I started my day intending to write about the details surrounding SEIU California President David Heurta’s assault in June revealed in a motion to dismiss and a motion to compel discovery filed yesterday. And I’ve been meaning to do a post on what much coverage of the dismissal of the case against Carlitos Ricardo Parias, a TikToker ICE shot on October 21, has not said: Basically DOJ avoided giving Parias due process by stashing him in a GEO detention facility and preventing his criminal defense attorneys any access, effectively escaping accountability for the shooting that way.
But later in the day, a DHS officer shot and killed an ICE observer, Renee Good, in Minneapolis. Both the Star Tribune and MPR have a running threads of developments.
Here’s a tracker of all the people ICE have shot, including a guy in San Diego shot after he shot his own gun to celebrate the New Year only to have an off-duty ICE officer kill him.
And so instead I’m going to float a suspicion I’ve been nursing.
In Greg Bovino’s deposition for the Chicago Book Club lawsuit, plaintiffs counsel Locke Bowman asked whether Kristi Noem gave him direction on the use of force. She does not.
Q Do you report to Secretary Noem to receive direction as to the use of force in the course of Operation Midway Blitz?
A Are you asking if — if she gives me driection —
Q Yes, sir.
A –to use of force?
Q Yes. If she gives you direction as to how and when to employ force?
A No.
But when Bowman asked Bovino if he had spoken to Stephen Miller about use of force, the DOJ lawyer, Sarmad Khojasteh, instructed him not to answer.
Q All right. How about Mr. Miller, have you spoken with Mr. Miller on the subject of employment of force and the issues of crowd control that you were facing in Operation Midway Blitz?
Mr. Khojasteh: Object to form. I’m going to instruct the witness not to answer to the extent that it — doing so would implicate executive privilege.
Q Okay. So there has been an invocation of privilege, and you are not answering the question based on that invocation, correct, sir?
A That’s correct.
Q I will ask the same question generally. Other than the two individuals I have mentioned, have you spoken with any of your superiors in the executive branch with respect to the issue of crowd control and the application of force in the course of Operation Midway Blitz?
Mr. Khojasteh: Object to form. Lacks foundation. Vague as to superiors in the executive branch.
Q I’ll stand on the question. Could you answer, please?
A Sir, could you be more specific, please?
Q In what respect?
A Who in the executive branch?
Q I’m asking anyone in the executive branch.
Mr. Khojasteh: Then I’m — if you’re going to be that vague about it, Counsel, I’m going to instruct the witness not to answer to the — that to the extent that doing so would reveal executive communications.
Q All right. Without revealing executive communications, and my question didn’t ask for the revelation of communications, can you answer, please?
A Based on the advice of my lawyer, no.
Q I’m not sure — was there an instruction not to answer as to the last question that I propounded?
Mr. Khojasteh: I’m not even sure I understood the last question you propounded.
Q Well, so there was no instruction?
Mr. Khojasteh: Well, I think — I thought it was the same question that I had —
Q Okay.
Mr. Khojasteh: — given the instructions.
Bovino: That’s what I thought. That’s the way I thought.
Q. Okay. All right. So is it true, with respect to the application of force and crowd control, that you take your orders from the executive branch, whether that’s President Trump or Secretary Noem?
Mr. Khojasteh: Object to form. Lacks foundation. Asked and answered.
Bovino: Can you repeat that, please?
Q Yes. Is it true, with respect to the application of force and the matter of crowd control during the course of Operation Midway Blitz, that you take your orders from the executive branch, whether that’s President Trump or Secretary Noem?
Mr. Khojasteh: I’m going to instruct the witness not to answer to the extent that doing so would reveal communications between he and the President.
Q I didn’t ask to reveal communications. I asked if what I just read is a true statement.
Mr. Khojasteh: Yeah, but embedded in your question is the substance of the communication you’re asking, right?
Q This calls for a yes or no. Can you answer it, yes or no?
Mr. Khojasteh: I’m going to instruct you not to answer as with — as it relates to communications with President Trump or anyone in the White House.
Bowman also noted that in a TV appearance, Bovino said he took his instructions from the Executive Branch, whether Trump or Kristi Noem.
The implication is fairly clear: That Stephen Miller is the one instructing him on use of force.
Greg Bovino was present for today’s shooting.
In the wake of the shooting, Tricia McLaughlin, Kristi Noem, Stephen Miller, and Donald Trump all have told vicious lies about the shooting; their lies aren’t even consistent with each other, much less the video.
The shooting comes in the wake of the Supreme Court ruling that Trump can’t deploy the National Guard to cities unless he has first resorted to active duty troops.
It’s time to ask whether Stephen Miller ordered Greg Bovino to shoot those who document DHS’ invasions.
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Laura Jedeed wonders whether Trump is testing out a new kind of colonialism, where you basically issued orders to the corrupt illegitimate authorities, rather than installing the opposition.
Trump and Rubio’s talking points combine into a message intended not for the people of America, but for the heads of state in Cuba, Columbia, [sic] and worldwide. The message itself is simple, elegant, and ugly: do exactly what we say or America will destroy you—not your country, or your economy, or your people, but you, personally. This strategy doesn’t just let America “run” Venezuela. It allows this administration to “run” any country unable to attack us on our home turf: extract their resources, dictate their domestic policy, force their leaders to resign. All by credibly threatening extreme personal violence against any head of state who pushes back.
Credit where credit is due: it’s an entirely new approach to colonialism. Here’s how it’s worked since Britain perfected the art: you invade the country, then place the opposition party in power. That party requires your support to maintain control (if they had enough force to do it themselves they’d already be in charge). In exchange for military backup, their leader will do anything you ask.
Trump, on the other hand, has endorsed Maduro’s Vice President, Delcy Rodríguez, allegedly because the opposition party “doesn’t have the support within, or the respect within the country.” This assertion is aggressive nonsense. Opposition party weakness is a feature, not a bug, for the reasons stated above. It’s also patently untrue in this case. Election monitors from several countries agree that candidate Edmundo González Urrutia beat Maduro in a landslide two years ago by as much as 51 percent. Trump and his allies know this—they’ve used Maduro’s election theft to justify invasion. It’s kind of perfect: the party doesn’t have the power to gain power by themselves, but they’re popular enough to minimize the danger of revolt. It’s the dream situation—so why isn’t the Trump administration going for it?
Most people seem to think Trump’s endorsement of the unpopular and hostile Rodríguez stems from bitterness towards María Corina Machado, the opposition party leader who received the Nobel Peace Prize that Trump wanted so badly last year. Machado seems to think so too; she’s offered to give the prize to Trump and spent ten minutes abasing herself before the Peace President on Hannity yesterday. It won’t help. Trump is petty to the core, it’s true, but Stephen Miller and the other ghouls actually running this country would never set the entire colonial playbook on fire just to appease some old queen’s ego.
The real reason, I suspect, is this: leaving Rodríguez in charge is the only move that does not require a full-scale invasion.
Unlike Machado, Rodríguez possesses a military and police force capable of holding Venezuela together. Under the old model, that force would have threatened our hegemony, but under Colonialism 2.0, she has a strong incentive to do exactly as she’s told regardless; she is, after all, one surgical strike away from losing her freedom or possibly her life. As long as she doesn’t call Trump’s bluff or get coup’d herself, it’s foolproof.
[snip]
And the administration was right: Rodríguez is already rolling over. “We consider it a priority to move towards a balanced and respectful relationship between the US and Venezuela,” she wrote on Telegram late Sunday. “We extend an invitation to the US government to work together on an agenda for cooperation that is aimed towards shared development.” So far, so good.
That’s certainly what Trump is trying to do.
But it’s wildly premature to assess whether it’ll work.
Before I explain how it may backfire, let me observe that this plan is precisely the same plan Trump (Stephen Miller, really) is attempting with the US.
What Trump plans for Colombia is little different than what he succeeded in doing with Columbia University: Make demands on the elected leader, extract tribute, change the rules to benefit the authoritarian state. Whether it will work long term has yet to be seen, but the lesson of New College in Florida shows where things may head in the medium term: with dramatically increased costs and noticeably decreased utility. Once DeSantis is out of power, the effort is likely to be abandoned, turning New College into a bigger shell than it is already is. Columbia might take longer to collapse, unless Stephen Miller doubles down on his demands.
Now consider what makes Venezuela (or Colombia) different from Columbia, starting with the guns, guns which might come from at least three different places.
First, there are Russia, China, and some other Venezuelan patron states that are under assault as well. Trump has ordered Venezuela to expel them, stop doing business with them, and sell oil only to the US.
The Trump administration has told Venezuela’s interim president Delcy Rodriguez that the regime must meet the White House’s demands before being allowed to pump more oil, according to three people familiar with the administration’s plan.
First, the country must kick out China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba and sever economic ties, the sources said. Second, Venezuela must agree to partner exclusively with the U.S. on oil production and favor America when selling heavy crude oil, they added.
According to one person, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told lawmakers in a private briefing on Monday that he believes the U.S. can force Venezuela’s hand because its existing oil tankers are full. Rubio also told lawmakers that the U.S. estimates that Caracas has only a couple of weeks before it will become financially insolvent without the sale of its oil reserves.
Russia has sent a submarine and other naval assets to escort an empty, rusting oil tanker that has become a new flashpoint in U.S.-Russia relations, according to a U.S. official.
The tanker, formerly known as the Bella 1, has been trying to evade the U.S. blockade of sanctioned oil tankers near Venezuela for more than two weeks. The vessel failed to dock in Venezuela and load with oil. Although the ship is empty, the U.S. Coast Guard has pursued it into the Atlantic in a bid to crack down on a fleet of tankers that ferry illicit oil around the world, including black-market oil sold by Russia.
The vessel’s crew repelled an effort by the U.S. to board the vessel in December and steamed into the Atlantic. As the Coast Guard followed it, the crew sloppily painted a Russian flag on its side, changed its name to the Marinera and switched its registration to Russia.
Russia has been concerned by U.S. seizures of tankers that ferry its illicit oil around the world and power its economy, and it has made the unusual move of allowing the tanker to register in Russia without an inspection or other formalities, experts say.
Will this lead to some kind of direct conflict? I have no fucking clue and neither do you, because both Trump and Putin are fucking nuts. If Trump were rational, he’d retaliate not with direct confrontation in the North Sea, but by arming Ukraine and giving them the green light to up its attacks on Russia, but he’s not rational. Russia’s economy is actually close to collapse, and it wouldn’t take much to get it there. Russia, of course, has other means it might use to retaliate against Trump.
We shall see.
China is another matter though. China not only is rational, but China kicked the shit out of Trump in his last attempt to demand obeisance, the tariffs. Trump thought he could achieve with tariffs what he is trying to achieve with Venezuela: obeisance and personal tribute. Not only have all the tariffs harmed the US, spiking small business bankruptcies and inflation (and in the process making Trump’s political support far weaker), but China used its near-monopoly on rare earths and ability to replace US soybeans to bring Trump to his knees instead.
In fact, the Venezuelan coup might be partly a response to China’s success at wielding the rare earth weapon. While there’s much I disagree with in it, this post argues the Venezuela invasion was not about oil, but about the rare earth China currently extracts.
Investigative reporting documented Chinese buyers operating directly at mining sites in Bolívar state. The Venezuelan government established official collection centers in Los Pijiguaos and Morichalito in 2023 specifically for cassiterite, coltan, nickel, rhodium, and titanium. The Maduro regime designated these as strategic resources for commercialization, meaning state control over extraction and export, with Chinese buyers integrated into official operations from the start.
The supply chain from Venezuelan mines to Chinese refineries operates through both formal and informal channels, with Chinese buyers exercising operational control at the extraction source. Minerals extracted in the Orinoco Arc move by river and air transport to Colombian border towns, then to Bogotá for smelting into refined bars. These materials are relabeled under incorrect tariff codes, transforming raw ore into processed ferro-tantalum or other classifications that obscure origin. Final export occurs through Colombian ports at Santa Marta and Buenaventura, destined for Chinese processing facilities.
Once Venezuelan minerals blend with Colombian or Brazilian ore in these intermediary steps, tracing origin becomes effectively impossible. This laundering mechanism allows Venezuelan minerals to enter legitimate global supply chains, including those feeding US defense contractors. The result is Pentagon weapons systems potentially incorporating materials extracted under Chinese buyer supervision in Venezuelan territory, then processed in Chinese refineries controlled by Beijing.
Chinese buyers do not operate at arm’s length through market transactions. They coordinate directly at the mining sites with both Colombian guerrilla groups (ELN, FARC dissidents) who control physical security and Venezuelan state security (SEBIN) who facilitate transport using official government vehicles. One miner described seeing Chinese operatives and ELN commanders “eating together, buying material together, and getting off the helicopter together.” This is not commercial activity. This is integrated operational control where Chinese buyers work directly with armed groups and state officials to extract strategic minerals.
Trump doesn’t need — indeed, the oil companies probably don’t want — Venezuela’s oil, at least not in the short term.
He does need rare earth deposits (which is also the stated purpose of usurping Greenlands).
It took us some months to understand how China responded to Trump’s threat of tariffs. It took less time to recognize China’s advance preparation for them (based on Trump’s trade war from the first term).
A lot of the coverage of the coup views it as a profound humiliation for China, not least because China’s Latin American envoy met with Nicolás Maduro the day before the coup. That didn’t stop China (and Russia and Iran) from attending Rodríguez’ signing in, so there’s a distinct possibility they’re in at least as close coordination with Rodríguez right now as Marco Rubio.
But the most belligerent thing — the thing people expect — is that China will take Taiwan, as it was practicing to do even as Trump had a fifth of deployed assets in the Caribbean preparing to invade.
With all the attention on Venezuela, there has been too little attention on vacuums created with this extended deployment off the coast of Venezuela (the most immediate of which is probably in the Middle East). But it is clear that Trump keeps launching little wars with resources most of Congress believes should be used to counter China’s expansionary plans.
But as China showed with the tariffs, they likely have ways to respond that are less direct and at least as devastating.
But China and Russia aren’t the only ones who have guns here.
So does, just as one example, Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, who has been indicted in SDNY alongside Maduro since 2020. Reuters describes that the US already threatened Cabello.
In the meantime, they have communicated to Cabello via intermediaries that if he is defiant, he could face a similar fate to Maduro, the authoritarian leader captured in a U.S. raid on Saturday and whisked away to New York to face prosecution on “narco-terrorism” charges, or could see his life in danger, the source said.
But taking out Cabello could be risky, possibly motivating pro-government motorcycle groups, known as colectivos, to take to the streets, unleashing the chaos Washington wants to avoid. Their reaction may depend on whether they feel protected by other officials, however.
In one of her first decisions as acting president, Rodríguez appointed General Gustavo González López as new head of the Presidential Honor Guard and the Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM), state TV said late on Tuesday.
González López, who has been sanctioned by the U.S. and EU along with at least half a dozen other high-ranking officials for rights violations and corruption, served as Venezuela’s intelligence director until mid-2024, when he was replaced by Maduro in a reshuffle of his cabinet and security team.
Later that year, he began working with Rodríguez as head of strategic affairs and control at state oil company PDVSA.
González López was considered close to Cabello, but it was not immediately clear whether his appointment was a gesture of support from Rodríguez to the man considered the strongman of the ruling party, or, on the contrary, a sign of a rift.
The officer replaces General Javier Marcano, whose performance came under scrutiny after Maduro’s capture, according to analysts.
One thing I’ve seen no coverage of is why the US thinks Rodríguez will be secure within Venezuela now that Trump killed the 40 Cubans who were protecting Maduro. And the militias via which Cabello exercises some of his repression could carry out a deniable kind of violence.
But Cabello isn’t even the only one with guns in question. The purported purpose of this operation is about stopping drug trafficking. But unless Trump is doing what every other caudillo does — manage the trade while extracting tribute — there will, eventually, be a counter response from the cartels, which don’t take kindly to losing their markets and have the ability to exercise violence both on site — in Venezuela — but also closer to home, including in the United States. Stephen Miller has so much of US law enforcement snatching workers at Home Depot that certain kinds of crime are likely far easier to pull off. Update: About which the NYT has another story today.
Finally, there are the Venezuelan people. Maduro only remained in power with a great deal of repression, and Trump is tinkering with that system of repression. Meanwhile, Trump’s plans to expel much of the Chinese may exacerbate already dire economic conditions for Venezuelans, because Trump won’t subsidize soft power in the way China has been willing to (to say nothing of the expulsion of Cubans who were providing medical care). Where Stephen Miller’s authoritarianism has failed most dramatically in the US is the way the counter reaction to his goons has revitalized civil society in cities that stand up to the goons. And there’s already a practiced opposition in Venezuela that, as in the US, dramatically outnumbers the goons in charge.
It’s only day four. We have no fucking idea how this will turn out. While Delta Force and the CIA performed spectacularly, there’s really just a handful of people in charge, and most — like Stephen Miller, who thinks of Venezuela as an island surrounded by a US armada and therefore is likely forgetting about a porous border with Colombia — are utterly ignorant about Venezuela and childish about power.
Columbia University was easy to subjugate, because no one had guns. But even there it only happened by damaging the host. There are a lot of people with guns with an interest in Venezuela.
It’s just as likely, in my opinion, that this precipitates World War III as that it succeeds in Venezuela much less produces the treasure Trump is demanding.
Update: CEO of the Human Rights Foundation, Venezuelan Thor Halvorssen, predicts Delcy Rodríguez’ quick demise.
Reports indicate the Trump administration has struck a deal with Delcy Rodríguez, Mr. Maduro’s iron-fisted vice president, positioning her as a transitional leader. She has, it seems, convinced U.S. officials that she can dismantle the Maduro dictatorship, which would have to include demobilizing the armed militias, disbanding the dreaded secret police and ending the regime’s drug empire. But this is a fantasy. Ms. Rodríguez will fail spectacularly, leading to the final unraveling.
Venezuela isn’t like Mexico, where a state coexists uneasily with cartels. Here, the cartel is the state. Factions—enriched generals, intelligence chiefs and narco-traffickers—won’t surrender power in a Washington-brokered deal. Ms. Rodríguez herself faces insurmountable obstacles, beginning with her utter lack of legitimacy. Never elected vice president, she has less authority than Mr. Maduro, the usurper who appointed her.
I think he wildly overestimates the extent that Trump would even permit any lapse in repression.
Update: Meanwhile on Xitter, I take this as confession that Stephen Miller knows fuckall about the oil market, especially the discount at which Venezuelan oil must be sold and the price at which it is worth drilling.
Paul Krugman’s column today is on how Trump’s oil math doesn’t add up.
[W]hatever it is we’re doing in Venezuela isn’t really a war for oil. It is, instead, a war for oil fantasies. The vast wealth Trump imagines is waiting there to be taken doesn’t exist.
Update: WSJ goes into more depth about the challenges Cabello may pose to Trump’s plans.
Fond of swinging a spiked club while spouting conspiracy theories on his hourslong weekly show on state television called “Bringing Down the Hammer,” now on its 556th episode, Cabello is hard to predict.
Cabello, a 62-year-old whose official title is minister of interior, justice and peace, has so far signaled unity, taking part in Rodriguez’s swearing-in ceremony on Monday, where various factions of Venezuela’s ruling socialist party were present.
But that night, Cabello was toting a rifle and riling up black-uniformed security forces before they patrolled Caracas to prevent citizens from protesting.
“Doubting is treason!” he said, before telling the armed group, “Now, off to battle in the streets for victory.”
Under a state of emergency that the government declared after Maduro’s capture, security forces were ordered to hunt down U.S. sympathizers, according to the Official Gazette, where the Venezuelan government publishes new laws and decrees. Residents in the capital reported new roadblocks around the city where armed, masked men checked the phones of ordinary Venezuelans for antigovernment messages.
Update: This offers a good explanation of all the people with guns who would make things difficult even if Delcy Rodríguez did want to cooperate with the US.
Update, January 9: This analysis lays out the difficulties of Delcy Rodriguez’ position better than I did.
For her part, Rodríguez confronts an unprecedented challenge for a Venezuelan leader: She must satisfy Washington’s demands while maintaining sufficient Chavista coalition support to prevent an internal fracture or a military coup. The Trump administration demands sufficient cooperation to enable US oil company operations, likely including transparent property contracts and regulatory stability—precisely the institutional environment that Chavismo systematically dismantled. Rodríguez making such an agreement with Trump would alienate the regime’s hardliners, who would view her accommodation as a betrayal. Thus, Rodríguez may be unable to guarantee the stability required for the business operations Trump wants to run in Venezuela.
Her public contradictions reflect this impossible position. In her first televised addresses as interim president, she demanded Maduro’s immediate release to demonstrate loyalty to domestic audiences. Less than twenty-four hours later, however, she declared it a priority to move toward a “balanced and respectful” economic cooperation between the United States and Venezuela.
This double game cannot persist indefinitely. Rodríguez must choose between accommodating Trump’s demands or preserving Chavista unity. Trump’s threat that if Rodríguez “doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro” makes clear that there will be consequences of noncompliance. Purging the hardliners may be Rodríguez’s best option.
Perhaps Rodríguez’s most complex challenge is managing Venezuela’s deep entanglements with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba while simultaneously partnering with the Trump administration. This is especially the case after the Trump administration demanded that Venezuela immediately cut ties and cease intelligence cooperation with Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba. These relationships represent more than diplomatic alignments—they constitute binding financial obligations, operational dependencies, and strategic commitments that cannot simply be abandoned without triggering massive economic and security consequences.
China presents the most significant financial exposure. Venezuela owes Beijing around twenty billion dollars in loans. These debts are secured through oil-for-loan arrangements that require repayment through crude deliveries, with China currently absorbing more than half of Venezuela’s oil exports (approximately 746,000 barrels per day in November 2025).
Beyond petroleum, Chinese state enterprises control critical Venezuelan infrastructure.
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As I’ll explain below (and mapped in this table), the superseding indictment against Nicolás Maduro and his wife unsealed yesterday is a more political document than the one that first charged Maduro in 2020. One important difference lies in how DOJ attempted to claim Maduro is not the leader of Venezuela, which will be a key element required to overcome any immunity claim Maduro will surely invoke.
Before I explain the differences between these indictments, let me stress that both are real indictments, documenting decades of corruption and cooperation with drug traffickers and terrorists. Prosecutors worked hard to pull them together and investigators (in the US and around Latin America) and sources no doubt risked their lives to make it possible.
The charges remain the same as in 2020
Both indictments charge the same four crimes:
Narco-Terrorism Conspiracy (21 USC 960a)
Cocaine Importation Conspiracy (21 USC 963)
Two counts of use of machine guns or destructive devices in furtherance of the conspiracies (18 USC 924)
The latter charges, charging Maduro for possessing machine guns, have attracted some mockery, including from me. DOJ is at the same time arguing that DC must allow semi-automatic weapons and at the same time charging a foreign leader with possessing machine guns. The charges are there (and were put there years ago) because they’re a way to get significant sentencing enhancements for other crimes. The presentencing memo for Hugo Armando Caraval-Barrio, who was charged with Maduro in 2020 and pled guilty in June, added so many sentencing enhancements they’re having a multi-day hearing later this month to fight about which ones apply. But given the evolution of gun prohibitions in the US since Bruen (issued in 2022), Maduro may try to challenge this charge, though Caraval-Barrio pled to those same charges in June.
DOJ includes Sinaloa, los Zetas, and Tred de Aragua for reasons that likely have to do with Stephen Miller’s fever dreams
In addition to adding overt acts that happened since 2020, the Narco-Terrorism Conspiracy charged in the newly unsealed indictment is interesting — and may have further significance — because it added several new cartels that have been deemed terrorist organizations last year. The 2020 indictment focused on FARC, the left wing Colombian terrorist organization that trafficked drugs, and Cartel de Soles (the vague name used for Maduro’s corruption). But in the last year, the Trump Administration has, for the first time (and controversially), designated drug cartels that engage in extreme violence as terrorist organizations. So the new indictment names not just FARC and ELN — Colombian terrorists whom Maduro gave shelter — but Sinaloa and the Zetas, along with Tren de Aragua.
24. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that NICOLAS MADURO MOROS, DIOSDADO CABELLO RONDON, and RAMON RODRIGUEZ CHACIN, the defendants, and others known and unknown, would and did engage in conduct that would be punishable under Title 21 , United States Code, Section 841 ( a), if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States, to wit, the distribution of, and possession with the intent to distribute, five kilograms and more of mixtures and substances containing a detectable amount of cocaine, knowing and intending to provide, directly and indirectly, something of pecuniary value to a person and organization that has engaged and engages in terrorism and terrorist activity (as defined in Title 8, United States Code, Section 1182(a)(2)(B)), or terrorism (as defined in Title 22, United States Code, Section 2656f(d)(2)), to wit, the following organizations that have been designated by the United States Secretary of State as FTOs pursuant to Section 219 of the INA, during times relevant to this Superseding Indictment: FARC, FARC-EP, Segunda Marquetalia, ELN, TdA, the Sinaloa Cartel, CDN, also known as the Zetas, and each organization’s members, operatives, and associates, having knowledge that such organizations and persons have engaged and engage in terrorist activity and terrorism, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 960a. [my emphasis]
This is one of the things I view as political. There’s far more substance behind the FARC allegations than the Sinaloa and Zetas ones. The Zetas allegation relies on the Zetas’, working with unnamed Columbian traffickers, use of Venezuelan ports from 2003 to 2011. The Sinaloa allegation relies on Caraval-Barrio’s protection of Chapo Guzmán in 2011. Both those allegations took place long before Marco Rubio included the Mexican cartels in his new designations. But by including them in this indictment, DOJ makes this application of such crimes applicable in Mexico, an ominous inclusion given Trump’s overt threats to pull the same kind of invasion in Mexico next.
The Tren de Aragua is likewise thin. In the 2020 indictment, two FARC leaders were included as co-conspirators, but that reflected a sustained relationship with Maduro as laid out in the overt acts. The TdA inclusion here relies on a similar move, including its leader, Hector Ruthsenford Guerrero Flores as a co-conspirator. But his inclusion relies on two overt acts that don’t involve Maduro: Guerrero’s actual trafficking with someone not alleged to be part of this conspiracy, and comments made in a Venezuelan prison in 2019. (These may be the comments that US intelligence services have deemed to be unreliable.)
f. Between approximately 2006 and 2008, HECTOR RUSTHENFORD GUERRERO FLORES, a/k/a “Nifio Guerrero,” the defendant, worked with one of the largest drug traffickers in Venezuela, Walid Makled. Members of the Venezuelan regime helped protect Makled’s cocaine shipments that were transported from San Fernando de Apure, Venezuela, to Valencia, Venezuela, and were then sent by plane from the Valencia international airport to Mexico and other locations in Central America for eventual distribution to the United States. Between in or about 2008 and in or about 2009, GUERRERO FLORES also provided another major Venezuelan drug trafficker with protection for cocaine shipments moving through Venezuela, including by providing armed men who carried, among other automatic weapons, AK47s, MP5s, and AR-15s, as well as grenades. At times, GUERRERO FLORES personally accompanied large cocaine loads as they were guarded by the teams of armed men, en route to airports or airstrips for transport north and eventual distribution to the United States. GUERRERO FLORES was paid a fee per kilogram of cocaine transported or received and he sometimes received an interest in portions of these massive cocaine shipments in lieu of payment. The traffickers that GUERRERO FLORES worked with moved thousands of kilograms per shipment, multiple times per month, resulting in the distribution of hundreds of tons of cocaine to the United States. In or about 2009, Makled was charged with narcotics offenses in this District and is a fugitive.
[snip]
o. In or about 2019, TdA’s leader, GUERRERO FLORES, discussed drug trafficking with an individual he understood to be working with the Venezuelan regime. Over multiple calls, GUERRERO FLORES offered to provide escort services for drug loads, explaining that GUERRERO FLORES and TdA had control of the coastlines of Venezuela’s Aragua State. GUERRERO FLORES, speaking from TdA’s base of operations in Tocor6n Prison, explained that TdA could handle the logistics of every aspect of the drug trade, including the use of storage compartments that GUERRERO FLORES called “cradles” located on a beach in Aragua State. In doing so, GUERRERO FLORES confirmed TdA’s ability to protect over one ton of cocaine.
That is, neither is TdA necessary to substantiate the narco-trafficking charges, which are well-substantiated based on protection of FARC, nor is the substance of TdA’s inclusion all that convincing.
At all.
But no doubt Stephen Miller will use this — a grand jury finding probable cause tying TdA to Maduro — to attempt to renew his Alien Enemies Act deportations.
Adding the family, leaving behind the key co-conspirator
On top of swapping FARC co-conspirators for a TdA one, the newly unsealed indictment adds Maduro’s wife and son as co-conspirators.
The inclusion of Maduro’s son is better substantiated. The indictment alleges that his plane was used to ship drugs, he shipped drugs to Miami, and he met with FARC (though neither he nor his mother are included in the narco-trafficking charge).
The inclusion of Cilia Maduro — who was shipped to SDNY along with her husband — rests on her allegedly accepting a bribe in 2007 to broker a meeting between a trafficker and Venezuela’s corrupt top anti-drug cop.
b. In approximately 2007, CILIA ADELA FLORES DE MADURO, the defendant, attended a meeting in which FLORES DE MADURO accepted hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes to broker a meeting between a large-scale drug trafficker and the director of Venezuela’s National Anti-Drug Office, Nestor Reverol Torres. The drug trafficker later arranged to pay a monthly bribe to Reverol Torres, in addition to approximately $100,000 for each flight that was transporting cocaine to ensure the flight’s safe passage, a portion of which was then paid to FLORES DE MADURO. In or about 2015, Reverol Torres was charged with narcotics offenses in the Eastern District of New York and is a fugitive.
But prosecutors likely included Maduro’s family — and snatched Cilia along with her spouse — to acquire leverage against him.
One more point about alleged co-conspirators. In the wake of yesterday’s invasion, Diosdado Cabello Rondón, who is incorporated into the narco-trafficking charge and was already in 2020, was the first person to call for calm, calling the Americans terrorists.
At the crack of dawn, Diosdado Cabello, the regime’s second-in-command, appeared on state-run Venezolana de Televisión, clad in tactical vest and helmet and surrounded by members of the political police. Cabello called the U.S. attack “treacherous and vile” and urged his supporters “not to lose their composure, to avoid despair.” “Avoid situations that favor the invading enemy,” he said. Cabello questioned the role of “international organizations” in this crisis, accusing them of being “complicit in a massacre of civilians.” The leader addressed his men on camera with the two central slogans of the regime’s security forces: “Always loyal, never traitors” and “To doubt is treason.”
This analysis of the aftermath notes that you’d have to take out more of Maduro’s aides, including Cabello, to defeat his government.
For more than a decade, real power in Venezuela has been held by a small circle of senior officials. Analysts and officials say though that the system depends on a sprawling web of loyalists and security organs, fueled by corruption and surveillance.
Within the inner circle, a civilian-military balance reigns. Each member has their own interests and patronage networks. Currently Rodriguez and her brother represent the civilian side. Padrino and Cabello represent the military side.
This power structure makes dismantling Venezuela’s current government more complex than removing Maduro, according to interviews with current and former U.S. officials, Venezuelan and U.S. military analysts and security consultants to Venezuela’s opposition.
“You can remove as many pieces of the Venezuelan government as you like, but it would have to be multiple actors at different levels to move the needle,” said a former U.S. official involved in criminal investigations in Venezuela.
A big question mark surrounds Cabello, who exerts influence over the country’s military and civilian counterintelligence agencies, which conduct widespread domestic espionage.
“The focus is now on Diosdado Cabello,” said Venezuelan military strategist Jose Garcia. “Because he is the most ideological, violent and unpredictable element of the Venezuelan regime.”
Donald Trump conducted a months-long operation to carry out an arrest, he claims. But somehow they left behind someone alleged to be just as culpable in the headline charges of the indictment, Cabello.
Disavowing democracy in attempting to negate Maduro’s immunity claim
Yesterday, Trump and Marco Rubio claimed that Maduro’s Vice President, Delcy Rodriguez, would do as she was told. Then she went on TV and said Maduro was still the president and Venezuela would never again be the colony of an empire. It’s unclear whether she’s misleading Marco Rubio or the Venezuelan people, or simply trying to find middle ground.
But her claim to authority only comes through Maduro.
And that’s important because, as Oona Hathaway explained this in an interview with Isaac Chotiner, whether or not Maduro is and was a head of state is central to what will surely be an attempt to claim he is immune from all this.
What do you mean, exactly, about his “seizure and indictment”? Venezuela had an election. It was not a free election. He declared himself President, and he’s broadly recognized as the President of Venezuela, but, again, he was not freely elected by the people of Venezuela. That could justify his indictment in an American court?
I should back up. As part of this military operation, at least one of the key goals seems to have been the capture of Maduro and his wife, who have been indicted for criminal charges in the Southern District of New York. The only way they can do that is if they’re claiming that he’s not a head of state, because heads of state get immunity and heads of state are not subject to criminal prosecution in the domestic courts of other states. That’s just a basic rule of international law. The United States has long recognized it.
So you were not saying that the fact that he stole an election per se means you can grab him and try him in an American court but, rather, that if he were not a head of state, that would at least allow for trying him in an American court, which normally would not be the case?
Right. So if he’s not actually a head of state, then head-of-state immunity doesn’t apply. And it’s connected to this broader question of the use of military force in that it may be that they would make a claim—although I haven’t yet seen this—that because he’s not the legitimate head of state that somehow they have a legal authority to use force to grab him. But, again, the two don’t connect. So the problem is that merely saying that he’s not head of state doesn’t then justify the use of military force in Venezuela.
[snip]
So if Maduro goes to trial in an American court, is this going to be a contested legal issue about whether he can even be tried based on whether he is the head of state of Venezuela? Is that something that American courts are going to have to weigh in on?
Yes, it is something that the American courts are going to have to weigh in on. It definitely is the case that his lawyers will make the argument that he’s a sitting head of state at the time that he was seized and that he remains the sitting head of state and therefore, under international law and under U.S. law, he should be given immunity, which means that he’s not subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts and can’t be criminally charged. This has come up once before with the criminal indictment of Manuel Noriega, the former leader of Panama, when the U.S. invaded Panama in 1989 and seized Noriega and then brought him back to the United States and indicted him for drug smuggling and money laundering.
Back then, Noriega argued that he enjoyed head-of-state immunity, and the executive branch argued that he didn’t because the United States had not recognized him as a legitimate leader of Panama. That gives us a hint as to what is likely to happen in this case. My guess is that the United States will argue that it’s never recognized Maduro as a legitimate leader of Venezuela and therefore he doesn’t receive immunity. And the courts are going to be in the position of having to decide whether they defer to the executive branch’s determination that he’s not head of state or whether they make an independent assessment of his legitimacy as a leader of Venezuela.
How did the Noriega case play out?
In the Noriega case, the courts deferred to the executive branch. They said they were going to accept that the executive branch said that he’s not a constitutional head of state, and therefore he can, in fact, be prosecuted.
Seems quite possible they will do so again now.
It seems likely they’re going to do the same thing. I mean, this is a weaker argument on the part of the executive branch.
Both indictments attempt to deal with this issue. The 2020 one does so by pointing to the US’ 2019 endorsement of Juan Guaidó.
In or about 2018, MADURO MOROS declared victory in a presidential election in Venezuela. In or about 2019, the National Assembly of Venezuela invoked the Venezuelan constitution and declared that MADURO MOROS had usurped power and was not the president of Venezuela. Since in or about 2019, more than 50 countries, including the United States, have refused to recognize MADURO MOROS as Venezuela’s head of state and instead recognized Juan Guaidó as the interim president of Venezuela. In or about January 2020, the United States Department of State certified the authority of Guaidó, as the interim president of Venezuela, to receive and control property in accounts at the United States Federal Reserve maintained by the Venezuelan government and the Central Bank of Venezuela.
The Trump Administration went all-in on declaring Guaidó interim president and … that went nowhere.
This equivalent paragraph in the newly unsealed indictment doesn’t say who runs Venezuela.
5. NICOLAS MADURO MOROS, the defendant, a Venezuelan citizen, was previously the President of Venezuela, and is now, having remained in power despite losses in recent elections, the de facto but illegitimate ruler of the country. MADURO MOROS also previously held a seat in Venezuela’s National Assembly between in or about 2000 and in or about 2006, acted as the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs between in or about 2006 and in or about 2013, and acted as the Vice President of Venezuela in or about 2013. MADURO MOROS succeeded to the Venezuelan presidency after former President Hugo Chavez died in or about 2013 and, during MADURO MOROS’s own presidency, continued to participate in cocaine trafficking with drug dealers and narco-terrorist groups. In or about 2018, MADURO MOROS declared victory in a disputed and internationally condemned presidential election in Venezuela. In or about 2019, Venezuela’s National Assembly invoked the Venezuelan constitution and declared that MADURO MOROS had usurped power and was not the legitimate President of Venezuela. Nonetheless, MADURO MOROS continued to exercise the powers of the Venezuelan presidency, causing more than 50 countries, including the United States, to refuse to recognize MADURO MOROS as Venezuela’s head of state. In or about 2024, Venezuela held another presidential election that was again widely criticized by the international community, in which MADURO MOROS declared himself the winner despite widespread condemnation.
Most independent observers believe Edmundo González won last year’s election. María Corina Machado just won a Nobel Prize as the leader of the opposition (though she claims González is the rightly elected President).
Yet not only doesn’t this indictment name either of them, yesterday Trump said of Machado, “She’s a very nice woman, but she doesn’t have the respect.”
I’ll leave it to experts like Hathaway to unpack whether Trump’s explicit denial of those with a real democratic claim to power has any impact on an immunity claim that Maduro is sure to mount. Her observation that SCOTUS, especially this SCOTUS, will likely defer to the Administration.
I’m simply observing that this indictment was designed, from the start, to rely on illegitimate claims about the lawful president in Venezuela. It had puppet power built into it.
Again, none of this says that the guts of this indictment are suspect. They’re not.
But it’s the packaging of it — a shift that occurred since Trump last indicted Maduro in 2020 — that could have significantly broader repercussions.
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https://www.emptywheel.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Screenshot-2026-01-03-at-23.12.38.png9501382emptywheelhttps://www.emptywheel.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Logo-Web.pngemptywheel2026-01-04 08:07:232026-01-04 13:19:31DOJ’s Politically Illegitimate Basis for Political Illegitimacy in Nicolás Maduro Indictment
Back before everyone checked out for the holidays, I did an inventory of the progress we’ve made in four ways to fight fascism (in comments ApacheTrout reminded I should have the courts in there too).
The Erica Chenoweth rule, which says that if you can get 3.5% of a population in the streets, it often leads to regime change.
Beginning to peel off four people in the Senate or eight or nine people in the House.
Rescuing Republicans from a predictable catastrophe like Democrats did in 2008 and 2020.
Waiting until 2026, winning at least one house of Congress, and beginning to rein in Trump that way.
I wrote it intending to kick off the new year with a post of things we can do, or do better. Here we are!
But first, let me explain where I’m coming from. Much of what follows builds on my belief that we’ve been fighting Donald Trump wrong.
Polarization is his superpower. It’s how he has gotten out of every single one of his political jams in the past: by turning his own scandal into a polarizing pivot, thereby turning his own failures and crimes into a matter of tribalism. Once he has done that, he invents some new bullshit story (usually stoking grievance), and getting right wingers to believe it because of that polarization.
This is why I’m such an asshole about the way people serve as data mules for Trump’s tweets: because those damn things are little polarization machines, which always serve to make him the center of attention around which society is re-polarized.
The way to combat someone whose superpower is polarization is not to exacerbate that polarization. It is to use his own tools — grievance and conspiracism — against him.
Back in May, before the Epstein files had created a full-blown crisis for the Trump Administration, Phil Bump and Mike Rothschild wrote about how conspiracism can undermine someone with power (which I added to here).
Discovering Trump was the villain of the Epstein scandal in which she had an unshakeable belief
Opposing Gaza (probably for horrible Jewish space laser reasons) and crypto currency (for justifiable reasons inflamed by conspiratorial thinking)
Seeing Trump mock affordability
After all that (but while she still had her courage), being targeted by Trump mobs
Packaging that in a morality tale, Christianity, whence she derived moral value
Simplifying and ignoring her potential political ambitions, Trump became the thing everyone suspected was being hidden in the Epstein files, and that led to cognitive dissonance that led MTG to revisit a lot of her other differences with Trump.
So some of my logic, below, is simply to focus on the things that are likely to get Trump supporters or sympathizers to feel betrayed by him including by holding people close to him accountable for shitty things we are pretty sure are going to occur. It includes:
Treat Epstein as the base layer
Focus on the Broligarchs and AI
Emphasize Trump’s loser stench
Visualize Trump’s corruption
Brand Trump as the criminal he is
Hold Stephen Miller accountable for his failures
Visualize how Stephen Miller took money for cancer research and veterans care to pay for a goon army snatching grandmothers
Discredit Key Spokespeople
Use Trump’s claimed opposition to antisemitism against him
Reclaim disinformation research
One more point about this. This post is not a To Do list for the DNC (though some people on Bluesky will undoubtedly treat it as such). It’s a To Do list for myself, most of all, but one that others can borrow if they find it useful. Many of these things are attentional activities that are about repetition and focus as much as congressional oversight or electoral politics.
These are meant to be stories we can tell, regardless of what someone in Congress or some candidate in Iowa does.
Treat Epstein as the base layer
Remember that Marc Caputo column — it was published on December 23 — stating that the Epstein releases could last a whole ‘nother week? On the day that would mark that week, December 30, Devlin Barrett published a story saying that, “The document review” of what is now believed to be 5.2 million documents “is expected to take until at least Jan. 20, according to a person familiar with the matter.” Even if they could finish it by January 20 (they won’t), that’ll just be the first go-around. DOJ has not done what they need to do to document the redactions, so there’ll be demands from Congress for them to do that (with obvious areas — including DOJ names and some deliberative documents specifically included in the law, where they’re in violation), they’ll need to repeat the entire process over again, Congress will begin to bring more legal pressure, and all the while survivors will be pointing out things they missed.
A week, Marc Caputo reported, as if that were credible!
This will go on for some time. This will go on for a very long time.
Still, while the Epstein scandal has been absolutely instrumental in loosing Trump’s grip on things, people are naive in thinking that will be enough. “My friends will get hurt,” Trump predicted, but what does it really mean for Trump’s power that Les Wexner has been implicated in the Epstein scandal as a co-conspirator? What is the use of creating right wing cognitive dissonance about Les Wexner, when Wexner is not the oligarch currently helping Trump destroy the country?
In my opinion, the Epstein scandal is a tool. It undercuts Trump’s ability to grab and redirect attention. It can create moments of cognitive dissonance, as it did for MTG. It is a way to turn Trump’s conspiracism and populism against him and may make other related narrative lines more salient. And if there’s a surprise disclosure — perhaps about Melania’s origin story — all the better. But as you keep the focus on Epstein, remember that there needs to be a direction beyond Epstein as well, a direction which incorporates the oligarchs who are still key players in Trump’s network of power.
Focus on the Broligarchs and AI
The Broligarchs who’ve been a key part of Trump’s power are one way to do that (and that’s before we’ve really gotten into Steve Bannon and Peter Thiel’s ties to Epstein).
Tesla Takedown was one of the most successful campaigns of 2025. At a time when Tesla faced cheaper competitors worldwide, the protests incurred a cost on Musk for his DOGE depredations.
Elon was installed in the White House in significant part by fellow South African “alien invader” David Sacks, who is even more conspiratorial and even more pro-Russian than Musk. Sacks was installed in the White House as a Special Government Employee (who, Elizabeth Warren suggests, has overstayed his welcome) to force a bunch of policy decisions that suck for America but ensure that Broligarchs won’t pay any consequences for their rash business deals. When one or both of crypto and AI crash (this is a really good story on how and why AI will burst), he’ll be there to ensure the government bails them out, as he did after playing a role in the failure of Silicon Valley Bank.
And even as Trump sheds support based on his mockery of affordability, even as MTG split with Trump over that and his support for crypto, Sacks is trying to brand Democrats as being more populist than even Zohran Mamdani is.
Fine. You want Democrats to be the party attending to the needs of working people? You’ve just made the GOP the party of “alien invader” billionaires who got tax cuts as millions lost their health care.
Sacks and the other Broligarchs are going to do something for which they’ll try to dodge accountability. Now is the time to make sure his name comes up as people look for culprits.
Emphasize Trump’s loser stench
Another thing that will lead people to defect is to realize that Trump is a loser. He has done things — like the takeover of the Kennedy Center — that makes it easy to demonstrate he’s a loser in tangible fashion. Better still, every time Trump attaches his name to something, it provides an opportunity to hijack that brand, as comedian Toby Morton auspiciously managed to do by anticipating Trump’s most venal instincts and buying the domain.
The same is true of his businesses. Trump and his entire family is getting rich off the presidency 2.0. But his businesses are built as cons, sometimes Ponzi schemes. The idea is to leverage the loyalty of MAGAts to get them to invest in something, run up its value, only to collapse, leaving the most vulnerable screwed. In the past, at least, the cult effect was such that even MAGAts bilked by Trump associates, as with Steve Bannon’s Build the Wall graft, were reluctant to turn on the fraudsters; that may change. But at the very least, the volatile nature of Trump’s frauds makes it easy to show that as a businessman, he’s a loser.
Visualize Trump’s corruption
While there has been good reporting on Trump’s corruption — see, for example, NYT’s nifty visualization from New Year’s Eve — there has not been a systematic effort to take on his corruption.
Nevertheless, possibly because of the Epstein scandal, a majority of the country does think Trump is corrupt.
That may actually not be in a bad place to be as we move into 2026. That’s because Democrats can make Republican inaction in the face of Trump’s corruption a campaign issue (and then, if it leads to a Democratic sweep in midterms, the electoral buy-in will be in place to do a lot of oversight and defunding of Trump’s corruption).
Trump’s pardons are similar. There’s actually a solid stream of reporting on how corrupt they are, without yet any political direction to it. Democrats running against Republican incumbents — especially in the Senate — should state as presumed that it is the job of Senators to respond to the kind of naked corruption Trump is engaged in.
Where activists can magnify the good reporting on both Trump’s corruption and his pardons is to focus on the victims. This is actually showing up in the reporting on both topics. WaPo focused on the victims of Trevor Milton who might have gotten restitution had Trump not pardoned him. LAT similarly focused on the victims fucked over by Trump’s pardon of David Gentile.
Rosenberg, a retired wholesale produce distributor living in Nevada, has supported Trump since he entered politics, but the president’s decision in November to commute the sentence of former private equity executive David Gentile has left him angry and confused.
“I just feel I’ve been betrayed,” Rosenberg, 68, said. “I don’t know why he would do this, unless there was some sort of gain somewhere, or some favor being called in. I am very disappointed. I kind of put him above this kind of thing.”
Trump’s decision to release Gentile from prison less than two weeks into his seven-year sentence has drawn scrutiny from securities attorneys and a U.S. senator — all of whom say the White House’s explanation for the act of clemency is not adding up. It’s also drawn the ire of his victims.
“I think it is disgusting,” said CarolAnn Tutera, 70, who invested more than $400,000 with Gentile’s company, GPB Capital. Gentile, she added, “basically pulled a Bernie Madoff and swindled people out of their money, and then he gets to go home to his wife and kids.”
This superb Bloomberg story on the extent to which the Juan Orlando Hernández pardon unraveled years of work starts with a murder arranged by the network.
Five minutes later, González was circling a roundabout when a gray van braked in front of him. At the same time, a green SUV crowded his rear bumper. A motorcycle carrying two men emerged on his left. A man on the back of the bike fired six shots through the driver-side window. González’s head slumped toward his shoulder, and he tilted forward, held upright by the seatbelt. He died instantly.
More than a dozen men streamed out of the two vehicles that had sandwiched his Nissan. They scrambled to collect the spent shell casings on the ground, then scattered other casings across the pavement—decoys to complicate ballistics tracing. They jumped back into their vehicles, circled the roundabout and took the same road Julián had just driven down.
When they approached the Slaughterhouse, the gates opened to let them in, then closed behind them.
Every one of these pardons has a victim — and that’s before you get into the people newly victimized by people who’ve been pardoned by Trump, which NYT covered in November and others are tracking as well.
A New Jersey fraudster who was pardoned by President Trump in 2021 was sentenced to 37 years in prison this month for running a $44 million Ponzi scheme, one of a growing number of people granted clemency by Mr. Trump only to be charged with new crimes.
The man, Eliyahu Weinstein, was pardoned by Mr. Trump in 2021 and was re-indicted by the U.S. attorney’s office in New Jersey three years later. He was accused of swindling investors who thought their money was being used to buy surgical masks, baby formula and first-aid kits bound for Ukraine, and a jury convicted him in April of several crimes, including conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud.
[snip]
Some of those pardoned for their role in the Jan. 6, 2021, riot at the U.S. Capitol have quickly drawn new attention from law enforcement. The group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington said in June that at least 10 of the more than 1,500 who were pardoned had been rearrested and charged, and the number has only grown since then.
Earlier this month, a man who was pardoned after having participated in the Jan. 6 attack was charged with sex crimes against two children. Another man whose original sentence Mr. Trump commuted in 2021 was recently sentenced to 27 months in prison after convictions on physical and sexual assault, among other crimes.
These stories provide an important way to explain the costs of Trump’s corruption.
Brand Trump as the criminal he is
And while we’re talking about telling these stories: We must never ever cede the ground of crime to Stephen Miller’s attempt to brand immigrants as criminals.
Trump — a felon who freed hundreds of cop assailants on his first day on the job — has an entire infrastructure devoted to trying to spin brown people as criminal. Every time that infrastructure goes into action, including with the effort to brand Somalis in Minnesota as inherently fraudulent when Trump himself is a serial fraudster, we need to repeat, relentlessly, that Trump is a serial criminal who coddles other criminals.
This is something Gavin Newsom just started doing, with an entire website devoted to cataloging Trump’s crime and that of his pardon recipients.
Do not let a conversation about crime go by without focusing on how much of it Trump does.
Crime, in Trump’s era, is a rich white man’s thing. And while it will take a lot of work to adjust a lot of racist priors, until people start seeing Trump as a criminal it will be far too easy for them to make excuses for him.
The import of shifting how we speak of Miller’s considerable power is clear. That’s true because he frankly has done huge damage, even to Trump’s goals, and well more so to average Americans. He’s someone that people, including Republicans, can scapegoat for Trump’s failures (and they’ll be right). And if we don’t make sure that happens, then he’ll scapegoat brown people.
Again, are Somali day care workers or billionaires systematically defrauding average people the problem? One easy to way to drown out Miller’s case that it’s the former is to make it clear how much he personally has harmed average Americans.
Visualize how Stephen Miller took money for cancer research and veterans care to pay for a goon army snatching grandmothers
But it still retains support of a big chunk of the population, probably because Trump officials routinely blame their own failures to address American problems on migrants, when as often as not, Trump’s response to immigration is the source of the problem.
America can’t have nice things, like cures for cancer and welcoming public schools, because Republicans in Congress took the money used to pay for those things and gave it to Stephen Miller to use to invade America’s neighborhoods.
Discredit Key Spokespeople
Right wingers like Jonah Goldberg and David French have expressed alarm by an old promo for a 60 Minutes piece (the piece itself was from October) that an influencer reposted yesterday, describing dozens of times when the government lied in court filings.
Judges have caught Trump’s DOJ in several major lies since then. In Chicago, Judge Sara Ellis wrote a 233-page opinion documenting the many lies DHS has told about their Chicago invasion.
And in December, judges in both Kilmar Abrego’s case caught the government obfuscating. In the criminal case, on December 30, Judge Waverly Crenshaw unsealed a December 3 opinion describing how Nashville’s US Attorney lied about how centrally involved Todd Blanche’s office was in demanding Abrego face trial.
The central question after Abrego established a prima facie case of vindictiveness is what information in the government’s control sheds light on its new decision to prosecute Abrego, after removing him from the United States without criminal charges. These documents show that McGuire did not act alone and to the extent McGuire had input on the decision to prosecute, he shared it with Singh and others. (Doc. No. 178-1). Specifically, the government’s documents may contradict its prior representations that the decision to prosecute was made locally and that there were no outside influences. For example, Singh contacted McGuire on April 27, 2025, to discuss Abrego’s case. (See Doc. No. 229 at Abrego-Garcia000001). On April 30, 2025, Singh asked McGuire what the potential charges against Abrego would be, whether the charging document would reference Abrego’s alleged MS-13 affiliation, and asked for a phone call before any charges were filed. (Id. at Abrego-Garcia000007–000008). In a separate email on April 30, 2025, Singh made clear that Abrego’s criminal prosecution was a “top priority” for the Deputy Attorney General’s office (Blanche). (Id. at Abrego-Garcia000037). He then told McGuire to “sketch out a draft complaint for the 1324 charge [making it unlawful to bring in and harbor certain aliens].” (Id.). On May 15th, McGuire emailed his staff that “DAG (Blanche) and PDAG would like Garcia charged sooner rather than later.” (Id. at Abrego-Garcia000060).
And as I’ve already noted, Judge Paula Xinis cataloged the many deliberately ignorant declarations DOJ filed about whether DHS had deportation plans for Abrego when she ruled that he must be released.
Respondents showcased Cantú’s ignorance about the content of his Declaration pertaining to Costa Rica. As the pointed questions of Respondents’ counsel made clear, Cantú’s lack of knowledge was planned and purposeful.
Counsel: So paragraph 4, final sentence [of the Cantú Declaration], do you see where it says the word—the words “certain understandings”?
Cantú: I found it. Yes, I do. I see it.
Counsel: What are the certain understandings referenced in the last sentence?
Cantú: I don’t know . . .
Counsel: What are the “contingencies” referenced in the last sentence?
Cantú: I do not know . . .
Counsel: What are the “interim developments” referenced in paragraph 5?
Cantú: I don’t know.
ECF No. 107 at 26:8–27:12 (counsel for Respondents, Jonathan Guynn (“Guynn”), questioning Cantú). See also id. at 53:8–9 (Guynn, at sidebar with Court, stating “I’ll just say I told you this was exactly what was going to happen,” regarding the witness’ ignorance on Costa Rica as a viable country of removal).
Ultimately, Respondents’ calculated effort to take Costa Rica “off the table” backfired. Within 24 hours, Costa Rica, through Minister Zamora Cordero, communicated to multiple news sources that its offer to grant Abrego Garcia residence and refugee status is, and always has been, firm, unwavering, and unconditional.
It’s a problem that, after huge scoldings like these, right wing critics of Trump don’t understand how much Trump’s people lie — not least because the Supreme Court still credits the most outlandish claims Trump makes, even after they’ve been thoroughly debunked by lower court judges.
Many of these lies are coming from the same people: Stephen Miller, Todd Blanche’s office, DHS spox Tricia McLaughlin, and Greg Bovino.
It is remarkable that so many of these people have been caught lying to courts (or publicly, about people before courts). But it needs to become common knowledge for everyone, so every time Tricia says something, they start from the assumption she’s lying, because she almost always is.
There comes a time when the credibility of systematic liars not named Trump collapse entirely such that every utterance they make discredits the claims they try to sell. Tricia McLaughlin, at least, is close those levels of propaganda, and Stephen Miller is not far behind.
Use Trump’s claimed opposition to antisemitism against him
Within days of his inauguration last year, Trump signed an EO — adding to one he signed in 2019 — claiming to oppose antisemitism. There has been some discussion about the bad faith of this EO and a DOJ lawyer implementing it, Michael Velchik, once wrote a paper from Hitler’s perspective. While it is explicitly targeted at universities (and has been a key tool to attempt to takeover universities), it nevertheless claimed to oppose antisemitism everywhere.
It shall be the policy of the United States to combat anti-Semitism vigorously, using all available and appropriate legal tools, to prosecute, remove, or otherwise hold to account the perpetrators of unlawful anti-Semitic harassment and violence.
This is the kind of statement of principle that can form the basis of political pressure — particularly as the MAGAt movement splinters around the overt antisemitism of people like Nick Fuentes and Candace Owen, and as political opportunists like Ted Cruz attempt to exploit that splinter.
We’re going to have to fight this battle in any case. As part of the revocation of everything Eric Adams did after he was indicted for bribery yesterday, Zohran Mamdani revoked an EO that gave Israel preferential treatment, which Israel is using to stoke division; yet Mamdani preserved the office Adams opened to combat antisemitism.
We need to call out the dripping antisemitism of Trump’s team, from top (at least JD Vance, who refuses to disavow Fuentes) to bottom.
There are two key Trump aides who should be targeted. Most notably, Paul Ingrassia, who had to withdraw his nomination to be Special Counsel after Politico exposed texts in which he confessed to a Nazi streak been installed at GSA instead. In addition, Kingsley Wilson became DOD spokesperson in spite of Neo-Nazi comments. NPR has done good work unpacking these ties.
Reclaim disinformation research
Republicans plan on exporting fascism via US tech platforms.
That’s not new. I’ve been talking about Elon’s plans to use Xitter as a machine for fascism for some time.
And, in the wake of the EU’s sanctions against Elon Musk for — basically — lying about why I have a blue check, Marco Rubio stripped the visas of five people, including US Green Card holder Imran Ahmed, a long time adversary of Elon’s.
But there are several developments that suggest it is time to renew efforts to defend disinformation research, not least the White House’s absurd effort to attack real journalism, what is sure to be a snowballing failure on Bari Weiss’ part to make propaganda popular, and the meltdown the head of DOJ’s Civil Rights division, Harmeet Dhillon, had over the holidays about right wing “misinformation” targeting Pam Bondi.
The right wingers are doing what they themselves established is unlawful. And that presents both political and legal opportunities to demonize their propaganda.
Some people write short resolutions. I guess I write 4,000-word To Do lists. Join me in my efforts!
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My previous post was about an article titled What Are We Living Through by Jedediah Britton-Purdy and David Pozen. The authors offer three scripts people use to answer the title question.
It seems odd that the authors, both law professors, don’t address the role of SCOTUS, but it’s probably because people don’t think about the role of SCOTUS in creating this disastrous presidency. But thinking about SCOTUS clarifies the situation. The Trump regime isn’t a sudden turn, as centrists and almost all Democratic politicians say. It is part of a long project, funded by an ever-changing group of filthy rich right-wing White people. One of their first overt steps was taking control of SCOTUS.
Gaining control of SCOTUS
Appointments to SCOTUS have had been virulently political at least since the nomination of Robert Bork was stymied by Democrats, based largely on “… his outspoken criticism of the Warren and Burger Courts and his role in the Saturday Night Massacre.“ The filthy rich loved Bork both for his right-wing politics and for his devotion to their interests.
The Federalist Society was formed in 1982 by students at Harvard, Yale and University of Chicago law schools “… with the aim of challenging liberal or left-wing ideology within elite American law schools and universities.” Bork and Antonin Scalia spoke at their first public event. The Wikipedia entry says this about early funding
… $5.5 million came from the John M. Olin Foundation. Other early donors included the Scaife Foundation, the Bradley Foundation[ and the Koch family foundations. Donors to the Federalist Society have included Google, Chevron, Charles G. and David H. Koch; the family foundation of Richard Mellon Scaife; and the Mercer family.
Readers will recognize those right-wing operations run by inheritors of great wealth.
Leonard Leo founded the Cornell branch of the Federalist Society and moved on to employment there. Under his leadership, five of the current members of SCOTUS are members of the Federalist Society.
Hacking at democracy
Once right-wing ideologues took over SCOTUS, they began hacking away at laws intended to protect our democracy. They got rid of campaign finance laws, eviscerated anti-corruption laws, wrecked the Voting Rights Act, authorized gerrymandering, and gave the filthy rich nearly everything they wanted. In the process, they ignored or dismantled guardrails on their own power, rules like standing, justiciability, and minimal decisions; they took on the role of determining facts (a role supposedly played by trial courts) and ignored stare decisis, the fundamental basis of US Constitutional law. Trump v. US freed Trump from criminal liability for anything remotely related to the office of President.
These cases had a huge impact, not least of which was the election of Donald Trump to a second term
Weakening Congress
Gerrymandering and toothless campaign laws enabled the Republicans to control the House of Representatives. Structural features of our system, including equal representation of states in the Senate and the filibuster made it possible for the Republicans to prevent congressional action.
SCOTUS compounded this weakness by striking down legislation it didn’t like. For example, John Roberts has a long-standing hatred of the Voting Rights Act. In Shelby County v. Holder he struck down the provision requiring certain states with a long history of racial discrimination in voting to submit all changes to their voting laws for pre-clearance. This procedure enabled the Department of Justice to review those laws for racial discrimination before they were allowed to take effect.
Roberts justified his decision with a newly-invented fiction he called the dignity of the states. Congress.he said, hadn’t done enough to satisfy Roberts that pre-clearance acted reasonably by singling out states with a history of racist actiions, somehow explaining away the express grant of such power toCongress in the 15th Amendment. Effectively Roberts set himself up as the arbiter of whether Congress had done enough to justify a rule he didn’t like.
Strengthening Trump
In Trump v. Andeerson, SCOTUS held that only Congress can enforce the 14th Amendment’s insurrection clause, effectively neutering it. In Trump v. US the current majority held that the president cannot be held accountable for crimes he commits that the current majority says are within the core executive functions of the president. These two cases cleared the way for Trump to run again.
Because there were no enforceable limitations on campaign finance, Trump was able to raise hundreds of millions from the filthy rich and got a second term. He promptly began breaking laws. He destroyed entire agencies and weakened the rest of them, he set masked gunsels to snatch people off the street if they looked like not-white people (an action permitted as Kavanaugh Stops), refused to comply with Congressional appropriation laws, fired heads of independent agencies, fired tens of thousands of federal employees, and more. SCOTUS has at least temporarily allowed all these assaults on Congress’ express Constitutional power, explaining that Trump wants it and if he can’t have it that’s a terrible injury, worse than allowing ICE to kidnap people.
Political discourse
I think Purdy-Britton and Pozen are mostly right about the nature of political discourse, and that’s a problem. Their three scripts don’t include this partial list of horribles about the current SCOTUS majority. Concentrating only on the marauding president is simply not good enough to deal with our situation. The Supreme Court has also lost its legitimacy and done terrible damage to our democracy in the process.
I agree with an opinion piece in The Guardian written by Ryan Doerfler and Samuel Moyn, law profs at Harvard and Yale, titled It’s Time to Accept that the US Supreme Court is Illegitimate and Must be Replaced. This article summarizes a longer paper, The Post-Legitimacy Court.. Both of these deserve more consideration than I give them here.
The paper cites Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania as a major source of the idea of legitimacy:
“The Court’s power lies in its legitimacy,” Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter explained in their joint opinion, “a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.”
The authors say that the current majority has abandoned the goal of preserving legitimacy, suggesting that they
… might care about the views only of other conservatives (whether lawyers or the public) [which] would be consistent with the larger turn in Republican politics.
The authors discuss responses by some of my favorite legal writers. law profs Kate Shaw from the Strict Scrutiny podcast, and Steve Vladek. The authors say, and I agree, that their reactions to this Court are too legalistic and restrained. Doerfler and Moyn say the current majority has moved the Court’s institutional legitimacy to the brink of cliff, and citizens need to push it over the edge.
I agree, and would go farther. The current majority is not a court. It’s a group of six political actors no different from the majority of a congressional committee. Each member has goals, and these mostly coincide with the goals of the Republican Party and its largest donors. They have the votes and that’s all that counts. The current majority has rejected national legitimacy in favor of the exercise of raw power.
I always blame Roberts personally for every evil thing Trump does. Here’s an example.
Hammer the Court whenever you get the chance, on social media and in real life. It’s the first step to change.
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At the hearing in accused pipe bomber Brian Cole’s case the other day, Magistrate Judge Matthew Sharbaugh ordered both sides to file their views about whether the indictment DOJ obtained against Cole from a Superior Court grand jury was valid; he ordered those filings to be posted to the public docket by end of business yesterday.
MINUTE ORDER as to BRIAN J. COLE, JR.: As discussed during today’s proceedings, the Court was presented yesterday afternoon with a two-count indictment in this case that was returned by a D.C. Superior Court grand jury, rather than a federal court grand jury. The indictment included the same two counts charged in the criminal complaint, namely 18 U.S.C. 844(d) and 844(i). In asking the Court to accept the indictment, the government invoked D.C. Code § 11-1916(a), which provides that “[a] grand jury serving in the District of Columbia may take cognizance of all matters brought before it regardless of whether an indictment is returnable in the Federal or District of Columbia courts.” The Court recognizes that Chief Judge Boasberg recently upheld the propriety of this approach based on that statute, concluding that Section 11-1916(a) authorizes local D.C. grand juries to return indictments in U.S. District Court (and vice versa). United States v. Stewart, 2025 WL 3237833 (Nov. 20, 2025). But Judge Boasberg then stayed that ruling pending appeal, stating in part that “the public interest lies in letting the Court of Appeals decide this issue before the Government moves forward both on this case and in similar fashion on other cases.” See Stewart, No. 25-mj-225, Order (Dec. 9, 2025). The Court yesterday deferred a decision on whether to accept the indictment pending further briefing from the parties on the question of whether Judge Boasberg’s stay order extends to the circumstances here. The parties were directed to submit briefing on that question, and the Court intends to issue a decision in short order on whether to accept the indictment as proposed. Meanwhile, the Court ORDERS that both sides shall file their respective briefs on the public docket by close of business on December 31, 2025. Either side may request redactions to their briefs the extent they believe it necessary, provided that the filing is accompanied by an appropriate motion to seal. SO ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Matthew J. Sharbaugh on 12/30/2025. [my emphasis]
According to Cole’s response, the government may have filed something under seal (I’m confused about the date here, because Cole’s response bears yesterday’s date, which would make the government filing, filed “yesterday,” on December 30).
Defendant Brian Cole Jr. respectfully submits this response in opposition to the government’s memorandum, filed late yesterday, December 29, 2025, asking this “Court [to] accept the indictment return,” referencing a document returned earlier that day not by a grand jury of this Court but rather by a grand jury organized by, and sitting at the behest of, the D.C. Superior Court. (Gov. Mem. at 7.)
But Jeanine Pirro went out partying last night before actually filing whatever they filed publicly.
And given the panic that Cole’s response describes, it suggests there may be real problems with the case.
The response provides the back story to their December 28 filing seeking to clarify that Tuesday’s hearing would include a probable cause inquiry.
On Christmas Eve, Cole’s attorneys asked prosecutors whether the December 30 hearing or whether they would indict before then.
We also need to know whether the government plans on holding a probabl[e] cause hearing on Tuesday [December 30, 2025]. We have received no information regarding an indictment and thus would like to know the government’s position on this. Please let us know by December 27, 2025.
Cole’s exasperated filing translated that inquiry this way: “Are you going to indict this case before next Tuesday?” [italics original].
The government used the holiday to stall almost two days, after which they asserted that the hearing would deal only with detention.
Tuesday’s hearing is a detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The government will be proceeding by proffer.
As Cole’s filing describes, nothing about that response made sense.
In this context, two options seemed likely: (1) the government had tried and failed to secure an indictment; or (2) it was still planning to obtain an indictment from the federal grand jury on Monday. To that end, Mr. Williams quickly wrote back:
Also, please tell us whether the government has sought an indictment before a grand jury on the charges against Brian Cole Jr. If an indictment was sought before a grand jury, we are requesting all documents demonstrating the outcome of the grand jury. For example, if a “No Bill” was rendered by the grand jury on Brian Cole Jr’s charges, please provide us with that. Please provide us with this documentation prior to this Monday.
On December 28 (that is, the day Cole’s attorneys filed that motion to clarify), AUSA Charles Jones responded that no grand jury was sitting after December 19, which surely he knew in real time.
As John [Shoreman] indicated below, the parties have not yet scheduled a Rule 5.1 preliminary hearing given the defense’s request to continue the December 15 detention hearing (at which we would typically have scheduled the preliminary hearing). Please let me know if you have a view on when to schedule that hearing.
Had there been a “no bill” in this matter, we would have promptly reported it to the Court pursuant to FRCP 6(f).[2] The government has not yet sought a grand jury indictment in this case given the defense’s request to continue the detention hearing and your agreement to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act’s 30-day indictment deadline. Additionally, there are no sitting grand juries in D.C. District Court between 12/19 and 1/5.
Which Cole’s attorneys used to note that the FBI was surveilling Cole for a good deal of time before they arrested him.
2 The government must only make the report of a “No True Bill” under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(f) “[i]f a complaint or information is pending against the defendant,” so the government’s response does not say whether it sought (and failed to receive) such an indictment prior to Mr. Cole’s arrest. From discovery, the defense team is aware that federal agents had placed the defendant under surveillance for a long period of time before his arrest, suggesting again that they had plenty of time to seek an indictment.
Cole’s team wonders whether they tried and failed to indict Cole; I repeat my observation that they did this last minute, in such a way that they would be unable to prosecute others.
This is when the filing gets a bit comical.
They translate what this means, again.
In turn, defense counsel finally had the answer to the question they had asked four days earlier: No, the government is not going to indict this case before next Tuesday. This meant, based on a plain reading of the relevant federal Rules and statutes, that there would have to be a preliminary or Mr. Cole would be released without conditions. [italics original, again]
In real time, Cole’s lawyers offered to forgo the probable cause inquiry if prosecutors would release him on bail.
(1) “We can exchange dates for the preliminary hearing;” and (2) “[W]ould the government be interested in waiving the preliminary hearing in exchange for bail under a strict set of agreeable conditions placed on Mr. Cole?”
That’s when Jones got obstinate: No release, no probable cause hearing until January 7.
23. About 20 minutes later, the government responded on these two points by writing: (1) “Would the afternoon on January 7 or January 8 work for a preliminary hearing?”; and (2) “We’re not willing to agree to release under conditions in exchange
Cole’s lawyers were not that stupid, as they describe.
Given that a federal grand jury would reconvene on January 6, 2025, it would have been malpractice for defense counsel to agree to delay the preliminary hearing again until a date as late as January 7, 2026.
Jones went silent, so Cole’s lawyers flew out a witness who — they reportedly said during the hearing the other day — would have testified that the pipe bombs would not have exploded. They also noted what I did: neither the arrest affidavit nor the detention memo presented any evidence that Cole bought black powder or the potassium nitrate that he allegedly told them he used to make it.
If these weren’t bombs, they might not be able to charge Cole under the existing statute, and if they can’t, then the statute of limitations might run before a grand jury is seated to indict Cole with something else.
And in the government’s (apparently still sealed) filing, they try to blame Cole for adhering to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
34. This is not hyperbole. The government admits as much, stating that it “would have sought [] an early indictment from a federal grand jury panel had there been any indication that the defense, contrary to all indications, intended to pursue a preliminary hearing on December 30, 2025.” In other words, the government expected defense counsel to drop the ball.3 That is not “changed circumstances.”
3 The government does not proffer any reason why competent defense counsel would agree to forego a preliminary hearing in the absence of receiving some benefit, such as an agreement to release the defendant from custody. That is because there is none—making the government’s purported reliance on this “indication[]” entirely unreasonable.
For what it’s worth, I think the government’s location data is also likely to be aggressively challenged.
But it sounds like the government also understands they’ve got a hole in their case where the actual explosives are supposed to be.
Update: Sharbaugh has dispatched with this process by, first, seemingly misrepresenting what the defense said about a probable cause hearing (and thereby granting himself the ability to determine probable cause without the hearing the defense wanted), then finding Cole should be detained. Then, after doing that, he said it was no harm no foul on forgetting to indict him and doing it in the DC Superior Court to avoid a hearing.
I don’t contest the decision, which seems reasonable enough (he relies heavily on DOJ’s representation of Cole’s confession, which his attorneys did not contest because they were making a procedural case), though I do think the procedural posture is a problem.
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Robert Draper did a 1,000-word piece describing the Four Takeaways of his much longer magazine profile describing Marjorie Taylor Greene’s Break With Trump. It focuses on four steps in the process, which he presents out of chronological order:
“Trump’s speech at Charlie Kirk’s memorial was a clarifying moment,” because it contrasted Erika Kirk’s forgiveness with Trump’s lack of Christian faith
“Greene’s demands to release the Epstein files seemed to be the last straw for Trump,” because MTG’s threat to reveal the names of those who abused Epstein’s victims would hurt Trump’s friends
“Her disillusionment with Trump goes beyond the Epstein files,” in which Draper lumps tariffs and Gaza but focuses primarily on the way Trump’s stochastic terrorism led to threats against MTG’s son
“Greene said she was wrong for accusing Democrats of treason in the past,” which simply doubles down on the apology MTG made already on CNN and explained that MTG realized Christians don’t do such things
I don’t doubt that Draper thinks of the transformation he describes as dominated — bullets one and four — by MTG living by her faith, but the word “Christian” only appears in the 8,100-word profile six times.
And word frequency is just one tell that Draper may be indulging MTG’s own retroactive reconstruction of it.
The profile is based on interviews that took place earlier this month, though as Draper recounts, he has been covering MTG closely since 2021 and met with her repeatedly before this month. The Kirk memorial with which Draper began both his profile and his Four Takeaways occurred on September 21. He describes MTG’s perception of the difference between Erika’s forgiveness and Trump’s doubling down as the moment when, “the stress fracture that had been steadily widening between Greene and her political godfather became an irrevocable break.”
But his stress fracture comment introduces a paragraph listing five policy splits with Trump, most of which predate the Kirk memorial, the most important of which — her support for releasing all the Epstein files — predates the memorial by several weeks and gets its own paragraph here and a more focused treatment later.
Declaring the war in Gaza a “genocide”
Objecting to cryptocurrency and artificial-intelligence policies that, from her perspective, prioritized billionaire donors over working-class Americans
Criticizing the Trump administration for:
Approving foreign student visas
Enacting tariffs that hurt businesses in her district
Allowing Obamacare subsidies to expire
Argu[ing] that all investigative material pertaining to Jeffrey Epstein should be released
Much later, the profile describes that well before the Epstein break came the realization that Trump does not return loyalty (including a campaign disloyalty similar to the one that drove Elise Stefanik’s later break), followed by Trump’s targeted harassment when MTG opposed his cryptocurrency graft.
She considered running against Senator Jon Ossoff but announced in May that she had decided not to.
Greene’s stated reasoning at the time was that “the Senate is where good ideas go to die.” But the week after her announcement, The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump had shared with her a survey from his pollster, Tony Fabrizio, projecting that Ossoff would beat her by 18 points. Later, Trump would claim in a Truth Social post that their split “seemed to all begin” when he sent her the poll — suggesting, in effect, that Greene was pouting over his lack of support: “All I see ‘Wacky’ Marjorie do is COMPLAIN, COMPLAIN, COMPLAIN!” Greene insisted to me, “It wasn’t about a Fabrizio poll.” She added: “I never had a single conversation with the president about it. Instead, he told me all the time, ‘You should run for governor — you’d win.’”
Still, Greene told me, it began to dawn on her that when it came to the president, loyalty is “a one-way street — and it ends like that whenever it suits him.” Being disabused of the idea that subservience would be rewarded appeared to have a liberating effect on her.
In June, Greene did an about-face on the president’s One Big Beautiful Bill after conceding that she voted for it without realizing that it contained a provision that would prevent states from enforcing restrictions on artificial intelligence for a period of 10 years. If the Senate did not strike the moratorium from the bill, Greene publicly warned, “when the O.B.B.B. comes back to the House for approval after Senate changes, I will not vote for it with this in it.” On July 1, the Senate voted to sever the provision from the bill, which Trump signed into law three days later.
Greene broke again from Trump on July 17, arguing on X that his cryptocurrency bill could permit a future president to “TURN OFF YOUR BANK ACCOUNT AND STOP YOUR ABILITY TO BUY AND SELL!!!!!” This time, Trump made his displeasure known to her — and to her peers.
That same day, Greene and roughly a dozen other House Republicans who also had reservations about the bill were summoned to the Oval Office. In Greene’s recollection, Trump focused his wrath on her. “When you have a group of kids,” she said, “you pick the one that is the most well behaved, that always does everything right, and you beat the living shit out of them. Because then the rest of them are like: ‘Oh, man, holy shit. If Dad does that to her, what would he do to me?’” A White House spokeswoman disputes that the meeting was contentious. “Not surprising to me at all,” Greene replied when I informed her of this. “They have major problems, and it’s only starting to build.”
After the hearing, Greene held a news conference at which she threatened to identify some of the men who had abused the women. (Greene says that she didn’t know those names herself but that she could have gotten them from the victims.) Trump called Greene to voice his displeasure. Greene was in her Capitol Hill office, and according to a staff member, everyone in the suite of rooms could hear him yelling at her as she listened to him on speakerphone. Greene says she expressed her perplexity over his intransigence. According to Greene, Trump replied, “My friends will get hurt.”
When she urged Trump to invite some of Epstein’s female victims to the Oval Office, she says, he angrily informed her that they had done nothing to merit the honor. It would be the last conversation Greene and Trump would ever have.
Along the way, Draper inserts something between the Epstein break and the Kirk epiphany and the ultimate break: the 8-week recess, during which MTG stewed as she heard complaints about affordability from her constituents.
But there was one more important ingredient.
As noted, Draper describes the evolving relationship he had with MTG. He first flew down to Rome, GA, in 2022, and honored MTG’s confidences, which built trust. She blew off a meeting for drinks during last year’s convention because Trump was giving her pride of place at the Convention, but shortly thereafter met with a NYT team and scoffed at their claim Trump would pursue retribution. Draper persisted with someone who adhered to the axiom that real news was fake for years.
There are a lot of lefties who hate this profile: They feel it goes easy on her (and given the Christian reconstruction, I’d agree). They see it as a willingness to let MTG rebrand herself, even while it foregrounds her transphobia. They hate the glam photo of her, which nevertheless provides helpful context to MTG’s claim she always opposed the plastic femininity of Mar-a-Lago (and provides a useful contrast with the still fresh Karoline Leavitt portrait).
In particular, she told me recently: “I never liked the MAGA Mar-a-Lago sexualization. I believe how women in leadership present themselves sends a message to younger women.” She continued: “I have two daughters, and I’ve always been uncomfortable with how those women puff up their lips and enlarge their breasts. I’ve never spoken about it publicly, but I’ve been planning to.”
I would add that Draper still treats Trump as the actor — Trump banished MTG, rather than she stood her ground in face of his demands.
It has been tempting for some observers to predict that the meteoric crash and burn of the MAGA movement’s loudest champion signals the beginning of the end for its leader as well. But it is Greene who is exiting the stage, while Trump continues to dominate it, as he did through impeachments and indictments and other controversies that no other politician would have survived.
Still, Draper hedges his bets. Maybe she will be a harbinger.
But because it represents an evolution for Greene, she may yet again prove to be a harbinger of a sea change in the movement she once helped lead.
By far the most fascinating part of the profile to me is how Draper traces MTG’s cognitive dissonance. In 2022 — and still today — MTG is certain there’s no way Joe Biden could have won the election in 2020.
One autumn evening in 2022, I ventured to ask just how she thought the 2020 election was stolen. Did she really think that a grand conspiracy, perhaps masterminded by the Obamas and the C.I.A., had secretly rigged the results?
“Robert,” she replied with a searching look, “do you really think Joe Biden got 81 million votes without even campaigning?”
“Yes,” I said. “They counted all the votes. That was the final tally. Why wouldn’t I believe it?” The look she then gave me, which I will never forget, was one of bottomless pity.
But the contrast between the earnest stories of the survivors followed by hearing Trump complain that naming those who abused Epstein’s girls would hurt his friends broke through a belief created by the bubble of Fox News.
The reason for her lack of concern, as Greene explained it to me, might seem improbable to anyone who is unfamiliar with how the mainstream press and the right-wing media cover the same story differently — or not at all. “The story to me,” she said, “was that I’d seen pictures of Epstein with all these people. And Trump is just one of several. And then, for me, I’d seen that Bill Clinton is on the flight logs for his plane like 20-something times. So, for people like me, it wasn’t suspicious. And then we’d heard the general stories of how Epstein used to be a member of Mar-a-Lago, but Trump kicked him out. Why would I think he’s done anything wrong, right?”
For Greene, the decades that Epstein spent eluding justice for exploiting and sexually assaulting countless girls and young women while amassing a fortune, and the seeming efforts by the government to cover up the injustice, “represents everything wrong with Washington,” she told me. This September, Greene spoke with several of Epstein’s victims for the first time in a closed-door House Oversight Committee meeting. She knew that the women had paid their own way to come to Washington. She saw some of them trembling and crying as they spoke. Their accounts struck her as entirely believable. Greene herself had never been sexually abused, but she knew women who had. In her own small way, Greene later told me, she could understand what it was like for a woman to stand up to a powerful man.
One of the most important parts of MTG’s split from Trump has been an evolving relationship with the media, especially Fox News, and therefore, the truth, but with Draper always there persisting. That is, MTG had to work through the cognitive dissonance of learning that Trump really did have ties to Jeffrey Epstein’s sex trafficking, that he really was trying to cover it up, before she got to the point of retconning it all inside a faith narrative. Her own banishment from Fox News may have helped work through the cognitive dissonance.
I talk a lot about one of the ways you fight fascism is to peel off members of Congress, four in the Senate or eight in the House. I’ve laid out repeatedly how central the Epstein scandal was to that process.
Whether you like the Draper profile or not, whether or not MTG’s split from Trump will be a harbinger of more (like Stefanik’s) to come, what this profile does do is show what it took for one diehard MAGAt to go through it: political betrayal, real policy differences, retaliation, and then cognitive dissonance regarding Epstein, the Kirk epiphany, until finally responding to his terrorism in a dramatically different way than almost every other Republican, whether MAGAt or not.
There’s a process.
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When DOJ released its detention memo for accused January 6 pipe bomber Brian Cole, the MAGAts showed almost no interest; they’re too busy claiming to have discovered benefits fraud in Minnesota first charged under Merrick Garland’s DOJ.
But Jeanine Pirro did. She want on social media and repeated the apparent miscitation of Cole’s own words I laid out here, treating a comment made in the present tense this month — “I really don’t like either party at this point” — as if it were a comment about his mindset on January 5, 2021.
Unsurprisingly, Cole’s attorneys took note, arguing in their bid for bail that the “government-induced excitement” around Cole’s arrest should not factor into bail consideration and in fact is a violation of local rules about prejudicing a case.
The government-induced excitement around the arrest of Mr. Cole should not take this Court’s focus away from two essential principles of law that govern bail hearings.1
1 Indeed the U.S. Attorney has made numerous comments in contravention of Local Criminal Rule 57.7(b), specifically concerning the “existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by the accused” ((b)(3)(ii)) and “opinion[s] as to the accused’s guilt or innocence or as to the merits of the case or the evidence in the case” ((b)(3)(vi)). See https://abcnews.go.com/US/pipe-bomb-suspect-disappointed -2020-election-results-us/story?id=128157568 (U.S. Attorney Pirro telling the media that based on the evidence, it is “unmistakable” that Mr. Cole is guilty and that “[t]his guy was an equal opportunity bomber.”); see also https://www.facebook.com/judgeje aninepirro/posts/my-office-has-filed-court-documents-that-brian-cole-jr-accusedofplacing-pipe-b/1424070829083142/ (U.S. Attorney Pirro posting on Facebook that Mr. Cole “has admitted that he was responsible for the devices and gave a detailed confession to the charged offenses”).
The rest of their opposition memo provides mere hints of how or whether they might defend this case.
It describes the evidence against Cole as circumstantial evidence of past guilt, not proof of ongoing risk at issue in the present.
The government’s showing is entirely retrospective and circumstantial. Even if credited, the government’s evidence describes an isolated window on a single evening nearly four years ago. It does not point to a “pattern of troubling activity” that would typically warrant detention in other cases. Klein, 539 F. Supp. 3d at 155. No device detonated, and the government has not alleged any comparable conduct or dangerous affiliations in the years since. This circumstantial proof—absent a direct forensic tie or evidence of ongoing threats—cannot overcome the Bail Reform Act’s default in favor of release subject to appropriate conditions. See Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1283 (The “threat [to the community] must also be considered in context.”).
It describes the pipe bombs as having “weapon characteristics,” perhaps questioning whether they really were functioning bombs at all.
According to the affidavit, both devices were rendered safe by the U.S. Capitol Police and later assessed by the FBI Laboratory to have “weapon characteristics,” with components consistent with improvised explosive devices.
It cites relevant DC Circuit opinions on pretrial release that just happen to be January 6 cases, here, Federico Klein — the former Trump State Department official with ties to Argentina’s fascist governments who was released on pretrial bail but ultimately sentenced to 70 months in prison — and Eric Munchel (AKA the Zip Tie Guy), whose pretrial release set the standard for many other January 6 defendants, but who was ultimately sentenced to 57 months in prison. Elsewhere the filing cites Bruno Cua, who was sentenced to just a year in prison after his pretrial release, largely because he was so young and impressionable during the events at hand.
All three, of course, have since been pardoned.
But Cole’s attorneys don’t mention those back stories to the detention precedents which must be applied to Cole too. Nor do they explain what they mean when they say the specific conditions that led young Bruno Cua to stalk the halls of the Capitol created a “specific risk profile for Mr. Cole,” just like it did Cua.
Finally, the unique conditions surrounding January 5–6, 2021, are unlikely to recur in a way that would present the same risk profile for Mr. Cole.
But that comment suggests they’re skeptical — perhaps have already seen reason to be skeptical — that Cole was telling the truth when he asserted there was no tie between his alleged planting of the pipe bombs and January 6, as the government’s detention memo asserts but does not quote directly.
They have reason to do that, of course. If planting the pipe bombs was part of January 6, then Cole may already have been pardoned, just like Klein and Munchel and Cua.
They do, however, confirm that Cole has been diagnosed with being on the spectrum.
Mr. Cole is an African American adult who has been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder, Level 1 and with obsessive compulsive disorder;
The only sign that today’s combined detention hearing and preliminary hearing, scheduled for 1PM before a Magistrate Judge who presided over only a (relative) handful of January 6 cases, might harbor some surprises is a repeat of their more explicit demand in a different filing that DOJ prove probable cause.
The defense understands that the detention hearing will begin with preliminary discussions that concern whether a rebuttable presumption that Mr. Cole should be detained arises in this case. The defense’s position is that the government cannot continue to keep Mr. Cole in custody absent a valid finding of probable cause.
One reason to do that is it raises the bar on pretrial detention.
True, the Bail Reform Act creates a rebuttable presumption “that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure . . . the safety of the community if . . . there is probable cause to believe that the person committed” one of an enumerated list of crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2). But for purposes of making that determination, “[a] grand jury indictment, by itself” is what establishes the probable cause “to believe that a defendant committed the crime with which he is charged.” Taylor, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 62 (quoting Stone, 608 F.3d at 945); see also United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he indictment alone would have been enough to raise the rebuttable presumption that no condition would reasonably assure the safety of the community.”)
But who knows. There might be more.
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May 9, 2025: NYT considers Stephen Miller’s (thus far, at least, abandoned) attack on habeas corpus
May 30, 2025: NYT traces Stephen Miller’s Salvadoran operation to his obsession with the Alien Enemies Act
June 14, 2025: Guardian considers how the invasion of Los Angeles might be viewed as revenge
June 20, 2025: WSJ describes how thoroughly Miller guides Trump’s White House
June 25, 2025: ProPublica talks about Miller’s attempt to centralize investigations into organized crime
July 7, 2025: Jason Zengerle compares Miller’s failures in the first term with his successes in this one, while considering what might halt that success
September 15, 2025: Bulwark discusses Miller’s plan to exploit Charlie Kirk’s killing
October 9, 2025: John Harwood argues Miller is uniquely fascist
November 28, 2025: Andrew Egger and Catherine Rampell discuss his latest devious plans to strip work permits
December 15, 2025: Greg Sargent reviews his xenophobic plans
December 18, 2025: WaPo describes how he started with a plan to attack Mexico but instead murderboated Venezuelans
There are more I’m still searching for; I’ll add them when I find links.
There has even been reporting on the weird relations the Trump administration has pursued with Venezuela, first sending Ric Grenell to negotiate and then moving an entire fleet to murderboat Venezuela into submission. The Atlantic’s version of the latter describes that, “Stephen Miller views the air strikes as an opportunity to paint immigrants as a dangerous menace” — murder as propaganda tactic.
There were reports when the Venezuelan men were sent home in July as part of a prisoner swap for ten Americans.
But in spite of the sustained focus on Stephen Miller, the CECOT operation, and Trump’s turn to Venezuela, I’m aware of no story that explains how — much less why — the Administration shifted from staging stunts in the Oval Office with Nayib Bukele and claiming Trump is helpless to do anything about the men he sent to torture, to instead sending them all to Venezuela as part of a purported prisoner swap.
To be sure, there’s a sense of what could explain the move.
Maybe Trump’s team just used the Salvadoran concentration camp to pressure Nicolás Maduro to accept its own deportees. Maybe the sustained focus on the prison — to say nothing of coverage of witnesses who tied Bukele to MS-13 — created problems for the Salvadoran strongman. Maybe the attention on Kilmar Abrego and his release raised pressure to release the others. Maybe one or two of the Americans stuck in Venezuela were that valuable to the Administration to make the swap worthwhile (aside from the ex-Marine triple murderer freed as a result of the swap, there has been far less focus on the Americans who were released than on the Venezuelans the US sent away). Maybe after John Sauer was confirmed in early April and he reviewed the paperwork — to say nothing of SCOTUS’ intervention on Easter weekend to prevent another AEA deportation operation — Miller was informed that his AEA deportations would be unsustainable even with a court packed to support Trump.
All of those are possible. None have been substantiated in reliable reporting.
And as a result, we don’t know what it looks like when one of Stephen Miller’s most extreme experiments with fascism fails. Aside from the public reporting on tensions between Grenell and Marco Rubio, there’s no discussion of whether Stephen Miller also lost out in a political dispute and if so how, or whether he was just placated by the opportunity to serially murderboat Latinos as a consolation prize.
Even the Administration is hiding how this went down. When the government told its story, as part of Judge Boasberg’s since re-halted contempt inquiry, of how it blew off Boasberg’s order to return the flights to El Salvador back in March, they did not include Stephen Miller in that story.
1. At approximately 6:45 PM on March 15, 2025, the Court orally directed counsel for the Government to inform his clients of the Court’s oral directives at the hearing, including statements directing that any removed class members “need to be returned to the United States.” By that point, two flights carrying individuals designated under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) had already departed from the United States and were outside United States territory and airspace.
2. At approximately 7:25 PM, the Court memorialized its temporary restraining order in a written order, as the Court had indicated at the hearing it would do. The written order enjoined Defendants “from removing” class members pursuant to the AEA. The written order, unlike the oral directives, said nothing about returning class members who had already been removed.
3. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Drew Ensign promptly conveyed both this Court’s oral directives and its written order to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through its Office of General Counsel, and to the leadership of the Department of Justice (DOJ).
4. Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche and Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove provided DHS with legal advice regarding the Court’s order as to flights that had left the United States before the order issued, through DHS Acting General Counsel Joseph Mazzara. Mr. Mazzara then conveyed that legal advice, as well as his own legal advice, to Secretary of Homeland Security, Kristi Noem. See 6 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1)(J). After receiving that legal advice, Secretary Noem directed that the AEA detainees who had been removed from the United States before the Court’s order could be transferred to the custody of El Salvador. As explained below, that decision was lawful and was consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the Court’s order.
5. Although the substance of the legal advice given to DHS and Secretary Noem is privileged, the Government has repeatedly explained in its briefs—both in this Court and on appeal—why its actions did not violate the Court’s order, much less constitute contempt. Specifically, the Court’s written order did not purport to require the return of detainees who had already been removed, and the earlier oral directive was not a binding injunction, especially after the written order.
It all happened without any involvement from Stephen Miller, if you can believe that.
There’s certainly reason to believe that if Erez Reuveni told his side of the story (testimony that was also thwarted by the DC Circuit’s renewed stay of the contempt proceeding), these redacted bits might disclose the role of the White House in the decision.
But in spite of all the profiles describing — credibly, to be sure — that Miller is really the one running most policy out of the White House, the government has gone to some lengths to avoid confirming that in legal contexts, perhaps for all the legal problems that would arise if Trump had to explain how he’s not the one who signed the Alien Enemies Act.
In mid-March, after Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents (ICE) shackled and herded 238 immigrants onto transport planes and flew them to a notoriously brutal Salvadoran prison. According to Trump, the men were members of Tren de Aragua, a violent Venezuelan gang, but the evidence was sketchy (often based on tattoos alone). Most had committed no serious crimes; one, Kilmar Abrego Garcia, was deported by mistake, the Trump administration admitted.
“I will concede that we’ve got to look harder at our process for deportation,” Wiles told me at the time.
When we spoke again in April, in cities across the country, masked ICE agents were snatching people off the street, throwing them in vans, and zip-tying and frog-marching them into makeshift deportation camps. Many were US citizens or entitled to be here. (ProPublica documented 170 cases in the first nine months of 2025 of US citizens being caught up in ICE’s dragnet.)
“If somebody is a known gang member who has a criminal past, and you’re sure, and you can demonstrate it, it’s probably fine to send them to El Salvador or whatever,” Wiles told me. “But if there is a question, I think our process has to lean toward a double-check.” But as the usa.gov site itself notes, “In some cases, a noncitizen is subject to expedited removal without being able to attend a hearing in immigration court.”
But there’s no hint that the Administration as a whole shares the opinion attributed to Wiles, and Miller’s other abusive deportations have continued with no pause.
Photographer Christopher Anderson’s two descriptions of taking that photograph of Miller, which Vanity Fair sandwiched right in the middle of the El Salvador discussion, may be one of the few pieces of journalism describing Miller’s vulnerabilities.
What is the encounter you remember most?
For me the most interesting encounter for the day was with Stephen Miller. I find him to be a really interesting character on many levels, both at this moment in time and just what he represents and how he carries himself. He’s not someone who’s been photographed a lot in this way. So he was clearly a little bit nervous about sitting for a portrait, and he asked a lot of questions. “Why are you doing this? Why are you shooting film as opposed to shooting digital? Why do you know what that thing does? And how does it look? How am I? How do I look sitting here? Does it look like I’m slouching?” And at one point, I said to him, “you know, the people may say a lot of things about you, but slouching is not one of the things they will accuse you of.” And at the end of the session he comes up to me to say goodbye, and he says, “You know, you have a lot of power in the discretion you use to be kind to people,” meaning kind to people in my pictures. And I looked at him, and I said, “Yeah, you know, you do too.” It was interesting to me, his reaction. But just being in that place is in itself a fascinating experience, to be kind of within the halls of that kind of power, but yet to see it that it is a little bit [like] the Wizard of Oz behind the curtain. The place is small and shabby and you see paint marks on the wall, the wiring is done in a shabby way, and the desks can be messy, and it’s—I guess it’s a little bit like looking at middle management at a lot of companies.
[snip]
Is there anything the readers haven’t yet noticed in your pictures?
There’s the one Easter egg that I hoped people might see, and maybe they are starting to see a little bit, is that I had Stephen Miller sit underneath one of the oil paintings in the Roosevelt Room that is a beautiful depiction of Native Americans crossing a river on horseback to return to their teepee village home. It was one of those things that—I found it to be kind of interesting and maybe incongruous, that I thought might be picked up on. Go look, go look for it.
But while a bunch of the Miller profiles talk about how powerful he is (most have sources protected by further anonymity describing how much some portion of Republicans in Congress hate him), few to none talk about what a Miller setback in this administration looks like.
I’ve been thinking about that as part of my year-end inventory of what we’ve learned this year.
To halt Trump’s worst abuses, Stephen Miller must be made toxic — which is not hard to do, at least not if people are granted anonymity. The costs his bigotry causes — the dollar signs, the trade-offs the monomaniacal implementing of his bigotry entails, the human cost of prioritizing bigotry over saving children from sexual assault — must be made visible.
But it would also become necessary to understand what confluence of events could lead Miller to experience a policy setback. Preferably not just one setback, but all of them, a collapse of his near-monopoly on the President’s ear and therefore on policy.
Contrary to his well-curated press, Stephen Miller is not omnipotent. His slovenly execution makes him even more vulnerable. He hates when his physical tics are visible; he probably also hates that his paunch appears in that same photo.
His long-planned bid to use the Alien Enemies Act to deport men based off soccer tattoos to be indefinitely tortured failed.
And we don’t know how or why it failed.
Update: This NYT story fills in some of the circumstances surrounding these events — describing a team that makes shit up on the fly, excludes experts, and then changes their mind months later. At its core is a flipflop (or perhaps cynical manipulation of Cuban-American legislators) on Chevron’s license to export oil from Venezuela.
It began when Cuban American lawmakers pressed Mr. Trump early this year to end Chevron’s Biden-era confidential license. After Mr. Trump and Mr. Rubio announced in late February that they would do so, Mr. Maduro stopped accepting deportation flights of Venezuelans. Mr. Maduro had agreed to them on Jan. 31 with Richard Grenell, a special envoy for Mr. Trump.
Chevron’s chief executive, Mike Wirth, lobbied the administration for a license extension, speaking to Mr. Trump several times over the coming months.
The Cuban American lawmakers got wind that the license could be extended, and they threatened to withhold their votes for Mr. Trump’s signature legislation, “the One Big Beautiful Bill.”
At the Oval Office meeting in late May, Mr. Trump told Mr. Rubio and Mr. Miller that he needed to get the bill passed. But he said he had heard about the downsides of ending the license, including that Chinese companies would take over Chevron’s stakes, said an official.
The president demanded options. That was when Mr. Miller offered to help. He had been nurturing his ideas for mass deportations and boat strikes.
Mr. Trump did not renew Chevron’s license when it expired on May 27. His domestic policy bill passed Congress five weeks later.
The president held a series of White House meetings on whether to strike at Venezuela. At one in the early summer that included Mr. Rubio, Mr. Miller and Mr. Grenell, Mr. Rubio argued that Mr. Maduro was a drug kingpin, a characterization that appeared to stick with Mr. Trump, an official said.
In late July, Mr. Trump reversed course on Chevron’s license. He ordered the Treasury Department to issue one with revised terms. That happened around the time Mr. Maduro freed 10 American prisoners in exchange for the more than 250 Venezuelans that the Trump administration had sent to CECOT, the Salvadoran prison. And Mr. Trump had been swayed by Mr. Wirth’s argument that Chevron was a bulwark against China.
But behind the scenes, Mr. Trump set a course for confrontation. On July 25, he signed a secret order telling the Pentagon to take action against drug-trafficking groups, putting in motion the targeting of Venezuelans.
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On Tuesday, Trump’s White House got Marc Caputo to write a credulous column platforming their laughable claims that they’re not responsible for how chaotic the release of the Epstein files has been, that the whole Epstein thing is just unfair to poor Donald Trump. Caputo’s column — the dutiful repetition of even ridiculous claims — is a read of Trump’s own perception of the challenge before him.
But before Caputo got to Trump’s flimsy excuses and the more damning detail — that the White House had taken over DOJ’s Xitter account — he started with his headline scoop: He allowed his sources to claim that the pain of this release will last one more week (that is, a week from Tuesday).
Only one more week.
Scoop: Trump administration expects Epstein files release could last another week
The Trump administration estimates it has about one week to go — and as many as 700,000 more pages to review — before it finishes releasing all the Jeffrey Epstein files.
[snip]
This will end soon,” another official said. “The conspiracy theories won’t.”
Imagine putting that prediction in writing!
The prediction lasted less than a day.
Even at the time, CNN was reporting that SDFL’s US Attorney’s Office has just solicited “volunteers” to work over the holiday to make this a one-week story.
The Justice Department’s leadership asked career prosecutors in Florida to volunteer over the “next several days” to help redact the Epstein files, in the latest Trump administration push toward releasing the hundreds of thousands of photos, internal memos and other evidence around the late convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein.
A supervising prosecutor in the Southern District of Florida’s US Attorney’s Office emailed the entire district office on Tuesday — two days before Christmas — announcing an “emergency request from the [Deputy Attorney General’s] office the SDFL must assist with,” according to a copy of the email reviewed by CNN. “We need AUSAs to do remote document review and redactions related to the Epstein files,” the email said.
Then, DOJ explained why they needed the volunteers: they (claim they) just discovered a million more pages.
This thing won’t be done in a week or even a month. And the people smoking Caputo need to understand that’s partly due to Todd Blanche’s incompetence, and partly due to the stuff that is a cover-up.
You’re likely to disagree with this opinion, because conventional wisdom on the left holds that the chaos of the Jeffrey Epstein releases to date reflects an attempted cover-up. But the chaos we’re seeing in the Jeffrey Epstein release is not (yet), primarily, a cover-up — though DOJ is flouting the law in ways that will create further scandal that may be entirely unrelated to protecting Donald Trump.
What you’re seeing is incompetence — frankly, the same incompetence we’ve seen from day one on Trump’s efforts to corral the Epstein conspiracy theories which his followers thrive.
Consider the things that have been identified as evidence of an imagined cover-up:
Documents from a civil lawsuit published to docket at different times, adopting different standards of redaction, and therefore revealing accusations against Trump in just one of them
These actually could be readily explainable (and, indeed, all three fit one of the five rules on how to read Epstein files that Ankush Khardori offered on the day of the release — understand what kind of files you’re reading, and the biases people harbor or lies people will tell). For example, if DOJ had released the files with an inventory of the kinds of things the release would include, and the known reliability issues with various kinds of documents, then people might have been prepared to treat the claims made in civil suits with some skepticism. If DOJ had released the alleged Epstein letter with FBI’s own analysis of it, it would have persuaded people that the letter is a fake, if it is.
But DOJ did not do that.
Instead, Todd Blanche sat for a softball interview with Kristen Welker in which he did the following:
Falsely claimed that the delay in responding arose from any concern for the survivors
Guaranteed that all mention of Trump would be unredacted
Alluded to the real reasons for overredaction, which Welker of course ignored
Repeated his past bullshit excuses for letting Ghislaine Maxwell lie to his face with impunity before getting moved to Club Fed and getting a puppy
[Unrelatedly, but still problematically, falsely claimed politicized prosecutions did not involve Trump]
The key answer here was Blanche’s claim that DOJ needs to redact for reasons other than protecting victims.
KRISTEN WELKER:
Well, you’re talking about protecting the victims. The law directed the Justice Department to “release internal DOJ communications including emails, memos, meeting notes concerning decisions to charge, not charge, investigate or decline to investigate Epstein or his associates.” That’s the crux of what many of the victims or the survivors say they want to see. Why wasn’t that information prioritized in the first release, Mr. Blanche?
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL TODD BLANCHE:
Well, first of all it was. And there are numerous documents released on Friday that address what you just quoted from, from the statute that address internal communications within the Department of Justice and internal communications between law enforcement and the Department of Justice. But it’s for the same reason. Because many of those internal communications talk about victims. Many of those internal back and forths between prosecutors and law enforcement talk about victims and their stories. And that has to be redacted. And by the way, everybody expects us to redact that. So the same complaints that we’re hearing yesterday and even this morning from Democrats and from others screaming loudly from a hill about lack of production on Friday, imagine if we had released tons of information around victims? That would be the true crime. That would be the true wrong. And if anybody out there, I heard Congressman Raskin, the Democrat on the House Oversight Committee, releasing statements accusing Attorney General Bondi, Director Patel and myself of not doing our jobs. If they have an issue with me protecting victims, they know how to get a hold of me. But we’re not going to stop doing it.
[snip]
KRISTEN WELKER:
Okay. Let’s delve more deeply into the redactions. Is any information about President Trump redacted in any of the files that have or will be released?
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL TODD BLANCHE:
No. Not unless it’s supposed to be redacted under the law, which means victim information or any sort of privilege like attorney-client privilege. But I have no reason to believe that the lawyers that are working on this case were talking about President Trump. Because he had nothing to do with the Epstein files. He had nothing to do with the horrific crimes that Mr. Epstein committed. And so I don’t expect there will be anything redacted. But the short answer is we are not redacting information around President Trump, around any other individual involved with Mr. Epstein. And that narrative, which is not based on fact at all, is completely false. [my emphasis]
There aer several problems for Todd Blanche’s claim that there are other reasons that DOJ can redact information — he mentions attorney-client privilege, but that could quickly expand to executive privilege (indeed, elsewhere in the interview he asserts he’ll never share his communications with Trump) or deliberative. The files are also being released with every DOJ identity redacted, including Audrey Strauss and Geoffrey Berman. That may have the temporary advantage, for DOJ, of hiding who was complicit in the sweetheart deal in 2007 and which real champions of the victims, like Maurene Comey, Trump fired right in this middle of this realease.
The problem for Blanche is that judges have already ruled (in unsealing grand jury materials) that the transparency law supersedes other protections.
The Act requires disclosure of Epstein grand jury materials by requiring disclosure of “all unclassified records, documents, communications, and investigative materials.” Id. “All” is crystal clear and should be afforded its “ordinary, common-sense meaning.” … (where Congress was aware of a category and did not exclude the category from the statute, that category is covered).
And so Congress will go to Richard Berman and argue that by withholding privileged or deliberative documents or even prosecutors’ names, DOJ is not complying with the law, and they’ll have precedent on their side.
Shit, Trump will be lucky if this only goes on for another month and not twelve.
The question Welker did not ask but should have is why DOJ is stuck doing this at the last minute if the FBI conducted an even bigger review of the files back in March. Why is DOJ in a mad rush to protect survivors now? Why wasn’t DOJ protecting survivors in March?
And the answer to that question is that, obviously, that earlier review was focused not on victims but on a political calculation: would the release of pictures of Bill Clinton in a public hotel pool in Brunei (which is what got released last week) outweigh the damage of files implicating Trump and his friends (starting with Les Wexner who was named as a potential co-conspirator in some documents already released), and that the conclusion of that earlier review, in July, was that this could not be weaponized like everything else, and so Trump and Todd Blanche personally attempted to pressure Congress to prevent this release at all costs but failed, which is why they’re stuck doing a second last minute review after the earlier one in March.
And eventually, all that — including whatever lists they made in March that Blanche probably hopes to shield under claims of privilege — should be ripe for release under the law. The incompetence of this first release will lead to iterative later releases.
Which brings us to the excuses Caputo platformed. As he describes, everyone is just exasperated, because how dare people take top Trump supporters like Charlie Kirk and Jack Posobiec and Benny Johnson and Kash Patel and Dan Bongino seriously when they focus on these files?
Behind the scenes: There’s a palpable sense of exasperation and annoyance in the administration about all of the headlines pertaining to Trump and Epstein and the inability to explain everything and just get the disclosure done.
“It’s a combination of extreme frustration at everything: at what Congress did, at our response to it, and a concern that it won’t go away,” an official said.
“There’s also a little bit of indignation at the media — that this wasn’t even a story for years and years. And now, not only is it a story, but the top of many news pages on a given day.”
How dare Trump’s trolls make this a huge story?!?!?!?!
This remains the problem with Blanche’s actions and everyone else’s. They’re misunderstanding that this is the scandal they rode in on.
They can’t just rely on past tools — like weaponization, like focusing on Clinton (as Trump attempted in his most recent wail about Epstein).
Because the Epstein scandal exists not because of anything Jamie Raskin or Ro Khanna did. The Epstein scandal exists because the conspiracism of it is the core of Trump’s power. Epstein conspiracy theories were always non-falsifiable (which I wrote about here and here and a bunch of other places).
And by attempting to bulldoze Congress on the big issues — on DOJ’s own prerogatives — Todd Blanche is only going to make things worse by creating new scandals.
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