I’ll be livetweeting the Oversight Hearing on the Benghazi attack.

Elijah Cummings, in his opening statement, laid into Darrell Issa for his partisan treatment of this investigation. He revealed, among other things, that the Committee didn’t share documents with Democrats. (Cummings and Issa had a bit of a squabble over whether this violated House rules or not, but Issa did not rebut Cummings’ claim they had not shared the documents.)

That’s curious, because somehow Eli Lake was getting those documents. Why do you suppose that is?

In his own opening statement, Romney surrogate Jason Chaffetz complained he wasn’t invited to a State Department press briefing last night.

The other day, I wondered whether using three C-130s to bring a team of FBI Agents to Benghazi was overkill. And while I was able to get some kind of explanation (1 transport, 1 decoy, 1 to bring the toys), given this report on all the Special Forces C-130s swarming out of Crete…

In the last weeks, an unsual, covert, constant activity of U.S. Special Operations planes has been recorded in the Mediterranean Sea. Quite regularly, taking off from Souda Bay, in Crete, various types of “Special Hercules”, including  MC-130Ps, MC-130Hs, HC-130P, and AC-130U gunships, performed day and night missions in the Libyan airspace whose purpose has yet to be fully unveiled.

As well as very vague reports that the Special Forces were not just protection–but were “helping gather intel”–in Benghazi, I’m not so sure.

Special Forces were always likely to help investigate this killing, but it appears there’s some kind of funky hybrid going on, the latest iteration of partnership between our National Security agencies in the war on terror.

And today, John Brennan headed to Libya to meet with Mohammed Magarief, who has been trying to consolidate national power even while the Prime Minister elect was ousted in a failure to form an acceptable government.

It’s against that background that this WaPo piece offers some key insight.

Before I get into it, I’m using “Obama Doctrine” as David Sanger did in his book. I think it’s a bogus term, but it’s the evolution in policy Sanger described as Obama moved away from CounterIntelligence in Afghanistan, to Counterterrorism, to a belief that partners and locals could carry out the fighting in Libya and elsewhere. The problem with that plan, I’ve always believed, is it offers no better solutions and some worse problems in how you establish the security and institution-building that countries need to have viable economies and legal systems. You’re still faced with the whole failed state problem.

In addition to general Islamist sentiment, Ambassador Steves’ assassination happened in an environment where the government was trying to nurture regime change and nation reformation without the military footprint we had in Afghanistan and Iraq. While Stevens appears to have had real security concerns, he also apparently pushed to have an open presence and to encourage capacity building in Libyans. Arguably, that’s part of what got him killed.

The WaPo catches us up to what kind of dilemmas that presents now as we try to find the best way to respond.

Should it rely on the FBI, treating the assaults on the two U.S. compounds like a regular crime for prosecution in U.S. courts? Can it depend on the dysfunctional Libyan government to take action? Or should it embrace a military option by ordering a drone strike — or sending more prisoners to Guantanamo Bay?

[snip]

All of the options available to the United States could have lasting consequences in Libya, where a transitional government is plagued by infighting and elected leaders have been unable to assume the full reins of power.

Even the basic issue of allowing the FBI to access the crime scene at the U.S. mission in Benghazi for less than a day last Thursday was politically sensitive for Libyans, a Foreign Ministry official said.

“There is very strong public opinion about the Americans coming here and running the investigation,” said Saad el-Shlmani, a ministry spokesman. Some top officials, he added, see the country’s sovereignty at stake.

But deferring to Libya’s fragile justice system — still warped after 42 years of undemocratic rule by Moammar Gaddafi — hardly presents an attractive choice for the administration.

Given how successfully (to the detriment of our civilian legal system) the Administration has been able to introduce limited amounts of intelligence as evidence, while hiding vast swaths of it, I suspect if they take custody of anyone, they will try them in a civilian court.

All that said, I’d like to return to a parallel I made before: to the investigation following the USS Cole bombing in Yemen.

In that case, we had good FBI Agents (including Ali Soufan) on the ground. While they were stymied by State’s desire not to push Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government too far, they were able to develop a sound picture–and admissible evidence–of the perpetrators in the attack. We let Yemen try several of them, which led to their escape from jail.

And yet, after 11 years of coddling Saleh partially in hopes it might make Yemen a move viable country, all while Saleh was playing a double game with us, using al Qaeda to create the need for additional arms, we finally gave up and replaced Saleh; I suspect there’s damning intelligence in a file somewhere showing he had much closer ties to the extremists who attacked us, but that’ll never see the light of day because Americans can’t know that we were basically equipping someone with actionable ties to AQAP.

We tried not to push Saleh too hard in 2000, but that didn’t prevent Saleh from using the extremists in his country to try to prop up his own personal power, without an associated increase in the viability of the Yemeni state.

And meanwhile, 10 years after his capture, 2 waterboardings, 1 mock execution, and other torture later, Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri still has not been tried for his role in the attack. We’ve proven just as incapable as the Yemenis of bringing to justice the men who attacked the USS Cole.

This is part of the reason why Obama has embraced drones, but as the WaPo points out, drone retaliation in Libya could have a particularly toxic effect there.

Some Libyans remember the 1986 airstrikes on Tripoli ordered by President Ronald Reagan in response to suspicions that Libya was responsible for the bombing of a West Berlin disco that killed two U.S. service members and injured 79 others.

“For Libya [drone strikes] would be a disaster. Libya is in a very fragile place,” said Shlmani, the Foreign Ministry spokesman. “Any unilateral action by any country, but especially by the United States, would really be damaging.”

Presumably, John Brennan was cooking up some kind of response today, presumably, one mapped out with the election in mind.

This kind of problem was predictable when the US intervened to overthrow Moammar Qaddafi, so a part of me thinks the Administration got its just deserts for intervening without stronger legal and military justification. But at this point the stakes are so high, I still hope (but doubt, particularly given election pressures) they get the careful balance going forward.

You can’t necessarily fault Eli Lake for the title the Daily Beast gave his latest entry in his efforts to help Romney surrogate Jason Chaffetz turn the Benghazi attack into Obama’s Jimmy Carter: “Exclusive: Libya Cable Detailed Threats.” Who knows whether he or his editor came up with it.

But you can fault those who keep pointing to the title as if the title reflects what the article itself says.

What Lake does is take a very routine diplomatic report–titled “Benghazi Weekly Report”–and spin it as proof of instability in Benghazi. It’s not until the 6th paragraph when Lake reports that,

The cable, titled “Benghazi Weekly Report – September 11, 2012,” notes the dangerous environment in eastern Libya. It does not, however, make a specific plea to Washington for more personnel or more security upgrades, and concludes that much of the violence in the country consists of Libyans attacking other Libyans, as opposed to specific plots directed at the West. Indeed, it says that in a meeting with Stevens, members of the Benghazi Local Council said security in their city was improving. [my emphasis]

Perhaps the title should have been, “Consulate reported that security in Benghazi was improving”?

What Lake uses to suggest that the Consulate should have had more security is a passage that pertains to two militia heads leveraging their claimed power.

Here’s what Lake says the cable said,

The cable, reviewed by The Daily Beast, recounts how the two militia leaders, Wissam bin Ahmed and Muhammad al-Gharabi, accused the United States of supporting Mahmoud Jibril, the head of the Libyan transitional government, to be the country’s first elected prime minister. Jibril’s centrist National Forces Alliance won the popular vote in Libyan elections in July, but he lost the prime minister vote in the country’s Parliament on Sept. 12 by 94 to 92. Had he won, bin Ahmed and al-Gharabi warned they “would not continue to guarantee security in Benghazi, a critical function they asserted they were currently providing,” the cable reads. [my emphasis]

Note that the cable itself–which was approved by Ambassador Chris Stevens–expresses some skepticism that bin Ahmed and al-Gharabi really were providing the critical security in Benghazi.

Lake, however, asserts not just that they did provide security, but that they were “responsible” for doing so, in his lead.

Just two days before the 9/11 anniversary attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, two leaders of the Libyan militias responsible for keeping order in the city threatened to withdraw their men.

As seems to be the case with Lake’s exclusives, this detail is actually incredibly important, but not for the reasons he states. He doesn’t identify the militas here, but al-Gharabi headed Rafallah al-Sehati until he was made to step down in the weeks after the attack. As the WaPo reported last week, Rafallah al-Sehati got pulled into rapid response the night of the attack, and the Americans were hesitant to trust them.

But a second militia, Rafallah al-Sehati, that had not previously been involved in guarding the Americans, was also asked to provide assistance that night, a spokesman for the militia said. The group has been backed by the Libyan government and provides security in Benghazi, which has aminimally developed police force. But one of its leaders has described himself as a “jihadist,” and Rafallah al-Sehati officials said that weapons capable of taking down airplanes were stolen when their compound was overrun by protesters last month.

Jamal Aboshala, a spokesman for Rafallah al-Sehati, said the request came at 3 a.m. local time from Fawzi Bukhatif, the commander of the 17th February militia. He said that American officials had initially declined an offer of help, and were later reluctant to share with militia members the precise location of an annex to which they had retreated.

And as I noted in response, Rafallah al-Sehati seemed to be trying to stall the American investigation of the attack by claiming Benghazi was too insecure for the FBI.

Now, the fact that the Consulate had to rely on Rafallah al-Sehati the night of the attack, just two days after they threatened to destabilize Benghazi for political retaliation, seems terribly important to the investigation. But it raises as many questions about what role Rafallah al-Sehati itself had in the attack, in addition to security preparations that had us relying on them when it mattered most.

Ah well. It’s still a neat article. Readers of it will learn such interesting details as that the Benghazi attack, with its 4 dead, was “the worst assault on a U.S. diplomatic mission since the 1979 hostage crisis in Iran,” making the attack worse, according to Lake, than the 1983 Lebanon attack that killed 63 or the 1998 attacks in Tanzania and Kenya that, between them, killed 223.

Or maybe Lake is just hewing so closely to the script he’s been given he doesn’t see how absurd his assertions are?

Apparently, Jason Chaffetz would have you believe that Libya is so dangerous it requires we take a full-time military stance. But not so dangerous he can’t do a quick political stunt “fact” “finding” trip to Libya with little warning. Predictably, Chaffetz’ extensive investigation onsite in Libya discovered that politics was dictating security.

“Rather than letting security dictate security, they let politics dictate security,” Chaffetz told Fox News.

Predictably, all this happened not just in time for Wednesday’s Chaffetz hearing on the attack, but more importantly in time for Mitt’s big foreign policy speech today, in which he will say,

The attack on our Consulate in Benghazi on September 11th, 2012 was likely the work of the same forces that attacked our homeland on September 11th, 2001.

Imagine what Commander in Chief Mitt Romney would do with the 2001 AUMF if all he needs to determine that the people who attacked the Consulate are “the same forces” that attacked the World Trade Center is to send a campaign surrogate to the Tripoli airport for a few hours.

Speaking of which. I look forward to all the journalists treating Chaffetz’ “fact” “finding” trip as a serious pursuit to ask whether tax payers will be paying for what was clearly designed to serve Mitt Romney’s campaign.

Two more updates in the continuing effort to make Benghazi into Obama’s Jimmy Carter.

Jake Tapper offers up an email showing the State Department’s Under Secretary for Management denying a request on May 3 that the Libyan Security Support Team continue to have access to a Department DC-3.

The U.S. government official who provided the email to ABC News – and wanted to remain anonymous because of  the sensitivity of the matter – described the small DC-3 plane as an asset for a security team to more freely and safely move throughout the country, and to more easily transport arms and other security equipment. In short, having the plane allowed the security team to better perform its duties, the official said.

The State Department official acknowledged that the plane was used to get around Libya, not just to get in and out of the country. But once commercial air service was re-established, the State Department decided that the SST didn’t need the plane anymore. The security team, it would seem, disagreed.

At one level, plane transportation was an issue the night of the attack. As the WSJ described last month, an American security team appears to have gotten to Benghazi in time to help repel the most aggressive attack against the annex. But when all the Americans were taken to the airport for transport to Tripoli, they didn’t fit on that plane.

A plane with an American security team from Tripoli arrived in Benghazi about 1:30 a.m., according to the Libyan account. The team found its way to the annex using global positioning devices. Libyans who accompanied the Americans to the scene weren’t told of the annex’s location because of its connection to sensitive programs, and the Americans didn’t give them the GPS coordinates or address. Libyans at an emergency operation center in Benghazi were also kept in the dark to the exact location.

As the U.S. and Libyan reinforcement team arrived from the airport, fighting broke out at the annex.

That assault, using rocket-propelled grenades and mortars, was described in U.S. and Libyan accounts as more sophisticated than the earlier attack on the consulate, and it appeared to involve militants with possible links to al Qaeda.

The Libyans led a convoy of roughly 30 Americans from the safe house to the airport, where a plane had been waiting. But they quickly realized the plane was too small to evacuate everyone at once.

“We were surprised at the numbers of Americans who were at the airport,” said Libyan Deputy Prime Minister Mustafa Abushagour. “We figured three or four people. No one told us the numbers ahead of time.”

The issue here, however, appears to stem from US efforts to keep their spooks off the books, not from any lack of transport itself. (Depending on configuration, a DC-3 might or might not have been big enough for all the unanticipated Americans.)

Furthermore, this issue seems to be more about the relative outfitting of State and DOD, a problem that has been well known to lay people since Dana Priest wrote in the Mission in 2003. Sure Special Forces teams are going to want more equipment. They’re used to it. But State has far less equipment than DOD. It may or may not have been the appropriate decision, but it is a decision that stems in part from the funding sources Congress–people like Paul Ryan–approve.

I’m far more interested in the other new development, the WaPo’s report that the Libyan inclusion of a second militia, in addition to the more trusted February 17th Brigade, for Quick Reaction Force response.

A soot-soaked copy of a memorandum found in the looted security office shows that as late as Sept. 9, American security officials were working to “clarify the work requirements and expectations” of the 17th February Martyrs Brigade, the militia that had been tasked with securing the Americans since they established the mission in 2011.

The document, cast as a request, specified that in case of an attack the guards “will request additional support” from their militia’s nearby base. The guards did so during the Sept. 11 attack, according to Libyan security officials, guards who were present from the beginning and other members of the 17th February militia who were summoned within minutes.

But a second militia, Rafallah al-Sehati, that had not previously been involved in guarding the Americans, was also asked to provide assistance that night, a spokesman for the militia said. The group has been backed by the Libyan government and provides security in Benghazi, which has aminimally developed police force. But one of its leaders has described himself as a “jihadist,” and Rafallah al-Sehati officials said that weapons capable of taking down airplanes were stolen when their compound was overrun by protesters last month.

Jamal Aboshala, a spokesman for Rafallah al-Sehati, said the request came at 3 a.m. local time from Fawzi Bukhatif, the commander of the 17th February militia. He said that American officials had initially declined an offer of help, and were later reluctant to share with militia members the precise location of an annex to which they had retreated.

Now, I’m interested in this for two slightly different reasons than the WaPo, which sees this as the contingency plan–which they admit was being actively discussed in the days before the attack–going awry. It appears, rather, to reflect the changing nature of the security plan, not the failure to adhere to a fixed plan.

But I do think the involvement of the Rafallah al-Sehati to be noteworthy. After all, the annex location was compromised. So we know the Americans were hesitant to share the annex location with Rafallah al-Sehati, and we know that someone compromised the location. (It’s likely, too, that solely the unexpected nature of the attack–a multi-prong assault rather than an IED–necessitated the call for more militia.)

Also, note the comment WaPo included in Wednesday’s article from a Rafallah al-Sehati figure.

“We don’t have institutions,” said Col. Salah bin Omran, the newly appointed military head of Rafallah al-Sahati, a government-backed militia that is one of the main groups providing security in Benghazi. “The security for normal people is fine. But I don’t know. If the Americans come, I’m not sure they’ll be completely safe.”

The comment bugged me when I reviewed all the ways security was used as an excuse to cover Libyan stalling on cooperation in the attack. And I find it more interesting now, particularly since Benghazi locals are saying the Americans were wrong not to trust Rafallah al-Sahati.

Within days before the Libyan government approved the US trip to Benghazi–pointedly carried out without relying on militias for security–the military head of the militia State found itself unexpectedly relying on was questioning whether it could keep Americans safe.

Two updates to the Benghazi attack story I’ve become obsessed with.

Multiple reports say the FBI has finally visited the attack site in Benghazi. The AP reports they were only onsite (the assumption being the sites include the consulate, the safe house, and presumably another safe house location) for about 12 hours.

Agents arrived in Benghazi before dawn on Thursday and departed after sunset, after weeks of waiting for access to the crime scene to investigate the Sept. 11 attack.

The agents and several dozen U.S. special operations forces were there for about 12 hours, said a senior Defense Department official who spoke anonymously because he was not authorized to speak publicly about the ongoing investigation. The FBI agents went to “all the relevant locations” in the city, FBI spokeswoman Kathy Wright said. The FBI would not say what, if anything, they found.

The FBI visit comes less than 24 hours after the WaPo visit on Wednesday when they discovered a bunch of documents.

More than three weeks after attacks in this city killed the U.S. ambassador to Libya and three other Americans, sensitive documents remained only loosely secured in the wreckage of the U.S. mission on Wednesday, offering visitors easy access to delicate information about American operations in Libya.

At first, I wondered whether this was a response to the WaPo’s apparent ease of access to the compound–that may have added urgency. But the AP story suggests that the FBI asked for military transport to Benghazi several days before the trip–so Tuesday at the latest.

Little said it was “a matter of days” between the request for the FBI to access the Benghazi crime scene and the team’s arrival Thursday, Libya time, when the U.S. military airlifted them to the city.

The request to the Pentagon to transport the FBI to Benghazi came several days ago and it took a few days to get authorization from the Libyan government and to make other necessary arrangements to get the team there, the senior Defense Department official said.

U.S. officials also suggested that there may have been some disagreement between the State Department and the FBI over whether or not the FBI team would use Libyan security or seek approval for the U.S. military to handle the mission. The U.S. Army Delta Force troops flew into Benghazi with the FBI team on three C-130 transport aircraft.

Three C-130 transport aircraft? This is our idea of a light footprint? What did we lug away with us when we left? (The NYT said there was just one, and suggested the transport planes had also brought armored vehicles for the drive to the compound.)

I’m also interested in the account of disagreement over whether to use Libyan security forces or not (particularly given the quote from a top militia leader in the WaPo saying Benghazi was still too dangerous for Americans), an account McClatchy examines too. To some degree, it seems like the same policy of letting the Libyans take control that Ambassador Stevens reportedly espoused. But it does seem that part of the delay came from waiting for Libyans to provide security for the trip, at which point State finally gave up and let FBI ask DOD to provide their 3 C-130s of security.

Assuming the FBI first asked DOD for transport on Tuesday, it would put it on the same day that Libya’s Deputy Foreign Minister still had not committed to such cooperation, even while suggesting it was imminent.

Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed Abdel Aziz said the prosecutor general had given only verbal approval for a joint investigation.

“We are getting ready for the FBI team to go to Benghazi and meet with our team and start joint investigations together and also visit the site,” he said.

“The FBI team is now in Tripoli. There are others who will come maybe soon to join the team … Hopefully in the coming days we will reach an agreement as to how the (U.S.) team will work with the Libyan team … We are now in the context of (awaiting) written permission.”

And on the same day Libya’s President said publicly the FBI could participate in Libya’s investigation.

Speaking to Arabic daily al-Hayat, Libyan President Mohammed el-Megarif said Tuesday the FBI can participate in Libya’s investigation. He suggested the slowness of the process wasn’t only Libya’s fault. The FBI says its agents in Libya can’t reach Benghazi because it’s dangerous.

So just two days ago, perhaps the same day the FBI asked the DOD to fly them over to Benghazi, el-Megarif seems to give permission for the FBI to join Libya’s investigation, even while he says FBI security was also driving the delay. And it takes a few days to arrange for permission to access the site, and in the interim period the WaPo gets access themselves. In other words, it at least seems–though State appears to want to avoid saying–that Libya caused part if not most of the delay. And remember, after the first week of the delay, Libya’s Deputy Interior Minister, Wanis al Sharif, who had been leading the investigation, got fired (though he wasn’t fired until September 16), partly for the overall security problems in Benghazi, partly for delays in responding to this attack. Along the way, though, Sharif was alone among Libyans in tying the attack to a protest.

Now consider this detail, also from the WaPo, suggesting the State Department may have expected the Libyan government to secure the compound.

No government-provided security forces are guarding the compound, and Libyan investigators have visited just once, according to a member of the family who owns the compound and who allowed the journalists to enter Wednesday.

[snip]

“Securing the site has obviously been a challenge,” Mark Toner, deputy spokesman at the State Department, said in response to questions about conditions at the Benghazi compound. “We had to evacuate all U.S. government personnel the night of the attack.  After the attack, we requested help securing the site, and we continue to work with the Libyan government on this front.” [my emphasis]

In her briefing today (which started at 12:47, so probably when the FBI was still onsite in Benghazi), spokesperson Victoria Nuland said State had had challenges securing the site 6 different times. State asked Libya to secure the compound. But it has been left open for people to come and go.

As you know, I’ve got questions about the provenance of the documents CNN (Chris Stevens’ journal) and WaPo found and this security arrangement–or lack thereof–is a big part of that. Recall the first report that documents had been taken from the compound and the safe house.

Sensitive documents have gone missing from the consulate in Benghazi and the supposedly secret location of the “safe house” in the city, where the staff had retreated, came under sustained mortar attack. Other such refuges across the country are no longer deemed “safe”.

Some of the missing papers from the consulate are said to list names of Libyans who are working with Americans, putting them potentially at risk from extremist groups, while some of the other documents are said to relate to oil contracts.

As a threshold matter, documents listing “names of Libyans who are working with Americans” isn’t that far different from documents–described by WaPo–providing extensive detail on the Libyan contractors working for the Americans (though I suspect the earlier reported document includes sources). And the Chris Stevens’ itinerary includes details of his meetings with the Arabian Gulf Oil Company, though I expect the documents taken away provided even more details. But these documents weren’t that far off what WaPo found at the site yesterday.

Yet today Nuland assured reporters “we don’t have any reason to believe that classified material were compromised,” even while avoiding saying more about what happened the night of the attack.

All of which seems to suggest the documents described in the Independent were sensitive but not classified documents, whereas the CIA knows they took or destroyed everything when they evacuated (the evacuation plan–included among the documents WaPo found–says to gather and remove or destroy the documents).

In other words, the documents reporters keep finding are similar to the kind of documents that got taken from the compound after the attack.

Those kind of documents can be useful in telling certain kinds of stories.

In any case, the entire saga says two things: we’re not (or weren’t) getting complete cooperation from Libya–and there may have been people predisposed to not finding the killers. The investigation so far is reminiscent of the one in the USS Cole, in which both the US and our host country had reasons not to press the investigation too quickly, both out of sensitivity for the relationship and, perhaps, out of fear for what we’d find.

And then one other detail: Turkey arrested 2 Tunisians yesterday trying to fly into Istanbul with fake passports. The arrest is going to introduce all sorts of legal squeamishness into things: do they get extradited to the US, which will lead Republicans to insist they be sent to Gitmo, or are they sent to Libya, where we’re having all these difficulties? But also, the apparent involvement of Tunisians in the Benghazi attack would seem to suggest wider involvement in the attack.  Finally, I find the timing rather curious: while Bloomberg doesn’t say they flew directly from Libya or anywhere close, it seems a remarkable coinkydink they were arrested on the day the Libyans finally started fully cooperating with this investigation.

I’m working on a post on the Blue Mountain Group Libyan contractors’ role in the Benghazi attack. But first, I want to point out a detail pertaining to the security provided by the February 17th Brigade–the militia that provided armed patrols outside of the Benghazi consulate.

In its report on the documents it found at the consulate the other day, the WaPo suggested one of the documents anticipated an attack.

At least one document found amid the clutter indicates that Americans at the mission were discussing the possibility of an attack in early September, just two days before the assault took place. The document is a memorandum dated Sept. 9 from the U.S. mission’s security office to the 17th February Martyrs Brigade, the Libyan-government-sanctioned militia that was guarding the compound, making plans for a “quick reaction force,” or QRF, that would provide security.

“In the event of an attack on the U.S. Mission,” the document states, “QRF will request additional support from the 17th February Martyrs Brigade.”

This appears to overstate the document somewhat. While it is clear that a September 9 document (page 8) lays out the terms of the militia’s role as a Quick Reaction Force, the January 25, 2011 US Mission Evacuation Plan (page 9) anticipates the involvement of QRFs (since the plan pre-dated Qaddafi’s ouster, the militia wouldn’t have provided that service at the time). And the militia was already serving in that role (and served better than some of the western contractors), according to reports. So the document seems to reflect ongoing discussions about that security agreement–including an apparently new understanding that the Americans would provide housing for the QRF personnel.

Now, that document was a draft agreement between the February 17th Brigade and the Regional Security Office.

But I do find one detail from Ambassador Stevens’ schedule of interest. On September 11, the day he died, he was initially scheduled to meet with a representative of the militia at 11 AM. Though a hand-written note suggests that meeting was moved to “another day.” (The itinerary may have been a draft, since it was printed on September 8 and had a few other hand-written notations, though interestingly it appears to have been folded at one point as if to put in a pocket.)

That’s not that big of a deal: after all, Stevens worked closely with the militias throughout the war. But it appears the Americans were in the process of tweaking their security agreement and it appears that Stevens intended to meet with the militia while he was in Benghazi. Given how central Stevens was in determining how much and what kind of security the consulate would have, I wonder whether part of those discussions were to discuss precisely the security concerns everyone is now pointing to as a big State lapse.

Note, Eli Lake’s first story on Benghazi claimed an al Qaeda affiliate had asked the February 17 Brigade to stand down during this attack. And attacks on the Brigade were repeated in other right wing outlets.

Next up in the campaign to turn the Benghazi attack into Obama’s Jimmy Carter? Danielle Pletka, one of the architects of the false claims that got us into Iraq War.

She draws a parallel between the Obama Administration’s treatment of the Benghazi attack and Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar’s attempts to blame the March 11, 2004 Madrid bombing on ETA rather than al Qaeda. Of course, in Pletka’s version, Aznar’s willingness to get suckered into Bush’s–and Pletka’s–illegal war in Iraq bore no role in Aznar’s loss at all; just his attempts to hide the real culprits.

Why did Aznar insist it was ETA? Simple. He didn’t want the Spanish people to believe that the terrorist attack in Madrid was related to Spain’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, fearing they would punish him at the polls. Ironically, however, it was not the bombings themselves that doomed Aznar and his party in elections held three days later; rather it was the handling, the appearance of a cover-up, and the widespread belief that all of the above was done in the aid of Aznar’s political fortunes rather than policy.

Of course, last I checked, Obama had admitted this was a terrorist attack, so the parallel falls apart unless you’re one of the people trying to turn the September 11 death of a talented Ambassador–one who called for light security himself—into an electoral opportunity.

I’m sure this effort to win political advantage from Stevens’ death has no connection with the fact that Pletka’s husband, Stephen Rademaker, is a Romney foreign policy advisor. (h/t Ali Gharib) I mean, given Pletka’s history, she’d be willing to politicize an Ambassador’s death all on her own, without the obvious conflict of interest of her husband’s political investments and career possibilities.

Again: there are legitimate reasons to have Congress investigate this. Which is why it would be nice if the Romney campaign would stop this celebration and allow people without obvious conflicts of interest–someone like Mike Rogers–to conduct that investigation.

Eli Lake continues to serve as the mouthpiece for a political attack explicitly crafted by close Rove associates. In today’s installment, he repeats Mitt Romney campaign surrogate, UT Congressman Jason Chaffetz’ latest attack: that the State Department cut security after the hot war in Libya ended.

In the six months leading up to the assault on the United States consulate in Benghazi, the State Department reduced the number of trained Americans guarding U.S. facilities in Libya, according to a leading House Republican investigating the Sept. 11 anniversary attacks. The reduction in U.S. security personnel increased America’s reliance on local Libyan guards for the protection of its diplomats.

[snip]

Chaffetz went further Wednesday, saying in an interview that the number of American diplomatic security officers serving in Libya had been reduced in the six months prior to the attacks. “The fully trained Americans who can deal with a volatile situation were reduced in the six months leading up to the attacks,” he said. “When you combine that with the lack of commitment to fortifying the physical facilities, you see a pattern.”

I confess I’m skeptical every time a set of documents gets “left behind” in Libya. First there were the intelligence documents showing how the US and UK collaborated in the rendition and torture of Libyan opposition figures. Then there was Ambassador Chris Stevens’ journal, in apparently undamaged condition. And now there are the documents a WaPo reporter found at the still unsecured compound.

Documents detailing weapons collection efforts, emergency evacuation protocols, the full internal itinerary of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens’s trip and the personnel records of Libyans who were contracted to secure the mission were among the items scattered across the floors of the looted compound when a Washington Post reporter and a translator visited Wednesday.

[snip]

At least one document found amid the clutter indicates that Americans at the mission were discussing the possibility of an attack in early September, just two days before the assault took place. The document is a memorandum dated Sept. 9 from the U.S. mission’s security office to the 17th February Martyrs Brigade, the Libyan-government-sanctioned militia that was guarding the compound, making plans for a “quick reaction force,” or QRF, that would provide security.

“In the event of an attack on the U.S. Mission,” the document states, “QRF will request additional support from the 17th February Martyrs Brigade.”

Other the documents detail — with names, photographs, phone numbers and other personal information — the Libyans contracted to provide security for the mission from a British-based private firm, Blue Mountain. Some of those Libyans say they now fear for their lives, and the State Department has said it shares concerns about their safety.

Not only do I find it a remarkable coinkydink that only in Libya do documents have a way of conveniently appearing. But all the documents in question are documents that address a specifically relevant subject matter at a convenient time. Moreover, given earlier reports that documents showing contacts were looted, I’m doubly skeptical an itinerary of Chris Stevens’ meetings would be left lying around, particularly given all the questions about what he was doing in Benghazi. And I’ll come back to my thoughts about the Libyan security contractors in a later post.

Ah well. None of that takes away from the laudable work of the reporters that continue to unearth this stuff.

Which brings me to the real question raised by the discovery of these documents. Thus far, at least 3 media teams have spent significant time at the compound.

And yet the FBI haven’t shown up for a visit once.

Perhaps that’s a factor of the FBI having chased their Arabic Agents out of the Bureau (I haven’t heard of similar problems with Agents of North African descent); it’d be a lot easier to at least do a few evidence collection visits if the FBI officers didn’t look and sound like Ken and Barbie. But in the WaPo’s case, at least, a reporter and a translator made it safely in and out of the compound.

Maybe the FBI can deputize the press to conduct this investigation?