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Ratifying Sedition: The Proud Boys 404(b) Evidence

As I noted yesterday, the government provided its 404(b) notice in Trump’s January 6 case. 404(b) notices alert the defendant to evidence that may or may not be intrinsic to the case but in any case shows the defendant’s criminal propensity.

In addition to showing how the Trump campaign tried to start a riot at the TCF Center in Detroit, DOJ also wants to show that Trump’s celebration of the Proud Boys bookends his own assault on democracy.

As the filing describes, Trump called out the militia at the first debate, and then — almost three years later — complained that convicted seditionist Enrique Tarrio faces a long sentence.

The Government plans to introduce evidence from the period in advance of the charged conspiracies that demonstrates the defendant’s encouragement of violence. For instance, in response to a question during the September 29, 2020, presidential debate asking him to denounce the extremist group the Proud Boys, the defendant instead spoke publicly to them and told them to “stand back and stand by.” Members of the group embraced the defendant’s words as an endorsement and printed merchandise with them as a rallying cry. As discussed below, after the Proud Boys and other extremist groups participated in obstructing the congressional certification on January 6, the defendant made clear that they were acting consistent with his intent and direction in doing so.

[snip]

Of particular note are the specific January 6 offenders whom the defendant has supported— namely, individuals convicted of some of the most serious crimes charged in relation to January 6, such as seditious conspiracy and violent assaults on police officers. During a September 17, 2023, appearance on Meet the Press, for instance, the defendant said regarding Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio—who was convicted of seditious conspiracy—“I want to tell you, he and other people have been treated horribly.” The defendant then criticized the kinds of lengthy sentences received only by defendants who, like Tarrio, committed the most serious crimes on January 6.

DOJ’s plan to show this is not surprising. After all, DOJ kicked off the Proud Boy sedition trial with Trump’s shout out to the Proud Boys.

But the significance, given the way DOJ has structured its conspiracy prosecutions from the start, is far more than damning evidence.

That’s because one of the conspiracy charges against Trump, 18 USC 1512(k), is one of the charges of which the Proud Boy leaders were convicted.

Aside from that public shout-out, which DOJ describes as, Trump speaking “publicly to them,” Donald Trump is not known to have communicated directly with any of them. But as I illustrated in January, Ethan Nordean, Joe Biggs, and Enrique Tarrio all communicated with Alex Jones and Roger Stone (and Owen Shroyer — who has two more days left in his sentence in Oakdale Correctional), even during the attack. Both of them, Jones and Stone — who have not been charged — communicated directly with Trump (and Mark Meadows). Stone’s actions leading up to January 6 were central to the guilty obstruction verdicts in Proud Boy Dan “Milkshake” Scott’s plea and Chris Worrell’s bench trial.

There may be more than that.

At the Proud Boy Leaders trial, for example, prosecutors introduced a series of Telegram chats from the day of, and immediately following, Trump’s shout-out. The men were giddy at Trump’s recognition.

In the wake of Trump’s debate recognition, there was talk of Trump inviting Proud Boys to the White House (Tarrio eventually did visit the White House, in December, as part of a Latinos for Trump event).

There was talk of mobbing election offices.

And, on November 8, Tarrio warned now-cooperating witness Jeremy Bertino not to wear colors because the campaign “asked us” not to do so.

As the campaign was ginning up mobs in swing states, Tarrio at least claimed to have some contact directly with the campaign. Stone is not the only candidate to be Tarrio’s tie to the campaign; Kellye SoRelle, who knew Tarrio from Latinos for Trump, was involved in the mob scene in Michigan.

A month ago, lead Proud Boys prosecutor Erik Kenerson dropped off one of the key pending Proud Boy prosecutions. There are many things that could explain that, but when other prosecutors — like Mary Dohrmann — moved under Jack Smith, that’s the kind of public activity that marked the move.

Several things have made clear in recent days that DOJ doesn’t consider the list of six uncharged co-conspirators in Trump’s January 6 indictment to be exclusive.

In their description of the TCF riot, for example, DOJ described the campaign employee who encouraged rioting (possibly Mike Roman) as “an agent (and unindicted co-conspirator).” Whoever it is would be a seventh co-conspirator.

More curiously, when Tanya Chutkan corrected Trump’s false representation of the indictment in her ruling that he did not have absolute immunity, she described that, “Defendant, along with at least six co-conspirators, id. ¶8, undertook efforts ‘to impair, obstruct, and defeat [that process] through dishonesty, fraud, and deceit,’ id. ¶ 10.” That comment stuck with me, as everyone else who has commented on the indictment has treated the six co-conspirators as an exclusive list. But sure enough, that paragraph she cites describes that the six co-conspirators laid out in the indictment — Rudy Giuliani, John Eastman, Sidney Powell, Jeffrey Clark, Kenneth Chesebro, and probably Boris Epshteyn — were only “among” those with whom Trump conspired.

The Defendant enlisted co-conspirators to assist him in his criminal efforts to overturn the legitimate results of the 2020 presidential election and retain power. Among these were:

If DOJ were ever to charge someone and make it a related case, it would come before Chutkan. That’s just one way that Chutkan might know of specific additional alleged co-conspirators that we wouldn’t yet know.

Conspiracy law doesn’t require co-conspirators to get together in a room to plot together. They need only agree on the objective and take steps to achieve it. If they have networked communications between them, all the better.

At the Proud Boys trial, prosecutors made Trump’s role in their conspiracy clear. Now, leading up to the former President’s own trial, DOJ has said they will present communications that amount to an agreement in September 2020 and ratification of the Proud Boy attack on the country in September 2023.

This is not just damning evidence of fondness for the right wing militia. It’s evidence that Trump pursued the same effort to obstruct the vote certification as the Proud Boys.

Judge Tanya Chutkan Had to Tell Trump That, “There is no ‘Presidential Immunity’ Clause”

Less than twelve hours after the DC Circuit ruled that an office-seeker does not enjoy presidential immunity from civil suit, Judge Tanya Chutkan issued her order ruling that Trump does not enjoy presidential immunity for crimes committed while president.

Her opinion can be summed up in one line.

[T]he United States has only one Chief Executive at a time, and that position does not confer a lifelong “get-out-of-jail-free” pass.

The timing of Chutkan’s decision is almost certainly not accidental. The key issue in this opinion, absolute immunity, has been fully briefed (as Trump noted on November 1 when he asked to stay all other proceedings until this was resolved) since October 26.

Chutkan said she was ruling now because the Supreme Court requires immunity to be resolved as early as possible.

Defendant has also moved to dismiss based on statutory grounds, ECF No. 114, and for selective and vindictive prosecution, ECF No. 116. The court will address those motions separately. The Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (citations omitted). The court therefore rules first on the Immunity Motion and the Constitutional Motion—in which Defendant asserts “constitutional immunity from double jeopardy,” United States v. Scott, 464 F.2d 832, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

She did not source that cite to Trump’s request for a stay, nor did she say she was also ruling on Trump’s motion to dismiss on Constitutional grounds, which includes a Double Jeopardy claim, because Molly Gaston asked her to,

But by ruling as she did (without a hearing), she simply mooted Trump’s request to stay any further proceedings with a minute order.

MINUTE ORDER as to DONALD J. TRUMP: In light of the court’s [172] Order denying Defendant’s [74] Motion to Dismiss Based on Presidential Immunity; Defendant’s [128] Motion to Stay Case Pending Immunity Determination is hereby DENIED as moot.

This puts the onus on Trump to appeal, which he reportedly will (though he has dilly-dallied on some of these motions, so we’ll see how much time he kills in the process).

It seems clear that Chutkan waited for Blassingame, the civil immunity opinion, because she found a way to cite it twice and still release her own opinion on the same day.

But it also seems likely that Judge Chutkan and her clerks simply reviewed that opinion to make sure nothing wildly conflicted with her already completed opinion, because her opinion doesn’t incorporate details of the absolute immunity argument — such as the significance of the fact that five of six co-conspirators described in the indictment (everyone but Jeffrey Clark) is a private citizen, which would be important if the DC Circuit applied any of their civil immunity test to the criminal context.

Indeed, one of Chutkan’s citations to Blassingame effectively admitted she didn’t get into its test — whether Trump was acting in his official role when he did the things alleged in the indictment.

Similarly, the court expresses no opinion on the additional constitutional questions attendant to Defendant’s assertion that former Presidents retain absolute criminal immunity for acts “within the outer perimeter of the President’s official” responsibility. Immunity Motion at 21 (formatting modified). Even if the court were to accept that assertion, it could not grant Defendant immunity here without resolving several separate and disputed constitutional questions of first impression, including: whether the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” includes within its “outer perimeter” at least five different forms of indicted conduct;5 whether inquiring into the President’s purpose for undertaking each form of that allegedly criminal conduct is constitutionally permissible in an immunity analysis, and whether any Presidential conduct “intertwined” with otherwise constitutionally immune actions also receives criminal immunity. See id. at 21–45. Because it concludes that former Presidents do not possess absolute federal criminal immunity for any acts committed while in office, however, the court need not reach those additional constitutional issues, and it expresses no opinion on them.

5 As another court in this district observed in a decision regarding Defendant’s civil immunity, “[t]his is not an easy issue. It is one that implicates fundamental norms of separation of powers and calls on the court to assess the limits of a President’s functions. And, historical examples to serve as guideposts are few.” Thompson v. Trump, 590 F. Supp. 3d 46, 74 (D.D.C. 2022); see id. at 81–84 (performing that constitutional analysis). The D.C. Circuit recently affirmed that district court’s decision with an extensive analysis of just one form of conduct—“speech on matters of public concern.” Blassingame v. Trump, Nos. 22-5069, 22-7030, 22-7031, slip op. at 23–42 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 1, 2023).

Instead, Chutkan argued — in language that likely preceded the Blassingame opinion, in a section on whether holding a former President criminally accountable will pose some of the harms to the presidency and government that suing a current or former President might — that no matter what the analysis is for civil immunity, criminal immunity is different.

The rationale for immunizing a President’s controversial decisions from civil liability does not extend to sheltering his criminality.

[snip]

For all these reasons, the constitutional consequences of federal criminal liability differ sharply from those of the civil liability at issue in Fitzgerald. Federal criminal liability will not impermissibly chill the decision-making of a dutiful Chief Executive or subject them to endless post-Presidency litigation. It will, however, uphold the vital constitutional values that Fitzgerald identified as warranting the exercise of jurisdiction: maintaining the separation of powers and vindicating “the public interest in an ongoing criminal prosecution.” 457 U.S. at 753–54. Exempting former Presidents from the ordinary operation of the criminal justice system, on the other hand, would undermine the foundation of the rule of law that our first former President described: “Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws, [and] acquiescence in its measures”—“duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true liberty.” Washington’s Farewell Address at 13. Consequently, the constitutional structure of our government does not require absolute federal criminal immunity for former Presidents.

The analysis has to be different of course. If you can be impeached for using your office to extort campaign assistance, it should not be the case that you cannot, though, be criminally charged for that extortion.

This is an opinion about whether impeachment provides the sole recourse for holding a former President accountable.

Judge Chutkan provides a very neat solution to that problem, by noting that impeachment is just one of two ways to remove a President who has misused his office.

[T]here is another way, besides impeachment and conviction, for a President to be removed from office and thus subjected to “the ordinary course of law,” Federalist No. 69 at 348: As in Defendant’s case, he may be voted out. The President “shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Without reelection, the expiration of that term ends a Presidency as surely as impeachment and conviction. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (Marshall, Circuit Justice) (“[T]he president is elected from the mass of the people, and, on the expiration of the time for which he is elected, returns to the mass of the people again.”). Nothing in the Impeachment Judgment Clause prevents criminal prosecution thereafter. [my emphasis]

Because voters saw fit to remove Trump, Chutkan held, he can now be charged criminally.

Chutkan punts the other questions upstairs to the DC Circuit and from there to SCOTUS.

And while I think Chutkan’s analysis of the two impeachment issues — immunity and double jeopardy — is sound, I do worry that her treatment of several other issues — the things Trump included in his motion to dismiss on Constitutional grounds besides double jeopardy — got short shrift as a result.

Those issues have only been briefed since November 22. She and her clerks probably wrote that part of the opinion over Thanksgiving weekend. And far less of her opinion addressed those issues — seven pages for the First Amendment issues and four for matters of fair notice — than addressed the impeachment issue:

Background (what the indictment really charges) 1

Standard 5

Executive Immunity 6

    • Text of Constitution 6
    • Structure (concerns of public policy, addressing Fitzgerald) 14
      • Burdens on the Presidency 15-20
      • Public Interest 20-25
    • History 25-29
    • Summary 29-31

First Amendment 31

    • Core political speech of public concern 33
    • Statements advocating govt to act 35
    • Statements on 2020 Election 37

Double Jeopardy 38

Due Process 44 (4 pages)

Importantly, while she noted at the outset of her opinion (in the five page “background” section) that Trump totally misrepresented the indictment against him, she didn’t lay out how, in addition to speech-related actions charged as conspiracies, there are some actions that are more obviously fraud, such as the effort to counterfeit elector certificates or the knowingly false representations about Mike Pence’s intent. Trump’s misrepresentation of the indictment is really egregious, but Chutkan barely explains why that’s a problem in this opinion.

Both the First Amendment issues and the notice issues (particularly on 18 USC 1512, though there’s readily available language on 18 USC 241 charge in the Douglass Mackey case) have been addressed repeatedly in other January 6 cases. Since those cases will be appealed on a more leisurely pace than this one, I worry that the issues are not fully addressed. And those are the issues about which Clarence Thomas and Sammy Alito were most likely to intervene in any case.

This is an opinion about holding a former President accountable before he becomes President again. The danger is real: On the same day two courts ruled that Trump didn’t have absolute immunity for his conduct while he was President, his Georgia lawyer argued that if he wins in 2024, he can’t be tried on that case until 2029.

But for now, the matter has been sent to the DC Circuit to deal with.

Donald Trump Insists He’s Too Special To Use Same Database 1,200 Other January 6 Defendants Have Used

In addition to his claim that he needs a bunch of intelligence so he can try to distinguish his influence operations from those of Russian spies, Donald Trump also submitted a filing claiming that Jack Smith has not done an expansive enough search on discovery.

To understand how frivolous this filing is, consider that it complains that Jack Smith has not included DC USAO materials on the January 6 investigation in its discovery to Trump.

Since the Order, the Special Counsel’s Office has enjoyed constructive access to USAODC documents. In an August 11, 2023 discovery letter, the Office wrote that the USAO-DC “maintains a separate database of materials comprising discovery in the criminal cases related to the breach of the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.” Ex. G at 6. The letter stated that the “investigative team” in this case had “accessed certain materials within that database and has taken into its possession certain materials that the investigative team may rely upon or use at trial.” Id. Given these alignments, there is no question that the USAO-DC is part of the prosecution team.

Twice over the course of these discovery letters, DOJ has told Trump if he wants access to the full database provided to all the other January 6 defendants, he can get it.

As we advised you, in the course of our investigation, we accessed certain materials within that database, took into our possession certain materials that we may rely upon or use at trial, and produced them to you in discovery in our case. In our August 11 letter, we also offered to facilitate your access to the USAO database. We reiterate that offer now.

In response, Trump complained about DOJ’s unwillingness to identify everything in the database that might be helpful.

Seeking to avoid that obligation, the prosecution’s November 25 letter again directed our attention to a “a separate database of materials comprising discovery in criminal cases related to the breach of the Capitol on January 6, 2021.” Ex. F at 3; see also Ex. G at 6. Like SASC Windom’s “full access to the FBI’s trove of evidence about Oath Keeper and Proud Boy extremists involved in the riot,” Doc. 116-1 at 9, the Office’s conceded access to the USAO-DC’s database further supports President Trump’s position that the USAO-DC is part of the prosecution team.

However, it is not enough for the prosecution to offer the defense access to materials produced in those cases. “The government cannot meet its Brady obligations by providing [the defendant] with access to 600,000 documents and then claiming that [the defendant] should have been able to find the exculpatory information in the haystack.” United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 14, 29-30 (D.D.C. 1998). In United States v. Saffarinia, the court relied on Hsia and agreed with the defense that “the government’s Brady obligations require it to identify any known Brady material to the extent that the government knows of any such material in its production of approximately 3.5 million pages of documents.” 424 F. Supp. 3d 46, 86 (D.D.C. 2020); see also United States v. Singhal, 876 F. Supp. 2d 82, 104 (D.D.C. 2012) (directing prosecutors to disclose the “identity (by Bates number) of the specific witness statements and documents” that are “producible as Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) documents material to preparing the defense, regardless of whether those documents are inculpatory or exculpatory”). The discovery in this case dwarfs that at issue in Hsia and Saffarinia, and the prosecution must identify information that is subject to Brady by doing more than pointing to another huge database.

This issue has already been litigated, repeatedly, in other January 6 cases. His demand for more is a demand to be treated better than the people at the Capitol, the people actually depicted in and/or who took the video.

The argument itself is largely an attempt to exploit the fact that the defendant was once the President and so interacted with all parts of government. As DOJ quipped in an October 24 letter:

To point out but a few of the exceedingly broad errors in your assertion, the prosecution team does not include the almost three million civilian, active duty, and reserve members of the Department of Defense; the 260,000 employees of the Department of Homeland Security (or its CISA component); or the Intelligence Community writ large. Furthermore, your attempt to serve Rule 17(c) subpoenas, ECF No. 99—definitionally reserved for non-party witnesses—on the House Select Committee’s successor entity and a member of the White House Counsel’s Office confirms your understanding that those entities are not members of the prosecution team.

It is not rooted in the actual evidence in the case or — as with virtually all the filings Trump’s teams have made — the actual charges against him.

That said, the associated filings are of some interest. It’s just that Trump’s team submitted them in the least useful way possible. I’ve put them below, in order.

Reading them together reveals that some of what Trump requested in his unclassified discovery request last night — such as the request for the classified backup to the 2016 ICA or the opportunity for foreign powers to hack the 2020 election — were already covered in DOJ’s motion to strike his CIPA 5 request.

Reading them together also shows a progression. As I’ve noted, his original request asked for:

43. Please provide all documents relating to communications or coordination by the Special Counsel’s Office and DOJ with any of the Biden Administration, the Biden Campaign, Hunter Biden, the Biden family, the Biden White House, or any person representing Joe Biden.

In the first response, DOJ addressed that question (and question 37(b) for materials on Executive Privilege) by describing five Executive Privilege waiver reviews

37b. The defendant was party to five miscellaneous matters regarding assertion of the executive privilege. Attachments to filings in those five matters included letters from the incumbent White House declining to invoke executive privilege over certain witness testimony. The defendant already has those materials.

Trump must have made a follow-up at the November 21 meet-and-confer, because DOJ addressed it again, saying that whatever he wants is not in the prosecution team’s possession and not covered by discovery obligations.

Requests 33, 40, 42, 43, and 44 seek information that exceeds the scope of our discovery obligations, is not within the possession of the prosecution team, and/or does not exist.

One interesting redaction in this most recent exchange pertains to Trump’s request for injuries of law enforcement on January 6.

2. If you intend to introduce evidence at trial of any injuries sustained to law enforcement or anyone else at the Capitol on January 6, 2021, please provide all documents regarding those injured during the protest at the Capitol, including medical records.

DOJ’s response to that is entirely redacted, suggesting that DOJ may well submit records of injuries, such as the heart attack Danny Rodriguez caused after being especially riled up at Trump’s rally.

Finally, of significant interest: Trump asks for the identities of all the people who’ve flipped.

16. Please provide all documents regarding offers of immunity, forgoing of prosecution, diversion, USSG 5K1.1 reductions, or any other consideration to persons under investigation or charged regarding activities related to January 6th.

DOJ included that request among those about which it said Trump was not entitled to discovery.

Requests 15-19, 34-36. All of these requests—regarding the pipe bomb investigation, offers of immunity to January 6 defendants, “Antifa,” sources, and various named and unnamed January 6 offenders—appear to be focused on others’ actions related to the January 6 attack on the Capitol. Many of them request information that exceeds the scope of our discovery obligations and/or is not within the possession of the prosecution team. To the extent that we possess any such materials, we have produced them to you. Relatedly, in our meet and confer, you stated that you believe that in certain other cases, the Department of Justice has taken a position inconsistent with the indictment’s allegations that the defendant is responsible for the events of January 6. We disagree. The Department’s position in other January 6 cases that the defendant’s actions did not absolve any individual rioter of responsibility for that rioter’s actions—even if the rioter took them at the defendant’s direction—is in no way inconsistent with the indictment’s allegations here.

Trump continues to argue he’s better than the members of his mob. And he’s trying to avoid being held accountable for any near murders his incitement caused.


August 11 DOJ letter accompanying first classified discovery; includes redacted reference to Secret Service at 6,

October 6 Trump letter addressing Document 1 and Document 5

October 23 Trump discovery letter with seven requests redacted (Unredacted copy)

October 24 DOJ response to classified discovery letter, describing scope of prosecution team

November 3 DOJ response to October 23 discovery letter rejecting most requests and telling Trump where to find some of it in discovery; this has a number of specific references to the requests in the October 23 letter

November 15 Trump discovery letter making broad requests for January 6 discovery

November 25 DOJ response to November 15 letter and November 21 meet-and-confer, providing additional responses to October 23 requests

Exhibit H (sealed; pertains to reason Bill Barr changed Public Integrity’s approach to voter fraud claims)

Exhibit I (sealed; follow-up to letter Molly Gaston and JP Cooney sent about PIN)

Exhibit J (sealed; involvement of National Security Division in January 6 cases)

Exhibit K (sealed; involvement from FBI WFO on January 2)

Exhibit L (sealed; involvement from FBI WFO on January 3)

Exhibit M (sealed; reference to DHS I&A as attempt to get to CISA Election Task Force; ODNI involvement)

Exhibit N (sealed; related to DHS involvement in March 2021 report on 2020 election)

Exhibit O (sealed; related to DHS involvement on January 6)

Trump Continues to Disavow the Mob that Sacrificed Their Lives for Him

As I have shown, Trump’s collective motions to dismiss his January 6 indictment selectively treat the five means alleged in the indictment (pressuring states, the fake elector plot, using Jeffrey Clark, pressuring Pence, and exploiting the mob), never actually dealing with all five as charged.

Rather than addressing the fifth, Mob (“directing supporters to the Capitol to obstruct the proceeding, id. at ¶¶ 86-105; and exploiting the violence and chaos that transpired at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021”), he instead filed a motion to strike all references to the mob.

Poof! It is a legalistic way to deny the very same mobsters (DOJ noted in their response) Trump has sung with and promised to pardon, and in so doing simply wish away the abundant evidence that Trump obstructed the vote certification.

It is the stuff of magic wands.

Trump’s reply uses a series of gimmicks to attempt to wish away parts of the indictment against him.

In one lengthy section that might invite a request to file a sur-reply by DOJ, Trump cites some of the greatest hits of articles by journalists who knew little about the investigation to claim that none of the investigation of the mob related to Trump.

12 Mark Hosenball and Sarah N. Lynch, Exclusive: FBI finds scant evidence U.S. Capitol attack was coordinated – sources, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2021), at https://www.reuters.com/world/us/exclusive-fbi-finds-scant-evidence-us-capitol-attack-wascoordinated-sources-2021-08-20/.

13 William M. Arkin, Donald Trump Didn’t Run the January 6 Riot. So Why Did It Happen?, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 6, 2022), at https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-didnt-run-january-6-riotso-why-did-it-happen-1661335.

14 Carol D. Leonnig and Aaron C. Davis, FBI resisted opening probe into Trump’s role in Jan. 6 for more than a year, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 19, 2023), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2023/06/19/fbi-resisted-opening-probe-intotrumps-role-jan-6-more-than-year/.

Trump also uses outdated and invented crowd numbers to claim that just a fraction of his mob was part of the mob, focusing just on the mob that entered the Capitol and not the one that besieged it, another part of this motion that might invite sur-reply.

In another place, Trump promises a motion in limine to eliminate all reference to the violence committed in his name, because the sheer violence of it will distract the jury.

For instance, the prosecution claims protesters were “extraordinarily violent and destructive.” Doc. 140, at 11. Even if marginally relevant, which it is emphatically not, the danger of “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury,” would far outweigh any probative value. F.R.E. 403. The fact that the prosecution even suggests that such inflammatory claims could have an appropriate place in the trial of President Trump only underscores the unfair and malicious way the Special Counsel is pursuing this case on behalf of the Biden Administration against its leading political opponent, President Trump.

In another paragraph of gibberish, Trump says that DOJ can’t include the actions (including of Couy Griffith, who had met with Trump personally) of people who weren’t charged with the same crimes he was and also says that because Merrick Garland generally defined Jack Smith’s mandate to crimes committed by those who weren’t at the Capitol, it means any crimes committed by people at the Capitol must be excluded.

Indeed, the January 6 cases relied on by the prosecution do not support its contention that “actions at the Capitol are relevant and probative evidence” of the charged conduct. Doc. 140, at 2. Several of the cases did not involve any of the charges brought against President Trump, rendering any relevance analysis inapplicable to this case. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, No. CR 21-244-2, 2023 WL 2043223, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2023) (charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1752(a)(1), 1752(a)(2); 40 U.S.C. §§ 5104(e)(2)(D), 5104(e)(2)(G)); United States v. MacAndrew, No. CR 21-730, 2022 WL 17961247, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 2022) (same). Those cases that did include at least one charge brought against President Trump (as well as charges not brought against him) all involved defendants who were personally present at the Capitol. Those are the types of cases that the Attorney General specifically carved out of the Special Counsel’s authority in Order No. 5559-2022: “This authorization does not apply to . . . future investigations and prosecutions of individuals for offenses they committed while physically present on the Capitol grounds on January 6, 2021.” Actual presence has been emphasized as an important factor in the relevance analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Stedman, No. CR 21-383 (BAH), 2023 WL 3303818, at *2 (D.D.C. May 8, 2023) (“defendant’s knowing joinder of a broader crowd is probative of his participation in a venture that interfered with a congressional proceeding”).

In yet another tactic, Trump falsely claims that a passage about how Trump’s manipulation of the mob demonstrates his motive pertains exclusively to his tweet attacking Mike Pence.

Despite three pages of narrative, the prosecution only suggests that one of the paragraphs that is subject to the Motion to Strike is appropriate for this purpose: paragraph 111, which relates to a social media post by President Trump concerning Mike Pence. Paragraph 111 does not show motive or intent as it relates to the actions at the Capitol.

In doing so, Trump ignores references to four other paragraphs explicitly cited in DOJ’s response.

As set forth in the indictment, on the morning of January 6, the defendant knew that the crowd that he had gathered in Washington for the certification “was going to be ‘angry.’” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 98. Despite this knowledge—or perhaps because of it—in his remarks to supporters, the defendant told knowing lies about the Vice President’s role in the congressional certification, stoked the crowd’s anger, and directed them to march to the Capitol and “fight.”

[snip]

Although the defendant knew that the certification proceedings had been interrupted and suspended, he rejected multiple entreaties to calm the rioters and instead provoked them by publicly attacking the Vice President. ECF No. 1 at ¶111. And instead of decrying the rioters’ violence, he embraced them, issuing a video message telling them that they were “very special” and that “we love you.” Id. at ¶ 116. Finally, while the violent riot effectively suspended the proceedings over which the Vice President had been presiding, the defendant and his coconspirators sought to shore up efforts to overturn the election by securing further delay through knowing lies. Id. at ¶¶ 119, 120.

Trump here ignores the warning from his aides that the mob was angry, Trump’s video declaring “we love you” to his mob, and Trump’s renewed efforts to prevent the vote certification even after the mob left.

And in two different ways, Trump tries, again, to simply wish away the evidence that Trump corruptly tried to obstruct the vote certification, two of the charges against him. In one, Trump claims that the certification of the election at the Capitol provides no context to charges that he obstructed the certification of the election at the Capitol.

As a final, futile, attempt to establish relevance, the prosecution argues that the actions at the Capitol on January 6 provide “necessary context for all the charged conduct.” Doc. 140, at 12. Nevertheless, again, the prosecution did not charge President Trump with any crime relating to the actions at the Capitol, such as insurrection or incitement. Actions by others—whom the prosecution does not claim were part of any of the alleged conspiracies—do not provide any context for the actions based on which President Trump is charged.

And then, two paragraphs later, Trump points to the paragraph delimitation in just one charge — the conspiracy to defraud the vote certification — that doesn’t exist for the other three charges, to say that DOJ has excluded the actions described in the paragraphs about the mob.

The challenged allegations’ lack of relevance to the charges against President Trump is further demonstrated by the Indictment itself. The Indictment claims that President Trump “and his co-conspirators committed one or more of the acts to effect the object of the conspiracy alleged” in a list of paragraphs. Doc. 1, ¶ 124. The Indictment omits Paragraphs 10(d), 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, or 113 from this list. Thus, the prosecution does not claim that the actions at the Capitol on January 6 were “acts to effect the object of the conspiracy,” an admission that these paragraphs lack relevance to the charged conduct.

Compare the list of paragraphs cited in the 18 USC 371 charge with paragraphs in the other three charges that cite paragraphs 8 through 123.

The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 4 and 8 through 123 of this Indictment are re-alleged and fully incorporated here by reference.

Not just his motion to strike, the promised motion in limine, and all his other efforts to, like the Apostle Peter, deny the mob he has made his religion are gimmicks, just efforts to wish away abundant evidence against him.

It all comes off as rather desperate.

And as you consider the flop sweat coming off Trump’s motion to strike, consider this: DOJ must have provided, in discovery, the evidence they plan to use to show what Trump’s mob did and that they did it because of him and his lies. DOJ has repeatedly said they’ve provided the evidence they plan to use at trial. Among the things Trump must have in his possession are the videos that show Danny Rodriguez went directly from hearing Trump’s speech to almost murdering Michael Fanone, and others responded to Trump’s Pence tweet by serving a critical role in opening a second front of the attack on the Capitol and breaching the Senate.

Trump has — must have!! — seen the evidence about his mob DOJ intends to use at trial. And his response is this blubbering effort to wish his mob away.

How Ryan Nichols Responded to Trump’s Mike Pence Tweet

A number of you have noted that dumbass James Comer has subpoenaed Hunter Biden and others (but asked only for voluntary testimony from Tony Bobulinski). And Trump has filed his appeal of Judge Tanya Chutkan’s gag order.

I’ll get to both of those.

For now, I’m more interested in the details of Ryan Nichols’ plea. Nichols is a former Marine who drove from Texas to DC, with four guns in his truck, with a buddy. He carried a crowbar to the Capitol. As he was marching to the Capitol from the Ellipse, he heard about Trump’s tweet targeting Mike Pence. In response, he gave a long, recorded speech responding to Trump’s news that Pence was not going to overturn the election by promising to drag politicians in the streets.

I’m hearing that Pence just caved. I’m hearing reports that Pence caved. I’m telling you if Pence caved, we’re gonna drag motherfuckers through the streets. You fucking politicians are going to get fucking drug through the streets. Because we’re not going to have our fucking shit stolen. We’re not going to have our election or our country stolen. If we find out you politicians voted for it, we’re going to drag your fucking ass through the streets. Because it’s the second fucking revolution and we’re fucking done. I’m telling you right now, Ryan Nichols said it. If you voted for fucking treason, we’re going to drag your fucking ass through the streets. So let us find out, let the patriots find out that you fucking treasoned this country. We’re gonna drag your fucking ass through the street. You think we’re here for no reason? You think we patriots are here for no reason? You think we came just to fucking watch you run over us? No. You want to take it from us, motherfucker we’ll take it back from you.

Later, at the Capitol, he pepper sprayed cops guarding the Tunnel, then called others to take up weapons. “If you have a weapon, you need to get your weapon,” chanting, “Pedo Pence.”

At the end of the day, he again recorded himself, explaining how the mob had listened to Trump, learned Pence “did the wrong thing, and so they stopped the vote.”

I watched patriots gather and on the way down Pennsylvania Avenue after we listened to President Trump speak, we heard that Pence did the wrong thing. And as we got [sic] the Capitol building the consensus across the board was the same, that if Pence did the wrong thing and sold us out, then we have to fight.

[snip]

They showed where Pennsylvania said yesterday, “hey, we screwed up. We want to change this,” but Pence did the wrong thing and allowed them to continue with the vote. So we stormed the Capitol building, and they stopped the vote. And went down in to the tunnels and hid, like the fucking cowards they are.

Instead of coming out there and addressing “we the people,” they ran. Because they knew they were doing the wrong thing. So we clashed with Capitol Police.

After engaging in the most committed kind of conspiracy theorizing about the January 6 investigation for years, Nichols pled guilty the other to assault and obstruction.

His guidelines sentence is 78 to 97 months.

Congressman Clay Higgins, who is nothing short of batshit, wrote a letter calling on Judge Lamberth to sentence Nichols to time served, less than two years, rather than the guidelines upwards of 6.5 years.

Because Nichols recorded much of what he did with a GoPro and/or on his phone, this is precisely the kind of evidence that prosecutors may use to show how Trump mobilized a mob against Congress, and Mike Pence in particular, to obstruct the vote certification on January 6.

As I noted the other day, Jack Smith has promised to prove Trump’s role in mobilizing the mob — both those who attacked cops and those who threatened to attack Mike Pence — at trial.

At trial, the Government will prove these allegations with evidence that the defendant’s supporters took obstructive actions at the Capitol at the defendant’s direction and on his behalf. This evidence will include video evidence demonstrating that on the morning of January 6, the defendant encouraged the crowd to go to the Capitol throughout his speech, giving the earliest such instruction roughly 15 minutes into his remarks; testimony, video, photographic, and geolocation evidence establishing that many of the defendant’s supporters responded to his direction and moved from his speech at the Ellipse to the Capitol; and testimony, video, and photographic evidence that specific individuals who were at the Ellipse when the defendant exhorted them to “fight” at the Capitol then violently attacked law enforcement and breached the Capitol.

The indictment also alleges, and the Government will prove at trial, that the defendant used the angry crowd at the Capitol as a tool in his pressure campaign on the Vice President and to obstruct the congressional certification. Through testimony and video evidence, the Government will establish that rioters were singularly focused on entering the Capitol building, and once inside sought out where lawmakers were conducting the certification proceeding and where the electoral votes were being counted. And in particular, the Government will establish through testimony and video evidence that after the defendant repeatedly and publicly pressured and attacked the Vice President, the rioting crowd at the Capitol turned their anger toward the Vice President when they learned he would not halt the certification, asking where the Vice President was and chanting that they would hang him. [my emphasis]

Already, DOJ has collected evidence to show that rioters who engaged in some of the most consequential actions on January 6 were directly responding to Trump’s incitement. The guys who first breached the Senate chamber and helped open a second major breach at the East door, for example, took GoPro video of themselves specifically looking for Pence. The guy who almost murdered Michael Fanone was caught on camera responding to Trump’s incitement by promising to slit Joe Biden’s throat. His buddy, who helped Ryan Nichols incite the crowd, also tied storming Congress to targeting Mike Pence.

“Pence did the wrong thing … So we stormed the Capitol, and they stopped the vote,” Nichols explained his actions that day.

These kinds of statements, mobsters explaining how they responded to Trump’s statements by taking violent action to stop the voter certification, happened over and over.

That’s what Trump wants to keep out of his trial.

DOJ Refuses to Let Trump Disavow His Mob

In three different ways in their responses to Trump’s motions to dismiss submitted yesterday, Jack Smith’s prosecutors emphasized that Trump should be subject to the same standards — and legal precedents — as the mob he sicced on the Capitol.

One pertains to the appellate precedents already set in the application of 18 USC 1512(c)(2). DOJ cited both January 6 precedents — Fischer and Robertson — to lay out that interrupting the vote certification to secure the presidency for oneself would be evidence of corrupt intent.

The alternatives include “using independently unlawful, felonious means,” id. at *9, and acting with a “corrupt purpose,” id. at *11, which includes acting “with an intent to procure an unlawful benefit,” Fischer, 64 F.4th at 352 (Walker, J., concurring) (quotation marks omitted), such as “secur[ing] . . . the presidency,” and acting dishonestly, Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 706- 07 (2005); see Robertson, 2023 WL 6932346, at *12 (noting that “dishonesty” or “seeking a benefit for oneself or another” is not necessary but “may be sufficient to prove corrupt intent”).

Then, in response to Trump’s claim of selective prosecution (based off two stories — the famous Carol Leonnig one and a much earlier NYT one, both by journalists who did little other coverage of the larger January 6 investigation) — DOJ pointed to all the other similarly situated Jan6ers who not only were prosecuted, but whose claims of selective prosecution or prosecution for speech failed.

The passage cited to:

  • Carl Nichols’ opinion that Garret Miller’s role in interrupting the peaceful transfer of power distinguished him from Portland rioters.
  • Trevor McFadden’s opinion that, because January 6 posed a greater threat than the Portland riots, David Judd could not argue he was being prosecuted more severely than they had been for setting off a firecracker in The Tunnel.
  • James Boasberg’s opinion that judge’s son Aaron Mostofsky, was not being prosecuted because he wore animal pelts to January 6, but because he obstructed the vote certification.
  • John Bates’ opinion that the threat to government officials and employees, as well as the objective of obstructing the vote certification, could warrant harsher charges against retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Larry Brock, who brought zip ties onto the floor of the Senate.
  • John Bates’ opinion that Zeeker Bozell, was not being prosecuted for his political views but for “the destructive acts he allegedly took to disrupt the January 6 Certification.”
  • Royce Lamberth’s findings of fact that it didn’t matter that, even if Alan. Hostetter sincerely believed–which it appears he did–that the election was fraudulent, that President Trump was the rightful winner, and that public officials committed treason, as a former police chief, he still must have known it was unlawful to vindicate that perceived injustice by engaging in mob violence to obstruct Congress.”
  • Amy Berman Jackson’s opinion dismissing Danny Rodriguez’ claim that he was being prosecuted for his “sincerely held political belief that the 2020 presidential election was not fairly decided,” noting that it was his criminal conduct, including tasing Michael Fanone.
  • Amit Mehta’s argument that Stewart Rhodes and his co-conspirators were charged of more in their seditious conspiracy indictment than simply calling on Trump to invoke the Insurrection Act.

This list includes four GOP appointed judges, including his two Trumpiest appointments (one a former Clarence Thomas clerk), it includes the scion of a prominent Republican family and several people who invaded the Senate, it includes two of the defendants whose actions prosecutors showed were the most directly tied to Trump’s speech. And it includes an Oath Keeper convicted of sedition.

That section describing January 6 defendants whose First Amendment claims have already failed included a cross-citation to DOJ’s response on the motion to strike. Over the course of that filing, DOJ provided still more precedents from Trump’s mob, about the collective action of the mob, that they argue should apply to him too:

“The sheer numbers of individuals making up the mob that marched on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021—without stopping at the fencing or the barricades or the police lines or the chemical spray and other crowd control tools deployed by law enforcement—had the effect of overwhelming law enforcement officers attempting to secure the Capitol, with the direct consequence of creating a catastrophic security risk requiring the evacuation of lawmakers, staff, and press representatives legitimately gathered inside the Capitol building that day to conduct, facilitate, and observe the certification of the Electoral College vote count and triggering a lengthy delay before this constitutionally-mandated proceeding could resume.”

  • James Boasberg’s opinion that Sara Carpenter could not exclude evidence of the effect on the vote certification because, “the weighty probative value of evidence that broadly depicts what happened on January 6 outweighs any potential prejudice or cumulativeness.”
  • James Boasberg’s opinion, again finding that such general evidence can come in to prove what Bradley Bennett obstructed.
  • Colleen Kollar-Kotelly’s opinion that evidence about context could come in at Danean MacAndrew’s trial because “the size of the crowd, political leaders, and false allegations of voter fraud and election interference” … “bear on Defendant’s mental state at the time of the charged offenses.”
  • Colleen Kollar-Kotelly’s opinion repeating her MacAndrew ruling that the government could present evidence of the collective action of the mob in Anthony Alfred Griffith’s trial.

The response to Trump’s motion to strike did more: It hung Trump’s mob on him. It called Trump out for disavowing his mob in an attempt to wipe away a critical part of the indictment.

[P]ublicly, the defendant has promoted and extolled the events of that day. While the violent attack was ongoing, the defendant told rioters that they were “very special” and that “we love you.” In the years since, he has championed rioters as “great patriots” and proclaimed January 6 “a beautiful day.” In this case, though, the defendant seeks to distance himself, moving to strike allegations in the indictment related to “the actions at the Capitol on January 6, 2021.” ECF No. 115 at 1. The Court should recognize the defendant’s motion for what it is: a meritless effort to evade the indictment’s clear allegations that the defendant is responsible for the events at the Capitol on January 6.

It debunked Trump’s claim that he is not charged with being responsible for January 6.

The defendant’s motion is premised on the disingenuous claim that he is not charged with “responsibility for the actions at the Capitol on January 6, 2021.” ECF No. 115 at 1. But the indictment clearly alleges, and the Government will prove at trial, that the defendant bears such responsibility.

And, as I predicted would happen, DOJ committed to prove that Trump obstructed the vote certification — and nearly got Mike Pence killed — in significant part, with his mob.

Ultimately, the defendant’s three conspiracies culminated and converged when, on January 6, the defendant attempted to obstruct and prevent the congressional certification at the Capitol. One of the ways that the defendant did so, as alleged in the indictment, was to direct an angry crowd of his supporters to the Capitol and to continue to stoke their anger while they were rioting and obstructing the certification.

At trial, the Government will prove these allegations with evidence that the defendant’s supporters took obstructive actions at the Capitol at the defendant’s direction and on his behalf. This evidence will include video evidence demonstrating that on the morning of January 6, the defendant encouraged the crowd to go to the Capitol throughout his speech, giving the earliest such instruction roughly 15 minutes into his remarks; testimony, video, photographic, and geolocation evidence establishing that many of the defendant’s supporters responded to his direction and moved from his speech at the Ellipse to the Capitol; and testimony, video, and photographic evidence that specific individuals who were at the Ellipse when the defendant exhorted them to “fight” at the Capitol then violently attacked law enforcement and breached the Capitol.

The indictment also alleges, and the Government will prove at trial, that the defendant used the angry crowd at the Capitol as a tool in his pressure campaign on the Vice President and to obstruct the congressional certification. Through testimony and video evidence, the Government will establish that rioters were singularly focused on entering the Capitol building, and once inside sought out where lawmakers were conducting the certification proceeding and where the electoral votes were being counted. And in particular, the Government will establish through testimony and video evidence that after the defendant repeatedly and publicly pressured and attacked the Vice President, the rioting crowd at the Capitol turned their anger toward the Vice President when they learned he would not halt the certification, asking where the Vice President was and chanting that they would hang him. [my emphasis]

DOJ’s commitment to prove this echoes moves it has taken during past prosecutions — the evidence of Trump’s effect on defendants has already been introduced in plea hearings or at trial.

DOJ has been preparing to prove this for a very, very long time.

Meanwhile they’ve been collecting receipts of all the times that Trump has owned this mob since — including receipts from the Waco rally kicking off his current presidential run.

The Government will further establish the defendant’s criminal intent by showing that, in the years since January 6, despite his knowledge of the violent actions at the Capitol, the defendant has publicly praised and defended rioters and their conduct. There is a robust public record of how rioters’ actions at the Capitol on January 6 were extraordinarily violent and destructive, including attacks on law enforcement officers with flag poles, tasers, bear spray, and stolen riot shields and batons. One officer who was dragged into the crowd endured a brutal beating while members of the crowd reportedly yelled, “Kill him with his own gun!” Terrified lawmakers and staff hid in various places inside the building, and many were evacuated. Despite this, the defendant has never wavered in his support of January 6 offenders. For instance, the Government will introduce at trial the defendant’s own statements in the years since January 6 proclaiming it “a beautiful day” and calling rioters “patriots,” many of whom he “plan[s] to pardon.”2 The Government will also introduce evidence of the defendant’s public support for and association with the “January 6 Choir,” a group of particularly violent January 6 defendants detained at the District of Columbia jail. 3 The defendant’s decision to repeatedly stand behind January 6 rioters and their cause is relevant to the jury’s determination of whether he intended the actions at the Capitol that day.

3 The defendant began a campaign rally in Waco, Texas, on March 25, 2023, by playing a recording of the Star-Spangled Banner by the January 6 Choir. Of the January 6 Choir, the defendant told the crowd, “[O]ur people love those people, they love those people.” See C-SPAN at 2:44, https://www.c-span.org/video/?526860-1/president-trump-holds-rally-waco-texas. The January 6 Choir includes defendants who assaulted law enforcement officers on January 6 and one who used chemical spray on a Capitol Police officer who died the next day. See Washington Post, Behind Trump’s Musical Tribute to Some of the Most Violent Jan. 6 Rioters (May 7, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2023/trump-j6-prison-choir/.

In an attempt to avoid the fate hundreds of them have already faced, Trump attempted to disavow his mobsters.

DOJ intends to prove that Trump was very much a part of the mob that attacked the Capitol on January 6 and almost got his Vice President killed.

Jack Smith Attempts to Prevent Trump from Delaying DC Trial with Interlocutory Appeals

In a hearing in the stolen documents case on November 2, Jay Bratt implored Judge Aileen Cannon not to base the timing of the Florida trial based on assumptions about the DC case, because that trial date

The Court really cannot let or should not let the D.C. trial drive the schedule here. In the D.C. case, they are making many of the same arguments, though they have not yet filed a motion for adjournment. They have already said that they likely will. They have talked about —

[snip]

A lot of this, though, is in the realm of the — I don’t want to say hypothetical, but it is in the realm of we don’t know what is going to happen. We don’t know what is going to happen in this case. We don’t know what is going to happen in the D.C. case. Among the things that the Defense has raised in the D.C. case is that if there are adverse rulings on any of the pending motions to dismiss, that they would seek an appeal and seek to stay the proceedings. That could happen. We don’t know. Obviously, there are arguments both ways, arguments both before the Trial Court before the D.C. Circuit, but that could happen. That trial date could disappear.

[snip]

Things could happen, things could happen with the D.C. case that would make going forward on May 20th, 2024, in this case not feasible. That may happen and we can address that, at that time, but we should be moving forward in this case.

The one thing he mentioned that could happen was a defense request to stay proceedings pending appeal.

Judge Tanya Chutkan certainly doesn’t want anything to delay the DC case. She said that explicitly in an October 16 hearing on Trump’s bid to stay her gag order.

THE COURT: This trial will not yield to the election cycle and we’re not revisiting the trial date, Mr. Lauro.

Perhaps to make that even clearer, after Trump filed to motion a stay pending appeal of any decision on his Absolute Immunity argument on November 1, she issued a requested order pertaining to jury selection by setting the beginning of that process to start on February 9.

But Jack Smith’s team appears to be concerned that Trump may use interlocutory appeals to delay the trial. In a response to Trump’s November 1 motion, Molly Gaston not only opposed that stay (which she described as an attempt to apply appellate and civil procedure to this criminal trial), but she requested that Judge Chutkan prioritize those decisions that are subject to interlocutory appeal: the Absolute Immunity bid, and one part of Trump’s Constitutional challenge to the indictment pertaining to double jeopardy.

[T]he defendant’s stay motion exposes his intention to use his meritless immunity claim to disrupt the Court’s schedule. Accordingly, to prevent undue delay and maintain the trial date, the Court should consider and decide first among the motions pending on the docket the defendant’s two claims that could be subject to interlocutory appeal: presidential immunity and double jeopardy.

In her motion, Gaston lays out Trump’s various dilatory tactics.

The defendant has planned to file this motion for months but waited until now in hopes of grinding pretrial matters to a halt closer to the trial date. As early as August 28, 2023, for instance, defense counsel informed the Court that the defendant would raise “executive immunity . . . with the Court likely this week or early next week, which is a very complex and sophisticated motion regarding whether or not this court would even have jurisdiction over this case. . . .” ECF No. 38 at 33-34. But the defendant did not file an immunity motion that week or the following. Instead, he waited more than a month before filing the promised pleading on October 5. See ECF No. 74. The defendant then waited another month to file the stay motion, late at night on November 1. Tellingly, earlier that same day, when defense counsel appeared at a hearing in the defendant’s criminal case in the Southern District of Florida, he used this Court’s March 4 trial date and pretrial schedule as an excuse to try to delay that trial—without disclosing that, within hours, he would file his stay motion here seeking to disrupt and delay the very deadlines in this case that he was using as a pretense. See United States v. Trump, No. 23-80101, Hr’g. Tr. at 24 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2023). In short, the defendant’s actions make clear that his ultimate objective with the stay motion, as has consistently been the case in this and other matters, is to delay trial at all costs and for as long as possible.

To thwart Trump’s efforts to stall any longer, Gaston requests that Chutkan prioritize the issues that can be appealed.

To limit such disruption, the Court should promptly resolve the defendant’s immunity motion, as well as his double jeopardy claim that is also potentially subject to interlocutory appeal, so that the Government can seek expedited consideration of any nonfrivolous appeal and preserve the Court’s carefully selected trial date.

She promises DOJ will use all mechanisms available to accelerate Trump’s own appeal.

To prevent the defendant from using the timing of any such appeal to disrupt the Court’s trial date, the Court should promptly consider and decide his immunity and double jeopardy motions. If the Court rules in the Government’s favor and the defendant appeals, the Government will take all possible measures to expedite the appeal, see Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1339-40 (7th Cir. 1989) (identifying mechanisms such as requesting summary affirmance or asking to expedite the appeal), just as the defendant sought to expedite his appeal of the Court’s Rule 57.7 Order—relief that the court of appeals provided. See United States v. Trump, No. 23-3190, Order (D.C. Cir. Nov. 3, 2023) (expediting merits briefing and oral argument). In any event, although a non-frivolous appeal would temporarily divest this Court of jurisdiction, it would do so over only “those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam). In sum, the Court’s prompt resolution of the defendant’s immunity and double jeopardy claims would best position this case to stay on track with its current pretrial schedule and trial date.

The thing is: The double jeopardy claim is frivolous; James Pearce noted that the four charges in the current indictment are for a totally different crime than the incitement of insurrection charged in impeachment.

But no matter how shitty the Absolute Immunity bid is, because of the historic nature of the case, all judges are going to take it seriously, including Chutkan.

The Absolute Immunity bid was fully briefed on October 26. Trump’s reply in the double jeopardy bid is due next week.

I don’t know appellate procedures well enough, nor can I imagine how John Roberts’ court will respond to a request to expedite something like the Absolute Immunity request.

But I do know that Jack Smith’s team seems to recognize that this bid for delay might work. Political pundits on both sides of the aisle are accounting for a trial that will start on March 4. But there has not yet been enough scrutiny on whether Trump’s bid for delay will succeed.

DOJ’s Responses on Trump’s Motions to Dismiss

DOJ submitted their responses to Trump’s motions to dismiss today. As a reminder, here’s my summary of Trump’s arguments.

I’ll write them up tomorrow, but here are links:

Here’s my Xitter thread on the omnibus response to MTD on Statutory and Constitutional Grounds.

Trump’s New Appellate Argument about His 100 Million Imaginary Friends

Judge Tanya Chutkan issued her order denying Trump a stay of her gag order on October 29.

That was admittedly a Saturday. Nevertheless, it took Trump four days before he ran to the DC Circuit to cry about an emergency infringement on the First Amendment rights of him and his mob.

He took those four days even as he demanded that the DC Circuit — which had been expecting Trump’s initial brief on November 8 — rule on this motion by November 10.

The Court should stay the Gag Order pending appeal. In addition, President Trump respectfully requests that the Court enter a temporary administrative stay pending resolution of this motion and issue its ruling by November 10, 2023. If the Court denies this motion, President Trump requests that the Court extend its administrative stay for seven days to allow him to seek relief from the U.S. Supreme Court.

During those four days that Trump didn’t file for a stay, John Lauro found time to file three different things (one, two, three) in Judge Chutkan’s docket. In those four days, Trump posted a slew of attacks on Joe Biden, the 2020 election, and his prosecution (though admittedly many of the recent posts targeted Arthur Engoron), many of them attacks that — he claims — this gag prevents him from making.

I’ll leave it to smarter people to explain the posture that leaves this case.

What I’m more interested in are the arguments that Trump makes that should not withstand prolonged scrutiny, at least not at the DC Circuit, arguments that are surely designed to trigger the interest of Sam Alito and Clarence Thomas.

In his appeal, Trump argues — substantially for the first time — that his gag subjects him to viewpoint discrimination. There’s a very short section dedicated to the topic, citing an inapt precedent.

7. The Gag Order reflects forbidden viewpoint discrimination.

By forbidding speech that “target[s]” certain individuals, the Gag Order prohibits only (vaguely defined) negative speech about them. See infra, Part I.C. In Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court held that prohibiting only negative or “disparaging” speech constitutes forbidden viewpoint discrimination. 582 U.S. 218, 243 (2017) (plurality opinion). Such a prohibition “constitutes viewpoint discrimination—a form of speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny.” Id. at 247 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). To prohibit “disparaging” speech “reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds offensive. This is the essence of viewpoint discrimination.” Id. at 249; see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391- 92. The Gag Order violates these principles

Trump lards the rest of the discussion with claims that a gag tied to the crimes alleged against Trump amounts to censorship of right wing views.

Based this speculation, the district court entered a sweeping, viewpoint-based prior restraint on the core political speech of a major Presidential candidate, based solely on an unconstitutional “heckler’s veto.” The Gag Order violates the First Amendment rights of President Trump and over 100 million Americans who listen to him.

[snip]

President Trump’s viewpoint and modes of expression resonate powerfully with tens of millions of Americans. The prosecution’s request for a Gag Order bristles with hostility to President Trump’s viewpoint and his relentless criticism of the government—including of the prosecution itself. The Gag Order embodies this unconstitutional hostility to President Trump’s viewpoint. It should be immediately stayed.

[snip]

As a viewpoint-based prior restraint on the core political speech of a Presidential candidate to an audience of over 100 million Americans, the Gag Order is virtually per se invalid.

There are nine appearances of the word “viewpoint” in the entire appendix. All appear in Trump’s filings bidding for a stay, not his underlying opposition to the gag. But all of those also appear as part of an argument about political speech — an important argument, but one largely divorced from the circumstance of this gag, not as a free-standing argument about the free speech of nutjob right wingers.

That argument is closely related to (and builds on) another argument that Trump belatedly raised: that gagging his speech harms the First Amendment rights of his 100 million followers.

4. The Gag Order violates the rights of tens of millions of Americans to receive President Trump’s speech.

The First Amendment’s “protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (citing many cases); Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104 (2017) (recognizing the right to “speak and listen, and then … speak and listen once more,” as a “fundamental principle of the First Amendment”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). A restriction on President Trump’s speech inflicts a reciprocal injury on the rights of over 100 million Americans who listen to him, irrespective of their political beliefs.

This right of listeners to receive President Trump’s message has its “fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office,” especially for the Presidency. Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 162. Ford emphasized that, if Congressman Ford were silenced, “reciprocally, his constituents will have no access to the views of their congressman on this issue of undoubted public importance.” 830 F.2d at 601. Likewise, Brown stated that “[t]he urgency of a campaign … may well require that a candidate, for the benefit of the electorate as well as himself, have absolute freedom to discuss his qualifications….” 218 F.3d at 430.

In Trump’s appeal, he doesn’t cite evidence supporting this number, but — as I already noted — the underlying motion relies on garbage double counting of bots on the Twitter platform Trump no longer uses. Given that this argument is based on fraudulent numbers, it amounts to a defense of the First Amendment rights to listen of Trump’s imaginary friends, including the Russian bots the now-deceased Yevgeniy Prigozhin deployed to fuck with US politics.

The problem with this argument is, as DOJ noted in its response to Trump’s bid for a gag, Trump misrepresented the record on that point.

11 The defendant did not invoke these interests in his response to the Government’s motion for an order under Local Criminal Rule 57.7(c). And while the defendant claims to have invoked these interests at the hearing, only to have been unfairly interrupted by the Court (ECF No. 110 at 17), his citations mischaracterize the record. For example, he asserts (id.) that the Court interrupted him in response to his statement, “And what the government is proposing here is an order not just directed against President Trump but against the American electorate that wants to hear from President Trump under these circumstances.” The Court did not, in fact, interject in response to that point. See ECF No. 103 at 44. Rather, it was only several sentences later, after defense counsel returned to his oft-repeated talking point that “[t]his is the first time we’ve had a sitting administration prosecute a political opponent” that the Court responded, “I’m going to interrupt you. . . . You have said that. You have said it repeatedly. I have heard it.” Id. Likewise, the defendant asserts (ECF No. 110 at 17) that, when counsel said, “The American people are entitled to understand that and understand the consequences of that,” the Court simply responded, “No.” The Court did no such thing. After defense counsel’s comment, the Court asked why the defendant “is entitled to suggest that an appropriate punishment would be death.” ECF No. 103 at 59-60. When defense counsel invoked the First Amendment in response, the Court said, “No. As part of that. But again, the First Amendment protections must yield to the administration of justice and the protection of witnesses.” Id.

In a footnote of Judge Chutkan’s order denying the stay, she agreed.

Defendant’s Motion argues that his speech restrictions are inconsistent with the “right of listeners to receive President Trump’s message.” Motion to Stay at 15. Defendant did not squarely raise that argument in his opposition brief to the government’s original motion; the closest he came to identifying any authority for it was an unrelated “see also” citation to United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 598 (6th Cir. 1987), a case that he now quotes to support his right-of-listeners argument. Compare ECF No. 60 at 5, with Motion to Stay at 16. But the court expressly addressed and distinguished that case. Order at 2–3. In any event, the argument does not alter the fundamental principle that First Amendment rights, whether those of the speaker or the listener, may be curtailed to preclude statements that pose sufficiently grave threats to the integrity of judicial proceedings.

Undeterred by that footnote, Trump argues that Chutkan’s failure to address something he didn’t raise is her reversible error, not a waiver on his part.

Though the issue was raised repeatedly, A159-60, A165, A178; A47, A62-63, the district court gave the First Amendment rights of President Trump’s audiences no meaningful consideration. The Gag Order does not mention them, see A1-3, and the district court declined to consider them when President Trump raised them, e.g., A47, A62-63. That is reversible error.

I’ve linked two of the spots in the record, above, where John Lauro imagines he raised this — A47, which he cites twice, was in the oral arguments, not the underlying brief. None was a substantive argument about his imaginary 100 million friends. Here’s the appendix if you want to see if you can find what other things he is citing to.

There are other problems with this appeal. Trump doesn’t address the part of Chutkan’s order that explicitly permits Trump to attack, “the current administration or the Department of Justice.” Trump does not engage, at all, with the evidence DOJ submitted of expected trial witnesses testifying under oath about how mobs started threatening them after Trump tweeted mean things. Notably, Trump’s citations to the government’s examples of threats that Trump made between August 2 and September 26 doesn’t cite to the footnotes in the government response that reference the threat — made the day after the linked threat, “if you come after me I’m coming after you” — to Judge Chutkan herself.

By the time the Gag Order was entered, the case had been pending for almost three months, and President Trump had often spoken about it. The prosecution provided seventeen examples of public statements by President Trump between August 2 and September 26, 2023, that it considered objectionable. A140-46; A190- 91. However, it did not produce any evidence that any prosecutor, witness, or court staffer experienced “threats” or “harassment” after President Trump’s speech. Likewise, it did not produce any evidence that any witness or prosecutor felt threatened or intimidated by President Trump’s speech—however subjectively—during three months of President Trump’s public commentary on the case. See A140-46; A190-91.

Lauro claims DOJ didn’t present any evidence that anyone, including court staffers but not the judge herself, felt intimidated by threats that followed on Trump’s incitement and simply ignores that footnote. But someone in Judge Chutkan’s chambers alerted the Marshals after that threat, and the FBI deemed it sufficiently dangerous to arrest Abigail Jo Shry for making it.

So there are other problems with this appeal, exhibiting the same obstinate refusal to address the record as it stands that Judge Chutkan described in her opinion refusing the stay.

But the key dynamic, in my opinion, is that Trump is trying to refashion his argument to trigger the known biases of Sam Alito and Clarence Thomas. But he’s doing so — launching a bid to protect the First Amendment rights of his imaginary friends — after the fact.

This is not a frivolous argument. The legal arguments should bear the weight of the historic decision that ultimately will result.

But instead of making serious arguments, John Lauro has pitched the Supreme Court’s right wing justices an argument about Trump’s imaginary Twitter friends.

Update: A DC Circuit panel of 3 Democratic appointees (Obama, Obama, Biden) has stayed the gag and ordered and set an expedited briefing that is quick enough SCOTUS is unlikely to have any reason to intervene.

PER CURIAM ORDER [2025399] filed considering motion to stay case [2025149-2], ORDERED that the district court’s October 17, 2023, order be administratively stayed pending further order of the court. Further ordered that his case be expedited. setting briefing schedule: APPELLANT Brief due 11/08/2023, at 5:00 p.m.. APPENDIX due 11/08/2023, at 5:00 p.m.. APPELLEE Brief due on 11/14/2023, at 5:00 p.m., APPELLANT Reply Brief due 11/17/2023, at 12:00 p.m., scheduling oral argument on Monday, 11/20/2023. Before Judges: Millett, Pillard and Garcia. [23-3190] [Entered: 11/03/2023 05:06 PM]

Trump Is Going Through the Motions to Dismiss until He Resumes the Presidency

One of the reasons I suspect that Trump-leaning Republicans replaced Kevin McCarthy with a key player in Trump’s last attempted coup is because Trump shows no signs of any plan to try to win his Federal criminal trials.

For some time, it has appeared (to me at least) that he has approached these cases with the belief that if he can use them as a campaign prop with which to get reelected, then he can simply pardon himself or remain President indefinitely to beat the Federal rap. That’s one of the reasons, I think, why he is treating many of his DC court filings as stunts, especially his extensive fundraising and messaging campaign around the gag order.

Delay, disinform, then dismiss.

I get that. I expected that. Yet, I still expected him to present the best legal case he could as insurance in case winning or stealing the election and self-pardoning doesn’t work.

He has lawyers capable of making very competent legal arguments.

So I’m frankly shocked by how inadequate his Motions to Dismiss have been. I wrote them up here and made this nifty table summarizing the arguments.

This is not just a legal observation — though some of his purportedly legal arguments, most notably his selective prosecution motionare legally shitty. Don’t take my word for it: take Carissa Byrne Hessick’s expert opinion, who says, “his motion is embarrassingly awful & should clearly be denied under current law.”

This is not just a legal observation. Partly, it’s box-ticking one. As I show below, Trump isn’t even addressing all the allegations against him.

As DOJ noted in the response to Trump’s MTD for Absolute Immunity, Trump totally misrepresented the indictment. As DOJ laid out, the indictment consists of four charges — three of them, conspiracy charges (18 USC 371, 1512(k), and 241). For each of those charges, DOJ alleged that Trump used five means of pursuing that conspiracy, laid out as five bullet points in the indictment. Those five bullets read:

a. The Defendant and co-conspirators used knowingly false claims of election fraud to get state legislators and election officials to subvert the legitimate election results and change electoral votes for the Defendant’s opponent, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to electoral votes for the Defendant. That is, on the pretext of baseless fraud claims, the Defendant pushed officials in certain states to ignore the popular vote; disenfranchise millions of voters; dismiss legitimate electors; and ultimately, cause the ascertainment of and voting by illegitimate electors in favor of the Defendant. [state]

b. The Defendant and co-conspirators organized fraudulent slates of electors in seven targeted states (Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin), attempting to mimic the procedures that the legitimate electors were supposed to follow under the Constitution and other federal and state laws. This included causing the fraudulent electors to meet on the day appointed by federal law on which legitimate electors were to gather and cast their votes; cast fraudulent votes for the Defendant; and sign certificates falsely representing that they were legitimate electors. Some fraudulent electors were tricked into participating based on the understanding that their votes would be used only if the Defendant succeeded in outcome-determinative lawsuits within their state, which the Defendant never did. The Defendant and co-conspirators then caused these fraudulent electors to transmit their false certificates to the Vice President and other government officials to be counted at the certification proceeding on January 6. [fake electors]

c. The Defendant and co-conspirators attempted to use the power and authority of the Justice Department to conduct sham election crime investigations and to send a letter to the targeted states that falsely claimed that the Justice Department had identified significant concerns that may have impacted the election outcome; that sought to advance the Defendant’s fraudulent elector plan by using the Justice Department’s authority to falsely present the fraudulent electors as a valid alternative to the legitimate electors; and that urged, on behalf of the Justice Department, the targeted states’ legislatures to convene to create the opportunity to choose the fraudulent electors over the legitimate electors. [Jeffrey Clark]

d. The Defendant and co-conspirators attempted to enlist the Vice President to use his ceremonial role at the January 6 certification proceeding to fraudulently alter the election results. First, using knowingly false claims of election fraud, the Defendant and co-conspirators attempted to convince the Vice President to use the Defendant’s fraudulent electors, reject legitimate electoral votes, or send legitimate electoral votes to state legislatures for review rather than counting them. When that failed, on the morning of January 6, the Defendant and co-conspirators repeated knowingly false claims of election fraud to gathered supporters, falsely told them that the Vice President had the authority to and might alter the election results, and directed them to the Capitol to obstruct the certification proceeding and exert pressure on the Vice President to take the fraudulent actions he had previously refused. [PenceCard]

e. After it became public on the afternoon of January 6 that the Vice President would not fraudulently alter the election results, a large and angry crowd–including many individuals whom the Defendant had deceived into believing the Vice President could and might change the election results–violently attacked the Capitol and halted the proceeding. As violence ensued, the Defendant and co-conspirators exploited the disruption by redoubling efforts to levy false claims of election fraud and convince Members of Congress to further delay the certification based on those claims. [mob] [red brackets my own]

Here’s how DOJ described the indictment in their response to Trump’s Absolutely Immunity filing.

A grand jury charged the defendant in a four-count indictment. ECF No. 1. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he “is absolutely immune from prosecution.” Mot. 1. When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the indictment “as a whole[,] and the allegations must be accepted as true.” United States v. Weeks, 636 F. Supp. 3d 117, 120 (D.D.C. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Count One, which charges a conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, alleges that the defendant, then a candidate seeking re-election to the presidency, conspired with, among others, several individuals outside the Executive Branch to “overturn the legitimate results of the 2020 presidential election by using knowingly false claims of election fraud to obstruct the federal government function by which those results are collected, counted, and certified.” ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 7, 8. The indictment further alleges that the defendant aimed at accomplishing the conspiracy’s objectives in five ways: [state] using deceit toward state officials to subvert the legitimate election results in those states, id. at ¶¶ 13-52; [fake electors] using deceit to organize fraudulent slates of electors in seven targeted states, and cause them to send false certificates to Congress, id. at ¶¶ 53-69; [Jeffrey Clark] leveraging the Department of Justice to use deceit to get state officials to replace the legitimate electoral slate with electors who would cast their votes for the defendant, id. at ¶¶ 70-85; [PenceCard] attempting to enlist the Vice President to fraudulently alter the election results during the certification proceeding on January 6, 2021, and directing supporters to the Capitol to obstruct the proceeding, id. at ¶¶ 86-105; and [mob] exploiting the violence and chaos that transpired at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, id. at ¶¶ 106-124. Counts Two and Three, which incorporate allegations from Count One, charge conspiracy and substantive violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) for corruptly obstructing the certification of the presidential election results on January 6, 2021. Id. at ¶¶ 125-28. Count Four, which likewise incorporates the allegations from Count One, alleges that the defendant conspired to violate one or more person’s constitutional right to vote and have one’s vote counted. Id. at ¶¶ 129-30. [red brackets my own]

Get used to this paragraph: you’re going to see some version of it in the response to many if not all of the MTDs submitted last week.

To address the charges, you need to explain why each of those five means don’t substantiate, either alone or in combination, the elements of the offense of the charges. Effectively, Trump has to show how these five means don’t prove the three different ways they have been charged criminally.

One reason you have to address the alleged means of conspiracy is that First Amendment protected activities, if they are part of a conspiracy, may be included as overt acts in that conspiracy. Scores of January 6 defendants have already made the same First Amendment argument Trump is, including some members of the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers who, like Trump, didn’t breach the Capitol. But if DOJ can prove speech was part of a conspiracy, that speech can come in as evidence of that conspiracy. Trump’s MTD on Constitutional Grounds, for example, which is substantially the same argument about the First Amendment that has already failed for other Jan6ers, names each of the crimes alleged.

These points are not in dispute. Nonetheless, in an astonishing display of doublethink, the prosecution simultaneously claims that President Trump—simply by speaking his mind and petitioning for a redress of grievances—also somehow conspired to “defraud the United States,” “oppress rights,” and “obstruct an official proceeding.” Id. at ¶ 5–6, 125–130.

Then, purportedly citing to the five bullets that describe the means, he spins the five means as giving voice to concerns about election integrity, not his unlawful goal of trying to invalidate the votes of 81 million Biden voters.

As the indictment itself alleges, President Trump gave voice to these concerns and demanded that politicians in a position to restore integrity to our elections not just talk about the problem, but investigate and resolve it. See id. at ¶ 10(a) (state legislators and election officials) act) [sic]; ¶ 10(b) (Vice President and other government officials); ¶ 10(c) (state officials); ¶ 10(d) (vice president); ¶ 10(e) (members of Congress).

This passage replaces the instrumentality alleged with the targets of what Trump calls persuasion. Trump correctly describes one target of the state means (but not the coercion involved). But then he spins the creation of fraudulent documents as, instead, an attempt to persuade Mike Pence. He redefines the hijacking of DOJ in order to make a seemingly authoritative false statement as an attempt to persuade state officials (long after the involvement of state officials was concluded). He describes efforts to get Pence to violate the law as instead an attempt to persuade him. And he calls a violent mob threatening to assassinate members of Congress as, instead, an attempt to persuade those members.

Trump is a con man. And his First Amendment argument is a breathtaking claim that the means he uses to sustain his con — including fraud and coercion backed by violence — are merely free speech.

To some degree, this quick sleight of hand doesn’t matter: In the discussion of the First Amendment that follows, he never returns to address the charges against him. As a result, Trump’s First Amendment argument is sloppy fluff compared to the First Amendment January 6 challenges that have gone before and will be before the DC Circuit by the time Trump goes to trial.

Having at least acknowledged the existence of all five “means” bullet points in his MTD on Constitutional Grounds (even if he redefined them as targets of persuasion), the section of Trump’s MTD on Statutory Grounds addressing 371 pretends the indictment names just three means, not five.

As relevant here, the indictment alleges three types of conduct that supposedly involved making a false statement: (1) claims that the 2020 Presidential election was rigged or tainted by fraud or other irregularities, made both in public and in communications with public officials; [state] (2) organizing and submitting contingent slates of electors to the President of the U.S. Senate and the Archivist of the United States; [fake electors] and (3) making public claims about the scope of the Vice President’s legal authority with respect to the election certification. [PenceCard] [red brackets my own]

Trump doesn’t even pretend to address two of the five means alleged involve a conspiracy to defraud the government: the Jeffrey Clark and mob means. In the sections addressing 1512 and 241, Trump never revisits those other two means (or, in any specificity, the three he does include).

And that’s how, in the section on 1512 (an area where he could, but does not, piggyback on two years of determined work from other January 6 defense attorneys, including several who are members of his larger defense team), he claims he did nothing that could have obstructed the official proceeding — the January 6 vote certification — that he never even identifies.

As discussed above, lobbying members of Congress and state officials to act in a certain way when they conduct an official proceeding does not “obstruct” or “impede” that official proceeding. Nothing about lobbying Congress to act a certain way “places an obstacle” or “impediments,” “hinders … from action,” “gets in the way of the progress of,” “holds up,” or “blocks” Congress from acting. See id. at 1132, 1159. On the contrary, lobbying Congress to act in a certain way presupposes that Congress will conduct an official proceeding, and it seeks to persuade Congress to act in a certain way during that official proceeding. That is the antithesis of “obstructing” or “impeding” the proceeding.

Think about that! If Trump bothered to mention the vote certification, he would literally be claiming that he had absolutely nothing to do with its interruption on January 6, 2021. Nothing.

Even the illegal order to Pence, clearly identified as item 3 in Trump’s 371 section and a primary focus of both Judge David Carter’s opinion finding it likely this did amount to obstruction and the January 6 Report, is gone here. Jeffrey Clark never gets put back in. Most importantly, the obvious means of sending thousands of angry Trump supporters, many armed, to Congress to chase lawmakers out of their chambers remains absent from Trump’s discussion.

This is why (as I noted earlier) I think Trump is simply trying to make his incitement of actual mobsters go away with the Motion to Strike. His legal arguments ignore the incitement of the mob entirely, even after his recusal stunt introduced evidence of someone convicted under 1512, Robert Palmer, who said he committed crimes “at the behest” of Trump, even after his gag fight introduced evidence of a Jan6er stalking Obama immediately after Trump sent him.

To the extent that Trump’s MTDs don’t result in the wholesale dismissal of his indictment (and DOJ argued that by allegedly conspiring with five people outside of government, most of the allegations against Trump couldn’t be treated as official acts even if he did win the Absolute Immunity argument) Trump’s failure to address some of the means he allegedly used will lead to the failure of these efforts.

With the exception of the MTDs for Absolute Immunity (arguing that as a former President Trump, can’t be charged for things he did as President) and Selective Prosecution, these MTDs don’t attempt to argue that the entire indictment should be dismissed. And where in some cases he could make compelling arguments — I think the Jeffrey Clark means, for example, is particularly prone to legal challenge, though Trump barely addresses it — so long as you leave one of the means intact, you won’t succeed in dismissing the indictment.

In practice, the scope of what Trump actually addresses in his MTDs looks something like this:

Not only doesn’t Trump ever address the indictment as alleged (DOJ notes that a Motion to Dismiss must accept the facts alleged as true), but in none of these MTDs does he address all the means alleged. The only place he fully deals with the Jeffrey Clark allegation (which, again, I think is the most susceptible to legal challenge) is in the Absolute Immunity filing that is weak for other reasons. The only place he deals with the mob means is in the Motion to Strike, his legal effort to sweep his role in the violence all under the rug.

If his effort to do that — to remove the descriptions of his own role in the violence from the indictment with his Motion to Strike — fails, then that means alleged in the indictment will survive no matter what else happens.

To be sure, these MTDs have no bearing on whether he’ll ultimately be successful. Trump doesn’t need any of these MTDs to succeed to be acquitted. There will be a contentious fight about admissible evidence and arguments, where this First Amendment argument will be even more contentiously argued than it is here. The fight over advice of counsel arguments has already started, And ultimately he only needs to find one MAGAt willing to ignore all evidence to keep on a jury.

But the big gaps in Trump’s MTD arguments, to say nothing of the way he spins having his campaign submit fraudulent documents to NARA and Congress, seem to reflect points where even his lawyers recognize his case is so weak they just won’t bother — they’ll just try to sweep it all under the rug some other way, like that Motion to Strike.

Again, even if this goes to trial in March as currently scheduled, Trump needs only persuade one voter. If he can use these court filings as a means to delay that trial and as campaign props to win the election, these weak points won’t matter.

Update: Corrected trial date, which is scheduled to start on March 4, per Sean Sullivan.