Soufan’s Narrative

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Ali Soufan didn’t get to read his entire prepared statement in today’s SJC hearing. But his prepared statement adds some more nuance to the narrative of how CIA started to torture Abu Zubaydah. (Except where linked, the details below come from Soufan’s testimony.)

March 28, 2002: Abu Zubaydah caught.

March 31, 2002: AZ flown to Thailand.

Early April, 2002: Soufan and his partner arrive in Thailand and start interrogating AZ with the help of CIA officers stationed in Thailand.

Immediately after Abu Zubaydah was captured, a fellow FBI agent and I were flown to meet him at an undisclosed location. We were both very familiar with Abu Zubaydah and have successfully interrogated al-Qaeda terrorists. We started interrogating him, supported by CIA officials who were stationed at the location, and within the first hour of the interrogation, using the Informed Interrogation Approach, we gained important actionable intelligence.

The information was so important that, as I later learned from open sources, it went to CIA Director George Tennet who was so impressed that he initially ordered us to be congratulated.

Several days later (early April): Upon learning that the FBI was having success with AZ, Tenet sends CIA CTC team to Thailand.

That was apparently quickly withdrawn as soon as Mr. Tennet was told that it was FBI agents, who were responsible. He then immediately ordered a CIA CTC interrogation team to leave DC and head to the location to take over from us.

During his capture Abu Zubaydah had been injured. After seeing the extent of his injuries, the CIA medical team supporting us decided they were not equipped to treat him and we had to take him to a hospital or he would die. At the hospital, we continued our questioning as much as possible, while taking into account his medical condition and the need to know all information he might have on existing threats.

We were once again very successful and elicited information regarding the role of KSM as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and lots of other information that remains classified. (It is important to remember that before this we had no idea of KSM’s role in 9/11 or his importance in the al Qaeda leadership structure.) All this happened before the CTC team arrived.

"Within a few days" (early April): CIA CTC team arrives and takes the lead, with FBI continuing to assist. CIA starts with clothing and sleep deprivation. Read more →

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Lindsey Graham: Cheney Put People in Gitmo Who Weren’t Military Threat

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Lindsey Graham spent much of the torture hearing trying to find a narrow ground from which he could condemn torture, yet prevent anyone from being held accountable for torture. But in an effort to admit past problems at Gitmo, he named names. One name–that of Dick Cheney.

My goal is to have a process, Mr. Zelikow, that would allow us as a nation to hold our head up high and say, "no one is in jail at Guantanamo Bay because Dick Cheney said so. The only people that are in jail at Guantanamo Bay are there because the evidence presented to an independent judiciary by our military passed muster with the judicial system–they’re there because they’re a military threat." And that when we try these people, they’re tried not because we hate them, but because of what they did.

I guess the presidential determination that someone is an enemy combatant is another of those presidential-level decisions that Dick Cheney made in lieu of the actual President. 

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Senate Judiciary Hearing on Torture

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 Here’s the committee stream.

Whitehouse: [link] Winston Churchill, truth always attended by bodyguard of lies. Sordid truth of torture accompanies by bodyguard of lies. Lies are legion. Bush told us America does not torture. Cheney agreed that waterboarding a dunk in the water. Former CIA said waterboarding once. Waterboarding determined to be legal, but not told how badly law ignored and bastardized, how furiously lawyers rejected OLC opinions. Couldn’t second-guess CIA officers, now told led by contractors with a profit motive. [Enters Hayden statement on experience of torturers into record] I believe Judge Mukasey and General Hayden owe experienced interrogators an apology. Example of Zubaydah is false, as information given before torture. No accounting of wild goose chases. Legislators can’t declassify. Though many of us in Congress knew lies were false, we could not reply. You criminalize conduct by making it illegal. Prosecution does not criminalize conduct, it vindicates it. First of series of hearings. I hope we’ll soon be provided the OPR report, and hold more thorough hearings. How sad it is that there should be an OPR investigation into OLC. Thank Leahy for holding this hearing. Thank Feinstein, leading detailed investigation into Bush’s interrogation program. Ali Soufan. Interviewed al Qaeda terrorists, threats have been documented, avoid photographing his face.

Graham: Nobility of the law or political stunt. I guess if we’re going to talk about evil, we’re going to have to talk about more than just the last Administrations efforts to fight evil. Would we have this hearing if we were attacked this afternoon? Or would we focus on repairing damage and staying ahead of enemy. We need to find out who was told and when. I’m calling for any memos that show information gathered from EIT be made available to the Committee so we can see what worked. Many years after 9/11. The people we’re judging woke up one morning and said, "oh my god, what’s coming next." I’ve been a prosecutor most of my life, I know the difference between political disagreement and a crime. The idea that you’d consult your political opponents with a crime.  As to Army Field Manual, to say that is the only way to interrogate is just not right. Let’s bring CIA director into this hearing, he has already testify he would ask for techniques not in army field manual. Read more →

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Piling on PolitiFact

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Jamison Foser already beat up PolitiFact for its ridiculous judgment on the he-said-she-said debate over whether Nancy Pelosi was briefed on torture.

The real problem here is PolitiFact’s insistance on declaring Pelosi’s statement "true" or "false," when the painfully obvious reality is that PolitiFact just doesn’t know whether it is true or false.  Other media would be wise to take PolitiFact’s conclusion with a grain of salt.

But I’m going to join in the fun to point out PolitiFact’s real difficulty with verb tenses and pronouns. The point of their post, remember, is to judge whether or not this Pelosi statement is correct.

We were not, I repeat, were not told that waterboarding or any of these other enhanced interrogation methods were used. What they did tell us is that they had some legislative counsel — the Office of Legislative Counsel opinions that they could be used, but not that they would.

Pelosi’s statement refers to a briefing occuring on September 4, 2002, after Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded 83 times. According to her statement, in September 2002, the CIA told Congress it could torture detainees, but did not say they would (in the future) be doing so. Her further comments from the same answer make that even more clear.

My experience was they did not tell us they were using that. Flat out. And any – any contention to the contrary is simply not true.

[snip]

And so, you know – flat out – they never briefed us that this was happening. In fact, they said they would if and when they did?

That is, Pelosi’s entire point was that in September 2002, after the CIA had already torturing Abu Zubaydah for months, the CIA came before Congress and spoke prospectively about using torture, but did not reveal that they had already been and were currently using it. 

So PolitiFact goes to the CIA briefing list, acknowledging Panetta’s comments about its potential inaccuracy, yet nevertheless deciding that it, PolitiFact, should determine whether it is inaccurate or not (it decides not), and looks at this language.

Briefing on EITs (enhanced interrogation techniques) including use of EITs on (alleged al-Qaeda operative) Abu Zubaydah, background on authorities, and a description of the particular EITs that had been employed.

Now, even assuming one should treat this document as accurate when the Director of CIA is saying it may not be, look carefully at this language. "Use of [torture] on … Abu Zubaydah" Read more →

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Dick Cheney, the “Not Available” Briefer?

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I’m going to make a wildarsed guess and suggest that when the CIA lists "not available" in a series of 2005 torture briefings to Republicans in Congress, they really mean "Dick Cheney attended, but we don’t want to tell you that."

At least, that seems to be the case for a briefing of John McCain the CIA describes as taking place in "late October 2005." As I pointed out earlier, that briefing appears to have been an attempt–partly successful–on the part of the Bush Administration to convince McCain to water down the Detainee Treatment Act that had passed the Senate earlier that month. 

As it turns out, whereas the CIA can’t seem to come up with details about that briefing (such as the date or the briefer), the WaPo covered a McCain meeting with Dick Cheney and then-CIA Director Porter Goss not long after it happened. 

The Bush administration has proposed exempting employees of the Central Intelligence Agency from a legislative measure endorsed earlier this month by 90 members of the Senate that would bar cruel and degrading treatment of any prisoners in U.S. custody.

The proposal, which two sources said Vice President Cheney handed last Thursday [October 20] to Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) in the company of CIA Director Porter J. Goss, states that the measure barring inhumane treatment shall not apply to counterterrorism operations conducted abroad or to operations conducted by "an element of the United States government" other than the Defense Department.

[snip]

Cheney’s proposal is drafted in such a way that the exemption from the rule barring ill treatment could require a presidential finding that "such operations are vital to the protection of the United States or its citizens from terrorist attack." But the precise applicability of this section is not clear, and none of those involved in last week’s discussions would discuss it openly yesterday.

McCain, the principal sponsor of the legislation, rejected the proposed exemption at the meeting with Cheney, according to a government source who spoke without authorization and on the condition of anonymity.

I guess maybe the CIA needs an introduction to the Google so it can refer to the public record to flesh out its briefing list?

If this was, in fact, McCain’s briefing, it might explain why McCain has imagined great heroism on his part in his one briefing on torture. Read more →

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Whitehouse: Laying the Groundwork for the Torture Case

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KeithO had Sheldon Whitehouse on this evening to set up his torture hearing tomorrow (10 AM, and yes, I’m liveblogging it). Here’s what Whitehouse said he hopes to accomplish tomorrow.

I hope what America will learn is that the facts that were alleged in the torture memos are very likely not true, the legal theories were contested even by Bush Administration lawyers who weren’t in on the fix, and a little bit about what the consequences are for lawyers who commit professional malfeasance.

I explained how Ali Soufan has (and will) shown that "the facts that were alleged in the torture memos" are not true here:

Ali Soufan, the FBI interrogator described in the DOJ IG report on interrogation as the interrogator (whom they call "Thomas") who called CIA’s tactics on AZ, "borderline torture," has an important op-ed in the NYT. He writes,

One of the most striking parts of the memos is the false premises on which they are based. 

I pointed this out myself, in a post on why the debate over whether these techniques were necessary and effective is so heated.

Check out what the second paragraph of the Bybee Memo says:

Our advice is based upon the following facts, which you have provided to us. We also understand that you do not have any facts in your possession contrary to the facts outlined here, and this opinion is limited to these facts. If these facts were to change, this advice would not necessarily apply. Zubaydah is currently being held by the United States. The interrogation team is certain that he has additional information that he refuses to divulge. Specifically, he is withholding information regarding terrorist networks in the United Stares or in Saudi Arabia and information regarding plans to conduct attacks within the United States or against our interests overseas. Zubaydah has become accustomed to a certain level of treatment and displays no signs of willingness to disclose further information. Moreover, your intelligence indicates that there is currently level of "chatter" equal to that which preceded the September 11 attacks. In light of the information you believe Zubaydah has and the high level of threat you believe now exists, you wish to move the interrogations into what you have described as an "increased pressure phase." [my emphasis]

Here’s what Ali Soufan says:

It is inaccurate, however, to say that Abu Zubaydah had been uncooperative. Read more →

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McCain’s Tortured Briefing Memory

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I guess it’s "why can’t Glenn Thrush read? day."

In addition to finally getting schooled on facts that have been in the public record for three weeks, Thrush gives John McCain a soapbox from which to scold Nancy Pelosi for not doing more when she learned–in 2003, reportedly via a staffer–that CIA was engaging in torture.

"If she felt it was wrong she should have acted," the former GOP Presidential hopeful said on his way into the Republican Senate lunch on Tuesday.

"Let me just tell you — I was briefed on it — and I vehemently objected to it. We did the Detainee Treatment Act, which prohibited cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. So we felt, I certainly felt, I could act on it."

He dismissed her claim she was barred from acting on what she learned in the briefings with a shrug.

"I’m sure she has her argument and we’ll see if the American people agree."

Set aside, for the moment, McCain’s completely erroneous premise, that Pelosi should have responded to "what she learned in the briefings." Pelosi’s entire point (not one I’m entirely sympathetic with) is that since she wasn’t briefed that waterboarding was being used, but instead learned that CIA was torturing detainees through a staffer and not the CIA, it would have been inappropriate for her to intervene directly.  

“She felt that the appropriate response was the letter from Harman, because Jane was the one who was briefed,” said the person. Pelosi “never got briefed on it personally, and when Harman got a ‘no response’ from the CIA, there was nothing more that could be done.”

Maybe McCain just doesn’t get Pelosi’s point; or maybe Thrush didn’t understand what he earlier reported on Pelosi and botched his own question. So for the moment set aside McCain’s faulty premise.

But look at what McCain claims about his own actions. McCain suggests that he was briefed on torture and then, because he objected so strenuously to what he learned in the briefing, he passed the Detainee Treatment Act. Briefing, then DTA, McCain tells the tale.

Yet according to the CIA briefing list the Republicans are so intent to use to attack Pelosi, John McCain was briefed on torture in "late October 2005" (in the chronology, McCain’s briefing appears after Thad Cochran and Ted Stevens got their briefing on October 18, 2005). 

The Senate passed its version of the DTA on October 5, 2005.

The chronology, at least according to CIA’s admittedly questionable timeline, went DTA, then briefing.

Read more →

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Rockefeller to Politico: Read the Damn SSCI Narrative Already!!!

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Jello Jay has finally resorted to explaining things to journalists reeeaaalllly slowly, so they can understand that this passage from the SSCI narrative, produced during Jello Jay’s tenure as Senate Intelligence Chair …

After the change in leadership of the Committee in January of 2003, CIA records indicate that the new Chairman of the Committee was briefed on the CIA’s program in early 2003. Although the new Vice-Chairman did not attend that briefing, it was attended by both the staff director and minority staff director of the Committee. [my emphasis]

… means that the new Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee in January 2003, a guy named Jay Rockefeller, maintains he did not attend the briefing that the CIA claims he attended. Spelled out all simple-like so reporters can understand it, Jello Jay’s stance reads like this:

We are not in a position to vouch for the accuracy of the document. We can tell you that in the particular entry stating that Senator Rockefeller was briefed on February 4th of 2003 with an asterisk also noting him as later individually briefed — that is not correct, or at least is not being reported correctly by people reading the document. The Democratic staff director attended a briefing on Feb. 4, but Senator Rockefeller was not present and was not later briefed individually by anyone in the intelligence community. He was first personally briefed by the intelligence community on Sept 4th, 2003. [my emphasis]

And these passages from the SSCI narrative…

In May 2004, the CIA’s Inspector General issued a classified special review of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program, a copy of which was provided to the Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman and staff directors in June of 2004. The classified August 1, 2002, OLC opinion was included as an attachment to the Inspector General’s review. That review included information about the CIA’s use of waterboarding on the three detainees.

[snip]

In July 2004, the CIA briefed the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee on the facts and conclusions of the Inspector General special review.

… suggest that Jello Jay first learned the full extent of what we were doing with waterboarding in 2004, when he received the IG report that revealed (among other things) that the CIA wasn’t doing what the OLC memos said it was doing.

Senator Rockefeller has repeatedly stated he was not told critical information that would have cast significant doubt on the program’s legality and effectiveness. Read more →

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Dick’s “Presidential-Level” Torture Decision

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 I’m just now catching up to Dick’s appearance on CBS yesterday. And I gotta say, I’m not sure who comes off as more obtuse in this exchange, Cheney or Bob Schieffer. When Cheney talked about "the volume" of intelligence reports gotten through torture, Schieffer didn’t ask the obvious follow-up about the quality of those huge numbers of reports. When PapaDick repeated the same claim his BabyDick made–that two out of three terrorists surveyed started talking after waterboarding–Shieffer doesn’t ask what happened to Rahim al-Nashiri, and what it means that Dick doesn’t assert waterboarding was effective with Nashiri. When Cheney trotted out the "we used these techniques on our own men and women," Schieffer mentioned neither the evidence that Bush Administration torture went far beyond what went on in SERE, nor the fact that SERE is premised on the fact that these techniques produce false confessions, not real intelligence torture produces unreliable intelligence [corrected per Jeff Kaye].

But Schieffer did, slightly, redeem himself by eliciting this weird response from Cheney on Bush’s role in approving torture (at 5:00 in the YouTube above).

SCHIEFFER: How much did President Bush know specifically about the methods that were being used? We know that you– and you have said– that you approved this…

CHENEY: Right.

SCHIEFFER: … somewhere down the line. Did President Bush know everything you knew?

CHENEY: I certainly, yes, have every reason to believe he knew — he knew a great deal about the program. He basically authorized it. I mean, this was a presidential-level decision. And the decision went to the president. He signed off on it.

Pardon me, but what the fuck does it mean when a President "basically authorizes" torture?!?!? And what’s the difference between a "presidential-level decision" and a "presidential decision," particularly when a number of key "presidential-level decisions" (such as the shoot down order on 9/11) during the Bush Administration got made by the Vice President?

I understand that some think this exchange constituted Cheney throwing Bush under the bus and it may be that. 

But it reads to me instead like the groundwork for launching the same defense that Cheney was preparing in the Plame outing, that Bush "signed off on" the declassification of a bunch of things to rebut Joe Wilson, without necessarily signing off on the exposure of a CIA spy. 

This is Cheney reveling in the gutting of our Constitution. And he’s not even sure who gets credit for gutting it. And of course, Schieffer doesn’t press Read more →

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Timing and the Sheikh al-Libi Death

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Since Andy Worthington reported on Sheikh al-Libi’s death over the weekend, a few more details on timing have come out.

Ibn Sheikh al-Libi Died in the Last Two Weeks

The first important point is that al-Libi died sometime after April 27, when a Human Rights Watch researcher spoke with him in a Libyan jail.

Human Right Watch researcher Heba Morayef told Reuters in London that she saw Fakhiri on April 27 during a visit to the Libyan capital’s main Abu Salim jail.

She said Fakhiri appeared for just two minutes in a prison courtyard. He look well, but was unwilling to speak to the Rights Watch team, she said. "Where were you when I was being tortured in American prisons?" she quoted him as saying.

This makes his death all the more suspicious, as it occurs after it has become clear there will be an inquiry of some sort here in the US (to say nothing of international prosecutions). The SSCI, remember, is conducting detainee by detainee reviews of treatment, and al-Libi is close to the top of the list in terms of seniority and brutality of treatment. Any reconsideration of Moussaoui’s sentencing given the treatment of evidence in his case may well point to al-Libi. Likewise, any contempt proceedings out of the ACLU case my bring attention to al-Libi’s treatment.

Most importantly, think of the people who would have an interest in having al-Libi–recently discovered by Human Rights Watch–silenced. If al-Libi had an opportunity to testify about how he fabricated the reports of al Qaeda ties to Iraq, it would focus intense attention on Dick Cheney’s lies to get us into war. And Egypt can ill afford to have the extent of their cooperation with the US on these matters exposed.

So there are a lot of reasons why al-Libi’s recent death is all the more suspicious.

Ibn Sheikh al-Libi Was Turned Over to Libya in 2006

Then there’s the detail that al-Libi was rendered to Libya in 2006 (which had been reported by the WaPo in 2007). Obviously, that would mean the US gave up custody of al-Libi before it moved the remaining High Value Detainees to Gitmo and ultimately made them available to the Red Cross. Read more →

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