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Which Came First, Unilateral Strikes or Signature Strikes?

I realized something as I was writing this post on Mark Mazzetti’s latest installment from his book. Signature strikes — those strikes targeted at patterns rather than identified terrorists — purportedly preceded our unilateral use of drone strikes in Pakistan.

At least that’s what appears to be the case, comparing this article, which dates General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s approval of signature strikes to a January 9, 2008 meeting with DNI Mike McConnell and Michael Hayden.

The change, described by senior American and Pakistani officials who would not speak for attribution because of the classified nature of the program, allows American military commanders greater leeway to choose from what one official who took part in the debate called “a Chinese menu” of strike options.

Instead of having to confirm the identity of a suspected militant leader before attacking, this shift allowed American operators to strike convoys of vehicles that bear the characteristics of Qaeda or Taliban leaders on the run, for instance, so long as the risk of civilian casualties is judged to be low.

[snip]

The new agreements with Pakistan came after a trip to the country on Jan. 9 by Mike McConnell, the director of national intelligence, and Gen. Michael V. Hayden, the C.I.A. director. The American officials met with Mr. Musharraf as well as with the new army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and offered a range of increased covert operations aimed at thwarting intensifying efforts by Al Qaeda and the Taliban to destabilize the Pakistani government. [my emphasis]

With Mazzetti’s latest, which dates unilateral strikes to a July 2008 meeting with Kayani (note, Mazzetti doesn’t say whether Hayden and Stephen Kappes, or someone else, “informed” Kayani).

While the spy agencies had had a fraught relationship since the beginning of the Afghan war, the first major breach came in July 2008, when C.I.A. officers in Islamabad paid a visit to Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Pakistani Army chief, to tell him that President Bush had signed off on a set of secret orders authorizing a new strategy in the drone wars. No longer would the C.I.A. give Pakistan advance warning before launching missiles from Predator or Reaper drones in the tribal areas. From that point on, the C.I.A. officers told Kayani, the C.I.A.’s killing campaign in Pakistan would be a unilateral war.

The decision had been made in Washington after months of wrenching debate about the growth of militancy in Pakistan’s tribal areas; a highly classified C.I.A. internal memo, dated May 1, 2007, concluded that Al Qaeda was at its most dangerous since 2001 because of the base of operations that militants had established in the tribal areas. That assessment became the cornerstone of a yearlong discussion about the Pakistan problem. Some experts in the State Department warned that expanding the C.I.A. war in Pakistan would further stoke anti-American anger on the streets and could push the country into chaos. But officials inside the C.I.A.’s Counterterrorism Center argued for escalating the drone campaign without the I.S.I.’s blessing. Since the first C.I.A. drone strike in Pakistan in 2004, only a small number of militants on the C.I.A.’s list of “high-value targets” had been killed by drone strikes, and other potential strikes were scuttled at the last minute because of delays in getting Pakistani approval, or because the targets seemed to have been tipped off and had fled.

So, in July 2008, when the C.I.A.’s director, Michael Hayden, and his deputy, Stephen Kappes, came to the White House to present the agency’s plan to wage a unilateral war in the mountains of Pakistan, it wasn’t a hard sell to a frustrated president. [my emphasis]

Now, Mazzetti dates the urgency to use unilateral strikes to a May 1, 2007 report that said al Qaeda was reconstituting in the tribal lands. The report was likely an early draft of or precursor to the July 17, 2007 NIE on “The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland.”

Let’s take a step back and contextualize that.

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Gareth Williams Inquest to be Secret Tribunal

I’ve been blogging about British efforts to expands the use of closed material proceedings so it won’t reveal embarrassing details about its cooperation in American torture in the future.

Which makes it interesting that Britain’s Foreign Secretary, William Hague, has ordered that the inquest into the death of GCHQ scientist Gareth Williams will be secret. Williams is the GCHQ-on-loan-to-MI6 sometimes-on-loan-to-NSA scientist whose body was found in a gym duffel in his flat a few years ago.

All sorts of cover stories have been leaked about his death: that it was some sort of gay bondage gone bad, that the Russian mafia took him out.

I’ve been most intrigued by the detail that Williams was working with NSA at the time when the US blew up the British planes investigation.

Whatever the reason, we’re not likely to find out, at least not immediately, because of the secrecy surrounding the inquest.

I’m not surprised the Brits don’t want their spy stories told in public, mind you.

Is Obama Threatening the “Special Relationship” to Hide Torture?

I noted, when David Cameron was in town, that his Justice Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, was pushing to expand “closed material proceedings” as a way to better protect secret information. The effort was a response, Clarke claimed, to courts forcing the government to release information about Binyam Mohamed’s torture, which ended up revealing the US was using some torture techniques before the Bybee Memo purportedly approved torture.

Now, Cameron’s government is ratcheting up the fear-mongering, claiming that the US withheld information about a terrorist threat 18 months ago because of the the Mohamed release.

The CIA warned MI6 that al-Qaeda was planning an attack 18 months ago, but withheld detailed information because of concerns it would be released by British courts.

British intelligence agencies were subsequently forced to carry out their own investigations, according to Whitehall sources.

Several potential terrorists were identified with links to a wider European plot, but it is still not known whether the British authorities have uncovered the full extent of the threat.

I flew through London 18 months ago during what I suspect was this terror threat. It was the kind of threat where one airline–American–had rolled out the full heightened security theater, but another–Delta–had nothing special, both on the same day.

That kind of terrorist threat.

If it is true the CIA is withholding such information (I’m not saying I buy that the US withheld information from a serious threat), then consider what this means. Back in August 2006, the US (specifically, Dick Cheney and Jose Rodriguez) betrayed the “Special Relationship” by asking the Pakistanis to arrest one of the plotters in the liquid planes plot, which in turn forced the Brits to roll up their own investigation before they had solidified the case against the plotters. Several of the plotters had to be tried two times to get a conviction. The Bush Administration did all this as an election stunt.

And yet we’re the ones purportedly complaining about information sharing?

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Is James Clapper’s Ignorance a Bug? Or a Feature?

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has been getting beat up because he got embarrassed by Diane Sawyer when he admitted he had no clue about a 12-person counterterrorism arrest in the UK earlier the day of the interview.

In an interview with ABC’s Diane Sawyer, taped Monday afternoon, Clapper was asked about the arrests, which had happened hours before and were featured on all of the network morning news broadcasts. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano and Chief Counterterrorism Advisor John Brennan, who were also participating in the joint interview, were aware of the arrests.

“First of all, London,” Sawyer began. “How serious is it? Any implication that it was coming here? … Director Clapper?”

“London?” Clapper said after a pause, before Brennan entered the conversation explaining the arrests.

Later in the interview, Sawyer returned to the subject.

“I was a little surprised you didn’t know about London,” Sawyer told Clapper.

“Oh, I’m sorry, I didn’t,” he replied.

As a threshold matter, it would be the intelligence community’s fault as a whole if Clapper should have been, but wasn’t, briefed about this arrest (the Administration has explained that Clapper was involved in START Treaty briefings all day Monday, and so didn’t get briefed), not Clapper alone. But I’m also wondering whether there’s more to his not getting briefed.

Note, first of all, that there are two kinds of briefings Clapper might have–but apparently didn’t–get: briefing about the investigation itself, and a briefing about the arrests, either before or after they happened.

Here’s some of what we know about the investigation and raid:

  • The investigation, which has been going on for months, has been described as “intelligence-driven”
  • Authorities triggered the raid after intercepted communications revealed the plotters were preparing to act
  • Britian’s Home Secretary was told of the raids during the week of December 12 through 18
  • Lord Alex Carlile, who acts as a watchdog on UK terrorism operations, also described watching one of the operations involved in the investigation
  • The group has ties to a known (and banned) British radical Muslim group
  • Like many of the recent arrests in the US, this group is alleged to have been influenced by Anwar al-Awlaki
  • Muslim leaders in Cardiff tipped authorities off to a group of radicalized youth though MI5 seemed to already bee aware of the group; the group held a meeting two weeks ago attended by up to 30 people

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Dick Cheney’s Counterterrorism Incompetence Continues to Endanger Us

When I was out tromping around Yosemite (!!) on Friday, one of Najibullah Zazi’s co-conspirators, Zarein Ahmedzay, plead guilty to two terrorism-related charges.

Mark that up as yet another counterterrorism victory for civilian courts.

But it’s more than that. As Isikoff and Hosenball emphasize, the government revealed on Friday that Zazi and Ahmedzay received instructions from two top al Qaeda figures–Saleh al-Somali and Rashid Rauf–in 2008. Here’s how DOJ reveals the detail in their press release:

As Ahmedzay admitted during today’s guilty plea allocution and as reflected in previous government filings and the guilty plea allocution of co-defendant Najibullah Zazi, Ahmedzay, Zazi and a third individual agreed to travel to Afghanistan to join the Taliban and fight against United States and allied forces. In furtherance of their plans, they flew from Newark Liberty International Airport in Newark, N.J., to Peshawar, Pakistan at the end of August 2008. Ahmedzay and the third individual attempted to enter Afghanistan but were turned back at the border and returned to Peshawar.

Within a few days, Ahmedzay, Zazi and the third individual met with an al-Qaeda facilitator in Peshawar and agreed to travel for training in Waziristan. Upon arriving, they met with two al-Qaeda leaders, but did not learn their true identities. As the government represented during today’s guilty plea, the leaders were Saleh al-Somali, the head of international operations for al-Qaeda, and Rashid Rauf, a key al-Qaeda operative. The three Americans said that they wanted to fight in Afghanistan, but the al-Qaeda leaders explained that they would be more useful to al-Qaeda and the jihad if they returned to New York and conducted attacks there. [my emphasis]

Now, that’s interesting for several reasons. Rauf, as you might recall, had a key role in planning the foiled 2006 attempt to use liquid explosives to blow up airliners (potentially using the same TATP Zazi was going to use in his plot). The British were busy conducting a solid law enforcement investigation of the plot and were working with Pakistan to extradite Rauf. But partly in an effort to shore up Bush’s crappy poll numbers, Cheney and the guy who ordered the destruction of the torture tapes, Jose Rodriguez, asked the Pakistanis to pick up Rauf before the Brits could finish their investigation. Here’s how Ron Suskind described what happened.

NPR: I want to talk just a little about this fascinating episode you describe in the summer of 2006, when President Bush is very anxious about some intelligence briefings that he is getting from the British. What are they telling him?

SUSKIND: In late July of 2006, the British are moving forward on a mission they’ve been–an investigation they’ve been at for a year at that point, where they’ve got a group of “plotters,” so-called, in the London area that they’ve been tracking…Bush gets this briefing at the end of July of 2006, and he’s very agitated. When Blair comes at the end of the month, they talk about it and he says, “Look, I want this thing, this trap snapped shut immediately.” Blair’s like, “Well, look, be patient here. What we do in Britain”–Blair describes, and this is something well known to Bush–”is we try to be more patient so they move a bit forward. These guys are not going to breathe without us knowing it. We’ve got them all mapped out so that we can get actual hard evidence, and then prosecute them in public courts of law and get real prosecutions and long prison terms”…

Well, Bush doesn’t get the answer he wants, which is “snap the trap shut.” And the reason he wants that is because he’s getting all sorts of pressure from Republicans in Congress that his ratings are down. These are the worst ratings for a sitting president at this point in his second term, and they’re just wild-eyed about the coming midterm elections. Well, Bush expresses his dissatisfaction to Cheney as to the Blair meeting, and Cheney moves forward.

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Cheney’s Sabotage of Counter-Terrorism

Just a day after the Brits finally prosecuted some (but not all) of the terrorists who were plotting to blow up planes with liquid explosive, a prosecutor in the case explains how the Americans almost blew the case.

Fearful for the safety of American lives, the US authorities had been getting edgy, seeking reassurance that this was not going to slip through our hands. We moved from having congenial conversations to eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations.

We thought we had managed to persuade them to hold back so we could develop new opportunities and get more evidence to present to the courts. But I was never convinced that they were content with that position. In the end, I strongly suspect that they lost their nerve and had a hand in triggering the arrest in Pakistan.

The arrest hampered our evidence-gathering and placed us in Britain under intolerable pressure.

Now, I’ve been following these accusations since August 2006, shortly after the arrests (which was, it should be said, shortly after Lamont’s primary victory over Joe Lieberman demonstrated how the Iraq War was hurting Bush and the Republicans). But the best explanation of what happened came a year ago from Ron Suskind

NPR: I want to talk just a little about this fascinating episode you describe in the summer of 2006, when President Bush is very anxious about some intelligence briefings that he is getting from the British. What are they telling him?

SUSKIND: In late July of 2006, the British are moving forward on a mission they’ve been–an investigation they’ve been at for a year at that point, where they’ve got a group of "plotters," so-called, in the London area that they’ve been tracking…Bush gets this briefing at the end of July of 2006, and he’s very agitated. When Blair comes at the end of the month, they talk about it and he says, "Look, I want this thing, this trap snapped shut immediately." Blair’s like, "Well, look, be patient here. What we do in Britain"–Blair describes, and this is something well known to Bush–"is we try to be more patient so they move a bit forward. These guys are not going to breathe without us knowing it. Read more