Mary mentioned this item earlier concerning retribution for the assassination of Mugniyah

“They want to kill as many people as they can, they want it to be a big splash,” said former CIA intelligence officer Bob Baer, who says he met with Hezbollah leaders in Beirut last month.

And low and behold Baer turns up in the Chalabi story (as does Col. Lang):

The conversation is wrapping up. The talk turns to the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, the machinations of those around him, what the future might hold. Chalabi, in an expansive mood, gets up, goes into a closet and brings out a note that Bob Baer, the C.I.A. agent, scribbled to him in that hotel lobby when the two men plotted a coup many years before. The talk, improbably, turns to memoirs; at the moment, Baer’s, “See No Evil,” was a best seller. I ask Chalabi, who is back on the couch, if it isn’t time that he write his own.

Oh, plotted a coup, really?

I am floundering to get a grasp of the overview but the picture I am getting is that both Rumseld and Cheney understood that they would not be able to acheive an Iraqi/Iranian invasion in the context of relying on traditional intelligence sources and so they knew they would have to subcontract this work out. At the same time they had developed an assessment of the internal characters whom they believed would be loyal to the purposes of the DOD and OVP whether through PNAC, AIPAC or some other martially oriented special interest group that had practical concern parallel to corporate strategy.

In parallel media stenographers were identified who could be led to sources in the sub-contracted organization already operating in Israeli, Irani, and Iraqui contexts. Chalabi filled this role in the Iraqi/Shi’a context and as Wilkerson said he was able to spit off his information so that it would reach independent intelligence agencies appearing to be multi-sourced. This would be the particular strength of a mathematician provocateur. Chalabi was also associated with the presentation of American documents to the Iranians. Likewise Ghobanifar with his background in matter Iran/Contra, although discredited at the CIA served as a sub-contractor in the context of things Iranian and Israeli with the capacity to draw on related regional resources.

Feith, Wolfowitz, Franklin, Rhodes, Cambone, Hayes, McNulty and the like operate in an administrative context as being particularly shrewd and loyal bureaucratic operators. Hadley is the liaison to the President. Leeden is the general contractor serving the Cheney/Rumsfeld alliance. And we too get a taste of the genesis of the friction between Rice and Cheney. Players in Congress need to be likewise identified to keep the various threads of influence isolated from their true genesis and to give validity to operational fictions.

Cheney is the principle who manages the shell game and holds all the threads together to maintain maximum effectiveness and voila the impediment of the accepted epistemologies practiced in the authorized intelligence channels is overcome. Cheney and Rumsfled have reached an understanding decades ago. If an agent strays off on a personal agenda or he is otherwise of no longer of any use to the cabal it is of no particular loss if he is stripped away by an indictment or other tactical difficulty. In fact such activity increases the intrigue. And that which is intended never to be seen: The puppet strings of the executive branch above and beyond the public stage are pulled to seize the oil fields of both Iraq and Iran. Who would have counted on our hostess and critic at large with an adroit facility for disentanglement tiring of the misleading conventions of this puppet theater noir? I got here a few years ago looking for answers. We are very close.

“forged American documents”

For a deeper picture of one of the two top AIPAC players caught with their hands in the cookie jar, Steven Rosen, this New Yorker article about him paints the framework accurately:

…He is a hard-liner on only one subject—Iran—and this preoccupation helped shape aipac’s position: that Iran poses a greater threat to Israel than any other nation. In this way, aipac is in agreement with a long line of Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who fears Iran’s nuclear intentions more than he ever feared Saddam Hussein’s. (aipac lobbied Congress in favor of the Iraq war, but Iraq has not been one of its chief concerns.) Rosen’s main role at aipac, he once told me, was to collect evidence of “Iranian perfidy” and share it with the United States.

Unlike American neoconservatives, who have openly supported the Likud Party over the more liberal Labor Party, aipac does not generally take sides in Israeli politics. But on Iran aipac’s views resemble those of the neoconservatives. In 1996, Rosen and other aipac staff members helped write, and engineer the passage of, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, which imposed sanctions on foreign oil companies doing business with those two countries; aipac is determined, above all, to deny Iran the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons…

And of course, none of this would have anything to do, not anything at all, with today’s marketing of the need to have a War with Iran!.

Nothing at all to do with things like this:

IRAN: Stop nukes by bombing oil wells, neocons suggest

Why attack Iran’s nuclear facilities when striking their oil infrastructure would be much more effective in the scope of a US-led preventive war? Sure, oil prices might skyrocket and the world economy might collapse. But, hey, that’s the price you pay for security.

Such a scenario is not a nightmare or an outtake from a remake of Stanley Kubrick’s “Dr. Strangelove,” but part of a serious recommendation made by two neoconservatives in case sanctions fail to persuade Iran to abandon its enrichment of uranium, a process that can be used to make nuclear weapons or fuel for peaceful energy production…

Which comes from this: The Last Resort: Consequences of Preventive Military Action against Iran

Be sure to read page 41 of that PDF to find the members of the Executive Committee who I’m willing to bet pay their dues promptly for membership in AIPAC.

Here’s more from that Secrecy News article:

Building on that prior ruling, the Court has now redefined the meaning of “agent of a foreign power” so as to justify the FISA surveillance in the AIPAC case.

“The FISC [the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that originally authorized surveillance of the AIPAC defendants] had ample probable cause to believe that the targets were agents of a foreign power quite apart from their First Amendment lobbying activities.”

But under the Court’s new definition, “agents of a foreign power” need not be literally “agents of a foreign power.” Rather, the term now includes other persons who engage in unlawful information gathering.

“While the defendants’ lobbying activities are generally protected by the First Amendment, willful violations of sec. 793 [the provision of the Espionage Act that prohibits collection and disclosure of national defense information] are not, and … the FISC had probable cause to believe that such violations had occurred in this case,” Judge Ellis explained.

Thus, the Court did not find that there was any reason to believe the defendants were acting on behalf of a foreign power. (The prosecution has conceded that they were not.)

Instead, Judge Ellis expanded the scope of the term “agent of a foreign power” to include someone who clandestinely gathers restricted information in a probable violation of the Espionage Act, even if there is no reason to suppose he is a spy or a terrorist.

By the Court’s logic, it does not take an big imaginative leap to envision the application of FISA surveillance to members of the press or others who deliberately solicit classified or controlled defense information or who report on classified programs in conscious defiance of official directives to the contrary.

A former FBI official with extensive experience in FISA policy and practice expressed doubt that the FISA could now be easily invoked against the press or the public for ordinary reporting or research activities since, he said, these do not normally involve the requisite intent to violate the law.

“There is quite a bit on the periphery that is not included in this Order,” the official told Secrecy News.

“The judge referred to the information ‘not generally available to the public’ in the context of clandestine activities that are violations of, for example, 18 USC 793 and 794 [the Espionage Act]. These are statutes that require an intent to harm the United States or benefit another power. Judge Ellis may have been parsimonious in his words, but he hasn’t advocated the position that worries you,” he said.

Even so, the FBI FISA expert agreed that the new court order does “make it possible to be ‘an agent of a foreign power’ for FISA surveillance purposes without having any actual connection with a foreign power whatsoever.”

The new order also called for a leak investigation to determine the sources of a August 2004 CBS news story about the AIPAC case.

I know…old news

Just bring the events together for questions down the line…

Did you know that Dougie Feith was instrumental in getting the US to nix Geneva Convention policy toward prisoners far, far earlier than when Yoo’s OLC opinion was written? Like decades earlier?

Per Wiki:

During his time in the Pentagon in the Reagan administration, Feith was instrumental in getting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Weinberger and Shultz all to recommend (successfully) to the President not to ratify changes to the Geneva Conventions. The changes, known as Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, would have allowed non-state militants to be treated as combatants and prisoners of war even if they had engaged in practices that endangered non-combatants or otherwise violated the laws of war. Reagan informed the Senate in 1987 that he would not ratify Protocol I. At the time, both the Washington Post and the New York Times editorialized in favor of Reagan’s decision to reject Protocol I as a revision of humanitarian law that protected terrorists.

detailicious. Nice reading for as saturday night.

Now this comment gives interesting insight into Feith’s understanding of methods:

The CIA’s assessments were incomplete, nonrigorous and shaped around the dubious assumption that secular Iraqi Baathists would be unwilling to cooperate with al Qaeda religious fanatics, even when they shared strategic interests. This assumption was disproved when Baathists and jihadists became allies against us in the post-Saddam insurgency, but before the war it was the foundation of much CIA analysis.

Doug Feith in the WSJ, May 4, 2007. Do you suppose the fact of the invasion made a difference?

Pursuant to direction from the offices of DoD General Counsel [Haynes] and USD(I) [Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Cambone] the inquiry has been limited in scope.

I think its becoming increasingly clear that Haynes has a particular gift for shutting down investigations.

OT – As I expect, many of you will cruise by the NYT to see their Sunday offerings. The lead lede is Cracking a Terrorist – Inside a 9/11 Mastermind’s Interrogation

In some ways it is an ode to the idea of “we can be nice too”, but I suspect that more will be made of some interesting details:

It located its overseas jails based largely on which foreign intelligence officials were most accommodating and rushed to move the prisoners when word of locations leaked. Seeking a longer-term solution, the C.I.A. spent millions to build a high-security prison in a remote desert location, according to two former intelligence officials. The prison, whose existence has never been disclosed, was completed — and then apparently abandoned unused — when President Bush decided in 2006 to move all the prisoners to Guantánamo.

(My Bold)

I don’t know if these dots are connected, but the NYT has a sub article which consists of a world map graphic and following the arrow pointing to an area that is comprised by places like Israel, Saudia Arabia, Iraq, Afghanistan, the NYT says this:

4. Middle East
Late 2005
After the location of the Poland site is disclosed by press reports and human rights groups, both detainees are moved to an unknown location in the Middle East.

Note: The two detainess they are refering to are Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.

And more interesting details:

Within a few days, Abu Zubaydah was flown to Thailand, to the first of the “black sites,” the agency’s interrogation facilities for major Qaeda figures.

Thailand, which had long faced Muslim insurgents in its south, became the first choice because C.I.A. officers had a very close relationship with their counterparts in Bangkok, according to one American intelligence official. At first, the official said, “they didn’t even tell the prime minister.”

And more again:

Senior Federal Bureau of Investigation officials thought such methods unnecessary and unwise. Their agents got Abu Zubaydah talking without the use of force, and he revealed the central role of Mr. Mohammed in the 9/11 plot. They correctly predicted that harsh methods would darken the reputation of the United States and complicate future prosecutions. Many C.I.A. officials, too, had their doubts, and the agency used contract employees with military experience for much of the work.

(My Bold)

And more details:

Within days, Mr. Mohammed was flown to Afghanistan and then on to Poland, where the most important of the C.I.A.’s black sites had been established. The secret base near Szymany Airport, about 100 miles north of Warsaw, would become a second home to Mr. Martinez during the dozens of hours he spent with Mr. Mohammed.

Poland was picked because there were no local cultural and religious ties to Al Qaeda, making infiltration or attack by sympathizers unlikely, one C.I.A. officer said. Most important, Polish intelligence officials were eager to cooperate.

“Poland is the 51st state,” one former C.I.A. official recalls James L. Pavitt, then director of the agency’s clandestine service, declaring. “Americans have no idea.”

And more still:

But the rules had changed, and the tough treatment began shortly after Mr. Mohammed was delivered to Poland. By several accounts, he proved especially resistant, chanting from the Koran, doling out innocuous information or offering obvious fabrications. The Times reported last year that the intensity of his treatment — various harsh techniques, including waterboarding, used about 100 times over a period of two weeks — prompted worries that officers might have crossed the boundary into illegal torture.

(My Bold)

And finally this:

His interrogator has moved on, too. Like many other C.I.A. officers in the post-9/11 security boom, Mr. Martinez left the agency for more lucrative work with government contractors.

His life today is quiet by comparison with the secret interrogations of 2002 and 2003. But Mr. Martinez has not turned away entirely from his old world. He now works for Mitchell & Jessen Associates, a consulting company run by former military psychologists who advised the C.I.A. on the use of harsh tactics in the secret program.

And his new employer sent Mr. Martinez right back to the agency. For now, the unlikely interrogator of the man perhaps most responsible for the horrors of 9/11 teaches other C.I.A. analysts the arcane art of tracking terrorists.

(My Bold)

Heh. Thanks for the timeline EW.

Nice part is that DoJ counter espionage doesn’t really need to make this a 30 second sound bite. They just need to start the indictments.

EW, What can you tell us about the Wilson CIA letter that Steve King held forth? On its face, it damages Wilson’s credibility. Can you point me to something that explains it in proper context?

Franklin moved over to the Pentagon from DIA, where he became the Iran expert, working for Bill Luti and Undersecretary of Defense for Planning, Douglas Feith. He was the “go to” person on Iran for Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and for Feith. This situation is pretty tragic, since Franklin is not a real Iranist. His main brief appears to have been to find ways to push a policy of overthrowing its government (apparently once Iraq had been taken care of). This project has been pushed by the shadowy eminence grise, Michael Ledeen, for many years, and Franklin coordinated with Ledeen in some way. Franklin was also close to Harold Rhode, a long-time Middle East specialist in the Defense Department who has cultivated far right pro-Likud cronies for many years, more or less establishing a cell within the Department of Defense.

Juan Cole, Aug. 1, 2004

Amazingly, in the DoD IG Report on The Rendon Group, there seems not a paragraph that goes by where the weasels don’t squirm right out of their grasp:

Question 6. In the mid 1990s, The Rendon Group was reprimanded by project managers in Washington when stories they contrived found their way into the American Press. This is a violation of the law. Why were their contracts non terminated?

Answer. The scope of the audit was to review DoD contracts awarded to TRG from FY 2000 through FY 2005; therefore, the mid 1990s and other agencies are beyond the scope of the audit.

Shorter DoD IG: “We wanted to ensure a good white-wash of TRG in this report, so we closed our eyes to all the criminal stuff that we couldn’t spin as legal.”

And I see from the time line that the FBI was already investigating Franklin and SSCI was in play as well in the Summer of 2003.

The entire document is here.

Great piece Ew incredible timeline.

Ledeen “I learned about it in the papers”

Hold them ACCOUNTABLE

“Faster Please”

Who forged the Niger Documents?
http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/21704/

Where is Micheal Rubin?

The charade that Rice was one of the first to try and negotiate with Iran is a real charade.

http://article.nationalreview……BmZmFiYWY=

News release from the U.S. Dept of Justice on the Rosen/Weissman
http://72.14.205.104/search?q=…..#038;gl=us