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OLC Restores 4th Amendment after Hounding from Congress

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In her post on Steven Bradbury’s October 6, 2008 OLC opinion withdrawing the October 23, 2001 OLC memo eviscerating the 4th Amendment, Christy asks some important questions.

In fact, it reads like a thinly veiled, but ever-so-politely worded, call of “bullshit.”

It’s laugh out loud funny.  Or would be if it weren’t for the fact that it took more than 7 years to issue it — during which time the government was still operating under the craptastic legal assumptions, one presumes.

Why was this kept hidden?

I’ve got a pretty good answer why Bradbury’s opinion was kept hidden.

In the exchange between DiFI and Michael Mukasey above–which took place on April 10, 2008–Mukasey equivocated, badly, about whether or not that October 23, 2001 opinion remained in force.

DiFi: Is this memo in force? That the Fourth Amendment does not apply in domestic military.

Mukasey: The principle that the Fourth Amendment does not apply in wartime is not in force.

DiFi: No. The principle that I asked you about? Does it apply to domestic military operations? Is the Fourth Amendment, today, applicable to domestic military operations?

Mukasey: [unclear] don’t know of domestic military operations being carried out today.

DiFi: I’m asking you a question. That’s not the answer. The question is, does it apply?

Mukasey: I’m unaware of any domestic military operations being carried out today.

[back and forth]

Mukasey:  The Fourth Amendment applies across the board regardless of whether we’re in wartime or in peacetime.

[snip]

Mukasey: In my understanding it is not operative.

Well, it turns out it took another six months for Bradbury to withdraw the opinion.

Given Mukasey’s equivocations, I’d say there’s a very good reason they hid the memo (and, by association, the evidence that it had not been withdrawn when Mukasey equivocated wildly). I’d also suggest that, Mukasey knew well of a domestic military operation–DOD’s NSA wiretapping Americans domestically–that was ongoing at the time. And which, until the passage of the FISA Amendment Act, may well have been relying on Yoo’s October 2001 memo for legal cover.

The Push to Publish the OPR Report

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Mike wants Yoo
(photo by Emilyschneider)

I was wondering when this would come out. After all, one of the advantages of having an easily-used journalist like Mikey Isikoff around is that when someone needs to leak something to increase political pressure, they know whom to go to.

So, those who want to make sure the OPR report damning John Yoo and Steven Bradbury is published in its current "very harsh" form will go to Mikey to make sure the report’s conclusions become public.

According to two knowledgeable sources who asked not to be identified discussing sensitive matters, a draft of the report was submitted in the final weeks of the Bush administration. It sharply criticized the legal work of two former top officials—Jay Bybee and John Yoo—as well as that of Steven Bradbury, who was chief of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the time the report was submitted, the sources said. (Bybee, Yoo and Bradbury did not respond to multiple requests for comment.)

But then–Attorney General Michael Mukasey and his deputy, Mark Filip, strongly objected to the draft, according to the sources. Filip wanted the report to include responses from all three principals, said one of the sources, a former top Bush administration lawyer. (Mukasey could not be reached; his former chief of staff did not respond to requests for comment. Filip also did not return a phone message.) OPR is now seeking to include the responses before a final version is presented to Attorney General Eric Holder Jr. "The matter is under review," said Justice spokesman Matthew Miller.

[snip]

OPR investigators focused on whether the memo’s authors deliberately slanted their legal advice to provide the White House with the conclusions it wanted, according to three former Bush lawyers who asked not to be identified discussing an ongoing probe. One of the lawyers said he was stunned to discover how much material the investigators had gathered, including internal e-mails and multiple drafts that allowed OPR to reconstruct how the memos were crafted.

And in addition to those pushing to make the report public, there are those–speaking in a voice that sounds remarkably like certain lawyers associated with Dick Cheney–attacking the legitimacy of the report.

"OPR is not competent to judge [the opinions by Justice attorneys]. They’re not constitutional scholars," said the former Bush lawyer. 

David! How’ve you been now that you’ve been separated from your man-sized safe?

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“Very Harsh Conclusions” about Yoo and Bradbury

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Remember that Office of Public Responsibility investigation that Congress requested, Bush squelched (by refusing the investigators clearance to do the investigation), but that, under Mukasey got reinstated?

Brad DeLong has word of what has happened to it:

[T]he OPR… came to "very harsh conclusions" about the professional competence of a number of the [Yoo and Bradbury] memos, making "recommendations for further action" with respect to both John Yoo and Stephen Bradbury. Attorney Genera Mukasey and Deputy AG Filip were reported to be apoplectic about the report and to have attempted to squelch it. Their concern is… for the defense of reliance on advice of counsel that Mukasey put forward in a series of speeches, and that the OPR reports will make, I understand, something of an absurdity…

There’s a lot to be said about this. But I’ll just start with the suggestion that–given that these "straws in the wind" have come to Berkeley Professor Brad DeLong–I can’t help but wonder whether Berkeley Professor John Yoo’s acceptance of a visiting position at Liberty University West Chapman University reflected some concern that Berkeley might see such "very harsh conclusions" to be the excuse they were looking for to get rid of the torture apologist.

Let’s hope this leak of Mukasey and Filip’s attempt to squelch this indicates that they have failed in doing so.

About those Missing OLC Opinions

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(Note: I’m scheduled to be on Mark Levine’s Inside Scoop today at 5PM ET. You can listen in here.)

Okay okay already. Here’s your damn missing OLC opinion post.

As a number of you have pointed out, ProPublica did a very cool database of all the OLC opinions on executive power, torture, and warrantless wiretapping that we know of. The database collects in one place, in sortable form, the opinions that track Bush’s abuse of power. 

I had done a timeline mapping the warrantless wiretap opinions to known events associated with Bush’s illegal program (though it’s not sortable like the ProPublica one). And don’t forget that John Conyers gave us a very detailed description of that opinion eliminating the 4th Amendment.

The memorandum, which was directed to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and Defense Department General Counsel William J. Haynes, addresses whether the president has constitutional or statutory authority to use military force inside the United States in terrorism-related situations and, if so, whether such domestic military operations would be barredby either the Fourth Amendment or the federal Posse Comitatus statute. Examples of the type of force considered for purposes of the analysis include, but are not limited to: (1) destroying civilian aircraft that are believed to have been hijacked; (2) deploying troops to control traffic in and out of a major American city; (3) seizing or attacking civilian property, such as apartment buildings, office complexes, or ships, believed to contain terrorism suspects; and, (4) using military-level eavesdropping and surveillance technology on domestic targets.

Mr. Yoo and Mr. Delahunty concluded that both Article II of the Constitution and the 9/11 use of force resolution would authorize these types of domestic military operations (even though Congress had expressly rejected language proposed by the Administration for the AUMF that would have authorized domestic military operations).292 The memorandum also contains extended discussion of a hypothetical example which posits that a domestic military commander has received information, not rising to the level of probable cause, suggesting that a terrorist has hidden inside an apartment building and may possess weapons of mass destruction. According to the memorandum, not only does the Constitution permit the commander to seize the building, detain everyone found inside, and then interrogate them – all without obtaining any sort of warrant – but information gathered by military commanders in this way could used for criminal prosecution purposes as long as the primary reason for the seizure was the military fight against terrorism and not law enforcement. Read more →

Iraq War Memos Released: Working Thread

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McClatchy’s Marisa Taylor has gotten a hold of three more Yoo memos–and one Jack Goldsmith memo–that reveal the Administration’s thinking on the Iraq War.

They are:

October 23, 2002: Bush has authority to declare war against Iraq because his Daddy did

November 8, 2002: UN 1441 doesn’t prevent Bush from going to war outside the terms of 1441

December 7, 2002: If Scooter Libby claims the Iraqis lied on their WMD declaration, Bush can declare war

March 18, 2004: If the US ships Iraqis outside of Iraq, then they can torture them [Jack Goldsmith’s opinion]

I’m most interested in the December 2002 memo, because it seems to have shaped the roll-out of propaganda directed against Iraq–up to and including John Bolton’s use of the Niger claim in a State Department release on Iraq’s declaration. Basically, they seem to have gotten the legal opinion, then tailored their propagana to the terms of the legal opinion.

But I guarantee you, Mary is going to have some things to say about the Goldsmith memo, which she has been keeping an eye out for for some time.

Consider this a working thread.

Update: Come to think of it, the October 23, 2002 opinion is pretty funky. As it points out, it came not long after Congress approved the Iraq War resolution.

You asked us to render an opinion based on the constitutional and other legal authorities that would exist in the absence of new authorization from either Congress or the United Nations ("U.N .") Security Council. We note that on October 16, 2002, the President signed into law the Authorization for Use of MiIitary Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, HJ. Res. 114, Pub. L No. 107-243,116 Stat. 1498 (2oo2),which authorizes the President to use force against Iraq to enforce relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq and to defend the national security of the United States from the threat posed by Iraq. We have not considered here the legal effect of that resolution. As this memorandum makes clear, even prior to the adoption HJ. Res. 114 the President had sufficient constitutional and statutory authority to use force against Iraq. We also note that negotiations are ongoing in the U.N. Security Council on a
new resolution regarding Iraq, but we do not address any of the proposed terms here.

It’s as if, at each stage of the process, Bush got Yoo to say he could do what he wanted regardless of the machinations in Congress and the UN, so he could claim he didn’t need that authorization. (Shades of Daddy, here.) And, of course, they eventually probably relied on that authority when they went to war without a new resolution.

I wonder whether Colin Powell knew about these opinions?

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John Yoo: “It Sucks to Have Judges Protecting the Constitution”

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John Yoo complains that the Supreme Court’s strong rulings last term are an "unprecedented" grab for power.

Slowly but surely, the justices have expanded their power to make many of our society’s fundamental political and moral decisions. Only the court now decides whether schools or the government can resort to race-based preferences when it admits students or doles out contracts. States and the federal government must live by the court’s dictates on the regulation of abortion. Whether religious groups can help educate inner-city children or provide welfare services is up to the justices. Use of the death penalty, indeed whether each individual execution will go forward, is ultimately controlled by our unelected judges.

[snip]

Some might prefer that judges still make these decisions because they hear cases in a formal, rational setting and issue long opinions explaining their reasons. Nonetheless, the courts are far from ideal as policymakers: They have great difficulty trading off competing values in these sensitive areas; they are insulated from the political process; and their only access to information comes to them through the narrow lens of a lawsuit.

When the federal judiciary decides national policy on these issues, under the guise of interpreting the Constitution, it prevents the people from making the decisions for themselves.

Not surprisingly, Yoo’s argument gets particularly laughable when he complains about Boumediene.

The decisions announced this summer only reaffirm the court’s power. In Boumediene v. Bush, five justices – the wandering Justice Anthony Kennedy joined by a liberal bloc of Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer – took the unprecedented step of striking down a wartime law enacted by Congress and the president.

U.S. history has never seen what the Boumediene majority now demands: Alien enemy prisoners at war with U.S. forces and detained outside the United States have the same right as criminal suspects to challenge their capture in civilian courts. Hundreds of years of practice, and the decided views of the political branches, to which the Constitution gives all of the powers over war, were tossed overboard.

After all, this was a guy who routinely ignored laws passed by Congress–including laws passed during the Vietnam war–to rationalize things like domestic surveillance and torture. But he has found one law–the Military Commissions Act–that he believes should be protected above all else.

Regardless of whether it violates the Constitution or not.

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The al-Haramain Decision

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Due to some doozy global warming storms last night, we had intermittent power, so I’m just now getting to the Vaughn Walker decision in the al Haramain case, in which he dismisses the suit but invites the plaintiffs to submit unclassified evidence in support of their case. So there’s already a range of smart commentary on the decision. The Electronic Frontier Foundation argues that Walkers ruling bodes well for their own case–which relies on the AT&T documents liberated by Mark Klein, and not classified evidence. Wired’s David Kravets notes that, coming as it does two business days before Congress will grant the telecoms immunity, the ruling has little meaning for EFF. McJoan basically makes the same argument–Congress is in the process of taking an unwieldy bad law and making it worse.

With regards the events of the next week, I sort of agree that this ruling will have little effect. There’s nothing in Walker’s ruling that will, by itself, persuade Barack Obama to take a stand on this legislation (he’s due to make an announcement about his stance on the legislation, but I don’t think this will change it one way or another). And I agree with Kravets–once Congress does pass its immunity, this ruling will be meaningless for those suing the telecoms (though perhaps it’ll make the likely suits that the immunity itself is illegal more interesting).

State Secrets Is Not Absolute

But the decision is interesting for two other reasons. First, Walker makes a strong case that the government’s ability to invoke state secrets is not absolute. Walker cites one of David Addington’s favorite cases, Navy v. Egan, to show that even that case envisions the possibility of Congress placing limits on the President’s ability to control national security information.

But Egan also discussed the other side of the coin, stating that “unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.” Id at 530 (emphasis added). Egan recognizes that the authority to protect national security information is neither exclusive nor absolute in the executive branch. When Congress acts to contravene the president’s authority, federal courts must give effect to what Congress has required. Egan’s formulation is, therefore, a specific application of Justice Jackson’s more general statement in Youngstown Sheet & Tube. [my emphasis]

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HJC Testimony: Mr. Unitary Executive and Mr. Yoo, Two

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Coverage of the hearing is on CSPAN3, the Committee stream, and good coverage (featuring Scott Horton and Jane Mayer) on KPFA.

Scott; Yoo, any discussion of SERE techniques?

Yoo: Can’t discuss.

Nadler: We need to know why.

Yoo: According to DOJ, privilege both attorney-client privilege and classified.

Nadler: Attorney-client not valid here. Classified is valid if it applies.

Yoo: I have to follow it.

Nadler: It’s difficult to assert your assertion of privilege on this issue bc Bradbury testified earlier this year and said it was adapted from SERE. How can this be privileged?

Yoo: Recognize that a-c does not apply. It is their privilege to raise. If you and DOJ have disagreement.

Nadler: Bradbury is the one making the decision on these privileges, but he answered the question.

Scott; Addington, SERE?

ADD: no, I don’t think I did, but no reason to dispute what Bradbury said.

Scott: Is torture illegal?

ADD: as defined by statute, it would be illegal.

Scott: international agreement of when it’s torture and when it isn’t?

ADD: Is a treaty in effect …

Scott: Don’t people know when it’s torture and when it’s not.

ADD: Senate put in reservation.

Scott: 9/11 did not change definition of torture.

Schroeder: it’d be hard to prosecute on opinion.

Scott: Does Administration have ability to write up such an opinion and torture people based on ridiculous memo.

Schroeder: No.

Scott: is it an excuse to torture if you got good information.

Schroeder: Treaty admits no exceptions.

Scott: If you’re going to go around torturing based on your memo, how do you know beforehand whether you’re going to get good information.

Yoo: Disagree with the premise of question.

Scott: If you can’t get information via other techniques, can you use harsher techniques?

Yoo: Nothing in statute that says anything about that.

Watt: Schroeder. Comment on your testimony, policy and law. In 22 years I practiced law, I had a client, who when he didn’t like my advice, he would say the lord told him to do otherwise. Are there things that go beyond Yoo’s memo?

Schroeder: Hope I’m not joining ADD and Yoo, not able to answer your question. We’ve read reports that water-boarding used on some subjects.

Watt: Would that go beyond Yoo’s memo?

Schroeder: I’d need to know more on water-boarding.

Watt: Recourse that public and Congress would have would be impeachment?

Schroeder: [Pondering] It would be difficult under legal theory in August 2002, to think of what remedy would be available other than impeachment.

Watt: What recourse does the public have against an Read more →

HJC Testimony: Mr. Unitary Executive and Mr. Yoo

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Here’s a post I did on David Addington’s testimony at the Libby trial.

Here is John Yoo’s prepared testimony.

Note this hearing is a Subcommittee Hearing–so it’s Jerrold Nadler’s baby, not Conyers’. That means a subset of HJC’s better questioners will appear today: Nadler, Davis, Wasserman Schultz, Ellison, Conyers, Scott, Watt, and Cohen, with Franks, Pence, Issa, King, and Jordan for the bad guys.

Nadler: Subject of utmost importance to integrity of nation. Will not be permitted to be disrupted–anyone will be expelled immediately. Legal memos defining torture out of existence. I speak for many of my colleagues when I say the more we hear the more appalled we become. One testifying voluntarily, one testifying under subpoena. We will not be deterred by unchecked delcaration of privilege.

Franks: Almost 60 hearings on detainee treatment. Torture banned by various laws. Severe interrogations do not involve torture and they are legal. Results of waterboarding KSM, Abu Zubaydah, and al-Nashiri valuable. Alan Dershowitz says we can torture, so everything’s okay.

Franks just asked to submit evidence into the record. Nadler went, whuh? Nadler complains about Addington stiffing the committee for written testimony, but then submitting his own exhibits.

Nadler: I want to defend Dershowitz against allegations he’s an ultra-liberal. He just wrote a book advocating torture through warrants.

Conyers: More concerned about what we’re going to do, not any individual citizen. I don’t know why giving someone a lawyer is shocking to anyone. We have reports stating that our witnesses played a central role in drafting legal opinions on torture.

[Note: both sides look unusually prepared today, with Franks and Conyers both showing video from earlier hearings.]

Addington: 3 points. Iran-Contra said I was working for Cheney, in fact designee for Broomfield of MI. An author of prep for minority views, I had left before the report was written. More important, Conyers mentioned, wanted to give benefit of doubt. There’s one subject in which there’s no doubt, I believe everyone on this committee want to defend this country, protect it from terrorism, differences on how that’s accomplished. Thank you.

Nadler: Sorry I gave you too much credit. Is that the entirety of your statement?

[Nadler seems befuddled by ADD]

Yoo: Thank you, appreciate Conyers open mind. Waive rest of my time.

Nadler: You don’t want to summarize it?

Yoo: I don’t need to. Read more →

The JAG Dismisses the Unitary Executive

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Via POGO, the Pentagon has made two key documents relating to the military’s use of torture available on its website: a March 2003 JAG Memo slamming a draft of the Working Group’s Report on Detainee Interrogation, and the Working Group’s Report which was published the following month. As POGO notes, these documents were declassified some time ago (Marty Lederman had posted the JAG one here and WaPo posted the report here), but they provide important context to the discussions surrounding John Yoo’s March 2003 Torture Memo.

I’ll come back to the Working Group Report (which lays out the potential risks for when the public discovers the US is using torture and has a nifty list of the ways our interrogation techniques would piss off our allies), but for now I just wanted to show how dubious the Judge Advocate general, General Thomas Romig, found John Yoo’s (and the Administration’s) Unitary Executive theories to be:

The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), Department of Justice (DOJ), provided DOD with its analysis of international and domestic law as it relates to the interrogation of detainees held by the United States Government. This analysis was incorporated into the subject draft Report and forms, almost exclusively, the legal framework for the Report’s Conclusions, Recommendations, and PowerPoint spreadsheet analysis of interrogation techniques in issue. I am concerned with several pivotal aspects of the OLC opinion.

While the OLC analysis speaks to a number of defenses that could be raised on behalf of those who engage in interrogation techniques later perceived to be illegal, the "bottom line" defense proffered by OLC is an exceptionally broad concept of "necessity." This defense is based on the premise that any existing federal statutory provision or international obligation is unconstitutional per se, where it otherwise prohibits conduct viewed by the President, acting in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, as essential to his capacity to wage war. I question whether this theory would ultimately prevail in either the U.S. courts or in any international forum. If such a defense is not available, soldiers ordered to use otherwise illegal techniques run a substantial risk of criminal prosecution or personal liability arising from a civil lawsuit.

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