The Anti-Democracy Project Of John Roberts

Trump v. CASA Inc., decided June 27, continues the personal project of John Roberts to enhance the power of the executive at the expense of the other two branches of government. It continues the work of Trump v. United States,  where Roberts gave Trump almost unlimited power to ignore Congress as he sees fit. It follows his weakening of statutes he doesn’t like, his refusal to allow Biden to exercise the authority given him by Congress, as in the student loan case, Biden v. Nebraska, and many other cases.

This post will show how these cases weaken the legislature and the judiciary while strengthening the President. That is profoundly anti-democratic.

Trump v. United States

Here’s a reasonably fair summary of Trump v. United States, which I offer because I refuse to pretend to be neutral about it and don’t seem to be able to make myself read it again anyway.  Read the real thing if you can; it’s a breath-taking demonstration of judicial hubris, based on the ridiculous idea that these six rogues can create a rule for the ages, and the even dumber idea that what this nation really needs is a “vigorous” president, unafraid to push against the boundaries of the law as set by the legislature and judicial precedent.

Trump v. CASA Inc.

This case is a government request for relief from nationwide injunctions barring enforcement of the obviously unconstitutional Trump executive order denying birthright citizenship to a large number of babies born here, causing untold damage to them and their families and inflicting untold costs on the states.

The Dissent filed by Ketanji Brown Jackson gives a clear picture of the case.

It is important to recognize that the Executive’s bid to vanquish so-called “universal injunctions” is, at bottom, a request for this Court’s permission to engage in unlawful behavior. When the Government says “do not allow the lower courts to enjoin executive action universally as a remedy for unconstitutional conduct,” what it is actually saying is that the Executive wants to continue doing something that a court has determined violates the Constitution— please allow this.

Snip

To hear the majority tell it, this suit raises a mind-numbingly technical query: Are universal injunctions “sufficiently ‘analogous’ to the relief issued ‘by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act’” to fall within the equitable authority Congress granted federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789? Ante, at 6. But that legalese is a smokescreen. It obscures a far more basic question of enormous legal and practical significance: May a federal court in the United States of America order the Executive to follow the law?

Speaking for the anti-democratic majority, Amy Coney Barrett says no. The courts cannot order the Executive to follow the law unless that is necessary to provide complete relief to the parties to the litigation. Her “reasoning” is that the Judiciary Act doesn’t allow a court to give relief to a non-party. Why? Because such relief would not have been allowed under the English Common Law.

Art. III, §1 of the Constitution provides in part as follows:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.

Barrett says that the judicial power of the United States is limited to the powers of the English High Court of Chancery in 1789. That’s absurd. In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court held that it had the final say on Constitutional questions. That is not true under English law, and certainly not for Courts of Chancery.

Barrett cites Marbury once;

See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) (concluding that James Madison had violated the law but holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus ordering him to follow it).

The Wikipedia entry explains that the Court in Marbury first held that the Judiciary Act gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases of mandamus. That was greater than the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court granted in Article III. Therefore that section of the Judiciary Act was unconstitutional, and was struck down. Marbury specifically holds that mandamus would be appropriate, but that it would have to proceed through a trial court. Does that sound like Barrett’s citation? No it does not.

Under Barrett’s holding, it is not clear exactly how the judicial branch is to act as a check on the executive branch. There is some discussion about class actions and other techniques. But there is no certainty. Perhaps the decisive factor is this:

Finally, the Government must show a likelihood that it will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. When a federal court enters a universal injunction against the Government, it “improper[ly] intru[des]” on “a coordinate branch of the Government” and prevents the Government from enforcing its policies against nonparties. That is enough to justify interim relief. Cite omitted.

In other words, the only harm that matters on injunctive relief is the government’s. The damage to everyone else, to every person in the same position as the named parties, is irrelevant. The damage done to the rule of law by allowing a patently unconstitutional and immoral harm is irrelevant.

Comparing Trump v. CASA Inc. and Trump v. United States

1. In both cases, SCOTUS ignores the facts of the case. The indictment in Trump v. United States said that Trump conspired to overturn an election, and laid out substantial factual allegations to support the claim. Roberts natters on about core powers and such, ignoring the fact that there are no circumstances in which overturning an election is a core executive anything.

In CASA, Barrett ignores the damage Trump and his henchmen do by imposing a blatantly unconstitutional policy on non-parties.

2 In both cases SCOTUS imposes an outcome that favors one political party. In Trump v. United States the decision favors Trump. There is no reasonable observer who thinks this would have been the outcome if that indictment had been charged against a Democrat.

In CASA, Barrett says that Gorsuch, Alito, Thomas, and Kavanaugh had previously raised questions about nationwide injunctions, including those levied against the Biden administration. Either she or Roberts or both could have joined with those four to deal with the problem in any of the cases raised by Biden. But no. Then, suddenly, a few weeks after Trump’s second term begins, they both decide this is an important Constitutional issue that must be totally resolved in favor of Trump and the Republicans.

3. In both cases, the power of the coordinate branches of government is weakened. In Trump v. United States, Roberts strangled the power of Congress to control the actions of the President. The holding makes it clear that Trump is entitled to do whatever he wants with the powers given him by law, and can only be held accountable under highly limited circumstance, to be determined later by him and his crew.

The decision also weakened the power of the judiciary to check the executive branch. It gave no guidance to lower courts or prosecutors. It sets itself up as the arbiter, a role it can easily duck. It insures vast delays in any effort to enforce the law against a criminal president.

The opinion in In CASA weakens the power of the judiciary to check the actions of a lawless executive branch, this time directly. It also weakened the power of Congress. Existing laws can only be enforced piecemeal against a lawless president.

In both cases, the power of the President is exalted above all other considerations.

The attack on democracy

Both cases should be seen as part of a decades-long attack on democracy. The legislature is the most democratic branch. It is closest to the citizenry, even given the undemocratic makeup of the Senate. Reducing the power of Congress reduces the influence of voters. By weakening the judiciary, the anti-democratic forces insure that the actions of a lawless executive cannot be controlled.

These aren’t the only attacks by SCOTUS though. The Voting Rights Act was expressly intended to improve our democracy. Roberts struck it down, finding that there is an implicit statute of limitations in the Reconstruction Amendments.

The recent invention of the so-called major questions doctrine weakens the power of the legislature to deal with emergencies. The attacks by SCOTUS on the administrative state are designed to increase the power of the president despite the explicit intent of Congress. Does anyone think Congress would have empowered Trump to decide on the toxicity of lead or the value of specific vaccines? Does anyone think letting Trump direct prosecutions and criminal investigations is a reasonable thing to do?

It’s not just that Roberts and his gang refuse to protect our rights. They actively help Trump destroy our rights.

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Open Thread: End of 2024-2025 Term, The Last Decisions

[NB: check the byline, thanks. /~Rayne]

We are finally at the end of this torturous SCOTUS term with six decisions expected today.

The most important in my opinion is Trump v. CASA, regarding the reach of a lower court order with regard to Trump’s ban on birthright citizenship.

Today’s decisions follow below and will be added to this post as released; any shadow docket decisions released today will follow in an update at the bottom of this post.

~ ~ ~

Trump v. CASA Inc. — Justice Barrett wrote the 6-3 decision, with the court breaking along ideological lines. Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissent for her, Kagan, and Jackson; Jackson also wrote a dissent.
See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24a884_8n59.pdf

This case centered on district court decisions in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington blocking enforcement of Trump’s executive order banning birthright citizenship to persons born in the US depending on the status of their parents’ citizenship. SCOTUS in essence said district courts can only write orders narrowed to the case though birthright citizenship has been recognized since the passage of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.

Kennedy v. Braidwood Management — Justice Kavanaugh delivered this 6-3 decision; Thomas wrote the dissent which Alito and Gorsuch joined.
See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-316_869d.pdf

This case arose from right-wing Christianist attacks on preventative health care under ACA like PrEP intended to prevent HIV infection; they claimed it infringed on their religious rights “by making them complicit in facilitating homosexual behavior, drug use, and sexual activity outside of marriage between one man and one woman.” (Never mind any first responders who might be on PrEP to protect themselves from incidental exposure.) The attack focused on the Appointment Clause attempting to sever the relationship between subordinate officers empaneled by HHS and policy execution; the case has had enormous repercussions affecting other preventative care under ACA.

Federal Communications Commission v. Consumers’ Research — Justice Kagan has the 6-3 decision; Gorsuch filed the dissent which Thomas and Alito joined.
See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-354_0861.pdf

summary TK

Mahmoud v. Taylor— Justice Alito wrote the 6-3 decision; Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed the dissent, joined by Kagan and Jackson.

See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-297_4f14.pdf

summary TK

Free Speech Coalition Inc. v. Paxton — Justice Thomas has the 6-3 decision; Justice Kagan filed a dissent joined by Sotomayor and Jackson.
See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1122_3e04.pdf

summary TK – though I must add RTFN:

Held: H. B. 1181 triggers, and survives, review under intermediate scrutiny because it only incidentally burdens the protected speech of
adults. Pp. 5–36.

Fuck any Free Speech rights minors may have, or the school district’s rights to determine PUBLIC SCHOOL curriculum because of right-wing Christianist freaks.

Louisiana v. Callais — This case was rescheduled for re-argument. Justice Thomas disagrees with this rescheduling and issued a dissent documenting his rationale.
See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-109_l53m.pdf

summary TK

Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic — This case appears to have been pushed out to next week.

summary TK

I assume we’ll get any shadow docket cases next week as well, but I could be wrong; the last decisions weren’t all released today after all and I thought incorrectly they would be.

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Open Thread: SCOTUS Decisions, End of Term Ahead

[NB: check the byline, thanks. /~Rayne]

This is the last week of the 2024-2025 term for the Supreme Court. SCOTUS is expected to release multiple decisions at least twice this week; what follows is the first batch.

As mentioned last week, the big decision we are waiting for with the end of this term is Trump v. CASA Inc. regarding nationwide injunctions blocking executive orders, in this particular case related to birthright citizenship.

Decisions released (these summaries from Marcy — Rayne is busy):

Hewitt v. US: 5-4 Jackson decision upholds First Step Act sentencing.

Medina v. Planned Parenthood: 6-3 Republican opinion rules that private plaintiffs can’t enforce Medicaid provision.

Guttierrez v. Saenz: 6-3 Sotomayor opinion, fascists in dissent, rules for death row inmate on DNA testing procedures.

Riley v. Bondi: 5-4 Alito ruling narrowing review in immigration case.

All remaining opinions will be released tomorrow.

 

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Open Thread: SCOTUS Decisions, Friday Edition

[NB: check the byline, thanks. /~Rayne]

We’re still in the end-of-term desk clearing zone at the Supreme Court. SCOTUS released a whopping six decisions today.

Decisions released:

FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co.
Justice Barrett lead the 7-2 decision.
See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1187_olp1.pdf

Esteras v. United States
Justice Barrett also lead this 7-2 decision with Justice Alito and Gorsuch dissenting.
See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-7483_6k4c.pdf

McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation
Justice Kavanaugh wrote the 6-3 decision.
See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1226_1a72.pdf

Diamond Alternative Energy LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency
Surprisingly, Justice Kavanaugh wrote this 7-2 decision and not Thomas who wrote Wednesday’s two decisions related to the EPA.
See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-7_8m58.pdf

Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida
Justice Gorsuch lead this 7-2 decision, although concurrence and dissent are a bit of a mish-mash:

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which BARRETT, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined as to Parts III and IV, except for n. 12.

See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-997_6579.pdf — you might want to read this one closely as it pertains to disability rights and nearly all of us at some point in our lives has been employed and been/will be disabled.

Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion.
See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-20_f2bh.pdf

Of these six decisions I note that Justice Kagan wrote one dissent joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson in the matter of McLaughlin Chiropractic. She’s otherwise joined the conservatives. Hmm.

In my opinion, the big decision we are waiting for with the end of the term is Trump v. CASA Inc. regarding nationwide injunctions blocking executive orders, in this particular case related to birthright citizenship.

That this decision has not already been released disturbs me; it feels like Roberts is holding it off until SCOTUS can make a clean getaway at the very end of the term next week. But is Roberts preparing to flee the wrath of Trump and his Wormtongue Miller, or the wrath of the people?

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Open Thread: SCOTUS Decisions

[NB: check the byline, thanks. /~Rayne]

It’s desk clearing time at the Supreme Court with the end of its annual term looming ahead. SCOTUS will dump a bunch of decisions in a short time frame beginning today.

Decisions released today:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas
Justice Brett Kavanaugh has 6-3 decision. See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1300_b97c.pdf
With this decision SCOTUS overturned the Fifth Circuit which had vacated a license granted to a private waste handler that wanted to build a nuclear waste facility in Texas, permitted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This decision is contrary to Texas state law but hinged on challenge by a nonparty.

Environmental Protection Agency v. Calumet Shreveport Refining
Justice Clarence Thomas has the decision. See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1229_c0ne.pdf
summary to follow

Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency
Justice Clarence Thomas has the decision. See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1067_6j36.pdf
summary to follow

United States v. Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter for Tennessee, et al.
Chief Justice John Roberts has the decision. See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-477_2cp3.pdf
This is revolting, allowing Tennessee to continue to undermine bodily autonomy of a small group of persons because they weren’t born into a false binary. The decision upholds the state of Tennessee’s ban on gender-affirming care for transgender minors because of wretched twistiness regarding “sex” versus “gender” identity.

Updates will follow as summaries are completed and additional information becomes available.

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Harvie Wilkinson Tries To Salvage Trump v. US

Every bad thing that has happened during this lawless administration can be traced to the execrable decision of John Roberts and the Trump Clique in Trump v. US. That certainly includes the rendition of Kilmar Albrego Garcia to a notorious prison in El Salvador; he’s been moved to another prison there. Trump and his henchmen believe that they can lever that decision to justify their outrageous goals. Step one: claim there’s an emergency. Step two: issue a proclamation. Step Three: everything is now just the energetic, vigorous executive dealing with the emergency.

In this case, the “emergency” is the invasion of the US by gangs from Venezuela under the control of an evil dictator. Step two is the invocation of the Alien Enemies Act. Step three is the sudden rendition of several hundred people to foreign prisons, denial of due process required by the Constitution and laws of the US, demands that the Department of Justice defend the action without regard to ethical obligations of all lawyers, and refusal to comply with Court orders. Albrego Garcia isn’t a member of the evil gang but so what? Mistakes happen when you’re being vigorous and energetic.

When Roberts and the Trump Clique saved Trump from accountability in Trump v. US, they never imagined that he might turn on them and on the judiciary so ferociously that the wimp Roberts was forced to issue a limp statement defending the rule of law and the judiciary.

Harvie Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit is trying to show Roberts his error. In his order slapping down the government’s attempt to avoid accountability for its illegal abduction of Abrego Garcia. Wilkinson writes:

“Energy in the [E]xecutive” is much to be respected. FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (1789) (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). It can rescue government from its lassitude and recalibrate imbalances too long left unexamined. The knowledge that executive energy is a perishable quality understandably breeds impatience with the courts. Courts, in turn, are frequently attuned to caution and are often uneasy with the Executive Branch’s breakneck pace.

And the differences do not end there. The Executive is inherently focused upon ends; the Judiciary much more so upon means. Ends are bestowed on the Executive by electoral outcomes. Means are entrusted to all of government, but most especially to the Judiciary by the Constitution itself.

For Wilkinson this is prelude to a discussion of the need for respect between the executive and the judiciary, for which he makes an extraordinary plea.

The reference to Federalist No. 70 is a polite call-back to Trump v. US:

The Framers “sought to encourage energetic, vigorous, decisive, and speedy execution of the laws by placing in the hands of a single, constitutionally indispensable, individual the ultimate authority that, in respect to the other branches, the Constitution divides among many.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 712 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). They “deemed an energetic executive essential to ‘the protection of the community against foreign attacks,’ ‘the steady administration of the laws,’ ‘the protection of property,’ and ‘the security of liberty.’ ” Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 223–224 (quoting The Federalist No. 70, p. 471 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)). The purpose of a “vigorous” and “energetic” Executive, they thought, was to ensure “good government,” for a “feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government.” Id., at 471–472.

Roberts, whether out of naiveté or ideological fervor, in substance removed the possibility of judicial control over egregious violations of law. Sonia Sotomayor, writing for the minority, pointed to the mendacity of Roberts’ citation of Federalist No. 70:

The majority’s single-minded fixation on the President’s need for boldness and dispatch ignores the countervailing need for accountability and restraint. The Framers were not so single-minded. In the Federalist Papers, after “endeavor[ing] to show” that the Executive designed by the Constitution “combines ,,, all the requisites to energy,” Alexander Hamilton asked a separate, equally important question: “Does it also combine the requisites to safety, in republican sense, a due dependence on the people, a due responsibility?” The Federalist No. 77, p. 507 (J. Harvard Library ed. 2009). The answer then was yes, based in part upon the President’s vulnerability to “prosecution in the common course of law.” Ibid. The answer after today is no.

Reading Wilkinson in this light shows how he is telling Roberts and the Trump Clique they screwed up and must remedy that by asserting the requirement that energy be restrained and explaining how that restraint is to be enforced. In her dissent in Trump v. US, Ketanji Brown Jackson explains what the idiot majority missed:

Here, I will highlight just two observations about the results … . First, the Court has unilaterally altered the balance of power between the three coordinate branches of our Government as it relates to the Rule of Law, aggrandizing power in the Judiciary and the Executive, to the detriment of Congress. Second, the majority … undermines the constraints of the law as a deterrent for future Presidents who might otherwise abuse their power, to the detriment of us all.

Wilkinson agrees with Jackson at least on the first point. The executive is focused on ends, he says, while the judiciary is focused on means to the end. He says means are set by all three branches of government. He thinks the judiciary is primarily responsible for insuring that the executive is limited to the means provided by law, which leads him to put the judiciary first. But he implicitly acknowledges the role of the legislature in setting  allowable means through laws. This too follows from both Federalist Nos. 70 and 77, which emphasize the power of the people acting through popularly elected legislatures as the protector of the safety of the people from tyrants.

Others have pointed out that Wilkinson is a conservative, and a respected jurist. His opinion should be read as a direct challenge from Roberts’ own ideological team to the foolish decision in Trump v. US. With the astonishing action of SCOTUS in the wee hours today, that message may be starting to sink in for some members of the Trump Clique.

 

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Chuck Grassley Says the FBI Must Combat Sexual Misconduct But the Senate Can Whitewash It

In a piece billed as “analysis” describing why Kash Patel likely faces little Republican opposition, the NYT’s Catie Edmondson chose to quote one after another Republican making false claims about bias from the Bureau:

  • Thom Tillis falsely claiming Patel’s nomination fulfilled Trump’s promise to “enforce our laws equally and fairly”
  • Chuck Grassley lying that the “unprecedented raid of President Trump’s home in Florida” was “to serve a warrant for records” and not conduct a search necessitated by Trump’s earlier obstruction
  • Joni Ernst imagining that Kash’s nomination would “create much-needed transparency at the F.B.I”
  • John Cornyn asserting that “no one should have to go through what President Trump went through by a partisan Department of Justice and F.B.I.,” which he falsely portrayed as a retribution tour launched by Jim Comey
  • Markwayne Mullin imagining that Kash might “actually get them focused on mission, rather than politics”

What the NYT describes but does not factually label is that most of the Republican party either parrots or truly believes Donald Trump’s manufactured claims of victimhood. But unless you describe that those claims that poor Donald Trump has been targeted are false, then you simply participate in the propaganda, blindly performing the same ritual of obeisance the Republican Senators are.

NYT quotes, but does not link, the letter in which Grassley issued his rant. Fact checking the letter (sent the day before Chris Wray announced he would resign, as Grassley demanded) might have provided a way to demonstrate the pile of false claims on which this impression of the FBI was built.

Oh sure, this particular journalist might not have had time to point out that on December 10, Alexander Smirnov answered any questions about the bribery claim he made up against Joe Biden by signing a plea deal (which the NYT wrote up yesterday, but buried), which Grassley complained about this way:

Consistent with that FBI failure, yet another glaring example of FBI’s broken promises under your leadership is its inexcusable failure to investigate bribery allegations against former Vice President Joe Biden, while strictly scrutinizing former President Trump. You’ve repeatedly claimed you would ensure the FBI does justice, “free of fear, favor, or partisan influence.”25 The FBI under your watch, however, had possession of incriminating information against President Biden for three years until I exposed the existence of the record outlining those allegations, but did nothing to investigate it.26 This record, known as an FD-1023, documented allegations of bribery between and among then-Vice President Biden, Hunter Biden, and Ukrainian officials.27 The FBI confidential human source (CHS) behind this FD-1023 was on the FBI’s payroll during the Obama administration, paid hundreds of thousands of dollars, was given permission to violate the law, and the information he provided was used in prosecutions. The FBI called this CHS “highly credible,” and Deputy Director Abbate publicly testified in response to the FBI’s refusal to remove obstructive redactions from that document that “[w]e often redact documents to protect sources and methods…the document was redacted to protect the source as everyone knows, and this is a question of life and death, potentially.” 28 Then after the FD-1023 was made public – which didn’t include the source’s name – DOJ not only publicly named him, but indicted him, calling into question the truthfulness of Deputy Director Abbate’s testimony and his refusal to be transparent.29 Still, to-date, the DOJ and FBI have neither answered whether they investigated the substance of the FD-1023, nor have they provided an explanation for any effort undertaken to obtain the financial records and other pieces of evidence referenced within the document. This sounds a lot like Director Comey’s leadership of the FBI, which was nothing short of shameful.

As I noted on the Senate floor on February 27, 2024, if a highly regarded source had alleged President Trump accepted a bribe, the FBI would pursue this information without keeping it stored away in one of its dusty closets for three years.30

Even before Smirnov’s plea agreement, though, there was plenty in the indictment (like reference to all the travel records that disprove Smirnov’s claims) that not just debunk Grassley’s claims, but make clear that the scandal here was that Scott Brady falsely insinuated to Congress that Smirnov’s travel records corroborated his claims, when they did the opposite.

There’s a far, far bigger problem though: Grassley’s claims about how FBI would respond to a claim of bribery if one implicated Trump are ridiculous.

When FBI (in reality, the decisions here were repeatedly made by DOJ, not FBI, which returning SJC Chair Grassley should be expected to know) got credible claims Trump had been paid by Egyptian spooks, first Robert Mueller (probably Rod Rosenstein), then Bill Barr prevented investigators from obtaining the financial records to pursue the case, a version of which story NYT published in August.

There’s the tip that — the NYT described — the Italians gave Barr and John Durham in 2019 about “suspicious financial dealings related to Mr. Trump,” a detail Durham chose to exclude from his final report.

There’s the $2 billion investment that Saudis made with Jared Kushner after Trump’s son-in-law finished his nepotistic service in the White House; as the NYT laid out, even the Saudis had doubts that Kushner had the expertise to invest that money. A NYT follow-up showed that Kushner’s firm has pocketed $112 million in fees without showing any profit from investments. Democrats have called for a Special Counsel to investigate that, but the Special Counsel-happy Merrick Garland has not done so.

And since the election, a Chinese national whom the SEC has accused of fraud, Justin Sun, effectively just sent Donald Trump $18 million (here’s a less direct NYT story on the how cryptocurrency creates real opportunity for corruption). Where’s your call for fairness, Chuck?

But there were alternative ways to debunk Grassley’s lies other than pointing to the six NYT stories that disproved his claims that FBI ignored a bribery allegation about Biden but chased them with Trump. Consider his most justified complaint, the one with which he begins his rant: The FBI has not explained whether it has pursued allegations of sexual misconduct within its own ranks fairly.

One of the most egregious examples is the FBI’s failure to provide basic information I requested more than two years ago related to the FBI’s ongoing mishandling of sexual harassment claims made by the FBI’s female employees. This request was not pulled out of a hat. It was based on credible whistleblower disclosures alleging hundreds of FBI employees had retired or resigned to avoid accountability for sexual misconduct. 5 Whistleblowers also alleged the FBI had disciplined senior officials less severely than their subordinates for this misconduct.6 In November 2022, I released internal FBI documents corroborating these disclosures.7 I and my staff ever since have asked repeatedly for information sufficient to determine how FBI handled these serious claims and how widespread the problem really is. The FBI, for its part, told the media it would provide the information to me.8 You personally told me at a December 5, 2023, Judiciary Committee hearing, when I confronted you with the FBI’s blatant inaction, that you would check with your team and then follow up with me.9 Your Deputy Director, Paul Abbate, also publicly stated the FBI is serious about removing officials for sexual misconduct. 10 After a year since you made that pledge, over three years since Deputy Director Abbate’s public comments, and after many more requests to FBI to provide this information, neither of you have followed up or followed through. This inexcusable delay and obstruction by you and Deputy Director Abbate has prevented Congress and the Judiciary Committee from addressing the shocking sexual misconduct at the FBI. This is a promise made and broken, on an issue of utmost importance.

Chuck Grassley says FBI’s failure to deal with credible claims of sexual misconduct is “an issue of utmost importance.”

Huh.

Grassley has not yet weighed in on the nominations of Pete Hegseth, Linda McMahon, or Kimberly Guilfoyle — all of whom have been implicated in sexual harassment or assault, but his comments about RFK Jr thus far have focused on, “educating him about agriculture,” rather than the assault of a nanny RFK admitted to. Other Senators, though, have suggested that Hegseth’s accusers should not enjoy the same protections that Grassley has fiercely defended for FBI whistleblowers, and have brushed off how Hegseth’s accuser could testify publicly given the nondisclosure agreement he paid her to sign.

More curiously, when he was asked about the sexual misconduct allegations against Matt Gaetz, Grassley falsely claimed his committee, “did a very thorough job following up on every accusation made against (Supreme Court) Justice Kavanaugh and nothing ever materialized.” Grassley said that after Sheldon Whitehouse issued a report showing that the FBI had forwarded all tips to the White House, rather than chasing them down.

On instructions from the White House, the FBI did not investigate thousands of tips that came in through the FBI’s tip line. Instead, all tips related to Kavanaugh were forwarded to the White House without investigation. If anything, the White House may have used the tip line to steer FBI investigators away from derogatory or damaging information.

Whitehouse’s report describing the whitewash FBI did quotes now-debunked claims Grassley made about the thoroughness of the investigation several times.

“These uncorroborated accusations have been unequivocally and repeatedly rejected by Judge Kavanaugh, and neither the Judiciary Committee nor the FBI could locate any third parties who can attest to any of the allegations.”

[snip]

Then-Chairman Grassley said that the FBI “decided” which individuals to contact,98 that the FBI’s investigation was being conducted “in accordance with the agency’s standard operating procedures,” that “the career public servants and professionals at the FBI know what they’re doing and how best to conduct a background investigation,” and that the FBI’s investigation “should be carried out independent of political or partisan considerations.”

If you want to talk about FBI’s inadequate response to sexual misconduct allegations, then surely its whitewash of allegations against Brett Kavanaugh should be included? Want to complain about the FBI? Complain about how they deprived you, Chuck Grassley, of treating misconduct claims against Brett Kavanaugh as “an issue of utmost importance.”

But doing so would expose Grassley’s crass double standard, refusing to exercise the same due diligence with sexual misconduct allegations that, he complains, the FBI has not done in his own job, exercising advice and consent with Donald Trump’s nominees.

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Conclusion To Series On Rights

 

Posts in this series

Conclusion to How Rights Went Wrong

In the last half of Jamal Greene’s book he gives us his explanation of a better way forward, and applies it to several controversial issues, including abortion and discrimination. Greene thinks that courts, especially SCOTUS, spend too much time on their made-up rules about about rights, instead of the rights themselves. He thinks all applicable rights claims have to be considered in rendering decisions and establishing remedies.

The Rodriguez case discussed in the last post is a good example. Kids are going to school with bats, but nothing can be done because of court-created rules designed to limit the reach of the Reconstruction Amendments. I think Greene is right about this.

I think that there are two problems underlying our current judicial approach that prevent Green’s ideas from being effectuated. First, immediately after the enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments SCOTUS limited their reach. The purported reason was preservation of federalism, as we see in The Slaughterhouse Cases. But that doesn’t explain the ferocity with which the Court attacked individual rights and especially Congressional action up to the 1930s, and then after a short respite, returned to the attack beginning in the Reagan era and continuing to the present.

This, I think, reflects a deep skepticism of democracy, whether in claims of individual rights against governments, or in concerted political action through the legislature. It seems SCOTUS has little respect for rights claims of ordinary people regardless of whether the rights arise through legislation or under the Constitution.

The judicial branch has always been a bastion of the privileged elites, who mostly like things the way they are. Powerful commercial interests are heavily over-represented, and have always been. Lewis Powell, the author of Rodriguez, is an example.

The second issue, I think, is the general unwillingness of the judicial system to make rulings requiring other branches to enforce. As an example consider Holmes’ 1902 decision in Giles v. Harris, discussed by Greene. Giles, a Black man, had been registered to vote in Alabama for years. The Alabama Constitution was changed to allow local election registrars to deny registration to people who lacked good character. Giles was not allowed to register under the new system. Ovrall, registration of Black men drooped to nearly zero. There is no doubt that this was a violation of the 15th Amendment. Holmes refused to do anything. One of his reasons was that “…the sheer scale of the conspiracy Giles was alleging exceeded the Court’s power to remedy it.” P. 49.

Courts have always been concerned about their ability to enforce their decrees, and rightly so. But that’s not an excuse for simply refusing to enforce rights. Courts are really good at collecting money. Creative use of this power is a great solution to weakness.

For example, in the Rodriguez case Powell could have given the school district a money judgment large enough to construct a new school, one less friendly to bats, and awarded further monetary damages necessary to bring the school’s textbooks up to date and deal with other issues. He could have imposed costs and attorney’s fees on the school district, and awarded the plaintiffs monetary damages for the injuries they suffered by going to school with bats and ripped up out-of-date textbooks. That would open the door to other under-funded schools in Texas to sue the State and local districts to equalize things. The legislature eventually would have been forced change the funding arrangement.

A third issue, most pornounced in the current panel of SCOTUS, is its effort to justify its decisions by newly created doctrines. The so-called Major Questions Doctrine is an example. This was apparently created for the purpose of thwarting government efforts to remedy serious emergencies pursuant to express legislative action. Another example is the absurd result in US v. Trump, where the loons expressly denied that they were looking at the facts of the actual case:  Trump’s efforts to overthrow an election. Instead they insisted they had to make a rule for the ages.

This is preposterous because the right-wingers on the Court don’t have a problem throwing out cases and rules they don’t like.

There are many better ways forward, including Greene’s. But so what? All Republicans including those on SCOTUS are incorrigible. We can’t even get the current crop of geriatric Democrats to hold a hearing on the corruption we all know exists in the judicial system, ranging from the ethics violations of right-wing SCOTUS members to the scandalous judge-shopping of the creepy right wing, to the overtly political decisions of the District and Circuit Court in Fifth Circuit. The fact is that only sustained aggressive demands will ever change anything.

Conclusion To The Conclusion

In this series I’ve discussed three texts: The Evolution Of Agency by Michael Tomasello; Chapter 9 of The Origins of Totalitarianism by Hannah Arendt; and Greene’s thoughtful book.

Tomasello provided a look at the way we humans evolved. I think it hints at how we came to think about rights. He speculates that the earliest ancestors of humans were weaker, slower, more fragile, and had less sensitive eyes, ears and noses than their competitors. They survived by being more cooperative, more attuned to their group, more sensitive to the desires and emotions of individuals in the group. This increased receptiveness to others was the genesis and result of increasing brain size. The larger brain changed the bodies of women to enable birth babies with larger heads. That led to complications of birth. Dealing with those complications required more social cooperation. The longer dependency of the young also increased the demands of cooperation. These changes increased over time and eventually we became human. For a similar view, I recommend Eve by Cat Bohannon, which discusses evolution from the perspective of the female body and mind.

The importance of cooperation in this story leads me to speculate that rights are a way of maintaining individuality among creatures who are tightly bound for the sake of survival.

The Arendt selection says that rights are mutually guaranteed by equal citizens in a society. It also says that rights don’t matter unless there is some way to enforce and protect them. These are her conclusions about the last 200 years, not the earlier millenia.

Greene’s book tells us the story of our national attempt to insure our rights through the legislature and the judiciary, and the sad results.

I think everything we know and essentially all we think and think we know comes from other humans. That includes our rights. Some of us talk about natural rights, some about constitutional rights, some about human rights, some about God-given rights, but all of that comes from other humans and our own interpretations of their thinking. We draw from religions, philosophy, novels, catechisms, preachers, practical experience, our own emotions and sensitivities, laws, each other, our parents and teachers, our colleagues and our children.

But it’s always just us humans, trying to survive as individuals and as members of a group.

So I conclude with a question: how do you discuss questions of rights with people who believe that they possess the absolute unvarying truth?

 

 

 

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The Injustice Of Our Rights Regime

Posts in this series

We’ve seen the rise of the Holmes/Frankfurter theory that the Constitution protects few rights but protects them strongly. In practice that means that if a law infringes a constitutionally protected right, there is a heavy burden on the government to justify it, called strict scrutiny, but if there is no right, the law stands unless there is no rational basis for it.

Chapter 4 of Jamal Greene’s How Rights Went Wrong is titled Too Much Justice. The phrase comes from a dissent by William O. Brennan in a death penalty case, McClesky v. Kemp. McClesky showed that in Georgia, Black people convicted of killing white people were disproportionately sentenced to execution. Lewis Powell constructed a slippery slope argument to the effect that any kind of defendant might show such disproportion and then what? Brennan wrote that McClesky would die because Powell was afraid of too much justice.

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, (1973) is similar.  The plaintiffs were the families of kids in the Edgewood district of the Defendant San Antonio Independent School District (SAISD). They claimed that the funding system for Texas school districts was unconstitutional because it effectively deprived their kids of a decent education.

Greene begins his discussion with a description of the school that the Rodriguez kids attended:

The school building was falling apart. Many of the windows were broken. Many of the teachers were uncertified and underpaid; a third of them had to be replaced every year. Temperatures in San Antonio reached the mid-80s that day, but the school had no air-conditioning. There was no toilet paper in the restrooms. A bat colony had nested on at least one floor of the school. P. 94.

Powell wrote the 5-4 majority opinion. He starts with a detailed history and description of the funding system which is based on property taxes in each district. Edgewood had the lowest property value in the SAISD. Texas capped property tax rates. Even though Edgewood had a higher property tax rate, it raised substantially less than other school districts in the SAISD. Edgewood had $356 per student compared with $596 in Alamo Heights, which had the highest property tax valuation.

Powell’s discussion of applicable law starts with a discussion of the decision below. A three-judge panel of the District Court found that the Texas funding system discriminated on the basis of wealth, that wealth was a suspect category, that education was a fundamental right, and therefore the State was required to carry a heavy burden of proof justifying this system. Of course Texas could not show a compelling reason for the funding system.

Powell rejects that analysis. He doesn’t bother with the actual facts of the case as they affect the plaintiff. His only interest is the nature of the legal rights asserted by the plaintiff.

We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.

Powell says the wealth discrimination shown here is unlike any other kind of wealth discrimination accepted by SCOTUS to date. Later he says the same about education as a fundamental right.

Wealth Discrimination

The lower court found that poorer people in San Antonio received “less expensive” educations that those in weather districts. It held that that was enough to find wealth discrimination. Powell says that’s simplistic. Powell says he has to find a class of disadvantaged poor people that can be defined in the customary language of equal protection cases; and then evaluate the relative — rather than absolute — nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence.”

He says there are three possible ways to show discrimination.

1. People with incomes below an identifiable and relevant level, which he calls “functionally indigent” (my quotes).
2. People relatively poorer than others
3. People who live in poor districts regardlesss of their incomes.

He says he will stick to SCOTUS precedents. He offers two groups where wealth discrimination has been found. He says that in those cases, the group discriminated against was so poor they could not pay, and thus were denied a benefit available to wealthier people. We are treated to several pages of cases, an expanded form of what lawyers call string-citing. Based on this analysis, the Texas plaintiffs must be relying on Powell’s first definition of a class of poor people.

But that is no good. There are equally poor people in wealthier districts. There’s a study saying that poor people tend to live in districts with a high concentration of warehouses and industry, which would support a higher property tax rate. That’s tnot the case here.

Anyway, SCOTUS precedents require that the class be denied the benefit. Here the kids are getting an education, and some money, and that’s good enough under the Equal Protection Clause.

 … [I]n view of the infinite variables affecting the educational process, can any system assure equal quality of education except in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the Minimum Foundation Program provides an “adequate” education for all children in the State.

Who can tell? It’s all so complicated.

The right to education

Powell says SCOTUS is committed to education as an important right. Then he says that education is just another service offered by the state. The Equal Protection Clause doesn’t require equality in that service. Powell says education isn’t a fundamental right set out in our Constitution.

It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.

Discussion

1. There’s more. Lots more. And that’s not counting the 114 footnotes. But I doubt many EW readers got far into the discussion before saying to themselves, But what about the kids going to school with BATS? The bat colony isn’t mentioned in either the SCOTUS decision or that of the lower court.  The lawyers are so wound up about the funding mechanism and court-created rules about classification that they ignored the actual outcome: kids are going to school with bats!

2. Powell gives us a slippery slope argument: if we say kids shouldn’t have to go to school with bats, we might have to say they have to be fed a nutritious meal at school.

3. Greene describes Powell’s background in some detail. Reading between the Ines, Powell seems like one of those genteel Southern Politicians, the ones who would never use the N-word in public, but can’t quite pronounce Negro, especially at the country club.

4, The 14th Amendment says in part that no state is permitted to “… deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” How hard is it to apply that rule to kids going to school with bats?

5. This case and hundreds of others are the direct result of the refusal of SCOTUS to enforce the 14th Amendment. Instead, we get blindingly stupid holdings based on what John Roberts called the dignity of the state. A state that makes kids go to school with bats and calls that an “adequate” education has no claim to dignity.

 

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Strict Scrutiny and Rational Basis Scrutiny

Index to posts in this series

In Chapter 2 of How Rights Went Wrong, Jamal Greene introduces us to a rule of Constitutional interpretation suggested by Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissent in Lochner v. New York (1905).  The idea is that the Constitution protects few rights, but those it protects, it protects strongly. This cashes out as the requirement that the government must show very strong grounds if it infringes a protected right, the strict scrutiny test. However, the government need only show that it has a rational basis for other legislation, the rational basis test.

Chapter 3 explains how that rule came into effect, worked for a while, and then proved inadequate. The principle driver of change was Felix Frankfurter, showing once again the importance of people and relationships in the evolution of our legal system. Frankfurter was the son of Austrian immigrants. He came to New York City in 1894 at the age of 11. He was a star student, went to Harvard Law, and began to rise in government service. Greene describes him as “An inveterate sycophant and social climber” (p, 60). One of his targets was Holmes, and over the years, Frankfurter slobbered over him.

In 1914 Frankfurter joined the law faculty at Harvard and began to advocate for the Holmes dissent in Lochner. He was in and out of government service, and became a sort of Leonard Leo figure, placing his best students in clerkships and government positions.

He forged a relationship with Franklin Delano Roosevelt during WWI when both served on a government board. The relationship grew when FDR became governor of New York.

The effort to actualize Holmes’ Lochner dissent wasn’t going well through the 1920s, as the Supreme Court repeatedly applied the rule of the Lochner majority. When FDR was elected president, Frankfurter became one of his most trusted advisers. In the early years of the New Deal, SCOTUS struck down most of the laws enacted to deal with the Depression. That led to FDR’s threats to pack the Court, and to the sudden change in the outcomes of these cases.

US v. Carolene Products Co. was an early example. In that case, the majority based its decision on Frankfurter’s view of Holmes’ Lochner dissent. Further, it expanded that rule with Footnote 4, which Greene summarizes as holding that strict scrutiny would apply in three different cases:

(1) when the law interferes with a right the Constitution specifically protects, (2) when the law restricts the political process itself, or (3) when the law discriminates against particular religious or racial minorities. P. 66.

I read Greene as suggesting  that one of the factors in Frankfurter’s advocacy was his progressive view of the need for government regulation of corporations. Footnote 4 connects that view with strong protection for minority groups.

Greene shows how this rule made its way into the leading treatises and legal textbooks, largely through the influence of people trained and steeped in Frankfurter’s views.

With minor adjustments, that remained the rule through the 50s and early 60s. That was a period of vast social change, and social unrest, as Black people, women, LGBTQ people, Native Americans, and poor people from all groups began to make demands on the legal system that went beyond the bare scope of Footnote 4.

One example of this push is Griswold v. Connecticut, which Greene discusses in detail. One of Frankfurter’s last SCOTUS decisions was Poe v. UllmanPoe was a facial challenge to Connecticut’s ban on birth control. Frankfurter punted, saying that the statute was never enforced. Side note: the legal term is desuetude. It ought to apply, for example, to the Comstock Act which isn’t ever enforced, but with the current majority on SCOTUS, who knows.

Estelle Griswold, the executive director of Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, got herself and a doctor arrested and convicted for dispensing birth control material and information. Frankfurter had retired due to a stroke. William O. Douglass, who had dissented in Poe, wrote the majority opinion in which he laid out the right to privacy.

In the remainder of the Chapter, Greene looks at the different ways courts, especially SCOTUS, have tried to deal with the demands of groups whose rights were limited by all branches of state and federal governments.

Discussion

1. Reading between the lines, it seems to me that Greene thinks that the values, biases, and opinions of judges play a crucial role in decisions. This is one of several versions of legal realism.

For the purposes of this Article, I define “legal realism” as the perspective that Supreme Court decisions resolving important constitutional law questions are based primarily on the Justices’ values, politics, and experiences, not on text, history, or precedent. In other words, personal preferences, rather than the prior law dictate most Supreme Court constitutional law decisions.

2. Here’s an example. Richard Posner is an intellectual. He served on the 7th Cir. From 1981 to 2017. He taught at the University of Chicago Law School for decades. He seems to have been influenced by the strict neoliberalism taught at the Chicago Business School. That connection perhaps led him to his theory of law and economics, which I would describe as the idea that in deciding cases Posner would assume that the law favors the economically efficient outcome.

In a 1985 article, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law,  he analyzes crimes like rape in terms of markets and market efficiency, apparently indifferent to the inherent silliness of the effort.

Put differently, the prohibition against rape is to the marriage and sex “market” as the prohibition against theft is to explicit markets in goods and services. [footnote omitted]

After the Great Crash of 2008, he formally renounced the entire project of the Chicago School of economics, including his own law and economics branch. Here’s a discussion.  That, of course, is the mark of an intellectual: he rejected a theory he had relied on for decades when he saw it didn’t work.

2. Greene mentions the deeply felt trope that we have a government of laws, not men, citing John Adams. P. 58.  How does it square with the theory that the prejudices and deeply held world views of judges are a critical factor in their decisions?

In routine cases it’s not a problem. But it’s a huge problem for major constitutional law issues decided by SCOTUS. Neil Gorsuch pompously demonstrated this when he said at oral argument in Trump v. United States,  “…we’re writing a rule for the ages” about presidential immunity from criminal accountability. P. 140. That is not the job of a judge. Writing rules for the ages is the responsibility of legislatures. But the current majority doesn’t think like that. As they showed in Dobbs and the gun cases, they don’t even believe there are rules for the ages. There are only rules laid down by five unelected unaccountable lawyers, good only until changed by five other unelected unaccountable lawyers.

3. I think that when institutions are controlled by people willing to subvert the norms of their jobs to achieve ideological or political goals, the institutions will fail. There are no rules sufficient to restrain them. The only solution is to remove them and replace them with people who comply with the norms.
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Graphic: Gilbert Stuart’s portrait of John Adams.

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