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The Government Spoliationing for a Fight with EFF

On November 6, 2007, Judge Vaughn Walker issued a preservation order in EFF’s challenge to what we now know to be Stellar Wind, the Shubert case (which would be applied to the Jewel case after that). Nevertheless, in spite of that order, in 2009 the NSA started destroying evidence that it had collected data outside of the categories Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly authorized way back in 2004.

Also in 2009, NSA shifted records showing 3,000 people — which highly likely included CAIR’s staff and clients — had been dragnetted without the First Amendment review mandated by Section 215 (CAIR wasn’t a plaintiff on EFF’s earlier suits but they are on EFF’s phone dragnet suit, First Unitarian United). When they did, the government even appeared to consider the existing protection order in the EFF case; I have FOIAed their deliberations on that issue, but thus far have been stonewalled.

Finally, in 2011, NSA destroyed — on very little notice and without letting their own IG confirm the destruction of data that came in through NSA’s intake process — all of its Internet dragnet data.

In other words, on three known occasions, the NSA destroyed data covered by the protection order in Northern California, one of them even after admitting a protection order might cover the data in question. In two of those cases, we know the data either exceeded FISA’s orders or violated the law.

In fact, it wasn’t until 2014, when the government started asking Judge Reggie Walton for permission to destroy the phone dragnet data and EFF complained mightily, that NSA started complying with the earlier protection order. Later that same year, it finally asked FISC to keep the Protect America Act and FISA Amendments Act data also included under that order in its minimization procedures.

These posts provide more background on this issue: postpost, post, post.

In other words, on three different occasions (even ignoring the content collection), NSA destroyed data covered by the protection order. spoiling the evidence related to EFF’s lawsuits.

Which is why I find this claim — in the January 8 filing I’ve been waiting to read, but which was just posted on March 4 (that is, 5 days after the NSA would have otherwise had to destroy everything on February 29 under USA Freedom Act).

The Government remains concerned that in these cases, absent relief from district courts or explicit agreement from the plaintiffs, the destruction of the BR Metadata, even pursuant to FISC Order, could lead the plaintiffs to accuse the Government of spoliation. In Jewel, the plaintiffs have already moved for spoliation sanctions, including an adverse inference against the Government on the standing issue, based on the destruction of aged-off BR Metadata undertaken in accordance with FISC Orders. See Jewel Pls.’ Brief Re: the Government’s Non-compliance with the Court’s Evidence Preservation Orders, ECF No. 233.

Gosh, after destroying data on at least three different occasions (again, ignoring at least two years of content they destroyed), the government is worried that if it destroyed more it might get in trouble? Please!

Elsewhere, the strategy in this filing seems to be to expand the possible universe they’d have to set aside under the three cases (plus Klayman) for which there is a protection order as to make it virtually impossible to set it aside so as to destroy the rest. In addition, having let the time when they could have set aside such data easily pass because they were still permitted to access the data (say, back in 2014, when they got caught violating their protection order), they now claim that the closure of the dragnet makes such a search virtually impossible now.

It’s a nifty gimmick. They can’t find a way to destroy the data because they already destroyed even legally suspect data. And we learn about it only now, after the data would otherwise be destroyed, but now can’t be because they didn’t find some better resolution 2 years ago.

The Government Tries to Quickly Force Feed Its Dog Its Phone Dragnet Homework

I have been following the government’s claims that it needs to make the phone dragnet plaintiffs look bad preserve evidence in the phone dragnet cases. I noted:

  1. NSA’s claim, on February 20, that it might need to preserve the phone dragnet information
  2. EFF Legal Director Cindy Cohn’s observation that NSA already should have been preserving phone dragnet data because of earlier orders in EFF cases
  3. NSA’s own claim, in 2009, that it was under a preservation order that might prevent it from destroying illegal alert information
  4. NSA’s own quickness to destroy 3,000 violative files in 2012 when caught retaining data in ways it shouldn’t have been
  5. NSA’s rather bizarre claim — given their abysmal track record on this point — that a great concern about defendants’ rights meant they had to keep the data
  6. The likelihood that, that claim of concern about defendants’ rights notwithstanding, NSA had probably already destroyed highly relevant data pertaining to Basaaly Moalin
  7. FISC’s equally bizarre — given their own destruction of any normal meaning of the word, “relevant” — order to force the government to continue destroying the dragnet data

That last bit — FISC’s order that the government go on destroying data in spite of existing protection orders to retain it — happened Friday.

Since Friday, the EFF has been busy.

First, it filed a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order to retain the records, pointing out that there have been two preservation order in effect for at least 5 years that should govern the phone dragnet.

There has been litigation challenging the lawfulness of the government’s telephone metadata collection activity, Internet metadata collection activity, and upstream collection activity pending in the Northern District of California continuously since 2006. The government has been under evidence preservation orders in those lawsuits continuously since 2007.

The first-filed case was Hepting v. AT&T, No. 06-cv-0672 (N.D. Cal). It became the lead case in the MDL proceeding in this district, In Re: National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, MDL No. 06-cv-1791-VRW (N.D. Cal). On November 6, 2007, this Court entered an evidence preservation order in the MDL proceeding. ECF No. 393 in MDL No. 06-cv- 1791-VRW. One of the MDL cases, Virginia Shubert, et al., v. Barack Obama, et al. No. 07-cv- 0603-JSW (N.D. Cal.), remains in litigation today before this Court, and the MDL preservation order remains in effect today as to that case.

In 2008, movants filed this action—Jewel v. NSA—and this Court related it to the Hepting action. This Court entered an evidence preservation order in Jewel. ECF No. 51. The Jewel evidence preservation order remains in effect as of today.

EFF also filed a similar motion with the FISA Court.

And it provided all the emailed reminders it sent the government, starting on February 26 after the government filed a motion with FISC to destroy the data, that it was already under a preservation order. On February 28, DOJ asked EFF to hold off until roughly March 5. But DOJ did nothing at that time, and EFF followed up again on March 7, after the order, asking how it was that the FISC didn’t know that existing preservation orders covered the phone dragnet. In response, DOJ’s Marcia (Marcy) Berman got dragged back into the case to give this convincing response.

[T]he Government’s motion fo the FISC, and the FISC’s decision today [March 7], addressed the recent litigation challenging the FISC-authorized telephony metadata collection under Section 215-litigation as to which there are no preservation orders. As we indicated last week, the Government’s motion did not address the pending Jewel (and Shubert) litigation because the district court had previously entered preservation orders applicable to those cases. As we also indicated, since the entry of those orders the Government has complied with our preservation obligations in those cases. At the time the preservation issue was first litigated in the MDL proceedings in 2007, the Government submitted a classified ex parte, in camera declaration addressing in detail the steps taken to meet our preservation obligations. Because the activities undertaken in connection with the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP) were not declassified until December 2013, we were not able to consult with you previously about the specific preservation steps that have been taken with respect to the Jewel litigation. However, the Government described for the district court in 2007 how it was meeting its preservation obligations, including with respect to the information concerning the PSP activities declassified last December. We have been working with our clients to prepare an unclassified summary of the preservation steps described to the court in 2007 so that we can address your questions in an orderly fashion with Judge White, if you continue to believe that is necessary.

After San Francisco Judge Jeffrey White ordered the government to explain itself, the government changed the timeline, suppressing the fact that they told EFF to hold off on making any filings. It also said it would just have to keep destroying data.

Therefore, in light of the FISC’s March 7 order, the Government currently remains subject to orders of the FISC—the Article II Court established by Congress with authority to issue orders pursuant to FISA and to impose specific minimization requirements—which orders require the destruction of call-details records collected by the NSA pursuant to Section 215 that are more than five years old.

In light of the obligations created by those orders, on March 7, 2014, upon receipt of the FISC’s decision, the Government filed a notice in First Unitarian and other cases challenging the legality of the Section 215 telephony metadata program of the Government’s intention, as of the morning of Tuesday, March 11, 2014, to comply with applicable FISC orders requiring the destruction of call-detail records at this time, absent a court order to the contrary.

Judge White was not impressed — he issued an order requiring the government to retain the data.

There are two things, even at first glance, that don’t make sense about all this.

First, there’s still one case that hasn’t been officially mentioned in any court discussion of retaining data I know of: Basaaly Moalin’s challenge to his dragnet identification, based off 2007 data that has probably already been destroyed but which almost certainly would reflect the many violations characteristic of the program at the time.

Then there’s the likelihood that one or both of the EFF cases was the case mentioned on February 17, 2009 — just over the 5 year age-off period at this point — regarding age-off requirements. If it was relevant then, why isn’t it now? Note, Reggie Walton is still presiding over the same decisions, so if that earlier case were an EFF one, Walton should know about it.

I would normally think this charade was just two sides lobbying for good press. Except that the phone dragnet data from just over 5 years ago — the stuff that would age off if the government followed FISC’s order — would show a great deal of violations, almost certainly constitutionally so.

So who is the entity in such a rush to destroy that data? DOJ? Or the FISC?

James Clapper Claims Publicly Acknowledged Details Are State Secrets While Boasting of Transparency

Between documents leaked by Edward Snowden, official court submissions, and official public statements, we know at least the following about the surveillance system set up after 9/11 and maintained virtually intact to this day:

  • Around of 8-14% of the content collected under Bush’s illegal program was domestic content (page 15 of the NSA IG Report says this constituted 8% of all the illegal wiretap targets but the percentage works out to be higher)
  • Some of the content collected via ongoing upstream collection currently includes intentionally-collected domestic content (NSA refuses to count this, even for the FISA Court)
  • Bush’s illegal wiretap program targeted Iraqi Intelligence Service targets, as well as targets affiliated with al Qaeda and its associates (see page 8)
  • NSA uses the phone metadata program with Iranian targets, as well as targets affiliated with al Qaeda and its associates
  • Both the illegal wiretap program and the Internet dragnet authorized under Pen Register/Trap and Trace in 2004 collected information that (because of the way TCP/IP works) would be legally content if treated as electronic surveillance
  • The NSA still conducts an Internet dragnet via collection overseas, which not only would permit the metadata-as-content collection, but would permit far more collection on US persons; that collection is seamlessly linked to the domestic dragnet collection
  • NSA uses the dragnets to decide which of content the telecoms have briefly indiscriminately collected to read

That is, the surveillance system is not so much discrete metadata programs and content programs directed overseas, directed exclusively against al Qaeda or even terrorists. Rather, it is a system in which network analysis plays a central role in selecting which collected content to read. That content includes entirely domestic communication. And targets of the system have not always been — and were not as recently as June — limited to terrorists.

These details of the surveillance system — along with the fact that AT&T and Verizon played the crucial role of collecting content and “metadata” off domestic switches — are among the details James “Least Untruthful” Clapper, with backup from acting Deputy Director of NSA Frances Fleisch, declared to still be state secrets on Friday, in spite of their public (and in many cases, official) acknowledgement.

In doing so, they are attempting to end the last remaining lawsuits for illegal wiretapping dating to 2006 by prohibiting discussion of the central issue at hand: the government has repeatedly and fairly consistently collected the content of US persons from within the US, at times without even the justification of terrorism. (For more background on Jewel v. AT&T, see here.)

Here’s how Clapper, with a nod to Fleisch, lays out the rebuttal of the Jewel plaintiffs.

the NSA’s collection of the content of communications under the TSP was directed at international communications in which a participant was reasonably believed to be associated with al-Qa’ida or an affiliated organization. Thus, as the U.S. Government has previously stated, plaintiff’s allegation that the NSA has indiscriminately collected the content of millions of communications sent or received by people inside the United States after September 11, 2001, under the TSP is false.

There are several weasel parts of this claim.

The “Terrorist Surveillance Program” and the “Other Target Surveillance Program”

First, to make this claim, Clapper (and Fleisch) revert to use of “Terrorist Surveillance Program,” a term invented to segment off the part of the larger illegal wiretap program that George Bush was willing to confess to in December 2005, that involving international communications with a suspected al Qaeda figure. But as Fleisch admits — but doesn’t explain — at ¶20, the TSP is just a subset of the larger Presidential Surveillance Program.  Read more