Posts

Even the Crusades Weren’t “Forever”

/in /by

I’m going to assume John Cole was asking sincerely when he posted this request.

Can someone explain this reaction from Emptywheel:

After prompting Kagan to deliver the standard justification for detaining enemy combatants during war and rewarding her with a condescending compliment, Lindsey starts by getting Kagan to agree that the war on terror will never end.

Lindsey: [Speaking of her rote recitation of the basis for indefinite detention] That’s a good summary. The problem with this war is that there will never be a definable end to hostilities, will there?

Kagan: [Nodding] That is exactly the problem, Senator.

 

What a breath-taking exchange! Rather than challenge Lindsey on his slippery definition (referring to “hostilities” rather than war), rather than challenging him on the premise, Kagan simply nods in agreement. One minority party Senator and the Solicitor General sat in a hearing today and decided between them the state of hostilities under which the Executive Branch has assumed war-like powers to fight terrorism will never end.

The police state will continue forever.

Maybe I am misinterpreting these remarks, and you have to watch the video, but didn’t Kagan just say it is a bad thing that we are currently engaged in never-ending hostilities? Don’t we agree that is a bad thing? Isn’t Kagan right? What should she have said?

The question of whether the GWOT will have a “definable end” that justifies indefinite detention means two things in practical terms. First, how long will a state of war exist that justifies our holding of 48 Gitmo detainees who can’t otherwise be prosecuted. And second, how long will a state of war exist that justifies holding people at Bagram, including bringing them to Afghanistan after being captured in other locations, for indefinite detention.

48 Gitmo detainees

So how long will we have a legal claim–both within US and international law–to justify holding the 48 detainees at Gitmo that we currently can’t charge but deem too dangerous to release?

As I pointed out in this post, the Gitmo Review Task Force Report provided the following reasons why we can’t charge these men:

  • At least some of these detainees can’t be charged because evidence against them is tainted (this probably includes people like Mohammed al-Qahtani and Abu Zubaydah).
  • For others, we only have evidence they were members of al-Qaeda, and not that they engaged in any actual terrorism against the United States, even including actions taken after October 2001 which might be legally considered self-defense but which in some cases (such as with Omar Khadr) we’ve chosen to label as terrorism. If these people had engaged in the same activities for which we’ve got evidence after October 2001–and especially after December 2004–we might be able to charge them, but they haven’t.
  • For a number of these men, we had evidence that we could have used to charge them with material support for terrorism but held them so long without charges that the statute of limitations has expired.
  • For some of these men, we purportedly could have charged them with material support, but did not because of “sentencing considerations,” which I take to mean we believed that the 15 year maximum sentence was too short, and so have not charged them (note, the Obama administration has not gone to Congress and asked for a change to this sentence).

Given that we can’t try these men, we are instead justifying holding them under the law of war. As Kagan explained,

Under the traditional law of war, it is permissible to hold an enemy combatant until the end of hostilities and the idea behind that is that the enemy combatant not be enabled to return to the battlefield.

And, as she made explicit elsewhere in this exchange and repeatedly during her hearings, our ability to invoke the law of war depends on our ability to invoke the AUMF passed after 9/11, which states,

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. [my emphasis]

We can only legally use this justification against people who either by themselves aided 9/11, or were members of an organization or nation that aided 9/11.

Now, we’re already pushing this, as the government’s lousy 14-36 record on habeas cases makes plain. For example, the Gitmo Task Force claimed the ability to hold people who simply have a “history of associations with extremist activity” without requiring that they have actually either membership in al Qaeda or direct participation in 9/11.

But to envision that the hostilities authorized by the AUMF will not end, you have to envision both that the  al Qaeda and affiliates that existed at the time of 9/11 will exist indefinitely, and/or that we will remain at war against the Taliban forever.  In some cases, this is obviously not going to be the case. Hamid Karzai is already talking about bringing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar into government. If he does so, will we still have justification to hold the members of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin who are among the 48? Discussions about a deal with the Taliban are less optimistic, but if we really do withdraw in 2011, will we still have the basis to hold the Taliban members who are among the 48? If we kill or capture Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, will we still claim holding someone who served as OBL’s guard in 2001 is too dangerous to release?

But even the al Qaeda and affiliates described in the AUMF seem to have a definite endpoint. After OBL and Zawahiri are gone and we’ve managed to kill our 217th “al Qaeda Number 3” will we still be able to say that the al Qaeda that hit us on 9/11 still exists? At some point, judges are going to consider the al Qaeda copycat groups that pop up in various locales to be too tenuously connected to the al Qaeda of 9/11 to be meaningfully the same group anymore.

Read more →

Amy Klobuchar Shreds Coburn’s “Concept of Freedom”

/48 Comments/in /by

Senator Coburn spent about 20 straight minutes today whining to Elena Kagan about how much less freedom we have today than we did 30 years ago.

Which Amy Klobuchar promptly shredded–by far the highlight of today’s hearing. As she points out, back in Coburn’s idyllic free time, women were not represented on the Supreme Court–and barely were in Congress. (Though, note, she corrected herself later–Senator Kassebaum was serving in the Senate already by 1980.)

But then what would you expect from one of the C Street boys, huh?

Elena Kagan on Illegal Wiretapping

/48 Comments/in /by

From Elena Kagan’s first comments about Cheney’s illegal wiretapping program yesterday (at 2:10), it sounds almost like she’d vote for rule of law in the al-Haramain case (though the case is probably in the gray area of cases on which she should recuse herself).

DiFi: And we have just had a case. It came–by a District Court Judge in California, as of March 31 of this year, the al-Haramain case, and Senator Specter and I have discussed this. It’s my understanding that what the judge did here was find the Terrorist Surveillance Program illegal, and essentially say that the plaintiff was entitled to damages from the government. So I guess the question might be whether that case goes up to the Supreme Court or not. But clearly the judge here dealt with something that was outside of the scope of law–which was the Terrorist Surveillance Program–and made a finding that it was, in fact, illegal.

Kagan: I believe that is what the judge said in that case and that case is still pending of course and might come before the Court. I think that the appropriate analysis to use with respect to that case or many others in this area would be the Youngstown analysis which makes very important what Congress has done. Where Congress authorizes the President, it’s one thing, where Congress has said nothing, it’s still another, where Congress has specifically barred the activity in question, you’ve got a much much higher bar for the President to jump over in order to find the action Constitutional.

After all, as DiFi with her historic concern for FISA being the “exclusive means” to conduct wiretapping seems intent to remind Kagan,  warrantless wiretapping was specifically barred.

But maybe not. Read more →

Elena Kagan and Lindsey Graham on the Global Battlefield, the Sequel

/44 Comments/in , /by

This exchange is one of the most telling from the entire Kagan hearing today (note; we’ve edited this exchange for length; here’s the full exchange; also, while you’re watching, keep an eye on the body language of the bearded man sitting behind Kagan, White House Counsel Bob Bauer).

It’s striking, first of all, because Lindsey Graham plays the role of the cross-examiner and his delivery largely overwhelms Kagan. As they go on, Kagan manages to reclaim her ground–on the issue of whether or not the entire world is the battlefield of the war on terror. But even there, the difference in her various answers suggests troubling things about her stance on habeas.

After prompting Kagan to deliver the standard justification for detaining enemy combatants during war and rewarding her with a condescending compliment, Lindsey starts by getting Kagan to agree that the war on terror will never end.

Lindsey: [Speaking of her rote recitation of the basis for indefinite detention] That’s a good summary. The problem with this war is that there will never be a definable end to hostilities, will there?

Kagan: [Nodding] That is exactly the problem, Senator.

What a breath-taking exchange! Rather than challenge Lindsey on his slippery definition (referring to “hostilities” rather than war), rather than challenging him on the premise, Kagan simply nods in agreement. One minority party Senator and the Solicitor General sat in a hearing today and decided between them the state of hostilities under which the Executive Branch has assumed war-like powers to fight terrorism will never end.

The police state will continue forever.

Perhaps sensing the danger, Kagan notes that the Hamdi decision envisions such an indefinite war might require a different approach to detention, perhaps a review to ensure a detainee’s continuing dangerousness. This thrusts Kagan not into the realm of legal review, but the policy disputes between the White House and Lindsey (again, the watchful eye of Bob Bauer here is worth noting).

Our excerpt jumps here (after Lindsey makes his pitch for just such a program).

Lindsey comes back by getting Kagan to personally endorse the stance she embraced in her Solicitor General role, arguing against habeas rights for Bagram detainees.

Lindsey: You argued against expanding habeas rights to Bagram detainees held in Afghanistan, is that correct?

Kagan: I did, Senator Graham.

Lindsey: As a matter of fact, you won.

Kagan: [pushing back with apparent discomfort] Uh, in the DC Circuit–

Lindsey: [interrupting] And you probably won’t be able to hear that case if it comes to the Supreme Court, will you?

Kagan: Well, that’s correct, and the reason–

Lindsey: [interrupting again] Well, that’s good cause then we can talk openly about it.

Kagan: [laughing] Uh, if I could just say, the Solicitor General only signs her name to briefs in the Supreme Court, authorizes appeal, but does not sign Appellate briefs, but I determined that I should be the Counsel of Record on that brief because I felt that the United States’ interests were so strong in that case based on what the Department of Defense told our office.

Lindsey: Right. I want every conservative legal scholar and commentator to know that you did an excellent job in my view of representing the United States in that case.

Lindsey then gets her to reiterate that she signed that brief because of the seriousness of the issues for the government. He interrupts again:

Lindsey: Well, let me read a quote: “The Federal Courts should not become the vehicle by which the Executive is forced to choose between two intolerable options: submitting to intrusive and harmful discovery, or releasing a dangerous detainee.” Do you stand by that statement?

Kagan: Senator Graham, can I ask whether that statement comes from that brief?

Lindsey: Yes it does.

Kagan: No, I uh, that statement is my best understanding of the very significant interests of the United States government in that case, which we tried forcefully to present to the Court and as you said before, the DC Circuit–a very mixed panel of the DC Circuit–upheld our argument.

Lindsey: Right. You also said “The Courts of the United States have never entertained habeas lawsuits filed by enemy forces detained in war zones. If Courts are ever to take that radical step, they should do so only with explicit blessing by statute.” You stand by that?

Kagan: Anything that is in that brief I stand by as the appropriate position of the United States government.

Lindsey: [while she is speaking] Fair enough.

Throughout this exchange, Lindsey basically had Kagan cornered, not wanting to disavow a document she had signed in unusual circumstances, but seemingly recognizing the risk of adopting these harsh statements as her own. Read more →

Does Kagan Think the 2001 Afghan AUMF Authorized Iraq?

/22 Comments/in , /by

I’m going to assume that this was just a misstatement on Elena Kagan’s part, but it’s one that I hope she corrects before her confirmation hearings are done. In response to a question from DiFi, Kagan suggested that SCOTUS’ decision in the Hamdi case–which relied on the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force passed after 9/11–applied to Iraq and Afghanistan.

DiFi: Could you elaborate on the scope of the President’s authority to detain individuals under the law of armed conflict?

Kagan: Senator Feinstein, the conversation that Senator Graham and I had–and I believe in that same hearing you asked a similar question–starts with the Hamdi case, where the Supreme Court said that the AUMF–the authorization for the use military force–which is the statute that applies to our conflict with Iraq and Afghanistan, that the AUMF includes detention authority, detention authority, and Hamdi said that the law of war typically grants detention authority in a wartime situation and interpreted the AUMF consistent with that law of war understanding.

Hamdi, of course, doesn’t even mention Iraq. And while Bush did conduct detention in Iraq in relation to that separate war, those detention operations fell under different guidelines even according to the radical people running the Bush Administration. More troubling, however, is the possibility that Kagan has internalized the false claims of many on the right that Iraq had anything at all to do with the 2001 AUMF, which authorized action only against those with ties to 9/11.

Again, I’m hoping this was just a misstatement, one which Kagan will correct before these hearings are done.

The NY Times, Elena Kagan and Batson

/32 Comments/in , , , /by

The New York Times has an article up that will appear in the front section of Wednesday’s print edition decrying the fact that racial selection and exclusion still maintain in jury selection for trials in the South.

Arguments like these were used for years to keep blacks off juries in the segregationist South, systematically denying justice to black defendants and victims. But today, the practice of excluding blacks and other minorities from Southern juries remains widespread and, according to defense lawyers and a new study by the Equal Justice Initiative, a nonprofit human rights and legal services organization in Montgomery, Ala., largely unchecked.
…..
While jury makeup varies widely by jurisdiction, the organization, which studied eight Southern states — Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Tennessee — found areas in all of them where significant problems persist. In Alabama, courts have found racially discriminatory jury selection in 25 death penalty cases since 1987, and there are counties where more than 75 percent of black jury pool members have been struck in death penalty cases.
…..
The Equal Justice Initiative study argues that jury diversity “is especially critical because the other decision-making roles in the criminal justice system are held mostly by people who are white.” In the eight Southern states the study examined, more than 93 percent of the district attorneys are white. In Arkansas and Tennessee, all of them are white.

Race based selection and exclusion in the formation and empanelment of juries is prohibited, and rightly so. It is considered improper, unethical and a violation of duty to the court, bar and public. And rightfully so. There mere inference of it, as is made clear by the numerous instances discussed in the NYT article can bring strong questions of propriety, especially for representatives of the people, i.e. prosecutors. And, as the Equal Justice Initiative points out, the systematic exclusion of people of color from public leadership roles, like prosecutors, is just as problematic and disgraceful.

It is a righteous thing the New York Times has emphasized and drawn attention to the depressing report by the Equal Justice Initiative on racial exclusion in the law. Which makes it all the more distressful that the famed Gray Lady of the Times never evinced the same concern about analogous inferences which could just as easily be drawn about Elena Kagan’s record of faculty hiring at Harvard Law School.

First raised by Duke Law Professor Guy Uriel Charles, and noted by other bloggers like Glenn Greenwald and yours truly (but never substantively addressed or reported by the New York Times or other major media), Kagan has a record that puts the examples in the New York Times article on Southern jury biases to shame. From Professor Charles:

But what about people of color? How could she have brokered a deal that permitted the hiring of conservatives but resulted in the hiring of only white faculty? Moreover, of the 32 new hires, only six seven were women. So, she hired 25 white men, six white women, and one Asian American woman. Please do not tell me that there were not enough qualified women and people of color. That’s a racist and sexist statement. It cannot be the case that there was not a single qualified black, Latino or Native-American legal academic that would qualify for tenure at Harvard Law School during Elena Kagan’s tenure. To believe otherwise is to harbor troubling racist Read more →

Search and Replace: Sexually Dangerous Person, Terrorist

/88 Comments/in /by

Just as a little thought experiment, let’s look how some passages from SCOTUS nominee Elena Kagan’s successful argument in U.S. v. Comstock–in which SCOTUS just voted 7-2 to affirm the federal government’s authority to indefinitely detain sex offenders who are mentally ill–appear when we replace the term “sexually dangerous person” with “terrorist.” (See Adam B’s post on the decision for a good overview of the decision.)

KAGAN: The Federal Government has mentally ill, sexually dangerous persons [terrorists] in its custody. It knows that those persons, if released, will commit serious sexual [terrorist] offenses;

[snip]

JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the likelihood is that the person will stay in Federal custody?

GENERAL KAGAN: I think that that’s fair, that the likelihood is that the person will stay in Federal custody until such time as a court finds that the reasons for that custody have lapsed.

[snip]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Right. I understand your argument to be that this power is necessary and proper, given the fact that the person is in Federal custody for some other reason, criminal conviction [enemy combatant designation].

GENERAL KAGAN: That has been the government’s case throughout this litigation, that it is always depended on the fact of Federal custody, on the fact that this person has entered the criminal justice system [been designated an enemy combatant],

[snip]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, why doesn’t the Federal Government’s authority to have custody because of the criminal justice system [enemy combatant designation] end when the criminal justice system is exhausted if he can’t be charged? In other words, when the sentence is done?

GENERAL KAGAN: Because the Federal Government has a responsibility to ensure that release of the people it has in its custody is done responsibly, and is done in such a way —

Read more →

When Kagan Defenders Hurt Her Case

/41 Comments/in , /by

Greg Craig, who was ousted from the Obama Administration because he’s too much of a purist on archaic things like the Constitution, reassures us that Elena Kagan is largely a “progressive” in the mold of the guy who ousted him.

The Questions I Should Have Asked

/30 Comments/in , /by

When you live in flyover country and have the opportunity to appear on cable, it lacks some of the niceties of the big city: no green room, no professional makeup artist, and sometimes you have to drive yourself to the studio through Detroit’s version of rush hour traffic (yeah, I know, no one works in this city anymore, but we’re on the rebound).

Which means you don’t get the same opportunity to compose your thoughts.

So here’s what I should have said when asked what two questions I’d ask Elena Kagan in a confirmation hearing:

  1. Do you think the President should be able to order the assassination of an American citizen with Predator drones with no due process?
  2. What sort of disclosure does your former employer Goldman Sachs owe its clients when it makes a massive bet that millions of Americans will lose their homes?

State Secrets Non-Compromise Compromise Architect to Replace Kagan

/36 Comments/in , /by

The great news just keeps coming.

Remember the “new” state secrets policy DOJ announced last year? It basically amounted to a promise that the Attorney General would review any invocation of state secrets to make sure such an invocation was really really secret rather than just sort of secret but really embarrassing, along with a promise that an Inspector General (but not a court) would investigate in case of wrong-doing (at the time, some of the existing state secrets invocations had already been investigated by IGs). Here’s how I described the “new” policy when it was announced.

What the “new” state secrets policy appears designed to do is buy time and limit the legal battlefields on which the Administration tries to stave off a CIPA-like process.

Legislatively, it appears the “new” policy (and presumably some pressure on Leahy directly) has convinced Leahy, at least, to hold off on moving his legislation forward. He seems to be content to wait and see how this new policy plays out. Nadler, on the other hand, seems to want to push forward with legislation (so is Russ Feingold, but he’s not in the same position to push forward Senate legislation as Nadler is). So at the very least, Holder’s “new” policy will buy the Administration time before Congress tries to reel in executive power.

Then there’s Horn. Word is that Holder will use the “new” policy to withdraw the state secrets claim in one case, and by all appearances that one case will be Horn (I don’t know whether that means they will try to settle Horn, or whether they’ll just move forward with what amounts to a CIPA-like process without a state secrets claim behind it.)

Now of the three cases in question (Horn, al-Haramain, and Jeppesen), Horn is the one that was the biggest slam dunk legally to support a CIPA-like process (because of the fraud involved and the Circuit Court’s earlier limitation on the state secrets claim). It’s the one in which the Bush Administration’s claim to state secrets was most bogus. And it’s the least risky one to settle or litigate.

By withdrawing the claim of state secrets in Horn (if that is indeed what will happen), the Administration will avoid having the DC Circuit joining the 9th in supporting some kind of CIPA-process in state secrets, while still giving the Administration hopes of dismissing Jeppesen and al-Haramain based on state secrets.

In other words, this is all a big bureaucratic ploy to try to keep the Bush Administration’s illegal actions on extraordinary rendition and warrantless wiretapping secret.

Well, the guy Obama plans to replace Kagan with is the architect of this “smoke and mirrors” policy.

The White House is poised to name Don Verrilli, an associate White House counsel, as solicitor general after Elena Kagan is confirmed to the Supreme Court. Verrilli joined the Obama administration as an associate deputy attorney general, where he helped his close friend, Attorney General Eric Holder, craft the Justice Department’s new state secrets doctrine guidelines.

[snip]

Verrillii’s trial balloon appointment as SG will be viewed suspiciously by civil libertarians for his authorial role in the state secrets drama and for his record of fighting on behalf of industry against tech entrepreneurs.  But he’s got the trust of Holder, Bauer, and President Obama.

I can’t wait to see what Obama has in store next to whittle away at the rule of law.