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One Explanation for Elon Musk’s Claimed DOGE Departure that Gossip-Mongers Missed

The NYT wrote an 1800-word, 5-byline post claiming Elon Musk’s departure from DOGE reflected tensions over Trump’s Big Ugly Tax Bill without mentioning one additional — possibly far more important — factor that may have influenced his announced departure.

This may be an attempt to preserve the damage Elon did to government, up to and including the data consolidation that DOGE carried out.

Even NYT’s claimed basis for Elon’s departure is unpersuasive.

On Tuesday, CBS posted a clip from an interview that will air Sunday, in which Musk complains that the Big Ugly Tax Bill raises the deficit.

Elon Musk says he is “disappointed” by the price tag of the domestic policy bill passed by Republicans in the House last week and heavily backed by President Trump. The billionaire who recently stepped back from running the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, made the remark during an exclusive broadcast interview with “CBS Sunday Morning.”

“I was disappointed to see the massive spending bill, frankly, which increases the budget deficit, not just decreases it, and undermines the work that the DOGE team is doing,” Musk said.

NYT claims that this tweet was a response to Elon. (These screencaps are ET+6.)

That led, NYT claims, to Elon’s announced departure from DOGE.

As it is, there are problems with this narrative. The non-inclusion of DOGE was not Elon’s prior complaint about the Big Ugly; the exacerbation of the budget deficit was. There were plenty of people, in Congress and outside, who were complaining that the Big Ugly didn’t codify DOGE cuts or did fund USAID, complaints more directly relevant to Stephen Miller’s comment. And Miller has been lying about the bill already.

Maybe the NYT’s portrayed drama is correct.

Or maybe this is yet more theater about Elon’s relationship with the Trump Administration.

There was an important DOGE-related development in recent days that may be impacted by Elon’s claimed imminent departure, one not mentioned in NYT’s long story.

After John Roberts, on Sunday, stayed a Christopher Cooper order regarding a FOIA that CREW served on DOGE, on Tuesday, Tanya Chutkan denied DOJ’s effort to dismiss an Appointments Clause lawsuit by blue states — led by New Mexico — against DOGE. [docket]

The DC Circuit (Henderson, Millett, and Walker) had earlier stayed a discovery order from Chutkan pending her decision on the motion to dismiss, holding that she should only grant discovery if the lawsuit will continue. If Chutkan’s decision stands, the government may have to provide the discovery on DOGE that John Roberts halted (in a different, FOIA, context).

Chutkan summarized a list of things the states allege Musk did that would require Senate confirmation.

States claim that DOGE, with Musk at the helm, “has inserted itself into at least 17 federal agencies” and exercises “significant authority” across the Executive Branch. Id. ¶¶ 70, 200. They identify the following categories of allegedly unauthorized actions by DOGE and Musk:

  • Controlling Expenditures and Disbursements of Public Funds: States allege that DOGE obtained “full access” to payment systems at multiple agencies and used that access to halt payments. Id. ¶¶ 78–79, 85, 127–30. For instance, after the acting-Secretary at U.S. Department of Treasury refused to “halt” payments, DOGE personnel threatened the acting Secretary with “legal risk [] if he did not comply with DOGE.” Id. ¶ 84. Then, on February 2, DOGE obtained “full access” to Treasury’s Bureau of the Fiscal Services payment systems, which disburses funds for social security benefits, veteran’s benefits, childcare tax credits, Medicaid and Medicare reimbursements, federal employee wages, federal tax refunds, and facilitates state recovery of delinquent state income taxes. Id. ¶¶ 78–79, 85. That day, Musk posted on X that “[t]he @DOGE team is rapidly shutting down these illegal payments,” in response to a post by a non-profit organization receiving funds pursuant to government contracts. Id. ¶ 86.
  • Terminating Federal Contracts and Exercising Control over Federal Property: States allege that Musk and DOGE asserted responsibility for terminating federal contracts across the Executive Branch. Id. ¶ 203–04. DOGE reported the cancellation of “104 contracts related to diversity, equity, inclusion and accessibility (DEIA) at more than a dozen federal agencies” on January 31, id. ¶ 205; of “thirty-six contracts across six agencies” on February 3, id. ¶ 206; of “twelve contracts in the GSA and the Department of Education” on February 4, id. ¶ 207; and “cuts of $250 million through the termination of 199 contracts” on February 7, id. ¶ 208. States also allege that DOGE and Musk exercise control over federal property by demanding access to secure facilities and threatening intervention by U.S. Marshals when agency officials refuse, id. ¶¶ 94–95; by “push[ing]” high-ranking officials out of their offices at agency headquarters, id. ¶¶ 164–66, by terminating leases for federal property, id. ¶ 206, and by announcing plans to “liquidate as much as half of the federal government’s nonmilitary real estate holdings,” id. ¶ 160.
  • Binding the Government to Future Financial Commitments without Congressional Authorization: States point to the Fork in the Road Email, which offered federal employees pay and benefits through September 2025 if they resigned by February 6, as entering into binding financial commitments. Id. ¶¶ 116–20, 212.
  • Eliminating Agency Regulations and Entire Agencies and Departments: States allege that DOGE personnel took steps to dismantle USAID and CFPB. On February 3, DOGE personnel allegedly “handed” USAID’s acting leadership “a list of 58 people, almost all senior career officials, to put on administrative leave.” Id. ¶ 102. The next day, USAID placed “nearly its entire workforce on administrative leave.” Id. ¶ 103. When “USAID contract officers emailed agency higher-ups” for authorization to cancel programs, DOGE personnel responded directly. Id. ¶ 101. Musk posted on X “CFBP RIP” on the same day that Musk’s aides “set up shop . . . at CFPB’s headquarters” and CFPB’s website was taken down. Id. ¶¶ 146–47. Three days later, CFPB’s acting Director Russell Vought told all employees to “[s]tand down from performing any work task” and “not come into the office.” Id. ¶ 148.
  • Directing Action by Agencies: States allege that Musk and DOGE obtain compliance from agency officials and employees by threatening action by U.S. Marshals, legal risks, or termination. Id. ¶ 84 (threatening acting-Treasury Secretary with “legal risk”); id. ¶ 95 (threatening USAID personnel blocking access to facility with action by U.S. Marshals); id. ¶¶ 176–178 (DOL employees told to comply or “face termination”). States claim that if agency officials object or raise concerns, Musk and DOGE ignore or override the agency and place on administrative leave or otherwise remove non-compliant individuals. Id. ¶¶ 84– 85 (acting-Treasury Secretary “placed on administrative leave” after refusing to halt payments); id. ¶ 110 (DOGE “gained full and unfettered access to OPM systems over the existing CIO’s objection”); id. ¶¶ 137–38 (DOGE representative was “installed” as the Department of Energy’s (“DOE”) “chief information officer” after DOE’s general counsel’s office and chief information office opposed DOGE’s access to DOE’s IT system); id. ¶ 166 (DOGE personnel “pushed” the “highest-ranking officials” at the Department of Education (“ED”) “out of their own offices”).
  • Acting as a Principal Officer Unsupervised by Heads of Departments: States allege that Musk acts and directs DOGE’s conduct without supervision by agency heads. For instance, States allege that Musk and his team sent the Fork in the Road Email “via a custom-built email system . . . without consultation with other advisers to the President or OMB officials,” id. ¶ 120; that DOGE personnel at agencies do not “interact at all with anyone who is not part of their team,” id. ¶ 165; and that Musk “reports only to President Trump,” id. ¶ 71.
  • Obtaining Unauthorized Access to Secure Databases and Sensitive Information: States allege that Musk and DOGE personnel obtained access to secure databases and systems at Treasury, id. ¶ 85, USAID, id. ¶ 95, OPM, id. ¶ 110, the Department of Health and Human Services, id. ¶ 127, DOE, id. ¶ 137, ED, id. ¶¶ 164, 167, DOL, id. ¶¶ 177–78, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, id. ¶ 190, Federal Emergency Management Agency, id. ¶ 194, and Small Business Association, id. ¶ 198.

These are all the DOGE actions that might be imperiled if this lawsuit succeeds.

Chutkan’s opinion sustaining the lawsuit focused closely on Elon’s role in DOGE.

Elon Musk’s role, authority, and conduct within the federal government is a central issue in this case. Defendants formally classify Musk as a “special Government employee.” Compl. ¶ 25 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 202(a)); see also Decl. of Joshua Fisher ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 24-1. Plaintiff States allege that Musk leads DOGE and directs the actions of DOGE personnel. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 59. Specifically, they claim that the “statements and actions of President Trump, other White House officials, and Mr. Musk himself indicate that Mr. Musk has been directing the work of DOGE personnel since at least January 21, 2025.” Id. They allege that, in this role, Musk “exercise[es] virtually unchecked power across the entire Executive Branch, making decisions about expenditures, contracts, government property, regulations, and the very existence of federal agencies.” Id. ¶ 67.

And given the precedents, it necessarily focused on whether Musk’s position at the head of DOGE is “continuing.”

That does not end the court’s inquiry. Having concluded that special government employees are not automatically exempt from the Appointments Clause, the court must assess whether Musk’s particular position is “sufficiently ‘continuing’ to constitute an office.” United States v. Donziger, 38 F. 4th 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2022), cert denied, 142 S.Ct. 868 (2023). In doing so, the court takes a holistic approach, focusing on a position’s “tenure, duration, emolument, and duties,” and whether the duties are “continuing and permanent, not occasional or temporary.” United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1878); The Test for Determining “Officer” Status Under the Appointments Clause, 49 Op. O.L.C. __, slip op. at 3 (Jan. 16, 2025) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s approach to assessing the ‘continuing’ nature of a position has been a holistic one that considers both how long a position lasts as well as other attributes of the position that bear on continuity.” (citations omitted)). Positions that do not qualify are “transient or fleeting,” “personal to a particular individual,” and assigned merely “incidental” duties. Donziger, 38 F.4th at 296–97 (citation omitted).

[snip]

States allege that Musk is DOGE’s leader. Compl. ¶¶ 59–60, 224. The court finds that States have sufficiently pleaded that this position qualifies as “continuing and permanent, not occasional or temporary,” Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511–12. The subsidiary DOGE Service Temporary Organization has a termination date of July 4, 2026, but there is no termination date for the overarching DOGE entity or its leader, suggesting permanence.

So on Tuesday, Judge Chutkan ruled that Elon’s continuing role in DOGE made this lawsuit viable. On Wednesday, Elon announced he would not be continuing at DOGE.

The government has already filed with the DC Circuit asking to offer additional briefing on its challenge to Judge Chutkan’s orders.

Way back in February I pointed out the viability of an Appointments Clause challenge before SCOTUS explained the obvious efforts to retcon Elon’s role.

In a response and declaration, the government blew off the first question [ordering details about DOGE firing plans], but on the second, denied that Musk has the power of DOGE. He’s just a senior Trump advisor, one solidly within the White House Office, and so firewalled from the work of DOGE, yet still protected from any kind of nasty disclosure requirements.

But as the attached declaration of Joshua Fisher explains, Elon Musk “has no actual or formal authority to make government decisions himself”—including personnel decisions at individual agencies. Decl. ¶ 5. He is an employee of the White House Office (not USDS or the U.S. DOGE Service Temporary Organization); and he only has the ability to advise the President, or communicate the President’s directives, like other senior White House officials. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. Moreover, Defendants are not aware of any source of legal authority granting USDS or the U.S. DOGE Service Temporary Organization the power to order personnel actions at any of the agencies listed above. Neither of the President’s Executive Orders regarding “DOGE” contemplate—much less furnish—such authority. See “Establishing and Implementing the President’s Department of Government Efficiency,” Exec. Order No. 14,158 (Jan. 20, 205); “Implementing the President’s ‘Department of Government Efficiency’ Workforce Optimization Initiative,” Exec. Order 14,210 (Feb. 11, 2025).

The statement is quite obviously an attempt to retcon the structure of DOGE [sic], one that Ryan Goodman has already found several pieces of evidence to debunk.

But it is a testament that the suit in question — by a bunch of Democratic Attorneys General, led by New Mexico [docket] — might meet significant success without the retconning of Elon’s role.

[snip]

The retconning of his role is all the more obvious when you understand that the right wing judges on SCOTUS feel very strongly about the Appointments Clause. And Trump is on the record relying on it, most spectacularly in convincing Aileen Cannon that Jack Smith had to be confirmed by the Senate before he could indict Trump.

In practice, Trump is saying Elon can dismantle entire agencies without Senate confirmation, but Jack Smith couldn’t prosecute him as a private citizen without it.

Or he was. Now he’s arguing that all this is happening without Elon’s personal direction.

And here we are again, two months later, and the apparent retconning has not stopped.

This ploy has already worked once. After Judge Theodore Chuang ruled that a USAID-focused Appointments Clause lawsuit was likely to succeed, the Fourth Circuit overruled him. Then DOJ installed DOGE staffer Jeremy Lewin as USAID Administrator, and actions which, back in February, were done by DOGE, now appear to be agency actions. On Tuesday, Chuang denied plaintiffs in that suit discovery.

These lawsuits are different. DOGE did a number of things at other agencies — most notably the data consolidation — that weren’t a central feature of shutting down USAID. Elon’s role at some other agencies was even more clearcut than Judge Chuang found at USAID.

But even if the states can show that Elon exercised the authority to override agency heads, as he reportedly did in several instances, the government is likely to point to Elon’s departure as proof that his appointment was always temporary, and therefore did not require Senate confirmation.

DOJ has been retconning what happened with DOGE for four months now. There’s no reason to believe the drama at this point.

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Pam Bondi Reverses Media Protections to Cover Up Her Complicity in Unlawful Renditions

There’s a great deal that is wrong not just with Pam Bondi’s reversal of Merrick Garland’s media policy, but the memo reversing it itself.

Bondi was in such a rush to splutter out unbridled sycophancy, she didn’t bother to spell check the document.

The very premise — that all leaking of “sensitive” information undermines law enforcement, the claim that leaking “sensitive” information is illegal — is wrong.

Safeguarding classified, privileged, and other sensitive information is essential to effective governance and law enforcement. Federal government employees intentionally leaking sensitive information to the media undermines the ability of the Department of Justice to uphold the rule of law, protect civil rights, and keep America safe.

Bondi ridiculously quotes Trump’s attack on Chris Krebs out of context and claims something that happened under Donald Trump instead happened under Biden.

However, under the Biden Administration, “elitist leaders in Government . . . weaponized their undeserved influence to silence perceived political opponents and advance their preferred, and often erroneous, narrative about significant matters of public debate.”2

2 Presidential Memorandum, Addressing Risks from Chris Krebs and Government Censorship, __ Fed. Reg. __ (Apr. 9, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/2025/04/addressing-risks-from-chris-krebs-and-government-censorship.

Worse still, Bondi parrots Trump’s attacks on Miles Taylor, including Trump’s legally erroneous claim that criticizing Trump anonymously is “treasonous.”

This Justice Department will not tolerate unauthorized disclosures that undermine President Trump’s policies, victimize government agencies, and cause harm to the American people. “Where a Government employee improperly discloses sensitive information for the purposes of personal enrichment and undermining our foreign policy, national security, and Government effectiveness—all ultimately designed to sow chaos and distrust in Government—this conduct could properly be characterized as treasonous.”8

8 Presidential Memorandum, Addressing Risks Associated with an Egregious Leaker and Disseminator of Falsehoods, __ Fed. Reg. __ (Apr. 9, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/addressing-risks-associated-with-anegregious-leaker-and-disseminator-of-falsehoods.

Both Krebs and Taylor, I think, have cause to demand Bondi’s recusal from any matters affecting them.

Bondi not only falsely describes the scope of the gag order that Tanya Chutkan imposed on Donald Trump,  and defies the DC Circuit’s decision upholding it, but in so doing sanctions vicious attacks on witnesses in criminal cases (the scope of the Chutkan gag upheld by the DC Circuit) and slanderous attacks against the FBI (the intended scope of the Florida gag).

This weaponization included prosecutors trying to muzzle protected First Amendment speech criticizing the Biden Administration, including through gag orders targeting not only President Trump3

3 See ECF No. 105, United States v. Trump, No. 23-Cr.-257 (D.D.C.) (gag order); ECF No. 592, United States v. Trump, No. 23-Cr.-80101 (S.D. Fla.) (motion for gag order).

Every bit of this memo is an abuse of her position as Attorney General.

But I find the specific example of a purportedly classified leak she invokes even more problematic.

The leaks have not abated since President Trump’s second inauguration,6 including leaks of classified information.7

7 See, e.g., John Hudson & Warren P. Strobel, U.S. intelligence contradicts Trump’s justification for mass deportations, Washington Post (Apr. 17, 2025), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/us-intelligence-tren-de-araguadeportations-trump; Charlie Savage & Julian Barnes, Intelligence Assessment Said to Contradict Trump on Venezuelan Gang, New York Times (Mar. 22, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/20/us/politics/intelligence-trump-venezuelan-gang-alienenemies.html.

These are the WaPo story reporting that 17 of 18 agencies dispute the claims at the heart of Trump’s Alien Enemies Act invovcation and the earlier NYT report first debunking Trump’s claims.

Given Tulsi Gabbard’s boisterous referral, I don’t doubt that these are the alleged leaks under investigation and these will be the first journalists to be targeted by DOJ (while I have no hopes in Bezos’ rag, I hope NYT, especially, preempts this with a challenge to the terms of this order).

But that is the single example of purportedly classified information in the entire memo. Bondi is saying she has to start targeting journalists to protect Trump’s policies, but the single allegedly unlawful leaks she points to are leaks that prove DOJ is defending renditions based on an Executive Order that Trump’s own Intelligence Community knows to be false.

This is not about protecting classified information. This is about covering up her own complicity in unlawful renditions.

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“The Very Importance of Facts Is Dismissed, or Ignored:” Todd Blanche Whines about Women Judges, Again

Yesterday, just ten minutes after the last career AUSA, Terry Henry, dropped off the Perkins Coie case (using a letter purportedly authored by Doug Dreier, who dropped off the case Tuesday), DOJ filed a motion to disqualify Beryl Howell from the case.

Fair proceedings free from any suggestion of impartiality are essential to the integrity of our country’s judiciary and the need to curtail ongoing improper encroachments of President Trump’s Executive Power playing out across the country. In this case, reasonable observers may well view this Court as insufficiently impartial to adjudicate the meritless challenges to President Trump’s efforts to implement the agenda that the American people elected him to carry out. In fact, this Court has repeatedly demonstrated partiality against and animus towards the President.

The motion is packed with allegations that don’t even make sense. Beryl Howell sinned by:

  • Questioning Twitter’s motives for defying a lawful warrant.
  • Upholding the gag order in the Twitter case for reasons other than what DOJ claims.
  • Disagreeing that Trump’s pardon of an accused cop assailant corrected “a grave national injustice.”
  • Finding that Trump had attempted to get Evan Corcoran to break the law for him.
  • Correcting Chad Mizelle’s false claims about the Steele dossier by saying, “you cannot be saying that there was nobody involved in the 2016 Trump campaign that had any connection with any Russian; you can’t say that.”
  • Noting that Trump lost a lawsuit against Perkins Coie.

The recusal motion says nothing about the fact that Howell oversaw the grand jury investigation of Michael Sussmann, permitting repeated subpoenas to law firms, including Perkins Coie. Beryl Howell treated Trump no better or worse than she did Sussmann.

Perhaps the craziest excuse given for demanding that Howell recuse, though, regurgitated an Elise Stefanik complaint that at a public appearance in 2023, Beryl Howell quoted Heather Cox Richardson about propaganda, without mentioning Trump at all.

This historian Heather Cox Richardson, whose book I’ve been reading . . . cautions in her book’s opening line . . . “America is at a crossroads teetering on the brink of authoritarianism” and she echoes this thought in her closing line, that we are at a time of testing and how it comes out . . . is in our own hands.

(This video was originally posted by one of Steve Bannon’s propagandists.)

In other words, DOJ’s political appointees, including Todd Blanche, are demanding that Beryl Howell recuse from this case because she warned about precisely the kinds of disinformation that DOJ spews in this court filing.

Blanche’s involvement is not just symbolic. This filing was authored by someone in the Deputy Attorney General’s office — Blanche’s office.

Blanche’s involvement matters for two reasons.

First, this is a ploy that Todd Blanche pulled before, back before taxpayers were on the hook to pay him to serve as defense attorney for Donald Trump. Back in September 2023, he moved to disqualify Tanya Chutkan in Trump’s January 6 case because she had already had to deal with multiple January 6 defendants who compared their own conduct to that of Trump (though the complaint would have stood for any DC judge).

President Donald J. Trump, through undersigned counsel, respectfully moves to recuse and disqualify the Honorable Tanya S. Chutkan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Fairness and impartiality are the central tenets of our criminal justice system.

Both a defendant and the public are entitled to a full hearing, on all relevant issues, by a Court that has not prejudged the guilt of the defendant, and whose neutrality cannot be reasonably questioned.

Todd Blanche, when he’s trying to defend Trump’s abuse of power, is making a habit of impugning women judges.

The other reason Blanche’s personal involvement matters is that most of the things he complains about are his own gripes carried over from serving as Trump’s defense attorney. Evan Corcoran testified that Trump deceived him about the classified documents his client was hoarding. Twitter ultimately turned over Trump’s account information, which proved that Trump was holding the weapon — the Twitter account — that almost got Mike Pence murdered. The way that Trump’s false claims led thousands to disrupt the peaceful transfer of power remained at the core of the prosecution of Trump even after SCOTUS had their way with the case.

Central to Perkins Coie’s argument is that Trump’s punitive Executive Order targeting the law firm amounts to a mulligan, an attempt to win legal battles he already lost, including the prosecution of Sussmann.

I think the government admitted to you that this was punitive. That makes a big difference, too, because in the separation of powers analysis, one thing you will look at — we submitted to you — that what they have done is just a mulligan from the things that happened in the judicial system.

Sussmann was indicted and acquitted. President Trump, as a private citizen, sued the law firm; and he lost. The punitive portion, courts mete out punishment, not the Presidents; and courts adjudicate, not Presidents.

Now, Blanche has done the same himself, making his own losses as a defense attorney the business of the United States.

It does nothing but prove that he has a conflict, not that Beryl Howell does.

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The Significance of Amy Gleason’s Fabulous Disappearing Act

I want to elaborate on the shenanigans pertaining to purported DOGE Administrator Amy Gleason here. (Thanks to LOLGOP for helping me make a video to help explain it.)

For some time, I’ve been talking about the way that DOGE, because it is so bureaucratically incompetent and because it is led by someone easy to villainize, actually provides regime opponents with an auspicious tool we otherwise wouldn’t have had if Trump had implemented his Project 2025 agenda more slowly via Russ Vought’s expert work.

If done competently, existing Article II authority and SCOTUS’ enthusiasm to expand it may well have provided a way to do everything they’re currently doing with complete legal sanction. But they chose not to do it competently, which has provided some means to at least slow things down and possibly to get SCOTUS to overturn this.

To be sure, the damage Elon Musk is doing on the front end is catastrophic. Elon is destroying lives and competencies with his chainsaw.

But because of DOGE’s incompetence, it creates legal leverage that I’m fairly confident Vought could have managed to avoid.

Agent Elon Musk

It has to do with Elon’s agency.

There have been a number of stories on how Elon came to choose USDS as a vehicle for his project — whatever purpose that project has. NPR did an early story on the background of the US Digital Service. Wired did a story on what that takeover looked like from inside. Wired did a more comprehensive piece this week.

There were several important bureaucratic reasons to use USDS as a vehicle for DOGE. By repurposing an already-existing entity, Trump avoided disclosure requirements under Federal Advisory Committee Act; this served to defeat the already-written lawsuits filed the first week of the Administration. And because USDS was a White House agency, it might have protected DOGE from other kinds of transparency, notably FOIA. And keeping it in the White House hypothetically made DOGE an advisory entity firmly under Article II power, not subject to other legal challenges.

It was a brilliant bureaucratic theory.

And then Elon and Trump and Karoline Leavitt kept opening their big mouths, making boastful claims about Elon’s own agency — double entendre intended — in the destruction that undermined the entire bureaucratic logic. For example, Elon’s claim to have put USAID through the wood chipper makes virtually every court filing.

By claiming credit for destroying free-standing agencies, Elon has undermined the entire premise of using USDS as a vehicle, because it has boasted that Elon has more power than USDS is supposed to have. As a result, Trump had to attempt to retcon the reporting structure of DOGE, in an attempt to sustain the bureaucratic benefits of using USDS as a vehicle.

In recent weeks, the intersection of several different lawsuits and several different legal theories opened a significant chink in the entire bureaucratic game.

It has to do with Elon’s agency. If DOGE is an agency and Elon heads it, then many of the bureaucratic benefits arising from using USDS as a vehicle collapse. Plaintiffs will get visibility into DOGE. And they’re likely to make Appointments Clause complaints that SCOTUS is generally amenable to.

OMB accepts a FOIA

One early mistake DOGE made was to accept a FOIA from CREW and grant it expedited processing, only to try to renege on that stance weeks later.

[O]n January 24, 2025, CREW submitted an expedited FOIA request to OMB (“Second OMB Request”) “seeking records related to changes to the operations of the U.S. Digital Service, organizational charts, financial disclosures, and other information relevant to the newly-formed USDS.” Id. ¶ 90; Mot. for PI, Ex. C (copy of Second OMB Request). The second request similarly focused on the time period beginning November 6, 2024, but also requested some records dating back until January 2014. Id. On the same day, CREW contacted the OMB FOIA Requester Service Center to ask how to submit a FOIA request directly to USDS and was directed to submit that request through OMB, too. Mot. for PI, Ex. D at 1 n.1. Accordingly, CREW also submitted an expedited FOIA request directly to USDS (“USDS Request”), which, along with the just-listed information, sought “[a]ll communications between USDS personnel and personnel of any federal agency outside of the Executive Office of the President.” Compl. ¶ 90; Mot. for PI, Ex. D. On January 24, OMB acknowledged receipt of both requests. Id. ¶ 92.

[snip]

Although OMB initially agreed to process the USDS request and granted it expedited treatment, it has since done an about face. After CREW sued, the government suggested that OMB had inadvertently accepted the USDS request. See Opp’n at 8–9 n.2. It further indicated that USDS had been reorganized as a “free-standing component of EOP that reports to the White House Chief of Staff.” Id. “As a result,” the government posits, “USDS is not subject to FOIA.” Id. The government confirmed at oral argument on CREW’s motion that neither OMB nor USDS itself intend to process the USDS request on that ground. Rough Tr. 3:23–4:4.

Normally, the White House, but not OMB, is immune from FOIA. OMB is not immune because it is a separate agency. Because OMB accepted this FOIA it provided CREW a way, within the FOIA context, to argue that DOGE was an agency.

That fuckup is what led Judge Christopher Cooper to grant a limited expedited FOIA response to CREW on March 10.

The narrowed USDS request seeks, in each case from January 20, 2025, to the present: “all memoranda, directives, or policies regarding changes to the operations of USDS”; organizational charts for USDS; ethics pledges, waivers and financial disclosures of USDS personnel; “all communications with the office of the Administrator of the USDS regarding actual or potential changes to USDS operations”; and “all communications between USDS personnel and personnel of any federal agency outside of the Executive Office of the President regarding that agency’s staffing levels (including any effort to reduce staffing), treatment of probationary employees, contract and grant administration, access to agency information technology systems, or the authority of USDS in relation to that agency.”

In granting that limited response, Cooper noted that DOGE never disputed claims that Elon was exercising significant authority.

The Court recognizes that much, though by no means all, of the evidence supporting its preliminary conclusion that USDS is wielding substantial independent authority derives from media reports. Yet, the Court finds it meaningful that in its briefing and at oral argument, USDS has not contested any of the factual allegations suggesting its substantial independent authority. To be sure, USDS claims it declined to make this argument because CREW’s “motion fails for multiple independent reasons.”

That led DOGE to ask for reconsideration of the FOIA order, which CREW calls “a do-over,” attempting to make the arguments about agency that — Cooper noted explicitly — it had declined to make in its first response. Along with that motion, DOGE submitted a declaration from Amy Gleason on March 14 making claims about DOGE’s structure that directly conflict with claims, including sworn claims made by Gleason, made about DOGE elsewhere.

1. My name is Amy Gleason. The following is based on my personal knowledge or information provided to me in the course of performing my duties at the United States DOGE Service (USDS).

2. I currently serve as the Acting Administrator of USDS. I joined USDS on December 30, 2024.

3. I am a full-time, government employee at USDS.

4. In my role at USDS, I oversee all of USDS’s employees and detailees to USDS from other agencies. 5. I report to the White House Chief of Staff, Susie Wiles.

6. Elon Musk does not work at USDS. I do not report to him, and he does not report to me. To my knowledge, he is a Senior Advisor to the White House.

Now, the government strongly implies that it wants Judge Cooper to rule quickly on its motion for summary judgment so it can appeal right away. Maybe that will all happen.

But it doesn’t put Gleason’s materially conflict declarations back in the box.

Elon’s conflicts become an issue

Meanwhile, as soon as DOGE came after the Department of Labor, a bunch of labor unions sued under what would normally be a weak privacy challenge, but to which both their initial and amended filings included the concern that DOGE generally and Elon specifically could access data of interest to Elon’s business or his companies, including data about labor complaints targeting his businesses.

9. DOGE will also have access to Department of Labor records concerning investigations of Mr. Musk’s businesses, as well as records containing the sensitive trade secrets of his business competitors, which are held by the Department of Labor and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. No other business owner on the planet has access to this kind of information on his competitors, and for good reason.

[snip]

30. Defendant U.S. DOGE Service (“USDS”) is a federal entity situated within the Executive Office of the President in Washington, D.C. Upon information and belief, its work is directed by Elon Musk, who is reportedly serving in the Trump-Vance Administration as a Special Government Employee (“SGE”). Mr. Musk is the wealthiest person in the world, with an estimated net worth of over $400 billion. Concurrent with his tenure in government, Mr. Musk has numerous large business concerns, many of which have substantial ties to the federal government and U.S. politics. They include SpaceX, a space technology company and extensive federal government contractor; Tesla Motors, an electric vehicle company; Neuralink, a neurotechnology startup seeking to embed computer hardware into the human brain; the Boring Company, a tunnel construction company; and X, formerly known as Twitter, a large social media platform.

[snip]

75. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) within the Department is responsible for enforcing safety standards at American companies. OSHA has investigated Mr. Musk’s space technology company, SpaceX, over multiple safety incidents, and has fined SpaceX in connection with one worker’s death and seven other serious safety incidents.33

76. OSHA has also investigated and issued fines to Tesla for unsafe working conditions in its factories. 34

77. OSHA also has open investigations into the Boring Company, and has issued it multiple fines for serious citations, according to OSHA’s website.35

78. On information and belief, the Department of Labor also currently has open investigations into one or more competitors of Mr. Musk’s companies.

79. Mr. Musk would ordinarily be unable to access non-public information regarding those investigations. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (Trade Secrets Act); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (FOIA exemption for trade secrets); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (FOIA exemption for records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes).

80. In light of the blanket instruction to provide DOGE employees with “anything they want,” Mr. Musk or his associates will be able to access that information simply by asking DOL employees for it.

[snip]

156. There is no public indication that Mr. Musk or DOGE personnel on leave from Mr. Musk’s corporate interests will be recused from access to any of this data, which includes “hundreds of complaints about [Mr. Musk’s] electric car company Tesla.”91

The judge in this case, John Bates, twice rejected their bid for a Temporary Restraining Order on standing grounds. But in plaintiffs’ second bid for one, they argued that DOGE members were prohibited from accessing agency records at Department of Labor, HHS, and CFPB under terms permitted by the Privacy Act because they didn’t work for an agency.

With respect to inter-agency personnel agreements, Congress provided legal authority for exactly that purpose through the Economy Act of 1932, which regulates whether and when federal employees can be temporarily detailed to new agencies. The Economy Act provides that, under certain circumstances, “[t]he head of an agency or major organizational unit within an agency may place an order with a major organizational unit within the same agency or another agency for goods or services[.]” 31 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (emphasis added). For purposes of Title 15 of the U.S. Code, “‘agency’ means a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government.” Id. § 101. Because DOGE is not an “agency or a major organizational unit within an agency” for purposes of the Economy Act, it cannot lawfully enter into agreements to detail its personnel to lawfully established federal agencies.

Bates still denied their TRO. But in his second order rejecting their privacy claims, he relied on defendants’ representations about whether they were an agency or not (they argued they were an instrumentality). They only successfully defeated a TRO request because, Bates opined, they were an agency.

Under those definitions, USDS—which is located with the Executive Office of the President, see First DOGE E.O. § 3(a)—appears to be an agency. In each context mentioned above, an entity within the Executive Office of the President is an agency if it “wield[s] substantial authority independently of the President.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, 266 F. Supp. 3d 297, 315 (D.D.C. 2017). If instead it serves solely “to advise and assist the President,” it is not an agency. Alexander v. FBI, 456 F. App’x 1, 1–2 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Kissinger v. Reporters Comm., 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980)). As plaintiffs themselves insist, USDS appears to do much more than advise and assist the President. USDS’s mission, per the Executive Order, is to “implement” the President’s modernization agenda, not simply to help him form it. See First DOGE E.O. § 1. While the record isn’t crystal clear as to these allegations, it is apparent that USDS is coordinating teams across multiple agencies with the goal of reworking and reconfiguring agency data, technology, and spending. See supra n.3 (describing the duties of the DOGE team members at DOL, HHS, and CFPB; Exec. Order No. 14,210, 90 Fed. Reg. 9669 (Feb. 11, 2025) § 3 (“Second DOGE E.O.”) (ordering that agency heads collaborate with DOGE teams on new appointment hires and prohibiting agencies from “fill[ing] any vacancies for career appointments that the DOGE Team Lead assesses should not be filled”). That is not the stuff of mere advice and assistance. See, e.g., Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d 852, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Curiously, defendants do not make this argument. They shy away from other, similar statutory definitions of agencies, notwithstanding USDS’s strong claim to agency status under them. This appears to come from a desire to escape the obligations that accompany agencyhood— subjection to FOIA, the Privacy Act, the APA, and the like—while reaping only its benefits. Indeed, at the renewed TRO hearing, defendants’ counsel insisted that USDS is not an agency under any of those three statutes (not to mention two Executive Orders scaffolding USDS, see First DOGE E.O. § 2(a); Second DOGE E.O. § 2(a)), but is under the Economy Act. Defendants insist that the inclusion of “instrumentalities” in the Economy Act definition renders “agency” there broader than its sibling definitions of “agency.” And so USDS becomes, on defendants’ view, a Goldilocks entity: not an agency when it is burdensome but an agency when it is convenient.

Plaintiffs leaned into this language when they requested discovery.

Plaintiffs argued that DOGE is not an “agency” for the purposes of the Economy Act, that it exists purely to advise the President and does not possess and organic statutory authority that would permit it to enter into Economy Act agreements with Defendant agencies. ECF No. 29-1 at 34-37. Defendants argue that DOGE is not an “agency,” but does constitute an “instrumentality” that may permissibly enter into Economy Act agreements. See Transcript of TRO Motion Hearing, ECF No. 41 at 32. This Court concluded that, based on the information before the Court about DOGE’s functional activities, DOGE most resembles an agency, but expressly noted the limitations of the current record and briefing to date.

[snip]

The facts about how DOGE is structured are arguably become less clear with time. On February 17, 2025, the White House stated for the first time that Elon Musk is not an employee of DOGE nor is he the U.S. DOGE Service Administrator.

[snip]

Discovery about the functional structure of DOGE–including who has decision-making authority over it–is directly relevant to being able to evaluate its status as an agency or instrumentality to whom Plaintiffs’ sensitive data may be disclosed without causing injury.

That’s part of what led Judge Bates to grant discovery. Another was that defendants’ own claims conflicted with the record.

Plaintiffs seek discovery on these issues in part because defendants already put into the record some facts relevant to the issues. The declarations defendants filed with their oppositions to plaintiffs’ TRO motions—all of which were prepared well after the challenged agency actions—introduced before-unknown information—some of which conflicted—on how USDS is operating at the defendant agencies: from the number of USDS employees working at each defendant agency, to the training and agreements put in place for those employees, to the access those employees are given.

[snip]

It would be strange to permit defendants to submit evidence that addresses critical factual issues and proceed to rule on a preliminary injunction motion without permitting plaintiffs to explore those factual issues through very limited discovery.

And that’s what led DOGE to take a rash step: To make the woman they had just declared to be their DOGE Administrator an HHS employee, effective March 4, even while they disclaiming being an agency in the CREW suit, and asking Amy Gleason to submit a sworn declaration claiming to be a full time DOGE employee ten days later.

Amy Gleason is on the hook for sworn claims to be an employee of HHS and, at the same time, to be DOGE’s full-time Administrator.

Elon skipped his appointment with Congress

All that this shell game over agency status has gotten plaintiffs so far — if the government can’t reverse these decisions on appeal — is some visibility about what DOGE really is, including visibility about what it’s doing with union members’ data.

But it’s all boxing the government in on what does matter: The at-least three different challenges to DOGE that argue Elon’s appointment violates the Appointments Clause, something that could — and did yesterday, in the Does 1-26 v. Elon lawsuit — require reversing all the actions the government has taken under Elon’s watch.

Does 1-26

New Mexico

Japanse American Citizens

It’s that lawsuit, Does 1-26 v Musk, in which Judge Theodore Chuang made big news yesterday by enjoining Elon and requiring the government to start reversing the effects of what DOGE did. But the lawsuit, and so his order, only apply to Elon and DOGE. Plus, to the extent that Elon can get permission from Marco Rubio or Pete Marocco to do the very same things they’ve already done, they have two weeks under the order to do that.

It’s an important ruling, but the most likely effect it may have, in practice, is to reveal how much DOGE broke when it was dismantling USAID, which may soon become evident to people getting their digital access restored.

In making his ruling, Chuang relied exclusively on the public record, all the instances of Trump hailing Elon for his DOGE work and Elon’s own claims about woodchippers.

In another of these cases, though, one by Democratic Attorneys General (captioned as New Mexico), Judge Tanya Chutkan granted plaintiffs expedited discovery on March 12, meaning barring a successful appeal, the AGs will get more visibility on DOGE by April 2 or thereabouts.

Still, like the Does 1-26 case, the AGs lawsuit only targets Elon (and Trump). It won’t have the ability of rolling back everything DOGE did. It might make DOGE itself illegal barring Congressional action, but it cannot reverse everything.

The third suit, which also names the agencies themselves, might do that.

Update: Judge Bates has denied the government’s motion to reconsider his discovery order and has instead extended it as plaintiffs requested. The order … shows some impatience with DOGE’s changing claims.

Presumption of irregularity

None of that is going to happen quickly.

But what is happening quickly is that the conflicting claims before different judges are making it clear that nothing this Administration says can be trusted.

CREW

[docket]

Judge Christopher Cooper

This is a simple FOIA lawsuit.

AFL-CIO

[docket]

Judge John Bates

This is primarily a privacy lawsuit, strengthen by unions’ need to be able to make confidential reports to Department of Labor.

Does 1-26 v. Musk

[docket]

Judge Theodore Chuang

This Appointments Clause challenge only sues Musk, not other government agencies.

New Mexico v. Musk

[docket]

Judge Tanya Chutkan

This Appointments Clause challenge sues Musk and Trump, but not agencies.

Japanese American Citizens

[docket]

Judge Tanya Chutkan

This is the most advanced Appointments Clause challenge, but may be consolidated with New Mexico. It not only sues Musk, but also a long list of agencies.

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Why Elon Musk Can’t Run DOGE [sic] Anymore

Yesterday, Judge Tanya Chutkan had a Presidents Day hearing on a lawsuit challenging DOGE’s actions. While she reportedly seemed inclined not to grant an emergency restraining order, she did order the government to provide her with two pieces of information: how many people had and were going to be fired, and what Elon Musk’s status is.

In a response and declaration, the government blew off the first question, but on the second, denied that Musk has the power of DOGE. He’s just a senior Trump advisor, one solidly within the White House Office, and so firewalled from the work of DOGE, yet still protected from any kind of nasty disclosure requirements.

But as the attached declaration of Joshua Fisher explains, Elon Musk “has no actual or formal authority to make government decisions himself”—including personnel decisions at individual agencies. Decl. ¶ 5. He is an employee of the White House Office (not USDS or the U.S. DOGE Service Temporary Organization); and he only has the ability to advise the President, or communicate the President’s directives, like other senior White House officials. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. Moreover, Defendants are not aware of any source of legal authority granting USDS or the U.S. DOGE Service Temporary Organization the power to order personnel actions at any of the agencies listed above. Neither of the President’s Executive Orders regarding “DOGE” contemplate—much less furnish—such authority. See “Establishing and Implementing the President’s Department of Government Efficiency,” Exec. Order No. 14,158 (Jan. 20, 205); “Implementing the President’s ‘Department of Government Efficiency’ Workforce Optimization Initiative,” Exec. Order 14,210 (Feb. 11, 2025).

The statement is quite obviously an attempt to retcon the structure of DOGE [sic], one that Ryan Goodman has already found several pieces of evidence to debunk.

But it is a testament that the suit in question — by a bunch of Democratic Attorneys General, led by New Mexico [docket] — might meet significant success without the retconning of Elon’s role.

Partly for more general benefit, let me talk about the various kinds of lawsuits filed so far against Trump’s attacks.

Kinds of plaintiffs:

  • Imminent, individual personal injury: The cases that have had the most success, so far, are examples of individuals who describe a specific imminent injury. The most obvious such example is a number of Trans women prisoners who’ve argued, successfully so far, that they face a very high likelihood of assault and/or rape if they are moved to male prisons.
  • Unions or other representatives of federal workers: These lawsuits address the imminent injury of privacy violations or firing and other mistreatment. The most successful (and eye-popping) so far has been the American Foreign Service Association lawsuit challenging the USAID shutdown [docket], in which a Doe employee yesterday provided another horrifying declaration describing another instance of a pregnant woman being deprived of promised medevac, and another from a woman in South Africa running up debt taxpayers will have to pay and about to lose access to electricity on the compound. But there are limits to the recourse that unions can seek on both these theories. For example, while Trump appointed judge Carl Nichols imposed a temporary restraining order on actions targeted at employees oversees, he has not done so for the USAID personnel stuck without the ability to fix anything in DC, because being put on paid leave is not the same kind of injury as being stuck overseas with no access to security warnings.
  • States (all with Democratic Attorneys General): The states are arguing a variety of things, both contractual breaches and injuries to their citizens. Contractual challenges may have little ability to halt ongoing destruction.
  • Private entities, like corporations or associations: These entities are often arguing contractual breaches, or privacy damages. The latter are likely to have more success than the former because of the way the Privacy Act works.

Kinds of challenges:

  • Many of these challenges claim a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, basically arguing that the government changed the rules without going through the process they are required to use to change the rules.
  • Many lawsuits also claim violations of the Privacy Act, which requires that the government follow certain rules if they’re accessing your data in new ways. Thus far, the government has argued that employees have more limited protections than private citizens.
  • Underlying many of these suits are claims about the Impoundment Act and Separation of Powers because the government is not spending money the way Congress said it had to, but argued through an APA challenge. These challenges are particularly important because a key project of Project 2025 is to effectively strip Congress of the power of the purse.
  • Some lawsuits have tried to get at cybersecurity violations or even hacking (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) claims, but thus far with little success. In any case, those would pivot on how DOGE [sic] got access to various computer systems, and in most cases, a senior Agency official ultimately relented to give them access.
  • This lawsuit, and another similar one brought by 26 anonymous USAID employees, argue that Elon Musk’s role in all this violates the Appointments Clause. This basically argues that Elon is acting as a superior officer, which requires Senate confirmation.

The injury suffered by each set of plaintiffs and legal theory largely limits the ability of judges to weigh in. So, for example, if a suit is arguing only Privacy Act violations, a judge can do no more than limit the dissemination outside of authorized channels of the data of the plaintiffs, something that has been ineffective once agencies started giving DOGE formal authorization to access computer servers. If a suit worries about firings, but the government instead puts tons of people on paid leave (as happened with USAID), then the plaintiffs are not yet suffering an irrevocable injury.

Here’s how the Appointments Clause theory, arguing that Elon is exercising powers that need to be created by Congress and confirmed by them, looks in the complaint.

64. Although he occupies a role President Trump—not Congress—created and even though the Senate has never voted to confirm him, Mr. Mr. Musk has and continues to assert the powers of an “Officer[] of the United States” under the Appointments Clause. Indeed, in many cases, he has exceeded the lawful authority of even a principal officer, or of the President himself.

65. As explained below, Mr. Musk: (1) has unprecedented and seemingly limitless access across the federal government and reports solely to President Trump, (2) has asserted significant and sweeping authority across a broad swath of federal agencies, and (3) has engaged in a constellation of powers and activities that have been historically associated with an officer of the United States, including powers over spending and disbursements, contracts, government property, regulations, and agency viability.

66. In sum, Mr. Musk purports to exercise and in fact asserts the significant authority of a principal officer on behalf of the United States. Yet, he does not occupy an office created by Congress and has not been nominated by the President or confirmed by the Senate. As a result, all of Mr. Musk’s actions are ultra vires and contrary to law.

You can see why the White House has decided that Elon is boxed away inside the White House with no direct control over the dismantling of government bureaucracy. The retconning of his role is all the more obvious when you understand that the right wing judges on SCOTUS feel very strongly about the Appointments Clause. And Trump is on the record relying on it, most spectacularly in convincing Aileen Cannon that Jack Smith had to be confirmed by the Senate before he could indict Trump.

In practice, Trump is saying Elon can dismantle entire agencies without Senate confirmation, but Jack Smith couldn’t prosecute him as a private citizen without it.

Or he was. Now he’s arguing that all this is happening without Elon’s personal direction.

There is plenty in the complaint already that debunks this, not least the narrative of how Elon started disappearing USAID even before, by his own description, Trump approved.

93. With a budget of over $40 billion, USAID accounts for more than half of all U.S. foreign assistance. USAID has missions in over 100 countries. As of January 2025, USAID had a workforce of over 10,000, with approximately two-thirds serving overseas.

94. On Saturday, February 1, 2025, a group of about eight DOGE personnel entered the USAID building and demanded access to every door and floor, despite only a few of them having the requisite security clearance.34 The areas to which they sought access included a sensitive compartmented information facility—commonly known as a SCIF—an ultra-secure room where officials and government contractors take extraordinary precautions to review highly classified information. DOGE personnel, aided by phone calls from Mr. Musk, had pressured USAID officials for days to access the secure facility and its contents.35

95. When USAID personnel attempted to block access to some areas, DOGE personnel, including Mr. Musk, threatened to call federal marshals. Under threat, the agency personnel acquiesced, and DOGE personnel were eventually given access to the secure spaces.

96. Later that day, top officials from USAID and the bulk of the staff in USAID’s Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs were put on leave. Some of them were not notified but had their access to agency terminals suspended. USAID’s security official was also put on leave.36 97. Within hours, USAID’s website vanished. It remains inoperative.37

98. On Sunday, February 2, 2025, Mr. Musk tweeted, “USAID is a criminal organization. Time for it to die.”

38 Later, he tweeted, “We spent the weekend feeding USAID into the woodchipper.”39

99. Mr. Musk provided no support for his claim that USAID is a criminal organization. 100. On Monday, February 3, 2025, Mr. Musk stated that he was in the process of closing the agency, with President Trump’s blessing. Mr. Musk stated: “I went over it with him [President Trump] in detail, and he agreed that we should shut it down. And I actually checked with him a few times [and] said ‘are you sure?’ The answer was yes. And so we’re shutting it down.”40

Now, before DOJ gave this answer and blew off Judge Chutkan’s order to provide details of the ongoing firing spree, she seemed inclined not to grant a restraining order to stop all this.

It’s unclear whether this defiance will change that. Or, at the very least, whether it will lead to more questions about whether White House wrote any of this down.

What is clear is that the White House recognizes a real risk if Elon is held accountable for all the things Elon has done.

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The January 6 Report Is Substantially the Immunity Brief Reporters Ignored in October

I want to say something about the structure of Jack Smith’s report. For his description of Trump’s alleged crimes, he includes a fairly high level narrative in the text, with detailed footnotes.

A great number of the footnotes — around 178 of them — cite to ECF 252.

ECF 252 is the immunity brief Jack Smith fought hard, over Trump’s objections, to submit in October. The footnotes often then cite the Special Counsel’s Bates stamp identifying that piece of evidence and include a short description of the source.

Take this footnote:

It sources this assertion in the report itself:

Under this plan, they would organize the people who would have served as Mr. Trump’s electors, had he won the popular vote, in seven states that Mr. Trump had lost-Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin-and cause them to sign and send to Washington false certifications claiming to be the legitimate electors. 39

It cites to the following language in the immunity brief:

So in early December, the defendant and his co-conspirators developed a new plan regarding the targeted states that the defendant had lost (Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin): to organize the people who would have served as the defendant’s electors had he won the popular vote, and cause them to sign and send to Pence, as President of the Senate, certifications in which they falsely represented themselves as legitimate electors who had cast electoral votes for the defendant. Ultimately, the defendant and his co-conspirators would use these fraudulent electoral votes—mere pieces of paper without the lawful imprimatur of a state executive—to falsely claim that in his ministerial role presiding over the January 6 certification, Pence had the authority to choose the fraudulent slates over the legitimate ones, or to send the purportedly “dueling” slates to the state legislatures for consideration anew.

[snip]

Notwithstanding obstacles, the defendant and his co-conspirators successfully organized his elector nominees and substitutes to gather on December 14 in the targeted states, cast fraudulent electoral votes on his behalf, and send those fraudulent votes to Washington, D.C., in order to falsely claim at the congressional certification that certain states had sent competing slates of electors.301 When possible, the defendant and co-conspirators tried to have the fake electoral votes appear to be in compliance with state law governing how legitimate electors vote.302

And this footnote in the immunity brief.

As advertised, the footnote links to the Appendix and (in this case) the actual fake elector certificates.

In other words, for the narrative sourced to ECF 252 (one part of the narrative not sourced to the immunity brief pertains to the riot itself), we’ve already gotten this material. We got it in October, before the election.

It got only passing coverage.

We got much of this report, in more detailed form, in October. Many of the people who claim releasing this report would have made a difference in the election didn’t read the immunity brief in October, much less make a big deal about it.

The structure is significant for a few more reasons. First, the footnotes in this report sometimes provide more description about what appears in the appendix. Second, for those (including state Attorneys General) who want the evidence from Smith’s prosecution, the place to go is Tanya Chutkan, because it’s all there in her docket, sealed.

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Jack Smith Asks for Three Weeks

Jack Smith just requested and got a consent motion to file a status report “or otherwise inform” Judge Tanya Chutkan of what they’re going to do with the January 6 case.

As a result of the election held on November 5, 2024, the defendant is expected to be certified as President-elect on January 6, 2025, and inaugurated on January 20, 2025. The Government respectfully requests that the Court vacate the remaining deadlines in the pretrial schedule to afford the Government time to assess this unprecedented circumstance and determine the appropriate course going forward consistent with Department of Justice policy. By December 2, 2024, the Government will file a status report or otherwise inform the Court of the result of its deliberations. The Government has consulted with defense counsel, who do not object to this request.

If that “otherwise inform” is a report, it would be done in plenty of time for Dick Durbin to hold a hearing.

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Jack Smith’s Delicate Treatment of BadgerPundit Kenneth Chesebro

As I’ve said a few times, when I was hunting for Lee Chatfield, I found Kenneth Chesebro.

There is a transcript in the mostly sealed Appendix I to Jack Smith’s immunity brief that must be Chesebro’s. Several passages describing events in which Chesebro was involved cite a transcript, spanning from roughly GA 97 to GA 103, that appears between Lee Chatfield and probable Pat Cipollone transcripts (GA 55-56 is someone whose name appears alphabetically between Bowers and Cannon; this may be Trump campaign staffer Michael Brown).

On December 16, [Chesebro] traveled to Washington with a group of private attorneys who had done work for the defendant’s Campaign in Wisconsin for a photo opportunity with the defendant in the Oval Office.315

[snip]

Later that morning, [Chesebro] worked with another attorney for the defendant, who contacted a U.S. Senator to ask him to obtain the fraudulent Wisconsin and Michigan documents from the U.S. Representative’s office and hand-deliver them to the Vice President.408

315 Documentary evidence, Presidential Daily Diary, GA 100-101

408 Documentary evidence, GA 55-56, GA 102-103, Chris Hodgson [Compare to full transcript]

That would mean that this section, which suggests the co-conspirators deliberately lied to fake electors, is sourced partly to Chesebro too (GA 517-518 is part of an at least 6-page section describing the fake elector involvement of someone whose name appears alphabetically between Raffensperger and Scavino, which hypothetically could be Mike Roman, but nothing marks it as necessarily him).

In practice, the fraudulent elector plan played out somewhat differently in each targeted state. In general, the co-conspirators deceived the defendant’s elector nominees in the same way that the defendant and [Eastman] deceived [Ronna McDaniel] by falsely claiming that their electoral votes would be used only if ongoing litigation were resolved in the defendant’s favor.282

282 Documentary evidence, GA 97-98, GA 517-518.

It’s not terribly surprising that Jack Smith got an interview with Chesebro. After all, Chesebro made a great show of cooperating in various state investigations — at a minimum, Georgia, Nevada, Wisconsin, and Michigan, as CNN laid out last December. But as CNN also reported, the veracity of his testimony came into question by February, when CNN caught Chesebro covering up a Twitter account he had.

So Jack Smith appears to have gotten an interview with Chesebro, but Chesebro may not be terribly reliable.

Perhaps for that reason, there are a great many things involving Chesebro that are not sourced to that transcript. Chesebro’s plotting about the fake electors plot, for example, is always sourced to the documents themselves.

More interestingly, this passage — describing that Chesebro followed Trump’s public instructions to go to DC, but also describing that he collected copies of the fake Michigan and Wisconsin elector certificates and handed them off to Congressman Mike Kelly — is sourced entirely to documentary evidence.

Meanwhile, [Chesebro] who had traveled to Washington as directed by the defendant’s public messages, obtained duplicate originals of the fraudulent certificates signed by the defendant’s fraudulent electors in Michigan and Wisconsin, which they believed had not been delivered by mail to the President of the Senate or Archivist.389 [Chesebro] received these duplicates from Campaign staff and surrogates, who flew them to Washington at private expense.390 He then hand-delivered them to staffers for a U.S. Representative at the Capitol as part of a plan to deliver them to Pence for use in the certification proceeding.391

Similarly, the description of Chesebro’s participation in the mob is sourced exclusively to documentary evidence.

Among these was [Chesebro] who had attended the defendant’s speech from the Washington Monument, marched with the crowd to the Capitol, and breached the restricted area surrounding the building.449

There’s a problem with Chesebro’s testimony on this point, of course: If he ferried fake elector certificates, then he wasn’t responding to Trump’s public tweeting about January 6. He was responding to the instructions of other plotters.

Which makes the way Smith sourced this passage, describing a December 16 meeting with Trump that Reince Priebus also attended, more interesting.

On December 16, [Chesebro] traveled to Washington with a group of private attorneys who had done work for the defendant’s Campaign in Wisconsin for a photo opportunity with the defendant in the Oval Office.315 During the encounter, the defendant complained about Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice [Brian Hagedorn] who two days earlier had cast the deciding vote in rejecting the defendant’s election challenge in the state.316 As the group was leaving, the defendant spoke directly—and privately—to [Chesebro]. 317 As late as early January, the conspirators attempted to keep the full nature of the fraudulent elector plan secret. On January 3, for instance, in a private text message exchange, [Boris Epshteyn] wrote to [Chesebro] “Careful with your texts on text groups. No reason to text things about electors to anyone but [Eastman] and me.” [Chesebro] responded, “K,” and followed up, “I’m probably a bit paranoid haha.” [Epshteyn] wrote, “A valuable trait!”318

315 Documentary evidence plus Chesebro

316 Probably Reince Priebus

317 Probably Reince Priebus

318 Documentary evidence

That is, Smith relies on Chesebro for the claim that this meeting was a photo op. But he doesn’t include Chesebro’s claims about what he said privately to Trump; he relies solely on what is likely Reince Priebus witnessing, but not participating in, that conversation.

Rather than describing what Chesebro claimed he and Trump said to each other, Smith relies on what Chesebro told another lawyer (likely Jim Troupis), afterwards. As soon as Chesebro saw Trump’s tweet announcing the January 6 rally, he texted someone else and boasted that “we” had a “unique understanding” of Trump’s December 19 Tweet calling people to DC.

The defendant first publicly turned his sights toward January 6 in the early morning hours of December 19. At 1:42 a.m., the defendant posted on Twitter a copy of a report falsely alleging fraud and wrote, ““. . . Statistically impossible to have lost the 2020 Election. Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!”319 When [Chesebro] learned about the Tweet, he sent a link about it to another of the Wisconsin attorneys who had met with the defendant in the Oval Office on December 16 and wrote, “Wow. Based on 3 days ago, I think we have unique understanding of this.”320

319 Trump tweet

320 Documentary evidence

Chesebro has testified about the December 16 meeting. TPM got his testimony to Michigan prosecutors. He described to them that he told Trump that the real deadline for certification was January 6.

Chesebro traveled to Washington to meet with Trump on Dec. 16 alongside a coterie of other Trump campaign attorneys.

Three years later, in the interview with Michigan prosecutors, Chesebro recalled the meeting with Trump: “The marching orders were, don’t say anything that would make [Trump] feel more positive than he did at the beginning of the meeting.”

He did not follow that advice. Chesebro told prosecutors that he began to speak with Trump after listening to the President talk on speakerphone with Newt Gingrich about something to do with Georgia voting machines. Then, the conversation turned to Trump’s chances in Arizona.

Chesebro did exactly what he had been told not to do: give Trump a sense of hope. He recalled telling Trump that the “real deadline” was Jan. 6. He was later admonished by former White House chief of staff Reince Preibus because, as Chesebro put it later to prosecutors, “the vibe that I had given him was some ground for optimism.”

Chesebro himself compared the meeting to a widely reported and infamous late-night encounter, two days later on Dec. 18, between Trump, Sidney Powell, former Overstock CEO Patrick Byrne, and the White House counsel’s office, saying that it was “sort of unauthorized.”

If Chesebro reliably told Jack Smith the same thing, it might strengthen the obstruction case. As it is, Jack Smith argues that the riot happened, Trump did nothing to stop it, and then he opportunistically targeted Mike Pence as his mob was hunting him down. He stops well short of saying he summoned the mob to overrun Congress.

Chesebro’s apparent unreliability may be preventing Jack Smith from taking the next step, showing that Trump heard from Chesebro on December 16 that there was still one more step to certification on January 6, which led him — less than three days later — to summon his mob. But if Chesebro’s testimony were more reliable, then he would not simultaneously be explaining that he ferried a second set of fake Michigan and Wisconsin certificates to DC but also simply showed up on January 6 in response to Trump’s Tweets. And it might change the import of the way he shadowed Alex Jones.

Still, as it is, Chesebro is central to the continued viability of 18 USC 1512(c)(2) and (k) charges. Under Fischer, there must be an evidentiary component to the obstruction charge. And in Chesebro, you have the sole member of the conspiracy who joined the mob on January 6 having earlier ferried fake elector certificates to members of Congress in hopes that Mike Pence would use the certificates to throw out Joe Biden’s votes.

If this ever goes to trial, Chesebro’s role — and possible testimony — may be key. But thus far, at least, it doesn’t appear that his testimony is reliable enough to build the case on.

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Trump’s GOP Is Running on a Platform of Freeing Seditionists and Cop Assailants

I’m halfway done my first review of the materials Jack Smith released today.

All of us who have followed this have concluded there’s not any new news (though the presentation of it reveals certain things about Smith’s investigation).

So why did Trump’s lawyers wail and wail about releasing these materials before the election?

Just days ago, after all, Trump’s lawyers argued that releasing these materials would alter the election.

It may be this:

As the appendix documents, on March 11, 2024, Trump posted to Truth Social that, along with closing the border and DRILL, BABY, DRILL, his first priority, Day One, was to free the seditionists and cop assailants who had fought for him on January 6.

Prosecutors cited that post to support their argument that Trump ratified the violence that day.

As the Government identified in its Rule 404(b) notice, ECF No. 174-1 at 8-9, the Government will introduce some of the defendant’s numerous statements that post-date his time as President in which he has blamed Pence and approved of the actions of his supporters who breached the Capitol and obstructed the certification proceeding,722 thus providing evidence of his intent on January 6.

The defendant’s endorsement of the violent actions of his supporters on January 6, and his sentiment that they were justified in threatening Pence—all made while the defendant was a private citizen after the end of his term in office—are probative of his intent during the charged conspiracies.

722 See, e.g., GA 1970 at 17:37 (Video of Trump Interview 07/10/2021); GA 1926 at 1:15:30 (Video of Conroe Rally 01/29/2022); GA 1971 at 15:51, 16:42 (Video of Trump Interview 02/01/2022): GA 1962 at 48:29 (Video of Trump at Faith and Freedom Coalition 06/17/2022); GA 1966 at 09:30 (Video of Trump Interview 09/01/2022); GA 1973 at 43:07 (Video of Waco Rally 03/25/2023); GA 1694 (Transcript of CNN Town Hall 05/10/2023); GA 1964 (Video of Trump Campaign Statement 2024); GA 1967 at 45:18 (Video of Trump Interview 08/23/2023); GA 1965 at 56:10, 57:11 (Video of Trump Interview on Meet the Press 09/17/2023); GA 1935 at 35:50, 01:16:16 (Video of Greensboro Rally 03/02/2024); GA 967 (Donald J. Trump Truth Social Post 03/11/2024); Isaac Arnsdorf and Maeve Reston, 7rump claims violence he inspired on Jan. 6 was Pence’s fault, WASH. PostT, (Mar. 13, 2023, 8:09 p-m.), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/03/13/trump-pence-iowa/. [my emphasis]

The GOP candidate for President has a criminal docket. And in that criminal docket, today, the government included a post promising to free seditionists and cop-assailants with the same urgency with which Donald Trump promises to close the border. “My first acts,” the GOP standard-bearer stated, would include freeing the people who assaulted the Capitol on January 6.

This was the proposal back in March, one of the first things Trump did after Nikki Haley conceded. And since that time, the entire GOP has fallen into line behind that plan.

The Republican Party’s candidate for President is running on a platform of freeing cop assailants and seditionists.

There’s nothing new in this appendix. But that post does clarify things considerably.

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Jack Smith’s Appendix

Sorry it has taken me so long to post the appendix to Jack Smith’s immunity briefing. The four sections are here:

Volume I

Volume II

Volume III

Volume IV

There’s virtually nothing new here. Trump’s temper tantrum was little more than a public wail that if people saw already-public documents about his plotting to run fake electors, it would swing the election.

That said, there are a few things we can confirm from the structure of all this, which I’ll write up over the weekend.

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