## Exhibit A

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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
4	Plaintiff, ) No. 3:12-cr-659-MO-1
5	v. )
6	REAZ QADIR KHAN, ) September 11, 2014
7	Defendant. ) Portland, Oregon
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15	Oral Argument
16	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
17	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL W. MOSMAN
18	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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APPEARANCES FOR THE PLAINTIFF: Mr. Ethan D. Knight Mr. Charles F. Gorder, Jr. United States Attorney's Office 5 1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 Portland, OR 97204 9 FOR THE DEFENDANT: Ms. Amy M. Baggio Baggio Law 621 S.W. Morrison, Suite 1025 10 Portland, OR 97205 11 12 Mr. John S. Ransom Ransom Blackman, LLP 1001 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 1400 13 Portland, OR 97204 14 15 16 COURT REPORTER: Bonita J. Shumway, CSR, RMR, CRR United States District Courthouse 17 1000 S.W. Third Ave., Room 301 Portland, OR 97204 (503) 326-8188 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

## (PROCEEDINGS)

MR. KNIGHT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. We're present in the matter of United States v. Reaz Khan. This is Case No. 12-cr-00659. Ethan Knight and Charles Gorder appearing on behalf of the government. The defendant is present, out of custody, with counsel Jack Ransom and Amy Baggio. And we're present today, Your Honor, on two of defendant's motions: a motion to compel discovery and a motion to compel notice of search and seizure authority.

Your Honor, for the Court's information, I'll be handling argument related to the motion to compel discovery and Mr. Gorder will be handling argument relating to the motion to compel notice.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Let's start with the latter one. And so it's a defense motion. I've reviewed what both sides have submitted. Is there anything you wish to add to what you've submitted in writing on that motion?

MS. BAGGIO: Your Honor, I will be arguing the motion to compel notice of the search and seizure for the defense. And I want to make sure I understood that's the one you wanted to --

THE COURT: That's the one we're going to do first, yes.

MS. BAGGIO: Thank you, Your Honor.

Just briefly, Your Honor, I believe that it's important for us to start out with the facts to which -- or law on which the parties agree. And first and foremost, I believe that the parties agree that FISA does not change the Government's discovery obligations. The question then becomes what are the Government's discovery obligations.

And I believe the parties still agree that the Government's discovery obligations come down to Rule 12 and Rule 16 in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Brady v. Maryland, the Jencks Act, and then whatever is constitutionally required.

And it's that last piece, Your Honor, that I think that we would have to admit there is some gray area in terms of what is constitutionally required.

THE COURT: Can I interrupt for just a moment and maybe toss in a couple of the thoughts I have about it and see where that takes you in your argument.

So not only the parties agree, but I agree that those are the governing standards here. And it seems to me that part of why there is this agreement about what FISA does or doesn't require with the ability to challenge the searches and seizures that led to evidence -- which is really what we're talking about here -- is that at some level, FISA has to some degree dropped out of the picture if you are at that point. At some level the government has

declassified something and given it to the defense, and now the defense wants to challenge the legitimacy of the acquisition of the evidence. If they don't declassify something and you don't know about it, then we're not having that motion to suppress because you don't have it.

And so at that point, that's what you're talking about. You have received a number of materials. You want to challenge the legitimacy of the searches or seizures that led to them coming to you, and that is, once the step I've just described has taken place, that is largely governed by the best we can do duplicating what's done in a regular criminal case, with some, you know, caveats in place, I suppose.

So if I understand your position correctly, you have evidence that you want to -- you want to evaluate, at a minimum, whether you can move to suppress it, and you believe that you need to know more than you now know in order to do that, right?

MS. BAGGIO: That's correct.

THE COURT: And you have, if I understand this correctly from your pleadings and from the government's brief in response here, you have two kinds of evidence: you have evidence that's been declassified and come to you; and at least the government seems to suggest that you have figured out that some of the evidence came just through

standard criminal investigative procedures like, say, physical stakeouts or something like that.

Is that a fair description of what's gone on so far for you?

MS. BAGGIO: Yes, Your Honor, except I would add to the last point, we may know that a Rule 41 search warrant was used to obtain certain evidence but we might not know all of the evidence, the source of all the evidence on which the search warrant application was based. So, in that sense, while we may have some definitive answers as to some of the evidence, we still may not know where it originally came from.

THE COURT: Right. So the crux of your issue is that you have a pile of evidence that maybe is in two stacks, the two I've just described, and you may have some rough ideas, but you certainly aren't sure if you can identify by what authority any particular piece of evidence was acquired?

MS. BAGGIO: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And your contention is that there's nothing about FISA or related national security law that changes the fundamental equation that as to evidence that you assume is going to be used against you because it's been produced, you should have whatever -- you should have enough to file a meaningful motion to suppress.

MS. BAGGIO: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And the Government suggests, I think, two things about that. One is that you -- well, maybe three. One is that you sort of have a rough idea about this dividing line between what you've received that's been declassified and what you've received that just came through nonclassified channels originally. And I think I have your answer on that. Maybe a rough idea, but nothing very specific.

MS. BAGGIO: Correct.

THE COURT: So that's one thought.

The other I'm not sure I totally understand, and I'll ask the government more about this in a minute, but I want to see if it is accurate as far as you know.

The government suggests that in conversations with you -- and I'm now looking at page 5 of the government's response to your motion. I'm not sure I get this. I'm starting with you because you're the moving party and maybe you can help me here.

The government suggests that in conversations with you, something about those conversations has informed you that if you're going to challenge the authorities by which the declassified evidence came -- came to be seized, if we will, that that's going to be FISA Titles 1, 3 and 7.

Tell me more about that from your perspective.

MS. BAGGIO: Your Honor, from my perspective, informing us that they used Titles 1, 3 and 7 of FISA is insufficiently specific.

THE COURT: Let me just start with that. Is that what's happened? Is that what's happened, first of all?

Have you been informed that the sources you ought to be thinking about challenging are 1, 3 and 7?

MS. BAGGIO: By reading this memo, Your Honor. I don't recall specific other conversations, other than after this was filed, in talking with the government about what we wanted. But I have no more specific information than what appears here.

THE COURT: Let's assume that means what it says, and that that's the road you ought to take. Once again, just help me if this is where you are. It seems like you are in a position to challenge the overarching constitutionality of those authorities, right? You spoke last time we were together about how you might have to challenge the constitutionality of every possible acquisition authority there might be, and if this is a limitation that's meaningful, then as to just what I'll think of as systemic challenges to authorities, you can limit yourself and you can raise broad Constitution-based challenges to the legitimacy of those authorities. Is that fair?

MS. BAGGIO: We could raise facial challenges --

THE COURT: That's the word I was thinking of.

MS. BAGGIO: -- to those three titles.

However, the problem is that even within those titles, there are so many different ways of doing so many different things that it's our position that that's not sufficiently specific.

And the second problem that we have, Your Honor, is because of -- based on the discovery provided, it suggests that this investigation went on for years and years. We're not certain which versions of these titles were used.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. BAGGIO: And --

THE COURT: So you have some problems even making a facial challenge to those authorities.

And then the second thing the government says here is that -- I guess a suggestion that these are the relevant authorities, and that if you prevailed as to those authorities, it would be dispositive of the case. I guess that's a way of saying that these are the authorities that matter in this case.

And then, second, the suggestion that this -well, it's not even a suggestion, I guess. There's the idea
that this allows you to seek rulings against the government

on the constitutionality of or the government's compliance 2 with those provisions. 3 So I guess my first take was maybe yes as to the constitutionality of it, but my impression is that you don't 4 5 think or don't have what you would need to challenge the 6 government's compliance with any specific authority. 7 that fair? 8 MS. BAGGIO: That is fair, both as to as-applied 9 constitutional challenges, as well as any statutory 10 violations that might have taken place. 11 THE COURT: So whether the government sort of 12 followed the protocol set out in those authorities for 13 obtaining the evidence it got, you just don't know? 14 MS. BAGGIO: That's correct. 15 THE COURT: And you think the authorities you 16 cited to me in your briefing entitle you to know? MS. BAGGIO: That's correct. 17 THE COURT: And that's kind of the crux of this 18 19 issue, isn't it? 20 MS. BAGGIO: And may I add one other? 21 THE COURT: Absolutely. I didn't mean to -- I'm 22 just telling you what I thought your argument was, and now 23 you can help me with what I missed. 24 MS. BAGGIO: Thank you, Your Honor. One other point that really came out to me in the 25

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government's briefing is footnote 2 on page 4, in which they are saying they don't intend to rely on the authority of the Terrorist Surveillance Program authorization of use of military force or president's Article II power.

I understand from a driveby perspective it kind of supports what the Court just referred to on page 5 if we're just dealing with these three subchapters of FISA -- or titles of FISA. But one of the problems that I'm having with this, Your Honor, is it's unclear to me how the government is interpreting seizures and constitutionally significant events, because based on some of the publicly disclosed government surveillance practices, in combination with some of the government's statements, for instance, before the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, we have -- we're getting this information that the government may take the position that it could conduct a bulk surveillance of telephone metadata or Internet metadata or perhaps even Internet communications under EO 12333 or under the FISA Amendments Act, but in some of the different places in which the government has made statements about this, they've taken the position that, well, that initial seizure isn't really a seizure, and in fact it's only when it's later sorted and certain information is pulled out that that's a seizure.

In another context, the government has taken the

position that later searches of a collected vat of information, later searches of that even years later don't constitute constitutionally significant events.

So my concern with the government's representation is I'm not sure how they are reading search and seizure law to say the only thing at issue here are Titles 1, 3 and 7 of FISA. So that is an additional concern, again based on both the publicly available information and the discovery in this case, which although the orders -- the orders seem to have come about around 2009, based on the seized communications, the email communications go back to 2005. And so there becomes a question in our minds under what authority were those seized back in 2005.

Does that concern make sense, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.

MS. BAGGIO: And I think one of the other things that I -- that we agree -- and this seems like we're all consistent on this. On page 3 of its response, the government cites a Federal Rules Decision case to say that the government's obligations are satisfied when it has made disclosures that sufficiently allow defendants to make informed decisions whether to file one or more motions to suppress.

This is what we're struggling with, Your Honor.

And if we take away the FISA overlay for a moment and

consider this a regular criminal case -- and Mr. Khan is charged not with material support but with a complex financial fraud -- and imagine that the government gives me 40,000 pages of information and they say, okay, here's our evidence, here's your charge, and we use Title 18, Chapters 119 and 121. And I know by reading those chapters that that could have been a wiretap, that could have been ordered under the Stored Communications Act, that could have been the Congress's Assistance to Law Enforcement Act. There's all these different legal mechanisms within that larger umbrella.

Now, I understand the point that you made earlier, Your Honor, is they've narrowed that somewhat if we're going to hold them to Title 1, 3 and 7, but even within the Title 1, 3 and 7, there's so many different ways to do things that I submit I can't be effective and I can't evaluate whether or not -- make an informed choice about whether I should file a motion to suppress evidence when I'm not sure which mechanisms were used.

And then if we add the FISA overlay, Your Honor, back into it, another point I just wanted to highlight --

THE COURT: Let me pause you there for a moment.

I take seriously your argument that you don't feel that you had adequate information to know whether, or if the answer is yes, then how to file a facial challenge to the

authorities.

I guess I thought your more fundamental argument was -- Let me back up. So that's an argument that you've been given some information towards what you need but not enough.

I thought your more fundamental argument was the second one, which is I was under the impression you have essentially no information that would tell you whether the government complied with the methods set out for obtaining it or not. Am I wrong about that?

MS. BAGGIO: No, you are correct. That is correct.

THE COURT: The first argument is you've been given something but not enough; but isn't the second argument that you have, in terms of deciding whether to challenge evidence based on the government's compliance with the authorities, you wouldn't know the first thing about whether to file or when to file, would you?

MS. BAGGIO: That is true, but I also recognize that, as outlined in the government's response, there are mechanisms for that to happen in a special way in a FISA case, but I don't even know which sets of statutes or which subsections or which definitions to look at so that I can draw a road map for Your Honor to go through and look at them. That's the kind of narrowing that we're hoping for.

THE COURT: And then you said -- your analogy was to a complex financial fraud case, and then you said if you add the FISA overlay, then what?

MS. BAGGIO: Thank you, Your Honor.

If you add the FISA overlay, you have not only Rules 12, 16 and the federal constitutional requirements and considerations, but we also have the express statutory right for this defendant to challenge in this proceeding the lawfulness of the seizure and whether the seizure occurred in conformance with the application and order.

And, Your Honor, my position is that that statutory right to say that this is an unlawful seizure is more than us being able to do a driveby "the FISA statute is unconstitutional on its face." To interpret that statutory right under -- it's under 1806(e) for the electronic motions to suppress and 1825(f) for the physical searches. For that statutory right to have any meaning, then we need to be given sufficient information to be able to challenge it.

And it's our position, Your Honor, that only with more detailed disclosures, at a minimum, of the statutes, subsections and versions used, but also that it needs to be tied back to at least classes of evidence, because that way we can more fully understand the picture. I can make an informed decision about whether to file a motion to suppress and so that we can understand the exploitation analysis,

because so many of these investigative methods allow retroactive information to be produced that I can't even possibly know when things happened, whether an order was issued in 2005 to get email or whether that happened in 2012 and was able to retroactively get email.

And therefore, Your Honor, it's our position that not only does a regular criminal case require the type of notice requested in other pleadings, but FISA further recognizes the necessity of us being able to exercise that statutory right to move to suppress evidence.

THE COURT: Did you just say that you needed further identification of the authorities in order to do the exploitation analysis?

MS. BAGGIO: And tie it back to individual pieces of evidence.

THE COURT: I didn't know what you mean by those two words.

MS. BAGGIO: Yes, Your Honor.

Well, if, for instance, if we're looking at, for example, a search warrant application, and the search warrant application describes an investigation that took place in 2005, either to a certain investigative process in 2006 and 2007, and then I can know that if a bad search happened in 2006, that that would then have a domino effect, and I can make a Wong Sun fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree

argument as to the government exploited that illegality.

THE COURT: Seems to me that the derivative use would be by exploitation.

MS. BAGGIO: Yes, Your Honor. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: It's a perfectly good word, I just didn't know what you meant by it. I guess that makes it not a perfectly good word.

One last question, then. You -- let me just ask what position would you be in if there were no further or -- no more linkage of authorities to pieces of evidence but a more specific identification of authorities with regard to your facial challenge? Why would you be able to make a facial challenge if you knew exactly what authorities had been used without knowing precisely what pieces of evidence came from the use of those authorities?

MS. BAGGIO: So long as that disclosure included specific enough reference to a section or subsection, and the version, Your Honor, I think based on having that information, I could do a facial challenge. I may still be unable to conduct an as-applied challenge or to examine whether they complied with the statute.

THE COURT: I was just sticking with the facial challenge.

You could get there probably, and you might even have, depending on the nature of the disclosed specific

authority, you might even have a pretty good idea what evidence came from it?

MS. BAGGIO: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Gorder, let's start with this concept of what's needed to make an adequate facial challenge, and then we'll talk about what's needed to make an adequate specific or as-applied challenge to the government's compliance.

MR. GORDER: Very well, Your Honor.

You know, we are cognizant and understand the dilemma that defense counsel is in in cases like this. To use her analogy, if this was a fraud case and we gave them records that said it came from criminal wiretaps and search warrants, she would get the affidavits in support of the wiretap orders, the copies of the orders, and be able to, you know, basically figure out her probable cause argument, if she desired to make that.

That's not the situation that Congress set up with regard to FISA. The situation is kind of in the reverse.

So we have gone about as far as we can go with regard to classified techniques of acquiring foreign intelligence.

THE COURT: That's, I think, a little -- relevant to both points I'm interested in, runs more towards the as-applied challenge. So the idea, at least, that we're left with is that -- without putting words in your

opponent's mouth -- I think there's a sort of a minimum that is sought by way of identifying the actual authorities relied on in this case, such that just a challenge to the constitutionality of those authorities could be made. So I suppose that could be made today with the disclosures you've made.

Actually, let me back up a little bit. Am I reading your brief correctly that in some way the defense has been told which authorities they ought to think about challenging here, maybe informally?

MR. GORDER: Well, both formally and informally, Your Honor. The formal way was the notices that we filed with the Court, which indicates that the government intends to use evidence derived from FISA Title I and FISA Title II and FISA Title VII.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GORDER: And so basically you've got electronic surveillance under FISA, physical search under FISA, and the FISA Amendment Act changes that occurred in 2008.

And I think to make a general facial challenge to those statutes, they have what the FISA statute says -- or what Congress says is required to make those kinds of facial challenges. I mean --

THE COURT: There would have to be -- I mean,

there might be truly overarching arguments made to the FISA and the FISA Amendments Act in their entirety, but to challenge the specific methodologies authorized by either of those acts today, if Ms. Baggio wanted to do that, she'd have to challenge all of them contained in those three chapters or subsections, right?

MR. GORDER: Yes. But --

THE COURT: Why is that better than the only way permitted under law, more detailed identification of what was relied on here?

MR. GORDER: Well, I'm not sure I understand what more detail the defense would need to make the facial argument. I mean, the electronic --

THE COURT: They know there was an electronic surveillance but they don't know what kind of electronic surveillance.

MR. GORDER: Right. But the statute that authorizes it, all electronic surveillance is the same. If you want to make a constitutional challenge to the government's ability to do FISA electronic surveillance, you look at Title 1 of FISA. I mean, the statute doesn't make a difference between different kinds of electronic surveillance.

THE COURT: I suppose the idea is that some methods of engaging in electronic surveillance are on weaker

constitutional footing than others. Maybe going after stored emails is weaker in some way -- I haven't thought about this, but weaker in some way than going after something else, so the idea being you might not have just one generic constitutional argument. You might have better ones for some methods and weaker ones for other.

MR. GORDER: Well, I think, Your Honor -- and again, I don't intend to say that this is an easy task, but that is what FISA requires.

THE COURT: Well, that's your position, is that more detailed identification than what you've done so far is beyond what Congress contemplated by way of notice?

MR. GORDER: Correct.

THE COURT: And what's your authority for that, the authority that would say that identifying not just the overarching authority but the specific methodologies used is not permitted here?

MR. GORDER: Well, I think, Your Honor, the authority that we have are the cases that upheld the in-camera ex parte process that is used to challenge FISA and to get into the as-applied analysis in any particular case.

Second, as we mentioned in our brief, I mean,

Congress did require more specific notices in certain cases

but not in the overall just general electronic surveillance

area or physical search area, but they did make an exception for certain kinds of notice in certain circumstances. So --

THE COURT: All right. Let's turn, then, to the idea that -- I guess only -- again, I'm not trying to make you say something you didn't say, but sort of hinted at in your brief is the idea that a person ought to be able to challenge not only the constitutionality of searches but the government's compliance with the authorities that allow for those searches.

Sitting here today, does Ms. Baggio have what she needs to challenge the government's compliance? Your analogy to financial fraud was she would be able to know whether there was PC to challenge it.

MR. GORDER: The answer to that question is no, she does not. The applications that went to the FISA board are classified, she does not have access to those, and the process that Congress has set up and that the courts have upheld as constitutional is should she file a motion to suppress, which she undoubtedly will next Monday, Your Honor, we will be preparing an exparte in-camera classified brief for you to examine that establishes, in our position, that the applications were proper, that the court orders were authorized by law, and that the government complied with the requirements of the various orders.

The procedure that Congress has set up and that

the Courts have upheld is that you will examine those yourself in camera, and only if you find it necessary to bring Ms. Baggio into the equation to make a decision, which you -- you know, we don't think you will need in this case, as hasn't happened in any other FISA case to date.

But that is the way that the as-applied and compliance mechanism is examined by the courts in this case, because the details of FISA surveillance -- physical search, et cetera -- are classified. We're not allowed to publicly discuss what the target of a FISA is, the details of the time period, court orders and that sort of thing. So that's just the way Congress has set it up, and the courts to date have upheld it as an appropriate way to balance the national security issues that are contained in FISA applications and orders and the criminal process that, you know, we're engaged in today.

THE COURT: So if I agreed with you, then going forward, what would happen is that for facial challenges, Ms. Baggio would be able to make a very sort of programmatic or overarching challenge to the constitutionality of FISA and the FAA, at a minimum, and to the degree that she thought she had particular arguments that got at some but not all of the methodologies used, she'd have to just make all of those arguments, not being sure that those methodologies were used in this case, challenge the

constitutionality of them.

And then as to the idea that the government failed to follow or failed to comply with the requirements for using those authorities without knowing one way or the other whether that was the case or not, or even if she had a good argument or not, she'd just have to move to suppress for failure, for example, failure of the government to show PC to the FISC, and you'd respond ex parte in camera?

MR. GORDER: That's correct, Your Honor.

And she could certainly use whatever discovery she has to date to supplement those arguments. I mean, I have seen in my own cases defense counsel take the discovery, and based on discovery make an argument that their client couldn't have been found to be an agent of a foreign power, for example, or somebody else couldn't have been found to be an agent of a foreign power.

But, again, we're cognizant of the difficulty that she is in in trying to make those arguments because she doesn't have the supporting documents, but that's just the process that's been set up by Congress and has been found constitutional.

THE COURT: And then if I could refer to page 4 for just a moment of your brief, I think you're asserting or at least suggesting that enough discovery has been given that the defense either can or has figured out which pieces

of evidence it's received have just come from non-FISA 2 means. Is that right? 3 MR. GORDER: Well --THE COURT: I'm not sure I understood what you 4 5 were saying there. 6 MR. GORDER: I think what we had said was they 7 have enough information to make a determination, 8 particularly given the notice that we have provided as to 9 what parts of FISA are important to litigate in this case, 10 and in a general sense can figure out most of the time, for 11 example, an audio call that was recorded, where it came 12 from. 13 THE COURT: What do you mean by saying that they 14 have -- leaving FISA aside, they have successfully divined 15 from discovery that evidence may also have been collected 16 pursuant to grand jury, physical surveillance, witness 17 interviews, border searches? 18 MR. GORDER: Right. I was referencing the chart 19 that Ms. Baggio has in her pleading where she goes through a 20 number of those items. And then obviously, you know, an FBI 302, for 21 22 example --23 THE COURT: Of a witness interview? MR. GORDER: -- of a witness interview makes it 24 25 clear that it was a witness interview.

THE COURT: So FISA just wouldn't apply and she could challenge it by any of the standard methods that were available?

MR. GORDER: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Ms. Baggio.

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MS. BAGGIO: Thank you, Your Honor.

Three quick points in rebuttal. First of all, the government has said that we can challenge the statute's constitutionality by just looking at the statute, and if it's an electronic seizure, we challenge the FISA statute for electronic seizure.

I'm trying, and it's really, really difficult, If we start with a good definitional section --Your Honor. for example, Mr. Gorder raised the example of, well, some attorney tried to argue whether or not his client could have been an agent of a foreign power. I think there are about ten different definitions of how somebody can be an agent of There are seven different definitions of a foreign power. how a person can actually be a foreign power directly. And I'm not even sure where we fit into any of these pieces. So even when I was preparing for argument, I was trying to do a visual of how all these ways could fit together, one piece of evidence, all the different ways by which the government might have obtained it, and I couldn't do it, it was just so

complicated.

So if we look at just, for example, the chapter on electronic surveillance, there is a whole statutory scheme if the electronic surveillance is seized without an order. There's a whole different statutory scheme if the electronic surveillance is obtained pursuant to an order. So even just narrowing by half, it would be of great assistance to the defense, but we still have the problem of so many definitions that come into play, and again, the problem of different versions being in effect at different times.

The same thing applies to the physical searches chapter, where they have a whole section that explains how physical searches can be done by presidential authorization and all the complicated processes associated with that versus how it can happen pursuant to a court order.

So that is what we're struggling with here, Your Honor, and I believe therefore that simple references to Title 1, 3 and 7 is insufficient.

The government also mentioned, well, there is an audio call, so clearly it's obtained by FISA. Well, we don't know if it's FISA or if it's the FISA Amendments Act.

And so those types of pieces of information will allow me to do my job but also to be able to focus the Court's attention on the different pieces of FISA that are relevant and not waste anybody's time on what's not

relevant.

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The last point that I just wanted to mention, Your Honor, is the government does make the argument that other parts of FISA require more specific disclosures. And I would like to just respond to that by saying if we look at each of those other FISA provisions that require more specific notice of an application, of a date of an order or of the information obtained I think are some of the things that those more specific notice provisions require, all of those involve people who aren't charged with anything. And I think that is absolutely the difference here, that Congress looked at someone who is charged in a criminal case, and when they're charged in a criminal case, the notice provisions come into play, the statutory right to move to suppress moves into play, as do the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the constitutional protections. of that applies in the examples cited by the government.

THE COURT: One of Mr. Gorder's arguments is that we're not writing on a blank slate here; that the Ninth Circuit, at a minimum, and other courts have spoken on what's allowed and not allowed. To what degree do you view what you're asking for as either open or foreclosed by Ninth Circuit authority? In other words, is there any theory under which your argument is simply suggesting that existing authorities have it wrong and I ought to reconsider versus

just open field where no authority prohibits what you're asking for?

MS. BAGGIO: I believe we're in the latter category, Your Honor, not the former. I'm aware of no one in any other case that has made this type of request, not for access to the applications and orders or challenging that process set out in FISA. This is different, Your Honor. We're asking just for more specific notice of the authorities that were used and the versions. We are also asking for it to be tied to at least classes of evidence. I'm not asking to read the application, I'm not asking to look at the order. I just want the universe of possibilities to be reduced dramatically to just the ones that are relevant to this case.

THE COURT: All right. And so I think I understand your position on challenging compliance, that you can do a better job of it if you -- if the field is narrowed somewhat for the authorities that had to be complied with. But you're not asking today for the underlying documents in order to see whether the affiant stated probable cause to the FISC?

MS. BAGGIO: Precisely, Your Honor. And if we know that we're in the section that allows recording of a phone call without a court order, then I would be setting out for the Court these are the processes, now that I know

we're in this one and not the court-ordered section of FISA.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. BAGGIO: Thank you.

THE COURT: Let's turn to the other motion. And I guess, then, Mr. Knight and Mr. Ransom, you're handling those; is that right?

MR. RANSOM: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So once again I've reviewed what you submitted and you've had a chance now to review the government's response. Anything you wish to add to what you said in writing?

MR. RANSOM: Yes.

In regard to the statements of the defendant, Your Honor, the government's position is it has provided all statements that are relevant and material. It is our position that the government has not.

I'd like to reference the emails themselves which have been obtained through either FISA or the FISA amendment. We assume there are a significant cache of documents that are held, the metadata, and that these are reviewed pursuant to keywords that are provided. Let's say in this case the keywords are "Reaz Khan," and of those, a thousand documents appear.

And then there is a filter, and in the first filter -- and this is all supposition based on what I have