

# Integrated Vulnerability Assessment of Ft. Detrick, Tenant Activities, and Frederick Cancer Research & Development Center (U)

Volume 1-Summary Report Revision A



February 1998

Defense Special Weapons Agency 6801 Telegraph Road Attn: ATC, Suite 331 Alexandria, Virginia 22310-3398


USAMRIID Control

: 07 -RIID- 8

Classified By: Multiple Sources Reason: 1.5 (g) Declassify On: OADR



Document No. SE-0121-98 Copy No.: \_\_\_\_\_\_



#### (U) SUMMARY REPORT

# INTRODUCTION.

A team from the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), Springfield Research Facility (SRF) conducted an Integrated Vulnerabil ty Assessment (IVA) of Ft. Detrick, Ft. Detrick tenant activities, and Frederick Cancer Research and Development Center (FCRDC) from 17-27 February 1998.

The IVA identified vulnerabilities that, if exploited, could lead to mission failure. Table 1 shows the range of potential threats, the tools used in the assessment to develop a comprehensive list of asset vulnerabilities, and the system elements analyzed.

Table 1. (FOUO) Asset Vulnerabilities.

#### FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

| INTEGRATED VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS |                       |                        |  |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|
| EGOTOE XTES                          | 1F0767L3              | TANDON DE LOS MEDINES  |  |
| Accidents                            | Models                | Structural Protection  |  |
| Criminal Activity                    | Observation           | Physical Security      |  |
| Sabotage/Espionage                   | Interviews            | Communications         |  |
| Terrorism                            |                       | Emergency Preparedness |  |
| Infowarfare                          |                       | Fire Prevention and    |  |
| Civil Unrest                         |                       | Protection             |  |
| Natural Disaster                     |                       | Utilities              |  |
| Technological Failure                | Population Dynamics   | Information Assurance  |  |
| Conventional Warfare                 | Threat Identification | Site-specific Systems  |  |
| WMD                                  |                       |                        |  |
|                                      | ASSET VULNERABILITIES |                        |  |

This assessment considers the full range of potential threats, and focuses on the survivability of the missions in each activity.



#### (FOUO) MAJOR FINDINGS.

This section summarizes the most significant vulnerabilities found during the IVA by functional area. For more detail, look in the body of the report or in the appendices for the heading with the same name as in this section.

# Surveillance Observations & Physical Security

Vulnerability: In the team's opinion, the physical security of Ft. Detrick is seriously compromised by the "open" post concept. This concept allows uncontrolled access to the Post by individuals or groups and allows a lack of control over delivery trucks entering the Post. These factors make it easy to conduct a direct attack with ballistic weapons or to place a large amount of high explosive, biological agents, or chemical agents close to any desired target. As a result, it would be simple to seriously cripple or eliminate any of Ft. Detrick's missions.


Recommendation: Consider using the "closed" post concept at Ft. Detrick. In any case, control all large vehicles entering the Post. Build a special "truck" gate and screen all incoming cargo. Ensure manifest paperwork is in order and that someone expects the delivery. For enhanced security, establish a Cargo Transfer Poin: (CTP) for all deliveries on the Post.


#### Structural Protection.

Vulnerability: All buildings on the post are easily approached due to the layout of Ft. Detrick and its proximity to public highways. Because the post is normally operated as an open post, a vehicle carrying a large amount of explosives could enter the compound and position itself near any building on the complex.

Even the sturdiest buildings, such as Building 1425 with brick on block construction, would be seriously compromised if a 2000-pound Ammonium Nitrate/Fuel Oil (ANFO) bomb was detonated within 65 feet of the building. The standard block wall construction, such as tijut found in Building 325, would be breached if the device was detonated within 120 feet of the building.

Recommendation: Determine allowable standoff distances for each building. Strictly control all vehicles that come within a few hundred feet of a building, and carefully monitor with limited and guarded access all vehicles requiring access to the areas behind a building.





iv



# Emergency Preparedness.

Vulnerability: The current Emergency Preparedness (EP) Plan is out-of-date and inaccurate in several areas. The plan does not address response to terrorist activity, mass casualty situations, or chemical/biological release (intentional or accidental). The Post's emergency exercise program is limited to the occasional fire drill.

Recommendation: Review all emergency planning documents. Ensure that the review process includes the Emergency Planner, the Force Protection Officer, the Provost Marshall, Garrison S-3, and the Fire Chief. Ensure that the Frederick Cancer Research and Development Center (FCRDC) and tenant command plans are in consonance with the Post's plans.

## Fire Protection and Prevention.


Vulnerability: Ft. Detrick's fire prevention and protection programs adequately support the post. However, there is no plan for transitioning from the response phase of fighting a fire to the recovery phase following the incident. Thus, the initial responders might remain at the site longer than necessary, delaying the reconstitution of the emergency providers and their equipment.

There is no comprehensive list of the locations and quantity of hazardous materials located at Ft. Detrick. Such a list would enable fire fighters to better plan their actions, resulting in more effective and efficient fire fighting.

Recommendation: The post should establish a Disaster Control Group (DCG) consisting of command elements and key personnel from organizations responsible for repairing the post. The DCG's mission would be to begin the cleanup and recovery process.

(Harmacy operation could be established to track the materials from "cradle to grave."







EMP and RF Threats.

Vulnerability: The threat from lightning has dramatically increased during the past year in the 1110<sup>th</sup> area. A significant amount of lightning protection was lost when the 308-foot microwave tower was removed. The tower served as an excellent lightning attractor and provided all structures within the 1110<sup>th</sup> area with excellent protection from lightning strikes.

Recommendation: Before the 1998 thunderstorm season starts, all organizations in the 1110<sup>th</sup> area should ensure that the existing lightning protection systems work as designed. Further, the organizations should develop and implement a system for monitoring, recording, and analyzing lightning strikes, to ensure that these lightning protection systems are adequate.



#### (U) PREFACE

This report contains the results of the Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (IVA) of Ft. Detrick, Ft. Detrick tenant activities, and Frederick Cancer Research and Development Center (FCRDC) from 17–27 February 1998. A team led by Tom Todd, from the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), Springfield Research Facility (SRF), conducted this assessment. The members of the team and the major areas of assessment are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Assessment Team and Functional Areas.

#### UNCLASSIFIED

| TEAM MEMBER  | FUNCTIONAL AREA  |
|--|--|
| rom Policial (* 1888)<br>Tom Bolicial  | Pagglados Pontinos   |
|  | a of fincetteniceopser and is a second of the second of th |
| DEDWING ROBBIDITY FOR SEASON   | and inclural solocology and the solocology are solocology and the solocology and the solocology are solocology are solocology and the solocology are solocology are solocology are solocology and the solocology are solocol |
|  |  |
| Noted Stational Control of the Contr | Par tysical School (v. 1984)   |
| lor, Tom Najehloka<br>Inck McKeever - 12 N   | Communications and the second  |
| Part Bologue Colonia Colonia   | All Action of the management of the second o |
| Paul Roal President Services   | HireProtection and Previous on Assessment  |
| William Kane P.D.  |  |
| Robert Bereit  |  |
| echia shani wa asaa ay ay ay ay ay ay ay   |  |
| DEGLESS CATANOLISM   |  |
| DOMER SENSO DE L'ASTAND CON CONTROL DE L'ASTAND CONTROL DE L'ASTAN | Manbal Advisors and the second of the second |
| Ken Hower Sales and the Control of t |  |
| PCOM YEARING AND THE SECOND  |  |
| Cillbert 140 mis   |  |
| OSTUNIA WOOTEN SEE THE TOTAL SEE THE SEE   | A TIM or mation as Suprince  |
| ken calahan secara da sa   | TATE/DMDRF//LEDUING  |
| Kristin Milker (* 1882)  |  |
| Terry Sector 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12  | A Annother was a second of the |


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Drs. Malone and Bumgarner served as technical advisors to the team, ensuring that the portions of the assessment that were medically or laboratory related were properly interpreted by other team members.

viii



This report is based on the assessment out-brief presented to the Ft. Detrick Garrison Staff on 31 March 1998 and gives information at three levels of detail:

- The summary briefly presents the most significant vulnerabilities found during the IVA.
- The body of the report gives some background information about the assessment and presents the major findings.
- Detailed reports for each functional area and a glossary of acronyms are in the appendices.





#### (U) TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Section                                   | Page       |
|---|------------|
| (U) SUMMARY REPORT                        | ii         |
| (FOUO) INTRODUCTION(FOUO) MAJOR FINDINGS  | ii         |
| (FOUO) MAJOR FINDINGS                     | iii        |
| (FOUO) Structural Protection.             | iii        |
| (FOUO) Communications.                    | iv         |
| (FOUO) Emergency Preparedness.            |            |
| (FOUO) Fire Protection and Prevention.    | V          |
| (FOUO) Utilities.                         | vi         |
| (POUO) Information Assurance.             | vi         |
| (FOUO) EMP and RF Threats.                | vii        |
| (U) PREFACE                               | viii       |
| (U) PREFACE                               |            |
| (U) TABLE OF CONTENTS                     | X          |
| (U) LIST OF TABLES                        |            |
|   |            |
| SECTION 1 (FOUO) INTRODUCTION             |            |
| 1.1 (FOUO) OVERVIEW                       | 1          |
| 1.2 (POLIO) THE THREAT TO FT DETRICK      |            |
| 1.3 (FOLIO) SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS        | 3          |
| 1.4 (FOUO) LOCAL POST CONCERNS            | 4          |
| SECTION 2 (FOUO) MAJOR FINDINGS           | 6          |
| 2.1 (FOUO) OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION        | 6          |
| 2.2 (FOLIO) POPULATION DYNAMICS           | U          |
| 2.3 (HOLIO) SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATIONS     | &          |
| 2.4 (FOLIO) STRUCTURAL PROTECTION         |            |
| 2.5 (FOLIO) PHYSICAL SECURITY             | .,.,       |
| 2.6 (FOLIO) COMMUNICATIONS                | [ ]        |
| 2.7 (FOUO) EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS         | l <i>L</i> |
| 2.8 (FOUO) FIRE PROTECTION AND PREVENTION | 13         |
| 2.9 (FOUO) UTILITIUS                      | 14         |
| 2.10 (FOUO) INFORMATION ASSURANCE.        | 15         |
| 2.11 (FOUO) EMP AND RF THREATS            |            |
| SECTION 3 (FOUO) CONCLUSION               |            |





#### (U) LIST OF TABLES

| Table   | Page |
|---|------|
| 1. (FOUO) Asset Vulnerabilities.                  | i    |
| 2. (FOUO) Assessment Team and Functional Areas.   | vii  |
| 3. (FOUO) Commands and Activities at Ft. Detrick. | 2    |
| 4. (FOUO) Ft. Detrick Population Centers.         |      |



# SECTION 1 (FOUO) INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 OVERVIEW.

This assessment considers the full spectrum of potential threats, and focuses on the survivability of the missions in each activity. Because of the large number of independent commands at Ft. Detrick, the survivability of each command's mission was considered independently.

Because of the large number of activities at Ft. Detrick, the Garrison Commander concurred that the assessment would concentrate on the major activities of the fort. These activities were divided into the three tiers shown in Table 3. An assessment of all Tier 1 activities was completed. Tier 2 was documented and the team believes that the findings for Tier 1 activities are applicable to Tier 2.

# Table 3. Commands and Activities at Ft. Detrick.

#### UNCLASSIFIED

#### TIER 1 ACTIVITIES

- TS Army Gamsak Emisteensy Charlener Fire and Security Service
- Frederick Cance Research and Development Center
- ... LLS Activ Melical Research Institute for Infectious Disease
- Arman horces Medical Intelligence ContemAPMIC
- TIS 1) Entrinent of Apricultures Horoten Disease Weed Science Research Unit

#### TIER 2 ACTIVITIES

- US Army Garrison (All other Activities)
- Army Medical Research and Material Command
- Army Center for Environmental Health Research
- USAF Medical Doctrine Development Center
- USAF War Medical Planning System Office
- 6<sup>th</sup> Theater Medical Material Management Center
- NAVSUPSYSCOM Det, Fleet Hospital Program Office
- Joint Medical Logistics Functional Development Center
- Naval Medical Logistics Office
- USAF Medical Logistics Office
- Defense Medical Standardization Board
- Army Medical Material Agency
- Army Medical Material Development Agency
- Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity
- Army Reserve Center
- Marine Corps Reserve Center

2



#### 1.2 THE THREAT TO FT, DETRICK.


In the team's opinion, the physical security of Ft. Detrick is seriously compromised by the "open" post concept. This concept allows uncentrolled access to the Post by individuals or groups and a lack of control over delivery trucks entering the Post. These factors make it easy to conduct a direct attack with ballistic weapons or to place a large amount of high explosive, biological agents, or chemical agents close to any desired target. As a result, it would be simple to seriously cripple or eliminate any of Ft. Detrick's missions.

The team considered a wide range of threats including terrorist attacks, accidents, technological failures, information attacks, and natural disasters. While the assessment primarily focused on preventing the disruption of each mission, the safety of personnel was also reviewed.

Prior to the recently completed Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA), Ft. Detrick personnel assembled a comprehensive threat analysis of the Ft. Detrick military community. This analysis, compiled with the assistance of local, state, and federal police agencies, was judged by the JSIVA team to be the best seen in over a year of Force Protection Assessments. The DSWA IVA team concurs in this finding.

The FL Detrick threat assessment found that the threat level posed by the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is high. In addition, a number of groups operating in the area such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), the National Alliance, the Mountaineers Militia, the Church of the Creator, and various transnational terrorist groups posed a medium threat level. Other groups were judged to pose low or negligible threat levels. The FBI considers the animal activist threat to medically related campuses and scientists as viable and cautions against advertising animal research. PETA has protested outside the main gate of Ft. Detrick and ALF has caused minor property damage in Washington County, Maryland. In other areas of the country and in Europe, these groups have carried out organized attacks against research facilities, commercial animal corporations and people. As a result, the assessment team believes it is likely that Ft. Detrick could become a target of PETA/ALF, resulting in potential animal release. In addition to maintaining the close relationships with law enforcement agencies, we suggest that web sites such as http://ampef.org and http://enviolink.org be monitored for potential animal activist activities.

### 1.3 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS.



.