“Dead Man Walking:” Magic Numbers Nine and Four

I’d like to look at a few things that Chuck Schumer said in a wildly counterproductive interview.

After a squishy exchange about the horrible people running for NYC Mayor, Lulu Garcia-Navarro challenged Schumer for his focus on upcoming elections. Schumer noted that the courts are our best bulwark against Trump’s abuses (something that factored heavily in his decision to let the Continuing Resolution get a vote). But then Garcia-Navarro asked what happens when Trump starts ignoring judges, as he did Friday when deporting hundreds of mostly Venezuelans to El Salvador in defiance of an order from James Boasberg. Schumer said he hoped the five to six Senators who’ve spoke up in support of the courts would do so — but then suggested they might be more likely to do so in a few months, assuming Trump will become less popular.

You know, I’ve heard you and other Democratic leaders talk about the next election as if it’s just going to be another election like any other election. But there has been all of this discussion about Trump auguring the end of democracy. I worry about this. When I say we’ll win the election, I’m assuming democracy stays, but that we have to fight to make sure that happens. I think that Trump is destroying norms that have preserved our democracy for centuries, certainly for decades, and he’s destroying them, and he doesn’t care. What is our best bulwark? It’s the courts. And one of the things we were able to do, which is proving very, very good, is we put in 235 new judges. And they’re now hearing so many of the cases that attorneys general, private citizens, unions and others are bringing. We’ve had preliminary success.

Are they going to respect those court orders, do you think? That is the $64,000 question. So let us say the courts uphold this. And one of the people who will determine that more than any other is probably John Roberts, who is very conservative. I didn’t vote for him. But I do believe that he believes in the courts. And so I think that even at the highest level, if you get the Supreme Court upholding the law, it will matter. What if Trump keeps going? That’s the question everybody’s asking. And I worry about this a lot. I wake up sometimes at 2, 3 in the morning thinking about this. I believe this, and it’s a little bit in concert with what I’ve said to you before: I believe Republican senators, on this issue, will stand up. I’ve talked to some of them. About five or six have said publicly they will work to uphold the courts, and to uphold the law if Trump tries to break it. And we can do that legislatively if we have to. That’s my hope. That’s what we’ve got to work toward. And I think there’s a decent chance that that would happen, particularly if Trump, three months from now, is less popular. [bold NYT’s, italics mine]

Those five to six Senators have been silent since Trump’s open defiance was revealed on Saturday.

Then, later, Schumer again pointed to his confidence that Republican Senators would like some distance from Trump.

The Republicans would like to have some freedom from Trump, but they won’t until we bring him down in popularity. That happened with Bush in 2005. It happened with Trump in 2017. When it happens, I am hopeful that our Republican colleagues will resume working with us. And I talk to them. One of the places is in the gym. When you’re on that bike in your shorts, panting away next to a Republican, a lot of the inhibitions come off.

These passages were among those mocked by those prioritizing Schumer over Trump and Elon Musk. In the rush to condemn Schumer (who has canceled the book tour at which there were sure to be loud protests), people mocked the very idea that Republicans in the Senate would ever oppose Trump.

I think Schumer has earned a good deal of the criticism he’s getting, even if I’m certain it is distracting from the focus on Trump and Musk.

I part ways with the claim that Senators will never split from Trump.

To be very sure, Trump has garnered near-total fealty, from the House and Senate, since his inauguration in January. His grip on the GOP has tightened year after year since he first sold his grievance narrative in 2018. The reason the Senate had this no-win choice in the first place is because, for the first time in recent memory, the GOP House stood together on a funding vote. Many of these Senators are veritable cult members, spouting the craziest nonsense that Trump told him to say.

But to suggest Senators will never split from Trump is counterproductive for two reasons.

First, to suggest you can never get Republicans to break with Trump is to concede.

It is to give up on one of just a few theories of change available — with just (successful) mass protest and revolution left — and to give up on the one that could bring results most quickly. In the short term, at least, it would take just nine members of the House or four Senators to completely stall Trump’s agenda on a particular issue, and fewer members of the House to cause gridlock. There are that many members who oppose Trump on discrete issues (most notably, Ukraine and Medicaid funding), and exploiting that reality is a tool, however inadequate. Even if you think a mass protest movement would be more successful, pressuring the Senators who’ve enabled Trump so far is a necessary (and fairly easy) step to push back against Trump.

In the interview, Schumer seems to too readily adopt James Carville’s theory of change, to do nothing to accelerate this process (note, Carville’s op-ed assumed House Republicans could not mount the unity to fund government). Perhaps he wants to avoid pissing off the men he’s panting away next to in shorts in the Senate gym.

There’s a great deal that people can do to make it more likely Senators will oppose Trump. I try to make a point of calling out Joni Ernst publicly every time Pete Hegseth disappears the accomplishments of women soldiers, or Thom Tillis every time Hegseth makes the military less safe, or Roger Wicker every time Hegseth has an embarrassing faceplant, or Bill Cassidy every time RFK Jr does something to exacerbate the measles outbreak, or Jerry Moran every time DOGE makes a stupid cut of VA benefits, or Todd Young every time Tulsi Gabbard repeats Russian disinformation, or John Cornyn every time Marco Rubio cuts back on PEPFAR, or Tom Cotton every time Trump does something that will help China. These people haven’t hidden their disagreement on key issues or appointees with Trump. Yet, in spite of those disagreements, these people have all done things to support people they knew were wrong. As the consequences of their cowardice pile up — as measles spreads across the country from Texas and veterans lose their jobs — their complicity should be front and center.

And while right wing members of Congress are not publicly confronting Trump, some of them are pushing back quietly, mitigating some of the damage Trump is doing — sometimes even in ways that extend benefits beyond their own jurisdiction. According to the NYT, for example, Deb Fischer was among those who pushed Trump to reverse some of the firings at National Nuclear Security Administration (though NYT also reports that NNSA lost many key experts nevertheless).

And GOP pushback will go largely unnoticed elsewhere. After succeeding in strong arming vaccine propagandist RFK Jr’s confirmation to lead HHS, Trump withdrew the nomination for vaccine propagandist Dave Weldon to lead CDC, minutes before his confirmation hearing this week, because Weldon didn’t have and wouldn’t get the votes.

That’s all we’ll see of GOP pushback until proof of consequences of their own complicity and pressure on them mounts. But in a world where any kind of friction can slow the march of authoritarianism, even that non-public pushback bit matters, and it could provide definitive down the road.

By all means, scoff at Carville’s outdated naivete and Schumer’s unwillingness to more directly confront those he pants next to on the exercise bike.

But don’t abstain from pressuring right wingers to show some courage against Trump’s outrages.

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Three Countries Formerly Known as Allies Reconsidering F-35 Purchases

First. Portugal:

Portugal is getting cold feet about replacing its U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets with more modern F-35s because of Donald Trump — in one of the first examples of the U.S. president undermining a potential lucrative arms deal.

The country’s air force has recommended buying Lockheed Martin F-35s, but when outgoing Defense Minister Nuno Melo was asked by Portugese media Público whether the government would follow that recommendation, he replied: “We cannot ignore the geopolitical environment in our choices. The recent position of the United States, in the context of NATO … must make us think about the best options, because the predictability of our allies is a greater asset to take into account.”

The defense ministry later sent a statement to POLITICO saying: “F-35s fighters were not ruled out from the F-16 replacement selection process.”

The ministry added a series of criteria that will be considered by Lisbon, including: “The geopolitical context” and “The extent of restrictions on the use of aircraft.”

Then, Canada:

Canada is actively looking at potential alternatives to the U.S.-built F-35 stealth fighter and will hold conversations with rival aircraft makers, Defence Minister Bill Blair said late Friday, just hours after being reappointed to the post as part of Prime Minister Mark Carney’s new cabinet.

[snip]

There has been a groundswell of support among Canadians to kill the $19-billion purchase and find aircraft other than those manufactured and maintained in the United States.

And now Switzerland (Google Translate):

SP Switzerland demands from the new Federal Council and VBS Chairman Martin Pfister to stop the F-35 procurement immediately. In addition, a parliamentary commission of inquiry (PUK) is to clarify the chaos in the VBS and the RUAG scandal. In view of the growing international uncertainty and the dangerous solo efforts of US President Donald Trump, the Federal Council must finally show its position. Switzerland needs a security policy that is geared towards Europe and focuses on cooperation, peacebuilding and diplomacy.

«Since Trump took office, Swiss armaments purchases such as the US F-35 jet have increasingly proven to be major mistakes. Trump could block the jets at any time, blackmailing the countries concerned to submit to his dictation in foreign policy », says SP co-president Cédric Wermuth. «In addition, the costs for the F-35 rise to uncontrollable heights, while central questions about its usability and independence remain unanswered. It is therefore clear that the VBS must finally act and stop the procurement of this dysfunctional project. »

Since Trump cut intelligence sharing with Ukraine, thereby making certain military platforms unusable, this has been inevitable.

Trump has started destroying America’s best export: military toys.

Update: Turkey joins in:

Turkey has submitted a request to purchase 40 Typhoon fighter jets from BAE Systems.

This is reported by the publication Defense Security Asia.

The request has been sent to the Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom, which is to make a decision on the sale of the aircraft and the export of British technology to Turkey.

The implementation of this potential export contract will be entrusted to the United Kingdom, namely to BAE Systems, which carries out partial production and final assembly of Typhoon fighters at the company in Wharton.

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Pete Hegseth’s DOD Says It Is Too Fragile to Make 16 New Badges

The government has filed a request that Judge William Alsup stay his order requiring six agencies to reinstate fired employees pending their appeal to the Ninth Circuit. In support, the six agencies submitted declarations — most of which appear to be based off the same template, making the same claims — talking about what a hardship it would be to have to reinstate those people.

A declaration from Timothy Dill, “performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs,” confesses to a truly shocking level of ineptitude at Pete Hegseth’s DOD. Though only 16 people were fired, Dill says it would cause great hardship — potentially even whiplash!!!! — to reinstate those 16 people.

8. Department records indicate that it fired 16 total probationary employees on or about February 13 and 14, 2025.

9. The Court’s order, requiring the Department to reinstate all probationary employees terminated on or about February 13 and 14, 2025, will impose substantial burdens on the Department, cause significant confusion, and potentially subject terminated employees to extreme whiplash.

10. Offers of reinstatement will impose significant administrative burdens on the Department. Among other things, all reinstated employees will require onboarding, including certain training, filling out human resources paperwork, obtaining new security badges, and re-enrolling in benefits programs.

Worse still, an agency that employs 950,000 people would have to make 16 new badges.

I absolutely expected DOD to degrade quickly under the leadership vacuum appointment of such an unqualified man as Pete Hegseth would create.

But holy hell!?!?!?

The Department of Defense would face significant hardship because they had to make 16 new badges?

How does Pete Hegseth expect to take on China if his department can’t manage making 16 new badges?

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Troy Edgar Implies We Should Deport Elon Musk

Most people pointing to this insane interview NPR did with DHS Deputy Secretary Troy Edgar focus on the import it has for Mahmoud Khalil’s case. When pressed repeatedly, Edgar can offer no proof to back his increasingly escalating claims that Khalil didn’t disclose something when he entered the US on a student visa; he just offers the classic troll answer that everything is clear.

Edgar: I think if he would have declared he’s a terrorist, we would have never let him in.

Martin: And what did he engage in that constitutes terrorist activity?

Edgar: I mean, Michel, have you watched it on TV? It’s pretty clear.

Michel: No, it isn’t. Well, explain it to those of us who have not or perhaps others have not. What exactly did you do?

Edgar: Well, I think it’s clear or we wouldn’t be talking about it. I mean, the reality is that if you watch and see what he’s done on the university …

Martin: Do you not know? Are you telling us that you’re not aware?

Edgar: I find it interesting that you’re not aware.

But the interview is far more interesting for the logic Edgar offers for Khalil’s detention as a Green Card holder entitled to more due process, which would suggest even Elon Musk — especially Elon Musk — must be deported under Trump’s Executive Orders, right along with Khalil.

Repeatedly Edgar suggests that the reason they can deport Khalil is because he initially came into the US on a student visa, even though he now has a Green Card. He asserts over and over that because Khalil originally entered on a student visa, it means the Secretary of the State can indefinitely review his status and deport him.

Edgar: Well, like I said, when you apply for a visa, you go through the process to be able to say that you’re here on a student visa, that doesn’t afford you all the rights of coming in and basically going through this process, agitating and supporting Hamas. So, at this point, yeah, the Secretary of State and the State Department maintains the right to revoke the visa, and that’s what they’ve done.

Martin: How did he support Hamas? Exactly what did he do?

Edgar: Well, I think you can see it on TV, right? This is somebody that we’ve invited and allowed the student to come into the country, and he’s put himself in the middle of the process of basically pro-Palestinian activity. And at this point, like I said, the Secretary of State can review his visa process at any point and revoke it.

Martin: He’s a permanent resident. He’s not a visa holder. He’s a legal permanent resident. He has the green card, at least he did, until it’s alleged that it was revoked.

If the allegation is that Mr. Khalil organized protests and made speeches after which other people engaged in prohibited activity, or, say, violent activity. Well, Mr. Trump gave a political speech on January 6, 2021, after which some individuals engaged in violent and illegal acts. How is this any different?

Edgar: President Trump’s a citizen and the president of the United States. This is a person that came in under a visa. And again, the secretary of state at any point can take a look and evaluate that visa and decide if they want to revoke it.

Martin: He’s a legal permanent resident. I have to keep insisting on that. He is a legal permanent resident.

So what is the standard? Is any criticism of the Israeli government a deportable offense?

Edgar: Like I said, I think that at this point when he entered into the country on a student visa, at any point we can go through and evaluate what his status is.

Martin: Is any criticism of the United States government a deportable offense?

Edgar: Like I said, if you go through the process and you’re a student and you’re here on a visa and you go through it, at any point …

Martin: Is any criticism of the government a deportable offense?

Edgar: Let me put it this way, Michel, imagine if he came in and filled out the form and said, ‘I want a student visa.’ They asked him, ‘What are you going to do here?’ And he says, ‘I’m going to go and protest.’ We would have never let him into the country. [my emphasis]

Edgar is wrong. This is not actually the basis on which the government claims to be relying to deport Khalil. A document published by WaPo confirms that the government is relying on the Section 237(a)(4)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as their basis to deport Khalil.

The Secretary of State has determined that your presence or activities in the United States would have serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States.

On the basis of the foregoing, it is charged that you are subject to removal from the United States pursuant to the following provision(s) of law:

Section 237(a)(4)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, in that the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe that your presence or activities in the United States would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States.

That document relies on the fact that Khalil is not a citizen, as does the law itself.

This document — dated March 9 — was filed the day after Khalil was detained. Like so much else, it could be an attempt to retcon a decision made off inaccurate information — though this Atlantic piece reveals that there was a second, still-unidentified Green Card holder on the same list targeting Khalil.

It turns out Secretary of State Marco Rubio identified a second individual to be deported, and included that person alongside Khalil in a March 7 letter to the Department of Homeland Security. Both were identified in the letter as legal permanent residents, The Atlantic has learned.

Rubio’s letter notified DHS that he had revoked both targets’ visas, setting in motion plans for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to arrest and attempt to deport them, according to a senior DHS official and another U.S. official who spoke on condition of anonymity to describe how the operation against Khalil took shape.

In addition to the two names in Rubio’s initial letter, the State Department has also sent the names of “one or two” more students whose visas it has revoked, according to the DHS official, who described the first group of names as an opening move, with “more to come.”

The Atlantic also notes a key error in the form, as well as the claim that DHS claims not to know when Khalil first entered the country.

Perhaps there’s some way to reconcile Edgar’s views with all this (or perhaps Edgar, who was sworn in last week, simply missed some of this). But the claimed basis for Khalil’s deportation doesn’t rely on the fact that he first came in on a student visa. It’s that he remains a non-citizen. Though I think Rubio needs to apply two clauses: first, his finding that Khalil presents a foreign policy problem for the US.

(C) Foreign policy
(i) In general
An alien whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States is deportable.

And also a finding that the fact that he hadn’t broken any laws before he entered the country would still not matter; he’s still a problem for foreign policy.

(ii) Exceptions
The exceptions described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of section 1182(a)(3)(C) of this title shall apply to deportability under clause (i) in the same manner as they apply to inadmissibility under section 1182(a)(3)(C)(i) of this title.

(iii) Exception for other aliens
An alien, not described in clause (ii), shall not be excludable or subject to restrictions or conditions on entry into the United States under clause (i) because of the alien’s past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations would be lawful within the United States, unless the Secretary of State personally determines that the alien’s admission would compromise a compelling United States foreign policy interest.

So I think Edgar is wrong on the law and wrong on what DOJ and State are at least claiming went down.

But to understand how problematic this premise is, take Edgar’s claim — that anyone who ever came in on a student visa could always have his status reviewed — and apply them to Elon Musk.

The underlying framework under which Khalil is facing deportation is a claim that Trump is combatting antisemitism. It’s all based on an Executive Order holding that it is the policy of the United States to combat antisemitism … using all available and appropriate legal tools.

Sec. 2. Policy. It shall be the policy of the United States to combat anti-Semitism vigorously, using all available and appropriate legal tools, to prosecute, remove, or otherwise hold to account the perpetrators of unlawful anti-Semitic harassment and violence.

The EO is focused exclusively on universities and defines antisemitism in the context of the October 7 attack.

Sec. 3. Additional Measures to Combat Campus Anti-Semitism. (a) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the head of each executive department or agency (agency) shall submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, identifying all civil and criminal authorities or actions within the jurisdiction of that agency, beyond those already implemented under Executive Order 13899, that might be used to curb or combat anti-Semitism, and containing an inventory and analysis of all pending administrative complaints, as of the date of the report, against or involving institutions of higher education alleging civil-rights violations related to or arising from post-October 7, 2023, campus anti-Semitism.

Trump wants every agency to find ways to deport students, and only students, implicitly those who support Palestine. (This is, I suspect, in significant part a Stephen Miller wet dream to use the tools of the Civil Rights movement against tolerance.)

He has done nothing to pursue his policy of combatting antisemitism, such as in DOGE, right there in the White House.

But the Civil Rights Act on which Trump is relying applies to all federal funding. It applies to government advisors. It applies to government contractors. It applies to government advertising or public statements, such as the ones that are being released only on Xitter.

It might even apply to some inauguration festivities.

And key government advisor Elon Musk is not only fostering antisemitism on his social media platform, he’s using his public government platform to adopt antisemitic symbols.

The clause State is using in an attempt to deport Khalil appears right between one targeting actual terrorists (remember that right wing hate groups have been deemed terrorists around the world) and those involved in Nazi genocide.

And yet Trump has no complaint about the former student visa holder Elon Musk using his platforms and government funding to defend the actual Neo-Nazis.

To be clear: Edgar is wrong. It’s not that Khalil entered on a student visa, it’s that he’s not a citizen. Elon was allowed to become a citizen, so is safe from this particular targeted persecution.

But his use of government funding to platform antisemitism should not be.

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Democrats Have to Stop Making Political Decisions with an Eye Towards 2026

I’ve been out of pocket as events moved towards today’s cloture vote on the dogshit continuing resolution Republicans have written. It’s not yet clear whether seven Democrats (in addition to John Fetterman) will join Chuck Schumer — who has said he’ll vote for cloture — in helping Republicans pass it, or whether a Democrat will buy some time.

It’s clear that Schumer’s excuse only emphasizes that there are no good options. He says if there’s a shutdown, Republicans will only reopen those parts of government they want. In the face of the shuttering of USAID and dismantlement of Department of Education, that seems like a futile worry.

Among the best arguments I’ve seen against a shutdown, laid out but dropped here by Josh Marshall, is that a shutdown would provide Trump a way to halt legal proceedings by deeming those lawyers non-essential.

I was told yesterday that a major driver for Dems was the fear that a shutdown would slow down or stop the various court cases against DOGE. Honestly, that sounded so stupid to me that I was skeptical. But this afternoon I heard it from other key directions. I don’t know if it’s the biggest driver but just on the basis of what I heard I get a sense that it’s a major one. That seems so wrongheaded, so lawyer-brained, that when I got the final piece of the puzzle in front of me and realized this was a real thing, it was hard for me to even process.

Schumer described it this way in his speech yesterday:

Justice, and the courts, extremely troubling, I believe. A shutdown could stall Federal court cases, one of the best redoubts against Trump’s lawlessness, and could require a furlough of critical staff at the courts, denying victims and defendants alike their day in court, dragging out appeals and clogging the justice system for months and even years.

I don’t think this is lawyer-brained at all. Trump could simply call the lawyers engaged in these suits non-essential, stalling legal challenges in their current status, and then finding new test cases to establish a precedent while judges were stymied.

In both Phoenix, where a reduction in force affected all the people running the courthouse, and in the Perkins Coie lawsuit, where a hearing the other day reviewed all the Executive Branch personnel, from Marshals to GSA, who keep the courthouse running, the Executive’s ability to limit the Judiciary via manipulation of facilities and staff has already become a live issue. Here’s how Beryl Howell described the way in which Trump’s attempt to exclude Perkins Coie from federal buildings could be enforced via Executive branch personnel.

THE COURT: I just want to make sure because we, in the judiciary — we’re the third branch. We are not the executive branch. We are not subject to this guidance. But our landlord, and all of the federal courthouses around the country is GSA —

MR. BUTSWINKAS: GSA.

THE COURT: — General Services Administration. And the people who do the security at our front doors, all across the country in federal courthouses, are DOJ-component employees from the U.S. Marshals Service or court security officers. So they are all executive branch employees.

Meanwhile the court cases are making progress. Just this week, we’ve had two judges order reinstatement of all the people fired, grant FOIA status to DOGE, and grant discovery to Democratic Attorneys General (plus in one of the two reinstatement cases, Judge Alsup ordered a deposition from an OPM person involved in the firing). As of this week, DOGE now has to answer for its actions in the courts.

Imagine, for example, if a shutdown made it easier for DHS to keep Mahmoud Khalil in Louisiana for the duration of a shutdown, even if they simply said moving him back to SDNY (or New Jersey) is not a priority. There are other cases where the government is being ordered to pay back payments; a shutdown would make such recourse unavailable to anyone who has not yet sued. In the financial clawback cases (where EPA and FEMA seized funds already awarded), a shutdown would give the FBI time to try to frame the case against plaintiffs they’re pursuing, while the plaintiffs get no protection in the meantime. A key flaw was revealed in the lawsuit against Perkins Coie in the hearing the other day (which I’ll return to); if given the time, I would expect Trump to try the same trick against another law firm, fixing that flaw, in an attempt to eliminate any anti-Trump legal teams in the country.

So the concern that a shutdown would eliminate one of two sources of power is real.

I’m agnostic about whether a shutdown brings more advantage than risks.

One thing I am absolutely certain of, however, is that Democrats on both sides of this debate are framing it in terms of 2026. Those justifiably furious at Chuck Schumer are thinking in terms of primaries against any Senator who supports cloture. They’re demanding a filibuster so that elected Democrats, as Democrats, be seen wielding some power, so the party doesn’t look feckless to potential voters. Those afraid of a shutdown are discussing electoral consequences in 2026. Polls are measuring who would be blamed in the polls.

This mindset has plagued both sides of Democratic debates for two months, with disastrous consequences.

Democracy will be preserved or lost in the next three months. And democracy will be won or lost via a nonpartisan political fight over whether enough Americans want to preserve their way of life to fight back, in a coalition that includes far more than Democrats. You win this fight by treating Trump and Elon as the villain, not by making any one Democrat a hero (or worse still, squandering week after week targeting Democratic leaders while letting Elon go ignored).

And Democrats, on both sides of this fight, are not fighting that fight. I’ve seen none of the most powerful voices — not AOC, not Bernie, not Jasmine Crockett, not Tim Walz, not Pete Buttigieg — put out a video talking about the fight over impoundment, about the stakes of having elected representatives of both parties fight for funding for their own constituents.

Democrats who want a shutdown have done none of the messaging to those already hurt by Trump’s power grab work to make it a short term political win, to explain the tie between right wing capitulation to Trump and services shutting down. Instead, they’ve been fighting among themselves, mobilizing politically active Democrats.

I get the anger with Schumer — though I do think his concerns about the courts need to be taken very seriously.

But until Democrats stop thinking in terms of their own leadership in Congress but instead think exclusively about winning the political fight with people being hurt, not as Democrats, but as people opposed to fascism, they’re going to be looking for power in the wrong places.

Update: Someone on Bluesky defending AOC, arguing that this appearance from her on CNN amounted to the explanation about impoundment I said is missing. It’s a great appearance, and makes the anti-CR case superbly. But I don’t think it gets through the jargon about how government is funded or why. Plus, it’s not viral!

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It’s Not the Shameless Executive Power Grab in Plain Sight, It’s the Attempt to Retcon It Afterwards

This, from Steve Vladeck, is a helpful piece on the plight of Mamoud Khalil, the Columbia student detained by ICE the other day whom Trump is trying to deport. As he describes, the case is clearly an attempt to police speech, but (as many things are in a counterterrorism frame) the Trump administration might well offer up some plausible legal justifications to defend their actions.

[A]lthough what the government has done to this point is profoundly disturbing, and is, in my view, unconstitutional retaliation for First Amendment-protected speech, I’m not sure it is as clearly unlawful as a lot of folks online have suggested. And that’s a pretty big problem all by itself.

[snip]

Third, what is the legal basis pursuant to which the government is seeking to remove Khalil?
This brings us to the central “merits” question. What is the exact basis on which Khalil, in the government’s view, is subject to removal from the United States? Suffice it to say, President Trump’s social media post is not exactly specific here, nor has Secretary of State Rubio provided much additional clarity.

For what it’s worth, my best guess (and it is only a guess) is that the government is going to rely upon one or both of two very specific provision of immigration law.

The first, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C), provides that “An alien whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States is deportable.” There’s a caveat protecting such a non-citizen from removal “because of the alien’s past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations would be lawful within the United States,” but only “unless the Secretary of State personally determines that the alien’s [continued presence] would compromise a compelling United States foreign policy interest.” Thus, if Secretary Rubio makes (or has made) such a personal determination, that would provide at least an outwardly lawful basis for pursuing Khalil’s removal—so long as Rubio has also made timely notifications of his determinations to the chairs of the House Foreign Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations, and House and Senate Judiciary Committees required by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C)(iv). (I’ve seen no evidence that he’s done so, but that doesn’t mean he hasn’t.)

The second provision is 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII), which renders both inadmissible and removable any non-citizen who “endorses or espouses terrorist activity or persuades others to endorse or espouse terrorist activity or support a terrorist organization.” Perhaps the argument is going to be that, insofar as Khalil was involved in organizing pro-Palestinian protests on Columbia’s campus, he was “endors[ing] or espous[ing]” terrorist activity (to wit, by Hamas).

I know there’s a lot of technical language here. The key point is that it’s at least possible that the government has a non-frivolous case for seeking Khalil’s removal under one or both of these provisions—especially if Secretary Rubio invoked § 1227(a)(4)(C). And insofar as the government is relying upon those provisions to pursue Khalil’s removal, that might bring with it a sufficient statutory basis for his arrest and detention pending his removal proceeding. We’ll see what the government actually says when it files a defense of its behavior before Judge Furman; for present purposes, it seems worth stressing that there may well be a legal basis for its deeply troubling conduct. [my emphasis]

I of course don’t question Vladeck’s legal analysis (some immigration experts were pointing to the same immigration law provisions as well).

I instead want to suggest that with this case, as with several others, it appears that the Trump Administration made a shameless power grab without doing their investigative work first. So what we see going forward may be nothing more than an attempt to retcon it, to change their story after the fact to adjust for new facts.

Here are some ways Trump has been retconning (or attempting to) in the 50 days of this short term already.

  • After Elon Musk made exaggerated claims about NYC’s use of hotels to house migrants paid for by a FEMA grant, Kristi Noem loudly bragged that she had fired the people involved and had clawed back the money involved. In its lawsuit suing to get the money back, NYC disputes the underlying claim that the government had pointed to (that Roosevelt Hotel was being used to support crime and NYC knew it). One of the fired workers, Mary Comans, disputed Noem’s claim about her own firing in one declaration. And now she’s suing not just for her termination, but for the false claims made about her publicly. As that suit was being filed, a top FEMA lawyer was fired, and those involved suspect it had to do with a request that the lawyer make claims about the clawback to give it legal justification.
  • After Elon and others repeatedly claims made in a Project Veritas video about efforts to fund the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund at the end of the Biden Administration, Lee Zeldin bragged that he would claw back that funding, in such a way that may expose him to legal claims. In an attempt to do that, Emil Bove and Ed Martin pressured a senior DC USAO prosecutor, Denise Cheung, to not just freeze the funds, but do so with a claim of probable cause based on the PV video. That led her to quit and release her resignation statement. Only after that, the FBI interviewed the guy in the PV video; according to his attorney, Mark Zaid, he had nothing to do with the disbursements in question. And since then, Ed Martin has been jurisdiction shopping attempting to pursue this case. Zeldin is trying to get the Acting Inspector General to invent justification for this after the fact. One of the entities involved, Climate Fund, has sued the EPA, Zeldin, and Citibank (there will be a hearing on its request for a TRO tomorrow).
  • With a great many DOGE activities (but most obviously with the USAID closure), the government initially claimed that it had stopped funding pursuant to Trump’s first-day Executive Orders, but after providers got Temporary Restraining Orders, the government (as laid out in a series of court declarations by Pete Marocco, in the USAID case) claimed, instead, that everything was shut down pursuant to a contract review involving Marco Rubio. The shutdown of contracts by itself may be totally legal (or at least defensible), but the way they did so raises real questions about whether the government was lying about Rubio’s personal involvement in the review process, and therefore its legality. (I’ll return to this example, and Rubio’s agency — double entendre intended — more generally, in a follow-up.)

With all of these things, like the Khalil detention, there might be some legal argument that it was legal.

But along the way, because the government didn’t have their story straight when they took action, they subsequently took actions that may cause, at the very least, legal friction going forward, if not legal liability themselves. Noem made allegedly false claims about Comans. A FEMA lawyer resigned, potentially available to offer conflicting testimony about what happened. Cheung resigned, loudly, exposing her opinion that Martin didn’t have criminal probable cause to pursue the clawback. Martin jurisdiction shopped. Marocco has made claims in declarations that defy credulity (and even conflict with a tweet Rubio posted yesterday).

More judges have gotten dragged in, with the kinds of fact sets that tend to piss off judges.

In Khalil’s case, there are several details that suggest the Trump Administration may be trying to retcon their basis for detaining him.

First, there were several right wing groups who first doxed and then targeted him. As with the PV video, right wingers are running with allegations regardless of the evidence. Last year after Columbia booted Khalil, they reversed the decision for lack of evidence. A right wing dossier on Khalil doesn’t actually include examples of antisemitism — but it dies invoke Hamas relentlessly. More recently, State has been doing AI searches to target people; thus far, anything this government has done with AI has had ridiculous problem. So there’s good reason to believe there was shitty information that went in the front end of this effort.

Further, it appears that ICE didn’t know that Khalil was a Green Card holder when they came to arrest him. The habeas petition claims that the agents “looked confused” when he provided proof of status.

15. On the evening of March 8, 2025, at approximately 8:30 p.m., [redacted] and his wife were returning to their Columbia University-owned apartment from a friend’s home. When they arrived at their apartment building, [redacted] and his wife were approached by approximately four people who were dressed in plain clothes. All of them entered the lobby of the apartment building.

16. When the people approached and his wife, they asked, “Are you [redacted]? When [redacted] answered in the affirmative, the men identified themselves as being with the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and that they have to take into custody. The agents told [redacted]’s wife to go up to her apartment, and that if she would not leave they threatened to arrest her, too.

17. [redacted]’s wife retrieved s immigration documents to show the agent that is a lawful
permanent resident. She handed the documents to the agent, who was talking to someone on the
phone. The agent looked confused when he saw the documents and said, “He has a green card.”
[redacted]’s wife heard the agent repeat that they were being ordered to bring in anyways.

[snip]

Attorney Greer identified herself as s attorney and asked who she was speaking with. The agent identified himself as Special Agent Elvin Hernandez of Homeland Security. Attorney Greer asked if Agent Hernandez had a warrant, and he answered in the affirmative, stating that [redacted]’s student visa had been revoked by the U.S. Department of State and therefore they were detaining him. Attorney Greer advised Agent Hernandez that is a lawful permanent resident and has the right to due process. Agent Hernandez responded that the Department of State had revoked [redacted]’s green card, too, and that he would be brought in front of an immigration judge. The agent stated that he would be taking to 26 Federal Plaza.

19. The agents then handcuffed and brought him outside where there were multiple vehicles
waiting. [redacted]’s wife asked for the names of the agents, their contact information, and how to
reach them to follow up on her husband’s detention, but they only advised her that would be
taken to 26 Federal Plaza, and otherwise refused to speak with her. They left her no business card
or any information at all as to how to find out where her husband will be taken, on what grounds,
or who she can contact. [my emphasis]

If the backup to the warrant to detain Khalil was premised on him being a student visa holder (this Tweet targeting Khalil directly asks Rubio to strip his visa), then it’s almost impossible that Marco Rubio would have done the concerted review that stripping him of his Green Card would require (much less the notice to Congress, which Vladeck laid out above), just as it’s “implausible” that Rubio really reviewed the USAID contracts that got shut down.

That is, the ICE agent’s representation that State had stripped Khalil’s visa when they detained him may not yet have been true, whatever else State tries going forward.

Finally, while it is normal for ICE to whisk people off to Louisiana like they did Khalil and normal for it to take a day or so to show up in the system (meaning, he wasn’t specifically disappeared, but rather, America’s detention systems work in this Kafkaesque way normally), the current record suggests that ICE moved Khalil after his attorneys had submitted the habeas petition. As Vladeck notes, that should help Khalil to retain the jurisdiction in SDNY, before Jesse Fruman and in the Second rather than Fifth Circuits.

Kahlil is currently being held in Jena, Louisiana—which is in the Alexandria Division of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (and, as importantly, the Fifth Circuit). It wouldn’t surprise me at all if the government tried to argue that the New York federal courts lack jurisdiction over Kahlil’s petition—because they lack jurisdiction over his “immediate custodian,” i.e., the head of the ICE detention facility in Jena. Indeed, this is the exact argument on which the Bush administration prevailed in the Supreme Court in the Jose Padilla case in 2004—when a U.S. citizen detained in South Carolina as an “enemy combatant” sought to challenge his detention in Manhattan, which is where he had last been before he was transferred to military custody.

But there are two potential grounds on which Padilla can be distinguished. First, in Padilla, the habeas petition wasn’t filed until after Padilla had been physically removed from the Southern District of New York. Here, Khalil’s lawyers have represented that they filed before he was transferred to Louisiana (at 4:40 a.m., no less!). If that’s true (and there’s no reason to believe that it isn’t), that would make this a very different case. After all, different line of Supreme Court precedent provides that the federal government can’t defeat jurisdiction in a habeas case by transferring the petitioner after the petition is filed.

But it also raised questions about whether ICE was trying to whisk him away to defeat the legal proceeding that was pending as soon as that petition was filed.

There’s that old adage, which seems inoperative since Nixon, that it’s not the crime, it’s the cover-up. With Trump and under expansive authorities of Article II, it often looks like it’s not the initial power grab that might create legal problems. It’s the attempt to retcon that power grab after it becomes clear the facts were not what Trump or others believed when the Administration took action.

Over and over, Trump 2.0 has taken aggressive steps based off bullshit, much of it coming from Elon or other far right propagandists. And over and over, Trump’s top people keep creating problems for themselves as they try to adjust the (legal) narrative to match their evolving understanding of the facts.

So as we go forward with discussions about Khalil, don’t necessarily assume that legal justifications that the government could have used were yet the legal justifications they may argue going forward.

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Tom Cotton Does Nothing as OPM Hack Equivalent Happens in Plain Sight

Both WaPo and MuskWatch have written about the declaration that former acting Chief of Staff to the then-Acting Social Security Commissioner, Tiffany Flick, submitted in a union lawsuit against the Social Security Agency on Friday. To support a bid for a Temporary Restraining Order arguing, in part, that the way DOGE has handled Social Security data exposes the unions’ members to fraud, Flick described how DOGE boys were given rushed access to the most sensitive kind of Social Security data, including:

The Enterprise Data Warehouse, which houses SSA’s master files and includes extensive information about anyone with a social security number (including names, names of spouses and dependents, work history, financial and banking information, immigration or citizenship status, and marital status);

The Numident file, which contains information about the assignment of social security numbers; and

The Master Beneficiary Record and SSI Record files, which contain detailed information (including medical data) about anyone who applies for or receives Social Security or SSI benefits

While WaPo’s Lisa Rein (who has been covering this particular takeover closely and was cited in the filing) ends her piece quoting Flick saying, “the risk of data leaking into the wrong hands is significant,” neither Rein nor MuskWatch considers the full implications of this. (And to be fair, the union’s lawsuit, which represents general government employees, doesn’t either.)

Though this complaint includes a FISMA component, meaning the unions are arguing, in part, that the government is violating its own cybersecurity rules, it does not and cannot make a national security argument: That treatment of the entire country’s data in this fashion presents enormous national security risks.

As Flick describes, Elon’s DOGE boys came into the Social Security Agency harboring and clinging to conspiracy theories about fraud, even when offered explanations to debunk them.

20. [snip] We proposed briefings to help Mr. Russo and Mr. Bobba understand the many measures the agency takes to help ensure the accuracy of benefit payments, including those measures that help ensure we are not paying benefits to deceased individuals. However, Mr. Russo seemed completely focused on questions from DOGE officials based on the general myth of supposed widespread Social Security fraud, rather than facts.

[snip]

51. Additionally, even with only read access DOGE can, and has already, used SSA data to spread mis/disinformation about the amount of fraud in Social Security benefit programs. The agency can always do more to ensure accurate and timely benefits payments, and it continues to pursue improvements. However, fraud is rare, and the agency has numerous measures in place to detect and correct fraud.

Having nothing more than conspiracy theories, DOGE demanded — and got (partly by replacing the Commissioner with a staffer who had worked with DOGE in advance) — that Akash Bobba be granted access to virtually all of Social Security Agency’s data, immediately. Bobba appears, with description of his access at GSA, in this Wired profile. Bobba got access to that data via a telework option, meaning he was located with a bunch of other people not cleared into this data itself.

22. Throughout this time, Acting Commissioner King requested that Mr. Russo report to her, as the CIO normally would, but he consistently gave evasive answers about his work. It appeared to me that he was actually reporting to DOGE.

23. During the week of February 10, with daily pressure from Mr. Russo, the CIO’s office tried to rapidly train Mr. Bobba to get him access to SSA data systems so he could work on a special project for Mr. Russo at DOGE’s request and so that he could “audit” any of the work of SSA experts.

24. We worked to provide Mr. Bobba with the necessary information and information security training but had to do so in a truncated manner and outside normal processes.

25. Given that, I do not believe Mr. Bobba had a sufficient understanding of the sensitive nature of SSA data or the ways to ensure such data’s confidentiality. These are complicated systems with complex policies governing very large programs, and it simply is not possible to become proficient within a matter of days.

[snip]

28. [snip] I understood that Mr. Bobba was working off-site at OPM while he was analyzing the SSA data. I also understood that other, non-SSA people were with him and may have also had access to the protected information. My understanding is that Mr. Russo approved a telework agreement for Mr. Bobba (while at the same time directing CIO management to work onsite full-time) to allow him to work out of OPM. But our standard telework agreements state that employees need to work in a private location and should be careful to protect systems and data from unauthorized access. Mr. Bobba’s work didn’t seem to align with those requirements.

[snip]

36. It was never entirely clear what systems Mr. Russo wanted Mr. Bobba to have access to, but Mr. Russo reportedly stated that Mr. Bobba needed access to “everything, including source code.”

[snip]

43. But the request to give Mr. Bobba full access to these databases without justifying the “need to know” this information was contrary to SSA’s longstanding privacy protection policies and regulations, and none of these individuals could articulate why Mr. Bobba needed such expansive access. I also understood that Mr. Bobba would not view the data in a secure environment because he was living and working at the Office of Personnel Management around other DOGE, White House, and/or OPM employees.

Even if we could assume these DOGE boys — at least three of whom (Edward “Big Balls” Coristine, Branden Spikes, and Sam Corcos) have been shown to have suspect ties — have no other motive than to spin false claims of fraud, this would still be a massive security risk. But as Flick repeats over and over, these DOGE boys were always evasive about what they were really up to. And as she describes, these boys are working off site, without the kind of confidentiality protections that would apply within SSA.

By handling the data like this, they make it child’s play for adversaries to help themselves as well.

It’s not just that DOGE has found almost nothing while compromising the most sensitive datasets in government. It’s also that the way they’re doing so, driven in significant part by this haste, has made it exceedingly more likely someone else will compromise the data.

The risk is not just fraud (the harm laid out in the lawsuit). It’s spying, on an even greater scale than China achieved with the OPM hack.

And the members of Congress who’re supposed to oversee such issues have done nothing — at least nothing public.

I’ve included contact numbers for the Senate Intelligence Committee (which is the most likely to give a shit about possible compromise like this), as well as the Chair and Ranking members of other committees with jurisdiction. If one of them is your Member of Congress, call and ask why they’re abdicating their duty to protect the country from obvious compromise.

Senate Intelligence Committee

GOP

Tom Cotton (202) 224-2353

Jim Risch (202) 224-2752

Susan Collins (202) 224-2523

John Cornyn (202) 224-2934

Jerry Moran (202) 224-6521

James Lankford (202) 224-5754

Mike Rounds (202) 224-5842

Todd Young (202) 224-5623

Ted Budd (202) 224-3154

Dems

Mark Warner (202) 224-2023

Ron Wyden (202) 224-5244

Martin Heinrich (202) 224-5521

Angus King (202) 224-5344

Michael Bennett (202) 224-5852

Kirsten Gillibrand (202) 224-4451

Jon Ossoff (202) 224-3521

Mark Kelly (202) 224-2235

Senate Homeland Security Committee

Rand Paul (202) 224-4343

Gary Peters (202) 224-6221

House Intelligence Committee

Rick Crawford (202) 225-4076

Jim Himes (202) 225-5541

House Homeland Security Committee

Mark Green (202) 225-2811

Bennie Thompson (202) 225-5876

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Stephen Miller Makes a Case to Defund or Deport Elon Musk

Over the weekend, ICE arrested one of the people involved in Columbia’s pro-Palestinian protests, Mahmoud Khalil. It appears that they first stopped him with the intent of arresting him on a claim his student visa had been canceled; but even after they confirmed he was a Green Card holder, they detained him anyway.

On Saturday, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officers detained Mahmoud Khalil – a recent Columbia University graduate who helped lead the Gaza solidarity encampment – at his New York City home, an apartment building owned by the school, says advocates.

According to the advocates, at around 8:30 PM, Khalil and his wife – who is eight months pregnant – had just unlocked the door to their building when two plainclothes DHS agents pushed inside behind them. The agents allegedly did not identify themselves at first, instead asking for Khalil’s identity before detaining him.

The agents proceeded to tell Khalil’s wife that if she did not leave her husband and go to their apartment, they would arrest her too. The agents claimed that the State Department had revoked Khalil’s student visa, with one agent presenting what he claimed was a warrant on his cell phone. But Khalil, according to advocates, has a green card. Khalil’s wife went to their apartment to get the green card.

“He has a green card,” an agent apparently said on the phone, confused by the matter. But then after a moment, the agent claimed that the State Department had “revoked that too.”

Meanwhile, Khalil had been on the phone with his attorney, Amy Greer who was trying to intervene, asking why he was being detained, if they had a warrant, and explaining that Khalil was a green card holder. The attorney had circled back to demanding to see a warrant when the agents apparently instead hung up the phone.

Khalil was initially detained in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody in downtown New York, pending an appearance before an immigration judge. Greer said they now do not know his precise whereabouts. They were initially told he was sent to an ICE facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey. But when his wife tried to visit him, she was told he wasn’t there. They have received reports that he may be transferred as far away as Louisiana.

This feels like another bone-headed move — like the firing of FEMA workers who were dutifully helping try to claw back funds already granted to NYC and the attempted investigation of an EPA worker who didn’t do what a Project Veritas video suggested — which the Administration will engage in further corruption to try to defend, making it and the authoritarianism far worse.

People will be fired.

Explanations will be ret-coned.

And either they’ll have to let Khalil free or — more likely — the Trump Administration will attempt to find cause, possibly criminal charges, to attempt to hold him longer (he has, indeed, been located in Jena, Louisiana). Trump will rely heavily on War on Terror precedents that allow the Executive to scream “terror” and with that detain even Green Card holders.

As we wait for better answers about what happened to Khalil, right wingers have taken to Xitter to wave their dicks around.

Newly elected right wing Congressman Brandon Gill, for example, suggested that “maybe we shouldn’t tolerate foreigners seizing control of US academic buildings (while including a screen cap that said Khalil was not in the group that occupied the building).

Gill is calling for the government to take action against foreigners seizing academic buildings even as South African immigrant Elon Musk takes over Department of Education, doing far more damage than protestors did.

And Stephen Miller insisted that the US would send any foreigners sympathizing with terrorism home.

Of course, one of Miller’s chief allies, Elon Musk, routinely platforms people sympathizing with far right terrorism — indeed, he played a direct role in ginning up riots in the UK and elsewhere.

The basis of this crackdown are two executive orders, admittedly focused on schools rather than government contractors, using Title VI funding as a means to dictate what otherwise First Amendment protected entities enjoy. (Note that Khalil’s arrest is inconsistent with Trump’s decision to strip $400 million in funds from Columbia, which would suggest the university, not Khalil did something wrong.)

But it nevertheless remains true that, to the extent that Xitter is protected speech (it is! just like university campuses!), Trump’s EO envisions intervening when government contractors don’t do enough to combat antisemitism.

And compared to Columbia, Elon Musk has been downright solicitous of antisemitism.

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Emil Bove Calls Resignation in Face of Unethical Order “Misconduct”

Unsurprisingly, in his amicus filing, Paul Clement strongly recommended that Judge Dale Ho should dismiss the Eric Adams prosecution with prejudice. The most remarkable thing about Clement’s memorandum, as first noted by Josh Gerstein, is that Clement did not mention the Mike Flynn case, even while making claims directly undermined by it. (Adams’ own filing mentions Neomi Rao’s dissent in Flynn, and Emil Bove invoked it inaptly to say that because the amicus in Flynn did not seek discovery, it means no amicus would need to.)

Bove’s submission, signed as well by newly-confirmed Todd Blanche, is surprising, but not just for its inapt citation of Flynn.

Filed in the wake of multiple questions about his own ethical misconduct, Bove largely shifts a key premise of his own motion to dismiss, that it should be dismissed because of an appearance of impropriety. He largely replaces that justification, one of two made for dismissing the Adams case, to weaponization alone.

The first sentence of the section addresses his excuses for dismissing the case cites a paragraph that mentions only appearance of impropriety, then the transcript where he mentions weaponization but supports it by claiming an appearance of impropriety.

Dismissal is required, on consent, based on the Department’s conclusion that this prosecution reflects an improper weaponization of the criminal justice system, which has given rise to “appearances of impropriety and risks of interference with the 2025 elections in New York City.” Mot. ¶ 5; see also 2/19/25 Tr. 23.

But the balance of the passage relies entirely on his claim of weaponization, citing to Trump’s Executive Order making false claims that Biden politicized DOJ, and eventually citing an appellate decision in the Blagojevich case that threw out those quid pro quos that involved trading of official positions, but not those involving personal benefit (seemingly suggesting that Eric Adams would get no personal benefit from dismissal).

In this case, the Department has exercised the capacious prosecutorial discretion that supports the Motion pursuant to the anti-weaponization policy articulated by President Trump on his first day in office. Specifically, Executive Order 14147, entitled Ending the Weaponization of the Federal Government, sets forth the following policy: “It is the policy of the United States to identify and take appropriate action to correct past misconduct by the Federal Government related to the weaponization of law enforcement . . . .” 90 Fed. Reg. 8235. The express “purpose” of the policy is to “ensure accountability for the previous administration’s weaponization of the Federal Government against the American people,” which included conduct “oriented more toward inflicting political pain than toward pursuing actual justice or legitimate governmental objectives.” Id.

It cannot be denied that President Trump’s anti-weaponization policy is in the public interest as an important reform in response to recent abuses of the criminal justice system. The purpose of the policy, like the Petite policy, “is to protect the individual from any unfairness.” Rinaldi, 434 U.S. at 31. “The defendant, therefore, should receive the benefit of the policy whenever its application is urged by the Government.” Id. Here, for the reasons set forth in the Motion and at the February 19, 2025 hearing, that means the pending charges must be dismissed.

[snip]

As a legal matter, the Department’s conclusion that dismissal would serve the public good by deterring weaponization, and promoting Executive Branch national security and immigration objectives, is entirely proper. Every action that a diligent public servant takes should be designed to advance the public good, which is what the Motion seeks to achieve. If taking such steps were treated as the equivalent of a personal gift or bribe, whether under the ethics rules or bribery laws, government would literally grind to a halt. That is why “a proposal to trade one public act for another, a form of logrolling, is fundamentally unlike the swap of an official act for a private payment.” United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2015).

Remember: Judge Ho ruled that the publicity around the case did not violate local rules, and Adams never even claimed selective prosecution. This is Bove saying he knows better and Judge Ho has no say in the matter.

Having thus claimed that Trump’s own declaration that prosecutions against him were unfair can, in turn, taint entirely different prosecutions, his defense attorney then tries to flip his own alleged unethical conduct. Both in the introduction and in a long follow-up section (together making up about 8 pages of 18), Bove spins Danielle Sassoon and Hagan Scotten’s refusal to do something they viewed to be unethical as itself misconduct.

He does so in two ways. First, and most alarmingly, he suggests that resigning rather than taking an action they deemed unethical amounted to misconduct. Consider the logic of these two paragraphs (Bragg v. Jordan is the Second Circuit opinion holding that Mark Pomerantz had to respond to a Jim Jordan subpoena, sustaining Bove’s paranoia and Trump’s conspiracy theories about him):

The decisions by U.S. Attorney-2 and AUSA-1 to resign, rather than carry out their obligations under the Department’s chain of command, are not a basis to question the Motion. Each U.S. Attorney’s authority is derivate of the Executive Power that the President has delegated to the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 503, 509, 515. So too is the residual power of AUSAs, who are removable by the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. § 542. The Attorney General explained on February 5, 2025 that “it undermines the constitutional order and deprives the President of the benefit of his lawyers” when the Department’s attorneys “refuse to advance good faith arguments . . . .”3 SDNY’s prosecution team and Executive Staff did just that, preferring “political theatre” [sic] over their obligations to the Constitution and the public. Bragg v. Jordan, 669 F. Supp. 3d 257, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

SDNY has taken a markedly different tack in other cases by conceding that the office is bound by the Department’s senior leadership. In Blaszczak, SDNY felt “constrained” to “confess error at the direction of the Solicitor General’s Office” and to ask the Second Circuit to “set aside” trial convictions on several fraud counts. ECF No. 453 at 8, No. 18-2811 (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2021); see also id. at 2 (noting that SDNY was “constrained to follow” the Department’s position); id. at 12 (“[T]he Government is constrained to concede that the § 641 object of each conspiracy was legally invalid. . . .”). In Paracha, an AUSA told the court that, because the dismissal motion had been “approved at the highest levels of the Department of Justice,” “w[e] do not have authority to make any changes to that document.” ECF No. 197 at 7 (emphasis added), No. 03 Cr. 1197 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2019). Here, too, the SDNY prosecution team lacked authority to countermand a decision authorized by the Attorney General. Their misconduct is not a basis to extend this litigation, much less deny the Motion. [my emphasis]

3 https://www.justice.gov/ag/media/1388521/dl?inline.

In this passage, Bove presents what is the proper ethical decision — to end a relationship with a client if they ask you to do something you cannot ethically do — as instead misconduct (and he calls it misconduct even though, as he says elsewhere, Sassoon and Scotten are “the subjects of an ongoing investigation at the Department,” making it clear, on the same day the head of Office of Professional Responsibility was sacked, that he has prejudged the affair).

He does so while invoking the memo Pam Bondi issued last month, demanding that all lawyers of the Department be willing to “vigorously defend[] presidential policies and actions against legal challenges on behalf of the United States.” The consequence Bondi lays out for failing to zealously (a word repeated four times) defend Trump’s views is discipline or termination.

It is therefore the policy of the Department of Justice that any attorney who because of their personal political views or judgments declines to sign a brief or appear in court, refuses to advance good-faith arguments on behalf of the Administration, or otherwise delays or impedes the Department’s mission will be subject to discipline and potentially termination, consistent with applicable law.

But that’s not what happened here: Sassoon and Scotten resigned. (Indeed, Bove formally treated Sassoon’s offer, made to AG Bondi, to resign as such, rather than firing her while she remained an employee, which he could have done).

In other words, Bove is robbing Sassoon and Scotten of the ability to resign to avoid an unethical act. He’s saying the mere act of doing so — the act of making the ethically correct decision as a lawyer — amounts to misconduct.

And from there, he document dumps a bunch of communications Sassoon, Scotten, and some other AUSAs on the case sent, a veritable Twitter Files dump in a legal filing, clearly misrepresenting the context of at least some of them. (I’ve put the references to all eight Exhibits below.)

For example, Bove quotes from a text exchange three days after the election in which someone asks the very conservative Hagan Scotten if he’s going to go after a judgeship now that a Republican won. Scotten replies, “Got to convict Adams before I can think about anything else.” Bove quotes this three times!! But it appears to say precisely the opposite of what Bove implies — he uses it to slam Scotten (along with Sassoon) as “aggressive and careerist.” But instead it shows that Scotten was focused on what he was doing; he wasn’t rushing from what Bove claims is a dogshit prosecution to find a lifetime promotion. Plus, Bove claims that Scotten’s text, “illustrates why [Scotten] was later interested in using public filings to send messages to President Trump,” which makes no sense at all; it was already clear by the election that Trump was sucking up to Adams. If Scotten wanted to suck up to Trump, he would have ditched the prosecution ASAP, possibly even (as Bove himself did) rush to represent Trump in two criminal cases for attacking the country, in hopes of political gain.

Similarly, Bove treats a draft of the letter Sassoon ultimately sent to Pam Bondi on February 12 as a big gotcha, pretending that there’s no difference between “having the authority” to dismiss charges with “having a valid basis to do so.”

Four of the documents Bove cites (Exhibit B, Exhibit C, Exhibit G, and Exhibit H) discuss the drafting of this court filing, which was in turn a response to this inflammatory filing from Adams’ attorneys. The comments all seem to react to the headache Damian Williams had caused by promoting himself and writing an oped opposing corruption — though Adams’ letter make ridiculous claims that Williams was trying to get into the Mayoral race with just months to spare. Adams’ letter effectively says that Williams’ anti-corruption stance as US Attorney, one that targeted both overt Democratic donor Sam Bankman-Fried and Robert Menendez, was partisan. None of the comments supports Adams’ point — that there was some impropriety with the prosecution or prejudice for Adams before a jury. Nor do they conflict with Judge Ho’s opinion on Damian Williams’ op-ed, which is that it was a stretch to suggest it targeted Adams at all and certainly didn’t violate local rules.

Although Mayor Adams does not request relief under Local Rule 23.1, the Court notes that, after carefully reviewing Mr. Williams’s op-ed, the op-ed does not contain any statements that run afoul of the Rule’s prohibitions. In the op-ed, Mr. Williams provides hyperlinks to several prosecutions brought during his tenure as U.S. Attorney, including those of federal and state elected officials, but none concern Mayor Adams. In fact, the majority of the statements in the oped that Mayor Adams claims are problematic concern New York State rather than New York City politics. For example, Mayor Adams highlights Mr. Williams’s statements that “[t]he ability to raise obscene sums of money for a campaign is precisely the wrong bottleneck to elected office,” and that “[i]t reeks of pay-to-play corruption and is offensive to most New Yorkers . . . ” Jan. 18 Letter at 2 (quoting Williams’s op-ed). But those sentences are found in a paragraph lamenting the ability of candidates “to raise money from individuals or entities with business before the state,” opining that “[t]he state’s new matching funds program is woefully inadequate,” and arguing in favor of “a truly transformative public financing system for state elections. . . ” Id. (emphases added). They do not appear to be directed at New York City politics generally or at this case specifically.

There is one sentence in the op-ed stating that “[t]he public reporting alone paints a picture” that “America’s most vital city is being led with a broken ethical compass,” id. at 1, which could plausibly be read to be a reference to Mayor Adams (among others). This particular statement, however, “do[es] not cross the line drawn by [Local] Rule 23.1 in the sense that [it] do[es] not, by [itself], constitute opinions as to the Defendant[’s] guilt, and [is] not otherwise the type of statement[] proscribed by the rule.” United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Local Rule 23.1(d)). Nor does the statement “go[] beyond the public record.”

There’s even a clear concern not to dictate anything to the incoming Main Justice team nor to piss off Trump, precisely the kind of deference Bove is demanding.

Plus, Bove omitted something from Sassoon’s letter to Bondi. Williams had a minimal role in the case.

As Mr. Bove’s memo acknowledges, and as he stated in our meeting of January 31, 2025, the Department has no concerns about the conduct or integrity of the line prosecutors who investigated and charged this case, and it does not question the merits of the case itself. Still, it bears emphasis that I have only known the line prosecutors on this case to act with integrity and in the pursuit of justice, and nothing I have learned since becoming U.S. Attorney has demonstrated otherwise. If anything, I have learned that Mr. Williams’s role in the investigation and oversight of this case was even more minimal than I had assumed. The investigation began before Mr. Williams took office, he did not manage the day-to-day investigation, and the charges in this case were recommended or approved by four experienced career prosecutors, the Chiefs of the SDNY Public Corruption Unit, and career prosecutors at the Public Integrity Section of the Justice Department. Mr. Williams’s decision to ratify their recommendations does not taint the charging decision

Emil Bove went fishing in the prosecutors personal emails (the other two AUSAs on the team were put on paid leave Friday, ensuring they lost access to these communications before Bove filed this), hoping to find corroboration for his false claims about politicization, and came up short. So instead, he simply made up they made Sassoon and Scotten look like careerists, when nothing he submitted supports that at all.

Twitter Files. An attempt to smear two prosecutors for making an ethical decision, precisely the basis of several ethical complaints raised against Bove himself.

Understand, too, Bove is playing a transparent game. Publishing these communications is a privacy violation, little different than the release of the Strzok and Page texts which DOJ subsequently determined was unlawful. Bove as much as concedes the point in his request asking to seal the exhibits.

In the Response, the Department sought to strike an appropriate balance between the public’s right of access, and the privacy interests of the attorneys at issue, by anonymizing the participants to communications. The participants are the subjects of an ongoing investigation at the Department.

[snip]

Even to the extent inferences regarding the identities of certain participants could be drawn based on connections to public reporting, that is not the case for each of the individual participants.

Of course, filing something under seal provides cause for the press to demand to have it unsealed under precisely the same “public right of access.” It won’t be sealed for long. And the only mystery about the identities of AUSAs 2, 3, and 4 is which is which member of the now-suspended prosecution team.

None of this helps Bove’s case. None of this disproves there was a quid pro quo. None of this presents any evidence that Sassoon or Scotten had any question about the ethics of their decision.

All it does is confirm that when Bove says he’s fighting weaponization, he means he’s going to go after anyone who gets in his way of weaponizing DOJ.


Exhibit A: Part of a package of communications Danielle Sassoon attached to an email; Bove claims that all are related to her resignation (it’s not clear they are)

On February 12, 2025, the recently-resigned Acting U.S. Attorney (U.S. Attorney-2) sent herself a draft letter stating that she was “personally disappointed in [her] predecessor’s self-serving actions after his departure. . . .” Ex. A,

[snip]

Attorney-2 sent an email attaching draft materials relating to her anticipated resignation. Ex. A. One of the documents was named “Adams PR,” i.e., press release, which suggests that she was already planning to publicize her resignation. Ex. A, Attachment 1. A another document, styled as a letter to the Attorney General, included the assertion that U.S. Attorney-2 “was personally disappointed in my predecessor’s self-serving actions after his departure, including the creation of a personal website.” Ex. A, Attachment 3. The draft letter also noted, in highlighted text, that “the Attorney General has the authority to order the dismissal of pending charges.” Id. On the day after sending the drafts, U.S. Attorney-2 emailed a letter to the Attorney General that omitted this language and claimed falsely: “The Government Does Not Have a Valid Basis To Seek Dismissal.”

Exhibit B: A discussion about how to respond to Eric Adams’ complaints about Damien Williams’ public comments

prior to making the public claim that only a “coward” or “fool” would sign the Motion, a recently-resigned AUSA from the SDNY prosecution team (AUSA-1) wrote the following regarding the letter that SDNY filed with the Court on January 22, 2025: “[U.S. Attorney-1] obviously has political ambitions, and I think suggesting we doubt that just costs us credibility.” Ex. B at 2

[snip]

AUSA-1 also wrote that it was “pretty plausible” to him that U.S. Attorney-1 “had a political motive in bringing this case.” Id.

[snip]

AUSA-1 pushed back. “I know that none of us were motivated by [U.S. Attorney-1’s] political aspirations, but I don’t think any of us know for sure what motivated [U.S. Attorney-1].” Id. AUSA-1 added the following comments in the draft of the letter:

  • “[T]he point to me is just to separate ourselves from [U.S. Attorney-1].”
  • “To me the point about the statements not naming EA feels a little too lawyerly—almost a technicality in this context since [U.S. Attorney-1] was obviously referring to EA [in the op-ed].”
  • “I don’t want to ask anyone to reject the theory that [U.S. Attorney-1] had a political motive in bringing this case. Seems pretty plausible to me.”
  • “I don’t want to say anything that picks a fight with EA’s accusation of political ambitions against [U.S. Attorney-1]: [U.S. Attorney-1] obviously has political ambitions, and I think suggesting we doubt that just costs us credibility.” Ex. B.

Exhibit C: Another discussion about how to respond to Eric Adams’ complaints about Damien Williams’ public comments

AUSA-1 explained that he hoped to “distance” the SDNY prosecution team from U.S. Attorney-1, “enough that [Judge] Ho and [President] Trump will know we don’t approve of what he did, but not so much that we magnify the scandal.”

[snip]

On January 19, 2025, AUSA-1 circulated a draft of the letter SDNY ultimately filed on January 22, 2025, in which the prosecutors argued—wrongly—that Mayor Adams’ “criticism of the article and the fact of its publication are beside the point.” ECF No. 102. In the email attaching the draft of the letter, AUSA-1 explained, “[b]asically, I tried to . . . distance us from [U.S. Attorney-1] enough that [Judge] Ho and [President] Trump will know we don’t approve of what he did, but not so much that we magnify the scandal.” Ex. C. In response to the draft, AUSA-3 argued, “I think we want to create distance between those prosecutors and the [] US Attorney.” Id. Another AUSA on the SDNY prosecution team (AUSA-4) added, “I agree that we should create some space from [U.S. Attorney-1], but I also think we should avoid anything that looks like us fighting with [U.S. Attorney-1] (which would be counterproductive).”

As the SDNY prosecution team continued to debate the substance of the draft letter, AUSA4 suggested that the prosecutors should argue that Mayor Adams was “wrong about his claim that our prosecution is motivated by [U.S. Attorney-1’s] political interests.” Ex. C.

Exhibit D: A November 8 text in which Scotten said he wasn’t going to pursue a judgeship right away

Just days after the 2024 election, in response to a text message asking if it was “time” for AUSA-1 to “take a seat on the bench,” AUSA-1 responded: “Got to convict Adams before I can think about anything else.”

[snip]

On November 8, 2024, AUSA-1 received a message with the following question: “You think it’s time to take a seat on the bench? Lol.” Ex. D. AUSA-1’s response included, “Got to convict Adams before I can think about anything else.”

[snip]

It is thus apparent from the context that, just as AUSA-1 hoped to convict Mayor Adams as the last notch in his belt before he took a “seat on the bench,” Ex. D,

Exhibit E: A July 17, 2024 discussion about trial strategy. 

At least one of the prosecutors was as aggressive and careerist as U.S. Attorney-1. For example, on July 18, 2024, AUSA-1 exchanged messages with another AUSA on the SDNY prosecution team (AUSA-2) about efforts to “exclude” a “defense witness” in this case. Ex. E. AUSA-1 remarked that an “invocation is better” than “[l]etting him come in and refuse cross.”

Exhibit F: A September 5, 2024 comment from one of the other AUSAs about how they portrayed the influence relationship

On September 5, 2024, another AUSA on the SDNY prosecution team (AUSA-3) acknowledged in a text message to AUSA-1 that “we did a lot of gymnastics around the influence point” in the Indictment, and argued that “maybe making him the one exploiting the corrupt relationship works better.” Ex. F

Exhibit G: A January 21 response to a draft of the filing

Later on January 21, AUSA-1 circulated a revised version of the draft with comment bubbles that included:

  • With respect to the “beside the point” sentence that was ultimately included in the letter, AUSA-1 noted that U.S. Attorney-2 “suggested this sentence, which makes the point less oblique—her objection to the prior version—while in my view still preserving our effort to distance ourselves from the article.”
  • AUSA-1 also noted: “I think we have a sufficiently strong ending without the prior ending (any US attorney would signed) which [U.S. Attorney-2] and others felt might be read as an attempt to hem in the new crew at main justice before they had a chance to weigh in on the case.”

Exhibit H: Another message about the January 21 filing

In a separate message, AUSA-1 asserted that he preferred a strategy that “buys us more credibility by first making clear we’re not defending the [U.S. Attorney-1] article before then going on the attack.” Ex. H

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