Putin Has Convinced Trump He’s Keeping Trump’s Weakness Secret

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“He gets played by them, because he thinks that they’re his friends and they are manipulating him full time … with flattery.” Kamala Harris

Here’s how WSJ described the Bob Woodward scoop that Donald Trump sent COVID testing equipment to Vladimir Putin rather than to Americans in need.

Woodward reports that one former intelligence analyst specializing in Russian affairs believed that Trump idolized Putin, making him open to manipulation. During the outbreak of Covid-19 in Russia, Trump secretly sent Putin some Abbott Point of Care Covid test machines for Putin’s personal use.

Putin then asked Trump never to mention it to anyone else, Woodward reports. “I don’t care,” Trump replied. “Fine.”

“No, no,” Putin said. “I don’t want you to tell anybody because people will get mad at you, not me. They don’t care about me.”

In this telling, there’s an intelligence analyst involved, someone who could be Woodward’s source.

It’s not just that Trump secretly sent Putin medical equipment that Americans needed. It’s that, presumably knowing full well the Intelligence Community would learn of that gift, Putin told Trump to keep it secret. “I don’t care,” Trump claimed. But he kept his KGB handler’s secret anyway.

He’s still trying to keep it secret.

You don’t need an intelligence analyst to tell the story of how easy it is for Vladimir Putin to manipulate Donald Trump. After all, HR McMaster documented Trump’s subjugation to Putin at length.

I was the principal voice telling him that Putin was using him and other politicians in both parties in an effort to shake Americans’ confidence in our democratic principles, institutions and processes. Putin was not and would never be Trump’s friend. I felt it was my duty to point this out.

[snip]

Trump wanted to call Putin to congratulate him on being elected to a fourth term as president of Russia. I explained that Putin’s victory had been rigged, thanks to the Kremlin’s control over the media, its quelling of the opposition, the disqualification of popular opposition candidates such as Alexei Navalny, and restrictions on election monitors.

A call was arranged anyway. The day before it, I told Trump I knew he was going to congratulate Putin, but that he should know that “the Kremlin will use the call in three ways: to say that America endorsed his rigged election victory, to deflect growing pressure over the Salisbury nerve agent attack and to perpetuate the narrative that you are somehow compromised.” I then asked Trump the following: “As Russia tries to delegitimize our legitimate elections, why would you help him legitimize his illegitimate election?”

But at this stage in our relationship, my advice on Putin and Russia had become pro forma. I knew that Trump would congratulate Putin and go soft on Salisbury. Trump took the early morning call from the residence. Because I had briefed him the day before, I listened in from my office. As expected, he congratulated Putin up front. After the call, Trump asked me, as he had before, to invite Putin to the White House.

On Face the Nation, McMaster described that he included all this in his book to try to demonstrate to Trump (or at least his hypothetical handlers in a second term) how successfully Putin was manipulating him.

MARGARET BRENNAN: When you got home, you said to your wife, “After [over] a year in this job, I cannot understand Putin’s hold on Trump.” How do you explain that now?

LT. GENERAL H.R. MCMASTER: Well, I explained it in the book. I try to place the president’s belief that he could have a good deal with Vladimir Putin in context of the two previous presidents who thought that they could have a good deal with- with Putin. But also, you know, President Trump, and people know this, he- he likes big splashy deals. He liked- he was pursuing that with Putin. He was pursuing that with Xi Jinping. And of course, Putin is the best liar in the world. And so I struggled, Margaret, should I write about how Putin tried to manipulate President Trump, or not? And I thought, well, Putin knows how he was trying to do it. So maybe in writing about how Putin was trying to press Donald Trump’s buttons, that will make a future President Trump, if he’s elected, less susceptible to those kind of tactics.

There’s been a lot of discussion about whether the intelligence community knows what a simp for Putin Trump is, knows about his ongoing calls with Putin.

The mention of the analyst at least suggests that the IC learned about the COVID testing equipment in real time, which is not surprising given that the equipment would have to be shipped somehow. Importantly, Trump’s KGB handler Vladimir Putin surely knew that it would be discovered. I’m sure the COVID testing kits were nice for Putin to have. The fact that Putin got Trump to prioritize Putin’s health over Americans, the fact that by keeping this secret, Putin ratcheted up the hold he had on Trump were probably far bigger gifts.

And that’s why I think Putin’s instructions to keep this secret are as important as the fact that Trump made efforts to care for Putin’s health as he neglected hundreds of thousands of Americans. It’s the control over all this information that Trump keeps ceding to Putin. As Asha Rangappa noted, Trump just keeps handing Putin ways to control him, willingly.

And now Putin is picking and choosing which of the secrets he has with Donald Trump he’ll make public. Oh sure, he sent me medical equipment at a time when Americans were struggling, Putin is effectively saying. But phone calls?!?! The seven phone calls that are bloody obvious from his claims about speaking to me about my dreams? Nyet! No phone calls, they didn’t happen!!

These tailored denials, hilariously, come from Dmitry Peskov, the guy whose call Trump and Michael Cohen criminally conspired to hide, the likely source for the false claim that appeared in the Steele dossier that the call to the Kremlin Cohen and Trump were hiding was not about real estate in January 2016, but was instead about cheating in an election in October 2016.

That is, I’ve long argued, one of the ways Putin has been wildly successful: not just getting Trump to simper to him like a teenager with a crush, but also to use Trump’s paranoia to heighten conflict in the United States over Trump’s ties to Russia.

Indeed, while Trump would have been preferable for Russia based on policy stances alone, Russia would prefer a weak Trump they could manipulate over a strong Trump any day. By the time of the 2016 operation, Vladimir Putin had already exhibited a willingness to take huge risks to pursue Russian resurgence. Given that audacity, Trump was more useful to Putin not as an equal partner with whom he could negotiate, but as a venal incompetent who could be pushed to dismantle the American security apparatus by playing on his sense of victimhood. Putin likely believed Russia benefitted whether a President Trump voluntarily agreed to Russia’s policy goals or whether Putin took them by immobilizing the US with chaos, and the dossier protected parts of the ongoing Russian operation while making Trump easier to manipulate.

Just as one example, Vladimir Putin knew the FBI was getting recordings of Sergey Kislyak’s calls with Mike Flynn — there’s even a moment when Kislyak’s assistant performs for the wiretap back on December 29, 2016. Putin knew that when he didn’t respond to Obama’s sanctions, the spooks would find those calls, leading to all manner of disruption for the US.

And that created a cascade of ongoing benefits for Putin, as Trump keeps denying Russia Russia Russia that he needed Russia’s help to win, and so keeps doubling and tripling down on his denials, even as he makes his capitulation to Putin readily apparent.

Russia’s 2016 intelligence operation and its aftermath may be the most successful intelligence operation in recent history, because Vladimir Putin has gotten Trump to believe that his KGB handler is hiding the proof he’s got of how weak Trump is, and Trump is desperate, to the core of his being, to pretend that his weakness is not obvious to all.

Update: Going to reup what I wrote just weeks after Helsinki.

Trump and the Russians were engaged in a call-and-response, a call-and-response that appears in the Papadopoulos plea and (as Lawfare notes) the GRU indictment, one that ultimately did deal dirt and got at least efforts to undermine US sanctions (to say nothing of the Syria effort that Trump was implementing less than 14 hours after polls closed, an effort that has been a key part of both Jared Kushner and Mike Flynn’s claims about the Russian interactions).

At each stage of this romance with Russia, Russia got a Trump flunkie (first, Papadopoulos) or Trump himself to publicly engage in the call-and-response. All of that led up to the point where, on July 16, 2018, after Rod Rosenstein loaded Trump up with a carefully crafted indictment showing Putin that Mueller knew certain things that Trump wouldn’t fully understand, Trump came out of a meeting with Putin looking like he had been thoroughly owned and stood before the entire world and spoke from Putin’s script in defiance of what the US intelligence community has said.

People are looking in the entirely wrong place for the kompromat that Putin has on Trump, and missing all the evidence of it right in front of their faces.

Vladimir Putin obtained receipts at each stage of this romance of Trump’s willing engagement in a conspiracy with Russians for help getting elected. Putin knows what each of those receipts mean.

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All Hell Is Going to Break Loose: Maybe Jack Smith Did Precisely What Elie Honig Claims He Didn’t

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There are a number of laugh-in-his-face funny things about Elie Honig’s column bitching that Jack Smith submitted his immunity filing before the election. First, for years Honig whined and moaned that the January 6 investigation would never reach the Willard Hotel, which was, in the opinion he formed without examining much of the evidence, the only way it would reach Trump.

Well, now the court filings have incorporated the Willard, yet Honig seems not to have noticed (but then, he has never exhibited much awareness of what’s actually in court filings).

More importantly, I strongly suspect that this filing does reflect the impact of DOJ policy prohibiting major actions in the three months leading up to an election.

That is, I suspect that Jack Smith considered making more substantive tweaks to the superseding indictment against Trump, but did not because of the DOJ prohibition. This is, to be clear, speculation. But the speculation rests, in part, on what we see in the court filings.

Start with this detail: When Jack Smith asked for a three week extension to submit a status report on August 8 — three weeks that he predictably used to supersede the indictment — he didn’t say he needed the time to present the case to a new grand jury. Rather, he said he needed the time to consult with other parts of DOJ.

The Government continues to assess the new precedent set forth last month in the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024), including through consultation with other Department of Justice components. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(a) (“A Special Counsel shall comply with the rules, regulations, procedures, practices and policies of the Department of Justice,” including “consult[ing] with appropriate offices within the Department for guidance with respect to established practices, policies and procedures of the Department . . . .”). Although those consultations are well underway, the Government has not finalized its position on the most appropriate schedule for the parties to brief issues related to the decision.

And while I think it likely that Smith did consult with OLC, the Solicitor General, and the prosecutors at DC USAO who are superseding other accused January 6 criminals charged with 18 USC 1512(c)(2) about the content of his indictment, that’s not even what he said he was consulting about.

He said he was consulting about “the most appropriate schedule” to brief certain issues regarding the decision. He said he was consulting about DOJ rules, regulations, and policies.

The one DOJ policy pertaining to timing is precisely the one Honig is so upset about: the one prohibiting criminal charges or statements that might give an advantage or disadvantage to a particular candidate.

9-85.500 Actions that May Have an Impact on an Election

Federal prosecutors and agents may never select the timing of any action, including investigative steps, criminal charges, or statements, for the purpose of affecting any election, or for the purpose of giving an advantage or disadvantage to any candidate or political party. Such a purpose is inconsistent with the Department’s mission and with the Principles of Federal Prosecution. See § 9-27.260. Any action likely to raise an issue or the perception of an issue under this provision requires consultation with the Public Integrity Section, and such action shall not be taken if the Public Integrity Section advises that further consultation is required with the Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General.

But as many people rebutted Honig, this pertains to stuff DOJ controls, like indictments, not to things a judge controls, like the briefing Judge Chutkan ordered, briefing about an indictment charged 14 months ago.

Tellingly, Honig didn’t bitch when Jack Smith superseded the indictment against Trump less than 90 days before the election. That’s probably because the indictment involved minor changes, mostly subtractions. Smith eliminated Jeffrey Clark’s conduct entirely, added language to emphasize Mike Pence’s role as Trump’s running-mate, and focused more closely on the fraudulent vote certifications Trump and his co-conspirators created. Honig didn’t opine that that more limited indictment would have required DOJ approval or violated pre-election rules.

The other reason I suspect that Smith considered, but did not, make more substantive changes to the indictment is what appears and doesn’t appear in the immunity filing.

First, as I alluded to the other day, there’s an asymmetry in how DOJ discusses Trump’s January 4 speech in Georgia and his January 6 speech. Regarding the former, prosecutors spend an entire paragraph laying out the fundraising emails Trump sent in advance of the Georgia speech, using those emails to argue that the speech was a campaign event.

Moreover, the defendant’s Campaign sent numerous fundraising emails before, during, and after the speech, confirming the event’s private nature. In a January 4 email around 3:00 p.m., the Campaign sent a fundraising email with the subject line “EPIC Rally in 6 HOURS,” that began, “President Trump is heading to GEORGIA for a RALLY with Senators [Loeffler] and [Perdue]. This rally is going to be EPIC and will show the Nation that REAL Americans, like YOU, are fired up and ready to FIGHT to keep our Republican Senate Majority. The Senate Runoff Election is TOMORROW, and it’s going to take the support of Patriots from all around the Nation if we’re going to WIN BIG and SAVE America from the Radical Left.”570 Later, at 9:21 p.m., the Campaign sent a fundraising email (in the name of the defendant’s son) that began, “My father is on stage RIGHT NOW in Georgia rallying with Senators [Loeffler] and [Perdue] to DEFEND our Senate Republican Majority. Are YOU watching?”571 The email reminded voters that “The Senate Runoff Election is TOMORROW and YOU are the only one who can stop [“‘the Left”] from taking over.”572 Another email at 10:41 p.m. (sent in the name of the defendant) began, “I just stepped off stage after speaking at an EPIC Victory Rally in Georgia with Senators [Loeffler] and [Perdue]. The energy of the American People was UNMATCHED and I know we’re going to WIN BIG tomorrow.”573?

It’s far more important to persuade Judge Chutkan that the January 6 speech was a campaign event. Yet, even though the filing spends three pages describing the “significant similarities” between the Georgia speech and the January 6 one, there’s no parallel argument that Trump fundraised off the January 6 speech. Indeed, there’s no other discussion of fundraising whatsoever in this filing, which is rather surprising given how Trump used his fundraising emails to cement The Big Lie. And we know that there was fundraising directly tied to the January 6 speech. As the January 6 Committee noted, the last email went out just as rioters breached the Capitol. J6C dedicated an appendix to both the legally sanctionable claims Trump made in fundraising emails and to ways Trump used the money raised to pay other bills, things other than what he told his rubes he would spend it on.

The easiest way to hold Trump accountable for January 6 in such a way that doesn’t remotely implicate presidential immunity would be to charge him for fundraising fraud, adopting the same model SDNY used to charge Steve Bannon and his co-conspirators for fundraising off the wall Trump never built. But there’s not a hint of that in the indictment currently before Judge Chutkan. The fact that prosecutors didn’t include the fundraising directly tied to January 6, even though it would help ensure they got to use the January 6 speech at trial, suggests they may be withholding it to use in some other way.

A still more obvious thing missing from the immunity filing is the Proud Boys.

Back in December, in the last filing Jack Smith submitted before Trump’s lawyers got Judge Chutkan to prohibit such things, Smith said he wanted to introduce Trump’s encouragement of the Proud Boys as 404(b) evidence.

The Government plans to introduce evidence from the period in advance of the charged conspiracies that demonstrates the defendant’s encouragement of violence. For instance, in response to a question during the September 29, 2020, presidential debate asking him to denounce the extremist group the Proud Boys, the defendant instead spoke publicly to them and told them to “stand back and stand by.” Members of the group embraced the defendant’s words as an endorsement and printed merchandise with them as a rallying cry. As discussed below, after the Proud Boys and other extremist groups participated in obstructing the congressional certification on January 6, the defendant made clear that they were acting consistent with his intent and direction in doing so.

[snip]

Of particular note are the specific January 6 offenders whom the defendant has supported— namely, individuals convicted of some of the most serious crimes charged in relation to January 6, such as seditious conspiracy and violent assaults on police officers. During a September 17, 2023, appearance on Meet the Press, for instance, the defendant said regarding Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio—who was convicted of seditious conspiracy—“I want to tell you, he and other people have been treated horribly.” The defendant then criticized the kinds of lengthy sentences received only by defendants who, like Tarrio, committed the most serious crimes on January 6. [my emphasis]

But the Proud Boys don’t appear, at all, in the immunity filing. You can go search for them using this OCR version. Nothing. Jack Smith said he wanted them to be part of the trial, but they’re not in this filing laying out that Smith might mention them at trial.

To be sure, there is a section of the immunity filing that addresses Trump’s fondness for convicted Jan6ers.

In the years after January 6, the defendant has reiterated his support for and allegiance to 39478 39479 rioters who broke into the Capitol, calling them “patriots478 and “hostages,479 providing them financial assistance,480 and reminiscing about January 6 as “a beautiful day.”481 At a rally in Waco, Texas, on March 25, 2023, the defendant started a tradition he has repeated several times—opening the event with a song called “Justice for All,” recorded by a group of charged—and in many cases, convicted—January 6 offenders known as the “January 6 Choir” and who, because of their dangerousness, are held at the District of Columbia jail.482 At the Waco Rally, of the January 6 Choir, the defendant said, “our people love those people, they love those people.”483 The defendant has also stated that if re-elected, he will pardon individuals convicted of crimes on January 6.484

But not only doesn’t it mention the Proud Boys directly (one of them was part of the Jan6 Choir, though not any of the seditionists), it doesn’t include the September 2023 interview in which Trump addressed Enrique Tarrio by name (bolded above).

478 GA 1973 at 16:52 (Video of Waco Rally 03/25/2023); GA 1962 at 48:29 (Video of Trump at Faith and Freedom Coalition 06/17/2022); GA 1971 (Video of Trump Interview 02/01/2022).

479 GA 1935 at 35:50, 01:16:16 (Video of Greensboro Rally 03/02/2024).

480 GA 1966 at 09:30 (Video of Trump Interview 09/01/2022).

481 GA 1967 at 45:18 (Video of Trump Interview 08/23/2023); GA 1692 (Transcript of CNN Town Hall 05/10/2023).

482 GA 1973 at 03:00 (Video of Waco Rally 03/25/2023). See, e.g., United States v. Jordan Robert Mink, 21-cr-25 (D.D.C. 2023); United States v. Ronald Sandlin, 21-cr-88 (D.D.C. 2022); United States v. Barton Shively, 21-cr-151 (D.D.C. 2022); United States v. Julian Khater, 21-cr-222 (D.D.C. 2022); United States v. James McGrew, 21-cr-398 (D.D.C. 2022).

483 GA 1973 at 06:02 (Video of Waco Rally 03/25/2023).

484 GA 1971 at 15:51 (Video of Trump Interview with Schmitt 02/01/2022).

If you’re going to impress SCOTUS with Trump’s outrageous support for convicted rioters, you would include the Proud Boys.

Unless you were holding them in reserve.

The immunity filing does include the other key focus of that December 404(b) filing, though: Mike Roman’s elicitation of a riot at TCF Center in Detroit.

In the immediate post-election period, while the defendant claimed fraud without proof, his private operatives sought to create chaos, rather than seek clarity, at polling places where states were continuing to tabulate votes. For example, on November 4, [Mike Roman]—a Campaign employee, agent, and co-conspirator of the defendant—tried to sow confusion when the ongoing vote count at the TCF Center in Detroit, Michigan, looked unfavorable for the defendant. There, when a colleague at the TCF Center told “We think [a batch of votes heavily in Biden’s favor is] right,”[Roman] responded, “find a reason it isnt,” “give me options to file litigation,” and “even if itbis [sic].”18 When the colleague suggested that there was about to be unrest reminiscent of the Brooks Brothers Riot,19 a violent effort to stop the vote count in Florida after the 2000 presidential election, responded, “Make them riot” and “Do it!!!”20 The defendant’s Campaign operatives and supporters used similar tactics at other tabulation centers, including in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,21 and the defendant sometimes used the resulting confrontations to falsely claim that his election observers were being denied proper access, thus serving as a predicate to the defendant’s claim that fraud must have occurred in the observers’ absence.22 [my emphasis]

Notably, that section of the immunity filing repeats something the 404(b) notice did: it called Roman — like Bannon — an unindicted co-conspirator, even though in the introduction of the immunity filing, it described him as an “agent” along with the other three main campaign operatives.

The Government also plans to introduce evidence of an effort undertaken by an agent (and unindicted co-conspirator) of the defendant who worked for his campaign (“the Campaign Employee”) to, immediately following the election, obstruct the vote count. On November 4, 2020, the Campaign Employee exchanged a series of text messages with an attorney supporting the Campaign’s election day operations at the TCF Center in Detroit, where votes were being counted; in the messages, the Campaign Employee encouraged rioting and other methods of obstruction when he learned that the vote count was trending in favor of the defendant’s opponent.

[seven lines redacted]

The Government will also show that around the time of these messages, an election official at the TCF Center observed that as Biden began to take the lead, a large number of untrained individuals flooded the TCF Center and began making illegitimate and aggressive challenges to the vote count. Thereafter, Trump made repeated false claims regarding election activities at the TCF Center, when in truth his agent was seeking to cause a riot to disrupt the count. This evidence is admissible to demonstrate that the defendant, his co-conspirators, and agents had knowledge that the defendant had lost the election, as well as their intent and motive to obstruct and overturn the legitimate results. [my emphasis]

As it did with Steve Bannon, the immunity filing called Roman a co-conspirator, without giving him a substitution, CC.

They’re both just “persons.”

At least in substitutions used in this filing.

Here’s why that’s especially interesting. As I noted in this post, the only evidentiary reason to describe Bannon as a co-conspirator is to introduce his words via hearsay exception, without requiring him to testify.

Some of what he said (bolded below), he said on texts to Boris Epshteyn, who was already treated as a co-conspirator, so those texts could come in anyway.

  1. October 31: “He’s gonna declare himself a winner.” J6C (Originally sourced to MoJo)
  2. November 13: “Trump just fired.”
  3. December 13: Bannon resumes daily contact.
  4. December 14: Alternate electors. J6C
  5. January 2: “The Vice President’s role is not “ministerial.” J6C
  6. January 2: Trump wanted Pence briefed by Eastman immediately.
  7. January 4: Pre-Pence Willard Hotel meeting, from which Rudy calls Trump.
  8. January 4: Post-Pence Willard Hotel meeting.
  9. January 5: “Fuck his lawyer.”
  10. January 5: Call with Trump before “All hell is going to break loose.” J6C

Others don’t involve Epshteyn (or are important for the way Bannon conveys recent contact with Trump).

One mention of Bannon in the immunity filing is his Halloween prediction that Trump would claim victory. According to Dan Friedman, who first reported on the recording, Bannon’s October 31 prediction that Trump would declare victory was a recording of a meeting he had with Guo Wengwui’s activists.

The pre-election audio comes from a meeting between Bannon and a half dozen supporters of Guo Wengui, an exiled Chinese mogul for whom Bannon has worked. Bannon helped Guo launch a series of pro-Trump Chinese-language news websites that have promoted an array of far-right misinformation, including a video streaming site called GTV. The meeting was intended to help GTV plan its election night coverage.

Though he did not attend, Guo arranged the confab, which was held in the Washington, DC, townhouse where Bannon tapes War Room, according to a person who was present.

Jack Smith chose to use this instance of Bannon’s prediction, which ties to the foreign funding of Bannon’s disinformation, rather than (as Bannon himself noted to Friedman in a comment for that story) any of the other times Bannon made the same prediction, including on his podcast.

[A] Bannon spokesperson argued that Bannon’s statements on the recording are not news. “Nothing on the recording wasn’t already said on War Room or on multiple other shows like The Circus on Showtime,” the spokesperson said. “Bannon gave that lecture multiple times from August to November to counter Mar[c] Elias’ Election Integrity Project.” Elias is a prominent Democratic election lawyer. The spokesperson also said that the January 6 committee “should have the courage to have Mr. Bannon come and testify publicly about these events.”

So one thing Smith does by including Bannon as a co-conspirator is to tie Guo’s funding of Bannon’s disinformation to January 6. Remember: SDNY treated Bannon as a co-conspirator at Guo’s trial (though did not treat it as a foreign influence operation).

But the more important instance where you’d need to treat Bannon as a co-conspirator to introduce his words is Bannon’s later prediction: “All hell is going to break loose.” The immunity filing directly ties the comment to an 11-minute phone call Bannon had with Trump, from 8:57 to 9:08 AM, earlier that morning.

The next morning, on January 5, the defendant spoke on the phone with [Bannon]. Less than two hours later, on his podcast, said in anticipation of the January 6 certification proceeding, “All Hell is going to break loose tomorrow.”376

That is, the immunity filing treats this prediction like three other things it includes on Bannon: his prediction Trump would declare victory, Bannon’s notice to Epshteyn that Trump would soon put Rudy in charge of post-election interference, and his January 2 instruction — given immediately after speaking to Trump — that Trump wanted John Eastman to brief Pence. All four use Bannon like a mirror to get to things (the filing implies) Trump told Bannon.

The immunity filing suggests that Bannon spoke to Trump, agreed that “all hell is going to break loose tomorrow,” and then shared that detail on his podcast.

Notably, though, like Roman’s elicitation of a riot, that’s not necessary to the charges in the existing indictment. Bannon’s involvement in the fake electors plot is — or is at least useful. Bannon’s conveyance of instructions from Trump, particularly on January 2, is a way to show Trump’s intent regarding the effort to pressure Pence.

But you don’t need violence to prove these charges. Indeed, both the indictment and the immunity filing stop well short of implicating Trump with inciting violence. They describe Trump and his co-conspirators attempting to “exploit” the violence already in progress to cause further delay, but they don’t accuse Trump of anticipating or encouraging that violence.

Steve Bannon and Mike Roman absolutely help prove the conspiracy counts currently charged against Trump; Roman’s communications, in particular, provide key details of how he recruited fake electors.

Where they become far more important as co-conspirators, though, both with the TCF unrest and the violence at the Capitol, is in arguing that Trump conspired to stoke violence, something that Jack Smith has not (yet, at least not publicly) charged, something that would also implicate the missing Proud Boys.

These inclusions and exclusions all suggest that Jack Smith could have approached the superseding indictment differently, but did not.

Again, this is speculation, but I suspect that Jack Smith reserved a number of things for use after the election.

If we get that far.

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Conclusion To Series On Rights

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Posts in this series

Conclusion to How Rights Went Wrong

In the last half of Jamal Greene’s book he gives us his explanation of a better way forward, and applies it to several controversial issues, including abortion and discrimination. Greene thinks that courts, especially SCOTUS, spend too much time on their made-up rules about about rights, instead of the rights themselves. He thinks all applicable rights claims have to be considered in rendering decisions and establishing remedies.

The Rodriguez case discussed in the last post is a good example. Kids are going to school with bats, but nothing can be done because of court-created rules designed to limit the reach of the Reconstruction Amendments. I think Greene is right about this.

I think that there are two problems underlying our current judicial approach that prevent Green’s ideas from being effectuated. First, immediately after the enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments SCOTUS limited their reach. The purported reason was preservation of federalism, as we see in The Slaughterhouse Cases. But that doesn’t explain the ferocity with which the Court attacked individual rights and especially Congressional action up to the 1930s, and then after a short respite, returned to the attack beginning in the Reagan era and continuing to the present.

This, I think, reflects a deep skepticism of democracy, whether in claims of individual rights against governments, or in concerted political action through the legislature. It seems SCOTUS has little respect for rights claims of ordinary people regardless of whether the rights arise through legislation or under the Constitution.

The judicial branch has always been a bastion of the privileged elites, who mostly like things the way they are. Powerful commercial interests are heavily over-represented, and have always been. Lewis Powell, the author of Rodriguez, is an example.

The second issue, I think, is the general unwillingness of the judicial system to make rulings requiring other branches to enforce. As an example consider Holmes’ 1902 decision in Giles v. Harris, discussed by Greene. Giles, a Black man, had been registered to vote in Alabama for years. The Alabama Constitution was changed to allow local election registrars to deny registration to people who lacked good character. Giles was not allowed to register under the new system. Ovrall, registration of Black men drooped to nearly zero. There is no doubt that this was a violation of the 15th Amendment. Holmes refused to do anything. One of his reasons was that “…the sheer scale of the conspiracy Giles was alleging exceeded the Court’s power to remedy it.” P. 49.

Courts have always been concerned about their ability to enforce their decrees, and rightly so. But that’s not an excuse for simply refusing to enforce rights. Courts are really good at collecting money. Creative use of this power is a great solution to weakness.

For example, in the Rodriguez case Powell could have given the school district a money judgment large enough to construct a new school, one less friendly to bats, and awarded further monetary damages necessary to bring the school’s textbooks up to date and deal with other issues. He could have imposed costs and attorney’s fees on the school district, and awarded the plaintiffs monetary damages for the injuries they suffered by going to school with bats and ripped up out-of-date textbooks. That would open the door to other under-funded schools in Texas to sue the State and local districts to equalize things. The legislature eventually would have been forced change the funding arrangement.

A third issue, most pornounced in the current panel of SCOTUS, is its effort to justify its decisions by newly created doctrines. The so-called Major Questions Doctrine is an example. This was apparently created for the purpose of thwarting government efforts to remedy serious emergencies pursuant to express legislative action. Another example is the absurd result in US v. Trump, where the loons expressly denied that they were looking at the facts of the actual case:  Trump’s efforts to overthrow an election. Instead they insisted they had to make a rule for the ages.

This is preposterous because the right-wingers on the Court don’t have a problem throwing out cases and rules they don’t like.

There are many better ways forward, including Greene’s. But so what? All Republicans including those on SCOTUS are incorrigible. We can’t even get the current crop of geriatric Democrats to hold a hearing on the corruption we all know exists in the judicial system, ranging from the ethics violations of right-wing SCOTUS members to the scandalous judge-shopping of the creepy right wing, to the overtly political decisions of the District and Circuit Court in Fifth Circuit. The fact is that only sustained aggressive demands will ever change anything.

Conclusion To The Conclusion

In this series I’ve discussed three texts: The Evolution Of Agency by Michael Tomasello; Chapter 9 of The Origins of Totalitarianism by Hannah Arendt; and Greene’s thoughtful book.

Tomasello provided a look at the way we humans evolved. I think it hints at how we came to think about rights. He speculates that the earliest ancestors of humans were weaker, slower, more fragile, and had less sensitive eyes, ears and noses than their competitors. They survived by being more cooperative, more attuned to their group, more sensitive to the desires and emotions of individuals in the group. This increased receptiveness to others was the genesis and result of increasing brain size. The larger brain changed the bodies of women to enable birth babies with larger heads. That led to complications of birth. Dealing with those complications required more social cooperation. The longer dependency of the young also increased the demands of cooperation. These changes increased over time and eventually we became human. For a similar view, I recommend Eve by Cat Bohannon, which discusses evolution from the perspective of the female body and mind.

The importance of cooperation in this story leads me to speculate that rights are a way of maintaining individuality among creatures who are tightly bound for the sake of survival.

The Arendt selection says that rights are mutually guaranteed by equal citizens in a society. It also says that rights don’t matter unless there is some way to enforce and protect them. These are her conclusions about the last 200 years, not the earlier millenia.

Greene’s book tells us the story of our national attempt to insure our rights through the legislature and the judiciary, and the sad results.

I think everything we know and essentially all we think and think we know comes from other humans. That includes our rights. Some of us talk about natural rights, some about constitutional rights, some about human rights, some about God-given rights, but all of that comes from other humans and our own interpretations of their thinking. We draw from religions, philosophy, novels, catechisms, preachers, practical experience, our own emotions and sensitivities, laws, each other, our parents and teachers, our colleagues and our children.

But it’s always just us humans, trying to survive as individuals and as members of a group.

So I conclude with a question: how do you discuss questions of rights with people who believe that they possess the absolute unvarying truth?

 

 

 

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How Jack Smith Wants to Prove Trump’s Crimes

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It goes too far to say, as some commentators have, that Jack Smith’s immunity filing is his trial brief.

If this thing were ever to go to trial, such a document would focus more on the elements of the offense that Judge Chutkan would have jurors assess, which I laid out here. While there’s extensive discussion of the Electoral Count Act, particularly regarding the intentional exclusion of the President from it, there’s less discussion of how Trump’s lies impaired its function, the crime charged under 18 USC 371. While there’s a discussion of the intent behind the fake electors plot, there’s less discussion of how those fake certificates served to impair the function of counting the real certificates (a point Trump made in his post-Fischer supplement to his motion to dismiss the indictment on statutory grounds), something that would be key to proving the two 18 USC 1512 charges. There’s little discussion of the victims — 81 million Joe Biden voters — whose rights Donald Trump allegedly attempted to violate in the 18 USC 241 charge.

Jack Smith is not exactly telling us how he’d prove his case. Rather, he’s asking for permission to use certain kinds of evidence to do so.

There’s no telling how SCOTUS will respond to this (I’m particularly interested in the tactical decision to call the Brooks Brothers Riot, “a violent effort to stop the vote count in Florida after the 2000 presidential election,” in a filing that aims to persuade John Roberts, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett.) Prosecutors have raised the cost for Roberts et al, by laying out that their immunity argument basically argues that it is the job of the President of the United States to send mean Tweets eliciting violent threats against members of his own party.

Now that Trump got permission to submit a sur-reply, his team is likely to frame this entire argument anew, as they wanted to do from the start. Given what they’ve said, I would assume their 180-page brief will focus extensively on the chilling effect it would have to hold a former President accountable for almost getting his Vice President killed. Once they prove that, Trump’s lawyers have argued, the entire indictment must be scrapped, because grand jurors were exposed to immunized behavior.

On that point: It seems that the brief relies on immunized conduct that was not shared with the grand jury. This appears most obvious in the footnote where the government says that part of a conversation Mike Pence had with Trump on December 19 is official conduct, but they don’t plan to share it with jurors. A more interesting instance, however, is the reliance on Pat Cipollone’s testimony that, after he showed up to the January 4 meeting at which John Eastman attempted to persuade Pence to throw out legal votes, Trump “explicitly excluded him from” the meeting. Under SCOTUS’ guidelines, that conversation presumably shouldn’t have been presented to grand jurors, but it is powerful evidence that the January 4 meeting was not official business.

The most notable new evidence in the filing is another example. Minutes after Trump sent the Tweet targeting Pence during the riot, the brief describes, Person 15 (Nick Luna), rushed into Trump’s dining room to tell him that Pence had been taken to safety, only for Trump to respond, “So what?” Prosecutors are only using that evidence, they explain, to contextualize the Tweet Trump had just sent, to make it clear it was a private Tweet. “The defendant further revealed the private nature of his desperate conduct as a candidate, rather than a President, in an exchange (that the Government does not plan to use at trial) he had with aide P15 shortly after the 2:24 p.m. Tweet.” Luna probably alerted Trump imagining he might take official action to protect his Vice President, so this would be an official act. Jurors will never hear that testimony, but we get to, as do John Roberts and his colleagues.

Mike Pence

Caveating that I expect Trump to throw the kitchen sink at the Pence issue, I think Smith does fairly well rebutting the presumption of immunity in Trump’s communications with Pence. That analysis relies heavily on the deliberate exclusion of the President from tallying the vote, supporting a conclusion that “it is difficult to imagine an occasion when a President would have any valid reason to try to influence” the certification of the vote (meaning relying on Trump’s discussions with Pence wouldn’t chill valid Presidential communications). It also relies heavily on Blassingame’s holding — one not explicitly adopted in SCOTUS’ immunity ruling — that a candidate for re-election is not entitled to presidential immunity. So, the filing argues, any discussions that Trump and Pence had about their re-election bid (the filing lists nine here) are not official.

[T]he Government intends to introduce evidence of private phone calls or in-person meetings (which occasionally included Campaign staff) that the defendant had with Pence in their unofficial capacities, as running mates in the post-election period.

[snip]

Pence “tried to encourage” the defendant “as a friend,” when news networks projected Biden as the winner of the election; on other occasions, softly suggested the defendant “recognize [the] process is over” even if he was unwilling to concede; and encouraged the defendant to consider running for election again in 2024. Although the defendant and Pence naturally may have touched upon arguably official responsibilities that were tangential to their election prospects—for instance, whether the federal government should begin its logistical transition to prepare for a different Administration°°’—the overall context and content of the conversations demonstrate that they were primarily frank exchanges between two candidates on a shared ticket, and the Government does not intend to elicit testimony about any peripheral discussion of arguably official responsibilities.

Another thing prosecutors did is engage in a system of parallel citation, often citing what must be interview or grand jury transcripts along with passages from Pence’s book.

The brief doesn’t ever mention footnote 3, in which Chief Justice John Roberts, in an attempt to dismiss Justice Barrett’s concerns that excluding officially immune evidence would make it impossible to prosecute the bribery specifically mentioned in the Constitution, said that of course prosecutors could rely on “the public record.” (See Anna Bowers’ good piece on the footnote here.)

3 JUSTICE BARRETT disagrees, arguing that in a bribery prosecution, for instance, excluding “any mention” of the official act associated with the bribe “would hamstring the prosecution.” Post, at 6 (opinion concurring in part); cf. post, at 25–27 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). But of course the prosecutor may point to the public record to show the fact that the President performed the official act. And the prosecutor may admit evidence of what the President allegedly demanded, received, accepted, or agreed to receive or accept in return for being influenced in the performance of the act. See 18 U. S. C. §201(b)(2). What the prosecutor may not do, however, is admit testimony or private records of the President or his advisers probing the official act itself. Allowing that sort of evidence would invite the jury to inspect the President’s motivations for his official actions and to second-guess their propriety. As we have explained, such inspection would be “highly intrusive” and would “ ‘seriously cripple’ ” the President’s exercise of his official duties. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 745, 756 (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 498 (1896)); see supra, at 18. And such second-guessing would “threaten the independence or effectiveness of the Executive.” Trump v. Vance, 591 U. S. 786, 805 (2020)

For much of the Pence testimony on which prosecutors want to rely, that parallel system of citation makes clear, there is a public record, and was — even excerpted in the WSJ — months before prosecutors interviewed Pence. Again, prosecutors aren’t making the argument that that should change the calculus. But ultimately, this is an instance where one key victim of Trump’s alleged crimes went public even before prosecutors asked for his testimony.

I actually think where Jack Smith’s bid may fail is with three others: Eric Herschmann (Person 9), Dan Scavino (Person 45), and Stephen Miller (who — best as I can tell — is not mentioned).

Eric Herschmann

If possible, Smith’s prosecutors rely even more heavily on Eric Herschmann’s testimony than the January 6 Committee did. The immunity brief uses his testimony to prove that Trump knew his claims of election fraud were false. It uses Herschmann’s prediction that Trump would never have to pay Rudy for his election interference because Rudy would never be able to prove his claims. It relies on Herschmann’s testimony (and that of another White House staffer) to describe how Trump mocked Sidney Powell even while relying on her false claims. It relies on Herschmann’s testimony about Trump possibly signing a false declaration in a Georgia lawsuit. And it relies on Herschmann to introduce the evidence presented by paid vendors that there was no evidence of substantive election fraud.

The filing includes two long sections (one, two) explaining why Herschmann’s testimony shouldn’t be considered official actions. Herschmann’s relationship with Trump was familial, arising from his childhood friendship with Jared. His portfolio at the White House was undefined. Prosecutors get around the possibility that Herschmann’s testimony might be official by describing his role as a “conduit for information from the Campaign,” providing “near-daily” updates on the campaign. If this argument fails, then a great deal of prosecutors’ best evidence would disappear.

Dan Scavino

Dan Scavino’s testimony is just as critical. Prosecutors want to use Scavino to introduce Trump’s Twitter addiction and to validate that some Tweets — including the one targeting Pence — were sent by Trump.

P45 served as Assistant to the President and White House Deputy Chief of Staff.694 He also volunteered his time for Campaign work, including traveling to political rallies with the defendant and posting pictures and videos.695 The Government will elicit from P45 at trial that he was the only person other than the defendant with the ability to post to the defendant’s Twitter account, that he sent tweets only at the defendant’s express direction, and that P45 did not send certain specific Tweets, including one at 2:24 p.m. on January 6, 2021.696 He also will generally describe the defendant’s Twitter knowledge and habits, including that the defendant was “very active on his Twitter account,” “paid attention to how his tweets played with his followers,” “was very engaged in watching the news,” and “knew how to read the replies and see all the replies of what people were saying and doing which . . . led to where he would retweet things,” and that any Tweet sent “between 5 or 6 a.m. until 9 or 10 a.m.” and after “9 or 10 p.m.” generally was the defendant personally sending out the Tweet, as opposed to P45 having do it. None of this proposed testimony on P45’s part constitutes evidence of an official act. General information about access to the defendant’s Twitter account, as well as P45’s testimony that P45 did or did not issue a particular Tweet, is unrelated to any particular official act by the defendant.

They also want to use Scavino, along with Herschmann and Nick Luna, to testify that Trump was sitting alone in his dining room obsessing about Fox News coverage on January 6.

The filing treats actions by the White House Deputy Chief of Staff as unofficial, in part, by noting that Scavino “volunteered” for the campaign while working as Deputy Chief of Staff and that “he did not differentiate between his official and his Campaign duties and when he would send Tweets on the account for Campaign purposes.” Like Herschmann, Scavino got White House Counsel advice about how to play both a White House and a campaign role. The filing tries to finagle this by distinguishing between Trump’s @POTUS and his @RealDonaldTrump Twitter accounts.

But ultimately, Scavino would be one of the most hostile witnesses at trial, or in any kind of evidentiary hearing (along with Jason Miller). Prosecutors are resting a whole bunch on what even they admit is a vague border between campaign and official Tweeting.

Stephen Miller

Then there’s Stephen Miller, Trump’s Discount Goebbels.

As far as I know, Miller is not mentioned in this brief at all.

That poses a bit of a potential weak point in prosecutors’ effort to rely on Trump’s January 6 speech treated as a campaign speech (which they otherwise do by matching it to a clear campaign speech given in Georgia two days earlier, focusing on who paid for the rally, noting that Secret Service did not consider it an official event, and observing that Trump walked in and out to Lee Greenwood and YMCA rather than Hail to the Chief).

That’s because — as the January 6 Committee Report describes — Miller was intimately involved in adding attacks on Pence back into the speech after the Vice President refused Trump’s demands a final time.

Instead, between 9:52 a.m. and 10:18 a.m., the President spoke with hisspeechwriter, Stephen Miller, about the words he would deliver at the SaveAmerica Rally just hours later.30 The former President’s speech had come together over the course of 36 hours, going from a screed aimed at encouraging congressional objections to one that would ultimately incite mob violence.31

Only four minutes after the call concluded, at 10:22 a.m., Miller emailedrevisions to the speechwriters, instructing them to “[s]tart inputting thesechanges asap” that included “red highlights marking POTUS edits.”32 ThePresident had made some cosmetic additions, like peppering in the word“corrupt” throughout,33 but there was one substantive edit—a new target—that would focus the crowd’s anger on one man.

None of the preceding drafts mentioned Vice President Pence whatsoever. But now, at the very last minute, President Trump slipped in the following sentences calling the Vice President out by name:

Today, we will see whether Republicans stand strong for the integrity of our elections. And we will see whether Mike Pence enters history as a truly great and courageous leader. All he has to do is refer the illegally-submitted electoral votes back to the states that were given false and fraudulent information where they want to recertify. With only 3 of the 7 states in question we win and become President and have the power of the veto.34

[snip]

As recounted in Chapter 5, President Trump called Vice President Penceat 11:17 a.m.39 The call between the two men—during which the President soon grew “frustrat[ed] or heated,”40 visibly upset,41 and “angry”42—lasted nearly 20 minutes.43 And President Trump insulted Vice President Pence when he refused to obstruct or delay the joint session.

After that call, General Keith Kellogg said that the people in the roomimmediately went back to editing the Ellipse speech.44 At 11:30 a.m., Miller emailed his assistant, Robert Gabriel, with no text in the body but the subject line: “insert—stand by for phone call.”45 At 11:33 a.m., Gabriel emailed the speechwriting team: “REINSERT THE MIKE PENCE LINES. Confirmreceipt.”46 One minute later, speechwriter Ross Worthington confirmed that he had reached Vincent Haley by phone.47 Haley corroborated that he added one “tough sentence about the Vice President” while he was at the teleprompter.48

The final written draft had the following Pence reference: “And we will see whether Mike Pence enters history as a truly great and courageous leader.”49 Haley wasn’t confident that line was what he reinserted, but email traffic and teleprompter drafts produced by the National Archives andRecords Administration (NARA) indicate that he was mistaken.50

Here’s how that process appears in the immunity brief:

At 11:15 am., shortly before traveling to the Ellipse to speak to his supporters, the defendant called Pence and made one last attempt to induce him to act unlawfully in the upcoming session.410 When Pence again refused, and told the defendant that he intended to make a statement to Congress before the certification proceeding confirming that he lacked the authority to do what the defendant wanted, the defendant was incensed.411 He decided to re-insert into his Campaign speech at the Ellipse remarks targeting Pence for his refusal to misuse his role in the certification.412

Admittedly, in the section that specifically argues for the speech’s treatment as a campaign speech, the filing describes that most staffers were using their personal emails to edit the speech (the brief uses this distinction elsewhere, including to admit communications from Mark Meadows). But not the final revisions.

Likewise, the defendant’s White House speechwriting staff understood that the speech was a political, unofficial one and used their personal devices and personal email accounts to do most of the drafting and fact-checking for the defendant’s Ellipse speech, though some last revisions to the speech on the morning of January 6 occurred over White House email.585 And officials in the White House Counsel’s Office who customarily reviewed the defendant’s official remarks pointedly did not review the Ellipse speech because it was an unofficial Campaign speech.586

This may not doom prosecutors’ efforts to admit the speech. There are so many other reasons why it is clearly a campaign speech (though of course, SCOTUS has not adopted Blassingame, so they may not even find that dispositive).

But Stephen Miller is right there in the middle of the speech revisions, ready to claim he did so as an official White House employee.

Mind you, if Trump tried to make that argument, prosecutors might revert to the same thing they did to rely on the Tweet Peter Navarro sent, lying about vote fraud, which Trump then used to pitch January 6. Navarro was a Hatch Act recidivist — Trump’s entire White House was — so you can’t use the fact that Navarro had a White House job to rule that his Tweet was an official act.

In tum, that Tweet linked to a document drafted by P69. P69 that had nothing to do with P69’s official duties as a White House trade advisor, but rather constituted unofficial political activity by a Campaign volunteer who the Office of Special Counsel already had determined to have violated the Hatch Act on numerous occasions by attacking the defendant’s opponent during the lead up to the 2020 presidential election.633 For the reasons described supra pp. 118-126 that make clear that the Ellipse rally was a private event, and the defendant’s remarks there unofficial, his Tweets as a candidate promoting the event were unofficial.

Now’s a good time to reveal that Navarro got a second extension on his deadline to file for cert at SCOTUS, partly because Magistrate Michael Harvey has not yet finished reviewing the emails he sent via ProtonMail for Presidential Records is not yet done. Or, to put it differently, Jack Smith likely still doesn’t have all the emails via which Navarro participated in this coup attempt.

If SCOTUS had any shame, this nitty gritty — the notion that Trump’s mean Tweets against fellow Republicans might be protected under a claim of presidential immunity — would soon become embarrassing.

But then I remember that the three Justices who would be most amenable to such an argument might well grow defensive after being reminded that they were present at the start of all this, the effort to shut down vote counts via lawfare accompanied by the threat of violence.

Update: Lawfare has posted their version of this post. They also point to footnote 3 in the context of Mike Pence’s book.

Update: Note that the December 14 podcast cited in the immunity brief laid out in this post was an interview about the fake elector plot with Stephen Miller. It’s another area where Miller is in the thick of things.

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The Immunity Brief: How We Got Here, Where We’re Going

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I want to take a step back and put the immunity briefing released yesterday in context.

On July 1, after SCOTUS released its immunity opinion on the last possible day, it remanded the case back to Judge Tanya Chutkan to assess what was immune under the newly rewritten Constitution.

As soon as she got the case back, Judge Chutkan ordered a status report for August 9 and a status hearing for August 16. But then on August 8, Jack Smith said, sorry, can we have more time? I correctly predicted then that Smith was superseding the indictment, which Smith did do on August 27 (for reasons I won’t yet explain, this filing makes me think we may see more charges after the election).

In a September 5 status hearing, prosecutors successfully persuaded Judge Chutkan to let them deal with the remand by first submitting a brief explaining how the new indictment complies with SCOTUS’ rewritten Constitution. During the hearing, Chutkan reiterated something she has said from the start: she’s not going to let the election stall this prosecution.

I understand there is an election impending, and I’ve said before and I say again that the electoral process and the timing of the election and what needs to happen before or shouldn’t happen before the election is not relevant here.

This Court is not concerned with the electoral schedule. Yes, there’s an election coming. But the sensitive time that you’re talking about, if you’re talking about the timing of legal issues and the timing of evidentiary issues in relation to when the election is, that’s not — that’s nothing I’m going to consider.

Trump’s team ignored that warning, wailing about the election in a filing that was supposed to be about discovery. They wailed again in response to Jack Smith’s request to file a 180-page brief. In her order granting Smith’s request, Chutkan again swatted back at Trump’s election wails.

In response, defense counsel reframed the problem as an “election dispute,” insisting that “it’s incredibly unfair in the sense that they’re able to put in the public record at this very sensitive time in our nation’s history.” Id. at 28–29. But Defendant’s concern with the political consequences of these proceedings does not bear on the pretrial schedule; “what needs to happen before or shouldn’t happen before the election is not relevant here.” Id. at 29.

When the prosecutors asked to file its brief in redacted form (which they had warned it would do, and which they noted complied with the protective order in the case), Judge Chutkan gave Trump a deadline of noon on Tuesday — a clear sign she didn’t want to dawdle over redaction fights. Nevertheless, in their reply, Trump’s lawyers accused Smith of “improper political considerations” again, rather than disputing any particular redaction. By choosing to offer no more than generalized complaints for more redactions (redactions that might have hidden, just as one example, how many times current Trump campaign advisor Jason Miller told Trump he had lost, lost, lost the election in 2020), Trump’s team sunk their chance to delay the redactions. I thought it might be quick, but didn’t expect it to come as soon as last night.

In her opinion ordering the motion to be unsealed, Judge Chutkan expressed increasing impatience with Trump’s claims of politicization. Trump already got his shot at a vindictive prosecution claim, Chutkan noted, which she rejected as soon as she got the case back in August.

In addition to the assertions discussed above, Defendant’s opposition brief repeatedly accuses the Government of bad-faith partisan bias. See Def.’s Opp’n at 2, 5–6. These accusations, for which Defendant provides no support, continue a pattern of defense filings focusing on political rhetoric rather than addressing the legal issues at hand. See Oversized Brief Order at 2–3 (identifying two recent instances of this pattern). Not only is that focus unresponsive and unhelpful to the court, but it is also unbefitting of experienced defense counsel and undermining of the judicial proceedings in this case. Defendant has had an opportunity to make his case that his prosecution is improperly motivated. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss for Selective and Vindictive Prosecution, ECF No. 116. Future filings should be directed to the issues before the court.

Best as I can tell, Chutkan issued her order around 3:30PM ET yesterday, and the Smith filing posted around 3:35PM.

At 8PM — so well after they should have read Chutkan’s order — Trump’s team requested permission to file for excess pages as well, the same 180-pages that Smith got. They also asked to get a sur-reply, the kind of request that you normally make after someone raises a new issue in a reply, albeit one she effectively invited at the status hearing last month.

But they also asked for an extension for their response until after the election, until November 21. Not only do they offer almost no excuse for the delay, aside from existing deadlines, one of which is for today and the other of which is for an attack on the Special Counsel appointment that conflicts with DC Circuit precedents. But they misrepresent the timing that has already occurred, suggesting that the time DOJ took to consult with others at DOJ and supersede the indictment was rather time they took to write the immunity brief.

[T]he Court granted the Special Counsel’s request for an additional three weeks to complete its drafting, setting a September 26, 2024, deadline.

[snip]

This resembles the 3-week extension the Court previously provided the Special Counsel, Aug. 9, 2024, Minute Order, which allowed the Special Counsel to work on its initial brief before the September status conference. In total, the requested extension would provide President Trump 8 weeks to file his Response, which approximates the 6 weeks the Court granted the Special Counsel (including a 3-week extension before the status conference, and an additional 3 weeks thereafter to finalize its brief and exhibits).

Trump’s lawyers offer no justification for the extension, at all, that arises from their own time constraints (for example, the Jewish high holy days, which have a habit of messing with many a criminal docket, or their other caseload). They simply want more time because, they falsely claim, Jack Smith got more time.

Jack Smith wrote a 180-page filing in three weeks.

And Judge Chutkan already knows that Trump’s team can work quickly. At the status hearing on September 5, when John Lauro similarly tried to stall, Thomas Windom pointed out that in July, Trump’s attorneys wrote a 52-page attack on the New York State hush payment case in nine days.

I want to point out just as a data point for your Honor, on July 10th of this year, the Defendant, in his New York State criminal case, the Defendant and two of the attorneys sitting at this table filed a 52-page motion to vacate his state criminal conviction on the grounds of a Supreme Court opinion that came out nine days before. Fifty-two pages covering an entire trial record in nine days.

The defense can move comprehensively, quickly and well. So can we. And the Court should consider that in setting its schedule. The final piece, your Honor —

THE COURT: Congratulations, Mr. Blanche.

That’s in the court record now: At a pace of 52 pages in nine days, Trump’s team should be able to file their 180 pages in a month.

But a month is longer than their current deadline, which is three weeks. So I wouldn’t be surprised if Chutkan did give them some relief. Even if she gives them one week, it’d bump right up against election day, which is transparently the point.

It is likely that Trump will not have to explain himself until after voters have already weighed in.

Back on August 31, I noted that Trump really didn’t want to have to justify almost getting Mike Pence killed on January 6.

In 2016, Donald Trump bragged, “I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody, and I wouldn’t lose any voters, OK?”

This election, Trump wants to hide from voters details of how he almost killed his Vice President, Mike Pence, and his claim that doing so was an official act protected by presidential immunity.

That’s the primary thing you need to know about the joint status report presented to Judge Tanya Chutkan in Trump’s January prosecution last night.

[snip]

There are a bunch of legal details in this status report. But given the near certainty that if Trump wins, the entire prosecution will go away, the only one that really matters is that, this election, Trump isn’t so sure that he would lose no votes if he shot someone on Fifth Avenue — or if voters learned why and how he almost had his Vice President assassinated in the US Capitol — as he was in 2016.

Trump doesn’t want to tell voters he thinks that as President, he could have Mike Pence shot on the Senate floor — shot as punishment because his Vice President refused an illegal order to steal an election — and be immune from any consequences for doing so.

But there must be more than that. After all, the allegation is out there, along with the new revelation that after Trump sent the tweet targeting Pence at 2:24PM, someone (probably Nick Luna) rushed into Trump’s dining room and told him Pence had been moved to a secure location. “So what?” Trump said as his Vice President was hearing chants of “hang Mike Pence” from Trump’s rioters.

Trump wants to boot this past not just the election, but also the aftermath.

Perhaps Trump just wants to leave open the possibility of never responding. If he wins, Judge Chutkan would have very few tools to enforce her deadlines, even in the two months before Trump was inaugurated.

Or perhaps Trump doesn’t want to address a coup strategy that he plans to reuse?

Update: I mean, how familiar does all this feel, citing how Trump laid the groundwork for his coup attempt?

  • In an interview on July 19, 2020, when asked repeatedly if he would accept the results of the election, the defendant said he would “have to see” and “it depends.”5
  • On July 30, despite having voted by mail himself earlier that year, the defendant suggested that widespread mail-in voting provided cause for delaying the election, tweeting, “With Universal Mail-In Voting (not Absentee Voting, which is good), 2020 will be the most INACCURATE & FRAUDULENT Election in history. It will be a great embarrassment to the USA. Delay the Election until people can properly, securely and safely vote???”6
  • In an interview on August 2, the defendant claimed, without any basis, that “[t]here is no way you can go through a mail-in vote without massive cheating.”7
  • At a campaign event in Wisconsin on August 17, the defendant told his supporters, “[t]he only way we’re going to lose this election is if the election is rigged, remember that. It’s the only way we’re going to lose this election, so we have to be very careful.”8
  • In his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention on August 24, the defendant said that “[t]he only way they can take this election away from us is if this is a rigged election.”9
  • On October 27, during remarks regarding his campaign, the defendant said, “[i]t would be very, very proper and very nice if a winner were declared on November 3rd, instead of counting ballots for two weeks, which is totally inappropriate, and I don’t believe that that’s by our laws. I don’t believe that. So we’ll see what happens.”10 The defendant said this despite—or perhaps because—his private advisors had informed him that it was unlikely that the winner of the election would be declared on November 3.

Update: As I suspected she might, Judge Chutkan gave Trump more time — just enough to get beyond the election. But not all the time he requested.

MINUTE ORDER as to DONALD J. TRUMP: Defendant’s [253] “Motion to Extend Page Limits and Time to Respond to Government’s Motion for Immunity Determinations and for Leave to File a Sur-Reply” is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The court’s [233] Order is MODIFIED as follows: Defendant’s combined Response and Renewed Motion to Dismiss Based on Presidential Immunity is due November 7, 2024 and may include up to 180 pages; the Government’s combined Reply and Opposition is due November 21, 2024; and Defendant may file a combined Reply and Sur-Reply by December 5, 2024. Signed by Judge Tanya S. Chutkan on 10/3/2024. (zcll)

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Bill Barr Didn’t Hear When Trump Asked, “Russia Are You Listening?”

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One of the most surprising details in the book by former Mueller prosecutors, including Aaron Zebley, is that they added a contentious half paragraph the morning they finished the report.

For volume I, we discussed one last time whether the report was sufficiently clear about “coordination” with Russia. One of the sticking points: on July 27, 2016, Trump had made his “Russia, if you’re listening” speech urging Russia to find Clinton’s “missing” emails. Five hours later, the Russian GRU launched attacks into the Clinton team’s personal email accounts. This appeared to be Russia’s response to Trump’s speech.

Bob had tied our work to established criminal standards. We did not view this “call and response”—Trump’s publicly asking for an action and then Russia taking one—as sufficient for a criminal agreement or conspiracy. But without more explanation, we were concerned a reader might not understand why these July 27 events did not constitute “coordination.” That morning, we added a paragraph to the introduction to volume I to make our reasoning clearer (emphasis added):

“Coordination” does not have a settled definition in federal criminal law. We understood coordination to require an agreement—tacit or express—between the Trump Campaign and the Russian government on election interference. That requires more than the two parties taking actions that were informed by or responsive to the other’s actions or interest. We applied the term coordination in that sense when stating that the investigation did not establish that Trump campaign coordinated with the Russian government in its election-interference activities.

There’s more to this paragraph: it starts by explaining why prosecutors didn’t assess Trump’s actions in terms of “collusion,” another term that’s not a crime. Unlike “collusion,” though, “coordination” was included in Rod Rosenstein’s appointment order. As a prosecution and declination report, Mueller had to (and did) assess conduct in terms of law, not buzzwords or Rosenstein’s ill-considered measures.

Rather than providing clarity, this paragraph made things worse, because those who had spent years talking about “collusion,” incorrectly claimed the report had addressed it. No collusion!!! All the headlines blared. No collusion!!! Bill Barr keeps claiming.

In fact, as the book describes it, prosecutors added the coordination language, at least, not to expand the scope of the report (to include terms people used to describe it), but to address how they approached what the book calls “call-and-response:” when Russia and Trump’s campaign worked in concert without formally agreeing to do so.

Of late, I’ve come to understand this “call-and-response” structure as Russia’s effort to lock Trump in, ensuring a benefit to itself, in his compromise and America’s polarization, whether or not he took the actions Russia would prefer.

There’s a sad irony here. Prosecutors thought that the “are you listening” comment was so outrageous, they needed to explain why it was nevertheless not a crime, because of course must appear outrageous to everyone else.

But in reality, it didn’t appear to their bosses at all. Both Rod Rosenstein and Bill Barr, for example, repeatedly excised a key part of Mueller’s findings: that Russia was seeking to help Trump and Trump was happy to accept the help from a hostile foreign country.

Rod Rosenstein did so when announcing the Internet Research Agency troll indictment; Rosenstein even ad-libbed a claim that the indictment did not allege the information operation changed the outcome of the election.

One thing we noticed about Rosenstein’s remarks was that he never stated that the defendants’ actions were designed to help Trump and disparage Clinton, even though that was one of the core allegations of the indictment. And at the end of his remarks, he added something that wasn’t in the indictment: “There is no allegation,” he said, “that the charged conduct altered the outcome of the 2016 election.”

Bill Barr didn’t say Russia was trying to help Trump when he informed Congress of his spin of the results.

It omitted or misstated our analysis. In its discussion of volume I, the letter accurately stated our core charging decisions, but left out any reference to the intent of the Russian social media campaign to aid Trump in his bid for the White House, nor did it describe that same objective driving the hack-and-dump operation run by Russian military intelligence. There was no mention of the contacts between members of the Trump campaign and Russian officials and proxies. The letter also left out a core conclusion of volume I: that the “Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure the outcome, and that the [Trump] Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through [Russian military] efforts.

And Barr did it again — refused to say Russia was trying to help Trump — when he gave a press conference with the release of the Report.

[A]s he had in his March 24 letter, he omitted any mention of Russian support for Trump’s election bid. He then described the Russian military intelligence operation to steal and dump Clinton campaign emails, but again omitted the Russian government’s purpose of harming Clinton’s election bid in order to aid Trump. Barr also did not mention our finding that the Trump campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian military intelligence efforts.

He then described the Russian military intelligence operation to steal and dump Clinton campaign emails, but again omitted the Russian government’s purpose of harming Clinton’s election bid in order to aid Trump. Barr also did not mention our finding that the Trump campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian military intelligence efforts.

To be sure, the prosecutors’ larger gripe was always how Barr dealt with volume II. Mueller’s team had decided they would not to make a prosecutorial decision, but Barr spun it as a choice that they could not make such a decision. (My instincts that they deliberately left this for Congress are confirmed by the book.)

But the book tracks how the people overseeing the investigation refused to admit something central to it: Russia wanted to help Trump, and Trump invited that help.

“If it’s what you say I love it especially later in the summer.”

It’s an important observation given what came next. The entire Durham investigation was premised on ignoring Trump’s request for help. Two years later, for example, Barr insisted that the Russian investigation started from the Steele dossier (and astonishingly, Barr dismissed the possibility that Russia would want something in exchange for electing Trump).

Bill Barr and John Durham deliberately kept themselves ignorant of all that. Three years later, Barr continued to insist the investigation arose from the Steele dossier (and, insanely, said that since Russia didn’t need help doing a hack-and-leak, there was no reason to investigate Trump). Durham repeatedly tried to prevent those he charged from describing how Trump’s public comments (and their likely knowledge that another hacking attempted followed the comments) drove their concerns about Trump’s ties to Russia, even though as Marc Elias described, that was the reason they all started to focus on Russia.

Even at the end of his four year investigation, Durham claimed to have no idea that in response to Trump’s comments, Russia attempted to hack a new target.

Of course, Barr and Durham had to ignore Trump’s solicitation of a hack. If they hadn’t, they would never have had an excuse to launch the Durham probe, to pretend that investigating why Trump’s campaign got advance warning of the operation and then goaded it on made total sense. Barr and Durham had to pretend that none of this posed a risk to the country.

For a report for Bill Barr, Mueller added language trying to explain why they didn’t treat Trump’s successful solicitation of an attempted hack against his opponent as a crime.

But Barr, both before, in real time, and for years after, never even considered that a problem. Or couldn’t, because if he did, he couldn’t criminalize Hillary Clinton’s victimization at the hand of Russia.

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Bill Barr, “So Far as We Knew”

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As I described, the book written by Aaron Zebley and two of Robert Mueller’s other former prosecutors breaks most new ground in its description of discussions between Mueller’s team, Trump’s lawyers, and those supervising the investigation at DOJ.

As it describes, for months, the investigation was working towards a January 27, 2018 interview of Trump, to be held at Camp David. But shortly after Mike Flynn pled guilty, Trump attorney John Dowd (whose call to Rob Kelner floating a pardon made it into the report but not the book), started getting cold feet. On January 30, Dowd told Jim Quarles, “I can’t let this guy testify. I will resign before he does.” On March 1, Dowd and Jay Sekulow first pitched the idea of written questions. Four days later, Mueller first raised the possibility of a subpoena; Dowd said that would be war. Trump would plead the Fifth before he’d respond to a subpoena.

Three weeks later, Dowd resigned.

On April 18, Sekulow told Quarles that Trump was close to bringing on new lawyers. Of Jane and Marty Raskin, Sekulow spoke of their high stature.

“We are talking to people with high stature to take over the representation,” Sekulow said. “Just finalizing everything now.”

“Good,” Jim said.

“You know them, actually. I think you’ve worked with them in the past. They are like-minded people who share our desire to get to the goal line.”

Of Rudy Giuliani (who was officially disbarred in DC yesterday), Sekulow said he hoped he wouldn’t join the team.

Sekulow continued, “There’s a third person too, but I’m hopeful he won’t join.” He did not divulge this person’s identity.

[snip]

Sekulow then said, “And the third person is, well, America’s Mayor.”

Jim thought for a brief moment. “Rudy?”

“That’s correct,” Sekulow said. “Rudy Giuliani is coming on too.”

Rudy almost immediately ran afoul of the Mueller team.

At a meeting on April 24, there was a discussion about whether Trump even could be charged. Bob told Rudy that “we plan to follow the [OLC] regulations” prohibiting the indictment of a sitting President, though in a way that left wiggle room in case (as the book describes) the team found “evidence proving Trump truly was a Manchurian candidate.” Rudy asked whether Trump was a witness, a subject, or a target; Mueller answered he was a subject.

Giuliani asked, “Is he a subject regardless of the OLC opinion?” In other words, were we not labeling Trump a “target” simply because he couldn’t be indicted? Or was he a subject because there was not enough evidence to make him a target?

Bob said that we had deliberately withheld making a judgment about the president’s conduct, but we would get back to them if we could say more.

In spite of repeated assurances the meeting was confidential, Rudy promptly ran to the press and (per the book, at least) misrepresented what Mueller said. As the book describes, Rudy told journalists that if Trump couldn’t be indicted, he couldn’t be subpoenaed.

That’s all background to the discussion of whether Trump could be charged with obstruction. As the book describes, Trump’s request that Don McGahn make a false statement disclaiming Trump’s effort to replace Mueller involved the creation of a false record in an attempt to obstruct the investigation; it clearly involved creating a false evidentiary record, and so would qualify no matter how you interpret 18 USC 1512(c)(2). But the other obstruction incidents did not (this issue has now been decided by Fischer to require evidentiary impairment, meaning the only obstruction incident that could be charged against Trump, ignoring the immunity opinion, is the McGahn one). So there was an extended dispute, starting in May 2018, which a long chapter discusses at length.

But then, unbeknownst to Mueller, Bill Barr weighed in, writing Rod Rosenstein and OLC head Steven Engel that Mueller’s views on obstruction were wrong.

As the book describes, Barr’s allegedly unsolicited memo was “remarkably timely,” because, from that point forward, Rosenstein’s team seemed to adopt precisely the analysis Barr offered.

We didn’t know it at the time, but just as we were starting our subpoena discussion with the DOJ, another person weighed in with the department on these very issues.

On June 8, 2018, the once-and-future attorney general, William Barr, submitted a nineteen-page memo to Rosenstein and Assistant Attorney General Steven Engel, who was then head of the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel. In his memo, Barr argued that section 1512 did not apply to President Trump in the manner Barr imagined we might be seeking to apply it. We say “imagined” because Barr had no actual insight into our work, so far as we knew.

Given that Barr was a private citizen at that time, his memo was remarkably timely. It posited (fairly accurately) that we were then “demanding that the President submit to interrogation about [obstruction] incidents, using the threat of subpoenas to coerce his submission.” Barr’s bottom line was that a prosecutor, even a special counsel, should not be allowed to require an examination of the president regarding these incidents, end of story. According to Barr, section 1512 prohibited only corrupt acts that impaired the integrity or availability of evidence, for instance, an act that destroyed a document or induced a witness to change his testimony. Barr’s memo stated that a president’s conduct can “obviously” be considered obstruction of justice in the “classic sense of sabotaging a proceeding’s truth-finding function. Thus, for example, if a President knowingly… induces a witness to change testimony… then he, like anyone else, commits the act of obstruction.”

But Barr maintained that the obstruction statute did not apply to what he termed the president’s “facially-lawful” actions—such as firing an FBI director or ending a federal criminal prosecution—even if such an action were done with corrupt intent and impacted a grand jury proceeding. In other words, even if Trump fired Comey for a corrupt purpose, that could not be a crime, in Barr’s view.

We wouldn’t become aware of Barr’s memo until December 2018, the day before his Senate confirmation hearing for attorney general. Nevertheless, his memo seemed to capture the fundamental issues Rosenstein and the department would raise throughout that summer when it came to subpoenaing the president. Barr may have previewed the department’s position when he wrote: “It is inconceivable to me that the Department could accept Mueller’s interpretation of 1512(c)(2). It is untenable as a matter of law and cannot provide a legitimate basis for interrogating the President.” [my emphasis]

A couple of points about this.

First, the Zebley book doesn’t address any documents that have subsequently been released. Most notably, while the book discusses the events immediately following the conclusion of the report at length, it doesn’t address Bill Barr’s memo declining prosecution on obstruction (the chapter on Barr’s letter to Congress is called “The Barr Report”), even though Barr egregiously avoided comment on the pardons that Trump was using to silence Mike Flynn, Paul Manafort, and Roger Stone.

Similarly, it doesn’t address the communications with OLC that were liberated via FOIA. Those show that starting on July 12 — the day before the GRU indictment incorporating reference to Roger Stone — Ed O’Callaghan shared everything that went between Mueller and Trump’s lawyers with Engel who, like Rosenstein, got the Barr obstruction memo, and along with O’Callaghan would “advise” Barr to release his letter to Congress. Starting on July 26, National Security Division head John Demers got added. Those things, taken together, strongly suggest that OLC was involved from the start to find a way to find that Trump couldn’t be charged (remember that Engel did similar cover-up work during impeachment).

All that is not that suspicious if, indeed, “Barr had no actual insight into our work.”

“So far as we knew.”

But it would be if Barr did have actual insight into what Mueller was doing.

LOLGOP and I are hard at work on our Ball of Thread episode on precisely how Bill Barr killed the Mueller investigation. And in that context, I’ve returned to something I’ve puzzled over for years: Barr’s description, in his book, of his decision to return to government with the intent of killing the Mueller investigation and starting an investigation without a crime, the Durham investigation.

I would soon make the difficult decision to go back into government in large part because I saw the way the President’s adversaries had enmeshed the Department of Justice in this phony scandal and were using it to hobble his administration. Once in office, it occupied much of my time for the first six months of my tenure. It was at the heart of my most controversial decisions. Even after dealing with the Mueller report, I still had to launch US Attorney John Durham’s investigation into the genesis of this bogus scandal. At the end of my first year in office, the President was impeached over a harebrained effort, involving Rudy Giuliani, to push back on the Russia collusion canard by digging up an alleged counter-scandal in Ukraine implicating the Clinton campaign or Vice President Biden and his son Hunter.

The fallout from Russiagate continued during my last year in office. My relationship with the President frayed as he became frustrated by my failure to bring charges against those who had ginned up Russiagate and the failure of Durham’s investigation to produce more rapid results.

I’ve always believed — even already taped for the podcast my belief — that you need no more than Barr’s reactionary views (which happen to match those of several SCOTUS justices), his past work obstructing Iran-Contra, and years of submersion in Fox News propaganda to explain his actions. Just like you need no more than Trump’s narcissism to explain his actions, you need no more than those three characteristics of Barr to explain his willingness to chase Russian disinformation in his effort to kill concerns about Trump’s ties to  Russia.

You need no more to explain their actions, but I can never shake the possibility there’s more.

All the more so given Lev Parnas’ claim, in interviews after the release of From Russia with Lev, that Victoria Toensing got Barr hired.

Now, Parnas’ reference — and his visibility on interactions between Toensing, Rudy, and Barr — post-dates Barr’s June 2018 memo. He’s talking about Toensing’s assurances to Trump, after he fired Jeff Sessions, that Barr would make the Mueller investigation go away (though if Toensing made that assurance, the Ukraine stuff looks far different, as does Barr’s treatment of it as a mere “counter-scandal”).

But Toensing was involved in the effort to make the Mueller investigation go away far earlier.

She represented Sam Clovis (who was interviewed, without an attorney, in two parts on October 3, 2017, and interviewed, including before a grand jury, with Toensing, on October 26, 2017). George Papadopoulos probably told Clovis that Russia had Hillary’s emails and Clovis was involved in Papadopoulos’ apparent discussions about setting up a September 2016 meeting with Russia, but Clovis testified that he had no memory of either of those things. And she represented Erik Prince (who was interviewed on April 4 and May 3, 2018) — who, like Steve Bannon, deleted their texts to each other from during the period when Prince was meeting with Kirill Dmitriev in the Seychelles, but has no memory of doing so.

Indeed, Toensing’s spouse, Joe DiGenova, even briefly said he was representing Trump, during that transition where Rudy got added. During his Ukraine caper a year later, Rudy repeatedly proposed that he do the work while Toensing billed for it. So if you got Rudy, you got Toensing.

And if Toensing later was involved in getting Barr hired, it would be unsurprising if she was a contact with him before that.

Incidentally, Barr never once mentions Toensing in his book. He mentions Rudy, who is a central focus of his book, around 44 times. He exercised his right to remain silent about Toensing.

In a follow-up, I’m going to talk (again) about the blind spot that connects the Mueller investigation and the Durham investigation — the blind spot at the core of Bill Barr’s effort to cover up Trump’s ties to Russia.

For now, though, consider the possibility that Barr had a great deal more insight into the Mueller investigation when he wrote that memo than he let on.

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Scott Schools Got the [Trump Subpoena] Memo — Then Left DOJ

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As noted, while the book by Aaron Zebley et al does not reveal a single new detail from the Russian investigation, it provided a bunch of new details on discussions between Mueller’s team, Trump’s lawyers, and DOJ. Two chapters focus almost entirely on discussions about an interview and, after Trump’s new legal team in May 2018, reversed earlier assurances Trump would sit for an interview, discussions about a subpoena.

The book describes how, after getting nowhere with requests for a voluntary interview, Zebley approached Scott Schools (then the senior non-political appointment at DOJ) about subpoenaing Trump. Schools asked for a memo making the case.

Three days after Mueller delivered it, Schools left DOJ.

Bob’s May 16 letter about the importance of an interview did not get an immediate response from Trump’s lawyers. Instead, after a series of emails, calls, and meetings during the ensuing weeks, the Raskins told us that they would agree to an interview on preelection Russia-related topics only. There could be no questions on obstruction. Bob rejected this proposal.

By the end of June, it was becoming clear that a subpoena might be the only way to secure the president’s testimony on obstruction. Aaron called Schools at the DOJ and relayed the president’s latest position. Aaron explained that “evidence from the president is likely to be of significant value to our evaluation of the issues.”

Schools did not immediately respond, so Aaron continued: “If we can’t negotiate a resolution, we’d like to point to a subpoena as our next step.” Aaron told Schools we wanted the department to agree to enforce a subpoena in the courts, including the Supreme Court if it came to that. “We have written materials that go through the evidence and our analysis” as to why a subpoena was necessary and appropriate, Aaron said.

Schools responded in his muted southern drawl, “Think we’ll want to see those.”

Four days later, on July 3, we delivered to Schools and O’Callaghan a memo, “Preliminary Assessment of Obstruction Evidence,” with a set of supporting documents. The takeaway was on page 1: the president had refused an interview; we had gathered significant evidence on obstruction and had determined that the law enabled us to compel the president’s testimony; and, finally, “we have concluded that the issuance of a subpoena is justified.” There was no immediate response from the department. (On July 6, 2018, after a decades-long career at the Department of Justice, Schools left to take a job in the private sector.)

There’s no evidence, here, that the memo was the reason Schools left, apparently with no notice to Mueller’s team.

But eight months later, in advance of the first meeting between Mueller and Barr, Ed O’Callaghan probed what would appear in the report on obstruction.

He specifically referred to the memo justifying the subpoena as “aggressive.”

We knew that one of the main issues for our March 5 meeting with Barr would be obstruction of justice. In the days leading up to the meeting, O’Callaghan had asked Aaron how we planned to handle our obstruction findings. “Will your report be as aggressive as your legal analysis from last summer?” he asked, referring to the memo we submitted in July 2018 about a subpoena for the president’s testimony. “That is a topic we want to discuss.”

As it happens, almost immediately after Mueller gave DOJ the memo in June 2018, according to files released under FOIA, they pulled in Office of Legal Counsel and (at least for a few meetings), National Security Division. It’s not entirely clear Mueller’s team realized Rod Rosenstein’s people were doing that.

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The Habitual Lies on Which Trump Has Built His Attack on Rule of Law

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Credit where it’s due: WaPo has already published two stories this week that attempt to cover Trump like the conman he is, rather than the good faith politician he is often treated as.

Yesterday, Ashley Parker wrote about how Trump spins ridiculous lies to gin up fear against Joe Biden and Kamala Harris.

It is a distorted, warped and, at times, absurdist portrait of a nation where the insurrectionists who stormed the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, to deadly effect were merely peaceful protesters, and where unlucky boaters are faced with the unappealing choice between electrocution or a shark attack. His extreme caricatures also serve as another way for Trump to traffic in lies and misinformation, using an alternate reality of his own making to create an often terrifying — and, he seems to hope — politically devastating landscape for his political opponents.

Later yesterday, Isaac Arnsdorf and Josh Dawsey described what Trump was trying to do with a statement that — among other things — said Trump wanted Florida to take the lead in investigating the Ryan Routh suspected assassination attempt: He was trying to “foment distrust of federal law enforcement.”

His statement sought to implicate President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris, picking up on other recent remarks blaming them for failing to protect him. There is no evidence that Biden or Harris were involved in any security decisions leading up to the apparent assassination attempts, and Biden has since ordered the administration to provide the Secret Service with every available resource and asked Congress for more funding.

These pieces treat Trump’s language as utilitarian means to accrue power, rather than transparent statements of truth, something that — in my opinion — is necessary to reclaim truth from him. It’s a rare moment of a news outlet applying savviness to the manipulation Trump is attempting rather than how it fits into a campaign strategy.

The means of manipulation are the news, not (primarily, anyway) the measure of their success.

That said, while the Arnsdorf/Dawsey story fact checks two of Trump’s claims,

There is no evidence that Biden or Harris were involved in any security decisions leading up to the apparent assassination attempts, and Biden has since ordered the administration to provide the Secret Service with every available resource and asked Congress for more funding.

[snip]

He also complained that FBI Director Christopher A. Wray, who Trump appointed, testified to Congress in July that he was not certain what struck Trump’s ear at the July 13 rally in Butler, Pa. The FBI quickly clarified that Trump was injured by a bullet or a fragment.

They don’t fact check the lies on which Trump’s grievances are based. For example, they misstate what Trump claimed that Director Wray said:

[T]he FBI Director went before Congress and falsely said that it may not have been a bullet, “It was just glass or shrapnel — a lie condemned by even my worst enemies. What he said was disgraceful, especially since it was witnessed LIVE by millions of people, and he was forced to immediately retract.

This quotation, presented as such, completely misstates what Chris Wray said.

He said, “there’s some question about whether or not it’s a bullet or shrapnel that hit his ear.” As the FBI clarified immediately, what hit Trump was, “a bullet, whether whole or fragmented into smaller pieces.” Bullet fragments are shrapnel.

Wray never raised glass (from the teleprompter).

Similarly, WaPo never debunks Trump’s false claim that the “Biden/Harris DOJ/FBI [have] control over local D.A.s and A.G.s.”

Perhaps the most curious choice, however, is how WaPo defined half a paragraph of shorthand for readers…

In the statement, Trump proceeded to recite a long list of legal problems that he attributed to his political opponents, using shorthand familiar to his fans, including:

  • “Russia, Russia, Russia,” meaning special counsel Robert S. Mueller III’s investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 election
  • “Impeachment Hoax Number One,” again meaning the 2019 impeachment, for which the Senate acquitted him; and “Impeachment Hoax Number Two,” meaning his 2021 impeachment for inciting the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol, again resulting in acquittal
  • “the Lawless Documents Hoax,” meaning the court-authorized search of his Mar-a-Lago estate as part of a federal prosecution for mishandling classified documents, which a Trump-appointed judge dismissed in July
  • “the January 6th Hoax” and “the J6 Unselect Committee,” meaning the House investigation into the attack on the Capitol
  • “the Manhattan D.A.’s Zombie Case,” meaning his conviction in May on 34 felony counts of falsifying business records in a 2016 hush money scheme
  • “the New York A.G. Scam,” meaning New York Attorney General Letitia James’s lawsuit accusing Trump’s businesses of fraud, resulting in a $450 million judgment in February

… without debunking the lies.

For example, DOJ has repeatedly debunked Trump’s claim that the January 6 Committee deleted documents and Republicans haven’t been able to prove it with their majority either.

Letitia James didn’t just accuse Trump and win a judgment, she proved that Trump and his sons are fraudsters.

And the balance of that paragraph includes a set of lies implicating Hunter Biden and his father. Trump invented the quote, “Russian interference and disinformation;” the false claim that the former spooks used the word “disinformation,” rather than “information operation,” has always been central to an orchestrated campaign claiming they lied. Moreover, the letter expressed a non-falsifiable opinion; to this day many of the former spooks who signed it stand by that opinion that the laptop “has the earmarks of a Russian influence operation.” (And contrary to some WaPo reports, FBI has never claimed to have done the things it would need to do to dispute it.)

Nothing in the laptop shows evidence of Joe Biden’s grift (indeed, after six years of investigation, DOJ didn’t substantiate any unlawful grift on the part of Hunter).

In other words, it’s not just the general insinuation that the Deep State can’t be trusted. WaPo is right that Trump uses a lot of shorthand when he attacks the Deep State.

But even that shorthand is riddled with deliberate false claims. In each instance, Trump transforms something that has a perfectly understandable explanation — Chris Wray was trying hard to avoid overstating what the FBI had concluded, the spooks expressed an opinion — and by misrepresenting it, makes it appear far worse, Wray dismissing the seriousness of Trump being hit, former spooks trying to cover for the Biden family.

I don’t mean to be greedy. I’m grateful that WaPo has, at long last, started explaining how Trump exerts his power, rather than treating his false claims as if they were delivered in good faith.

But if we’re going to unpack the very cynical way Trump has deployed lie after lie to get his supporters and the Republican Party generally to hate rule of law, this cumulative process needs to be unpacked. The press has, for years, simply let Trump repeat those underlying claims without contest, as WaPo again does here. None of them are true, but his followers believe them, not least because the press disseminates them in various ways without contest.

There is no underlying basis for Trump’s grievances about the Deep State. None.

To invent that grievance, Trump has created lie after lie, and built them together into a caricature of the Deep State that his loyal followers have been trained to attack.

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Why No One Went to Prison for Rudy Giuliani’s Hunter Biden Corruption

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Like many people, I’ve watched From Russia with Lev since it was released the other day.

The documentary tells a story I’ve covered here in real time: of how, with Lev Parnas’ help, Rudy Giuliani solicited dirt on Hunter (and Joe) Biden from foreigners, mobsters, and Russian spies, in hopes of helping Trump stay in office.

As told, with Lev’s spouse Svetlana serving as a key narrator, it’s a compelling, personal story.

I’ve also told — am one of the only people who has told — the story that many people are now asking: why no one went to prison for this caper. The documentary has led many people, understandably, to demand to know why no one (besides Lev, they sometimes say, inaccurately) went to prison for all this, which has, predictably, led to the same conspiratorial bashing of Merrick Garland we saw with the January 6 investigation.

The question is premised on certain choices the filmmakers made: focusing away from Dmitry Firtash and especially from Andrii Derkach (who got involved after Lev was done), crediting the spin of Lev’s attorney, Joseph Bondy, and simplifying the investigation of Hunter Biden. The film doesn’t fill in any of the gaps I noted in Lev’s book, and creates new ones. It creates the appearance that Lev was prosecuted solely to protect Trump from impeachment and that the investigation into Hunter arose solely out of Rudy’s efforts. Those choices make sense for narrative and legal reasons, but as a good story does, it simplifies the issue.

And I promise you, the film vastly understates the corruption that went on. Wildly understates it. One goal I have for Ball of Threads is to unpack what is currently known of that far deeper corruption, but that still just scratches the surface.

The quick explanation of why Rudy didn’t go to prison for this is that:

  • Bill Barr did wildly corrupt things to protect him, Donald Trump, and himself
  • By the time, shortly into the Biden administration, DOJ tried to pursue Rudy, Rudy’s phones were corrupted

Trying to hold Garland responsible for failing to prosecute the underlying crime amounts to doing Bill Barr’s propaganda work, because Barr worked relentlessly to protect Rudy.

You can, however, hold Garland responsible for one thing: the continued appointment as Special Counsel of David Weiss, who as a witness to Barr’s corruption, is conflicted in any investigation pursuing Alexander Smirnov’s attempts to criminally frame Joe Biden.

This post explains all that in more detail.

 

Lev didn’t go to prison for the Hunter Biden stuff

As I said, the film leaves the impression that Lev was arrested to protect Trump during impeachment by silencing the key witness.

But that’s not why Lev went to prison (as a news clip in the movie tacitly admits).

Lev and Igor Fruman (along with David Correia and Andrey Kukushkin) were first charged on October 9, 2019, via indictment that was (according to then US Attorney for SDNY Geoffrey Berman’s memoir) drafted quickly overnight in advance of Lev and Igor’s trip to meet Dmitry Firtash in Vienna. From Berman’s memoir, I’m not 100% sure whether he pushed it because he genuinely feared they were about to flee the country, felt he had to do so before Barr intervened … or for more nefarious reasons.

The charges were:

  • Conspiring to make a bunch of political donations in the name of Global Energy Producers
  • Lying to the Federal Election Commission
  • Falsifying a document to the FEC
  • Laundering donations from Russian Andrey Muraviev to pay pro-cannabis politicians

As Bondy described, the indictment implied that Lev and Igor’s political contributions to Pete Sessions were tied to an attempt to fire Marie Yovanovitch. But that was not charged as FARA.

On September 17, 2020, the indictment was superseded. Lev and Correia’s longterm Fraud Guarantee fraud was added and the charges tied to Muraviev (who was secretly indicted that same day) were bumped up. The paragraph describing a payment to Sessions took out the reference to an Ambassador, describing it instead as to “further their political goals.” There were still no FARA charges though.

Ultimately, Lev was convicted at trial in October 2021 of the GEP and Muraviev donations, and in March 2022, pled guilty to the fraud guarantee charges. He was never charged with FARA violations.

Bondy’s insinuation that SDNY took out the foreign agent aspect to protect Rudy is wholly inconsistent with the warrants (linked below) targeting Lev and Rudy unsealed last year.

They show that the investigation into Lev, which started based on a Campaign Legal Center complaint, initially focused on campaign finance crimes. In August 2019 — after the firing of Marie Yovanovitch but before the disclosure of the Perfect Phone Call — SDNY began to turn to Foreign Agent suspicions (though one of two warrants obtained in August 2019 was not executed). After the arrest, SDNY more aggressively turned to developing the Foreign Agent prong of the investigation. On November 4, 2019, SDNY obtained warrants targeting Rudy (which were not released last year). On December 10, 2019, the Foreign Agent prong continued.

That’s when Bill Barr intervened to kill that prong of the investigation, certainly as it pertained to Rudy, as I’ll lay out below.

After that point, SDNY focused on the Fraud Guarantee fraud.

It’s not that Lev went to prison for this but Rudy did not. On the contrary, Barr worked hard to ensure no one could go to prison on such charges.

While Barr was doing that, SDNY appears to have put that investigation on ice and attempted, without success, to resuscitate once Barr was out of office.

SDNY believed Lev was not fully forthcoming

The film makes it sound like SDNY refused Lev’s efforts to cooperate against Rudy and everyone else.

It’s more complicated than that.

SDNY has a rule: To enter into a cooperation agreement with them, one has to plead to all crimes. Geoffrey Berman described it this way in his memoir, explaining why SDNY didn’t give Michael Cohen a cooperation deal.

Cooperation in the Southern District means full cooperation—taking responsibility for all criminal actions, not just a select few. If any one area of a defendant’s life is off limits, we do not recommend leniency in sentencing. (Some districts are more transactional: you give a little, you get a little.)

When defendants agree to this and become cooperating witnesses against others, their testimony is more credible. Our prosecutors can tell juries that if the cooperator is caught lying, the agreement can be revoked and he or she will be prosecuted not only for the crimes covered at trial but for a host of others that the cooperator copped to as part of his agreement.

The SDNY rules also serve as a powerful investigative tool, because when you acquire absolute cooperation, your avenues for making other cases expand dramatically. We often learn of additional criminal activity—whole new threads of wrongdoing that in some instances we knew nothing about.

That’s one reason why SDNY didn’t give Lev a cooperation agreement. As SDNY explained in their sentencing memo for him, Lev’s attorney, Joseph Bondy, proffered information in the months after his arrest in October 2019. But Bondy provided details that were contradicted by the evidence (at the time, Lev may not have understood that FBI had obtained iCloud content he deleted). SDNY then did a reverse proffer on November 6, 2019 (two days after obtaining a warrant for Rudy’s comms), meaning they told Lev and Bondy all the evidence they had against Lev. After that, Bondy replied saying that Parnas was unwilling to plead guilty to the campaign finance crimes charged against him.

After that meeting, Parnas’s counsel wrote the Government to report that he could not “accept responsibility for criminal activity for which he is not guilty,” which based on discussions with counsel, the Government understood to be a reference to, among other things, the campaign finance and false statements offenses of which Parnas now stands convicted.

That’s consistent with Parnas’ own memoir, in which he still attributes the campaign finance stuff as a lack of awareness of the law and of the Russian source of the money he was throwing around.

According to SDNY, that unwillingness to fully accept responsibility continued when Parnas did sit for a proffer on March 5, 2020.

In addition, SDNY was unable to corroborate some of the things Parnas claimed in that March proffer.

[T]he Government was ultimately unable to corroborate significant portions of what Parnas said.

This was during a period when Barr was aggressively trying to limit SDNY’s investigation, so it may not have been Lev’s fault they couldn’t corroborate this stuff.

Finally, DOJ generally has a rule: Cooperating witnesses who chat to the press are usually useless as witnesses. This makes sense for a lot of reasons, not least that it alerts criminal targets of what prosecutors do and don’t know. SDNY told Parnas this early on, in November 2019, and his early 2020 interviews would have only exacerbated this.

At the close of that [November 6, 2019] meeting, the Government informed Parnas that public spectacles, leaks, and social media postings could undermine his credibility and diminish his value as a potential cooperating witness.

Given Barr’s fuckery, I don’t know if Parnas could have pulled off cooperation in any case. But even without it, things he himself did made it virtually impossible he could get a deal from SDNY.

And honestly, it wouldn’t have served his purposes. He needed to come out publicly against Trump, but that was inconsistent with the ability to cooperate criminally. The impeachment was his one shot for accountability, and Congress blew that. (As I was writing this, I considered that, had Democrats made Lev’s testimony more central to impeachment, Republicans might have forced Hunter Biden to testify, as they were threatening at the time; I have long wondered whether Trump’s impeachment defense team had a copy of the laptop.)

Bill Barr insulated the impeachment review from the Hunter Biden caper

The film focuses closely on how, after Trump’s Perfect Phone Call with Volodymyr Zelenskyy was released, onetime Trump defense attorney John Dowd, speaking as a lawyer for Lev and Igor, first refused to cooperate with Congress. Their arrest, days later, put Parnas and Fruman at the mercy of lawyers arranged by Trump, until Parnas hired Bondy.

It is true that their arrest discredited them as witnesses.

But it wasn’t just their arrest that limited the investigation from impacting impeachment. DOJ also did some tactical things to prevent the Trump impeachment from merging with Lev’s prosecution.

When Lev and Igor were arrested, DOJ told the press that Barr had been briefed on the investigation from early in his tenure as Attorney General.

That seems inconsistent with a claim that Barr made in his memoir (which IMO is largely CYA about these matters). Barr claimed he had no awareness of Rudy’s efforts to investigate Biden, and only learned of it from news reports.

By the spring of 2019, I had noticed news stories stating that Giuliani was pushing the Ukrainians to investigate Biden’s role in Shokin’s dismissal. But other than what I glimpsed in the media, I had no knowledge of the former mayor’s activities. During the spring, I expressed my concern about Giuliani with the President. As I was leaving an Oval Office meeting on another topic, I paused briefly to raise the matter.

“Mr. President,” I said, “I don’t think you are being well served by Giuliani at this point. Mueller is over, and Russiagate is dying. Why is Giuliani thrashing about in Ukraine? It is going to blow up—”

“Yeah,” the President said, cutting me off. “I told him not to go over there. It was a trap.” President Trump gave the impression Giuliani had a degree of independence and was going to pull back. I did not press the point.

Even imagining that SDNY kept these details from Barr, by August 14, 2019, it is highly likely that the National Security Division had notice of the focus on Rudy. That’s when possible Foreign Agent charges (and a reference to Marie Yovanovitch) got added to the warrants targeting Lev and Igor.

NSD head John Demers was one of the first people at DOJ to review the Perfect Phone Call. He did so, on August 15, 2019, after SDNY had turned to FARA crimes normally overseen by NSD.

That may explain why DOJ did something that served to insulate the Public Integrity (PIN) review of the Perfect Phone call from the ongoing investigation of Rudy’s efforts with Lev and Igor: Demers and Criminal Division head Brian Benzkowski only had PIN review the transcript of the call, not the full whistleblower complaint. Had investigators done what investigators have been ordered to do since 9/11 with the full complaint, they would have searched on all the references in the complaint, including those in the OCCRP report on Lev and Igor referenced repeatedly in it. That, in turn, should have identified the SDNY investigation, which would have immediately implicated Trump in the investigation.

Effectively, by focusing solely on the transcript, someone at DOJ deliberately blinded that PIN review to an ongoing FARA investigation, thereby eliciting a clean bill of health for Trump.

There’s a lot more that Barr did as the scandal unfolded, as I’ve laid out here and here. But the first thing someone at DOJ did was to gin up a prosecution declination before anyone could tie Trump’s coercion of Zelenskyy with the existing investigation into Lev and Igor.

Bill Barr played a shell game to protect Rudy’s “collusion” with a known Russian spy

Barr was nowhere near done.

There seems have been an ongoing cat-and-mouse between SDNY and Barr.

When SDNY got the indictment, according to Berman, they got approval from two PIN prosecutors in the middle of the night, not NSD, which may be why only the campaign finance crimes were in the indictment and only the campaign finance crimes were on the warrants for the searches done the day of arrest (this would have served to hide that part of the investigation from Lev and Igor, too). That’s the biggest piece of evidence that SDNY did not arrest Lev and Igor as a favor for Barr, as he attempted to kill impeachment, but the reverse.

In October, SDNY got warrants to search everything for the FARA crimes. On November 4, 2019, SDNY got warrants targeting Rudy for FARA crimes.

On December 5, 2019, Rudy met, with Barr’s foreknowledge, known Russian asset Andrii Derkach.

And on December 10, 2019, SDNY got further warrants in that investigation.

DOJ had just let Rudy meet with a Russian spy while SDNY had an ongoing investigation into whether Rudy was working with foreign spies. It was insane to let that happen in any case. All the more so given the ongoing investigation from the Sovereign District of New York, as SDNYers like to call themselves.

So Barr had to gut SDNY’s sovereignty.

Barr did several things:

  • Assigned any investigation of Derkach, with whom Rudy had just met, to EDNY, not SDNY where it would be a natural follow-on.
  • Made EDNY US Attorney Richard Donoghue the gate-keeper for all Ukraine investigations, requiring SDNY to get permission from him before taking any investigative steps against Rudy or Lev.
  • Asked Pittsburgh US Attorney Scott Brady to play a role. Publicly, Barr and Brady claimed this was a vetting process of tips from Ukraine. But Brady’s congressional testimony revealed he did almost no functional vetting; he ignored evidence from the impeachment and some key public articles. Plus, he did more than vetting. Brady also checked in on investigations into all the oligarchs from whom Rudy had solicited dirt on Hunter Biden, with uncertain outcome; he tried to tell SDNY he knew better than they did about their investigation; he demanded details about the investigation into Hunter Biden. Most importantly, some yet unidentified person told Brady to seek out FBI informant Alexander Smirnov, who had made a reference to Hunter Biden in an informant report about Mykola Zlochevsky years earlier. By May 2020, Smirnov was allegedly attempting to frame Joe Biden with allegations of bribery, and Brady made that part of his work. Once again with Smirnov’s allegations, Brady did little functional vetting, falsely claiming that his travel schedule confirmed the claim, rather than debunked it.
  • Barred the FBI Agents working with SDNY from receiving certain information, including Rudy’s interview with Scott Brady.
  • Ordered David Weiss, whom DOJ had put in charge of an investigation into DC and CA resident Hunter Biden, to consult with Brady on his tips.

These efforts halted what should have been obvious next steps in the SDNY investigation, ensured Rudy could share information obtained from a known Russian spy with no legal risk, and ordered that some of Rudy’s information be used in an investigation of Joe Biden’s kid. DOJ was literally protecting a Russian influence operation, because it served the interest of the President.

The biggest reason why Rudy didn’t go to prison for this is that Barr protected this entire process, including the solicitation of dirt from a known Russian spy.

DOJ approved steps against Rudy on Lisa Monaco’s first day on the job

While Trump remained in office, SDNY tried several more times to get warrants targeting Rudy, but were denied.

On Lisa Monaco’s very first day on the job, April 21, 2021, SDNY finally obtained warrants targeting Rudy. Merrick Garland’s DOJ did precisely what everyone is wailing for: He immediately permitted prosecutors to advance this long-thwarted investigation.

Based on what we can see, there were at least two limitations on the investigation, however. First, the warrants targeting Rudy did not include the Trump lawyer’s January 29, 2020 interview with Scott Brady. That suggests Rudy’s effort to share dirt from Russian spies was still protected as cooperation rather than confession, even after Garland took over (indeed, that’s what Rudy pointed to to argue he couldn’t be searched at all, his “cooperation” with Barr). Just as importantly, while some of the 2019 warrant affidavits mentioned Donald Trump’s call to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the 2021 warrants did not. I would be unsurprised if Barr got OLC to write a memo putting all that off limits before they left office.

Aside from that, DOJ’s approach to Rudy Giuliani remained remarkably aggressive, contrary to what virtually every news outlet will tell you. Importantly, SDNY did something no one else has reported: They installed a Special Master and got permission to review Rudy’s content — all Rudy’s post-2017 content — for privilege. Among other things, that freed up content, including at least one document the January 6 Committee did not get, for any other investigations.

Nevertheless, the delay (or possibly corrupt Rudy dead-enders in NY) appears to have killed any chance of pursuing Rudy for his role in soliciting dirt from Russian spies and others to attack Hunter Biden. On November 14, 2022, SDNY informed the court that the grand jury had concluded without filing charges (though Rudy’s lawyer and Hunter Biden laptop co-conspirator, Robert Costello, has never substantiated a declination letter). In a July 25, 2023 declaration in the Ruby Freeman lawsuit, Costello revealed one potential explanation: many of the devices seized from Rudy obtained in April 2021 were corrupted. Costello blamed the FBI’s contractor for making the phones unusable.

Not all the devices were corrupted, however. As noted, the privilege log from Freeman’s case shows a great deal of files pertaining to January 6 were successfully extracted, including a few identifiable files not obtained by the January 6 Committee.

DOJ also seized a phone from Victoria Toensing. But the value of that may have been limited by attorney-client privileged tied to Firtash, the same privilege which has, at times, led Lev (because he was a translator in that relationship) to limit his own comments about Firtash in all this. To fully unpack what happened, you’d need to know what promises Toensing made to Firtash and what Barr knew about them.

Attorneys General have vast discretion

In a just world, Bill Barr could be held accountable for the corruption he enabled. But that’s virtually impossible under the structures of impunity our system accords prosecutors and Attorneys General.

I’m neck-deep in a post on the three IG investigations pertaining to Bill Barr’s corrupt conduct.

All of them conclude that however nuts Bill Barr’s conduct was, the expansive authority of the Attorney General means that his actions, including his intervention into the sentencing for Trump’s rat-fucker and his decision to share details of minor infraction by someone whom Barr knew would never be charged for political gain, were within the discretion of the Attorney General.

DOJ IG has spent over four years investigating Barr’s corruption, and thus far, they have always concluded that as Attorney General, Barr’s discretion was so vast that he can break all of DOJ’s rules prohibiting its politicization.

There’s still at least one IG Report including Barr’s conduct outstanding (almost certainly, the ongoing investigation into DOJ getting the communications records of journalists for whom people like Jim Comey might have been a source). But of all the fuckery I know Barr to have committed, I can envision only a few details of his conduct might even remotely end up the focus of criminal investigation.

Even the most corrupt insinuations about Rudy’s efforts, in which Rudy allegedly offered Ihor Kolomoyskyi, Dmitry Firtash, and Mykola Zlochevsky relief from criminal investigations for dirt on Hunter Biden, would be included in this.

Lev explains why in his book: This was deliberately framed as the exact equivalent of Andrew Weissmann’s efforts to flip Firtash for information on Paul Manafort.

Andrew Weissman, who was lead prosecutor for the investigation of Russian collusion in the 2016 Election, had gotten there first. He offered a deal in which Firtash could avoid prison if he testified about the relationship between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The inclusion of Putin meant that Firtash would never take the deal. Nobody over there wants to make Putin angry.

Nobody else knew about the deal he was offered. Giuliani and Solomon wanted Firtash’s legal team to make it public. His Viennese lawyers were against it, so Firtash was reluctant. Soon, in a heated meeting in Vienna, an argument between some of Firtash’s legal team led to Victoria Toensing, who was on our team, confronting Dan Webb about it months later. Webb — who was connected with Weissmann, William Barr and other heavy hitters — admitted to the deal.

Still, we convinced Firtash that we — who were representing Trump’s interests — could help him with his extradition far more effectively than Weissman. The real goal for us was to get Firtash to use his contacts to pressure President Zelenskyy to announce an investigation of the Bidens. Our pitch was successful, Firtash agreed to hire Giuliani for $1 million. And $200,000 for me to be official translator and to be under the attorney-client privilege umbrella.

Prosecutors trade leniency for information on other crooks all the time. Here, however, it was the Attorney General, who had never served as a prosecutor himself, who would be making those deals, offering leniency to foreign oligarchs if they could offer dirt on Donald Trump’s likely opponent.

It’s unclear whether, and if so what, deals were made: an investigation into Zlochevsky was reportedly shut down in December 2019; investigations into Kolomoyskyi ratcheted up in 2020; and the prior investigation into Dmitry Firtash remains deadlocked on his extradition, as it has been for years.

But these kinds of deals would be consistent with an elaborate effort Barr makes in his book to spin Trump’s pursuit of dirt on the Bidens as a legitimate law enforcement pursuit, the logic of Trump’s impeachment defense taken to its logical conclusion.

It’s all transparent bullshit. But it would also be virtually impossible to debunk at trial, even if you could get beyond the vast discretion of an Attorney General.

David Weiss’ appointment threatens to limit further fallout

There’s one thing I do fault Merrick Garland for: For not removing David Weiss from the investigation into Alexander Smirnov.

By all appearances, Weiss asked to be appointed Special Counsel only after he renewed his focus on Smirnov in July 2023, after receiving, but blowing off, the allegation days before the 2020 election, on October 23, 2020.

Investigating Smirnov’s allegation that Joe Biden accepted a bribe from Burisma was the first thing that focused the investigation onto Biden, after the original prosecutor, Lesley Wolf had successfully avoided that focus for years. It was the first thing that created a real conflict with working for Joe Biden.

And Weiss bases his authority to prosecute Smirnov for lying when he started chasing that hoax on his Special Counsel authority. He could only do so if he were legitimately chasing that hoax as witness testimony.

Here’s the problem with that: David Weiss is a witness in what should be a broader investigation into how a side channel set up by Bill Barr ended up discovering an informant who once met Mykola Zlochevsky and then not vetting the false claims he made. At the very least, there should be an investigation into who — everyone swears it was not Rudy, and Smirnov has at least three other links to people close to Trump — alerted Brady that Smirnov might offer up such claims.

Bill Barr’s deputy ordered David Weiss to accept briefing on this hoax. He ordered him to let Scott Brady snoop on Weiss’ investigation of Joe Biden’s kid. That makes Weiss a witness. Once Smirnov became a subject rather than a witness, that created a conflict that should disqualify Weiss from overseeing an investigation into the former informant and the circumstances that allowed him to make allegedly false allegations against Joe Biden.

Merrick Garland should (at a minimum, though I could argue more broadly) move the primary team prosecuting Smirnov under supervision without such conflicts. A system set up by Bill Barr criminally framed Joe Biden, and a guy who worked with Bill Barr on that case continues to supervise the aftermath.

The complicity of the press

There’s one more party that demands accountability: The press.

Much of what I wrote in this post is public. It requires diligent reading, but not great access to Donald Trump or anyone else.

Not only has this entire story not been reported by mainstream outlets. Not only did NYT affirmatively obscure Rudy’s role in all this (and therefore Trump’s) in their one attempt to cover it. But one after another journalist — especially at NYT — writes stories that disappear the Hunter Biden pursuit from all of Trump’s abuse of DOJ. Indeed, some outlets, including Rachel Maddow’s parent company, seem to treat Hunter Biden as a gossip rag to drive clicks, rather than the locus of unprecedented corruption. Rather than chasing this story, or even asking Bill Barr direct questions about it, one after another TV star invites him on as if he’s a critic of Trump’s corruption, rather than a key player in it. WaPo’s Will Lewis pointed to a badly conflicted Hunter Biden piece as his antidote against accusations of lefty bias.

Want to know how Rudy Giuliani was allowed to solicit dirt from Russian spies to help Trump get elected, without accountability? Want to know why Barr is considered a critic of Trump rather than his most corrupt enabler? Ask the journalists who lost interest in that story as soon as Rudy released a laptop full of Hunter Biden’s dick pics.

From Russia with Lev begins to reverse all that. But as infuriating as it is, it barely scratches the surface.

Timeline

Below, every bullet is a known warrant. The ones not linked were described in a passage that failed to be fully redacted in a Lev Parnas filing. This document compares the Foreign Agent focus of the three warrants bolded below.

  • January 18, 2019, 19 MJ 1729: Yahoo and Google content

May 15, 2019: Marie Yovanovitch firing public

  • May 16, 2019, 19 MJ 4784: iCloud content
  • August 14, 2019, 19 MJ 7593: Yahoo and Google content since January, with expanded focus
  • August 14, 2019, 19 MJ 7594: Unknown warrant
  • August 14, 2019, 19 MJ 7595: Existing Yahoo and Google content, with expanded focus

September 25, 2019: Disclosure of Perfect Phone call

October 9, 2019: Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman arrested

  • October 17, 2019, 19 MJ 7595: Actual authorization of the warrant approved in August
  • October 21, 2019, 19 MJ 9829: iCloud content since May
  • October 21, 2019, 19 MJ 9830: Unknown warrant
  • October 21, 2019, 19 MJ 9831: Devices from Dulles
  • October 21, 2019, 19 MJ 9832: Existing iCloud content for expanded focus
  • November 4, 2019: Warrant for Rudy’s iCloud
  • November 4, 2019: Warrant for Rudy’s email
  • November 4, 2019: Warrant for Victoria Toensing’s iCloud
  • November 6, 2019: Warrant for Yuriy Lutsenko’s email

December 5, 2019: Rudy meets with known Russian asset, Andrii Derkach

  • December 10, 2019, 19 MJ 11500: Stuff seized from residences for foreign agent focus
  • December 10, 2019, 19 MJ 11501: Instagram
  • December 10, 2019, Warrant for Roman Nasirov’s email
  • December 13, 2019, Warrant for Victoria Toensing’s email

December 14, 2019: Barr aide texts him: “Laptop on way to you”

January 3, 2020: Barr establishes dedicated channel to ingest Rudy’s dirt

January 17, 2020: Jeffrey Rosen makes Richard Donoghue a gatekeeper for all Ukraine-related investigations

  • February 28, 2020: iPhone of Alexander Levin
  • March 3, 2020: iPad of Alexander Levin
  • March 20, 2020, 20 MJ 3074: Fruman iCloud content obtained with October 21, 2019 warrant to cover earlier periods

June 20, 2020: Barr fires Geoffrey Berman

November 2020: SDNY denied authority to seek devices of Rudy Giuliani

January 2021: SDNY denied authority to seek devices of Rudy Giuliani

  • April 13, 2021: Cell site data for Rudy and Toensing

April 21, 2021: Lisa Monaco sworn in

  • April 21, 2021, 21 MJ 4335: Rudy’s office, residence, and devices
  • April 21, 2021: Victoria Toensing iPhone
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