Funny Telecom Games on Retroactive Immunity

There are two funny things in the telecom brief in response to Judge Walker’s questions about the retroactive immunity statute. (Here is EFF’s brief and Eric Holder’s.)

Don’t Cite the Statute

First, in spite of the fact that Walker asked the parties to address a specific question about a specific clause of the FISA Amendment Act, the telecom lawyers don’t get around to actually discussing the language of that clause until page 15 of a 17 page brief. There’s a reason for that. Once they do discuss the clause in question, they’re faced with precisely the problem that Walker (and bmaz and Mary) have identified: the language doesn’t tell the Attorney General whether he has to give the telecoms immunity, or simply can give immunity, at his whim.

Here, § 802(a) does not expressly state whether certification is mandatory or discretionary. It provides merely that a “civil action . . . shall be promptly dismissed, if the Attorney General certifies to the district court” that at least one of the five criteria in § 802(a) has been met (emphasis added). The Attorney General cannot submit a certification unless the standards of § 802(a) have been satis-fied, and the word “if” simply reflects that these standards will not be met in every case. But noth-ing in the statute specifies whether the Attorney General may decline to certify after determining that a case is eligible for certification. The statute does not state, for instance, that the decision whether to certify is committed to the “discretion” of the Attorney General. Nor does the statute use permissive language, such as the word “may.”

While Section 802 also does not specify that certification is mandatory, what is critical for purposes of constitutional avoidance is that it fairly admits of that construction. Section 802(e) re-fers to the “authority and duties of the Attorney General” (emphasis added). The use of the word “duties” indicates that § 802 imposes some mandatory obligation on the Attorney General, but the statute does not expressly identify which of the tasks it describes are mandatory. This ambiguity could be resolved by reading § 802 as imposing on the Attorney General a “dut[y]” to certify if he finds the predicate facts, if it were necessary to construe the statute in this way in order to save its constitutionality. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (courts must “‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute’”); United States v. LSL Biotech., 379 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts must “strive to avoid constructions that render words meaningless”).

They’re left, then, with basically asking Walker to read the "can" language throughout as "must."

But because it is “fairly possible” for the Court to read § 802 as mandatory, the Court’s “plain duty is to adopt” that construction if necessary to avoid a serious constitutional issue.

The Outdated Senate Report

The other problem with the brief is that the telecom lawyers repeatedly cite the SSCI report on its FISA amendment to prove that the legislative intent for this law is clear. (DOJ cites the report in its brief, too, but not to get to the idea of good faith.)

Here in particular, we know for certain the motivating pur-poses that Congress embodied in § 802. Congress embarked on two years of study and debate of the circumstances under which litigation against telecommunications providers alleged to have assisted the government should proceed—including this litigation in particular. It ultimately concluded that granting immunity to companies that either did not provide the assistance alleged, or provided any assistance in good faith, would enhance the nation’s security by ensuring that private parties cooperate in intelligence activities in the future, and by preventing the disclosure of classified information. See S. Rep. No. 110–209, at 9-12 (2007).

[snip]

First, Congress sought to address the concern that “without retroactive immunity, the private sector might be unwilling to cooperate with lawful Government requests in the future without unnecessary court involvement and protracted litigation.” S. Rep. 110-209, at 10. It observed that the “possible reduction in intelligence” that could result from this delay is simply unacceptable for the safety of our Nation.” Id. Congress thus concluded that it was appropriate to “exten[d] immunity” to electronic communication service providers that acted, if at all, “on a good faith belief that the President’s program, and their assistance, was lawful.” Id.

[snip]

As discussed above, Congress enacted § 802 to further the public interest of protecting national security. It also sought to protect the private right of carriers who either did not do what was alleged or acted in good faith. S. Rep. 110–209, at 9–12. [my emphasis]

Note the date on the report: 2007. This is the report that SSCI released after its version of the legislation passed the committee, a full eight months before the final legislation passed both houses of Congress–in significantly different form.

Here’s the language in Section 802a in the bill discussed in the Senate report:

SEC. 802. PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING STATUTORY DEFENSES.

(a) Requirement for Certification-

(1) IN GENERAL- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no civil action may lie or be maintained in a Federal or State court against any person for providing assistance to an element of the intelligence community, and shall be promptly dismissed, if the Attorney General certifies to the court that–

(A) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant to an order of the court established under section 103(a) directing such assistance;

(B) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant to a certification in writing under section 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B) or 2709(b) of title 18, United States Code;

(C) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant to a directive under sections 102(a)(4), 105B(e), as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of the FISA Amendments Act of 2007, or 703(h) directing such assistance; or

(D) the person did not provide the alleged assistance.

(2) REVIEW- A certification made pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be subject to review by a court for abuse of discretion.

 And here’s Section 802a of the bill Walker asked the parties to respond to:

‘SEC. 802. PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING STATUTORY DEFENSES.

‘(a) Requirement for Certification- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a civil action may not lie or be maintained in a Federal or State court against any person for providing assistance to an element of the intelligence community, and shall be promptly dismissed, if the Attorney General certifies to the district court of the United States in which such action is pending that–

‘(1) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant to an order of the court established under section 103(a) directing such assistance;

‘(2) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant to a certification in writing under section 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B) or 2709(b) of title 18, United States Code;

‘(3) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant to a directive under section 102(a)(4), 105B(e), as added by section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-55), or 702(h) directing such assistance;

‘(4) in the case of a covered civil action, the assistance alleged to have been provided by the electronic communication service provider was–

‘(A) in connection with an intelligence activity involving communications that was–

‘(i) authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007; and

‘(ii) designed to detect or prevent a terrorist attack, or activities in preparation for a terrorist attack, against the United States; and

‘(B) the subject of a written request or directive, or a series of written requests or directives, from the Attorney General or the head of an element of the intelligence community (or the deputy of such person) to the electronic communication service provider indicating that the activity was–

‘(i) authorized by the President; and

‘(ii) determined to be lawful; or

‘(5) the person did not provide the alleged assistance. [my emphasis]

To be fair, the "if" before the AG certification is in both–so the problem Walker is looking at exists in both. But clause 802(a)4 doesn’t exist in S.2248, the bill the Senate report discusses (though the language exists elsewhere in the bill). And for good reason. That’s because the bill passed by Congress narrowed the definition of who gets immunity (not enough, but significantly). That narrowing was made to make the amorphous "good faith" that the telecoms cite repeatedly from the SSCI report more concrete.

In other words, faced with the fact that Congress wrote this statute too vaguely, the telecom lawyers have gone and found a legislative history they can point to that they claim should guide Walker’s deliberation. But it’s legislative history pertaining to a different bill and–significantly–a different Section 802a. And in doing so, they resuscitate the notion that all it took for telecoms to get their immunity is good faith.

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18 replies
  1. bmaz says:

    Here is the DOJ Brief. Here is the Plaintiffs’ Combined Brief.

    The DOJ Brief covers effectively the same ground as the telecom brief that Marcy linked. The Plaintiffs’ Combined Brief sets out the arguments that you will be interested in in rebuttal, and effectively tracks what I, and Mary, were arguing back on February 11-12, as Marcy noted above along with more, and, of course, better specificity.

    The problem is that the “delegation” discussed by the defendants is completely arbitrary and it has the power to benefit one telco corp. by eliminating them as a party defendant, but not another; and to kill one plaintiff’s cause of action but not that of another similarly situated plaintiff. Contrary to what the defendants argue, this gives the executive, by and through the attorney general, the power to arbitrarily and capriciously “legislate” individual rights to relief and recovery through the court system. Every time the AG makes a decision on one of these “certifications”, he is effectively legislating somebody’s right to court access.

    And, despite all the defendants’ wailing that there is a discernible “intelligible principle” behind the gross arrogation of power to the AG by 802, there really are not; it might delineate under what conditions it could be applied, but not when and on what definable criteria. Back to the totally arbitrary deal. Lastly, they, as a crude fallback, then blithely argue that “well, if you can’t tell when the provision might be applied, just assume it will be applied all the time”. That is fucking laughably stupid.

    Take a gander at the Plaintiffs’ combined brief for a more complete dissection of the defendants’ bullshittery.

  2. Leen says:

    Obama “no one is above the law”
    Eric Holder “no one is above the law”
    Leahy “no one is above the law”
    Pelosi “no one is above the law”

    Those words ring hollow

    • bmaz says:

      Obama “no one is above the law”
      Eric Holder “no one is above the law”
      Leahy “no one is above the law”
      Pelosi “no one is above the law”

      Greg Craig: “Nevermind that, we’re all above the law”

  3. PJEvans says:

    I’ll just about bet that Walker has noticed that difference between what the telecoms are citing as law and what the law actually says.

    May I hope he throws lawbooks at them?

  4. Neil says:

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    I put KarlRove on my watchlist on Twitter and replied to his most recent post. He put me on his watchlist. Should I let him watch?

  5. pdaly says:

    Reading the EFF’s brief was like reading a latest compilation of ew’s, bmaz’, and Mary’s prior posts and comments on this subject. I understood much of the bigger arguments (although my eyes still glaze over when I spot too many “A v. B”s in a row).

    Not only does their brief demolish the Carriers’ lawyers’ arguments, it also puts a cloud over our Congress which enacted such a horribly constructed law. As the EFF states, Congress knows how to enter the words ’shall’ in its laws when it wants to command action, and it knows that guidelines must accompany any law that allows the AG or other members of another government branch to exercise discretion in areas dealing with legislation.

    I assume such a bad law had a specific purpose –to retroactively mirror Gonzales’ actions signing off on illegal warrantless wiretapping while the WH attorney. What I don’t understand, since Congress didn’t require the AG or local officials to certify any and all cases that meet the requirements of 802, whether there is a reason (retroactively) that would need to be the case. I see the power that accrues going forward to the Executive branch if their AG can sign or not sign at a whim (knocks out of business uncooperative carriers), but in all pending telecom court cases wouldn’t the Bush WH have preferred secrecy and thus certification across the board?

    • bmaz says:

      I see the power that accrues going forward to the Executive branch if their AG can sign or not sign at a whim (knocks out of business uncooperative carriers), but in all pending telecom court cases wouldn’t the Bush WH have preferred secrecy and thus certification across the board?

      I don’t know if this is all of it or not, but i believe you have the first part right; and, as to the latter, I think it was at least partially that they did not wish to look so totally obvious about covering their own butts as opposed to the telcos. I don’t know if this is the case or not, but I remember seeing that somewhere and it seems at least partially plausible. I believe the very earliest versions actually spelled out the cases to be dismissed in the NDCA. My guess is that looked too obvious and they also wanted some flexibility for mischief in other matters in other jurisdictions. Just a guess though.

      • pdaly says:

        Thanks.

        they did not wish to look so totally obvious about covering their own butts

        I laughed when I read this at first, because they were so obvious. Then again, if I remind myself that I’ve been watching them through the clear group eyes of this website maybe Congress’ machinations weren’t and are not so obvious to the casual news watcher.

  6. MadDog says:

    And I would note that per the Telco brief, Brad Berenson is representing AT&T in this matter.

    That would be the same Brad Bereson, to quote EW:

    …who is representing Abramoff scandal firewall Susan Ralston, is also representing USA Purge firewall Kyle Sampson?

    I’m not suggesting there’s a formal conflict, mind you. I just find it mighty convenient that Berenson, who was Associate White House Counsel under Alberto Gonzales (and had a hand in writing the PATRIOT Act), also happens to be defending two of the people who could reveal the inner workings of how BushCo skirts the law.
    ..

    And that good ol’ Bradford was allowed to get involved in this case “Pro hac vice” which per Wiki means:

    …a legal term usually referring to a lawyer who has not been admitted to practice in a certain jurisdiction but has been allowed to participate in a particular case in that jurisdiction.

    The right to appear pro hac vice is not guaranteed. Rather, the attorney wanting to practice in a jurisdiction within which he or she is not licensed must specifically request permission from the court to be able to appear as an attorney of record. This is accomplished with a Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice, where another attorney who is licensed in the jurisdiction requests that the non-licensed attorney be admitted to practice in a particular case.

    In addition to the motion, the non-licensed attorney is typically required to provide the court with a statement from his local bar association indicating that he is a member in good standing and also pay a small fee to the local bar association…

    Brad is a member of good standing???

  7. Mary says:

    Just came in from holding horses for the shoer so I haven’t read the briefs linked, and so, from that position of ignorance, I’ll go ahead and ramble. *g*

    If the telecoms are pushing too hard on the good faith issue, I think that could shoot them in the foot, bc if they are saying that Congress wanted them to get immunity to the extent that they assissted in actual good faith, then an implicit part of their argument would be that Congress did not want a telecom who acted in bad faith to get immunity.

    Under that approach, it’s pretty easy to argue that the discretion granted to the AG was to make decisions to grant certifications or not based on the AG’s decisions/determinations on good faith, a definite ”may” rather than shall. With that, it could be well argued that the language in most of 802(a) in general, and then in particular for 802(a)(4) and subsections thereof, goes merely to the language that the AG should use in the certifications, i.e., the ”form” of certifications, as opposed to the actual circumstances where certifications shall issue, i.e. the ”substance” of certifications.

    So if the argument is ”good faith” then the response could well be that they are concedeing that if there is evidence of bad faith they are not entitled to a certification, even if the items in 802(a)(4) could all be ”checked off”

    So, for example, if the telecoms had in house memos that the program was not legal and had been involved in briefings that disclosed the FISA Chief judges determined the program was not legal and were barring it and had been involved in briefings where Goldsmith’s objections and the refusal of DOJ to sign off were explained and had been privy to the information disclosed to Judge Digg-Taylor and her determination that the program was unlawful and had memos asking for more money to cooperate bc of the risks or had asked for pocket pardons or had used info from wiretaps to improperly influence members of Congress on the legislations etc. etc.

    —in those situations did Congress actually intend that the AG ”shall” give immunity, notwithstanding, bc there a head (or deputy) of an ”intelligence agency” went so far as to ”indicate” that the activity was ”authorized by the President” and amorphously ”determined to be lawful”

    Really?

    Other aspects, in addition to the fact that ”good faith” is not referenced in 802 at all and yet is being invoked; and
    in addition to the fact that Congress knows how to say ”shall;” and
    in addition to the fact that interpreting a ”shall” into the statute will not, in this case and these facts and circumstances, avoid a Constitutional issue bc it merely takes you to other arguments that also involve Constitutional issues and actually a strict statutory reading with overbreadth the issue avoids more Constitutional issues than creating a shall where it doesn’t exist –

    – well, in addition to those and more, other aspects go to what direction Congress gave if it did mean a ”shall.” 802(a)(4)(A)(i) isn’t too bad, the shall would be based on a determination that an authorization came from the President during those periods, but when you go to (ii) what is it that the AG is supposed to look at to make his determinations and what kind of due diligence is he supposed to exercise in determinations that the program is/was ”designed to detect or prevent a terrorist attack, or activities in preparation for a terrorist attack, against the United States” Designed solely for that? Designed for that AND to also protect 4th Amendment rights of Americans on American soil? Well designed for that? Designed primarily for other purposes but with a subsidiary component that could also be implement for that? What kind of due diligence is Congress expecting in the reveiw on this? What if telecom in-house memos say ”this is a crazy, expensive way of creating more hay piles to find the needle in, but we are making lots of money so let’s not rock the boat” Did Congress mean for the AG to look at ”who” made that design decision – were NSA lawyers involved in the design decisions or were intelligence analysts or tech specialists or Mrs. Littrel’s Fifth Grade class in Boise?

    Then you go to B and suddenly, although the President was the one ”authorizing” you have a reference to ”requests” or ”directives” (and if it is requests, isn’t it implicit that they are conceding there was no authority to require compliance legally?) coming from the AG or head(or deputy) of ”an element” (does that mean an agency, or a task force, or a car pool group?) of the ”intelligence community” How can Congress be mandating a certification without doing anything much in the way of defining terms and investigative process? Maybe element of the intelligence community is a defined term in the staute, but I don’t recall it.

    And then as you get into the subsections, you have the biggest of the problems on what Congress may or may not have meant. At this point, you have the head (or deputy) of an ”element” of the ”intelligence community” in a ”request” going on to ”indicate” that the activity was authorized by the President (isnt’ the President signing those requests?) and that the activities requested had been ”determined to be lawful.”

    And there you have the biggest issue IMO on lack of Congressional guidance for the AG’s certification. Did Congress really mean that if the AG and DOJ had determined that the program was NOT LAWFUL and if the President and the telecoms knew that the AG and DOJ had made the determination the program was unlawful, and the telecoms knew that the lawyers for the ”element” of the ”intelligence community” had been barred from reviewing the program – – – iow, if there was every element of bad faith you could stack up – – – did Congress really mean that a certificate ”shall” issue to the telecoms bc a deputy head of an intel agency overruled the AG and ”indicated” that the program was ”lawful?” Really?

    Add in the fact that the history is pretty clear that Congress passed the statutes without being briefed on the program, other than a few people, and I think it’s a hard sell to say that Congress (not briefed on the program) forgot to use ”shall” when talking about a program about which Congress did not know the elements or what the AG might find, and in particular that they meant a certificate shall issue even when there was actual bad faith, despite their discussions of premising the statute on the telecom’s good faith.

    All fwiw – probably would have been quicker for me to go read, wouldn’t it? And more to the point.

    Oh well, I’m going to turn my well shod horses out and head to work

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