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Judge Dale Ho Upends Emil Bove’s Weaponization

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As predicted, yesterday Judge Dale Ho dismissed the indictment against Eric Adams with prejudice, meaning the Trump Administration can’t charge Adams anew if he fails to do their bidding on immigration.

In his opinion explaining his decision, Ho engaged in a great deal of legal analysis, but ultimately it came down to this: even though DOJ’s explanations for the request to dismiss the indictment don’t hold up, because there’s no way to continue prosecuting Adams, Ho would end up having to dismiss the case in 70 days anyway on Speedy Trial grounds.

Thus, whatever teeth the public interest inquiry might have under Rule 48(a), denying dismissal as contrary to the public interest would be futile as a practical matter where, as here, the Motion was filed by DOJ itself. See id.; Nederlandsche, 453 F. Supp. at 463. While the Court could deny the Motion, allow seventy days to pass, and then dismiss the case on Speedy Trial Act grounds, it is hard to see what good that would accomplish.

Ho finds, for a bunch of reasons (including precisely the appearance of impropriety that DOJ claimed motivated their abandonment of the prosecution) to dismiss with prejudice, so the case is not hanging over Adams’ head. And so, having decided to dismiss with prejudice, Ho does so now rather than later (though he doesn’t say it, he does so with enough time that NYC voters can hold Adams accountable for this stinky deal).

[G]iven that seventy days from the date of this Opinion would take us uncomfortably close to the June 24, 2025 New York City mayoral primary election,60 the Court concludes that, if dismissal is inevitable, the public interest weighs in favor of its happening now rather than later.

In the process, Ho dismisses all the arguments DOJ made to justify the request.

First, he dismisses one of two reasons given for the dismissal — the appearance of impropriety — as a pretext. Ho cites his own opinion rejecting the claim when Mayor Adams’ team made it earlier.

45 To the extent that Mayor Adams argues that he has been prejudiced from extrajudicial statements about the case, see Adams Br. at 19-20, the Court has rejected two prior motions under Rule 6 raising these issues. See First Rule 6 Order; Second Rule 6 Order. Moreover, the Government itself has, until the filing of the Rule 48(a) Motion, denied that Mayor Adams has suffered any prejudice from any pretrial publicity throughout this litigation. For example, in response to Mayor Adams’s First Rule 6 Motion, the Government observed that there was no evidence that news articles about the investigation into his alleged illegal activity “put pressure on senior Justice Department officials to approve the indictment,” induced any grand jury witness to testify, or affected the grand jury’s decision to indict the Mayor. Gov’t First Sanctions Opp’n at 21-23. The Government also argued that Mayor Adams “ha[d] not established reason to believe that a future trial jury w[ould] be prejudiced by the news coverage of this case.” Id. at 23. The existence of such prejudice is typically uncovered through voir dire, which obviously has not happened here (nor will it). See United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (“When a trial court determines that media coverage has the potential for unfair prejudice, it is obligated to canvass the jury to find out if they have learned of the potentially prejudicial publicity and, if necessary, voir dire the jury to ascertain how much they know of the distracting publicity and what effect, if any, it has had on that juror’s ability to decide the case fairly.”).

But Ho also repeatedly adopts the word “pretext,” the one Hagan Scotten used to describe that excuse in his resignation letter.

As to Emil Bove’s claim that the indictment was hindering Adams’ ability to govern, Ho uses the public appearance Adams made to show that he was able to help the Administration in spite of the indictment.

The dispute here, however, seems to be more about how to interpret the facts than what the facts are. In a February 3, 2025 letter to DOJ (which they filed on the docket without prompting from the Court), Mayor Adams’s counsel asserted that the Mayor’s “independent abilities to exercise his powers have also been complicated by his indictment.” See Letter from Adams’s Counsel to DOJ. Specifically, they noted that [the Mayor’s] powers allow him to take actions such as preventing the Office of the Corporation Counsel from litigating challenges to immigration enforcement, preventing appointed city employees from taking public stances against enforcement efforts, reopening the ICE office on Rikers Island, and directing the NYPD to supply manpower to assist federal immigration agents. Id. Mayor Adams’s counsel did not explain how the Mayor’s exercise of these powers had been “complicated” by this case. Instead, they provided a list of discrete policy options that the Mayor could choose to exercise. And then, three days after DOJ issued the February 10 Decisional Memo directing SDNY to move to dismiss the Indictment (and one day before the Rule 48(a) Motion was ultimately filed), Mayor Adams decided to take one of these official acts, announcing that “he would issue an executive order allowing federal immigration authorities into the Rikers Island jail complex.” Br. of Amicus Curiae State Democracy Defenders Fund et al. at 5, ECF No. 152-2; see also ECF No. 150-4 at 152 (news article stating that “New York City Mayor Eric Adams said Thursday he will use his executive powers to allow federal immigration authorities back into the city’s sprawling Rikers Island jail complex, marking a substantial shift in the city’s sanctuary policies that prevent it from enforcing immigration law”). It seems that the Indictment was not, in fact, a barrier to that particular policy decision.

From that, Ho laid out how this creates the appearance of a quid pro quo.

The parties deny that Mayor Adams’s Rikers Island decision—which appears to be contrary to New York City Code53—reflects a quid pro quo. The record contains no contemporaneous notes of what was actually said during the January 31 meeting at DOJ,54 but counsel for Mayor Adams have represented in a letter to the Court that “we never said or suggested to anyone . . . that Mayor Adams would do X in exchange for Y, and no one said or suggested to us that they would do Y in exchange for X,” adding: “We are prepared to confirm these points under oath in sworn declarations.” See Def.’s Feb. 18, 2025 Letter at 2. The Court appreciates counsel’s willingness to supplement the record and facilitate further inquiry by the Court beyond the materials that they have affirmatively submitted without solicitation. E.g., Letter from Adams’s Counsel to DOJ.

But the Court finds that additional factual investigation—even if permissible—is unnecessary at this time. Whether anyone expressly incanted the precise words that they “would do X in exchange for Y” is not dispositive. As the Second Circuit has explained, “[a]n explicit quid pro quo . . . need not be expressly stated but may be inferred from the official’s and the payor’s words and actions.” United States v. Benjamin, 95 F.4th 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied,

No. 24-142, 2024 WL 5112284 (Dec. 16, 2024); see also Benjamin, 95 F.4th at 68 (noting that while a “quid pro quo must be clear and unambiguous, there is no reason why it cannot be implied from the official’s and the payor’s words and actions.”); cf. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The official and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law’s effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods.”). The Court need not and does not make any conclusive findings as to whether there was an explicit bargain here.55 It is sufficient to note that the facts, as put into the record by Mayor Adams’s legal team, do not support the notion that continuing this case will impede the Mayor’s ongoing immigration enforcement efforts—they instead suggest that dismissal of the case will facilitate future efforts by the Mayor, in alignment with the administration’s policy preferences

53 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 9-131(h)(2) (“Federal immigration authorities shall not be permitted to maintain an office or quarters on land over which the department exercises jurisdiction, for the purpose of investigating possible violations of civil immigration law; provided, however, that the mayor may, by executive order, authorize federal immigration authorities to maintain an office or quarters on such land for purposes unrelated to the enforcement of civil immigration laws.”).

54 As noted above, the Sassoon Letter states one of her colleagues took contemporaneous notes but that those notes were confiscated at the end of the meeting. Sassoon Letter at 3 n.1. The February 13 Bove Letter in response references these events as well. See Feb. 13 Bove Letter at 3 n.3.

55 If such factual findings were necessary to the Court’s decision, additional evidentiary proceedings could then be appropriate.

The footnotes here are — as footnotes usually are — the sweet spot. Ho notes that Adams agreed not just to cooperate with Trump’s immigration enforcement, but to do so in defiance of New York City law.

And then he effectively says, if you don’t like my judgement that there is at least the appearance of a quid pro quo, we can reopen the evidentiary proceedings, in part by examining the notes that you seized from an AUSA on the case.

Judge Ho dismisses much of Bove’s effort to impugn Danielle Sassoon and Scotten by pointing out that it is irrelevant to the issue before him. DOJ said they were only relying on the two reasons to dismiss the indictment: the pretextual claim of appearance of impropriety that Ho had already rejected, and the infringement on Adams’ ability to do his work that Ho described as a quid pro quo. So they can’t, after the fact, attempt to manufacture real bias by posting communications from the prosecutors out of context.

In any case, Ho was unimpressed with Bove’s attempt to smear the prosecutors, finding it unexceptional, for example, that one of Scotten’s friends thought he would make a good judge.

Finally, the parties raise related issues in their briefs that do not appear in DOJ’s Rule 48(a) Motion. For reasons explained below, a court cannot properly grant a Rule 48(a) motion on the basis of rationales that were not raised in the motion. But even considering these additional points on the merits, the Court finds them either inapposite or unsupported by the record. For example, DOJ attaches various exhibits to its brief consisting of communications involving the former prosecution team and asserts that they show “troubling conduct” at USAO-SDNY. DOJ Br. at 1. But these communications were not public until DOJ sought to rely on them; as a matter of logic, they could not have affected “appearances” in this case. Moreover, the notion that DOJ sought dismissal because of improper conduct by the USAO-SDNY prosecution team is belied by the February 10 Decisional Memo itself, which makes clear that DOJ, in reaching its decision, “in no way call[ed] into question the integrity and efforts of the line prosecutors responsible for the case.” February 10 Decisional Memo at 1. At any rate, the Court has reviewed these communications carefully and finds that they do not show any improper motives or violations of ethics canons or the Justice Manual by the USAO-SDNY prosecution team or by former U.S. Attorney Sassoon.49

49 The Justice Department’s Principles of Federal Prosecution state, in relevant part, that “the attorney for the government should commence or recommend federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless (1) the prosecution would serve no substantial federal interest; (2) the person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.” U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.220 (2023). There is nothing in the USAO-SDNY communications indicating a violation of these principles. For example, one communication indicates that a friend of AUSA Scotten believed that he would make a good federal judge. See ECF No. 175-4. The Court has reviewed this communication and finds that it shows nothing noteworthy, only that AUSA Scotten was focused on his current job “first,” rather than on any possible future opportunities. Id. Another communication—an email circulating a draft letter to the Court—refers to the Williams op-ed as a “scandal,” ECF No. 175-3, but the use of that informal shorthand in an email does not suggest that any of the individual AUSAs on the case, or the U.S. Attorney at the time, had any inappropriate motives or otherwise violated Justice Department policy or guidelines for purposes of its Rule 48(a) Motion, disclaimed any reliance on the suggestion of improper purposes in this prosecution.

Plus, there’s no way these could substantiate the appearance of impropriety claim justify dismissing the case, because Bove only made them public after the fact.

Similarly, Ho rejected Bove’s belated claims that there was something problematic with the case itself — and in a footnote, insinuates that Pam Bondi and Chad Mizelle were the ones engaged in misconduct by sharing their opinions about the strength of the case in violation of local rules.

The Rule 48(a) Motion does not allude to the possibility of other reasons for dismissal beyond the two set forth on its face. See Rule 48(a) Mot. ¶¶ 5-6. To the contrary, the Motion suggests that there are none. See id. at 3 (seeking dismissal “[b]ased on the foregoing” reasons). At the February 19 conference, DOJ confirmed that there were no other bases asserted in the Motion. See Feb. 19 Conf. Tr. at 22:18-22 (confirming that the Court’s “understanding that the motion contains no statement about the government’s views regarding the strength of the case in terms of the facts or the legal theory” is “correct”); id. at 22:18-25 (stating that “[t]here are two” bases for the Motion, neither of which concerned the merits). While counsel for DOJ stated “I do have other concerns” about the case, he disclaimed reliance on them for purposes of the Rule 48(a) Motion, explaining that the Government is “not asking the court to rely on any” reasons for dismissal beyond what is stated in the Motion itself. Id. at 22:5-13. And DOJ’s February 10 Decisional Memo is unequivocal in this regard, stating that “[t]he Justice Department has reached this conclusion without assessing the strength of the evidence or the legal theories on which the case is based, which are issues on which we defer to the U.S. Attorney’s Office at this time.” Feb. 10 Decisional Memo at 1 (emphasis added). It was only in response to this Court’s Order requesting further briefing on several questions, none of which concerned the reasons for the Motion, that DOJ raised this additional ground for dismissal.57

57 To be sure, in his February 13 letter to U.S. Attorney Sassoon, Acting DAG Bove stated that he has “many other concerns about this case,” which he described as turning on “factual and legal theories that are, at best, extremely aggressive.” Feb. 13 Letter at 7. Mayor Adams also points to a statement by the Attorney General that the case was “incredibly weak,” and has previously referenced similar statements to the same effect by the DOJ Chief of Staff. See Adams Br. at 6; Def.’s Feb. 21, 2025 Letter at 1. Assuming these concerns were well founded, they still do not contradict the February 10 Decisional Memo’s statement that DOJ reached its determination regarding dismissal without assessing the strength of the case. Separately, the Court notes that the statements referenced by Mayor Adams appear to violate Local Criminal Rule 23.1, which prohibits extrajudicial statements regarding an “opinion . . . in connection with pending or imminent criminal litigation . . . if there is a substantial likelihood that the dissemination will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.” S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. L. Crim. R. 23.1(a). The Rule provides that “[a]ny opinion as to . . . the merits of the case” “presumptively involve[s] a substantial likelihood that their public dissemination will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice within the meaning of this rule.” Id. at 23.1(d)(7). [my emphasis]

I noted the problems with Mizelle and Bondi’s interventions at the time.

You can’t retcon the reasons for dismissing the case, Judge Ho says, because it would undermine the political accountability that is one purpose for judicial involvement in a Rule 48(a) motion.

None of this is meant to suggest that it would be wholly impermissible for the government to have, in addition to valid reasons that are expressly stated, other unstated reasons for dropping a prosecution. But if the reasons actually articulated in a Rule 48(a) motion itself are insufficient, and dismissal can be justified only by resort to other grounds, then the omission of those other reasons misleads the court and the public, undermining political accountability. Under such circumstances, it would flout Rule 48(a)’s requirement of leave of court to grant a motion based on belatedly offered rationales. See Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 620 (“Rule 48(a)’s requirement of judicial leave . . . contemplates exposure of the reasons for dismissal.”). Here, DOJ has affirmatively asked the Court to rely on the reasons in its Rule 48(a) Motion and has argued that these reasons are a sufficient basis for granting the Motion. See Feb. 19 Conf. Tr. at 22:5-17. The Court therefore cannot permit DOJ to rely on a post hoc rationale not stated in the Motion itself. “[W]hen so much is at stake, . . . the Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people.” Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1909. For these reasons, the Court cannot consider DOJ’s belated merits-based arguments in adjudicating this motion. [my emphasis]

In the last pages of the opinion Ho does a number of things that may have application outside of this case. He adopts Sassoon’s point that the comparison of the Adams case to the Viktor Bout case is inapt. More importantly, the Bout case was a quid pro quo. It doesn’t help Bove claim this wasn’t a quid pro quo, it does the opposite.

First, it is odd that DOJ would analogize its decision to dismiss Mayor Adams’s indictment—which it vehemently denies is a quid pro quo—to a prisoner exchange that was explicitly a quid pro quo. Moreover, it is inapt to compare an exchange negotiated between two sovereign nations, neither of which is beholden to the laws of the other, to the Government’s decision to dismiss the indictment of an elected public official who is subject to local, state, and federal laws.

The unprecedented nature of DOJ’s rationale is particularly concerning given its view that its decision is “virtually unreviewable” because it “invocates concerns about executive power that go right to the core of Article II of the Constitution.” Feb. 19 Conf. Tr. at 23:20-24. If that is correct, DOJ’s position has rather broad implications, to put it mildly. For instance, DOJ endorsed the view that the government can apply this rationale to virtually any public official with immigration-related responsibilities—ranging from a local police commissioner to the governor of a border state—and determine that they are essentially immune from criminal liability. See id. at 32:22-34:8.

Where I’m most intrigued, Ho likens what DOJ is doing here — using the threat of prosecution to coerce states — to Congressional attempts to do the same.

Threatening federal indictment to compel compliance with federal regulatory objectives by a state or local official also raises significant federalism concerns. It is well established that “the Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997). Although this prohibition has typically been applied to acts of Congress, the principles that underpin it—namely, federalism and political accountability—would similarly preclude an attempt by the federal executive branch to coerce a state or local official into implementing federal policy objectives. 58

See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-16.110 (2020) (cautioning that “[p]lea bargains with defendants who are elected public officers can present issues of federalism . . . when they require the public officer defendant to take action that affects his or her tenure in office”). Here, the fact that, after DOJ made the decision to seek dismissal of his case, Mayor Adams decided to issue an executive order in alignment with current “federal immigration initiatives and policies,” Rule 48(a) Mot. ¶ 6, but in apparent conflict with New York City law, see N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 9-131(h)(2), is troubling to say the least. It suggests that the federal government is using the pendency of a federal indictment to override the City’s laws in favor of its own policy goals.

58 That prohibition applies even where state or local officials consent to federal compulsion, because “[t]he interests of public officials . . . may not coincide with the Constitution’s intergovernmental allocation of authority.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183 (1992). “The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States . . . as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States.” Id.

But this is what Trump is doing left and right: Threatening states, cities, and private entities to try to get compliance with Trump’s orders. And while federalism would only apply this holding to government entities, Trump has already retaliated against New York’s other elected leaders for personal grievances. Pam Bondi has even threatened criminal prosecution in the immigration context.

So don’t be surprised if you see this opinion cited down the road.

Emil Bove attempted to force through his corrupt deal quietly, with pretextual excuses for doing so. When that failed, he turned to retaliation against at least Sassoon and Scotten. Whatever else this opinion does — no matter how unsatisfying it is that Adams will escape accountability, and it is — Ho used this opinion to lay out judicial record that Bove’s claims are bullshit.

Ho can’t stop Bove’s corrupt deal. But this opinion may forestall follow-on weaponization of this case.

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Emil Bove Calls Resignation in Face of Unethical Order “Misconduct”

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Unsurprisingly, in his amicus filing, Paul Clement strongly recommended that Judge Dale Ho should dismiss the Eric Adams prosecution with prejudice. The most remarkable thing about Clement’s memorandum, as first noted by Josh Gerstein, is that Clement did not mention the Mike Flynn case, even while making claims directly undermined by it. (Adams’ own filing mentions Neomi Rao’s dissent in Flynn, and Emil Bove invoked it inaptly to say that because the amicus in Flynn did not seek discovery, it means no amicus would need to.)

Bove’s submission, signed as well by newly-confirmed Todd Blanche, is surprising, but not just for its inapt citation of Flynn.

Filed in the wake of multiple questions about his own ethical misconduct, Bove largely shifts a key premise of his own motion to dismiss, that it should be dismissed because of an appearance of impropriety. He largely replaces that justification, one of two made for dismissing the Adams case, to weaponization alone.

The first sentence of the section addresses his excuses for dismissing the case cites a paragraph that mentions only appearance of impropriety, then the transcript where he mentions weaponization but supports it by claiming an appearance of impropriety.

Dismissal is required, on consent, based on the Department’s conclusion that this prosecution reflects an improper weaponization of the criminal justice system, which has given rise to “appearances of impropriety and risks of interference with the 2025 elections in New York City.” Mot. ¶ 5; see also 2/19/25 Tr. 23.

But the balance of the passage relies entirely on his claim of weaponization, citing to Trump’s Executive Order making false claims that Biden politicized DOJ, and eventually citing an appellate decision in the Blagojevich case that threw out those quid pro quos that involved trading of official positions, but not those involving personal benefit (seemingly suggesting that Eric Adams would get no personal benefit from dismissal).

In this case, the Department has exercised the capacious prosecutorial discretion that supports the Motion pursuant to the anti-weaponization policy articulated by President Trump on his first day in office. Specifically, Executive Order 14147, entitled Ending the Weaponization of the Federal Government, sets forth the following policy: “It is the policy of the United States to identify and take appropriate action to correct past misconduct by the Federal Government related to the weaponization of law enforcement . . . .” 90 Fed. Reg. 8235. The express “purpose” of the policy is to “ensure accountability for the previous administration’s weaponization of the Federal Government against the American people,” which included conduct “oriented more toward inflicting political pain than toward pursuing actual justice or legitimate governmental objectives.” Id.

It cannot be denied that President Trump’s anti-weaponization policy is in the public interest as an important reform in response to recent abuses of the criminal justice system. The purpose of the policy, like the Petite policy, “is to protect the individual from any unfairness.” Rinaldi, 434 U.S. at 31. “The defendant, therefore, should receive the benefit of the policy whenever its application is urged by the Government.” Id. Here, for the reasons set forth in the Motion and at the February 19, 2025 hearing, that means the pending charges must be dismissed.

[snip]

As a legal matter, the Department’s conclusion that dismissal would serve the public good by deterring weaponization, and promoting Executive Branch national security and immigration objectives, is entirely proper. Every action that a diligent public servant takes should be designed to advance the public good, which is what the Motion seeks to achieve. If taking such steps were treated as the equivalent of a personal gift or bribe, whether under the ethics rules or bribery laws, government would literally grind to a halt. That is why “a proposal to trade one public act for another, a form of logrolling, is fundamentally unlike the swap of an official act for a private payment.” United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2015).

Remember: Judge Ho ruled that the publicity around the case did not violate local rules, and Adams never even claimed selective prosecution. This is Bove saying he knows better and Judge Ho has no say in the matter.

Having thus claimed that Trump’s own declaration that prosecutions against him were unfair can, in turn, taint entirely different prosecutions, his defense attorney then tries to flip his own alleged unethical conduct. Both in the introduction and in a long follow-up section (together making up about 8 pages of 18), Bove spins Danielle Sassoon and Hagan Scotten’s refusal to do something they viewed to be unethical as itself misconduct.

He does so in two ways. First, and most alarmingly, he suggests that resigning rather than taking an action they deemed unethical amounted to misconduct. Consider the logic of these two paragraphs (Bragg v. Jordan is the Second Circuit opinion holding that Mark Pomerantz had to respond to a Jim Jordan subpoena, sustaining Bove’s paranoia and Trump’s conspiracy theories about him):

The decisions by U.S. Attorney-2 and AUSA-1 to resign, rather than carry out their obligations under the Department’s chain of command, are not a basis to question the Motion. Each U.S. Attorney’s authority is derivate of the Executive Power that the President has delegated to the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 503, 509, 515. So too is the residual power of AUSAs, who are removable by the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. § 542. The Attorney General explained on February 5, 2025 that “it undermines the constitutional order and deprives the President of the benefit of his lawyers” when the Department’s attorneys “refuse to advance good faith arguments . . . .”3 SDNY’s prosecution team and Executive Staff did just that, preferring “political theatre” [sic] over their obligations to the Constitution and the public. Bragg v. Jordan, 669 F. Supp. 3d 257, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

SDNY has taken a markedly different tack in other cases by conceding that the office is bound by the Department’s senior leadership. In Blaszczak, SDNY felt “constrained” to “confess error at the direction of the Solicitor General’s Office” and to ask the Second Circuit to “set aside” trial convictions on several fraud counts. ECF No. 453 at 8, No. 18-2811 (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2021); see also id. at 2 (noting that SDNY was “constrained to follow” the Department’s position); id. at 12 (“[T]he Government is constrained to concede that the § 641 object of each conspiracy was legally invalid. . . .”). In Paracha, an AUSA told the court that, because the dismissal motion had been “approved at the highest levels of the Department of Justice,” “w[e] do not have authority to make any changes to that document.” ECF No. 197 at 7 (emphasis added), No. 03 Cr. 1197 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2019). Here, too, the SDNY prosecution team lacked authority to countermand a decision authorized by the Attorney General. Their misconduct is not a basis to extend this litigation, much less deny the Motion. [my emphasis]

3 https://www.justice.gov/ag/media/1388521/dl?inline.

In this passage, Bove presents what is the proper ethical decision — to end a relationship with a client if they ask you to do something you cannot ethically do — as instead misconduct (and he calls it misconduct even though, as he says elsewhere, Sassoon and Scotten are “the subjects of an ongoing investigation at the Department,” making it clear, on the same day the head of Office of Professional Responsibility was sacked, that he has prejudged the affair).

He does so while invoking the memo Pam Bondi issued last month, demanding that all lawyers of the Department be willing to “vigorously defend[] presidential policies and actions against legal challenges on behalf of the United States.” The consequence Bondi lays out for failing to zealously (a word repeated four times) defend Trump’s views is discipline or termination.

It is therefore the policy of the Department of Justice that any attorney who because of their personal political views or judgments declines to sign a brief or appear in court, refuses to advance good-faith arguments on behalf of the Administration, or otherwise delays or impedes the Department’s mission will be subject to discipline and potentially termination, consistent with applicable law.

But that’s not what happened here: Sassoon and Scotten resigned. (Indeed, Bove formally treated Sassoon’s offer, made to AG Bondi, to resign as such, rather than firing her while she remained an employee, which he could have done).

In other words, Bove is robbing Sassoon and Scotten of the ability to resign to avoid an unethical act. He’s saying the mere act of doing so — the act of making the ethically correct decision as a lawyer — amounts to misconduct.

And from there, he document dumps a bunch of communications Sassoon, Scotten, and some other AUSAs on the case sent, a veritable Twitter Files dump in a legal filing, clearly misrepresenting the context of at least some of them. (I’ve put the references to all eight Exhibits below.)

For example, Bove quotes from a text exchange three days after the election in which someone asks the very conservative Hagan Scotten if he’s going to go after a judgeship now that a Republican won. Scotten replies, “Got to convict Adams before I can think about anything else.” Bove quotes this three times!! But it appears to say precisely the opposite of what Bove implies — he uses it to slam Scotten (along with Sassoon) as “aggressive and careerist.” But instead it shows that Scotten was focused on what he was doing; he wasn’t rushing from what Bove claims is a dogshit prosecution to find a lifetime promotion. Plus, Bove claims that Scotten’s text, “illustrates why [Scotten] was later interested in using public filings to send messages to President Trump,” which makes no sense at all; it was already clear by the election that Trump was sucking up to Adams. If Scotten wanted to suck up to Trump, he would have ditched the prosecution ASAP, possibly even (as Bove himself did) rush to represent Trump in two criminal cases for attacking the country, in hopes of political gain.

Similarly, Bove treats a draft of the letter Sassoon ultimately sent to Pam Bondi on February 12 as a big gotcha, pretending that there’s no difference between “having the authority” to dismiss charges with “having a valid basis to do so.”

Four of the documents Bove cites (Exhibit B, Exhibit C, Exhibit G, and Exhibit H) discuss the drafting of this court filing, which was in turn a response to this inflammatory filing from Adams’ attorneys. The comments all seem to react to the headache Damian Williams had caused by promoting himself and writing an oped opposing corruption — though Adams’ letter make ridiculous claims that Williams was trying to get into the Mayoral race with just months to spare. Adams’ letter effectively says that Williams’ anti-corruption stance as US Attorney, one that targeted both overt Democratic donor Sam Bankman-Fried and Robert Menendez, was partisan. None of the comments supports Adams’ point — that there was some impropriety with the prosecution or prejudice for Adams before a jury. Nor do they conflict with Judge Ho’s opinion on Damian Williams’ op-ed, which is that it was a stretch to suggest it targeted Adams at all and certainly didn’t violate local rules.

Although Mayor Adams does not request relief under Local Rule 23.1, the Court notes that, after carefully reviewing Mr. Williams’s op-ed, the op-ed does not contain any statements that run afoul of the Rule’s prohibitions. In the op-ed, Mr. Williams provides hyperlinks to several prosecutions brought during his tenure as U.S. Attorney, including those of federal and state elected officials, but none concern Mayor Adams. In fact, the majority of the statements in the oped that Mayor Adams claims are problematic concern New York State rather than New York City politics. For example, Mayor Adams highlights Mr. Williams’s statements that “[t]he ability to raise obscene sums of money for a campaign is precisely the wrong bottleneck to elected office,” and that “[i]t reeks of pay-to-play corruption and is offensive to most New Yorkers . . . ” Jan. 18 Letter at 2 (quoting Williams’s op-ed). But those sentences are found in a paragraph lamenting the ability of candidates “to raise money from individuals or entities with business before the state,” opining that “[t]he state’s new matching funds program is woefully inadequate,” and arguing in favor of “a truly transformative public financing system for state elections. . . ” Id. (emphases added). They do not appear to be directed at New York City politics generally or at this case specifically.

There is one sentence in the op-ed stating that “[t]he public reporting alone paints a picture” that “America’s most vital city is being led with a broken ethical compass,” id. at 1, which could plausibly be read to be a reference to Mayor Adams (among others). This particular statement, however, “do[es] not cross the line drawn by [Local] Rule 23.1 in the sense that [it] do[es] not, by [itself], constitute opinions as to the Defendant[’s] guilt, and [is] not otherwise the type of statement[] proscribed by the rule.” United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Local Rule 23.1(d)). Nor does the statement “go[] beyond the public record.”

There’s even a clear concern not to dictate anything to the incoming Main Justice team nor to piss off Trump, precisely the kind of deference Bove is demanding.

Plus, Bove omitted something from Sassoon’s letter to Bondi. Williams had a minimal role in the case.

As Mr. Bove’s memo acknowledges, and as he stated in our meeting of January 31, 2025, the Department has no concerns about the conduct or integrity of the line prosecutors who investigated and charged this case, and it does not question the merits of the case itself. Still, it bears emphasis that I have only known the line prosecutors on this case to act with integrity and in the pursuit of justice, and nothing I have learned since becoming U.S. Attorney has demonstrated otherwise. If anything, I have learned that Mr. Williams’s role in the investigation and oversight of this case was even more minimal than I had assumed. The investigation began before Mr. Williams took office, he did not manage the day-to-day investigation, and the charges in this case were recommended or approved by four experienced career prosecutors, the Chiefs of the SDNY Public Corruption Unit, and career prosecutors at the Public Integrity Section of the Justice Department. Mr. Williams’s decision to ratify their recommendations does not taint the charging decision

Emil Bove went fishing in the prosecutors personal emails (the other two AUSAs on the team were put on paid leave Friday, ensuring they lost access to these communications before Bove filed this), hoping to find corroboration for his false claims about politicization, and came up short. So instead, he simply made up they made Sassoon and Scotten look like careerists, when nothing he submitted supports that at all.

Twitter Files. An attempt to smear two prosecutors for making an ethical decision, precisely the basis of several ethical complaints raised against Bove himself.

Understand, too, Bove is playing a transparent game. Publishing these communications is a privacy violation, little different than the release of the Strzok and Page texts which DOJ subsequently determined was unlawful. Bove as much as concedes the point in his request asking to seal the exhibits.

In the Response, the Department sought to strike an appropriate balance between the public’s right of access, and the privacy interests of the attorneys at issue, by anonymizing the participants to communications. The participants are the subjects of an ongoing investigation at the Department.

[snip]

Even to the extent inferences regarding the identities of certain participants could be drawn based on connections to public reporting, that is not the case for each of the individual participants.

Of course, filing something under seal provides cause for the press to demand to have it unsealed under precisely the same “public right of access.” It won’t be sealed for long. And the only mystery about the identities of AUSAs 2, 3, and 4 is which is which member of the now-suspended prosecution team.

None of this helps Bove’s case. None of this disproves there was a quid pro quo. None of this presents any evidence that Sassoon or Scotten had any question about the ethics of their decision.

All it does is confirm that when Bove says he’s fighting weaponization, he means he’s going to go after anyone who gets in his way of weaponizing DOJ.

Exhibit A: Part of a package of communications Danielle Sassoon attached to an email; Bove claims that all are related to her resignation (it’s not clear they are)

On February 12, 2025, the recently-resigned Acting U.S. Attorney (U.S. Attorney-2) sent herself a draft letter stating that she was “personally disappointed in [her] predecessor’s self-serving actions after his departure. . . .” Ex. A,

[snip]

Attorney-2 sent an email attaching draft materials relating to her anticipated resignation. Ex. A. One of the documents was named “Adams PR,” i.e., press release, which suggests that she was already planning to publicize her resignation. Ex. A, Attachment 1. A another document, styled as a letter to the Attorney General, included the assertion that U.S. Attorney-2 “was personally disappointed in my predecessor’s self-serving actions after his departure, including the creation of a personal website.” Ex. A, Attachment 3. The draft letter also noted, in highlighted text, that “the Attorney General has the authority to order the dismissal of pending charges.” Id. On the day after sending the drafts, U.S. Attorney-2 emailed a letter to the Attorney General that omitted this language and claimed falsely: “The Government Does Not Have a Valid Basis To Seek Dismissal.”

Exhibit B: A discussion about how to respond to Eric Adams’ complaints about Damien Williams’ public comments

prior to making the public claim that only a “coward” or “fool” would sign the Motion, a recently-resigned AUSA from the SDNY prosecution team (AUSA-1) wrote the following regarding the letter that SDNY filed with the Court on January 22, 2025: “[U.S. Attorney-1] obviously has political ambitions, and I think suggesting we doubt that just costs us credibility.” Ex. B at 2

[snip]

AUSA-1 also wrote that it was “pretty plausible” to him that U.S. Attorney-1 “had a political motive in bringing this case.” Id.

[snip]

AUSA-1 pushed back. “I know that none of us were motivated by [U.S. Attorney-1’s] political aspirations, but I don’t think any of us know for sure what motivated [U.S. Attorney-1].” Id. AUSA-1 added the following comments in the draft of the letter:

  • “[T]he point to me is just to separate ourselves from [U.S. Attorney-1].”
  • “To me the point about the statements not naming EA feels a little too lawyerly—almost a technicality in this context since [U.S. Attorney-1] was obviously referring to EA [in the op-ed].”
  • “I don’t want to ask anyone to reject the theory that [U.S. Attorney-1] had a political motive in bringing this case. Seems pretty plausible to me.”
  • “I don’t want to say anything that picks a fight with EA’s accusation of political ambitions against [U.S. Attorney-1]: [U.S. Attorney-1] obviously has political ambitions, and I think suggesting we doubt that just costs us credibility.” Ex. B.

Exhibit C: Another discussion about how to respond to Eric Adams’ complaints about Damien Williams’ public comments

AUSA-1 explained that he hoped to “distance” the SDNY prosecution team from U.S. Attorney-1, “enough that [Judge] Ho and [President] Trump will know we don’t approve of what he did, but not so much that we magnify the scandal.”

[snip]

On January 19, 2025, AUSA-1 circulated a draft of the letter SDNY ultimately filed on January 22, 2025, in which the prosecutors argued—wrongly—that Mayor Adams’ “criticism of the article and the fact of its publication are beside the point.” ECF No. 102. In the email attaching the draft of the letter, AUSA-1 explained, “[b]asically, I tried to . . . distance us from [U.S. Attorney-1] enough that [Judge] Ho and [President] Trump will know we don’t approve of what he did, but not so much that we magnify the scandal.” Ex. C. In response to the draft, AUSA-3 argued, “I think we want to create distance between those prosecutors and the [] US Attorney.” Id. Another AUSA on the SDNY prosecution team (AUSA-4) added, “I agree that we should create some space from [U.S. Attorney-1], but I also think we should avoid anything that looks like us fighting with [U.S. Attorney-1] (which would be counterproductive).”

As the SDNY prosecution team continued to debate the substance of the draft letter, AUSA4 suggested that the prosecutors should argue that Mayor Adams was “wrong about his claim that our prosecution is motivated by [U.S. Attorney-1’s] political interests.” Ex. C.

Exhibit D: A November 8 text in which Scotten said he wasn’t going to pursue a judgeship right away

Just days after the 2024 election, in response to a text message asking if it was “time” for AUSA-1 to “take a seat on the bench,” AUSA-1 responded: “Got to convict Adams before I can think about anything else.”

[snip]

On November 8, 2024, AUSA-1 received a message with the following question: “You think it’s time to take a seat on the bench? Lol.” Ex. D. AUSA-1’s response included, “Got to convict Adams before I can think about anything else.”

[snip]

It is thus apparent from the context that, just as AUSA-1 hoped to convict Mayor Adams as the last notch in his belt before he took a “seat on the bench,” Ex. D,

Exhibit E: A July 17, 2024 discussion about trial strategy. 

At least one of the prosecutors was as aggressive and careerist as U.S. Attorney-1. For example, on July 18, 2024, AUSA-1 exchanged messages with another AUSA on the SDNY prosecution team (AUSA-2) about efforts to “exclude” a “defense witness” in this case. Ex. E. AUSA-1 remarked that an “invocation is better” than “[l]etting him come in and refuse cross.”

Exhibit F: A September 5, 2024 comment from one of the other AUSAs about how they portrayed the influence relationship

On September 5, 2024, another AUSA on the SDNY prosecution team (AUSA-3) acknowledged in a text message to AUSA-1 that “we did a lot of gymnastics around the influence point” in the Indictment, and argued that “maybe making him the one exploiting the corrupt relationship works better.” Ex. F

Exhibit G: A January 21 response to a draft of the filing

Later on January 21, AUSA-1 circulated a revised version of the draft with comment bubbles that included:

  • With respect to the “beside the point” sentence that was ultimately included in the letter, AUSA-1 noted that U.S. Attorney-2 “suggested this sentence, which makes the point less oblique—her objection to the prior version—while in my view still preserving our effort to distance ourselves from the article.”
  • AUSA-1 also noted: “I think we have a sufficiently strong ending without the prior ending (any US attorney would signed) which [U.S. Attorney-2] and others felt might be read as an attempt to hem in the new crew at main justice before they had a chance to weigh in on the case.”

Exhibit H: Another message about the January 21 filing

In a separate message, AUSA-1 asserted that he preferred a strategy that “buys us more credibility by first making clear we’re not defending the [U.S. Attorney-1] article before then going on the attack.” Ex. H

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Former WikiLeaks Task Force Member Charles McGonigal Didn’t Take Credit for the Josh Schulte Investigation

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There’s something about the second Josh Schulte trial I’ve always meant to go back and lay out. It pertains to what I think of as Schulte’s “Guccifer Gotcha.”

Throughout the trial, Schulte, who was representing himself, often got caught up in proving — right there in the courtroom — that he was the smartest guy in the room. That often (particularly with prosecutors’ technical expert and a former supervisor) led Schulte to get entirely distracted from proving his innocence. He focused on proving he was smart, rather than not guilty.

A particularly revealing instance came with Richard Evanchec who, as a member of New York Field Office’s Counterintelligence Squad 6 that focused on insider threats, was one of the lead FBI agents on the Schulte investigation.

On direct, Evanchec had described how before, August 2016, Schulte had only done three searches — ever — on WikiLeaks, but he did 39 searches between August 2016 and January 2017, when WikiLeaks announced Vault 7. (This exhibit is from Schulte’s first, 2020 trial; because the exchange below describes the August 16 search as the first one, I believe the one from his 2020 trial may not have included the Snowden search.)

Schulte started his cross on this topic by asserting that Evanchec had “made [a] grave mistake” in calculating Schulte’s Google searches.

[Reminder: these transcripts were paid for by Wau Holland foundation, which has close ties to WikiLeaks.]

Q. Additionally, sir, did you realize that you made the grave mistake in calculating the Google searches during this time period?

A. I don’t.

Q. You don’t recall that.

A. No.

[snip]

Q. Did you not realize, sir, that 80 percent of the searches you claim that I conducted for WikiLeaks were not actually searches at all?

A. I don’t know that, sir, again.

Q. Sir, are you familiar with the service Google offers called Google News?

A. I am not. I don’t use Google regularly or gmail regularly so I don’t know what that is.

Schulte then walked Evanchec through how a Google News search and a related page visit search show up differently in the logs, demonstrating the concept with some activity from early morning UTC time on August 17, 2016 on Schulte’s Google account.

Q. Did you know that Google makes a special log in its search history when you are using Google News?

A. I don’t. I am not aware of that.

[snip]

Q. OK. Entry no. 12954.

A. Your question, sir?

Q. Can you read just the date that this search is conducted?

A. Appears to be August 17 of 2016 at 2:45:07 UTC.

Q. Can you read what the search is?

A. Searched for pgoapi.exceptions.notloggedinexception. Then there is: (https://www.Google.com/?Q=pgoapi.exceptions.notloggedinexception).

Q. OK. And then the search after it, Google has it, produces it in the opposite direction so the one after that. Can you read that?

A. You are referring to line 12953?

Q. Yes. I’m sorry. Thank you.

A. Tease [sic] OK. Again August 17, 2016, 2:35:27 https://www.google.com/search?Q=WikiLeaks&TBM=NWS).

Schulte then got Evanchec to admit that the FBI agent didn’t consult with any FBI experts on Google before he did his chart of Google searches.

Q. So you basically, just as a novice, opened up this document and just based on no experience, you just picked out lines; correct?

A. No.

Q. No. You did more?

A. Yes. I queried for every time this history set searched for and then included the search terms. That’s what I culminated in my summary.

Q. OK, but you didn’t run that by any of the technical experts at the FBI, did you?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. And you said you didn’t reach out to Google or anyone with expertise, correct?

In his close, Schulte claimed that the exchange showed that all the Google searches he did between August 2016 and January 2017 were based off a Google news alert, and what drove the number of searches was the degree to which WikiLeaks was in the news because of the DNC hack-and-leak.

Mr. Lockard then brings up the Google searches for WikiLeaks, but of course, as Agent Evanchec testified, there were multiple news events that occurred in the summer of 2016. WikiLeaks dumped the Clinton emails. Really? Come on. Everyone was reading that news — Guccifer 2.0. The Shadow brokers released data, and even WikiLeaks claimed to have that code.

No doubt Schulte did demonstrate clearly to Evanchec that he didn’t did look closely at the logs of these searches and that he — Schulte — knew more about Google searches than one of the agents who had led the investigation into him did.

He was the smartest guy in the room.

But in the particular search in question — one that would have been before midnight on August 16, 2016 on the East Coast — what Schulte appears to have shown is that among all the Google news alerts reporting on a flood of news about WikiLeaks, one of the only alerts that he clicked through was one reporting WikiLeaks’ claim to have a tie to ShadowBrokers.

WikiLeaks on Monday announced plans to release a collection of “cyber weapons” purportedly used by the National Security Agency following claims that hackers have breached a division of the NSA said to deal in electronic espionage.

“We had already obtained the archive of NSA cyber weapons released earlier today and will release our own pristine copy in due course,” WikiLeaks said through its official Twitter account Monday.

Individuals calling themselves the “Shadow Broker” claimed earlier in the week to have successfully compromised Equation Group — allegedly a hacking arm of the NSA — and offered to publicly release the pilfered contents in exchange for millions of dollars in bitcoins.

At a threshold level, Schulte’s gotcha doesn’t show what he claimed it did. It showed that among the flood of news about WikiLeaks — almost all focused on the DNC hack-and-leak — he clicked through on stories about an upcoming code release. “Everyone was reading that news — Guccifer 2.0,” Schulte said. But he wasn’t. He clicked on one Guccifer story. He was sifting past the Guccifer news and reading other stuff. Schulte caught Evanchec misreading the Google logs, but then went on to misrepresent the significance of what they showed, which is that amid a flood of news about the DNC hack-and-leak, he was mostly interested in other stuff.

More importantly, once you realize that Evanchec hadn’t looked closely at the logs of these Google searches, something about his first demonstrative — showing just these three searches before August 2016 — becomes evident.

July 29, 2010: Searched for “WikiLeaks”

  • Visited Wikileaks.org webiste [sic]

July 30, 2010: Searched for “WikiLeaks ‘Bastards’”

  • Visited website titled “WikiLeaks Plans to Post CIA Chiefs Hacked Emails” on The Hill

July 6, 2016: Searched for “WikiLeaks Clinton Emails”

  • Visited website titled “WikiLeaks Dismantling of DNC Is Clear Attack By Putin on Clinton” on The Observer

For at least two of these searches, the date in Evanchec’s demonstrative cannot reflect the actual date of the search.

The story, “WikiLeaks Dismantling of DNC Is Clear Attack By Putin on Clinton” — one of the first ones concluding from the DNC hack that Putin was involved — was not posted until July 25, 2016, yet Evanchec’s demonstrative says the search happened weeks earlier.

The story, “WikiLeaks Plans to Post CIA Chiefs Hacked Emails,” describing the Crackas With Attitude hacks of top intelligence community figures in advance of the 2016 operation, dates to October 21, 2015. Evanchec described Google records that say the search happened five years before the article was posted.

Neither of those searches could possibly have been done on the date in Evanchec’s demonstrative, which Schulte — in spite of his obsession with being the smartest guy in the room — undoubtedly knew but didn’t point out at trial.

Schulte got his gotcha. It didn’t help him secure acquittal (or even another hung jury). And it got me, at least, to look more closely at what it proves, which is that at least two of the manual searches Schulte did, searches that sought out very select stories, seemed to obscure the date of the search.

As I said, I’ve been meaning to post this ever since it happened at trial.

I’m revisiting it, though, because of something remarkable about Charles McGonigal’s sentencing memo. Unsurprisingly,  his attorney, former Bill Barr flunkie Seth DuCharme, lays out a bunch of the important FBI investigations that McGonigal was a part of over his 22-year FBI career to describe what service he has done for US security: TWA Flight 800, the 1997 investigation into attempted subway bombers Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer and Lafi Khalil, the investigation into the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Africa, the 9/11 attack, the 2002 abduction of a Wooster County, OH girl, the Sandy Berger investigation, the RICO investigation of Huawei Technologies Co.

The government, in their own sentencing memo, includes a footnote suggesting that McGonigal is fluffing his role in at least one of these investigations.

The law enforcement and counterintelligence agents who reviewed McGonigal’s cited exploits noted that he often claims credit for operations in which his personal involvement was less significant than the operation itself. For example, in both his classified and unclassified submissions, McGonigal may describe a significant investigation where he—along with many other officials—was simply somewhere in a lengthy chain of command. (See PSR ¶ 82). Thus, to the extent this Court is inclined to parse McGonigal’s career achievements, the Government respectfully submits that it should limit its analysis to the specific actions that McGonigal personally took. See United States v. Canova, 412 F.3d 331, 358-59 (2d Cir. 2005) (Guidelines departure for exceptional public service warranted where defendant served as volunteer firefighter “sustaining injuries in the line of duty three times,” “entering a burning building to rescue a threeyear old,” “participated in the successful delivery of three babies,” and administered CPR to persons in distress both while volunteering as a firefighter and as a civilian).

One example where McGonigal claimed credit for being in a lengthy chain of commend must be the Huawei investigation, one that Seth DuCharme would also have worked on in the period when he and McGonigal overlapped in NY, from 2016 until 2018. The 2020 press release that DuCharme links to about that investigation, from over a year after McGonigal retired, includes two paragraphs of recognition, including units far afield from counterintelligence.

But one investigation included in McGonigal’s sentencing memo where he did have more involvement is the original WikiLeaks Task Force.

Mr. McGonigal later led the FBI’s WikiLeaks Task Force investigating the release of over 200,000 classified documents to the WikiLeaks website—the largest in U.S. history—ultimately resulting in the 20-count conviction of Chelsea Manning for espionage and related charges.

Charles McGonigal did have a significant role in the first criminal investigation of WikiLeaks, one conducted five years before his retirement.

And that’s why it’s weird that McGonigal doesn’t describe that, in the 18 months before he retired, including in the period between May 2017, when he received a report describing Oleg Deripaska’s ties to GRU, and the period, starting in March 2018, when McGonigal first started interacting with Deripaska’s deputy, Yevgeny Fokin, whom McGonigal allegedly identified as a Russian intelligence officer and claimed to want to recruit, a unit McGonigal supervised solved a WikiLeaks compromise even more damaging and complex than Chelsea Manning’s had been four years before.

Charles McGonigal doesn’t claim credit for the arrest of Josh Schulte and charges filed, over two years after the compromise, for the Vault 7 attack, something in which his team had a more central role than in the Huawei case, something that was every bit as important to national security.

By that point, WikiLeaks had ties to Russia not just through Israel Shamir but also — at least through a shared lawyer — with Oleg Deripaska. That shared lawyer almost negotiated immunity for Assange in exchange for holding off on the Vault 7 leaks.

Now, I’m not at all suggesting that McGonigal was responsible for that fucked up Google analysis, which Schulte would mock five years later. There would have been several levels of management between McGonigal and that analysis. Evanchec simply didn’t look closely enough at the Google metadata, and so didn’t see that those searches were even more interesting than he understood.

But what McGonigal would have known, when he was meeting Deripaska personally in 2019, was that the FBI hadn’t discovered that Schulte had somehow obscured when he did his search on WikiLeaks’ role in embarrassing CIA Director John Brennan and National Security Director James Clapper in 2015, in advance of the 2016 election attack, that he had likewise obscured the date when he searched on Putin’s role in the DNC hack-and-leak. The FBI didn’t even know that in 2022, by the second trial.

McGonigal may also have known what someone associated with WikiLeaks told me, in 2019, that the FBI had learned about Schulte: that he had somehow attempted to reach out to Russia.

To be clear: None of this is charged. There’s no evidence that McGonigal shared details he learned as NYFO’s counterintelligence head, about the WikiLeaks investigation, to say nothing about NYFO’s investigation of oligarchs like Deripaska. McGonigal’s case has been treated as a public corruption case, not an espionage case. So it may be that SDNY has confidence that McGonigal didn’t do anything like that.

But this risk — the possibility that McGonigal could have shared investigative information with Deripaska — doesn’t show up in SDNY’s sentencing memo. SDNY makes no mention of how obscene it is that DuCharme wants his client to get probation when any witnesses implicated in the investigations McGonigal oversaw would never know whether he had shared that information with Deripaska.

That includes me: As I have written, in August 2018, the month before McGonigal retired, someone using one of the ProtonMail accounts Schulte and his cellmate used reached out to me. I have no idea why they did that. But I’d love to know. I’d also love to know whether McGonigal learned of it and shared it.

It makes sense that McGonigal doesn’t emphasize what SDNY did on their own sentencing memo: That McGonigal went from supervising investigations into Deripaska to working for him, allegedly knowing full well he had ties to Russian intelligence. But the tie between WikiLeaks and Deripaska is more obscure, and so he could have bragged that twice in his career he led substantial investigations into WikiLeaks. Schulte’s third trial, for Child Sexual Abuse Material, even happened after Judge Jennifer Rearden became a judge in October 2022.

McGonigal could have bragged that twice in his career, in 2014 and in 2018, teams he oversaw solved critical WikiLeaks compromises. He only claimed credit for the first of those.

Update: Corrected Fokin’s first name.

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The May 2017 Report Tying Oleg Deripaska to Russian Intelligence

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I’m working on a longer post about the sentencing submissions (McGonigal; SDNY) for Charles McGonigal’s SDNY case — the former head of counterintelligence for FBI’s New York Field Office. He will be sentenced in that case on Friday; he will be sentenced in his DC case in February.

The submission for McGonigal submitted by former Bill Barr flunkie Seth DuCharme argued that McGonigal’s crime, researching a rival oligarch for Oleg Deripaska after he retired in 2018, is no big deal because DOJ has sanctioned Deripaska’s rival, Vladimir Potanin, since that time.

[W]hen compared to other conduct for which the government has brought criminal charges, it bears repeating that here the crime was clearly malum prohibitum rather than malum in se—in other words, the defendant’s intent in agreeing to provide an SDN with information to be used for business competition purposes is far less serious than the criminal conduct in other IEEPA-related cases. [links added]

DuCharme asks for a probation sentence.

As you can imagine, SDNY has a lot to say about that in response. DuCharme, whom PACER does not show as having taken many, if any defendant, through sentencing since he left DOJ in 2021, really invited SDNY to throw a lot of damaging information at McGonigal.

One thing SDNY did was explain why McGonigal knew working for Deripaska was more damaging than that. One thing they note is that in January 2018, before he left the FBI, McGonigal reviewed a list of oligarchs, including Deripaska, under consideration for sanctions.

McGonigal knew full well that Deripaska was sanctioned. As SAC, McGonigal supervised and participated in investigations of Russian oligarchs, including Deripaska. (PSR ¶ 19).

[snip]

And in January 2018, McGonigal received and reviewed a then-classified list of Russian oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin who would be considered for sanctions to be imposed as a result of Russia’s 2014 attack on Ukraine. (PSR ¶ 19).

That detail was in the indictment.

As SAC, McGonigal supervised and participated in investigations of Russian oligarchs, incl uding Deripaska . Among other things, in 2018, McGONIGAL , while acting as SAC, received and reviewed a then-classified list of Russian oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin who would be considered for sanctions to be imposed as a result of Russia ‘ s 2014 conflict with Ukraine .

But there’s a detail DOJ has since gotten declassified, one of those “other things” only alluded to in the indictment: before McGonigal started pursuing ties with Albania while still at FBI, he received a report “stating that Deripaska was associated with a Russian intelligence agency.”

Among other things, in May 2017, McGonigal received a then-classified email stating that Deripaska was associated with a Russian intelligence agency, and possibly involved in that agency’s coup attempt in another country. (PSR ¶ 19).

By context, the agency must be GRU and the attempted coup must be Montenegro, a country implicated in McGonigal’s other prosecution — one where Paul Manafort had an extensive history with Deripaska and one mentioned in Andrew Weissmann’s Team M report. See also this post Rayne wrote on related topics.

In other words, this strongly suggests that in the same month when Rod Rosenstein appointed Robert Mueller to investigate how GRU tampered in the 2016 election, McGonigal received a report tying Deripaska to the GRU.

Then he went on to agree to work for Deripaska anyway, hoping to make millions from a guy with a key role in the 2016 attack on American democracy.

And Bill Barr’s flunkie, Seth DuCharme — the guy who helped set up a way for Rudy Giuliani to share information from Russian-backed Ukrainians to be funneled to the Hunter Biden investigation — thinks that McGonigal should be sentenced to probation as a result.

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