes the phone dragnet authority “continuing until October 30, 2009” and ¶58 describes the Internet dragnet “requires continued assistance by the providers through [redacted] 2009. They appear not to have known for sure whether the programs would be reauthorized that night! But they appear not to have explained why not.

Perhaps the most pregnant paragraph is ¶62, which in context appears to relate only to the phone dragnet, though I suspect the government would point to to claim their description of violations was not comprehensive:

NSA is committed to working with the FISC on this and other compliance issues to ensure that this vital intelligence tool works appropriately and effectively. For purposes of this litigation, and the privilege assertions now made by the DNI and by the NSA, the intelligence sources and methods described herein remain highly classified and the disclosure that [redacted] would compromise vital NSA sources and methods and result in exceptionally grave harm to national security.

By any measure, Alexander’s declaration falls short of what the government already knew at that time, demonstrably so in the case of the phone dragnet. He hid details — significantly, the watchlist of Americans that violated statute, and almost certainly that the NSA was collecting content in the name of metadata — that were material to the suits at hand.

Which brings me to the memo on authorities. Even as the government was hiding material violations of the statutes they were disclosing to Judge Walker, was it also making expansive Executive Authority claims it couldn’t (and still can’t) share with plaintiffs? Did the government, for example, make an Executive Authority claim that we have every reason to believe John Bates (especially) and Reggie Walton would rebut if they knew about it?

In any case, in addition to the watchlist data from those 3,000 US persons (which would have aged off last month otherwise), the last of the illegal Internet content-as-metadata data might be aged off as soon as April absent these stays.That data might well provide plaintiffs proof they were illegally wiretapped (note, the Internet dragnet was limited to certain switches, but Jewel was built around the Folsom Street switch which was almost certainly included in that). And that the government provided highly misleading descriptions to Vaughn Walker when bidding for a state secrets exemption.

And add in one more legal fight here: as I noted, DOJ is withholding the October 30, 2009 (as well as one later one from 2009) from both the ACLU and EFF (the EFF suit is before a different San Francisco judge). In addition, DOJ is refusing all push for expedited processing on FOIAs for the Internet dragnet filings.

Seeing how clearly manipulative their data release in these lawsuits is, it seems safe to suggest the government is also making FOIA decisions to prevent plaintiffs from obtaining information to really contest these suits. That shouldn’t surprise anyone. But I would hope it would piss off the judges.

The Government Has a Festering EO 12333 Problem In Jewel/First Unitarian

The government claims it does not have a protection order pertaining to the phone dragnet lawsuits because the suits with a protection order pertain only to presidentially-authorized programs.

The declaration made clear, in a number of places, that the plaintiffs challenged activities that occurred under presidential authorization, not under orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), and that the declaration was therefore limited to describing information collected pursuant to presidential authorization and the retention thereof.

Therefore, the government is challenging the EFF’s effort to get Judge Jeffrey White to reaffirm that the preservation orders in the Multidistrict Litigation and Jewel apply to the phone dragnet.

Fine. I think EFF can and should challenge that claim.

But let’s take the government at its word. Let’s consider what it would obliged to retain under the terms laid out.

The government agrees it was obliged, starting in 2007, to keep the content and metadata dragnets that were carried out exclusively on presidential authorization. Indeed, the declaration from 2007 they submitted describing the material they’ve preserved includes telephone metadata (on tapes) and the queries of metadata, including the identifiers used (see PDF 53). It also claimed it would keep the reports of metadata analysis.

That information is fundamentally at issue in First Unitarian Church, the EFF-litigated challenge to the phone dragnet. That’s true for three reasons.

First, the government makes a big deal of their claim, made in 2007, that the metadata dragnet databases were segregated from other programs. Whether or not that was a credible claim in 2007, we know it was false starting in early 2008, when “for the purposes of analytical efficiency,” a copy of that metadata was moved into the same database with the metadata from all the other programs, including both the Stellar Wind phone dragnet data, and the ongiong phone dragnet information collected under EO 12333.

And given the government’s promise to keep reports of metadata analysis, from that point until sometime several years later, it would be obliged to keep all phone dragnet analysis reports involving Americans. That’s because — as is made clear from this Memorandum of Understanding issued sometime after March 2, 2009 — the analysts had no way of identifying the source of the data they were analyzing. The MOU makes clear that analysts were performing queries on data including “SIGINT” (EO 12333 collected data), [redacted] — which is almost certainly Stellar Wind, BRFISA, and PR/TT. So to the extent that any metadata report didn’t have a clear time delimited way of identifying where the data came from, the NSA could not know whether a query report came from data collected solely pursuant to presidential authorization or FISC order. (The NSA changed this sometime during or before 2011, and now metadata all includes XML tags showing its source; though much of it is redundant and so may have been collected in more than one program, and analysts are coached to re-run queries to produce them under EO 12333 authority, if possible.)

Finally, the real problem for the NSA is that the data “alerted” illegally up until 2009 — including the 3,000 US persons watchlisted without undergoing the legally required First Amendment review — was done so precisely because when NSA merged its the phone dragnet data with the data collected under Presidential authorization — either under Stellar Wind or EO 12333 — it applied the rules applying to the presidentially-authorized data, not the FISC-authorized data. We know that the NSA broke the law up until about 5 years ago. We know the data from that period — the data that is under consideration for being aged off now — broke the law precisely because of the way the NSA mixed EO 12333 and FISC regulations and data.

The NSA’s declarations on document preservation — not to mention the declarations about the dragnets more generally — don’t talk about how the EO 12333 data gets dumped in with and mixed up with the FISC-authorized data. That’s NSA’s own fault (and if I were Judge White it would raise real questions for me about the candor of the declarants).

But since the government agreed to preserve the data collected pursuant to presidential authorization without modification (without, say, limiting it to the Stellar Wind data), that means they agreed to preserve the EO 12333 collected data and its poisonous fruit which would just be aging off now.

I will show in a follow-up post why that data should be utterly critical, specifically as it pertains to the First Unitarian Church suit.

But suffice it to say, for now, that the government’s claim that it is only obliged to retain the US person data collected pursuant to Presidential authorization doesn’t help it much, because it means it has promised to retain all the data on Americans collected under EO 12333 and queries derived from it.

The Clear Precedent for Carrie Cordero’s “Uncharted Territory” of Destruction of Evidence

Shane Harris has a report on the government’s odd behavior in regards to preserving the phone dragnet data in light of the suits challenging its legality.

It’s surprising on three counts. First, because he claims the legal back and forth has not previously been reported.

Now, that database will include phone records that are older than five years — not exactly the outcome that critics of the NSA program were hoping for. A dramatic series of legal maneuvers, which have not been previously reported, led the outcome.

It’s surprising not just because the “legal maneuvers” have in fact been reported before (though not the detail that James Cole got involved, though it’s not yet clear how his involvement affected the actual legal maneuvers rather than the internal DOJ communication issues). But also because Harris neglects to mention key details of those legal maneuvers — notably that EFF reminded DOJ, starting on February 26, that it had preservation orders that should affect the dragnet data, reminders which DOJ stalled and then ignored.

Harris’ piece is also surprising because of the implicit suggestion that NSA hasn’t been aging off data regularly, as it is supposed to be.

A U.S. official familiar with the legal process said the question about what to do with the phone records needn’t have been handled at practically the last minute. “The government was coming up on a five-year deadline to delete the data. Lawsuits were pending. The Justice Department could have approached the FISC months ago to resolve this,” the official said, referring to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

There should be no “deadline” here — aside from the daily “deadline” that should automatically age off the five year old data. Now, the WSJ had previously reported that that’s not actually how age-off works.

As the NSA program currently works, the database holds about five years of data, according to officials and some declassified court opinions. About twice a year, any call record more than five years old is purged from the system, officials said.

But even assuming NSA only ages off data twice a year (in which case they should stop claiming they only “keep” data for 5 years because they already keep some of it for 5 1/2 years), most of these suits are well older than 6 months old, predating what might have been an August age-off, which means unless NSA already deviated from its normal pattern, it deleted data relevant to the suits.

By far the most surprising detail in Harris’ story, however, is this response from former DOJ National Security Division Counsel Carrie Cordero to the news that Deputy Attorney General James Cole has gotten involved. This is, Cordero claims, “uncharted territory.”

“This is all uncharted territory,” said Carrie Cordero, a former senior Justice Department official who recently served as the counsel to the head of the National Security Division. “Given the complexity and the novelty of this chain of events, it’s a good thing that the deputy attorney general is personally engaged, and it demonstrates the significant attention that they’re giving to it.”

To be more specific about Cordero’s work history, from 2007 to 2011, she was deeply involved in FISA-related issues, first at ODNI and then at DOJ’s NSD.

In 2009, I served as Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the Unit ed States Department of Justice, where I co – chaired an interagency group created by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to improve FISA processes. From 2007 – 2009, I served in a joint duty capacity as a Senior Associate General Counsel at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, where I worked behind the scenes on matters relating to the legislative efforts that resulted in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.

Given her position in the thick of FISA-related issues, one would think she was at least aware of the protection order Vaughn Walker issued on November 6, 2007 ordering the preservation of evidence, up to and including “tangible things,” in the multidistrict litigation issues pertaining to the dragnet.

[T]he court reminds all parties of their duty to preserve evidence that may be relevant to this action. The duty extends to documents, data and tangible things in the possession, custody and control of the parties to this action,

And Cordero presumably should be aware that Walker renewed the same order on November 13, 2009, extending it to cover the Jewel suit, which had an ongoing focus.

Cordero is presumably aware of two other details. First, there should be absolutely no dispute that the phone dragnet was covered by these suits. That’s because at least as early as May 25, 2007 (and again in a declaration submitted October 2009), Keith Alexander included the phone dragnet among the things he considered related to the EFF and other suits over which he claimed state secrets.

In particular, disclosure of the NSA’s ability to utilize the TSP (or, therefore, the current FISA Court-authorized content collection) in conjunction with contact chaining [redacted–probably relating to data mining] would severely undermine efforts to detect terrorist activities.

[snip]

To the extent that the NSA’s bulk collection and targeted analysis of communication meta data may be at issue in this case, those activities–as described in paragraphs 27 and 28 above–must also be protected from disclosure.

In paragraphs 27 and 28 and the following paragraphs, Alexander named the FISC Pen Register and Telephone Records Orders by name.

Thus, as far back as 2007, the NSA acknowledged that it used its content collection in conjunction with its metadata dragnets, including data obtained pursuant to the FISA dragnet orders.

Read more