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Remember Scooter Libby’s Lost Emails?

Turns out they’re still lost.

When we last heard from Libby’s lost emails, CREW and National Security Archive had reached a settlement with the White House to restore 33 days worth of email and examine 21 days of low volume email to see whether prior restorations had really worked (among other things).

I’m still reading through the documents to figure out what has happened since (aside from Libby’s emails still being lost–but then, that’s not news). The eye-popping takeaway is that, for the 21 days of emails supposedly restored, 83% of the emails weren’t restored:

As documented [in a report from Microsoft included in CREW’s available documents] the comparison of the two data sets–one containing emails previously identified as the archival email records of the Bush administration for the 21 days in question and one containing emails extracted from backup tapes for those 21 days–revealed a huge discrepancy between the two. Specifically, 190,819 email messages on the backup tapes were not found in the archival set of email messages. Conversely, 31,819 emails contained in the archival set were not found on the backup tapes for those same days. In other words, 83% of the universe of known emails for those days were not archived and would not be available today but for actions of CREW and the Archive and the resulting restoration project.

Now, the discrepancy, to me, is even more interesting than the sheer numbers involved. It suggests that two totally different sets of emails were captured in the multiple archiving processes. Which suggests a great deal of emails may have been tampered with between the time they were written and archived. (Though I await the tech wonks to explain this in more depth).

And then there’s this bit.

[On May 10, 2006], the estimated cost for one of [the options for restoring White House email]–restoring all dates of low volume email for EOP components–was $2,414.221 [sic]. The Bush White House did not pursue this option, and instead hired multiple contractors to perform various costly analyses aimed at winnowing down the number of days that arguable could be considered as statistically low volume.

In other words, rather than spend what now looks like a pittance (less than $2.5 million) to restore everything, the Bush White House instead spent even more money paying consultants to argue that not all these days needed to be restored. And that decision was taken, of course, at a time when Libby’s case was in discovery and any indictment of Rove had just been declined. And, presumably, Patrick Fitzgerald still may have had lingering suspicions that Libby and Judy (if not Novak) were emailing back and forth about outing Plame.

But really, none of this is suspicious at all.

Meanwhile, CREW just recently started this whole process over again to get John Yoo’s missing torture emails.

Does no one else see the pattern here?

Jon Kiriakou: Libby Knew Plame Was Covert

Jason Leopold has a long article and videotape of an interview with Jon Kiriakou that you should check out in full. I’ll discuss their conversation about Abu Zubaydah’s torture (and, more interestingly, Kiriakou’s knowledge about who Abu Zubaydah is) later. But I wanted to look more closely at Kiriakou’s description of a June 10, 2003 meeting at which (Kiriakou says) Scooter Libby made it clear that he knew of Plame’s identity.

Kiriakou said he was the “note taker” at this meeting, which took place on June 10, 2003, when I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, former Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff, “entered the room furious, putting on a big show, arms flailing around, swearing and demanding to know why nobody at the CIA told him that Valerie Plame was married to Joe Wilson.”

Kiriakou said it was clear to him that when Libby “entered the room” on June 10, 2003, he had already known that Plame was an undercover operative.

Now, it always pays to approach Kiriakou’s statements with some skepticism. And his description certainly doesn’t accord with what Grenier testified to at the Libby trial. But for the moment, let’s look at what Kiriakou’s description would mean for the chronology of the week of June 8, 2003.

After a break of several weeks after Nicholas Kristof first reported Joe Wilson’s allegations, the allegations returned again on June 8, 2003, when George Stephanopolous asked Condi Rice about the allegations. Apparently first thing on the following day, June 9, 2003, President Bush expressed to Libby in some way his concern about the allegations. And that seems to have been what set OVP into overdrive trying to learn about the source of the allegations. Later that same afternoon, John Hannah had already completed a briefing for Cheney on the issue.

According to Kiriakou’s story, Libby had his furious outburst on June 10. That would probably mean it happened at the 12:45 NSC DC [Deputies Committee] meeting, four hours before Kiriakou wrote his email requesting more information. Though note, the content of the Kiriakou email we have–which asks for very specific information for John McLaughlin in anticipation of a meeting with Cheney the following day and doesn’t mention the meeting itself–doesn’t match the description he gave Jason:

After Libby’s outburst, Kiriakou said he “went back to headquarters and I wrote an email to all of the executive assistants of all the top leaders in the agency saying, this meeting took place, Libby is furious, we believe that he was conveying a message from the vice president. I wanted to know when did we know that Valerie was married to Joe Wilson, sent it around, nobody ever responded to my email.”

That says, if Kiriakou’s narrative is correct, Libby probably learned of the tie between Plame and Wilson between June 9 and June 10, if not earlier. Which might explain why the date on Libby’s note record learning of Plame’s tie to Wilson appears to be written over. One possibility, for example, is that the note originally read June 9, not June 12.

This is where Kiriakou’s story begins to conflict with Robert Grenier’s and Marc Grossman’s. Marc Grossman testified he told Libby, probably at a DC meeting on June 11 or 12, that Wilson’s wife worked at the CIA (based on the INR memo). And Grenier testified that Libby asked him for information on a phone call on June 11, at which point, Grenier claimed, he “had never heard of [Wilson’s trip] before.” Both claims would be false if Libby had blown up in the June 10 meeting.

Now, both Grossman and Grenier’s testimony is problematic on a number of other levels, so we can’t use their testimony to dismiss Kiriakou’s story out of hand.

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Judy Miller’s Editor Calls on Journalists to Expose False Journalism

Tim F made this point implicitly, but it deserves to be made explicitly. Do you really think Howell Raines, the editor who oversaw Judy Miller’s Iraq War propaganda, is really the one to exhort journalists to call out Fox for its false journalism?

One question has tugged at my professional conscience throughout the year-long congressional debate over health-care reform, and it has nothing to do with the public option, portability or medical malpractice. It is this: Why haven’t America’s old-school news organizations blown the whistle on Roger Ailes, chief of Fox News, for using the network to conduct a propaganda campaign against the Obama administration — a campaign without precedent in our modern political history?

[snip]

Why has our profession, through its general silence — or only spasmodic protest — helped Fox legitimize a style of journalism that is dishonest in its intellectual process, untrustworthy in its conclusions and biased in its gestalt?

[snip]

Why can’t American journalists steeped in the traditional values of their profession be loud and candid about the fact that Murdoch does not belong to our team?

[snip]

As for Fox News, lots of people who know better are keeping quiet about what to call it. Its news operation can, in fact, be called many things, but reporters of my generation, with memories and keyboards, dare not call it journalism.

I’ll admit that when I first suggested that Judy Miller was not engaging in journalism when Dick Cheney and Scooter Libby outed Valerie Plame to her, I wished that other journalists would have the courage to acknowledge that what she was doing was not journalism. It would have been nice, then, to have a column like this, calling on journalists to expose disinformation in the guise of journalism.

But really. Does Howell Raines have no sense of irony?

After all, it’d be a pity if Raines missed the irony of the fact that Judy Miller now works for Fox News.

Pat Fitzgerald Chose Not to Consult with Margolis on Rove Indictment

I recognize that at some point I’m going to have to read Karl Rove’s book propaganda. But until I find it lying around somewhere for almost-free right next to at least a six-pack of equally almost-free beer, I’m going to let Main Justice read it so I don’t have to. They’ve got a fairly detailed post of Rove’s spin on his interactions with Fitz–one of the most interesting tidbits of which (given recent events) is that Rove’s lawyer Robert Luskin tried to get Fitz to allow David Margolis to review his decision to indict Rove, but he chose not to do that.

After the October [2005] grand jury testimony, Fitzgerald called Rove’s lawyer, Robert Luskin, and said they were leaning towards an indictment, Rove wrote. Luskin arranged to fly to Chicago to talk with Fitzgerald about the case and urged the prosecutor to consult with others in the Justice Department. In particular, Luskin recommended Fitzgerald talk to David Margolis, the DOJ’s highest-ranking career official and a 45-year veteran of the department. Fitzgerald eventually decided against contacting Margolis, Rove wrote, but agreed to bring in two other lawyers in the Chicago U.S. attorney’s office who had previously been uninvolved with the case to re-examine his thinking.

In an epic five-hour meeting, Luskin and Fitzgerald hashed out the various aspects of the case against the White House adviser. At the meeting, Fitzgerald said he was bothered by Rove’s non-recollection of the conversation with Cooper. If Rove did not remember the conversation with Cooper, Fitzgerald asked, why did he ask his aides in January 2004 to go through his phone records and notes to find any evidence of contact with Cooper? Luskin had the surprising answer, Rove wrote. The lawyer had learned from a friend who worked at Time that Cooper told colleagues he had spoken with Rove about Plame.

The tidbit is interesting not just because Fitz chose not to let DOJ’s fixer decide whether or not Karl would get indicted, but also for what that suggests about how much oversight Margolis had over Fitz’s decisions more generally. And remember, Margolis would have just barely taken over from Comey (who left DOJ in August 2005) as Fitz’s direct supervisor on this case in fall 2005.

Oh–and as I said probably 4 years ago–it was a journalist who helped Rove avoid any consequences for his role in leaking Plame’s identity.

Go figure.

Obama's New Classification Policy: the Good and the Bad

Steven Aftergood reviews Obama’s new classification Executive Order and finds much to be happy about.

For the first time, each executive branch agency that classifies information will be required to perform “a comprehensive review” of its internal classification guides to validate them and “to identify classified information that no longer requires protection and can be declassified.”  The new requirement is one of the most potentially significant features of an Executive Order on national security classification policy that was signed by President Obama last week.

There are more than two thousand agency classification guides currently in use and they constitute the detailed operating instructions of the classification system.  If the so-called Fundamental Classification Guidance Review (set forth in section 1.9 of the new Order) is faithfully implemented by the agencies, it should eliminate numerous obsolete classification requirements and effectively rewrite the “software” of government secrecy.

Other outstanding features of the new Executive Order 13526 include the establishment of a National Declassification Center to coordinate and streamline the declassification process (section 3.7);  the adoption of the principle that “No information may remain classified indefinitely” (section 1.5d);  and the elimination of an intelligence community veto of declassification decisions made by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel. This veto authority had been granted by the Bush Administration in 2003.

But the Order contains many dozens of other changes in language that are subtle but important.  So, for example, section 3.1g states that “no information may be excluded from declassification… based solely on the type of document or record in which it is found.”  What this simple formulation does (or is expected to do) is to eliminate the permanent classification of the President’s Daily Brief (PDB), the daily intelligence compilation that is delivered to the President each morning.  The CIA has long argued that by virtue of being presented to the President, the information contained in PDBs is inherently and permanently classified.  Now it’s not.

[snip]

Some of the changes suggest previously unsuspected problems or issues.  Section 4.1c states curiously that “An official or employee leaving agency service may not … direct that information be declassified in order to remove it from agency control.”  There may be a story behind that new provision, but I don’t know what it is.  Section 3.1h states for the first time that classified “artifacts” and other classified materials that are not in the form of records shall be declassified in the same way as classified records.

I wonder whether they’re considering “CIA officer’s classified identity” to be an artifact in that last bit?

But Aftergood notes some areas in which Obama’s EO supports more secrecy.

Not all of the changes are in the direction of increased disclosure.  Section 4.3 authorizes the Attorney General, as well as the Secretary of Homeland Security, to establish highly secured Special Access Programs, an authority reserved in the previous Executive Order to the Secretaries of Defense, State, Energy and the then-Director of Central Intelligence.  Sections 1.8c and 3.5g exclude material submitted for prepublication review from classification challenges and mandatory declassification review.

This one is actually quite concerning. Remember that a lot of Bush’s most secret–arguably illegal–programs (like his torture program, his domestic surveillance program, and his assassination program) may have had aspects that were SAPs. Letting DHS and DOJ institute them seems to increase the risk of domestic SAPs.

Also, while I could be misreading this, but this passage would seem to explicitly prevent someone–oh, say, the Vice President–from declassifying a CIA officer’s identity without either the assent of the CIA Director Read more

Bob Bauer and Scooter Libby Justice

photo: Bob Bauer (PolicitalActivityLaw via Flickr)

photo: Bob Bauer (PolicitalActivityLaw via Flickr)

Glenn Greenwald has a post hitting on an op-ed Bob Bauer — Greg Craig’s replacement as White House Counsel — wrote supporting a pardon for Scooter Libby. (h/t BayStateLibrul) Glenn focuses on these passages…

Bush’s opposition has braced for a pardon and its rage at the prospect is building.  To Bush’s antagonists on left, a pardon would be only another act in the conspiracy — a further cover-up, a way of getting away with it. But this is the entirely wrong way of seeing things.  A pardon is just what Bush’s opponents should want. . . .Nothing in the nature of the pardon renders it inappropriate to these purposes. The issuance of a presidential pardon, not reserved for miscarriages of justice, has historically also served political functions — to redirect policy, to send a message, to associate the president with a cause or position. . . .

Libby is said to be unpardonable because the act of lying, a subversion of the legal process, cannot go unpunished. Yet this is mere glibness. . .

Now, as it happens, I didn’t write about this when it first came out. And to be honest, I’ve got mixed feelings about it. After all, Bauer did something that few people in DC were doing at the time–pointing to Bush’s own involvement in the leak of Plame’s identity.

A presidential pardon is finally an intervention by the President, his emergence from behind the thick curtain he has dropped between him and these momentous events involving his government, his policy, his Vice President. By pardoning Libby, he acknowledges that Libby is not really the one to confront the administration’s accusers. Now the president, the true party in interest, would confront them, which is what his opponents have demanded all along.

[snip]

But if the President pardons Libby, and by this act makes the case his own, he will have picked up a portion of the cost. Libby will fall back, restored to obscurity. Bush will step forward and take the lead role. He will have to explain himself; he will have to answer questions.

Even though I had already pointed to evidence showing Bush was involved–and may have even ordered OVP’s campaign against Joe Wilson in June 2003, when Bauer wrote this, almost no one would utter the possibility that Bush was somehow in the loop on the Plame outing. I think I remember being mildly grateful that someone would even point out that Bush ultimately bore responsibility for the Plame outing.

That said, I think Bauer was, on two counts, hopelessly naive. Read more

Cheney’s Betrayal Made an IIPA Charge for Libby Possible

HungOutToDry_EWYesterday, I showed the many ways that Dick Cheney hung his purportedly valued aide, Scooter Libby, out to dry in his interview with Patrick Fitzgerald.

But I didn’t do a very good job of explaining the consequences of that action from Cheney. Luckily, perris did that for me.

As a reminder, I’ve shown over the years that a great deal of circumstantial evidence suggests that Dick Cheney ordered Scooter Libby to leak a number of things to Judy Miller on July 8, 2003: The NIE (as Libby testified), but also the report from Joe Wilson’s trip and Valerie Wilson’s identity. From public reporting, it always looked like Cheney had constructed a firewall to defend against an IIPA violation. If Fitzgerald ever proved that Libby leaked Valerie Wilson’s identity to Judy Miller knowing she was covert, then Cheney could claim that he had insta-declassified her identity, thereby giving that leak a legal defense, however dubious. Cheney even went so far to imply to Tim Russert that he hypothetically could have declassified Valerie Wilson’s identity.

Q There was a story in the National Journal that Cheney authorized Libby to leak confidential information. Can you confirm or deny that?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I have the authority as Vice President under an executive issued by the President to classify and declassify information. And everything I’ve done is consistent with those authorities.

Q Could you declassify Valerie Plame’s status as an operative?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I’ve said all I’m going to say on the subject, Tim.

But Cheney’s denials of all knowledge of the Plame leak during his Fitzgerald interview would have made that defense impossible.

[Cheney] has no personal knowledge of anyone having provided [Mrs. Wilson’s employment] to Robert Novak, or any other reporter.

[snip]

he does not recall having a conversation with the President about the Wilsons. [note, Cheney goes on to contradict this claim]

[snip]

He does not recall discussing Valerie Wilson with Libby prior to her name appearing in Novak’s column on 7/14/03.

[snip]

His handwritten notes on the 7/6/03 editorial about Wilson’s trip and the involvement of Wilson’s wife in the CIAs selection of Wilson was triggered by his recollection of the prior telephone conversation he had with George Tenet, wherein Tenet identified Wilson’s wife as an employee of the agency. The Vice President also indicated that he never discussed the substance of his call with Tenet with anyone prior to the publication of Valerie Wilsons identity in Novak’s 7/14/03 newspaper column. [Note, earlier he had said he may have told Libby]

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Cheney Refused to Release the Journalists

There is a lot in Cheney’s interview report–we’ll have a busy weekend. But for the moment, let’s start with this bit:

After the Vice President again mentioned that he was pressed for time, two separate requests were made to Vice President Cheney in an effort to assist the DOJ/FBI investigation into this matter. First, an FBI waiver form was presented to the Vice President and copies were given to his attorneys. It was explained to Vice President Cheney that his signature was being sought on the waiver form in order to release any reporters with whom the Vice President may have had conversations about the subject matter of this investigation, from promises of confidentiality arising from any such conversations. Vice President Cheney acknowledged receipt of the FBIs waiver form but declined to sign until his attorneys have had sufficient time to review it.

Cheney refused to release the reporters he spoke with of confidentiality.

Now, over the course of his interview, Cheney was asked and he denied speaking with Novak and Cooper (and claimed to have no knowledge of discussions with Judy). The sole key journalist in question he didn’t deny any knowledge about was Woodward (and, though less important, Andrea Mitchell). But he basically denied speaking to any journalist.

And then he refused to sign a waiver of confidentiality over his conversations with journalists.

Couple that with a few more data points.

  1. When Libby was first asked to sign such a waiver, he too refused to sign it.
  2. When Novak was first asked to testify, he refused to testify until he could limit his testimony to those who had signed such waivers (and he originally limited it to Armitage, Rove, and Harlow).
  3. The only question Judy Miller refused to provide some answer to when I posed a bunch of questions about her involvement was about seeing Cheney in Jackson when she saw Scooter (the Aspen comment).
  4. After Novak was interviewed in September 2004, someone–presumably Fitzgerald–searched for records of contacts between Novak and the White House on a bunch of days, including July 7, 2003, the day before Novak spoke with Armitage.
  5. Judy refused to testify about her conversations on this subject until she could limit her conversations to Libby.

If Cheney spoke to both Novak and Judy–and there’s reason to believe he might have–he refused to expose those conversations to the scrutiny of Fitzgerald.

What Judge Sullivan’s Opinion Means

As I reported, Judge Emmet Sullivan has issued his ruling in the Dick Cheney interview FOIA, ruling partly for and partly against CREW. Sullivan has ordered DOJ to turn over the documents in question by October 9. He has directed DOJ to redact the information exempted in two earlier filings. So, as I suggested, we’ll get some new information. But we won’t learn how Cheney answered when asked whether Bush authorized him to leak classified information (which ended up including Valerie Wilson’s identity).

Here’s some more detail on what the ruling means.

A Rebuke to Obama’s Executive Power Grab

While Judge Sullivan accepted all of Ralph DiMaio and David Barron’s specific exemptions based on national security or deliberative grounds, he rejected the laughable DOJ argument that releasing Cheney’s interview materials would dissuade other high level White House officials from cooperating in investigations. That’s important, because it rejects a theory that would shield a great deal of information on White House criminality. Here’s Sullivan’s description of everything that would be shielded under such a theory.

In this sense, the category of proceedings that DOJ asks this Court to conclude are “reasonably anticipated” could encompass any law enforcement investigation during which law enforcement might wish to interview senior White House officials. Such proceedings might include an investigation into alleged criminal activity that physically took place in the White House; financial wrongdoing by a White House official that took place before or during his or her tenure in the executive branch; misconduct relating to official responsibilities, such as the breach of national security protocol that formed the basis of the Plame investigation; or even an event occurring outside the White House with only tangential connection to one or more White House officials. Thus conceived, it becomes clear that the scope of the proceedings described by DOJ is breathtakingly broad.

I’m guessing, but unless the parts of Cheney’s interview Sullivan has ordered to be released are a lot more scandalous than I think they are, I don’t think Obama’s DOJ will appeal this because it’s unlikely the Appeals Court will agree with them, and as we’ve seen, Obama’s Administration tends to go to great lengths to avoid letting Appeals Courts issue rulings in relatively unimportant cases that reign in executive power. 

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Judge Sullivan Rejects DOJ’s Expansive Claims to Protect Cheney Interview

Judge Sullivan has rejected DOJ’s most expansive claims they used to try to protect Dick Cheney’s CIA Leak case interview.

I am reading this now for more detail, but the key graph is this one.

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the agency has met its burden of demonstrating that certain limited information was appropriately withheld from disclosure to protect the well-recognized deliberative process and presidential communications privileges under Exemption 5, personal privacy under Exemptions 6 and 7(C), and national security interests under Exemptions 1 and 3. The Court cannot, however, permit the government to withhold the records in their entirety under Exemption 7(A) on the basis that disclosure might interfere with some unidentifiable and unspecified future law enforcement proceedings. The purpose of Exemption 7(A) is to protect specific ongoing or reasonably anticipated law enforcement proceedings. There are no such proceedings at issue here. Neither congressional intent nor well-established precedent supports the application of the exemption under the circumstances in this case, and the Court declines the government’s invitation to create a new, per se FOIA exemption for any and all law enforcement interviews involving high level White House officials. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. An appropriate Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.

I suspect this will still shield the key information about whether or not Bush authorized Cheney to leak classified information–up to and including Plame’s identity. 

I’ll confirm that after I’ve read more carefully.

Update: Here’s Sullivan’s order. He’s ordering DOJ to turn over a redacted document by October 9. It seems that Sullivan has permitted DOJ to shield everything listed under the CIA and DOJ declarations, which will shield whether or not Bush explicitly authorized Shooter and Scooter to go leaking classified information to shut Joe Wilson up.