



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330108

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

8 January 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000171DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abu Bakr Ibn Ali Muhammad Alahdal
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Abu Bakr Ibn Ali Muhammad al-Ahdal, Uthman Ali Muhammad al-Shamrani, Abu Muhammad, Abu Ali, Uthman Ali Muhammad, Abu Bakr al-Shamali, Abu Bakr al-Shamrani
- Place of Birth: al-Hudaydah, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 1979
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000171DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is on a list of high-risk detainees from a health perspective. Detainee is currently in overall fair health but has a diastolic heart murmur. Detainee also has a perforated left tympanic membrane, but refused repair.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 14 January 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and his name and alias were found on al-Qaida affiliated documents. Detainee identified himself as

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
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a willing terrorist against the US, and acknowledged he was a member of a terrorist support entity in Yemen. Detainee was identified as a sub-commander on the front lines. Detainee is assessed to be a fighter in UBL's 55th Arab Brigade,¹ who participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces at Bagram as a member of an artillery unit. Detainee also participated in hostilities in Tora Bora where he served in a supply unit and was captured with Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-Fakhri aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212). Detainee is assessed to have received basic training and the al-Qaida advanced artillery training in Afghanistan. Detainee admitted occupying known Taliban and al-Qaida guesthouses and is associated with the Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI).² JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective.
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- (S//NF) Included reporting identifying detainee as a leader on the front line of Bagram
- (S//NF) Corrected detainee's association with a rocket division commander to an artillery division commander
- (S//NF) Added assessment that detainee received artillery training
- (S//NF) Updated reporting associating detainee with UBL's 55th Arab Brigade
- (S//NF) Attributed aliases Uthman Ali Muhammad al-Shamrani and Abu Bakr al-Shamrani to detainee³
- (S//NF) Removed detainee's association to explosives; analysis indicates detainee did not stay at a guesthouse operated by the commander of the al-Ghuraba Training Camp where explosives were instructed

¹ Analyst Note: The 55th Arab Brigade served as UBL primary battle formation supporting Taliban objectives, with UBL participating closely in the command and control of the brigade. Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), had primary operational command of the Arab Brigade, serving as UBL's military commander in the field.

² Analyst Note: HUJI is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 1B Counterterrorism (CT) Target. Priority 1B targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack U.S. persons or interests

³ ➤GUAN-2007-T03214-HT, AFGP-2002-604008, TD-314/40693-02, GUAN-2007-I10153-HT, 000252 FM40 05-Jan-2005 (Part one of two)

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4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee attended the al-Nur Institute in al-Hudaydah for twelve years, studying the Koran and English.⁴ After graduating in 1998, the Jamiat Taalim al-Koran, a Yemen-based religious organization, employed detainee to teach the Koran to young children at the Muad Ibn Jabal Madrassa in Bayt al-Ahdal, Hudaydah, YM.⁵ Detainee stated his last address in Yemen was in the city of Sanaa, YM.⁶

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In late 2000, detainee started driving a taxi and joined the Islah political party.⁷ In December 2000, Soviet-era mujahid Abu Jaffar, aka (Yaqub), visited the Uthman and al-Nur Mosques to discuss jihad in Afghanistan and recruit new jihadists.⁸ In March 2001, detainee decided to visit Afghanistan after hearing about the Taliban's destruction of the Buddhist statues in Bamiyan, AF. Detainee considered the statues an affront to Islam and respected the Taliban for demolishing the ancient stone idols. Detainee did not intend to fight, but wanted to learn more about the Taliban ways of Islam. In April 2001, Abu Jaffar returned to Hudaydah and detainee sought his assistance in traveling to Afghanistan. Abu Jaffar facilitated the acquisition of a passport, plane tickets, money, and contacts for detainee's trip to Afghanistan.⁹ On 11 May 2001, detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan (PK) spending three weeks in a Karachi hotel with two Yemeni textile businessmen, whom detainee met on the plane.¹⁰ Detainee then continued to the Daftar Taliban (Taliban Office) in Quetta, PK where the office manager, Muhammad Dauod,

⁴ 000171 SIR 02-JUL-2003, Analyst Note: Detainee also stated he studied English for six years at the Institute. In a May 2002 joint US-Yemeni Political Security Organization (PSO) interview, detainee claimed he graduated high school in 1998 and studied the Koran at the Nur Institute for three unspecified years. Variants of Nur include Nurr and Noor. See TD-314/28802-02

⁵ 000171 SIR 02-JUL-2003 Analyst Note: The al-Nur Institute is a government-sponsored school that specializes in religious education. Jamiat Taalim al-Koran translates to "The Association of Teaching the Koran." No available reporting confirms the existence of a Yemeni Jamiat Taalim al-Koran organization. However, Jamiat Taalim al-Koran is the name of a large Pakistani-based trust organization founded by Haji Muhammad Rafiq, who operates over one thousand madrassas throughout Pakistan.

⁶ >000171 SIR 31-May-2002

⁷ Analyst Note: The Islah (Reform) Party is an NIPF Priority 2 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 2A TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests or provide witting operational support to priority 2A terrorist groups. See TD-314/28802-02 and TD-314/12546-01

⁸ IIR 6 034 0221 02, 000171 MFR 31-MAR-2002, 000171 SIR 02-JUL-2003, Analyst Note: Abu Jaffar traveled to different mosques to recruit for Afghan jihad. Variants of Jaffar include Jaffir, Jafaar, and Jafar. A variant of Yaqub is Yaqoob. Abu Jaffar is not identifiable with Algerian facilitator Abu Jaffar al-Jazairi.

⁹ 000171 SIR 02-JUL-2003, 000171 MFR 31-MAR-2002

¹⁰ 000171 FM40 10-OCT-2002, 000171 MFR 08-JUL-2003, TD-314/28802-02

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facilitated his jihad application in Afghanistan.¹¹ Dauod also organized detainee's crossing of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.¹²

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: In Kandahar, AF, detainee stayed at the al-Alam Guesthouse managed by Abu Ahmed.¹³ After four days, detainee traveled to Kabul, AF where detainee stayed at the al-Khat Guesthouse for one week.¹⁴ Detainee then visited Jalalabad, AF for two weeks touring the market and mosque. A North African, named Abu Ayman, assigned detainee a room at an unidentified guesthouse in Jalalabad. Detainee returned to Kabul and stayed at a guesthouse run by Abu Muaz.¹⁵ In Kabul, detainee presented himself to Taliban commander Mullah Abd al-Ahad.¹⁶ On 14 July 2001, after receiving training on the AK-47, detainee traveled to the Bagram front lines, but returned to the Kabul guesthouse one week later due to a lack of combat activity.¹⁷ Detainee was subsequently hospitalized for malaria. Detainee spent two days in a Kabul hospital before returning to Abu Muaz's Guesthouse. There, detainee spent two months recovering from his illness.¹⁸ Detainee requested to return to the front lines after fully recovering from his illness and was assigned as a guard in a twelve-man unit, composed of nine Arabs and three Afghans. Mullah Abdul al-Ahad commanded the unit, which provided security for the Taliban rear headquarters.¹⁹

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Detainee claimed he withdrew to a village on the outskirts of Jalalabad and hiked into the mountains where he remained for the duration of Ramadan. After six days of

¹¹ TD-314/00684-02, 000171 MFR 31-MAR-2002, Analyst Note: Muhammad Dauod is not Abu Zubaydah whose alias was Dauod.

¹² 000171 SIR 08-JUL-2003, 000171 MFR 31-MAR-2002

¹³ TD-314/28802-02

¹⁴ TD-314/00684-02, Analyst Note: The al-Khat Guesthouse was also known as the Karti Barwan, aka (Number Nine), aka (Number Ten), Guesthouse. Al-Khat is not a reference to the narcotic leaf, but is probably the Arabic for "The Line," meaning the guesthouse served the fighters going to and from the front lines. The guesthouse was a rally point for Taliban fighters returning from the front lines to rest and recuperate. The Taliban also used this area to determine which fighters would be moved to the front lines and which would serve as rear support in Kabul. See 000587 SIR 17-DEC-2003, IIR 6 034 0312 05, IIR 6 034 0051 05.

¹⁵ 000171 MFR 31-MAR-2002, Analyst Note: Abu Muaz is assessed to be Abu Muaz al-Suri, who ran a guesthouse in Kabul. See IIR 6 034 0133 04

¹⁶ TD-314/00684-02, Analyst Note: Mullah Abdul Ahad is assessed to be Taliban artillery commander Abdul Ahad Akhond. See 000934 HANDNOTE 05-JAN-2004

¹⁷ IIR 6 034 0221 02

¹⁸ 000171 MFR 31-MAR-2002, Analyst Note: In another interview, detainee claimed he remained in the hospital for two months. See 000171 MFR 02-JUL-2003

¹⁹ TD-314/00684-02, IIR 2 340 0131 02, 000171 KB 07-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee's request to return to the front lines after hearing of the 11 September terrorist attacks indicates detainee's willingness and desire to fight US forces.

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walking in the mountains, his group broke into two-man units to reduce suspicion. The group was aided by a Yemeni who approached a concentration of other Arabs making their way to Pakistan. Upon arrival, the villagers turned them all over to Pakistani authorities. They were taken to a police station in pickup trucks at night and later sent in a convoy of three buses toward another prison when a riot broke out in one of the other buses.²⁰ Detainee's story indicates he fled Afghanistan with a group of al-Qaida and Taliban fighters led by UBL appointed military commander in Tora Bora, LY-212. The group crossed the Afghani-Pakistani border in the Nangarhar region in mid-December 2001. Their Pakistani contact convinced them to surrender their weapons and gathered the group in a mosque where Pakistani forces immediately arrested them.²¹ On 30 December 2001, Pakistani forces transferred detainee from Kohat, PK, to US custody at the Kandahar Detention Facility.²²

b. (S) Property Held:

- Money:
 - 5,675 Pakistani rupees
 - 500 Saudi riyals
- Miscellaneous personal items including wristwatch, calculator, and a piece of paper²³
- Sony World Time FM/SW/1-9/MW 11 band receiver

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 14 January 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Details on Taliban security measures
- Biographical information on Taliban military groups and commanders
- Details concerning Taliban radio communication procedures

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee is assessed to be deceptive and withholds information. Detainee's initial interrogation in December 2001 was when he probably demonstrated the most candor. Since then, detainee has provided very generic and innocuous descriptions of his activities while in Afghanistan, consistent with a cover story to hide probable participation in al-Qaida, terrorist training, and combat against Coalition forces. Detainee's only mention of his trip to Jalalabad was during the December 2001 interrogation. Detainee stated he never received militant training, but reporting and historical analysis as well as a gap in

²⁰ TD-314/00684-02

²¹ > IIR 7 739 3396 02, Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis

²² TD-314/00845-02

²³ Analyst Note: The translation of the paper is discussed in Paragraph 7b.

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detainee's timeline during May and June 2001, indicates detainee did receive militant training prior to serving on the front lines of Afghanistan against US and Coalition forces.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida. Detainee's name and alias were found on al-Qaida affiliated documents and he admitted occupying known al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee is an extremist and identified himself as a willing terrorist against the US, and acknowledged he was a member of a terrorist support entity in Yemen. Detainee is assessed to be a fighter in UBL's 55th Arab Brigade, who participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces at Bagram where he was identified as a commander. Detainee was assigned to an artillery unit and is assessed to have received artillery training in Afghanistan, an advanced al-Qaida course. Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Tora Bora where he was identified providing supplies to the fighters.²⁴ Detainee is associated with the HUJI.

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida.
 - (S//NF) Supporting detainee's assessment as a member of al-Qaida, his name and alias are included on al-Qaida affiliated documents providing further indications of his association with al-Qaida members and use of al-Qaida facilities.
 - (S//NF) A variant of detainee's alias, Bakr al-Shamrani identified as a Yemeni, is included on a document named "Asra.doc" recovered from a hard drive associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, ISN US9KU-010024DP.
 - (S//NF) Detainee's name and alias were also included on a document listing 324 names, aliases, and nationalities, recovered from raids on suspected al-Qaida safe houses in Karachi, PK. The document noted the contents of detainee's trust account included his Yemeni passport, ID card, and money.²⁵ (Analyst Note:

²⁴ Analyst Note: The 55th Arab Brigade served as UBL primary battle formation supporting Taliban objectives, with UBL participating closely in the command and control of the brigade. Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), had primary operational command of the Arab Brigade, serving as UBL's military commander in the field.

²⁵ TD-314/40693-02(U//FOUO) Analyst Note: In a letter home, detainee referenced his father's name as Uthman.²⁵ Normal identification of an Islamic Arab male follows the progression of individual's name – individual's father's name – individual's grandfather's name. Detainee's father, based on detainee's stated name, would be Ali. Detainee has noted his name is Abu Bakr. Normally the "Abu" name is identifiable with a male who has children and the trailing name, in this case "Bakr", represents the name of the first born child – detainee claims to be childless. Islamic extremists were instructed to choose aliases based on an "Abu" identifier. Additionally, on 2 June

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Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad.)²⁶

- ◆ (S//NF) Detainee admitted he stayed at a guesthouse in Kabul run by Abu Muaz, assessed to be al-Qaida associate Abu Muaz al-Suri, on numerous occasions prior to July 2001.²⁷
- ◆ (S//NF) Detainee stayed at the Najim al-Jihad Guesthouse during his retreat from Afghanistan.²⁸ Najim al-Jihad, located on the outskirts of Jalalabad, was a UBL-owned guesthouse used by al-Qaida members and their families. In mid-October 2001, UBL stayed at the guesthouse shortly after the US bombing campaign started.²⁹
- ◆ (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged traveling to Afghanistan following a short stay at the Daftar Taliban, a known al-Qaida way-point for transiting recruits.³⁰
- ◆ (S//NF) In late May 2001, detainee arrived in Kandahar and a Saudi named Abu Ahmad welcomed detainee at the al-Alam Guesthouse.³¹ (Analyst Note: Detainee stated Arabs occupied the guesthouse. The guesthouse was probably one of the three main al-Qaida-linked Arab guesthouses in Kandahar: al-Ansar, al-Nebras, or Hajji Habash.)
- (S//NF) Detainee adheres to extremist Islamic ideology and identified himself as a "willing terrorist against the US."
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated he was proud to have been a mujahid fighting for the Islamic cause under the Taliban banner. Detainee stated he will bide his time until the next "Islamic nation" arises and he will join the fight against the enemies of Islam. Detainee remarked he was a willing terrorist against the US because of his opinion that the US holds a hostile position against Palestinian Muslims and other Arab populations.³²

2005 detainee wrote a letter home and addressed it to Abu Bakr,²⁵ the name he claims as his own. It is assessed, contrary to detainee's claim, that Abu Bakr is his alias and not his name. Detainee's true name is probably Uthman Ali Muhammad.

²⁶ IIR 6 034 0292 02, TD-314/05434-02; Analyst Note: Abdullah al-Iraqi is an alias for IZ-10026, 55th Arab Brigade commander. It is unclear whether Abdullah al-Iraqi is IZ-10026, due to detainee reporting that Abdullah al-Iraqi was captured with him fleeing Afghanistan. The terms poison and chemical were used interchangeably by al-Qaida and extremist personnel. These refer to the various chemical and biological research, development, and training programs including persistent and non-persistent agents, gaseous vapors, liquids, and powders and were materials designed to induce incapacitation or create casualties through physical contact or inhalation.

²⁷ 000171 MFR 31-MAR-2002

²⁸ IIR 6 034 0275 02

²⁹ IIR 2 340 6473 02, IIR 2 340 6828 02

³⁰ 000171 MFR 31-MAR-2002

³¹ TD-314/28802-02

³² TD-314/00684-02

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- (S//NF) Detainee was a member of the al-Islah party founded by Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar, leader of the most prominent and powerful Yemeni tribal confederation, Hashid. Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar created the Yemeni Islah party to gain power in Yemen politics.³³
 - (S//NF) The party is affiliated with UBL and promotes Islamic terrorism, to include organizing young mujahideen against the Yemen government, Coalition interests in Afghanistan, Palestinian terrorism against Israel, and more recently, Coalition forces in Iraq.³⁴
- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces on the front lines as a fighter in UBL's 55th Arab Brigade and as an al-Qaida fighter in Tora Bora.
 - (S//NF) Detainee occupied Taliban and al-Qaida positions on the front lines during Operation Enduring Freedom. Detainee reported he returned to Kabul in July 2001 and spent two months recovering there before he returned to the front lines. Detainee was on the front lines until withdrawing to Jalalabad and the nearby mountain where he spent Ramadan (mid-November to mid-December) 2001 before escaping to Pakistan.³⁵
 - (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeab Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), identified detainee a commander of a group of fighters in Bagram.³⁶
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated he used a small push-to-talk radio to communicate with other positions on the battlefield.³⁷ (Analyst Note: Generally only those in positions of leadership were provided radios, indicating detainee probably held a leadership position within the unit.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee was assigned to an artillery unit and is assessed to have received basic and advanced training requisite of this assignment. Detainee occupied a Taliban position north of Kabul under the command of Mullah Abdul Ahad.³⁸ Detainee's unit consisted of twelve personnel. Mullah Abdul Ahad was a Taliban artillery division commander who directed two positions near Kabul and one near Kandahar.³⁹
 - (S//NF) Abdul Ghani, ISN US9AF-000934DP (AF-934), identified Abdul Ahad Akhond as a commander of an artillery division. He commanded two

³³ TD-314/12546-01, 000171 Yemen JITF CT 07-MAR-2005

³⁴ TD-314/12546-01, YEMEN TRIBAL AFFILIATIONS 01-FEB-2001

³⁵ IIR 6 034 0221 02, 000171 MFR 31-MAR-2002, 000171 MFR 02-JUL-2003, TD-314/00684-02, IIR 2 340 0131 02, 000171 KB 07-FEB-2002

³⁶ > 000252 FM40 05-JAN-2005

³⁷ IIR 2 340 6159 02, 000171 SIR 15-JUL-2003, 000171 KB 07-Feb-2002, Analyst Note: The Taliban and al-Qaida forces used ICOM 168 or ICOM 174 radios.

³⁸ > TD-314/00684-02

³⁹ IIR 2 340 0131 02, 000934 HANDNOTE 08-FEB-2003, Analyst Note: Mullah Abdul Ahad fled to Pakistan in early 2003, and remains at large.

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groups in Kabul and one in Kandahar. AF-934 stated there were 10 to 12 individuals in each group.⁴⁰ In other reporting, Skandar Shah remarked AF-934 worked for Abdul Ahad, the 8th Artillery Division Commander before the 11 September attacks.⁴¹

- (S//NF) Detainee was captured with a calculator.⁴² Detainee stated he used the calculator to determine exchange rates for currencies of various countries detainee was visiting.⁴³ (Analyst Note: Calculators may be used for indirect fire calculations such as those required for artillery fire.)
- (S//NF) Hani Said Muhammad Banan al-Khalaf al-Ghamidi, ISN US9SA-000438DP (SA-438), stated the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp provided basic militant training. He added upon completion of basic training, additional specialized training was offered but the individual had to volunteer to take the training. SA-438 stated the specialized training included artillery, urban warfare, and mountain warfare courses.⁴⁴ (Analyst Note: Detainee would be required to have prior training before being accepted to artillery training. He is assessed to have completed basic training and artillery training prior to assignment to the artillery unit.)
- (S//NF) Abd al-Rahman Maadha Dhafir al-Hilala al-Umari, ISN US9SA-000199DP (SA-199, deceased), photo identified detainee from the front lines. SA-199 claimed detainee served at the Said Position commanded by Abu al-Aynak near Bagram.⁴⁵ (Analyst Note: Muhammad Ali Abdallah Muhammad Bwazir, ISN US9YM-000440DP (YM-440), reported Abu al-Aynaa, possibly a variant of al-Aynak, was the leader at the camp.⁴⁶)
- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Tora Bora. YM-252 reported detainee worked for Mahmoud Hasan al-Rabia, ISN US9KU-000551DP (KU-551) in Tora Bora, helping organize and distribute food to the fighters.⁴⁷
- (S//NF) Detainee was captured with a large group of al-Qaida affiliated fighters who fled the hostilities in Tora Bora. Detainee stated he was captured in Pakistan and placed on a truck for transport. Detainee stated a riot erupted on one of the trucks. During detainee's initial screening, he acknowledged he was carrying an AK-47 at the time of his capture.⁴⁸ These details corroborate reporting detailing the transport

⁴⁰ > 000934 HANDNOTE 08-FEB-2003

⁴¹ Skandar Shah FM40 04-OCT-2004

⁴² 000171 PERSDOC 17-SEP-2002

⁴³ 000171 FM40 10-OCT-2002

⁴⁴ 000438 FM40 04-Feb-2003

⁴⁵ IIR 6 034 0293 06, Analyst Note: Detainee is identified with his MP number – 160, and the name Abu Bakr.

⁴⁶ IIR 6 034 0744 04

⁴⁷ > 000252 FM40 05-JAN-2005

⁴⁸ 000171 Initial Screening Form 31-Dec-2001

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of over 100 fighters captured along with LY-212, commander of al-Qaida forces in Tora Bora. LY-212 led the fighters out of Tora Bora in mid-December 2001, following engagements with Northern Alliance forces and bombardment from US and Coalition aircraft.⁴⁹

- (S//NF) Detainee is associated with the HUJI.⁵⁰
 - (S//NF) A document in detainee's possession at the time of capture contained contact information for a safe house and a central office operated by the Pakistani extremist group HUJI.⁵¹ Abu Abdullah al-Iraqi instructed detainee to show the paper to any person in Pakistan for assistance in finding one of the two houses.⁵² (Analyst Note: In 1998, HUJI became allied with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.)
 - (S//NF) HUJI utilized a house, located at #192 Sakina Atha Nasaqaur, Lane P-38, Islamabad, PK, as a main operations center. Phone numbers attributed to this house include 92-51-444-3837 and 92-51-444-6207. This address was the first address listed on detainee's translated document. The house was used to facilitate fighters out of Afghanistan, track funds and supplies, monitor planning and results of various attacks, and maintain training records of personnel. The house was owned by Shahid Abbasi.⁵³
 - ◆ (S//NF) Moazzam Begg, ISN US9UK-000558DP (UK-558, transferred), identified Shahid Abbasi as a leader of the HUJI house aiding fighters fleeing from Afghanistan. UK-558 stated Shahid Abbasi personally escorted people through Tora Bora to Islamabad and assisted personnel in finding family members and getting home.⁵⁴

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been mostly non compliant and semi-hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 249 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 12 December 2007, when he scratched paint off his cell with his fingernail. Detainee has 73 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 22 November 2007, when he scratched a guard's face with his fingernails. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include, failure to follow instructions and camp rules, threatening guards, damage to government property, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, provoking words and gestures. In 2006, detainee had a total of 59 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and 61 in 2007.

⁴⁹ Withdrawal from Tora Bora

⁵⁰ 000171 MFR 08-APR-2002

⁵¹ 000171 PERSDOC 17-SEP-2002, TD-314/50578-01, IIR 6 034 0292 02

⁵² IIR 6 034 0292 02

⁵³ TD-314/50578-01, 000171 PERSDOC 17-SEP-2002, IIR 6 034 0292 02, Analyst Note: Shahid Abbasi joined the HUJI during Afghan war and afterwards served in the organization in various positions before becoming the chief of the organization's Islamabad-Rawalpindi zone.

⁵⁴ IIR 6 044 0136 02

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8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 18 January 2007.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: In 1999 or 2000, detainee was probably recruited into al-Qaida from his job teaching the Koran. Detainee was a member of the Islah party with access to party members and possibly plans and operations. Detainee stayed at a series of guesthouses in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and had access to other al-Qaida and Taliban members. Detainee's multiple and prolonged stays in the Syrian guesthouse indicate detainee was being trained there vice al-Faruq. While in Afghanistan, detainee had access to al-Qaida personnel affiliated with explosives and poison programs. Detainee had direct access to al-Qaida and Taliban military leaders during the defense of Kabul and had access to operational planning and logistics networks. Detainee's smaller group was probably part of the large group led out of Tora Bora by LY-212. Likewise, detailed contact information for safe houses in Karachi is an uncommon pocket litter item, and suggests detainee was a valuable asset.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has information on Islah's leadership and recruitment networks. Detainee can provide information on the Jamiet Taaleem al-Koran. Detainee has information on al-Qaida and Taliban support networks from Yemen through Pakistan to Afghanistan. Detainee's stay at an unidentified safe house in Kandahar, detainee's first trip to Jalalabad, and detainee's two-month time lapse between May and July 2001, require further exploitation. Through detainee's relationships with al-Qaida operatives and associates in Kabul, detainee has information on al-Qaida's guesthouses and connections to Syrian extremists. Detainee probably can elaborate on tactics and procedures utilized by al-Qaida and Taliban during combat operations from detainee's association with Taliban leader, Mullah Abd al-Ahad.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:


- Al-Qaida personnel, recruitment, facilities, plans, and operations
- Al-Qaida and Taliban egress routes from Afghanistan
- Islah leadership and recruitment networks

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000171DP (S)

9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 28 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

v/r,



MARK H. BUZBY
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.