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Donald Rumsfeld’s Torture Defense and Appendix M

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As I noted yesterday, the 7th Circuit has permitted a Bivens lawsuit against Donald Rumsfeld to move forward.

I wanted to turn to a dispute not resolved in the opinion, which should be: whether or not Rummy changed the Army Field Manual after the Detainee Treatment Act so as to permit ongoing use of torture.

As the opinion notes, plaintiffs Donald Vance and Nathan Ertel claim that not only did Rummy ignore the DTA’s prohibition on torture, he secretly changed the Army Field Manual to permit it.

The plaintiffs contend that, after the enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act, Secretary Rumsfeld continued to condone the use of techniques from outside the Army Field Manual. ¶ 244. They allege that on the same day that Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act in December 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld added ten classified pages to the Field Manual, which included cruel, inhuman, and degrading techniques, such as those allegedly used on the plaintiffs (the plaintiffs refer to this as “the December Field Manual”). Id. The defendants describe this allegation as speculative and untrue, but we must accept these well-pled allegations as true at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage of the proceedings.8

On appeal, the plaintiffs 8 cite a newspaper article reporting on the development of this classified set of interrogation methods. See Eric Schmitt, “New Army Rules May Snarl Talks with McCain on Detainee Issue,” New York Times (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/14/politics/ 14detain.html (last accessed Aug. 4, 2011) (“The Army has approved a new, classified set of interrogation methods . . . The techniques are included in a 10-page classified addendum to a new Army field manual . . .”). The plaintiffs contend that Secretary Rumsfeld eventually abandoned efforts to classify the Field Manual, but that the “December Field Manual” was in operation during their detention and was not replaced until September 2006, after plaintiffs had been released, when a new field manual (Field Manual 2-22.3) was instituted. ¶ 244; Pl. Br. at 11. The dissent criticizes plaintiffs’ reliance on the newspaper report, but plaintiffs’ case for personal responsibility rests on allegations that are far more extensive. In any event, these are disputes of fact that cannot be resolved by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

But the thing is, Vance doesn’t need to rely on this newspaper article to prove a version of Appendix M authorizing their torture exists. They can rely on Steven Bradbury’s opinion describing Appendix M as it existed during their torture.

As a reminder, Vance and Ertel were detained by American troops around April 15, 2006 and sent to Camp Cropper a few days later; Ertel was released in May 2006 and Vance was released July 2006. While there, they allege, they were subjected to:

exposure to intolerable cold and continuous artificial light (no darkness day after day) for the duration of their imprisonment; extended solitary confinement in cells without any stimuli or reading material; blasting by loud heavy metal and country music pumped into their cells; being awoken by startling if they fell asleep; threats of excessive force; blindfolding and “hooding”; and selective deprivation of food and water, amongst other techniques.

On April 13, 2006, just days before Vance and Ertel’s torture started, in a memo for the file assessing whether changes to the AFM complied with the DTA, Steven Bradbury described Appendix M as it existed at that time. His description makes it clear that DOD had added six techniques not otherwise allowed by the AFM.

Appendix M of the FM 2-22.3, provides guidance for the use of six “restricted interrogation techniques” that are otherwise not permitted by the Field Manual.

Now, DOJ redacted four of the six techniques in releasing this memo under FOIA (the two left unredacted are “Mutt and Jeff” and “False Flag”). But comments that remain unredacted later in the memo make it clear that they involve precisely the kind of environmental manipulation, sleep deprivation, and solitary confinement inflicted on Vance and Ertel. Bradbury writes:

Similarly, the three “Adjustment” techniques are designed to change the detainee’s environment [3/4 line redacted] but without depriving him of any basic necessities or exposing him to dangerous or tortuous conditions. Whether these techniques are used separately or in tandem, the detainee is guaranteed to received adequate levels of food, water, sleep, heat, ventilation, and light. In addition, the detainee’s health must be continually monitored by medical personnel. These safeguards ensure that these techniques do not involve the infliction of punishment and negate any inference that they represent deliberative indifference.

Finally, the “Separation” technique expressly requires that the “basic standards of humane treatment” be maintained even though the detainee may be isolated from other detainees. A detainee subjected to this technique does not undergo sensory deprivation and thus is far less likely to suffer the adverse physiological consequences associated with that experience. M-51. In addition, the Separation technique is carefully limited in duration, which is not to exceed 30 days without express authorization from a senior military officer. With these limitations in place, and given the important role isolation can play in conditioning detainees for interrogation (including limiting the ability to frustrate or mislead interrogators by sharing information about the interrogation process), the Separation technique does not amount to punishment and is not shocking to the conscience. [my emphasis]

Bradbury’s description of detainees receiving adequate food and water, sleep, warmth, and light make it clear these are precisely the environmental factors manipulated under the “Adjustment” techniques. And his discussion of “Separation” makes it clear Bradbury is describing solitary confinement. Thus, while the description of these techniques may be redacted, they clearly must describe the techniques used on Vance and Ertel.

Now, at one level this memo–if Rummy weren’t pretending it didn’t exist–might help his case. After all, like the Yoo memos before it, this memo gives legal approval for torture, in this case stating that Appendix M techniques did not violate DTA.

But there are several reasons why, as used with American citizen non-combatant, the memo does not apply. Bradbury reveals, for example, that these techniques “may be used only during the interrogation of ‘unlawful enemy combatants’.” Vance and Ertel were actually given a detainee review board, and were called Security Internees, not Enemy Combatants.

Further, Appendix M as it existed when they were tortured “required that detainees receive adequate medical care,” something Vance and Ertel were specifically denied.

In addition, Appendix M prohibited the use of threats; but threats of “excessive force” were used with Vance and Ertel.

There’s one more out that Rummy might try to take. As I described in this post, this memo uses a structure I’ve not seen in any other OLC memo. Bradbury notes that he sent a letter (also on April 13, 2006) to DOD General Counsel Jim Haynes “advis[ing] that these documents are consistent with the requirements of law, in particular with the requirements of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.” We don’t have that letter. Rather, we have the memo that Bradbury wrote to the file. In other words, we have no way of knowing whether Bradbury communicated his caveats tying (for example) medical care to his judgment that the techniques described in Appendix M complied with the DTA (though we do know that the highest levels of DOD were involved in this approval process).

Now, aside from the fact that Bradbury’s direct quotes make it clear that those limitations were in Appendix M itself, there’s another problem with this. Both Bradbury’s unusual gimmick–as well as his subsequent failure to disclose it to Congress when specifically asked–is itself evidence that DOD and OLC were trying to hide their efforts to get around the clear meaning of DTA.

Here’s the specific refutation Rummy’s team made that his DOD revised the Army Field Manual before the torture of Vance and Ertel.

Nor is plaintiffs’ allegation that defendant Rumsfeld “modified” the Field Manual on “the same day Congress passed the DTA” to add “ten pages of classified interrogation techniques that apparently authorized, condoned, and directed the very sort of violations that Plaintiffs suffered.” SAC ¶ 244. Apart from relying on pure guesswork about the contents of supposedly classified information plaintiffs have never seen, there is no credible factual basis for the theory that the Field Manual was modified in any manner on December 30, 2005 (the DTA’s date of passage) or even in “December 2005,” id. ¶ 245, or that some portion of it is classified. To the contrary, the only update of the Field Manual since September 1992 was in September 2006, and no part of either of these versions is classified. Both the 1992 and 2006 Field Manuals are matters of public record and can be viewed in their entirety on the Internet at: www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/intel_interrrogation_sept-1992.pdf (1992 Field Manual) [my emphasis]

Rummy claims that his DOD did not have a classified version of Appendix M; Rummy claims they didn’t update the AFM before September 2006.

Except his General Counsel got approval from OLC for that updated classified version of Appendix M just days before the torture on Vance and Ertel started.

Another Day, Another Person Suing Donald Rumsfeld for Torture

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The 7th Circuit has just issued a decision in yet another case where a US citizen (actually, two of them–Donald Vance and Nathan Ertel) are suing Donald Rumsfeld for the torture they suffered at the hands of the military. (h/t scribe) The opinion allows the Bivens lawsuit to go forward.

Vance and Ertel are both American citizens who reported the contractor they worked for in Iraq, Shield Group Security, to the FBI for making payments to Iraqi sheikhs. Following the discovery of a cache of guns owned by Shield, Vance and Ertel were ultimately put in Camp Cropper and tortured. As the opinion describes,

After the plaintiffs were taken to Camp Cropper, they experienced a nightmarish scene in which they were detained incommunicado, in solitary confinement, and subjected to physical and psychological torture for the duration of their imprisonment — Vance for three months and Ertel for six weeks. ¶¶ 2, 20-21, 146-76, 212. They allege that all of the abuse they endured in those weeks was inflicted by Americans, some military officials and some civilian officials. ¶ 21. They allege that the torture they experienced was of the kind “supposedly reserved for terrorists and so-called enemy combatants.” ¶ 2. If the plaintiffs’ allegations are true, two young American civilians were trying to do the right thing by becoming whistleblowers to the U.S. government, but found themselves detained in prison and tortured by their own government, without notice to their families and with no sign of when the harsh physical and psychological abuse would end. ¶¶ 1-4, 19, 21, 52- 54, 161.

[snip]

Vance and Ertel were driven to exhaustion; each had a concrete slab for a bed, but guards would wake them if they were ever caught sleeping. ¶¶ 148, 149. Heavy metal and country music was pumped into their cells at “intolerably-loud volumes,” and they were deprived of mental stimulus. ¶¶ 21, 146, 149. The plaintiffs each had only one shirt and a pair of overalls to wear during their confinement. ¶ 152. They were often deprived of food and water and repeatedly deprived of necessary medical care. ¶¶ 151, 153-55.
Beyond the sleep deprivation and the harsh and isolating conditions of their detention, plaintiffs allege, they were physically threatened, abused, and assaulted by the anonymous U.S. officials working as guards. ¶ 157. They allege, for example, that they experienced “hooding” and were “walled,” i.e., slammed into walls while being led blindfolded with towels placed over their heads to interrogation sessions. ¶¶ 21, 157.

The decision, written by Obama appointee David Hamilton, had little patience for Rummy’s defense. It accused Rummy, first of all, of ignoring the detail alleged in the complaint so as to expand the meaning of Iqbal.

The defendants instead argue that plaintiffs have not alleged more than “vague, cursory, and conclusory references to [their] conditions of confinement, without sufficient factual information from which to evaluate their constitutional claim.” This argument, which is more of a pleading argument to extend Iqbal and Twombly than an argument about qualified immunity, is not persuasive. The defendants argue, for example, that while the plaintiffs allege that their cells were extremely cold, they provide no “factual context, no elaboration, no comparisons.” At this stage of the case, we are satisfied with the description of the cells as “extremely cold.” Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 and Forms 10-15 (sample complaints that “illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate”).
The defendants also suggest that the plaintiffs did not detail in their Complaint whether they sought and were denied warmer clothing or blankets. Even if it was not necessary, the plaintiffs actually specified the clothing and bedding that was available to each of them — a single jumpsuit and a thin plastic mat. The defendants also argue that plaintiffs did not specify how long they were deprived of sleep. That level of detail is not required at this stage, but a fair reading of this Complaint indicates that the sleep deprivation tactics were a constant for the duration of their detention, as was the physical and psychological abuse by prison officials.

It dismisses the argument–submitted in a amicus brief by the military–that regular military justice offered Vance and Ertel alternative means of justice.

For three reasons, however, we are not persuaded by the argument that a Bivens remedy should be barred because detainees who are being tortured may submit a complaint about their treatment to the very people who are responsible for torturing them. First, if, as plaintiffs allege here, there was a problem stretching to the very top of the chain of command, it would make little sense to limit their recourse to making complaints within that same chain of command.

Second, the opportunity to complain offers no actual remedy to those in plaintiffs’ position other than possibly to put a stop to the ongoing torture and abuse. A system that might impose discipline or criminal prosecution of the individuals responsible for their treatment does not offer the more familiar remedy of damages.

Third, during oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel asserted that Vance and Ertel in fact did complain about their treatment while detained. At least one of the men had face-to-face conversations with the commander of Camp Cropper, who said there was nothing he could do about their treatment.

And it got really outraged when Rummy tried to claim the war constituted a special factor that should exempt the government from prohibitions on torturing its own citizens.

The defendants are arguing for a truly unprecedented degree of immunity from liability for grave constitutional wrongs committed against U.S. citizens. The defense theory would immunize not only the Secretary of Defense but all personnel who actually carried out orders to torture a civilian U.S. citizen. The theory would immunize every enlisted soldier in the war zone and every officer in between. The defense theory would immunize them from civil liability for deliberate torture and even coldblooded murder of civilian U.S. citizens. The United States courts, and the entire United States government, have never before thought that such immunity is needed for the military to carry out its missions.

[snip]

If we were to accept the defendants’ invitation to recognize the broad and unprecedented immunity they seek, then the judicial branch — which is charged with enforcing constitutional rights — would be leaving our citizens defenseless to serious abuse or worse by another branch of their own government. We recognize that wrongdoers in the military would still be subject to criminal prosecution within the military itself. Relying solely on the military to police its own treatment of civilians, however, would amount to an extraordinary abdication of our government’s checks and balances that preserve Americans’ liberty.

Now, the ruling is significant for a number of reasons. The facts here are very close to the facts in Doe v. Rumsfeld–the DC District case which was just allowed to move forward. In both, US citizens who were civilian employees in Iraq were tortured in Camp Cropper. Both took place after the Detainee Treatment Act. That’s particularly significant, since both cases argue that since Congress didn’t address torture of US civilians under the DTA, it both reinforces the notion there is no other remedy, but also rules out the possibility that Rummy simply couldn’t be expected to know that torturing American citizens was wrong.

The plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Secretary Rumsfeld was responsible for creating policies that governed the treatment of the detainees in Iraq and for not
conforming the treatment of the detainees in Iraq to the Detainee Treatment Act.

In fact, this case goes further, pointing to news reports that after DTA, Rummy rewrote part of the Army Field Manual (Appendix M) to permit torture to continue.

The plaintiffs contend that Secretary Rumsfeld eventually abandoned efforts to classify the Field Manual, but that the “December Field Manual” was in operation during their detention and was not replaced until September 2006, after plaintiffs had been released, when a new field manual (Field Manual 2-22.3) was instituted. ¶ 244; Pl. Br. at 11. The dissent criticizes plaintiffs’ reliance on the newspaper report, but plaintiffs’ case for personal responsibility rests on allegations that are far more extensive. In any event, these are disputes of fact that cannot be resolved by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

But this ruling–particularly the language about the immunity that a rejection of the Bivens suit would imply–applies in large part to Jose Padilla’s suit against Rummy for almost the same terms (though Padilla wasn’t even seized in a war zone).

This ruling in the 7th Circuit, with another ruling due at some point in Padilla’s 4th and 9th Circuit suits, as well as the DC District Doe case, all raise the chances that SCOTUS will have to answer the question of whether our government can torture US citizens with impunity.

Sure, Justice Roberts and his pals are likely to try to find some way to thread this needle, if not approve such treatment more generally. But it looks increasingly likely they’re going to have to decide the question one way or another.