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Judge: Padilla Can’t Sue for Torture because Justification for His Torture Was Based on Torture

Here’s the main thrust of Judge Richard Mark Gergel’s decision to dismiss Jose Padilla’s Bivens suit against Donald Rumsfeld and other high level Bush officials who denied him his Constitutional rights.

The Court finds that “special factors” are present in this case which counsel hesitation in creating a right of action under Bivens in the absence of express Congressional authorization. These factors include the potential impact of a Bivens claim on the Nation’s military affairs, foreign affairs, intelligence, and national security and the likely burden of such litigation on the government’s resources in these essential areas. Therefore, the Court grants the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. Entry 141) regarding all claims of Plaintiffs arising from the United States Constitution.

Basically, the “special factors” in this case mean Padilla can’t sue for having been tortured and denied counsel.

Now that’s not all that surprising. That’s been one of the favored ways of making Bivens claims go away.

But what’s particularly interesting is the implicit argument in Gergel’s opinion that Abu Zubaydah’s torture was one of those “special factors.” Between the long passage where Gergel lays out the “special factors” as the guideline governing his decision and where he argues that those special factors require dismissal of the case, he includes this passage:

In analyzing this substantial body of case law relating to Bivens claims, it is useful to soberly and deliberately evaluate the factual circumstances of Padilla’s arrival and the then-available intelligence regarding his background and plans on behalf of Al Qaeda. Padilla arrived in Chicago nearly eight months after September 11, 2001 with reports that he was an Al Qaeda operative with a possible mission that included the eventual discharge of a “dirty bomb” in the Nation’s capital. (Dkt. Entry 91-2 at 4) He also had reportedly engaged in discussions with Al Qaeda operatives about detonating explosives in hotels, gas stations and train stations. (Jd. at 5). He was also thought to possess significant knowledge regarding Al Qaeda plans, personnel and operations. (Dkt. Entry 91-23 at 8-9).

Based on the information available at the time, which reportedly included information from confidential informants previously affiliated with Al Qaeda, the President of the United States took the highly unusual step of designating Padilla, an American citizen arrested on American soil, an enemy combatant. (Dkt. Entry 91-3).

Note how the judge doesn’t cite a source here for the claim that Padilla’s designation “reportedly included information from confidential informants;” the source for that sentence is just Bush’s designation itself, which has the section on sources redacted. But earlier he referenced Michael Mobbs’ declaration which included the following footnote describing these sources.

Based on the information developed by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement activities, it is believed that the two detained confidential sources have been involved with the Al Qaeda terrorist network. One of the sources has been involved with Al Qaeda for several years and is believed to have been involved in the terrorist activities of Al Qaeda. The other sources is also believed to have been involved in planning and preparing for terrorist activities of Al Qaeda. It is believed that these confidential sources have not been completely candid about their association with Al Qaeda and their terrorist activities. Much of the information from these sources has, however, been corroborated and proven accurate and reliable. Some information provided by the sources remains uncorroborated and may be part of an effort to mislead or confuse U.S. officials. One of the sources, for example, in a subsequent interview with a U.S. law enforcement official recanted some of the information that he had provided, but most of the information has been independently corroborated by other sources. In addition, at the time of being interviewed by U.S. officials, one of the sources was being treated with various types of drugs to treat medical conditions.

Gergel doesn’t say it, but we all know that one of those “confidential informants” is Abu Zubaydah and the other is probably Binyam Mohamed. Presumably, Zubaydah was the one “being treated” with drugs. And given the reference to US law enforcement, he is also presumably the one who recanted his statements about Padilla.

But more importantly, Gergel doesn’t say, but we know, that both Zubaydah and Mohamed had been subjected to extreme sleep deprivation–and possibly a great deal more–by the time they made their statements tying Padilla to terrorism. Gergel also doesn’t say that other cases based on Mohamed’s torture-induced testimony had been dismissed.

Gergel also doesn’t acknowledge that the federal conspiracy charges of which Padilla was convicted have nothing to do with the charges laid out in these documents related to his designation as an enemy combatant; that doesn’t stop Gergel from emphasizing that Padilla is a “convicted terrorist.”

Nevertheless, his discussion of Padilla’s designation using torture-induced evidence, appearing as it does right between his establishment of “special factors” as the guiding principle and his dismissal of the suit betrays that this torture-induced evidence is a key part of these “special factors.”

That background, though, makes it clear why Gergel thought those special factors should trump Padilla’s constitutional rights.

Padilla’s counsel would likely seek information on intelligence methods and interrogations of other Al Qaeda operatives. All of this would likely raise numerous complicated state secret issues. A trial on the merits would be an international spectacle with Padilla, a convicted terrorist, summoning America’s present and former leaders to a federal courthouse to answer his charges. This massive litigation would have been authorized not by a Congressionally established statutory cause of action, but by a court implying an action from the face of the American Constitution.3

3 Plaintiffs’ counsel urged the Court at oral argument to delay consideration of the practical realities of allowing a Bivens claim to go forward under these facts and circumstances until after the motion to dismiss stage. This approach, however, would result in the Court failing to timely consider “special factors” counseling hesitation, which include here the potential disruption and burdening of national security, intelligence and military operations arising from discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

You can’t have a “convicted terrorist” summon someone like Rummy to a federal courthouse to answer questions about the torture the government used to justify Padilla’s own designation as an enemy combatant so we could in turn torture him. That would be a “spectacle.”

It all makes so much sense!

Eric Holder’s Defense of Ashcroft to Defend the Material Witness Statute

The NYT has a worthwhile editorial lambasting the Obama DOJ’s pursuit of SCOTUS review in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, which will probably result in expanded immunity for government officials that abuse the law so as to abuse the rights of Americans. The editorial focuses closely on the way in which DOJ’s defense of absolute immunity amounts to a defense of using the material witness law as an improper basis for detention.

Prosecutorial immunity is intended to let prosecutors enforce the law without fear of being held personally liable. Protecting that legitimate aim did not require the administration to defend the indefensible. In forcefully defending the material witness statute on grounds that curtailing it would severely limit its usefulness, it is defending the law as a basis for detention. That leaves the disturbing impression that the administration is trying to preserve the option of abusing the statute again.

In other words, NYT argues that DOJ’s SCOTUS appeal in this case is as much about preserving the improper use of the material witness statute–to hold a person under the material witness statute so you can conduct an investigation into him–as it is about the immunity per se.

Of course it is.

After all, this is what Eric Holder (along with Janet Reno and two others) had to say about the material witness statute in 2004.

Even when there is insufficient evidence to charge a citizen with a crime, the material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, permits the detention of a person whose testimony is “material in a criminal proceeding” if “it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena.” This statute is an effective counter-terrorism tool for several reasons. Because a grand jury investigation is a “criminal proceeding” for purposes of this statute, see United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 49-64 (2d Cir. 2003); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 939-41 (9th Cir. 1971), and because of the broad scope of grand jury investigations, see supra p. 11, the government can detain a suspected terrorist as a material witness before it has evidence sufficient to support a criminal arrest or indictment.

The government can obtain a material witness warrant with relative ease. For a grand jury witness, the required showing can be made by a good faith statement by a prosecutor or investigating agent that the witness has information material to the grand jury. Bacon, 449 F.2d at 943; Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 65-66. Nor would establishing that a suspected terrorist poses a flight risk be an onerous task. See 349 F.3d at 69 (bail denied in part because witness failed to come forward with material testimony concerning terrorist attack). [my emphasis]

Mind you, in its Cert Petition, the government doesn’t admit that the material statute really was used in al-Kidd’s case to hold him even though the government had insufficient evidence to do so.

First, respondent claimed that, in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, petitioner implemented a policy of using the material witness statute as a pretextual tool to investigate and detain terrorism suspects whom the government lacked probable cause to charge criminally. Respondent alleged that he was arrested as a result of this alleged policy, which he contended violated the Fourth Amendment. [my emphasis]

So even though a document–signed by the current Attorney General at a time when al-Kidd was still subject to restricted movement–boasts about how easy it is to use of the material witness statute to hold people without sufficient evidence to do so, DOJ calls this use of the material witness statute “alleged.”

I guess if they admitted this was an intentional policy, it’d be harder to get SCOTUS to wink at its use going forward.

Update: harpie’s right. This is an editorial, not an op-ed.

The Terrorist Sympathizers Grassley Doesn’t Mention: Chiquita

Predictably, Politico piles onto the latest installment of the McCarthyist attacks on DOJ, largely repeating the attack as made by Dana Perino and Bill Burck. The one thing it does add is some discussion of what Eric Holder should have disclosed at his confirmation hearings last year.

Holder didn’t mention the brief during his confirmation hearings to be Attorney General, even though the Senate Judiciary Committee questionnaire required him to list all Supreme Court amicus briefs he was party to. His questionnaire lists briefs in only three cases: Miller-El v. Cockrell, Johnson v. Bush and D.C. and Fenty v. Heller.

A Justice Department spokesman, Matthew Miller, said “the brief should have been disclosed,” but had been “ unfortunately and inadvertently” left out in the documents submitted to the committee.

“ In any event,” he said, “ the Attorney General has publicly discussed his positions on detention policy on many occasions, including at his confirmation hearings.

Justice Department officials also didn’t mention the briefs in the letter they sent to Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) informing Congress that nine of the department’s political appointees either “represented detainees [or] … either contributed to amicus briefs in detainee-related cases or were otherwise involved in advocacy on behalf of detainees.”

Now, I agree that Holder should have disclosed all this.

But I’m also interested in the tizzy surrounding whether Holder should have disclosed himself in response the questions Chuck Grassley posed on terrorist sympathizers at DOJ. Granted, originally asked were definitely targeted toward creating this witchhunt–that is, to detainees at Gitmo, rather than to the representation of terrorists and their affiliates generally.

But if we’re going to discuss Holder’s “biases,” shouldn’t we start with Holder’s representation of Chiquita, and particularly his success at getting several white Republican men off of charges that they knowing supported right wing Colombian terrorists? Particularly given the way Bush’s DOJ facilitated that process?

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The Next Attack: Holder’s Amicus Curiae Brief Against Unlimited Presidential Power

As Jake Tapper reports, the next attack the McCarthyites have planned is on Eric Holder, for once saying in an amicus curiae brief that it’s possible following the Constitution will make it harder to detain potential terrorists.

In 2004 Attorney General Eric Holder was one of four former Clinton administration officials offering an amicus brief questioning President Bush’s assertion that he had the inherent authority to indefinitely detain as “enemy combatants” American citizens captured in the US.

The brief, offered in the case Donald Rumsfeld v Jose Padilla, can be read HERE.  Holder’s co-authors include former Attorney General Janet Reno, former deputy Attorney General Philip Heymann, and the former counsel for the CIA Jeffrey Smith.

A Republican official on the Senate Judiciary Committee tells ABC News that Holder did not disclose this amicus brief before his confirmation hearings.

The brief is actually refreshing in its simplicity. It recites all the means the executive branch has to combat terrorism, then says the President doesn’t also need the power to detain Americans without any judicial oversight. I can see why and how the Republicans will make a stink of it, but that doesn’t mean they are right.

But there’s a part of the brief that deserves particularly close attention–because it raises the implicit question of why the Bush Administration didn’t just charge Jose Padilla, if they could back up the claims they made about him.

When Padilla was arrested pursuant to the material witness warrant, his terrorist plans were thwarted. He was then available to be questioned to the same extent as any other citizen suspected of criminal activity. Moreover, the facts set forth in the President’s findings, and the facts presented to the District Court, are more than sufficient to support criminal charges against Padilla, including providing material support to designated terrorist organizations, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; providing material support to terrorists, id. § 2339A; conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a; and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, id. § 2332a(a)(1).36 Read more

OPR Report Timeline

In response to the news that David Margolis spiked the misconduct conclusion in the OPR Report on OLC justifications for torture, I wanted to put together a timeline of its construction. Two things stick out. First, the role of Mary Patrice Brown–who replaced Marshall Jarrett at a time when OPR was backing off its offer of transparency–deserves further scrutiny in this report. When she presented the report to Holder in August, she apparently recommended that he reopen investigations into torture.

Also, I still think the timing suggests DOJ delayed its release to protect Yoo in the Padilla suit.

January 4, 2008: Padilla sues Yoo.

February 12, 2008: Senators Durbin and Whitehouse request that OPR investigate torture authorizations

February 18, 2008: Marshall Jarrett informs Durbin and Whitehouse that torture authorizations included in OPR investigation of OLC, agrees to share report with them and–possibly–release an unclassified public version

Late December 2008: Draft of OPR submitted, Michael Mukasey and Mark Filip demand that Yoo, Bybee, and Bradbury get to respond

February 14, 2009: Isikoff reports that OPR report came to harsh conclusions of OLC lawyers’ work; reports Mukasey and Filip allowance for lawyer response

February 16, 2009: Whitehouse and Durbin inquire about process used with OPR report

March 6, 2009: Hearing in Padilla-Yoo law suit

March 25, 2009: OPR response (signed by M. Faith Burton, Acting AAG) to Whitehouse and Durbin states Mukasey/Filip comments already integrated, OLC lawyer counsel in process of reviewing report; it doesn’t mention “career prosecutor” review:

When the review and comment [from Yoo, Bybee, and Bradbury’s lawyers] is concluded, OPR intends to review the comments submitted and make any modifications it deems appropriate to the findings and conclusions. OPR will then provide a final report to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General. After any additional review they deem appropriate, the department will determine what disclosures should be made.

The letter backs off Jarrett’s earlier promise to release the report:

In determining appropriate disclosures, we will be mindful of the considerable interest that Congress has previously expressed in connection with this matter and will seek to accommodate the information needs of our oversight committees in response to requests from their chairmen. While we appreciate your request for a disclosure commitment, we can only fully evaluate the scope of appropriate disclosures once the review process is completed. We trust you understand that those decisions depend in part on the content and conclusions of the OPR final report and the outcome of any further Departmental review.

March 31, 2009: Durbin and Whitehouse reply to OPR letter

April 8, 2009: Holder names Mary Patrice Brown to replace former OPR head, Marshall Jarrett

April 29, 2009: Leahy invites Bybee to testify to Senate Judiciary Committee; Bybee panics in response

May 4, 2009: According to AAG Ronald Welch, deadline for Yoo, Bybee, and Bradbury response to OPR report; on that day, Welch responds to Durbin and Whitehouse laying out the following as “normal” process for OPR reports:

In the past, former Department employees who were subjects of OPR investigations typically have been permitted to appeal adverse OPR findings to the Deputy Attorney General’s Office. A senior career official usually conducted that appeal by reviewing submissions from the subjects and OPR’s reply to those submissions, and then reaching a decision on the merits of the appeal. Under this ordinary procedure, the career official’s decision on the merits was final. This appeal procedure was typically completed before the Department determined whether to disclose the Report of Investigation to the former employees’ state bar disciplinary authorities or to anyone else. Department policy usually requires referral of OPR’s misconduct findings to the subject’s state bar disciplinary authority, but if the appeal resulted in a rejection of OPR’s misconduct findings, then no referral was made. This process afforded former employees roughly the same opportunity to contest OPR’s findings that current employees were afforded through the disciplinary process. While the Department has previously released public summaries of OPR reports under some circumstances, public release of the reports themselves has occurred only rarely. In the past, the release of a public summary occurred only after the subjects were afforded an opportunity to appeal any adverse findings.

The May 4 letter also informed the Senators of the CIA review.

May 6, 2009: WaPo reports OPR report still recommends sanctions against Yoo and Bybee

June 12, 2009: Judge rules Padilla suit can move forward

June 17, 2009: Whitehouse reveals that CIA conducting “substantive comment and classification review”

July 9, 2009: Yoo appeals decision on Padilla suit–and DOJ stops representing Yoo; Miguel Estrada would take on that role

July 12, 2009: Scott Horton reports that reading OPR Report was one thing that convinced Eric Holder to launch criminal review of torture

Prior to August 24, 2009: OPR submits report to Holder, recommends reopening criminal investigation into torture

August 24, 2009: Holder announces criminal investigation, citing (among other things) OPR report

November 16, 2009: Yoo submits opening brief in Padilla suit appeal

November 18, 2009: Holder announces OPR report due out “this month;” Court grants government extension to December 3 to submit amicus brief

November 20, 2009: Padilla requests extension–because of delay in government brief–until January 15

December: Margolis, purportedly reviewing OPR report, out sick (though reports say Yoo’s lawyer making last appeal for changes)

December 3, 2009: DOJ submits amicus brief claiming that OPR can address Padilla’s concerns

December 29, 2009: Yoo starts book publicity

January 18, 2010: Padilla submits response to appeal

January 29, 2010: Klaidman and Isikoff report OPR conclusions have been altered

John Yoo: Much More, and Much Less, Than a "Mere Lawyer"

Yoo casts himself here as a mere lawyer, but he was much more (and much less).

So reads the Padilla response to Yoo’s efforts to dismiss Padilla’s suit against him.

Padilla’s team goes on to argue why the 9th Circuit must allow Padilla’s suit against Yoo for violation of his constitutional rights to continue.

The district court’s order should be affirmed. First, the court properly concluded that an American citizen seized from a civilian jail and subjected to years of military detention and torture has a remedy under Bivens. The habeas statute does not extinguish a damages remedy: while habeas can stop an unconstitutional detention from continuing, it cannot remedy an unlawful detention that has already occurred-and provides no relief to a torture victim. Bivens deters unconstitutional conduct, and the Supreme Court long ago affirmed that this deterrence is, if anything, more important when a defendant–even the Attorney General–invokes national security in an effort to preclude judicial review. The need to deter the military imprisonment and tortre of Americans in America strongly counsels providing Padila with a remedy for the serious, systematic and willful constitutional violations.

Second, the district court properly rejected Yoo’s claim to lack causal responsibility.. He set the constitutional violations in motion: as a member of the War Council, he formulated policies of extra-judicial detention and brutal interrogation visited upon Padilla; then, as a government attorney, he provided interrogators with the legal cover they demanded before implementing those policies.

Third, it has long been clearly established that military agents cannot seize a citizen from a civilian jail, transport him to a military prison, detain him there indefinitely and incommunicado without criminal charge or conviction, and subject him to a program of brutal interrogations, sensory deprivation, and inhuman conditions. Y 00 contends that all those rights became unclear when the Executive labeled Padila an “enemy combatant,” but no reasonable official could have believed that the Executive’s unilateral labeling of a citizen would allow it to transgress core freedoms long recognized by the Supreme Court.

They go onto to explain why lawyers’ conduct must not be immune from liability.

If merely being a government lawyer insulates Yoo’s conduct from liability, then there is no limit to what government lawyers fired up with personal “zeal” can counsel: the construction of secret and lawless interrogation sites in American cities, dragnets based entirely on race or religion, the summary execution of American citizens on American streets.

And note that Yoo tried to dismiss precedents that are directly on point in this suit.

Y00 does not cite any case holding that lawyers cannot be held liable for giving knowingly false advice. Instead, he protests that a case cited by Plaintiffs involved “claims against government lawyers for providing intentionally incorrect legal advice.” Br.32 (citing Donovan, 433 F.2d at 744-45). Padilla alleges exactly that-that Y00 intentionally misrepresented the law to shield policies that he helped formulate and set in motion, providing legal cover for unconstitutional policies. Like Y00, the government lawyers in Donovan claimed that they had provided advice “in good faith” and that their opinion was based on a reasonable legal belief. But the defendants’ assertions of good faith were factual issues for the jury, not matters for the court even on summary judgment.

Padilla’s team then goes on to remind of the German lawyers prosecuted for war crimes.

Perhaps the most interesting argument in here, though, is the reference to a State Department document asserting that victims of domestic torture have access to Bivens.

Congress has criminalized torture, see 18 U.S.C. § 2340, the President has signed and the Senate has ratified the Convention Against Torture, 6 U.S.T. 3314, under which “[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war. . .may be invoked as a justification of torture,” and the Executive has not only prohibited the use of sensory deprivation, cruel and degrading torture, and physical or mental torture, Army Reg. 190-8 (criminalizing acts “intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering”), but plainly stated that a Bivens remedy is available to domestic torture victims like Padilla, see U.S. Written Response to Questions Asked by U.N. Committee Against Torture

ir 5 (Apr. 28,2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68554.hrm.8 [ed note, this should be: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68554.htm]

The State reference goes to a passage which reads:

U.S. law provides various avenues for seeking redress, including financial compensation, in cases of torture and other violations of constitutional and statutory rights relevant to the Convention. Besides the general rights of appeal, these can include any of the following, depending on the location of the conduct, the actor, and other circumstances:

[snip]

Suing federal officials directly for damages under provisions of the U.S. Constitution for “constitutional torts,” see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979);

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Another New Month, and Still No OPR Report

John-YooJohn Yoo has spent the last several weeks insisting he did not give George W Bush a blow job–while admitting that sometimes, he just had to play favorites with the President.

Were you close to George Bush?

No, I’ve never met him. I don’t know Cheney either. I have not gone hunting with him, which is probably a good thing for me.

[snip]

So you’re saying you were just one notch above an intern, you and Monica Lewinsky?

She was much closer to the president than I ever was.

[snip]

When you say you had “a client,” do you mean President Bush?

Yes, I mean the president, but also the U.S. government as a whole.

But isn’t a lawyer in the Department of Justice there to serve the people of this country?

Yes, I think you are quite right, when the government is executing the laws, but if there’s a conflict between the president and the Congress, then you have to pick one or the other.

Meanwhile, it has been 48 days since Eric Holder said the OPR Report on John Yoo and other OLC lawyers would be released by the end of November. And yet we still don’t have that report.

That’s particularly interesting because–as I pointed out a month ago, just days after Holder promised the OPR report imminently, the lawyers for Jose Padilla got an extension on their appellate response to Yoo and the government’s claim that Padilla couldn’t sue Yoo for all the bad lawyering he did. Their deadline? January 15, now just 11 days away.

In the government’s amicus brief in this suit, they boasted that Padilla didn’t need to sue Yoo personally, because the government had means to punish him for bad lawyering on its own. One means they boasted of? An OPR investigation.

In addition to potential discipline by a state bar, Department of Justice attorneys are also subject to investigation by the Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”), see 28 C.F.R. 0.39 and the Office of the Inspector General, 5 U.S.C. App. §8E. Section 1001 of the USA Patriot Act directs the Department of Justice Inspector General to review information and receive complaints alleging abuses of civil rights and civil liberties by Department of Justice employees. See Pub. L. 107-56, § 1001, 115 Stat. 391 (2001). OPR and the Office of the Inspector General have broad investigatory powers and can recommend discipline and even criminal prosecution, where appropriate. [my emphasis]

At the rate we’re going, Padilla’s lawyers will have to file their response to the boast that OPR can offer adequate discipline in cases like this, without yet learning what OPR did in this particular case.

I’m increasingly convinced that’s by design.

They Picked a Bad Week to Stop Sniffing Glue

The Obama Administration got stuck with a bad court date to have to try to convince a Judge the Jose Padilla suit against John Yoo should be dismissed. After all, we knew Yoo’s memos were legally indefensible. But with the release of nine new OLC memos–including the memo eviscerating the Fourth Amendment, the two withdrawing that one and others, and, significantly, one of the memos pertaining to Padilla specifically ("authorizing" his military detention), the sheer cravenness of Yoo’s legal work is in sharp relief this week.

Nevertheless, they did argue Judge White should dismiss the suit. Though it sounds like he wasn’t impressed with their argument. 

The judge, Jeffrey S. White of Federal District Court, explored the arguments of Mr. Padilla’s lawyers thoroughly, but he appeared to be skeptical of elements of the government’s argument.

And he referred to the 4th Amendment Evisceration memo specifically.

In fact, Judge White, who was appointed by President George W. Bush, even told the government’s lawyers that Mr. Yoo’s 2001 memorandum stating that the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures can be overridden was “a pretty scary position.”

And there’s a further problem with the Administration’s position. They’re arguing that it is not the place for the Courts to take recourse against a government lawyer gone bad–it’s the role of the Executive.

But any recourse against a government lawyer "is for the executive to decide, in the first instance, and for Congress to decide," not the courts, she said. 

Which suggests that the Administration thinks its puny OPR investigation against Yoo is an appropriate response.

The Obama Administration has already signalled that it doesn’t plan real legal consequences for its lawyer for torture. And yet based on that, they want the Courts to butt out.

One more point. It appears that the Administration has not yet turned all the memos used to justfy Padilla’s treatment over (or at least not made them public). 

Earlier last week, the Obama administration released nine "war on terror" memos — some written by Yoo, others by 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jay Bybee — shortly after White ordered the DOJ to clarify whether it wanted to submit them under seal in the Padilla case. However, the administration didn’t release all of the memos referenced in Padilla’s complaint, Read more

John Yoo complains, “I am trapped on a plane in all of this bad weather”

Poor John Yoo. Apparently now he’s trapped. Or, as his lawyer said, faced with "nothing more than a political rant disguised as a lawsuit." I know you’re all crying for him.

I’m a little bit late to posting about the law suit, on the behalf of Jose Padilla and his mother, against the guy who rationalized his torture, John Yoo. But that makes my punditry job easier–I can just borrow liberally from all the smart lawyers who have been debating the suit in this thread.

Though I’m not a lawyer, I agree with bmaz’s take that the suit is fairly weak.

First off, as despicable as Yoo is, I am not sure he is a proper party defendant here. Secondly, I think his actions are probably entitled to qualified immunity. Third, I see a real problem establishing direct causation for Padilla’s damage elements. Fourth, despite the allegations in the complaint, I am not sure that NDCA is the proper venue. fifth, it is just not particularly artfully plead. Read more