Posts

Angry Mom: Hiding the Trumpian Genocide’s Records

/43 Comments/in , , , /by

When I think can’t get any angrier at this miserable excuse for governance, the Trump administration proves there isn’t a limit to how low they will go.

Sleazy, unlawful executive action without adequate oversight followed by a fog of obfuscation and prevarication is bad enough. The administration will now double down now to hide what it’s done and hope like hell nobody notices.

It doesn’t help that members of Congress, journalists, and the public still haven’t grasped the true nature of the crimes before them.

The Trump administration hasn’t merely ignored or broken existing U.S. laws on handling of asylum seekers. See 8 U.S. Code § 1158:

(a) Authority to apply for asylum
(1) In general
Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 1225(b) of this title.

(2) Exceptions
(A) Safe third country
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien if the Attorney General determines that the alien may be removed, pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement, to a country (other than the country of the alien’s nationality or, in the case of an alien having no nationality, the country of the alien’s last habitual residence) in which the alien’s life or freedom would not be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and where the alien would have access to a full and fair procedure for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent temporary protection, unless the Attorney General finds that it is in the public interest for the alien to receive asylum in the United States.

(B) Time limit
Subject to subparagraph (D), paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien unless the alien demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.

There’s more but the key part in boldface above. The “zero tolerance” approach to border protection violated this code. Asylum seekers do not have to apply from outside the country; they can apply once inside the country. I’m not a lawyer but I don’t see anything here that indicates asylum seekers are suddenly not eligible to apply for asylum because they crossed the border.

And nothing in the entirety of 8 U.S. Code § 1158 indicates the government may take custody of asylum seekers’ minor children with or without force.

Note also where the asylum seekers may apply — they are NOT limited to designated ports.

DHS Secretary Nielsen’s claim that border crossers had not applied through ports of entry is a lie because it wasn’t required of them.

What happens to the children appears to fit the description of kidnapping (18 U.S. Code § 1201), including section (a)(3), an “act against the person is done within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States as defined in section 46501 of title 49” for those children who are flown by aircraft to other destinations in the U.S. out of their parents’ physical custody. It’s no wonder carriers like United Airlines and American Airlines wrote and published letters yesterday telling DHS to stop using their services for moving the children across the country.

The conditions in which many of the children have been placed also appear to be abusive; based on the children seen so far there are reports of not enough food, sedation, restraints, disruption to sleep habits, etc.

But that’s not the end of it. The entire separation of children from their families appears to be genocide under The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which the U.S. has signed (1948) and ratified (1988):

Article 2
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

We have not yet seen evidence of child deaths, but section (b) is likely and (e) of Article 2 is definite — the children are now in custody of the United States government and disbursed to others’ care.

Wednesday’s executive order does nothing to remedy the situation. It doesn’t even stop the separation of children from families due to its murky wording. It exacerbates the problem by foisting some of the responsibility on the military, placing the Defense Department at odds with the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S. Code § 1385) as the EO expects the military to perform a domestic function — DHS’ border patrol and immigration services — which is not in response to a natural disaster.

(Oh, this is definitely a disaster, but it is human made.)

Ordering the military to provide assistance also draws defense resources away from where they may be needed, potentially creating security risks.

And yet this is not enough insult. DHS’ Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) asked the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) last year if it could change its record retention practices, according to The Memory Hole:

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has asked for permission to destroy all its documents about the deaths of detained immigrants in custody 20 years after a case is “closed.” (Deaths in ICE custody are almost always investigated by ICE itself. A minority are investigated by the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General. [report])

Similarly, ICE wants to destroy all its documents about sexual assaults of detained immigrants in custody. The time frame is 20 years after a case is “closed.” (Again, ICE almost always investigates itself in these cases. The Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General investigates around 1% of complaints/reports. [article]) NARA argues that this information is “sensitive,” implying that documents containing the identities of victims and the accused should not be kept indefinitely. ICE itself did not offer this (or any) justification.

Thankfully The Memory Hole followed up and asked for status on ICE’s request, to which NARA replied:

No final action has been taken on this schedule. NARA appraisal staff have reviewed the comments received, and held several meetings with ICE records management and program staff regarding the records being scheduled.

Proposed changes to the schedule are being reviewed internally by NARA stakeholders for internal concurrence, after which NARA will inform ICE of the required changes. NARA will then publish a follow-up Federal Register notice responding to the public comments we received. This notice will be open for public comment for 15 days from the date of publication.

But it is not yet impossible that records related to the current human-made disaster affecting thousands of children may be destroyed prematurely, depriving them of justice.

There’s simply no way that ICE should be allowed to change its records retention given the scale of the separated families disaster. And yet I have a horrible, angry feeling the Trump administration will do whatever it can to hide its role in this genocidal activity along the U.S. southwest border.

EDIT — 5:45 P.M. EDT —

I meant to add one more thing to this post. It’s imperative I add this now that the White House has tried to change the subject by using FLOTUS as a human shield with a target literally painted on her back. Do not be derailed by their bullshit. Keep asking:

Where are the girls?

Where are the babies?

Where are ALL the bodies???

Yes, the Government Does Believe the Military Can Use Military Force in the US

/12 Comments/in , /by

I made an error.

In this post, I suggested that debates about whether the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force constituted an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act ignore that for 7 years — from the time John Yoo wrote a memo on whether the Fourth Amendment inhibited military deployment in the US  in 2001 until the time Steven Bradbury “withdrew” the memo in 2008 — the official position of the Executive Branch was that PCA had been suspended under the AUMF.

Armando Llorens and Adam Serwer have debated — specifically in the context of whether the President could kill Americans within the US – whether PCA applies in this war. And while they’re staging an interesting argument (I think both are engaging the AUMF fallacy and therefore not discussing how a President would most likely kill Americans in the US), what the Yoo memo shows, at the least, is that the folks running the Executive Branch believed, for 7 years, the PCA did not apply.

To be clear, this memo was withdrawn in October 2008 (though not without some pressure from Congress). While the PCA aspect of the opinion is one of the less controversial aspects in the memo, as far as we know it has not been replaced by similar language in another memo. So while this shows that PCA was, for all intents and purposes, suspended for 7 years (as witnessed by NSA’s wiretapping of Americans), it doesn’t mean PCA remains suspended.

My error was in suggesting Bradbury “withdrew” the memo.

He did not.

Instead, Bradbury directed that “caution should be exercised” before relying on it.

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that caution should be exercised before relying in any respect on the Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States (Oct. 23, 2001) (“10/23/01 Memorandum”) as a precedent of the Office of Legal Counsel, and that certain propositions stated in the 10/23/01 Memorandum, as described below, should not be treated as authoritative for any purpose.

As noted, he said that five propositions in the Yoo memo should not be treated as authoritative for any purpose.

We also judge it necessary to point out that the 10/23/01 Memorandum states several specific propositions that are either incorrect or highly questionable. The memorandum’s treatment of the following propositions is not satisfactory and should not be treated as authoritative for any purpose:

But then, in a series of bullet points laying out the problems with those five propositions, Bradbury doesn’t always dismiss the outcomes Yoo’s analysis supported, but in several cases accepts the outcomes but simply provides a different basis for supporting them. Read more →

John Yoo and the Obama White Paper and Killing Americans in America and Yemen

/12 Comments/in /by

Just for shits and giggles, compare this paragraph:

In the normal domestic law enforcement context, the use of deadly force is considered a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has examined the constitutionality of the use of deadly force under an objective “reasonableness” standard. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7, 11 (1985). The question whether a particular use of deadly force is “reasonable” requires an assessment of “the totality of the circumstances” that balances ‘”the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.'” Id. at 8-9 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). Because “[t]he intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched,” id. at 9, the governmental interests in using such force must be powerful. Deadly force, however, may be justified if the danger to the officer’s or an innocent third party’s life or safety is sufficiently great. See Memorandum to Files, from Robert Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Use of Deadly Force Against Civil Aircraft Threatening to Attack 1996 Summer Olympic Games (Aug. 19, 1996).

With this one:

The Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” test is situation-dependent. Cf Scott, 550 U.S. at 382 (“Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force.”‘). What would constitute a reasonable use of lethal force for purposes of domestic law enforcement operations differs substantially from what would be reasonable in the situation and circumstances discussed in this white paper. But at least in circumstances where the targeted person is an operational leader of an enemy force and an informed, high-level government official has determined that he poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States, and those conducting the operation would carry out the operation only if capture were infeasible, the use of lethal force would not violate the Fourth Amendment. Under such circumstances, the intrusion on any Fourth Amendment interests would be outweighed by the “importance of the governmental interests [that] justify the intrusion,” Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-the interests in protecting the lives of Americans.

The first paragraph comes from this October 23, 2001 Office of Legal Counsel Memo authored by John Yoo. The second comes from the Obama Administration’s November 8, 2011 White Paper on targeted killing.

The Yoo paragraph was a bit of an odd diversion in a memo otherwise laying the groundwork to allow DOD to conduct searches in the US; as far as I know, it was primarily used to enable the National Security Agency (which, after all, is part of DOD) to conduct warrantless searches of US person communications collected within the US. But along the way, Yoo threw in deadly force — within the US — because he had already suspended the Fourth Amendment in the memo and so why not?

The White Paper paragraph would be a relatively uncontroversial paragraph among other more controversial ones authorizing the President to kill an American with no due process. Except that it collapses the distinction between laws that apply to the military and laws that apply to the CIA.

And then, perhaps unsurprisingly, the Fourth Amendment discussion in paragraph 21 (the first in section IIB) only applies to those targeting the US, not members of an AUMF enemy per se.

Similarly, assuming that a lethal operation targeting a U.S. citizen abroad who is planning attacks against the United States would result in a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment, such an operation would not violate that Amendment in the circumstances posited here.

But wait! The passage goes on to cite two domestic law enforcement cases, Tennessee v. Garner and Scott v. Harris. That’s a problem, because Article II authorities are going to be a covert operation, and therefore the CIA, which is prohibited from serving as a law enforcement agency.

Nevertheless, these respective paragraphs — insofar as they apply domestic law enforcement precedents to purported real threats — are somewhat reasonable expansions of the authority, confirmed in Tennessee v. Garner, to kill an American in hot pursuit, within the context of more controversial memos.

There are two reasons to look further than that, however.

The Posse Comitatus Question

First, there’s Yoo’s analysis, which was treated as law for 7 years, that in the War on Terror, the Posse Comitatus Act did not apply.

Both the express language of the PCA and its history show clearly that it was intended to prevent the use of the military for domestic law enforcement purposes. It does not address the deployment of troops for domestic military operations against potential attacks on the United States. Both the Justice Department and the Defense Department have accordingly interpreted the PCA not to bar military deployments that pursue a military or foreign policy function.

[snip]

Because using military force to combat terrorist attacks would be for the purpose of protecting the nation’s security, rather than executing the laws, domestic deployment in the current situation would not violate the PCA.

Armando Llorens and Adam Serwer have debated — specifically in the context of whether the President could kill Americans within the US — whether PCA applies in this war. And while they’re staging an interesting argument (I think both are engaging the AUMF fallacy and therefore not discussing how a President would most likely kill Americans in the US), what the Yoo memo shows, at the least, is that the folks running the Executive Branch believed, for 7 years, the PCA did not apply.

To be clear, this memo was withdrawn in October 2008 (though not without some pressure from Congress). While the PCA aspect of the opinion is one of the less controversial aspects in the memo, as far as we know it has not been replaced by similar language in another memo. So while this shows that PCA was, for all intents and purposes, suspended for 7 years (as witnessed by NSA’s wiretapping of Americans), it doesn’t mean PCA remains suspended.

Update: Read this post. Bradbury didn’t withdraw the memo. He urged people to use caution before relying on Yoo’s earlier memo. And while he specifically takes apart Yoo’s language on PCA, he leaves intact the military purpose doctrine, including for the use of military force.

The Lackawanna Six and the First Dead American

The earlier Yoo memo is also interesting to review in light of the debate the Bush Administration had in 2002 about whether they ought to use it to declare the Lackawanna Six enemy combatants.

Some of the advisers to President George W. Bush, including Vice President Dick Cheney, argued that a president had the power to use the military on domestic soil to sweep up the terrorism suspects, who came to be known as the Lackawanna Six, and declare them enemy combatants.

Mr. Bush ultimately decided against the proposal to use military force.

Dick Cheney espoused doing so because, DOJ worried, the government didn’t have a strong enough case against the Six.

Former officials said the 2002 debate arose partly from Justice Department concerns that there might not be enough evidence to arrest and successfully prosecute the suspects in Lackawanna. Mr. Cheney, the officials said, had argued that the administration would need a lower threshold of evidence to declare them enemy combatants and keep them in military custody.

Call me crazy, but there’s reason to believe DOJ believed any case against Anwar al-Awlaki had similar weaknesses.

The Lackawanna Six, under pressure of being named enemy combatants, all plead guilty to material support; all have or are reaching the end of their sentence.

Which is where this comes full circle.

Because just months after Dick Cheney contemplated sending the military to capture 5 guys outside of Buffalo (the sixth was in Bahrain getting married), the US killed the first American in a drone strike in Yemen, Kamal Derwish, purportedly the recruiter for the Six.

The same impetus that first contemplated using military force in the US ended in the first drone death of an American. And now, in discussion of the memo authorizing the death of another American (or three) in Yemen, we’re back to discussing whether the President can authorize targeted killings within the US.

I’m not saying the white paper is as outrageous as the Yoo memo. In some ways it is more defensible. In others–specifically in its application to the CIA–it is more of a stretch.

But, as this relatively reasonable paragraph from less reasonable memos makes clear, we really haven’t moved that far beyond where Dick Cheney was in 2002.