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Brett Kavanaugh Thinks that Jack Smith Is as Crazy as Ken Starr Was

There was a subtle moment in yesterday’s SCOTUS hearing on Trump’s absolute immunity claim.

Former Whitewater prosecutor Brett Kavanaugh asked Michael Dreeben whether DOJ had weighed in on this prosecution.

Did the President weigh in? he asked. The Attorney General?

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: As you’ve indicated, this case has huge implications for the presidency, for the future of the presidency, for the future of the country, in my view. You’ve referred to the Department a few times as having supported the position. Who in the Department? Is it the president, the attorney general?

MR. DREEBEN: The Solicitor General of the United States. Part of the way in which the special counsel functions is as a component of the Department of Justice.

The regulations envision that we reach out and consult. And on a question of this magnitude, that involves equities that are far beyond this prosecution, as the questions of the Court have —

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: So it’s the solicitor general?

MR. DREEBEN: Yes.

Having been told that Jack Smith consulted with a Senate-confirmed DOJ official on these tough issues, Kavanaugh immediately launched into a screed about Morrison v. Olson, the circuit court decision that upheld the Independent Counsel statute.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay. Second, like Justice Gorsuch, I’m not focused on the here and now of this case. I’m very concerned about the future. And I think one of the Court’s biggest mistakes was Morrison versus Olson.

MR. DREEBEN: Mm-hmm.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I think that was a terrible decision for the presidency and for the country. And not because there were bad people who were independent counsels, but President Reagan’s administration, President Bush’s administration, President Clinton’s administration were really hampered —

MR. DREEBEN: Yes.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: — in their view —

MR. DREEBEN: Mm-hmm.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: — all three, by the independent counsel structure. And what I’m worried about here is that that was kind of let’s relax Article II a bit for the needs of the moment. And I’m worried about the similar kind of situation applying here. That was a prosecutor investigating a president in each of those circumstances. And someone picked from the opposite party, the current president and — usually —

MR. DREEBEN: Mm-hmm.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: — was how it worked. And Justice Scalia wrote that the — the fairness of a process must be adjudged on the basis of what it permits to happen —

Kavanaugh slipped here, and described the horror of “Presidents,” not former Presidents, routinely being subject to investigation going forward.

MR. DREEBEN: Mm-hmm.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: — not what it produced in a particular case. You’ve emphasized many times regularity, the Department of Justice. And he said: And I think this applied to the independent counsel system, and it could apply if presidents are routinely subject to investigation going forward. “One thing is certain, however. It involves investigating and perhaps prosecuting a particular individual. Can one imagine a less equitable manner of fulfilling the executive responsibility to investigate and prosecute? What would the reaction be if, in an area not covered by this statute, the Justice Department posted a public notice inviting applicants to assist in an investigation and possible prosecution of a certain prominent person? Does this not invite what Justice Jackson described as picking the man and then searching the law books or putting investigators to work to pin some offense on him? To be sure, the investigation must relate to the area of criminal offense” specified by the statute, “but that has often been and nothing prevents it from being very broad.” I paraphrased at the end because it was referring to the judges.

MR. DREEBEN: Mm-hmm. Yes.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: That’s the concern going forward, is that the — the system will — when former presidents are subject to prosecution and the history of Morrison versus Olson tells us it’s not going to stop. It’s going to — it’s going to cycle back and be used against the current president or the next president or — and the next president and the next president after that. All that, I want you to try to allay that concern. Why is this not Morrison v. Olson redux if we agree with you? [my emphasis]

Kavanaugh pretended, as he and others did throughout, that he wasn’t really suggesting this was a case of Morrison v. Olson redux; he was just talking hypothetically about the future.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Right. No, I was just saying this is kind of the mirror image of that, is one way someone could perceive it, but I take your point about the different structural protections internally. And like Justice Scalia said, let me — I do not mean to suggest anything of the sort in the present case. I’m not talking about the present case. So I’m talking about the future.

This intervention came long after Kavanaugh suggested that charging Trump with defrauding the US for submitting fake election certificates and charging Trump with obstructing the vote certification after first charging hundreds of others with the same statute amounted to “creative” lawyering.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay. For other official acts that the president may take that are not within that exclusive power, assume for the sake of argument this question that there’s not blanket immunity for those official acts but that to preserve the separation of powers, to provide fair notice, to make sure Congress has thought about this, that Congress has to speak clearly to criminalize official acts of the president by a specific reference. That seems to be what the OLC opinions suggest — I know you have a little bit of a disagreement with that — and what this Court’s cases also suggest.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, it’s — isn’t — it’s a serious constitutional question whether a statute can be applied to the president’s official acts. So wouldn’t you always interpret the statute not to apply to the president, even under your formulation, unless Congress had spoken with some clarity?

MR. DREEBEN: I don’t think — I don’t think across the board that a serious constitutional question exists on applying any criminal statute to the president.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: The problem is the vague statute, you know, obstruction and 371, conspiracy to defraud the United States, can be used against a lot of presidential activities historically with a — a creative prosecutor who wants to go after a president.

But Kavanaugh returned to his insinuation that it was a stretch to prosecute a political candidate for submitting false certificates to Congress and the Archives under 18 USC 371 after his purported complaint about Morrison v. Olson.

Second, another point, you said talking about the criminal statutes, it’s very easy to characterize presidential actions as false or misleading under vague statutes. So President Lyndon Johnson, statements about the Vietnam War —

MR. DREEBEN: Mm-hmm.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: — say something’s false, turns out to be false that he says about the Vietnam War, 371 prosecution —

MR. DREEBEN: So —

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: — after he leaves office?

None of this intervention made any sense; it wouldn’t even have made sense if offered by someone who hadn’t criminalized an abusive, yet consensual, blowjob for years.

After all, contrary to the demands of many, Merrick Garland didn’t appoint a Special Counsel until Trump declared himself a candidate. By that point, hundreds of people had already been charged under 18 USC 1512(c)(2) and DOJ was at least four months into Executive Privilege fights over testimony from Mike Pence’s aides and Trump’s White House counsel. Jack Smith was appointed nine months after Lisa Monaco publicly confirmed that DOJ was investigating the fake electors and six months after overt subpoenas focused on the scheme came out (to say nothing of the treatment of Rudy Giuliani’s phones starting a year earlier).

This is not a Morrison v. Olson issue.

Rather, Kavanaugh is using his well-established hatred for Morrison v. Olson to complain that Trump was investigated at all — and that, after such time that a conflict arose, Garland appointed a non-partisan figure to head the already mature investigation.

It was one of many examples yesterday where the aggrieved white men on the court vomited up false claims made by Trump.

Kavanaugh made no mention of the appointment of Robert Hur — not just a Republican but a Trump appointee who had deprived Andy McCabe of due process — to investigate Joe Biden for precisely the same crime for which Trump was charged. That’ll become pertinent at such time as Donald Trump’s claim to Jack Smith’s appointment gets to SCOTUS. After all, in that case, Trump will have been similarly treated as Joe Biden. In that case, Hur’s distinction between Biden’s actions and Trump’s should (but probably won’t) reassure the right wing Justices that Trump was not selectively prosecuted.

Speaking of things Kavanaugh didn’t mention, his false complaint — and which Clarence Thomas raised as well — comes at a curious time.

Because of Aileen Cannon’s dawdling, Trump’s challenge to Jack Smith’s appointment won’t get to SCOTUS for months, if ever.

But Hunter Biden, whose challenge to David Weiss’ appointment takes the same novel form as Trump’s — an appropriations clause challenge — may be before the Third Circuit as soon as next week. In a passage of Abbe Lowell’s response to Weiss’ demand that the Third Circuit give Lowell, an observant Jew, three days including Passover to establish jurisdiction for his interlocutory appeal, Lowell scolded Weiss for presuming to know the basis of his appeals.

The Special Counsel boasts that it prepared its motion in “two days” (Mot.Exped.3), but the legal errors that permeate its motion to dismiss only underscore why more time is needed to adequately research and thoughtfully brief the jurisdictional issues for this Court. The Special Counsel ignores numerous bases for jurisdiction (e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 (collateral order doctrine), 1292(a)(1) (denial of Appropriations Clause injunction), and 1651 (mandamus)) over this appeal, and the legal claims it does make are flatly wrong, compare Mot.6 (falsely claiming “all Circuit Courts” reject reviewing denials of motions to enforce plea agreements as collateral orders), with United States v. Morales, 465 F. App’x 734, 736 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We also have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of orders denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on the ground that it was filed in breach of a plea agreement.”)

In addition to mandamus (suggesting they may either attack Judge Noreika’s immunity decision directly or ask the Third Circuit to order Delaware’s Probation Department to approve the diversion agreement that would give Hunter Biden immunity), Lowell also invoked an Appropriations clause injunction — basically an argument that Weiss is spending money he should not be.

Normally, this would never work and it’s unlikely to work here.

But even on the SCO challenge, there are a number of problems in addition to Lowell’s original complaint: that Weiss was appointed in violation of the rules requiring someone outside of DOJ to fill the role.

For example Weiss keeps claiming to be both US Attorney and Special Counsel at the same time (most obviously in claiming that tolling agreements signed as US Attorney were still valid as Special Counsel), or the newly evident fact that Weiss asked for Special Counsel status so that he could revisit a lead he was ordered to investigate — in the wake of Trump’s complaints to Bill Barr that Hunter Biden wasn’t being investigated diligently enough — back in 2020, a lead that incorporated Joe as well as Hunter Biden, a lead that uncovered an attempt to frame Joe Biden, an attempt to frame Joe Biden to which Weiss is a witness.

The oddities of Weiss’ investigation of Joe Biden’s son may even offer another claim that the right wing Justices claim to want to review. Jack Smith claims to have found only two or three charges with which Kavanaugh, who insists (former) Presidents can only be charged under statutes that formally apply to Presidents, would leave available to charge a President. But there’s one he missed: 26 USC 7217, which specifically prohibits the President from ordering up a tax investigation into someone, which Lowell invoked in his selective and vindictive prosecution claim. Lowell has not yet proven that Trump directly ordered tax officials, as opposed to Bill Barr and other top DOJ officials, to investigate Hunter Biden for tax crimes. But there’s a lot of circumstantial evidence that Trump pushed such an investigation. Certainly, statutes of limitation on Trump’s documented 2020 intrusions on the Hunter Biden investigation have not yet expired.

The Hunter Biden investigation has all the trappings of a politicized investigation that Kavanaugh claims to worry about — and with the Alexander Smirnov lead, it included Joe Biden, the Morisson v. Olson problem he claims to loathe.

That’s a made to order opportunity for Brett Kavanaugh to restrict such Special Counsel investigations.

Except, of course, it involves Democrats.

Maryellen Noreika Never Answered Mark Scarsi’s Question

As I laid out in this post, Judge Maryellen Noreika’s opinion denying Hunter Biden’s bid for immunity under his diversion agreement provided new insight on the nature of her intervention at the July 26, 2023 plea hearing, and her attempt to refashion that intervention after the fact. Among other things, I showed:

  • Judge Noreika provided several indications that she knew, during the hearing, that Probation head Margaret Bray had refused to sign the diversion agreement before the hearing. Given the logistics as described by AUSA Benjamin Wallace, her knowledge of that fact almost certainly had to come from conversations between Bray and Noreika in advance of the plea hearing, and as such, Bray’s refusal to sign the agreement may amount to proxy refusal from Judge Noreika, who was not a party to the agreement.
  • Bray’s discussion with Wallace (which, if Bray refused to sign the diversion agreement at Noreika’s direction, would amount to ex parte communication between the judge and prosecution) created information asymmetry in the hearing. When Leo Wise made comments about the diversion only going into effect once Bray (or Noreika, as he once misspoke) signed it, Hunter’s team had no way to know that that discussion was only happening because of Bray’s earlier refusal. When Wallace piped up to affirm Judge Noreika’s question about the clause under which she should review the plea, Hunter’s team had no way of knowing that his assent may have reflected ex parte knowledge of Noreika’s concerns about how the plea and diversion agreements worked together.
  • Contrary to her portrayal of the hearing in her opinion, Noreika’s intervention in the diversion agreement preceded the moment when Leo Wise “appeared to revoke” the deal. The deal collapsed, temporally at least, first because of her intervention and only subsequently because her intervention gave Wise opportunity to renege on the scope of the immunity agreement.
  • Judge Noreika still claims to have a veto over the substance of the diversion agreement, a contract to which she is not a party.
  • After intervening based on a claim that Hunter’s immunity wasn’t as broad as he understood, her opinion ruled that even though none of the parties to the diversion agreement disputes that it would cover at least gun, tax, and drug crimes, she nevertheless ruled the immunity grant was too uncertain to be applicable to gun, tax, and drug crimes.

Given the assertions and omissions in Noreika’s opinion, Hunter Biden may have a plausible argument that she did precisely what she claimed she feared: unconstitutionally intervened in a prosecutorial decision that David Weiss had already committed himself to.

Noreika’s opinion puts her actions that day at issue, every bit as much as Weiss’ subsequent actions are.

That makes the disparate treatment that Judge Noreika and Judge Scarsi gave to Hunter’s selective and vindictive prosecution claim important.

To be sure, both opinions are supposed to be addressing different things, two different prosecutorial decisions. And both opinions, at least at times, artificially limit their consideration to developments after that failed plea.

Nevertheless, even after ruling (before he would rule again) that Abbe Lowell had not procedurally presented his case, Scarsi engaged in a laudable point by point treatment of Hunter Biden’s claims.

As a result, the two judges took a dramatically different approach to Hunter’s claim that Republican members of Congress had attempted to intervene in his criminal case directly. The longer version of that argument from Abbe Lowell, presented before Judge Noreika, looks like this:

Then on July 25, just one day before Mr. Biden’s scheduled plea hearing, Chairman Smith actually tried to intervene in this case to file an amicus curiae brief “in Aid of Plea Hearing” (United States v. Biden, D.E. 7, No. 23-mj-00274-MN), in which, with no shame about doing real political interference while complaining about non-existent involvement by others, he encouraged the Court to “consider” the unfounded allegations by the IRS agent whistleblowers that the probe into Mr. Biden was tainted by political interference and attaching transcripts of their testimony (which contained confidential taxpayer and grand jury information) on the public docket. (D.E. 7-3 (Smith Memo) (“[T]he Defendant appears to have benefited from political interference which calls into question the propriety of the investigation of the U.S. Attorney’s Office . . . it is critical that the Court consider the Whistleblower Materials before determining whether to accept the Plea Agreement.”).) 25

In Scarsi’s response to a shorter version of this argument, which was posted before Judge Noreika ruled, he raised the question of whether Judge Noreika had considered Jason Smith’s attempt to intervene in the case.

On June 23, 2023, the Ways and Means Committee of the United States House of Representatives voted to publicly disclose congressional testimony from the IRS agents who worked on the tax investigation. Jason Smith, chair of the Ways and Means Committee, told reporters that the agents were “[w]histleblowers [who] describe how the Biden Justice Department intervened and overstepped in a campaign to protect the son of Joe Biden by delaying, divulging and denying an ongoing investigation into Hunter Biden’s alleged tax crimes.” Farnoush Amiri, GOP releases testimony alleging DOJ interference in Hunter Biden tax case, PBS NewsHour (June 23, 2023, 3:58 p.m.), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/gop-releases-testimony-alleging-dojinterference-in-hunter-biden-tax-case.29 One day before the plea hearing in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, Mr. Smith moved to file an amicus curiae brief imploring the court to consider the IRS agents’ testimony and related materials in accepting or rejecting the plea agreement. Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Br., United States v. Biden, No. 1:23-mj-00274-MN (D. Del. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 7-2; Amicus Curiae Br., United States v. Biden, No. 1:23-mj-00274-MN (D. Del. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 7-3.30

29 This source does not stand for the proposition that several leaders of house committees “opened a joint investigation.” (Selective Prosecution Mot. 6.)

30 The docket does not show that the Delaware district court resolved the motion, and the Court is uncertain whether the court considered Mr. Smith’s brief.

[snip]

After the plea hearing, Mr. Smith told Fox News, “I think that justice is being served,” Jason Smith on Hunter Biden plea deal collapse: Justice is being served, Fox News (July 26, 2023, 7:01 p.m.), https://www.foxnews.com/video/6331889313112 [https://perma.cc/YL3P-JNW5]. [my emphasis]

As I noted in this post, Scarsi actually over-read what Abbe Lowell argued here. Lowell only argued that the amicus was proof that Jason Smith attempted to intervene, not that Judge Noreika had considered his amicus.

Meanwhile, Scarsi applies a measure — whether Judge Noreika considered Smith’s amicus, not whether he tried to file it — that Lowell doesn’t make (and which is irrelevant to a vindictive prosecution motion, because Noreika is not the prosecutor); Smith did succeed in getting the amicus unsealed, including the exhibits that Hunter claimed include grand jury materials. Whether or not Judge Noreika considered the content of the amicus, that Smith filed it is undeniable proof that Smith tried to intervene, which is all Hunter alleged he did.

Scarsi, by contrast, raised the question — again, before Judge Noreika ruled — of whether Judge Noreika considered Jason Smith’s plea to scotch the plea deal before she intervened in a contract to which she was not a party. Judge Scarsi raised the question of whether Smith had succeeded in intervening, with Noreika.

Noreika, who offered no indication she had reviewed Scarsi’s selective prosecution language (though his opinion on this topic was in the same omnibus ruling she cited on the diversion agreement), didn’t answer that question. Instead, in her selective and vindictive prosecution opinion, she simply dismissed the bulk of that claim with one paragraph.

In attempting to show discriminatory purpose, Defendant points to past and recent statements made by former President Trump, alleged conduct of one of the former president’s personal attorneys (Rudy Giuliani) and a purported criticism and pressure campaign by Congressional Republicans. (See id. at 27-37). None of this evidence, however, is relevant to any alleged discriminatory purpose in this case. The charging decision at issue here – from 2023 – did not occur when the former president was in office. Nor did it occur when Mr. Giuliani was purportedly trying to uncover “dirt” about Defendant and presenting that information to U.S. Attorneys across the country. (See id. at 30). And the pressure campaign from Congressional Republicans may have occurred around the time that the Special Counsel decided to move forward with indictment instead of pretrial diversion, but the Court has been given nothing credible to suggest that the conduct of those lawmakers (or anyone else) had any impact whatsoever on the Special Counsel. It is all speculation. [my emphasis]

Noreika does three things in this passage (besides ignoring Bill Barr’s intervention last year, which is pertinent to her silence about Alexander Smirnov). First, she treats Rudy’s intervention as contested (even while falsely claiming Hunter had described his gun purchase in his memoir, when instead he only did so in text messages, published by NYPost, that Rudy obtained from Hunter’s hard drive). She did so even in spite of Lowell’s submission of Scott Brady’s transcript, detailing Rudy’s intervention, as a supplemental authority.

Generally, as she does elsewhere, she fails to do what she claimed to do, to consider “the prosecution’s decision to abandon the Plea and Diversion Agreement framework.” Her description of David Weiss as “Special Counsel” is the tell here: she’s dating Weiss’ actions to a date, August 11, that postdates the first steps of abandoning the diversion. And she’s explicitly focused on the indictment, not the abandonment, even though she claims to be considering the abandonment.

Having fiddled with the timing, she then — astoundingly — questions whether and when a pressure campaign from Congress happened! Noreika here cites Lowell’s later discussion of Congressional intervention, not the earlier factual background discussion for the entire motion that mentions Smith’s filing to her own docket specifically.

Given Noreika’s own apparent veto of a contract between prosecutors and Hunter Biden, Noreika’s treatment of Lowell’s separation of powers is more interesting.

At the end of his selective- and vindictive-prosecution arguments, Defendant argues that his prosecution also violates the separation of powers. (See D.I. 63 at 54-60). The gist of Defendant’s argument is that the Legislative Branch has failed to respect the prosecutorial discretion vested in the Executive Branch and instead attempted to usurp that authority. (Id.). In particular, Defendant claims that many members of Congress “are actively interfering with DOJ’s investigation” and conducting “a criminal investigation of private conduct by a private citizen” – i.e., Defendant. (Id. at 58). He goes so far as to assert that these Legislative Branch officials “have overcome Special Counsel Weiss’s independent judgment” and, even further, those officials are the reason that pretrial diversion was abandoned in favor of indictment. (Id.). Defendant’s separation-of-powers argument is not credible.

As an initial matter, Defendant never disputes that the Executive Branch holds the ultimate power to prosecute in his case and that that branch of government is headed by his father. And Defendant does not actually accuse the Legislative Branch of successfully encroaching on or usurping the Executive Branch’s power. Indeed, Defendant’s argument is more subtle and nuanced; he alleges that the Legislative Branch is exerting pressure on the Special Counsel, purportedly causing him to make charging decisions that he would not otherwise make simply because members of Congress are unhappy. Yet members of the Legislative Branch pressuring Executive Branch officials or the Special Counsel to act is fundamentally different than actually making charging decisions or influencing them. And, apart from Defendant’s finger-pointing and speculation, the Court has been given no evidence to support a finding that anyone other than the Special Counsel, as part of the Executive Branch, is responsible for the decision to indict Defendant in this case instead of continuing to pursue pretrial diversion. There is thus no basis to find a violation of the separation of powers under the facts here.

I think the two judges’ opinions that Lowell’s separation of powers argument has no basis in precedent is absolutely right. But Noreika’s treatment of it here is far more suspect given her own description that she intervened in a contract to prevent David Weiss from entering into a contract that limited his prosecutorial authorities. If Noreika thereby usurped Weiss’ authority, then this whole focus on whether Congress influenced Weiss is misplaced.

The question becomes whether Congress influenced her.

And in spite of the fact that Judge Scarsi specifically raised the question of whether Noreika had considered Jason Smith’s intervention, Noreika didn’t answer that question. Instead, her treatment of Lowell’s interference claim — the facts meant to apply to the entire selective and vindictive motion to dismiss — instead entirely dodges the uncontested fact that Smith attempted to intervene with her.

On July 19, 2023, Margaret Bray recommended Hunter Biden for diversion. On July 20, at least per Benjamin Wallace, Probation “agreed to revisions to the diversion agreement to more closely match the conditions of pretrial release that Probation recommended in the pretrial services report issued yesterday.”

Neither judge has addressed why that doesn’t amount to approval to the extent Bray has authority over the diversion. Scarsi simply rewrote Probation’s agreement out of his opinion. Noreika simply dismissed its import.

More importantly, no one explained what happened between July 20 and July 26 such that Bray declined to approve the diversion agreement she had approved six days earlier. What changed?

One thing that changed was the intervention of Congress with Judge Noreika.

Judge Maryellen Noreika’s Unconstitutional Concerns about Unconstitutional Concerns

On April 12, the same day that Judge Maryellen Noreika finally issued her opinions rejecting Hunter Biden’s motions to dismiss based on immunity and selective and vindictive prosecution, Hunter filed a notice of interlocutory appeal of all of Scarsi’s opinions. My Hunter Biden page has been updated to reflect these developments.

I think, but am not certain, that the notice of appeal came after Noreika released her opinions, and so might be a response to it.

It’s unclear what basis Lowell believes he has for an interlocutory appeal. At the initial appearance, Judge Scarsi had instructed Abbe Lowell to brief whether he could file such an appeal for the diversion agreement, which Lowell failed to do in his motions to dismiss. One possibility is that Lowell plans to argue that Delaware, as the first filed case, should have ruled first. He argued this in a February motion to continue the similar filings.

“[W]hen cases between the same parties raising the same issues are pending in two or more federal districts, the forum of the first-filed action should generally be favored.” Heieck v. Federal Signal Corp., 2019 WL 1883895, at *2 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 11, 2019). This approach maximizes judicial economy, avoids the possibility of inconsistent judgments, and minimizes any unnecessary burden on the two Courts’ or the parties’ resources.

If that’s the case, however, the facial similarity of the two diversion agreement opinions might doom an appeal that would be extremely unlikely to work anyway. Both judges ruled that because Probation did not sign the diversion agreement, it was not in place and so Hunter got no immunity from it. The rulings are not inconsistent on their key point (though are in other key ways).

That said, even though neither side formally called attention to Judge Scarsi’s rulings, Judge Noreika noted it in a really confusing footnote.

5 This Court recognizes that, relying largely on California and Ninth Circuit law, the judge overseeing tax charges brought against Defendant in the Central District of California decided that Probation’s approval is “a condition precedent to performance, not to formation,” and that the absence of Probation’s approval means that “performance of the Government’s agreement not to prosecute Defendant is not yet due.” United States v. Biden, No. 2:23-cr-00599-MCS-1, 2024 WL 1432468, at *8 & *10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2024). Neither of those issues nor that law was raised by the parties before this Court.

I don’t know what “law” she’s referring to — possibly the Ninth Circuit precedent Scarsi relied on? If that’s the case, then she would be affirming precisely the problem Lowell pointed out: by relying on different precedents, Scarsi has created inconsistency in the judgments.

But she’s flat out wrong that the government’s arguments about whether Probation’s signature was a condition precedent to the formation or the performance of the diversion agreement; it was central to the government’s response.

Applying contract law principles, the approval of U.S. Probation was a condition precedent to the formation of the contract. “A condition may be either a condition precedent to the formation of a contract or a condition precedent to performance under an existing contract.” W & G Seaford Assocs. v. Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc., 714 F.Supp. 1336, 1340 (D.Del.1989) (citing J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 11–5, at 440 (3d ed.1987)); Williston on Contracts §38.4. “In the former situations, the contract itself does not exist unless and until the condition occurs.” Id.; Willison on Contracts § 38.7.

There is a bigger difference between the two opinions, though: how they understand Probation’s decision not to sign the plea. As I’ve noted, Scarsi effectively rewrote one of the exhibits he relied on to claim that Probation was not part of revisions to the diversion agreement. As I’ll show, Noreika does not deny that Probation was a part of those revisions, but nevertheless, with no explanation, held that Probation didn’t approve the agreement.

And that’s important because Noreika doesn’t explain her own intervention in the approval of the diversion agreement, effectively intervening in a prosecutorial decision, a problem I pointed out in this post. Indeed, the opinion is consistent with Margaret Bray refusing to sign the diversion agreement because of some interaction Bray had with Judge Noreika before the hearing.

Before I explain why, let me emphasize, Hunter Biden is well and truly fucked. What I’m about to say is unlikely to matter, and if it does, it’s likely only to matter after two judges who seem predisposed against Hunter make evidentiary decisions that will increase the political cost of two trials, if and when juries convict Hunter, and after those same judges rule on whether Hunter can remain out on pretrial release pending the appeal of this mess, which Scarsi, especially, is unlikely to do. Worse still, after I laid out all the ways Judge Scarsi had made his own opinion vulnerable on appeal, he ruled against Abbe Lowell’s attempt to certify all the evidence Scarsi said had not come in properly. Scarsi is using procedural reasons to protect his own failures in his opinions. He’s entitled to do so; he’s the judge! So what I’m about to write does not change the fact that Joe Biden’s son is well and truly fucked.

Judge Noreika refashions her intervention in the plea hearing

In his omnibus ruling on Hunter’s motions to dismiss, Judge Scarsi only cited the plea hearing transcript six times, entirely focused on the end of the discussion (the Xs describe who is being quoted in the citation).

The parties submitted the Plea Agreement and the Diversion Agreement to United States District Judge Maryellen Noreika in advance of a scheduled July 26, 2023, Initial Appearance and Plea Hearing. (See Machala Decl. Ex. 1 (“Del. Hr’g Tr.”), ECF No. 25-2.) At the hearing, after questioning Defendant and the parties, the District Court Judge expressed concerns regarding both Defendant’s understanding of the scope of the immunity offered by the Diversion Agreement and the appropriateness of the District Court’s role in resolving disputes under the Diversion Agreement. (Del. Hr’g Tr. 103–08.) The District Court Judge asked the parties to rework the agreements and provide additional briefing regarding the appropriate role of the District Court in resolving disputes under the Diversion Agreement. (Id.) At the hearing, Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the tax charges then pending in Delaware. (Id. at 109.)

[snip]

6 This observation begs a question regarding another provision, the parties’ agreement that the United States District Court for the District of Delaware would play an adjudicative role in any alleged material breach of the agreement by Defendant. (Diversion Agreement § II(14).) The judge overseeing the action in Delaware questioned whether it was appropriate for her to play this role. (Del. Hr’g Tr. 92–104.) The Court is uncertain as to whether the parties understood the Probation Officer also to have a role in approving the breach-adjudication plan in her capacity as an agent of the court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3602. But these issues need not be resolved to adjudicate the motion.

[snip]

On July 26, 2023, the district judge in Delaware deferred accepting Defendant’s plea so the parties could resolve concerns raised at the plea hearing. (See generally Del. Hr’g Tr. 108–09.)

By contrast, Judge Noreika cited her own hearing transcript 33 times: 24 times in her background section, four times in her sua sponte section deeming the extent of Hunter’s immunity uncertain, three times in a sua sponte section that intruded on the Executive’s prosecutorial function where she said it would be unconstitutional to intrude on the Executive’s prosecutorial function, and twice more in a section misrepresenting the focus of Hunter’s judicial estoppel argument. 21 of her citations were substantially to her own comments in the hearing.

The degree to which this opinion makes claims about what Noreika actually did at the plea hearing matters. Not only does Noreika fluff the nature of her own intervention, but her discussion left out critical discussion about the nature of approvals required for the diversion agreement (including but not limited to those marked in blue above). That includes five complaints about the fact that she was not asked to sign the diversion agreement and a key intervention in which she expressed an opinion on the scope of the authority for Margaret Bray to intervene in the diversion agreement.

Additionally, in one place, she misrepresented the transcript in a way that minimized her own intervention.

That is, Noreika used her own opinion to refashion the intervention she made in the plea hearing.

The last example — when she misrepresented the transcript — is instructive. As noted, though neither side made this argument, Noreika nevertheless spent 2.5 pages arguing that the scope of the immunity grant in the diversion agreement was not sufficiently clear to be contractually enforceable. In it, she claimed that the uncertainty over the scope of the immunity, and not her own intervention, was the only reason the plea collapsed, a claim she carries over to the selective and vindictive prosecution opinion.

Then, she declined to accept Chris Clark’s oral modification of the immunity provision to include just gun, tax, and drug crimes.

Pressing the parties on their respective understandings of what conduct was protected by the immunity from prosecution led to a collapse of the agreement in court. (D.I. 16 at 54:10-55:22).

Apparently acknowledging that the immunity provision as initially drafted was not sufficiently definite, the parties attempted to revise the scope of the immunity conferred by the Division Agreement orally at the July 2023 hearing. (See D.I. 16 at 57:19-24 (“I think there was some space between us and at this point, we are prepared to agree with the government that the scope of paragraph 15 relates to the specific areas of federal crimes that are discussed in the statement of facts which in general and broadly relate to gun possession, tax issues, and drug use.”)). The Court recognizes that Delaware law permits oral modifications to contracts even where the contract explicitly provides that modifications must be in signed writings, as the Diversion Agreement did here. (See D.I. 24, Ex. 1 ¶ 19 (“No future modifications of or additions to this Agreement, in whole or in part, shall be valid unless they are set forth in writing and signed by the United States, Biden and Biden’s counsel.”)). That being said, although the government asserted that that oral modification was binding (D.I. 16 at 89:9-14), the Court has never been presented with modified language to replace the immunity provision found in Paragraph 15. [my emphasis]

This is a nutty argument to begin with: Neither side is arguing that gun crimes were not included in the diversion immunity (to which elsewhere she limits her review); neither is even arguing there was uncertainty as to the application of immunity to tax and drug crimes. The only uncertainty pertained to FARA (and that only because — as Noreika herself described it, Leo Wise “revoked” a signed agreement).

This discussion is especially problematic because, elsewhere, she left out a crucial part of her own invitation to clarify the immunity language, which the opinion describes this way:

The Court also suggested that the parties clarify the scope of any immunity conferred by the immunity provision of the Diversion Agreement. (Id. at 105:16-22).

Noreika’s reference to the government’s assertion that Chris Clark orally modified the scope of immunity by agreeing to limit it to tax, guns, and drugs pertains to this comment from Leo Wise:

Obviously this paragraph has been orally modified by counsel for Mr. Biden and we would — I’m not going to attempt to paraphrase it. I don’t want to make the record muddy. The statement by counsel is obviously as Your Honor acknowledged a modification of this provision, and that we believe is binding.

Importantly, when Noreika invited the parties to clarify the diversion scope (claiming all the while she was not trying to tell the parties how to negotiate), she treated the Clark comment as having been orally modified.

you might, though I’m not trying to tell you how to negotiate the Diversion Agreement, you might fix that one paragraph that you have orally modified today.

At the hearing, Noreika treated the diversion scope as orally modified, but in this opinion she not only omits mention that she did so, but she suggests that because the parties didn’t modify the contract about prosecution declination to her liking, then it is not binding.

She’s claiming to have no role in the drafting process, and then she’s demanding changes in the contract that she already said had been adopted, a contract in which she repeatedly says would be unconstitutional for her to intervene.

The logistics of the asymmetric knowledge of Margaret Bray’s non signature

All this matters because of something else: Judge Noreika’s opinion exhibits knowledge of something to which she was not a witness. It arises from the logistics from that plea hearing.

As I noted, while claiming he was ruling on the diversion agreement as an unambiguous contract, Judge Scarsi nevertheless relied on extrinsic evidence — a declaration from AUSA Benjamin Wallace. Before Wallace submitted the declaration before Judge Scarsi, Wallace withdrew his appearance before Judge Noreika, in a letter signed as a Delaware AUSA reporting to US Attorney David Weiss, someone who is no longer before that docket.

Given that Wallace referred to final agreements four times as drafts in the declaration, it deserves close scrutiny.

In it, Wallace described that before Judge Noreika took the bench and while Chris Clark and Leo Wise were signing the plea agreement and diversion agreement on July 26, he told Margaret Bray that she could soon sign the diversion agreement. According to Wallace, she “expressly declined to sign the draft diversion agreement.”

3. Before the District Judge took the bench, the parties signed the draft plea agreement in No. 23-mj-274 and the draft diversion agreement in No. 23-cr-61. Leo J. Wise, Special Assistant United States Attorney, signed on behalf of the government. Mr. Biden and his attorney, Christopher J. Clark, signed on behalf of Mr. Biden.

4. While Mr. Biden, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Wise were signing the two agreements, I approached the Chief United States Probation Officer for the District of Delaware, Margaret M. Bray, to tell her that the draft diversion agreement would be ready for her signature shortly. Ms. Bray expressly declined to sign the draft diversion agreement.

In the Los Angeles motions hearing, Abbe Lowell suggested there was something funny about this timing and asked a more important question: Why the head of Probation was not the one submitting the declaration.

MR. LOWELL: It probably — well, it matters in the following way. If what was happening was questions were being raised, and that’s why she didn’t do it, or for any other reason, after she manifested her agreement in what she sent to the court on July 20th or what the Government said, then it probably doesn’t matter.

I don’t think it really matters why at that moment and when it doesn’t — when it happened. I’m just saying that I think the sequence of what happened on July the 26th is murky, at best.

And I’d like to have Ms. Bray be the one to give a declaration, not somebody else that talks about what happened and when it happened and why it happened. I was there, so it would be good if the person who did it, did it. But that’s not what they submitted.

But Noreika’s opinion makes it clear why the timing and substance matters — and why Margaret Bray, the person that both Noreika and Scarsi have ruled effectively vetoed this agreement by not signing it, should have been the one submitting a declaration.

Assuming Wallace’s description of the timing is correct — that this happened while Clark and Wise were busy signing the documents themselves and before Judge Noreika entered the courtroom — then it would create an asymmetry of knowledge among the participants in the hearing. Bray, who never spoke at the hearing, would know she had refused to sign. Wallace would know and therefore did know when he made his single comment at the hearing: agreeing that if the immunity language had been included in the plea agreement rather than the diversion agreement, it would change the rule under which Judge Noreika was reviewing the plea agreement.

THE COURT: And if it were included in the Memorandum of Plea Agreement, would that make this plea agreement one pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(A)?

MR. WALLACE: It would.

Did Wallace make this comment because of something Bray told him before the hearing? Importantly, Noreika relies on this assent to use her own uncertainty about the proper clause under which to consider the plea to replace authority to alter the diversion. That is, Noreika effectively used Wallace’s assent to suggest she had the authority to draft the diversion agreement. If he learned that Noreika had a concern about that clause from Bray, it would amount to an ex parte communication between the prosecution and the judge.

Over the course of the hearing — most notably, between the time Leo Wise made a comment about the limits of Probation’s involvement and the time when Wise said the diversion agreement would only go into effect after Bray signed it — Wallace could have shared that knowledge with the other prosecutors. That is, it is possible but uncertain whether prosecutors used this asymmetric knowledge to get out of the plea deal.

But Hunter Biden’s team would never know this occurred, which is consistent with Chris Clark’s repeated statements that he believed Probation had already approved the diversion, which Weiss’ team did not dispute.

And, because all this happened before she took the bench, Judge Noreika should not have known that Ms. Bray refused to sign it. She should not have known it, that is, unless she and Margaret Bray had discussions before the hearing about Bray not signing the agreement.

If they did, then Bray’s failure to sign the diversion agreement would effectively serve as a proxy disapproval from Judge Noreika. It would amount to Judge Noreika, who is neither a party to this agreement nor someone authorized to approve or disapprove it, vetoing the agreement by instructing Bray not to sign it.

Noreika exhibited knowledge of Bray’s lack of signature

There are three times in Noreika’s opinion where she exhibits some knowledge that Bray had not signed that diversion agreement before the hearing.

First, in her treatment of Hunter’s half-hearted attempt to claim that judicial estoppel prevents the prosecution from had not started yet, she described believing at the time and still believing that the government did not believe the diversion period started until Bray signed the agreement.

As the Court understood that statement at the time, the government’s position was that the diversion period did not begin to run until Probation’s approval was given – approval to be indicated by a signature on the Diversion Agreement itself. That is, the Diversion Agreement would not become effective until approval through signature was given. That continues to be the Court’s understanding today.

Having such a belief at the time would only make sense if she knew the diversion had not yet been signed and, given the logistics, that would seemingly require having known before Bray told Wallace she would not sign it.

In her section rejecting Hunter’s argument that by recommending Hunter for diversion on July 19 and then, along with the parties, tweaking the diversion agreement, Noreika offered no reason why she was unpersuaded that Bray had indicated her assent by participating in those changes, something about which her courtroom deputy received emails.

Defendant nevertheless suggests that Probation’s approval may be implied from the fact that Probation recommended pretrial diversion and suggested revisions to the proposed agreement before the July 2023 hearing. (D.I. 60 at 18-19). The Court disagrees. That Defendant was recommended as a candidate for a pretrial diversion program does not evidence Probation’s approval of the particular Diversion Agreement the parties ultimately proposed. Probation recommended that Defendant was of the type of criminal defendant who may be offered pretrial diversion and also recommended several conditions that Probation thought appropriate. (D.I. 60, Ex. S at Pages 8-9 of 9). That is fundamentally different than Probation approving the Diversion Agreement currently in dispute before the Court. And as to Probation’s purported assent to revisions to the Diversion Agreement (D.I. 60, Ex. T at Page 2 of 28), Defendant has failed to convince the Court that the actions described can or should take the place of a signature required by the final version of an agreement, particularly when the parties execute the signature page. Ultimately, the Court finds that Probation did not approve the Diversion Agreement. [my emphasis]

Importantly, Noreika does not address the scope via which Probation, having already approved the parts they would oversee, could reject this deal.

But the most important evidence that Judge Noreika knew of something during the hearing to which she was not a direct witness was a question she posed — invoking the first person plural — suggesting that Probation should not approve the deal.

THE COURT: All right. Now, I want to talk a little bit about this agreement not to prosecute. The agreement not to prosecute includes — is in the gun case, but it also includes crimes related to the tax case. So we looked through a bunch of diversion agreements that we have access to and we couldn’t find anything that had anything similar to that.

So let me first ask, do you have any precedent for agreeing not to prosecute crimes that have nothing to do with the case or the charges being diverted?

MR. WISE: I’m not aware of any, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any authority that says that that’s appropriate and that the probation officer should agree to that as terms, or the chief of probation should agree to that as terms of a Diversion Agreement?

MR. WISE: Your Honor, I believe that this is a bilateral agreement between the parties that the parties view in their best interest. I don’t believe that the role of probation would include weighing whether the benefit of the bargain is valid or not from the perspective of the United States or the Defendant. (46)

Not only did Noreika suggest that some collective “we” had been reviewing diversion agreements together, but she suggested Bray could still reject the deal based on the scope of David Weiss’ prosecutorial decision. She suggested Bray could dictate to Weiss how much he could include in a declination statement.

This is precisely the kind of usurpation of the Executive’s authority that Noreika said would be unconstitutional. Which was precisely Leo Wise’s response: he responded that Bray did not have the authority to opine that the parties had entered into a contract that did not sufficiently protect the interests of the United States.

Shortly after that exchange, Judge Noreika started complaining that she was not asked to sign the diversion agreement.

I think what I’m concerned about here is that you seem to be asking for the inclusion of the Court in this agreement, yet you’re telling me that I don’t have any role in it, and you’re leaving provisions of the plea agreement out and putting them into an agreement that you are not asking me to sign off on. (50)

[snip]

But then it would be a plea under Rule (c)(1)(A) if the provision that you have put in the Diversion Agreement which you do not have anyplace for me to sign and it is not in my purview under the statute to sign, you put that provision over there. So I am concerned that you’re taking provisions out of the agreement, of a plea agreement that would normally be in there. So can you — I don’t really understand why that is. (51)

[snip]

All right. Now I have reviewed the case law and I have reviewed the statute and I had understood that the decision to offer the defendant, any defendant a pretrial diversion rest squarely with the prosecutor and consistent with that, you all have told me repeatedly that’s a separate agreement, there is no place for me to sign off on it, and as I think I mentioned earlier, usually I don’t see those agreements. But you all did send it to me and as we’ve discussed, some of it seems like it could be relevant to the plea. (92)

[snip]

THE COURT: First it got my attention because you keep telling me that I have no role, I shouldn’t be reading this thing, I shouldn’t be concerned about what’s in these provisions, but you have agreed that I will do that, but you didn’t ask me for sign off, so do you have any precedent for that? (94)

[snip]

What’s funny to me is you put me right smack in the middle of the Diversion Agreement that I should have no role in, you plop meet [sic] right in there and then on the thing that I would normally have the ability to sign off on or look at in the context of a Plea Agreement, you just take it out and you say Your Honor, don’t pay any attention to that provision not to prosecute because we put it in an agreement that’s beyond your ability. (104)

The first two of these citations — the ones that precede Leo Wise’s “revocation” of the plea deal — are not mentioned in Noreika’s opinion. The other three are invoked several times in references to the transcript (including three of the references made by Judge Scarsi), but in none of those references does Noreika admit she was demanding the authority to sign off on the diversion agreement. 

The Court pressed the government on the propriety of requiring the Court to first determine whether Defendant had breached the Diversion Agreement before the government could bring charges – effectively making the Court a gatekeeper of prosecutorial discretion. (D.I. 16 at 92:22-95:17).

[snip]

The parties attempted to analogize the breach procedure to a violation of supervised release, but the Court was left with unanswered questions about the constitutionality of the breach provision, leaving open the possibility that the parties could modify the provision to address the Court’s concerns. (Id. at 102:5-106:2).

She presented these demands to sign off on the diversion agreement as the exact opposite of what they were: a concern that she would be usurping the role of prosecutors if the diversion went into effect, when in fact she was concerned that she wasn’t being given opportunity to veto prosecutors’ non-prosecution decision.

Notably, Judge Noreika mentions Chris Clark’s failure to object after Leo Wise (after such time as Wallace could have told him that Bray did not sign the diversion agreement) said the agreement would go into effect when Probation signed it.

4 Although not part of the Court’s decision, the Court finds it noteworthy that the government clearly stated at the hearing that “approval” meant “when the probation officer . . . signs it” and Defendant offered no objection or correction to this. (D.I. 16 at 83:13-17 & 90:13-15).

She doesn’t mention her own failure to correct Wise when he said she could sign the diversion agreement.

I think practically how this would work, Your Honor, is if Your Honor takes the plea and signs the Diversion Agreement which is what puts it into force as of today, and at some point in the future we were to bring charges that the Defendant thought were encompassed by the factual statement in the Diversion Agreement or the factual statement in the Plea Agreement, they could move to dismiss those charges on the grounds that we had contractually agreed not to bring charges encompassed within the factual statement of the Diversion Agreement or the factual statement of the tax charges.

This doesn’t prove that Judge Noreika asked Margaret Bray not to sign the diversion before Bray told Wallace she would not sign it. But it does show that Noreika thought one of the two of them, either she or Bray, should have the power to veto a prosecutorial decision.

And Judge Noreika refashions her intervention in the plea hearing to obscure that point.

Noreika shifts her demands for sign-off power

As noted, even in spite of her minute order that reflects she deferred agreement on both the plea agreement and the diversion agreement in which it would be unconstitutional for her to intervene, Noreika suggests that the plea fell apart only because of the dispute about immunity that started after she had already intervened in signing authority.

She does ultimately deal with her demands — in a section reserving veto authority over the diversion agreement based on her authority to dictate public policy to prosecutors!

In a truly astonishing section, Noreika applies contract law about a diversion she claims, with no basis, has been made part of the plea deal and uses it to claim she could veto a prosecutorial decision.

Contractual provisions that are against public policy are void. See Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Joseph Schlanger 2006 Ins. Tr., 28 A.3d 436, 441 (Del. 2011) (“[C]ontracts that offend public policy or harm the public are deemed void, as opposed to voidable.”). “[P]ublic policy may be determined from consideration of the federal and state constitutions, the laws, the decisions of the courts, and the course of administration.” Sann v. Renal Care Centers Corp., No. 94A-10-001, 1995 WL 161458, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 1995). Embedded in the Diversion Agreement’s breach procedure is a judicial restriction of prosecutorial discretion that may run afoul of the separation of powers ensured by the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case . . . .”); United States v. Wright, 913 F.3d 364, 374 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A] court’s power to preclude a prosecution is limited by the separation of powers and, specifically, the Executive’s law-enforcement and prosecutorial prerogative.”).

At the hearing in July 2023, the Court expressed concern over the breach provision of the Diversion Agreement and the role the parties were attempting to force onto the Court.8 (See D.I. 16 at 92:12-98:19). In the Court’s view, the parties were attempting to contractually place upon the Judicial Branch a threshold question that would constrain the prosecutorial discretion of the Executive Branch as to the current Defendant. As the government admitted, even if there were a breach, no charges could be pursued against Defendant without the Court first holding a hearing and making a determination that a breach had occurred. (Id. at 94:10-15). If the Court did not agree to follow the procedure, no charges could be pursued against Defendant. (Id. at 94:16-20). Mindful of the clear directive that prosecutorial discretion is exclusively the province of the Executive Branch, the Court was (and still is) troubled by this provision and its restraint of prosecutorial decisions. Although the parties suggested that they could modify this provision to address the Court’s concerns (id. at 103:18-22), no language was offered at the hearing or at any time later. And no legal defense of the Diversion Agreement’s breach provision has been provided to the Court – the deals fell apart before any supplemental briefing was received.

Even if the Court were to find the Diversion Agreement was approved by Probation as required and the scope of immunity granted sufficiently definite, the Court would still have questions as to the validity of this contract in light of the breach provision in Paragraph 14. To be clear, the Court is not deciding that the proposed breach provision of Paragraph 14 is (or is not) constitutional. Doing so is unnecessary given that the Diversion Agreement never went into effect. The Court simply notes that, if the Diversion Agreement had become effective, the concerns about the constitutionality of making this trial court a gatekeeper of prosecutorial discretion remain unanswered. And because there is no severability provision recited in the contract, more would be needed for the Court to be able to determine whether this provision could properly remain in the Diversion Agreement and whether the contract could survive should the Court find it unconstitutional or refuse to agree to serve as gatekeeper.

This entire opinion is rife with examples where Judge Noreika placed herself in a contract to which she was never a party, effectively dictating what David Weiss could include in a prosecutorial declination. But she claims she’s doing the opposite, not snooping into a contract that should only be before her for its immunity agreement, but instead protecting prosecutors’ ability to renege on a declination decision.

I will leave it to the lawyers to make sense of the legal claims here.

But there’s a procedural one that Noreika overlooks.

As noted here, Scarsi’s ruling that the diversion agreement remains binding on the parties conflicts with Noreika’s claim that the problem here is that no one briefed her to placate her complaints.

There are other places where Scarsi’s ruling and Noreika’s conflict — specifically about Probation’s involvement in revisions to the terms that Probation actually governs. But if Scarsi is right, than Noreika’s order withdrawing the briefing order was withdrawn improperly.

Alexander Smirnov Goes Missing — from Judge Noreika’s Opinions

The name Alexander Smirnov appears in neither Judge Maryellen Noreika’s opinion rejecting Hunter Biden’s immunity nor her opinion rejecting his selective and vindictive prosecution claim. Whereas it appears that Judge Mark Scarsi believes that Smirnov is not before him at all, Lowell did raise Smirnov — whose arrest postdated the reply brief deadline before Noreika and so couldn’t have been included in motions filings in Delaware — as an additional authority for his selective and vindictive claim.

The detail matters because of the way Noreika handled the two motions, which she treated as related by relying on the facts laid out in her immunity opinion in her selective prosecution opinion, even though her position in those two opinions is slightly different.

For the selective prosecution opinion, Noreika used Abbe Lowell’s request, in his reply brief, that she focus on David Weiss’ decision to abandon the plea and diversion agreement, an approach she adopted.

Defendant’s motion sets forth a winding story of years of IRS investigations, Congressional inquiries and accusations of improper influence from Legislative Branch and Executive Branch officials within the prior administration, including former President Trump himself. (See D.I. 63 at 4-20). Yet, as Defendant explains in reply, his selective  and vindictive prosecution claims are focused on “the prosecution’s decision to abandon the Plea and Diversion Agreement framework it had signed in response to ever mounting criticism and to instead bring this felony indictment.” (D.I. 81 at 2 n.1). That decision occurred in the summer of 2023. Any allegation of selective or vindictive prosecution stemming from the IRS investigations or prior administration officials or any conduct that preceded this past summer appears largely irrelevant to the present motions. Moreover, the only charges at issue in this case are firearm charges  — Defendant’s financial affairs or tax-related charges (or investigations thereof) also appear irrelevant. Thus, the only charging decision the Court must view through the selective and vindictive prosecution lens is Special Counsel David Weiss’s decision to no longer pursue pretrial diversion and instead indict Defendant on three felony firearm charges.

But Noreika’s treatment of when the decision occurred is fuzzy. In one place she describes that it happened in summer 2023, which could include everything from June 21, 2023 on (the day after the diversion and plea were published).

Defendant claims that the Special Counsel’s decision to abandon pretrial diversion and indict Defendant on the three felony firearm charges in this case is presumptively vindictive. (See D.I. 81 at 2 n.1). Because that decision occurred in the summer of 2023, his complaints about original charging decisions (or lack thereof) in this case are irrelevant, as are charging decisions for the unrelated tax offenses being pursued in another venue. Yet even as to the Special Counsel’s decision to indict after failing to reach agreement on pretrial diversion, Defendant fails to identify any right that he was lawfully exercising that prompted the government to retaliate. [my emphasis]

Her temporal argument doesn’t seem to support the point she uses it for: That Weiss’ decision to change his mind means that what he changed it from, “are irrelevant” (this is particularly important given how she treats the dispute over immunity).

Elsewhere, she treats the entirety of the decision to be after the failed plea hearing.

Defendant has made clear, however, that his selective prosecution claim is focused on the decision to abandon pretrial diversion and pursue indictment on the three felony firearm charges – a decision that occurred after the Court’s hearing in July 2023. (See D.I. 81 at 2 n.1). [my emphasis]

It’s not remotely clear how she adopted this timeframe. But by doing so, she excluded from her consideration things that clearly were part of abandoning the existing plea deal, most notably reneging on the full extent of the immunity. (She also excluded from her consideration her own role in the process, which as I’ll show, she makes a good case was unconstitutional.)

She did so even while describing that “the government appeared to revoke the deal” when Hunter Biden insisted on the terms of immunity that had been negotiated in June.

Having received contradictory sworn statements about Defendant’s reliance on immunity, the Court proceeded to inquire about the scope of any immunity. At this point, it became apparent that the parties had different views as to the scope of the immunity provision in the Diversion Agreement. In the government’s view, it could not bring tax evasion charges based on the conduct set forth in the Plea Agreement, nor could it bring firearm charges based on the particular firearm identified in the Diversion Agreement, but unrelated charges – e.g., under the Foreign Agents Registration Act – were permissible. (D.I. 16 at 54:13-55:9). Defendant disagreed. (Id. at 55:17-18). At that point, the government appeared to revoke the deal (id. at 55:22) and proceedings were again recessed to allow the parties to confer in light of their fundamental misunderstanding as to the scope of immunity conferred by the Diversion Agreement (id. at 57:1-7). The hearing resumed, with Defendant’s attorney again reversing position and explaining to the Court that the immunity provision covered only federal crimes related to “gun possession, tax issues, and drug use.” (Id. at 57:23-24).

For reasons I’ll explain in a follow-up, Noreika sua sponte conducted a lengthy discussion of the scope of immunity. But just that observation that the government “appeared to revoke” the terms of the deal, paired with the uncontested claims that Hunter had been assured there was no ongoing investigation on June 19, should make Weiss’ decision to chase the Smirnov claims central.

Noreika also claimed that by adopting Lowell’s framework about how the deal was abandoned, it put the actions of all Trump’s officials out of play.

Yet, as was the case with selective prosecution, the relevant point in time is when the prosecutor decided to no longer pursue pretrial diversion and instead indict Defendant. Whether former administration officials harbored actual animus towards Defendant at some point in the past is therefore irrelevant. This is especially true where, as here, the Court has been given no evidence or indication that any of these individuals (whether filled with animus or not) have successfully influenced Special Counsel Weiss or his team in the decision to indict Defendant in this case. At best, Defendant has generically alleged that individuals from the prior administration were or are targeting him (or his father) and therefore his prosecution here must be vindictive. The problem with this argument is that the charging decision at issue was made during this administration – by Special Counsel Weiss – at a time when the head of the Executive Branch prosecuting Defendant is Defendant’s father. Defendant has offered nothing credible to support a finding that anyone who played a role in the decision to abandon pretrial diversion and move forward with indictment here harbored any animus towards Defendant. Any claim of vindictive prosecution based on actual vindictiveness must fail.

Except it shouldn’t. Lowell cited Barr’s intervention in the FD-1023 discussion in his original motion to dismiss, intervention that happened between the time Weiss agreed to a deal and the time he started reneging on the immunity he had offered. The Brady side channel was a central part of Lowell’s argument about the selective prosecution role of Trump’s officials.

Plus, Noreika’s silence about Smirnov matters because Noreika invests a whole lot of energy in prosecutors’ claims that they couldn’t be retaliating against Hunter Biden because Hunter’s father runs the Executive Branch.

To the extent that Defendant’s claim that he is being selectively prosecuted rests solely on him being the son of the sitting President, that claim is belied by the facts. The Executive Branch that charged Defendant is headed by that sitting President – Defendant’s father. The Attorney General heading the DOJ was appointed by and reports to Defendant’s father. And that Attorney General appointed the Special Counsel who made the challenged charging decision in this case – while Defendant’s father was still the sitting President. Defendant’s claim is effectively that his own father targeted him for being his son, a claim that is nonsensical under the facts here. Regardless of whether Congressional Republicans attempted to influence the Executive Branch, there is no evidence that they were successful in doing so and, in any event, the Executive Branch prosecuting Defendant was at all relevant times (and still is) headed by Defendant’s father.

This entire argument fails if, as the available evidence suggests, David Weiss asked for Special Counsel status to pursue a bribery investigation into Hunter and his father. Once you include the Smirnov claims, Joe Biden is the subject of the investigation, an investigation that was only made possible by reneging on the immunity agreement.

Judge Noreika clearly stated that the government appeared to revoke the deal based on Hunter’s statement about immunity. If that’s right, then Smirnov has to be central to her considerations. Instead, she ignored him.

Judge Maryellen Noreika Confuses Hunter Biden’s Memoir for the NYPost

Judge Maryellen Noreika has finally ruled on (three of) Hunter Biden’s motions to dismiss; like Judge Mark Scarsi, she rejected them.

In a follow-up, I’ll show how Noreika conceives of what went down in the failed plea hearing last summer. Her conception of it has some problem of its own, but it does shore up some problems created by Judge Scarsi’s opinion.

Before I get there, though, I want to look at a key passage of her selective and vindictive prosecution opinion, in which she lays out what she suggests is sound reason for this prosecution.

Although Defendant asks this Court to find that the prosecution’s decision to abandon pretrial diversion and proceed with indictment on the three firearm charges only occurred because of Defendant’s political affiliations (or his father’s political affiliations), Defendant has failed to offer “clear evidence” that that is what happened here. Moreover, in this case, there appear to be legitimate considerations that support the decision to prosecute. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (recognizing “the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan” as legitimate factors that may motivate a particular prosecution). Defendant has published a book about his life, where he admitted that his firearm was taken from him at some point after purchase and it was discarded (along with ammunition) in a public trash can, only to be discovered by a member of the public. (D.I. 68 at 2, 7). The government has an interest in deterring criminal conduct that poses a danger to public safety, and prosecutors are not frozen in their initial charging decisions. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382 (“A prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise the broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal interest in prosecution. An initial decision should not freeze future conduct.”) [my emphasis]

This paragraph is a formulaic paragraph in virtually all selective and vindictive prosecution opinions. You cite Armstrong for reasons prosecutors might charge besides animus, you cite Goodwin to lay out that they can change their minds, and then you cite some thing that justifies the prosecution.

Because the standards laid out in Armstrong and Goodwin are so high, you don’t have to include much to justify meeting that standard.

But what you cite generally has to be true.

And it is not true that Hunter Biden wrote in his memoir about the gun. He wrote about someone else pulling a gun on him, which is cited on a different page of the government response Noreika cites for the claim.

One night, while looking for crack and stepping around people curled up on cardboard, the defendant pulled back the flap on a tent and, from the pitch black, saw a gun pointed at his face. Id. at 190.

Only a few months after this happened, on October 12, 2018, the defendant chose to buy his own gun, and during this period he continued to be addicted to crack. Guns and drugs, of course, are a dangerous combination.

He wrote texts — cited in other parts of the selective prosecution motion — to Hallie about the gun.

On October 23, 2018 (the day his then-girlfriend discarded his firearm), the defendant messaged his girlfriend and asked, “Did you take that from me [girlfriend]?” Later that evening, after his interactions with law enforcement, he messaged her about the “[t]he fucking FBI” and asked her, “so what’s my fault here [girlfriend] that you speak of. Owning a gun that’s in a locked car hidden on another property? You say I invade your privacy. What more can I do than come back to you to try again. And you do this???? Who in their right mind would trust you would help me get sober.” In response, the girlfriend stated “I’m sorry, I just want you safe. That was not safe. And it was open unlocked and windows down and the kids search your car. You have lost your mind hunter. I’m sorry I handled it poorly today but you are in huge denial about yourself and about that reality that I just want you safe. You run away like a child and blame me for your shit . . .”

I believe somewhere texts, which I believe to be between Hunter and Keith Ablow, in which Hunter discusses the incident, got cited in this case.

But prosecutors should not have accessed any of the texts before charging. They didn’t have a warrant to do so until 81 days after they indicted.

While Hunter Biden has not yet made a claim, texts between Hunter and Ablow might fall under a doctor-client privilege.

And Abbe Lowell was at least claiming he’d file a motion to suppress the laptop.

Effectively, then, Judge Noreika’s rationale for why it was sound for prosecutors to charge Hunter Biden either amounts to charging Hunter because someone pulled a gun on him (a ridiculous detail to include in the response motion anyway, since it doesn’t pertain to the crime), or because NY Post has been publishing data that Hunter alleges was stolen from him.

Update: The fact that Noreika relies on evidence obtained from Hunter’s laptop is important given the way she dismisses the import of Rudy Giuliani in the selective prosecution motion.

In attempting to show discriminatory purpose, Defendant points to past and recent statements made by former President Trump, alleged conduct of one of the former president’s personal attorneys (Rudy Giuliani) and a purported criticism and pressure campaign by Congressional Republicans. (See id. at 27-37).
None of this evidence, however, is relevant to any alleged discriminatory purpose in this case. The charging decision at issue here – from 2023 – did not occur when the former president was in office. Nor did it occur when Mr. Giuliani was purportedly trying to uncover “dirt” about Defendant and presenting that information to U.S. Attorneys across the country. (See id. at 30). And the pressure campaign from Congressional Republicans may have occurred around the time that the Special Counsel decided to move forward with indictment instead of pretrial diversion, but the Court has been given nothing credible to suggest that the conduct of those lawmakers (or anyone else) had any impact whatsoever on the Special Counsel. It is all speculation.

Leo Wise Has a Sex Worker [and Other False Statement] Problem

It took a while to get a transcript for the motions hearing in Hunter Biden’s Los Angeles case. Now that I’ve read it, I want to revisit two claims Leo Wise made in the same blustery attack on Hunter Biden’s motion to dismiss for outrageous conduct.

His attack was a response to two things that Abbe Lowell said. First, Lowell claimed that the details included in the speaking indictment against Hunter Biden were precisely the details that Gary Shapley and Joseph Ziegler raised in their testimony and public comments, including lifestyle, luxury, drugs, escorts, and sex clubs.

Look in the indictment that you have on your desk.

Each one of the charges is exactly what those two agents said should happen.

What else did they say? They went on and they said, “And this is what he did as opposed to paying his taxes.” And they talked about all of his lifestyle, luxury, drugs, escorts, sex clubs, whatever they put in.

What happened? It’s exactly the phraseology that the special counsel put in, which is abhorrent. It doesn’t happen in pure government tax cases, where they go on for 36 pages, but that’s exactly what the agents demanded and said. So Walters is not just —

The other was that the IRS agents’ testimony set off a series of dominoes in May.

So what we know today is they did the causation. It was those two agents that started the domines. That’s what happened here.

They started in May to complain about what they say is done wrong in the case. The next thing, they’re on the airwaves. The next thing is members of Congress put them in their hearing. The next thing, they reveal what they were — said in the hearing, and release the transcripts wholesale, in the midst of those famous negotiations that were happening.

The next thing that happens is members of Congress complain about the June agreement. The next thing that happens is — while they’re still out there complaining, you know, in May, when they were removed from the case, they didn’t go home. They didn’t go work on some other case, or if they did, they had plenty of time to go on their publicity tour.

So then the next thing that happens is Chairman Smith of the Ways and Means Committee tries to intervene to squirrel the deal in Delaware. All that starts with these agents.

Here’s Wise’s response:

Well, they said, “Oh, they started the dominoes.” What dominoes? Where is the proof of any of that?

Other than insulting us, where is the proof that anything these two agents — who I couldn’t have picked out of a lineup — had anything to do with our decision-making?

The idea that every American knows this story, that’s absurd. I mean, the myopia of people that live in Washington, to think that everyone in America cares what Gary Shapley and — I don’t even know what Ziegler’s first name is — what Ziegler says. That’s not proof.

You know, he talks about, “Well, did the — where did the prosecutors get the concept of a speaking indictment?”

I’ve been a white-collar prosecutor for 18 years. I’ve been writing speaking indictments the entire time. We didn’t have to get the idea from Gary Shapley saying, “Oh, Biden — Biden was involved with drugs and escorts.”

Biden wrote about that in his book. I mean, we could read about it in the book. America can read about it in the book. You don’t have to watch some obscure pundit on some podcast I’ve never heard of talk about it

So, I mean, this is as weak, as factless as the vindictive selective motion was. This one is even worse, because here, they can’t even articulate a theory of causation. It’s just these guys are hyenas, baying at the moon, and that must have had something to do with us, and there’s simply no proof of it.

Wise does something he and Derek Hines have done over and over: Make up claims that Lowell has insulted them, when instead Lowell has insulted the Republicans targeting Hunter (in the Delaware hearing, Hines also falsely claimed that Lowell was trying to delay the trial).

Then, Wise totally reframes Lowell’s argument, shifting Lowell’s focus to things that happened in May to “our decision-making” that happened in December. That wasn’t what Lowell was arguing, at all.

There may be no proof that Gary Shapley and Joseph Ziegler had any influence on the decision to charge Hunter with precisely the crimes they demanded he be charged with. But as I’ve noted, the proof that they were the dominoes that started the reversal of David Weiss’ initial prosecution decision is in Thomas Sobocinski’s still-unreleased transcript, which describes how Shapley’s May appearances led to threats and stalking of the investigative team. There’s proof. It’s just that everyone is withholding it from Hunter.

Then, for good measure, Wise suggests that it would be myopic to suggest that the non-stop focus on Hunter Biden on Fox News has led people outside of DC to know who Hunter Biden is.

And then — this is the most amazing thing — Leo Wise claimed that, “America can read about it’ — a reference to both drugs and use of escorts — “in the book.”

Nope. There’s one mention of an escort (as a sex worker) in the book — but it’s a description of a way to get drugs. There’s lots of mention of clubs in the book, but not sex clubs. The indictment mentions strippers twice, but only as one of the kind of human detritus a junkie hangs out with.

thieves, junkies, petty dealers, over-the-hill strippers, con artists, and assorted hangers-on,

[snip]

my merry band of crooks, creeps, and outcasts

[snip]

An ant trail of dealers and their sidekicks rolled in and out,

[snip]

Their stripper girlfriends invited their girlfriends, who invited their boyfriends.

Nevertheless, Wise suggested he got his focus — and false suggestion that the women payments to whom Hunter allegedly wrote off improperly were sex workers –from Hunter’s book rather than Ziegler’s obsession with them (or watching Fox News or accessing public content attributed to the laptop).

Remember, Weiss’ team was so excited to include a payment to an exotic dancer in the indictment that they appear to have gotten the date wrong (as I suggested, this may mean that prosecutors didn’t do enough due diligence on what happened to Hunter’s Venmo account after two new devices accessed it in different cities at almost the same time).

Wise did so in a passage where he called Lowell’s motion “factless.” He did so in a hearing where he pounded the table, pretended to be a victim, and used the old “pound the table adage.”

And Judge Mark Scarsi appears to have adopted Weiss’ false claim about escorts being in the book when he said that, “Defendant himself brought notoriety to his conduct though the publication of a memoir.”

I get it: All three parties involved here have been caught making factual errors. Abbe Lowell claimed that public reports of the threats David Weiss faced were death threats and also misstated the timing of threats Trump made. Judge Scarsi claimed that an email said only the parties were involved in revising the diversion agreement, when the email in question said that Probation was involved. And Weiss’ team claimed sawdust is cocaine.

I get it. Much of Wise’s bluster is just totally banal prosecutorial dickishness. Leo Wise has been relying on prosecutorial dickishness for a very long time, at least since the prosecution of Joseph Nacchio bulldozed through Nacchio’s claim that he was prosecuted because he refused to let Qwest participate in Stellar Wind. It works! Especially with judges like Scarsi!

But this is the second time Weiss’ team has made a claim about Hunter’s memoir that was inaccurate (the other being a claim that the state of Hunter’s addiction in February 2019 after ketamine treatment exacerbated it was the state of his addiction when he purchased a gun in October 2018) even while arguing that the memoir is what distinguishes Hunter from other memoir writers like Roger Stone. That, along with the sawdust error and the belated warrant to search the laptop for materials supporting the gun crime raise real questions about what these prosecutors did do before obtaining these indictments. They don’t appear to have read the memoir, they don’t appear to have reviewed the actual laptop, they never indexed the laptop.

Abbe Lowell may not have proved his case that the IRS agents were the dominoes here. I don’t dispute Scarsi’s judgement that the standard here is incredibly high and Lowell didn’t meet it.

But if Weiss’ team didn’t get their sex worker obsession and errors from Ziegler and Shapley, the alternatives — given the evidence that they didn’t look where such evidence is known to be in hand — are actually worse. That is, it may well be they didn’t get their sex worker obsession from Ziegler. Does that mean they got it from Rudy Giuliani?

How Mark Scarsi Post Hoc Dismantled Abbe Lowell’s Juicy Timeline

Update: The day I wrote this post, Judge Scarsi denied Abbe Lowell’s motion to supplement the record on procedural grounds. 

Aside from his opinion on the diversion agreement — which gets weirder and weirder the more I look at it — Judge Mark Scarsi’s denials of the seven other Hunter Biden motions to dismiss were totally in line with precedent and my own expectations of what Scarsi would do.

To each of what I called the technical motions to dismiss, Judge Scarsi left it to the jury to decide. Scarsi relied on prior rulings on past Special Counsel appointments to deem David Weiss’ appointment legal. And for the Selective and Vindictive claim and the Egregious Misconduct claim, Scarsi ruled that the standard for dismissal is extremely high and Hunter Biden didn’t reach it.

Ordinarily, no judge would be reversed by ruling in such a fashion. All of his decisions are the easy out based on precedent — the cautious approach.

But it’s on the last two — the ones where all Judge Scarsi had to say was that the standard was super high — where he may have provided surface area for attack on appeal.

This post got overly long so here’s a map.

First, I lay out how Judge Scarsi claims to be demanding a laudably rigorous standard of evidence and procedure. Then, I show how in one of his correct fact checks of Abbe Lowell, Scarsi ends up providing more focus on the threats David Weiss faced, while debunking that Weiss testified they were death threats; that’s a topic on which Leo Wise provided wildly misleading testimony. I next look at how Scarsi claims to adopt a standard on the influence the IRS leaks had throughout the period of the prosecution, but ultimately only reviews whether those leaks had an effect on the grand jury (the standard Weiss wanted that Scarsi said he did nto adopt). Then I lay out two 9th Circuit opinions via which Scarsi accuses Lowell’s timeline argument to be a post hoc argument. Finally, I show how even while Scarsi fact checks some of Lowell’s claims, elsewhere he arbitrarily changes the timeline or ignores key parts of it. This last bit is the most important part, though it builds on the earlier parts, so skip ahead and read that. Finally, I note that Abbe Lowell may have erred by failing to put details about the Alexander Smirnov before Judge Scarsi.

A laudably hard grader

Ironically, that surface area arises, in significant part, from Scarsi’s attempted attentiveness, which I hailed a few weeks ago when he offered David Weiss a chance to respond to concerns that he was arbitraging (my word) his SCO appointment.

Scarsi’s attentiveness carries over to this opinion.

Once upon a time I was known as a hard grader and so I genuinely appreciate Scarsi’s attention to detail. I think he raises a number of good points about Abbe Lowell’s failure to meet Scarsi’s insistence on procedural rigor and factuality.

On the first part, for example, many reporters had claimed that Scarsi scolded Lowell at the motions hearing that he had no evidence (I’m still working on getting a transcript from Scarsi’s court reporter).

As this opinion makes clear, that was, first and foremost, a comment on the fact that Lowell had not submitted a declaration to attest to the authenticity of his citations.

As the Court stated at the hearing, Defendant filed his motion without any evidence. The motion is remarkable in that it fails to include a single declaration, exhibit, or request for judicial notice. Instead, Defendant cites portions of various Internet news sources, social media posts, and legal blogs. These citations, however, are not evidence. To that end, the Court may deny the motion without further discussion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 47(b) (allowing evidentiary support for motions by accompanying affidavit); see also C.D. Cal. R. 7-5(b) (requiring “[t]he evidence upon which the  moving party will rely in support of the motion” to be filed with the moving papers); C.D. Cal. Crim. R. 57-1 (applying local civil rules by analogy); cf. C.D. Cal. Crim. R. 12-1.1 (requiring a declaration to accompany a motion to suppress).

In at least one place, Scarsi even makes the same criticism of prosecutors, for not submitting the tolling agreements on which they relied with such a declaration.

This is a procedural comment, not an evidentiary one. It is a totally fair comment from a judge who, parties before him should understand, would insist on procedural regularity. He’s a hard grader.

That said, Scarsi’s claim that Lowell submitted no evidence is factually incorrect on one very significant point: In Lowell’s selective prosecution motion, he incorporated the declaration and exhibits included with the diversion agreement motion, which is cited several more times.

3 The extensive back-and-forth negotiation between the U.S. Attorney’s Office and Mr. Biden’s counsel regarding the prosecution’s decision to resolve all investigations of him is discussed in the declaration of Christopher Clark filed currently with Mr. Biden’s Motion to Dismiss for Immunity Conferred by His Diversion Agreement. (“Clark Decl.”)

So the record of the plea negotiations — an utterly central part of these disputes — did come in under the procedural standards Scarsi justifiably demanded. Even if you adopt Scarsi’s procedural demands, those records of how the plea deal happened are evidence before Scarsi.

Given Scarsi’s procedural complaint, though, it’s not entirely clear what the procedural status of this complaint is. As noted, Lowell did submit a declaration attesting to the authenticity of these documents before Scarsi unexpectedly ruled 16 days earlier than he said he would. Scarsi has not rejected it.

In any case, Scarsi described that he dug up and reviewed “all the cited Internet materials” Lowell cited himself and ruled based on that.

In light of the gravity of the issues raised by Defendant’s motion, however, the Court has taken on the task of reviewing all the cited Internet materials so that the Court can decide the motion without unduly prejudicing Defendant due to his procedural error.21

Having done that, though, Scarsi accuses Lowell of misrepresenting his cited sources.

21 However, Defendant mischaracterizes the content of several cited sources. The Court notes discrepancies where appropriate.

He’s not wrong! And honestly, this is the kind of fact checking I appreciate from Scarsi.

It’s the same ethic that led me to check Judge Scarsi’s claims about an exhibit that he misrepresented in his diversion agreement opinion, claiming that “the parties changed” the diversion agreement when in fact the exhibit said, “The parties and Probation have agreed to revisions to the diversion agreement,” arguably recording the agreement from Probation that, under Scarsi’s ruling, would trigger an obligation that prosecutors adhere to the immunity agreement he says is contractually binding.

It’s the same ethic that led me to check Judge Scarsi’s citation of Klamath v Patterson, only to discover he had truncated his citation, leaving out the bolded language below that would suggest this agreement is ambiguous and therefore should be interpreted in Hunter Biden’s favor.

The fact that the parties dispute a contract’s meaning does not establish that the contract is ambiguous; it is only ambiguous if reasonable people could find its terms susceptible to more than one interpretation. [my emphasis]

I genuinely do appreciate the fact that Scarsi tests the claims people make before him.

I do too.

The threats that at least five witnesses have described were real and likely incited by the IRS agents but may not have been death threats

One fact check of note that Scarsi raises, for example, pertains to Lowell’s citation of Politico’s coverage of David Weiss’ testimony, including the Special Counsel’s admission that he was concerned for the safety of his family. Scarsi notes that Politico doesn’t report, as Lowell claimed, that “Mr. Weiss reported he and others in his office faced death threats and feared for the ‘safety’ of his team and family.”

In a closed-door interview with Judicial Committee investigators in November 2023, Mr. Weiss reportedly acknowledged that “people working on the case have faced significant threats and harassment, and that family members of people in his office have been doxed.” Betsy Woodruff Swan, What Hunter Biden’s prosecutor told Congress: Takeaways from closed-door testimony of David Weiss, Politico (Nov. 10, 2023, 2:05 p.m.), https://www.politico.com/news/2023/11/10/ hunter-biden-special-counsel-takeaways-00126639.34

34 Although Mr. Weiss reportedly admitted “he is . . . concerned for his family’s safety,” Woodruff Swan, supra, this outlet did not report that Mr. Weiss “and others in his office faced death threats.” (Selective Prosecution Mot. 7.)

Scarsi is right. Those words, “death threats,” are not in the story. “Significant threats,” but not “death threats.”

Nor is it in Weiss’ still unreleased transcript, in which Weiss twice used the word “intimidated” when decrying such threats.

It’s not in Assistant Special Agent in Charge Ryeshia Holley’s testimony, where she described precautions taken for at least one of her FBI agents and for prosecutor Lesley Wolf after they were stalked and received comments of “a concerning nature.” It’s not in Lesley Wolf’s own testimony; rather, she described delaying her departure from DOJ because she believed she’d be safer if she remained a DOJ employee. Wolf also explained how her family had, “changed the way we do some things at home because of” the threats and stalking. A specific description of death threats is likewise not in the testimony of Los Angeles US Attorney Martin Estrada — effectively, a local colleague of Judge Scarsi — when he described working with the US Marshals because of “an uptick [of threats and hate mail] when the news came out in the spring regarding the Hunter Biden investigation,” including dozens of hate messages, some using the N-word and others using “certain derogatory terms reserved for Latinos.”

It’s not even in Ken Dilanian’s report (which Lowell did not cite), based off this congressional testimony as well independent reporting, describing how prosecutors and FBI agents have been the target of threats because they weren’t tough enough on Hunter Biden.

Prosecutors and FBI agents involved in the Hunter Biden investigation have been the targets of threats and harassment by people who think they haven’t been tough enough on the president’s son, according to government officials and congressional testimony obtained exclusively by NBC News.

It’s part of a dramatic uptick in threats against FBI agents that has coincided with attacks on the FBI and the Justice Department by congressional Republicans and former President Donald Trump, who have accused both agencies of participating in a conspiracy to subvert justice amid two federal indictments of Trump.

The threats have prompted the FBI to create a stand-alone unit to investigate and mitigate them, according to a previously unreleased transcript of congressional testimony.

None of these sources — and except for Dilanian, who has proven unreliable in the past, I’m working from official sources — mention death threats. Whether they mention influence from the IRS agents’ public campaign is a different issue.

Dilanian insinuated there was a tie between the threats against Wolf and the claims by Gary Shapley and Joseph Ziegler that Wolf “ma[de] decisions that appeared favorable to Biden.” US Attorney Estrada — Scarsi’s quasi colleague in Los Angeles — suggested a temporal tie, but didn’t mention the IRS agents.

As I’ve noted, though, Special Agent in Charge Thomas Sobocinski was more direct. When asked what he meant when he said that he and David Weiss had “both acknowledged that [Gary Shapley’s public comments were] there and that it would have had[,] it had an impact on our case,” Sobocinski described the effect to be the stalking of not just members of the investigative team, but also their family members.

None of this documented testimony described death threats. Scarsi is right on that point! The near unanimity that the prosecution team faced doxing and in some cases threats doesn’t describe the kind of threats, though US Marshals had to get involved on both coasts and some sources attribute those threats to the IRS agents, in Sobocinski’s case, explicitly.

That said, most of this documented testimony is unavailable to Hunter Biden’s lawyers, because Jim Jordan won’t release it, and because instead of sharing it, David Weiss sat in Scarsi’s own courtroom watching Leo Wise make claims about the impact of the IRS agents’ leaks that may be technically true as far as Wise’s experience (it’s not Leo Wise’s family being followed, presumably), but hides the impact on the prosecution team before Wise joined the team — the impact that Sobocinski described to Congress.

So I admire Judge Mark Scarsi for holding Abbe Lowell to the documentary record. As a former hard grader, I think such accuracy is important.

But Scarsi’s complaints about Lowell’s misrepresentation of the reported record about these threats also serve to highlight what David Weiss (and Jim Jordan) are withholding from Hunter Biden and his attorney, even while misleading Scarsi about it.

Incidentally but importantly, because Abbe Lowell relied on a NYPost story for the Estrada citation, he relied on a source that presented only part of what the LA US Attorney said about his team’s analysis of why they recommended against partnering with Weiss on a Hunter Biden prosecution, the part focusing on how resource-strapped he was and how there were many far more urgent crimes to prosecute in LA.

Estrada also said there was an evidentiary part of the discussion.

We only prosecute cases where we believe a Federal offense has been committed and where we believe there will be sufficient admissible evidence to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt to an unbiased trier of fact.

But of course, that (plus the three underlying reports recommending against prosecution) are another thing Weiss has withheld.

Judge Scarsi adopts — then abandons — a standard on IRS leaks

Which leads me to one of three things that — on top of Scarsi’s miscitation of that exhibit recording involvement from probation in revising the diversion agreement and his truncation of a relevant precedent to give it the opposite meaning — I think may provide more surface area for attack on appeal.

It pertains to Judge Scarsi’s ruling on Hunter’s outrageous conduct motion, in which Abbe Lowell argued that the extended media campaign from the IRS agents had resulted in a grave due process violation.

Scarsi makes a big show of adopting a different standard than the one David Weiss — the guy who reportedly sat in Scarsi’s courtroom and saw Leo Wise make a claim that was not true as it applied to himself — advocated: that the charges themselves “result from” the outrageous government conduct at issue.

48 The Government advances a rule that “the defendant must show that the charges resulted from” the outrageous government conduct to show a due process violation. (Outrageous Conduct Opp’n 4–9.) Though the Government’s presentation is persuasive, the Court stops short of adopting that rule. It is true that courts often consider the doctrine in contexts where the defendant asserts the offending government conduct played a causal role in the commission, charge, or conviction of a crime. (Id. at 7–8 (summarizing Russell, 411 U.S. 423; Pedrin, 797 F.3d 792; United States v. Combs, 827 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2016); Stenberg, 803 F.2d 422; United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1993); and Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507).) And the Government’s proposed rule aligns with the proposition that “the outrageous conduct defense is generally unavailable” where the crime is in progress or completed before the government gets involved. Stenberg, 803 F.2d at 429. But the Ninth Circuit teaches that there is no one-size-fits-all rule for application for the doctrine, see Black, 733 F.3d at 302 (“There is no bright line dictating when law enforcement conduct crosses the line between acceptable and outrageous, so every case must be resolved on its own particular facts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and nothing in the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of the doctrine mandates that the offending misconduct play some causal role in the commission of the crime or the levying of charges, see Russell, 411 U.S. at 431–32. The Court takes the Second Circuit’s cue and leaves the door open to challenges based on “strategic leaks of grand jury evidence by law enforcement.” Walters, 910 F.3d at 28. [my emphasis]

Elsewhere, addressing a slightly different argument from Lowell, Scarsi describes that the standard is “substantially influenc[ing] the grand jury’s decision to indict, or if there is grave doubt the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations.” [my emphasis]

Exercise of supervisory authority to dismiss an indictment for wrongful disclosure of grand jury information is not appropriate unless the defendant can show prejudice. Walters, 910 F.3d at 22–23 (citing Bank of N.S., 487 U.S. at 254–55). In other words, “dismissal of the indictment is appropriate only if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict, or if there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations.” Bank of N.S., 487 U.S. at 256 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Scarsi claims to adopt a standard in which egregious government misconduct could have an influence elsewhere, besides just causing the charges against the defendant, as Weiss wants the standard to be. So Scarsi says the standard doesn’t require a direct influece on the grand jury.

Then he abandons that standard.

In his ruling, Scarsi ultimately adopts Weiss’ standard of causing a prejudicial effect on the grand jury’s decision.

Defendant offers no facts to suggest that the information Shapley and Ziegler shared publicly had any prejudicial effect on the grand jury’s decision to return an indictment. That Shapley and Ziegler’s public statements brought notoriety to Defendant’s case is not enough to show prejudice.50

50 As noted previously, Defendant himself brought notoriety to his conduct though the publication of a memoir. [my emphasis]

In the same breath, he offers up a gratuitous representation that Hunter’s complaint was about notoriety and not, along with the threats to prosecutors’ family members, the ability to get a fair trial.

Judge Scarsi claims he was not going to exclude the impact that leaks might have earlier in the process; he’s referencing a case in which the offending federal official leaked documents for 16 months. But ultimately, he adopts Weiss’ focus on the actual grand jury decision to indict.

Now, as I suggested above, with regards to the evidence in front of Scarsi, his opinion is still totally sound, because Weiss is withholding precisely the proof of influence that Leo Wise claims doesn’t exist. But when Sobocinski’s testimony becomes public — whether via Hunter Biden’s IRS lawsuit, a change in Congress, or discovery challenges launched by Hunter himself — Scarsi’s adoption (then abandonment) of the possibility that strategic leaks could be basis for dismissal could become important. The standard is, as Scarsi says, still very very high. But the evidence in question attributes the stalking and threats against investigative personnel, including Weiss himself, to Shapley’s leaks. The IRS leaks caused the threats which immediately preceded Weiss reneging on the plea deal.

Get Me Roger Stone

As noted, in his discussion of the IRS leaks, Scarsi includes a gratuitous swipe that Hunter Biden’s memoir created notoriety. In doing so, Scarsi probably has adopted the prosecution’s continued misrepresentation of what the memoir does and does not do.

As to the crimes alleged in both the tax indictment and gun indictment, Hunter’s memoir couldn’t have brought notoriety to his conduct from the memoir. As Lowell correctly pointed out, Hunter’s memoir doesn’t describe failing to pay his taxes or buying a gun.

Hunter’s notoriety substantially comes from release of his private files by the same Donald Trump attorney who solicited dirt about Hunter from known Russian spies. Rudy Giuliani’s leaks are before Scarsi in several forms, in articles describing Trump’s politicization of them.

And the IRS agent claims — virtually all of which have been debunked or explained — were different in kind, because they were the kind of claims that could, and did, gin up threats against investigators rather than just Hunter himself. The IRS agents targeted David Weiss and Lesley Wolf. Hunter’s memoir didn’t do that.

Finally particularly in the context of the discussion about the IRS agent, Scarsi seems to adopt this swipe from prosecutors. But I think it overstates what the memoir shows and certainly overstates what is before Scarsi. The two longest quotes from the memoir in the indictment focus on the riff raff being a wealthy junkie attracts. For example, the passages of the memoir before Scarsi refer to strippers but does not say Hunter slept with them.

thieves, junkies, petty dealers, over-the-hill strippers, con artists, and assorted hangers-on,

[snip]

my merry band of crooks, creeps, and outcasts

[snip]

An ant trail of dealers and their sidekicks rolled in and out,

[snip]

Their stripper girlfriends invited their girlfriends, who invited their boyfriends.

This is important because both Shapley and Ziegler focused on prostitutes in their testimony to Congress (indeed, it’s how Ziegler predicated his side of the investigation). Worse still, Ziegler falsely called Lunden Roberts (an exotic dancer when Hunter met her) — who, as the recipient of the best-documented improper write-off from Hunter, may be a witness at trial — a prostitute before he corrected himself. So the IRS agents, not the memoir, pushed one aspect highlighted in the indictment that is not in the book: the sex workers. Remember: the indictment itself conflates women with prostitutes (and appears to ignore a male who tried to insinuate himself into Hunter’s life as an assistant); the same conflation Ziegler engaged in appears in the indictment.

Which brings me back to Weiss’ false claims about memoirs and Roger Stone.

As a reminder, the selective comparator is not a huge part of Hunter Biden’s argument. He focused on the way a political campaign that led to stalking and threats against prosecutors led David Weiss to abandon a plea deal.

But Stone is in there. And in suggesting that Stone is not a fair comparator, Judge Scarsi punts on a number of things. For example, he admits that DOJ accused Stone, via civil complaint, of defrauding the United States.

The Stones intended to defraud the United States by maintaining their assets in Drake Ventures’ accounts, which they completely controlled, and using these assets to purchase the Stone Residence in the name of the Bertran Trust.

But Scarsi seems to dismiss the intent involved in creating alter egos to hide money from the IRS because the civil resolution of the complaint led to voluntary dismissal of the fraud claim.

Nothing in the record of the civil cases, let alone in the circumstances of the “countless others” the Government declines to prosecute, (Selective Prosecution Mot. 19), provides an inference that these individuals are similarly situated to Defendant with regard to indicia of criminal intent. Obviously, Stone and Shaughnessy were civil cases; intent was not a material element of the nonpayment counts at issue. See generally Compl., United States v. Stone, 0:21-cv60825-RAR (S.D. Fla. April 16, 2021), ECF No. 1; 37

37 Intent was an element to a claim for fraudulent transfer the United States brought against the Stones, which the United States eventually dismissed voluntarily. Joint Mot. for Entry of Consent J. 1, United States v. Stone, 0:21-cv-60825-RAR (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2022), ECF No. 63.

But that’s part of the point! IRS used the threat of fraud and evasion charges to get the bills paid, and they dismissed what could have been a separate criminal charge — one they allege was done to evade taxes — once they got their bills paid. Hunter didn’t get that chance, in part because he paid his taxes two years before the charges filed against him.

Stone allegedly evaded taxes for two tax years, not one, and unlike Hunter, had not paid when the legal proceeding was filed against him.

And Scarsi doesn’t address the full extent of Lowell’s rebuttal to Weiss’ attempt to minimize Stone; he doesn’t note they’ve been caught in a false claim.

But adopting Defendant’s position would ignore the numerous meaningful allegations about Defendant’s criminal intent that are not necessarily shared by other taxpayers who do not timely pay income tax, including the Shaughnessys and Stones. (See Selective Prosecution Opp’n 2–4
(reviewing allegations).) Without a clear showing that the evidence going to criminal intent “was as strong or stronger than that against the defendant” in the cases of the Shaughnessys, the Stones, and other comparators, the Court declines to infer discriminatory effect. United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 810 (11th Cir. 2000).38

For example, Scarsi doesn’t mention, at all, that the other Stone crimes invoked in the DOJ complaint against Stone posed real rather than hypothetical danger to a witness and a judge and were invoked as his motive in the complaint, not even though that was part of the rebuttal that Weiss attempted to make. He doesn’t mention that the complaint against Stone alleges that Stone used his Drake account to pay associates and their relatives, one of the allegations included in the Hunter indictment, nor that it describes how instead of paying taxes the Stone’s enjoyed a lavish lifestyle, again repeating allegations in the Hunter indictment.

32. The Stones used Drake Ventures to pay Roger Stone’s associates, their relatives, and other entities without providing the required Forms 1099-MISC (Miscellaneous Income) or
W-2s (Wage and Tax Statement).

[snip]

[T]he Stones’ use of Drake Ventures to hold their funds allowed them to shield their personal
income from enforced collection and fund a lavish lifestyle despite owing nearly $2 million in
unpaid taxes, interest and penalties.

Scarsi does recognize, in passing, to how Weiss falsely claimed that Stone hadn’t written a memoir when it was actually more closely tied to the complaint than Hunter’s.

38 In his reply, Defendant proffers that Mr. Stone “wrote a memoir about his criminal actions,” as Defendant is alleged to have done. (Selective Prosecution Reply 6 (emphasis removed).) That memoir is not before the Court, and its value as evidence in a putative criminal tax evasion case against Mr. Stone is unestablished.

Now, Scarsi is absolutely right on this point as well: Abbe Lowell should have ponied up for Stone’s reissued Memoir so Scarsi could read it. But some of the evidence of the tie is before him.

Judge Scarsi might include Lowell’s link to my post among those that were not part of the record when he drafted this opinion — what he described as Lowell’s lack of evidence. But it was included among those for which Lowell submitted a declaration before Scarsi docketed his opinion (on which filing Scarsi has thus far taken no action). If Scarsi read all of Lowell’s sources as he claimed, it would be before him. (Welcome to my humble blog, Judge Scarsi!)

While my post did not link the memoir, it included a paragraph by paragraph description of the introduction that violated the gag order. I described how Stone, “Complains about his financial plight,” in this paragraph, which, like the tax complaint, ties Stone’s decision to stop paying taxes to the Mueller investigation:

Furthermore, my post did include a link to this filing, providing much of the correspondence regarding the reissue of the memoir. It includes, for example, Stone’s demand for an immediate wire payment because he owed others — people who worked on the book, but also likely potential witnesses in the Mueller investigation (for example, Kristin Davis, who was subpoenaed in that investigation and the January 6 investigation, was heavily involved in promotion of the book).

Stone was describing doing prospectively what the Hunter indictment alleges prospectively, payoffs to associates and their family members.

It also shows that Stone was paid, once in December 2018 and once in January 2019, to the Drake Ventures account that was used — per DOJ’s complaintwith the intent of defrauding the United States.

In unredacted form, those emails would provide one of just two of the kinds of information for which the tax indictment — as distinct from the gun indictment, which relies on it much more directly (though Weiss got his evidence wrong, again, and so misstates its value) — uses the memoir: To show income that could have gone to paying taxes.

158. In 2020, prior to when the Defendant filed the 2019 Form 1040, the Defendant’s agent received multiple payments from the publisher of his memoir and then transferred the following amounts to the Defendant’s wife’s account in the amounts and on the dates that follow:

a. $93,750 on January 21, 2020; and
b. $46,875 on May 26, 2020.

There was certainly enough in my post such that Scarsi didn’t have to infer that Stone’s two years of alleged invasion and fraud more closely mirror Hunter’s than he let on.

The comparison was never going to be the basis for dismissal. But because of the way Scarsi minimizes this, the comparison with another  “American [who] earn[s] millions of dollars of income in a four-year period and [wrote] a memoir allegedly memorializing criminal activity” will be ripe for inclusion in any appeal, particularly if — as I expect — Hunter’s team demonstrates at trial how prosecutors have mistaken a memoir of addiction as an autobiography, one that hurts their tax case as much as it helps.

Scarsi accuses Lowell of post hoc argument

As noted above, when Scarsi loudly accused Abbe Lowell of presenting no evidence to support his selective and vindictive prosecution claim at his motions hearing, he was making a procedural comment about the way Lowell laid out evidence that pressure from Republicans and the IRS agents led Weiss to renege on a plea deal and file the 9-count indictment before Scarsi.

Scarsi has not rejected Lowell’s belated filing with such a declaration, which leaves me uncertain about whether those materials are now (and therefore were) formally before Scarsi before he ruled, even if only minutes before.

For both the IRS challenge and the general selective and vindictive claim, Scarsi ruled that Lowell had not reached the very high bar for such things. As I noted above, that is the easy decision, one that would almost always be upheld on appeal. These are not, on their face, controversial decisions at all.

Where those decisions become interesting, in my opinion — or could become interesting if they were included along with the inevitable appeal of the weird immunity decision — is in how he rejected those claims.

At the hearing, Judge Scarsi asked Abbe Lowell if he had any evidence of vindictive prosecution besides the timeline laid out in his filing, which relies on all those newspaper articles. Lowell conceded the timeline is all he had, but that “it’s a juicy timeline.” (Wise and Hines both wailed that the description of all this impugns them, an act that is getting quite tired but seemed to work like a charm for Scarsi.)

At the hearing, Lowell reportedly included several things in this discussion:

  • The existence of an already agreed plea and diversion in June
  • Congressman Jason Smith’s efforts to intervene in the plea hearing
  • Leo Wise reneging at the plea hearing on earlier assurances there was no ongoing investigation into Hunter Biden, followed by Weiss’ immediate effort to strip all immunity from the diversion agreement
  • The resuscitation of the Alexander Smirnov allegations
  • A claim (that may reflect ignorance of some grand jury testimony) that, in the tax case, Weiss already had all the evidence in his possession that he had in June 2023 when he decided to pursue only misdemeanors
  • The fact that, in the gun case, Weiss didn’t pursue basic investigative steps (like getting a gun crimes warrant for the laptop content or sending the gun pouch to the lab to be tested for residue) until after charging Hunter
  • The subpoena to Weiss and his testimony just weeks before the tax indictment

In response to Lowell emphasizing these parts of the timeline — not a single one of which relies exclusively on news reports — the Judge who misused the phrase “beg the question” cited two Ninth Circuit precedents, neither of which Weiss relied on, to accuse Lowell of making a post hoc argument.

At best, Defendant draws inferences from the sequence of events memorialized in reporting, public statements, and congressional proceedings pertaining to him to support his claim that there is a reasonable likelihood he would not have been indicted but for hostility or punitive animus. As counsel put it at the hearing, “It’s a timeline, but it’s a juicy timeline.” But “[t]he timing of the indictment alone . . . is insufficient” to support a vindictiveness theory. Brown, 875 F.3d at 1240; see also United States v. Robison, 644 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting appearance-of-vindictiveness claim resting on “nothing more than the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy”). [links added]

Neither of these opinions are about timelines. Brown involves a case where someone already convicted of a federal weapons crime but awaiting trial in a state murder case escaped; after he made a declaration at his cellmate’s trial for escaping, he was charged himself for escaping. The Ninth Circuit ruled that was not vindictive because prosecutors got newly obtained evidence — his own declaration — with which to charge him for escaping.

Robison involves another case of newly discovered evidence. Several months after a state murder conviction was overturned and as he was appealing a charge for destroying a Federal building, he was charged with burning down a tavern. The court held a hearing (this was back in 1980, when such things were still done), and determined that the evidence implicating Robison in the tavern bombing post-dated his appeals.

Now, Weiss would argue (but curiously has always stopped well short of doing so) that he did get new evidence: He called a bunch of witnesses before a CA grand jury. Best as I can tell, the only thing Lowell has seen from that was testimony used in the warrant to search the laptop for gun crimes after the indictment. In neither LA nor in Delaware is Weiss arguing he got new information (while Weiss did serve a bunch of subpoenas for documents against Hunter, it’s not clear how many witness interviews were part of his apparently abandoned attempt to charge Hunter and his father with bribery). Unlike Jack Smith, Special Counsel Weiss appears not to be sharing all the grand jury testimony against Hunter.

But neither of these cases (as distinct from Bordenkircher and Goodwin) involve a prosecutor upping the ante on the same crimes as Weiss did. More importantly, they were offered to defeat Lowell’s claim of a timeline, a whole series of events. In response, Scarsi offers up cases that involve two (arguably, three with Robison) events.

Lowell’s timeline focuses closely on June and July, not December, and yet Scarsi adopts precedents that focus on the timing of an indictment, not a reneged plea.

I’m interested not so much that these citations are inapt (but they are). It’s what Scarsi does to dismantle Lowell’s timeline.

Scarsi corrects, and then fiddles with, and in two places, ignores the timeline

Scarsi is absolutely right that Hunter’s initial motion is a mess (remember that Lowell had asked for an extension in part because the lawyer responsible for these filings had a death in the family; I suspect that Scarsi had his opinion on this motion written before the hearing and possibly even before the reply). Scarsi makes much, correctly, of several details Lowell erroneously suggests immediately preceded the December tax indictment.

Moreover, Defendant appears to suggest that, after the deal in Delaware fell apart but before the filing of the indictment in this case, Mr. Trump “joined the fray, vowing that if DOJ does not prosecute Mr. Biden for more, he will ‘appoint a real special prosecutor to go after’ the ‘Biden crime family,’ ‘defund DOJ,’ and revive an executive order allowing him to fire Executive Branch employees at will.” (Id. at 7.) The comments he cites all predate the unraveling of the Delaware plea—if not even earlier, before the announcement of a plea.

But in correcting that error, Scarsi has noted (what the Delaware motion does note) that Trump’s attacks on Weiss were an immediate response to the publication of the plea agreement.

And that’s interesting, because Scarsi repeatedly fiddles with the timeline on his own accord.

For example, he starts the entire opinion by laying out what he claims is “a brief background of undisputed events leading up to the Indictment.” In it, he astonishingly declines to date the plea agreement — which was publicly docketed on June 20 — anytime before late July 2023.

By late July 2023, Defendant and the Government reached agreement on a resolution of the tax charges and the firearm charges memorialized in two separate agreements: a memorandum of plea agreement resolving the tax offenses, (Machala Decl. Ex. 3 (“Plea Agreement”), ECF No. 25-4), and a deferred prosecution agreement, or diversion agreement, addressing the firearm offenses, (Machala Decl. Ex. 2 (“Diversion Agreement”), ECF No. 25-3).

So for the opinion as a whole, Scarsi has simply post-dated events that unquestionably happened a month earlier. Much later in the opinion, however, Scarsi cites the evidence (accompanied by a declaration) that that decision happened in June.

On May 15, 2023, prosecutors proposed “a non-charge disposition to resolve any and all investigations by the DOJ of Mr. Biden.” (Clark Decl. ¶ 6.)26 After further discussions over the following month, Defendant and the Government coalesced around a deal involving a deferred prosecution agreement and a plea to misdemeanor tax charges. (See generally id. ¶¶ 7–39.)

Having post-dated the actual prosecutorial decision filed to docket in June, Scarsi repeatedly says that Hunter doesn’t have any way of knowing when any prosecutorial decisions happened. In one place, he makes the fair assertion that Hunter hasn’t substantiated when particular decisions were made.

Defendant asserts that a presumption of vindictiveness arises because the Government repeatedly “upp[ed] the ante right after being pressured to do so or Mr. Biden trying to enforce his rights.” (Selective Prosecution Mot. 16.) Defendant alleges a series of charging decisions by the prosecution, (id. at 4–7), but the record does not support an inference that the prosecutors made them when Defendant says they did.

[snip]

But the fact of the matter is that the Delaware federal court did not accept the plea, the parties discussed amendments to the deal they struck toward satisfying the court’s concerns, and the deal subsequently fell through.

In another, he makes the ridiculous assertion that Hunter has not substantiated when any prosecutorial decisions were made.

Defendant asserts that the Government made numerous prosecuting decisions between 2019 and 2023 without offering any substantiating proffer that such decisions were made before the Special Counsel decided to present the charges to the grand jury, let alone any proffer that anyone outside the Department of Justice affected those decisions, let alone any proffer that any of those decisions were made based on unjustifiable standards.

Hunter presented authenticated, undisputed proof regarding when one prosecutorial decision was made, and it was made in June, not July, where (in one place) Scarsi misplaces it.

Similarly, Scarsi distorts the timeline when Leo Wise reneged on the assurances that there was no further investigation. He admits that prosecutors withdrew all immunity offer in August, but dates it to after the plea hearing, not before (as represented by Wise’s comment about an ongoing investigation).

On July 26, 2023, the district judge in Delaware deferred accepting Defendant’s plea so the parties could resolve concerns raised at the plea hearing. (See generally Del. Hr’g Tr. 108–09.) That afternoon, Defendant’s counsel presented Government counsel a menu of options to address the concerns. (Def.’s Suppl. Ex. C, ECF No. 58-1.)31 On July 31, Defendant’s counsel and members of the prosecution team held a telephone conference in which they discussed revising the Diversion Agreement and Plea  Agreement. The Government proposed amendments and deletions. (See Lowell Decl. Ex. B, ECF No. 48-3.) On August 7, counsel for Defendant responded in writing to these proposals, signaling agreement to certain modifications but resisting the Government’s proposal to modify the provision of the Diversion Agreement contemplating court adjudication of any alleged breaches and to delete the provision conferring immunity to Defendant. Defense counsel took the position that the parties were bound to the Diversion Agreement. (Id.) On August 9, the Government responded in writing, taking the position that the Diversion Agreement was not in effect, withdrawing its proposed modifications offered on July 31 in addition to the versions of the agreements at play on July 26, and signaling that it would pursue charges. (Def.’s Suppl. Ex. C.)

In the section of his opinion discussion selective prosecution, he accepts that the IRS agents first started leaking in May 2023, but finds — having heard Leo Wise’s misleading claim that he knew of no effect the disgruntled IRS agents had and having also acknowledged that Weiss himself testified that he was afraid for his family’s safety (but leaving it out of all his timeline discussions) — that Lowell presented no evidence that Shapley and Ziegler affected Weiss’ decision-making.

Meanwhile, in late May, Internal Revenue Service agents spoke to news media and testified before the Ways and Means Committee of the United States House of Representatives about their involvement in the tax investigation of Defendant. E.g., Jim Axelrod et al., IRS whistleblower speaks: DOJ “slow walked” tax probe said to involve Hunter Biden, CBS News (May 24, 2023, 8:31 p.m.), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/irs-whistleblower-tax-probe-hunter-biden/ [https://perma.cc/7GQF-2HJA]; Michael S. Schmidt et al., Inside the Collapse of Hunter Biden’s Plea Deal, N.Y. Times (Aug. 19, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/19/us/politics/inside-hunter-biden-pleadeal.html [https://perma.cc/6CVJ-KYDK].27

27 Defendant asserts that the IRS agents’ actions prompted then-United States Attorney David Weiss to change his position away from a non-charge disposition to the plea the parties ultimately contemplated, (Selective Prosecution Mot. 5 & nn.11–12), but the support for this assertion apparently is his own attorneys’ and the IRS agents’ speculation as reported by the New York Times, see Schmidt et al., supra (“Mr. Biden’s legal team agrees that the I.R.S. agents affected the deal . . . .”). For the same story, Mr. Weiss declined to comment, and an unnamed law enforcement official disputed the assertion. Id.

Later in that section, having made his big show of rejecting Weiss’ bid to limit the consideration of IRS influence just to grand jury decisions but then flip-flopped, Scarsi decides that he’s not going to look too closely at this timing (for the egregious violation motion).

43 The particulars of when and how Defendant asserts Shapley and Ziegler made these disclosures, and what their contents were, are immaterial to this Order. The Court declines to make any affirmative findings that Shapley and Ziegler violated these rules given the pending civil case Defendant brought against the IRS related to the alleged disclosures, see generally Complaint, Biden v. U.S. IRS, No. 1:23-cv-02711-TJK (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023), ECF No. 1, and the potential for criminal prosecution of such violations. But the Court need not resolve whether their public statements ran afoul of these nondisclosure rules to decide the motion.

That — plus Wise’s misleading comment — is how Scarsi dismisses Lowell’s claim that the IRS agents had a role in killing the plea deal.

(“There is no doubt that the agents’ actions in spring and summer 2023 substantially influenced then-U.S. Attorney Weiss’s decision to renege on the plea deal last summer, and resulted in the now-Special Counsel’s decision to indict Biden in this District.”).) His theory rests on a speculative inference of causation supported only by the sequence of events.

Meanwhile, his efforts to dismiss the import of Congress’ and Trump’s earlier intervention is uneven. Scarsi’s treatment of this passage from Hunter’s motion deserves closer consideration:

Mr. Biden agreed to plead guilty to the tax misdemeanors, but when the plea deal was made public, the political backlash was forceful and immediate. Even before the Delaware court considered the plea deal on July 26, 2023, extremist Republicans were denouncing it as a “sweetheart deal,” accusing DOJ of misconduct, and using the excuse to interfere with the investigation.13 [2] Leaders of the House Judiciary, Oversight and Accountability, and Ways and Means Committees (“HJC,” “HOAC,” and “HWMC,” respectively) opened a joint investigation, and on June 23, HWMC Republicans publicly released closed-door testimony from the whistleblowers, who, in the words of Chairman Smith, “describe how the Biden Justice Department intervened and overstepped in a campaign to protect the son of Joe Biden by delaying, divulging and denying an ongoing investigation into Hunter Biden’s alleged tax crimes.”14 Then, one day before Mr. Biden’s plea hearing, Mr. Smith tried to intervene [4] to file an amicus brief “in Aid of Plea Hearing,” in which he asked the court to “consider” the whistleblower testimony.15

13 Phillip Bailey, ‘Slap On The Wrist’: Donald Trump, Congressional Republicans Call Out Hunter Biden Plea Deal, USA Today (June 20, 2023), https://www.usatoday.com/.

14 Farnoush Amiri, GOP Releases Testimony Alleging DOJ Interference In Hunter Biden Tax Case, PBS (June 23, 2023), https://www.pbs.org/.

15 United States v. Biden, No. 23-mj-00274-MN (D. Del. 2023), DE 7. [brackets mine]

Here’s how Scarsi treats this passage laying out what happened between the publication of the plea and the failed plea hearing:

The putative [sic] plea deal became public in June 2023. Several members of the United States Congress publicly expressed their disapproval on social media. The Republican National Committee stated, “It is clear that Joe Biden’s Department of Justice is offering Hunter Biden a sweetheart deal.” Mr. Trump wrote on his social media platform, “The corrupt Biden DOJ just cleared up hundreds of years of criminal liability by giving Hunter Biden a mere ‘traffic ticket.’” Phillip M. Bailey, ‘Slap on the wrist’: Donald Trump, congressional Republicans call out Hunter Biden plea deal, USA Today (June 20, 2023, 11:17 a.m.), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/06/20/donald-trump-republicans-react-hunter-biden-plea-deal/ 70337635007/ [https://perma.cc/TSN9-UHLH]. 28 On June 23, 2023, the Ways and Means Committee of the United States House of Representatives voted to publicly disclose congressional testimony from the IRS agents who worked on the tax investigation. Jason Smith, chair of the Ways and Means Committee, told reporters that the agents were “[w]histleblowers [who] describe how the Biden Justice Department intervened and overstepped in a campaign to protect the son of Joe Biden by delaying, divulging and denying an ongoing investigation into Hunter Biden’s alleged tax crimes.” Farnoush Amiri, GOP releases testimony alleging DOJ interference in Hunter Biden tax case, PBS NewsHour (June 23, 2023, 3:58 p.m.), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/gop-releases-testimony-alleging-dojinterference-in-hunter-biden-tax-case.29 One day before the plea hearing in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, Mr. Smith moved to file an amicus curiae brief imploring the court to consider the IRS agents’ testimony and related materials in accepting or rejecting the plea agreement. Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Br., United States v. Biden, No. 1:23-mj-00274-MN (D. Del. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 7-2; Amicus Curiae Br., United States v. Biden, No. 1:23-mj-00274-MN (D. Del. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 7-3.30

28 This source does not stand for the proposition that “extremist Republicans were [1] . . . using the excuse to interfere with the investigation.” (Selective Prosecution Mot. 5–6.) Of Mr. Weiss, Mr. Trump also wrote: “He gave out a traffic ticket instead of a death sentence. . . . Maybe the judge presiding will have the courage and intellect to break up this cesspool of crime. The collusion and corruption is beyond description. TWO TIERS OF JUSTICE!” Ryan Bort, Trump Blasts Prosecutor He Appointed for Not Giving Hunter Biden ‘Death Sentence,’ Rolling Stone (July 11, 2023), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/trump-suggests-hunter-bidendeath penalty-1234786435/ [https://perma.cc/UH6N-838R].

29 This source does not stand for the proposition that several leaders of house committees “opened a joint investigation.” (Selective Prosecution Mot. 6.) [3]

30 The docket does not show that the Delaware district court resolved the motion, and the Court is uncertain whether the court considered Mr. Smith’s brief. [brackets mine]

First, Scarsi uses an ellipsis, marked at [1], to suggest the only reason Lowell cited the USA Today story was to support the claim that Republicans moved to intervene in the investigation, when the sentence in question includes three clauses, two of which the story does support. The sentence immediately following that three-clause sentence [2] makes a claim — OGR, HWAM, and HJC forming a joint committee, that substantiates that claim. Scarsi’s complaint at [3] is not that the cited article does not include Jason Smith’s quotation; rather, it’s that Lowell has not pointed to a source for the formation of a joint investigation (a later-cited source that Scarsi never mentions does include it). Meanwhile, Scarsi applies a measure — whether Judge Noreika considered Smith’s amicus, not whether he tried to file it — that Lowell doesn’t make (and which is irrelevant to a vindictive prosecution motion, because Noreika is not the prosecutor); Smith did succeed in getting the amicus unsealed, including the exhibits that Hunter claimed include grand jury materials. Whether or not Judge Noreika considered the content of the amicus, that Smith filed it is undeniable proof that Smith tried to intervene, which is all Hunter alleged he did.

Meanwhile, Scarsi relegates Trump’s Social Media threats — which Scarsi later corrects Lowell by noting that they came during precisely this period — to a footnote.

Here’s one thing I find most interesting. Scarsi’s two most valid complaints about Lowell’s filing are that, in one part of his timeline but not another, he misrepresented Trump’s pressure as happening after the plea failed, and that Lowell claimed that Weiss testified he had gotten death threats when instead the cited source (and the Weiss transcript I assume Lowell does not have) instead say that Weiss feared for his family. He acknowledges both those things: Trump attacked Weiss, and Weiss got threats that led him to worry for the safety of his family.

But he never considers Weiss’ fear for his family’s safety in his consideration of what happened between June and July. He never considers whether those threats had a prejudicial affect on Hunter Biden.

And aside from that correction regarding the safety comment, nor does Scarsi consider the most direct aspect of Congress’ intervention in the case — that Congress demanded Weiss testify, and he did so just weeks before he filed the charges actually before Scarsi.

In other words, Scarsi accuses Lowell of making a post hoc argument, claiming that he is simply pointing to prior events to explain Weiss’ subsequent actions. Except he ignores the impact of the two most direct allegations of influence.

Lowell did neglect to notice one important detail

There is one detail that Scarsi entirely ignores — but it’s one area where Lowell’s failures to provide evidence may be the most problematic.

Scarsi doesn’t mention Alexander Smirnov.

But it’s not clear the Smirnov case is properly before Scarsi.

He was definitely mentioned. Weiss first raised Smirnov, though without providing docket information, and Lowell responded.

But as I laid out here, while both discovery requests pertaining to the Brady side channel as well as a notice of the Smirnov indictment are before Judge Noreika, neither filing was repeated before Scarsi. There are allusions to it — such as Jerry Nadler’s efforts to chase down the Brady side channel, but not formal notification in court filings of the FD-1023 or Smirnov’s arrest.

In his introduction to the selective prosecution section, Scarsi noted that there was more in the docket in Delaware, stuff he was not going to consider (which leads me to believe he’s got something specific in mind that he is excluding).

20 The parties freely refer to briefs they filed in connection with a motion to dismiss filed in the criminal case against Defendant pending in Delaware, in which the parties advanced similar arguments, but more voluminously. Although the Court has read the Delaware briefing, (see Tr. 13, ECF No. 18), its resolution of the motion rests only on the arguments and evidence presented in the filings in this case. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020). [link added]

Scarsi’s citation seems to suggest that arguments not made before him by Lowell would be improper to consider. But at least with respect to Lowell’s request for the materials on the side channel, it has never been clear whether Lowell was supposed to repeat discovery requests before Scarsi he already made in Delaware.

One way or another, though, Scarsi has not formally considered the abundant evidence that the reason Leo Wise reneged on past assurances that there was no ongoing investigation was so he could chase Smirnov’s false claims of bribery. There are ways that Lowell could present that as new news, but it seems that Scarsi maintains that he has not yet done so, not even when prosecutors were the first to raise it.

As I keep saying, Scarsi’s decision on the selective prosecution and the egregious misconduct are not wrong. But the way in which he rejected them provide reason for complaint.

Lowell has strongly suggested that he will appeal this decision (but he likely cannot do so unless Hunter is found guilty). If that happens, it’s likely these weaknesses in Scarsi’s opinion — his failure to adhere to his own admirably rigorous standards — may make the opinion more vulnerable to appeal.

Update: Note I’ve updated my Hunter Biden page and also added Alexander Smirnov to my nifty Howard Johnson graphic.

Maryellen Noreika and Mark Scarsi’s Schrödinger’s Cat

David Weiss invokes Maryellen Noreika in the very first sentence of his Los Angeles — but not his Delaware — response to Hunter Biden’s immunity bid (not to mention, extrinsic evidence that, per his position that the diversion agreement was unambiguous, should be irrelevant).

The defendant has moved to dismiss the indictment returned by the grand jury in this district on the ground that a proposed diversion agreement presented to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware on July 26, 2023, which the district court rightly referred to as a “proposed agreement,” which required the approval of the Chief United States Probation Officer to enter into effect, which she expressly declined to give, see Exhibit 1, and as to which the district court in Delaware “deferred” a decision on accepting, nonetheless is in effect and confers “sweeping” immunity on the defendant in this case. [my emphasis]

The filing uses the word “proposed” 43 more times, almost all discussing either the diversion agreement or the tax plea agreement and in one case, including it in brackets within a quote of Leo Wise’s own words, effectively putting what Weiss claims Noreika said into Wise’s mouth even though Wise didn’t say it himself.

Only, Weiss misquotes what Judge Noreika said.

The word “proposed” was uttered once in the failed plea hearing, referring to both the plea and the diversion. Judge Noreika didn’t call either document a “proposed agreement;” she instead described “what is being proposed.” And before she used that word, “proposed,” she twice called the documents “agreements,” with no modifier.

THE COURT: Now, we have two cases and two agreements and I understand that the Diversion Agreement is not something that is typically before the Court, but you all did send it to me so I do want to talk about that a little bit. There are some provisions in those agreements that are not standard and are different from what I normally see, so I think we need to walk through these documents and get some understanding of what is being proposed so that I can give due consideration to the determination that you all are asking me to make. So I want to start with Criminal Action 23-274 involving the tax charges. [my emphasis]

In Weiss’ Delaware response, he only places that word in Judge Noreika’s mouth on the second page, and in full context, and only uses the word proposed 33 times. He never misquotes Noreika to Noreika.

In context in the plea hearing, Noreika was probably referring not to either document as “proposed.” She was probably referring to the way the two documents worked together and the expectations the two documents, working together, would put on her and Delaware head of Probation, Margaret Bray.

This immunity bid, along with three other motions to dismiss and a discovery motion, have now been fully briefed before Judge Noreika for 66 days. During those 66 days, both sides briefed the same issues before Judge Scarsi, he held a motions hearing, and issued a decision — a decision that would mean representations on which she made decisions last year are no longer valid.

I described the other day that Noreika appears to be frozen in uncertainty about what to do about these motions. And since Judge Scarsi issued his weird ruling on this same motion on Monday, neither side has noticed Noreika of the decision. It’s as if everyone is hunkering down waiting for Noreika to rule to see how it affects all these other moving parts.

I want to propose something about this dispute, about what is making it so difficult — for Noreika, especially — to decide. As Noreika herself noted in that passage from which David Weiss misquoted her, Judges don’t usually get involved in diversion agreements. But she did here. And in an effort to get out of that diversion agreement, Weiss has made Noreika’s intervention into the diversion agreement the subject of the dispute.

Noreika did not approve the plea on July 26 of last year for two reasons.

First, she was uncomfortable with the role she played in the diversion agreement, which all sides agreed she had no role in approving.

The immunity provision, for all crimes — gun, drug, and tax — was in the diversion agreement, not the plea agreement, but was cross-referenced in the plea agreement.

Both sides told her that she was only approving the plea, but since they had given her the diversion agreement, she inquired about how her role would work.

THE COURT: All right. Now at this point I would normally ask Mr. Biden how he pleads, but as we’ve already discussed, the Diversion Agreement is out there in a felony case, it is cross-referenced in the Memorandum of Plea Agreement. The Plea Agreement is cross-referenced in the Diversion Agreement, so before I ask him how he pleads, I need to understand — well, ask him how he pleads or decide if I can accept the Plea Agreement, I need to understand the Diversion Agreement.

So the felony gun charge here is a bit unusual, and we don’t usually make diversion agreements public. I don’t usually see a diversion agreement as the parties up here have hinted, but in fact you all did send it to me and it is referenced in the agreement that is before me in the tax case.

She objected to the way the diversion agreement included her as a finder of fact in case of a breach of the agreement.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All right. Now I have reviewed the case law and I have reviewed the statute and I had understood that the decision to offer the defendant, any defendant a pretrial diversion rest squarely with the prosecutor and consistent with that, you all have told me repeatedly that’s a separate agreement, there is no place for me to sign off on it, and as I think I mentioned earlier, usually I don’t see those agreements. But you all did send it to me and as we’ve discussed, some of it seems like it could be relevant to the plea.

One provision in particular stands out to me, and that is paragraph 14. That paragraph says if the United States believes that a knowing material breach of this agreement has occurred, it may seek a determination by the United States District Judge for the District of Delaware with responsibility for the supervision of this agreement.

It then goes on to say that if I do find a breach, then the government can either give the Defendant time to remedy the breach or prosecute him for the crime that is the subject of the information or any other that falls within the language of the agreement. Do I have that understanding correct?

[snip]

THE COURT: First it got my attention because you keep telling me that I have no role, I shouldn’t be reading this thing, I shouldn’t be concerned about what’s in these provisions, but you have agreed that I will do that, but you didn’t ask me for sign off, so do you have any precedent for that?

[snip]

THE COURT: I’m concerned that that provision makes me a gatekeeper to criminal charges and puts me in the middle of a decision as to whether to bring a charge. And we already talked about separation of powers and that choice as to whether to bring charges is not — that’s the executive branch, not the judicial branch, so is this even constitutional?

MR. CLARK: I believe it is, Your Honor, because what the structure makes clear is that Your Honor is just finding facts. [my emphasis]

Importantly, all three sides — Hunter Biden’s team, David Weiss’ team, and Judge Noreika — made comments at this plea hearing that were internally inconsistent.

In Judge Noreka’s case, some of those comments pertained to whether her role was presiding over just the plea, or also the diversion agreement, which both parties to it said she had no authority to approve.

What’s funny to me is you put me right smack in the middle of the Diversion Agreement that I should have no role in, you plop meet right in there and then on the thing that I would normally have the ability to sign off on or look at in the context of a Plea Agreement, you just take it out and you say Your Honor, don’t pay any attention to that provision not to prosecute because we put it in an agreement that’s beyond your ability.

So this is what I am going to do. These agreements are not straightforward and they contain some atypical provisions. I am not criticizing you for coming up with those, I think that you have worked hard to come up with creative ways to deal with this. But I am not in a position where I can decide to accept or reject the Plea.

[snip]

THE COURT: I certainly understand what — if it’s a plea under subsection (c)(1)(B), I am not going to just agree with you as to the limits of my role. My problem is I am not — I am not sure, and I need to understand the propriety, it may very well be that it is appropriate, but as I said, it did catch my attention, you throw me in there, Judge, you’re the gatekeeper and then you take me out of the other aspects of the — you throw me into the Diversion Agreement and then you take me out of the Memorandum of Plea Agreement.

So I cannot accept the Plea Agreement today.

Even though the government did repeatedly tell her that the diversion agreement was only between the parties, they have also pointed to her docket minutes in support of their argument that the diversion had not come into effect.

The Court deferred a decision on the plea and pretrial diversion agreement.

But here’s the thing: If Noreika believes it is a separation of powers violation for Article III to be involved in a diversion agreement, then the diversion agreement should not be in that docket minute. It should, instead, say something like she was deferring a decision on the plea because of concerns about the diversion agreement.

I have argued that Judge Mark Scarsi misapplied Schrödinger’s cat paradox to his own weird decision on the diversion agreement. But one thing that happened here is that someone outside to the diversion agreement observed it with the result that the status of it changed. We are still debating on the status of that contract to which she is not a party because of her interventions.

And now Judge Noreika has been asked to rule on whether that contract that became a not contract because of her observations on it is a binding contract.

But that brings us to the other reason Noreika refused to approve the plea. Noreika didn’t accept the plea because Leo Wise told her there was an ongoing investigation.

THE COURT: Is there an ongoing investigation here?

MR. WISE: There is.

THE COURT: May I ask then why if there is we’re doing this piecemeal?

MR. WISE: Your Honor may ask, but I’m not in a position where I can say.

This, right at that moment, was a separate breach of the agreement between the parties, and deserves more attention. As I have laid out, Weiss has had five different opportunities to contest Abbe Lowell’s representation that on June 19 of last year, David Weiss’ office told Chris Clark that there was no ongoing investigation. Weiss has waived the opportunity to contest that. Leo Wise’s claim, at the hearing, was a breach of those representations.

And then, specifically referencing Wise’s affirmation that there was an ongoing investigation, Noreika asked if FARA charges could be charged and Leo Wise said they could, while Hunter and his attorneys believed that was prohibited by the diversion agreement. Along the way, Wise misrepresented the nature of the agreement, suggesting that Noreika would sign the diversion agreement.

MR. WISE: Because by the terms of the Plea Agreement, the only function, the Diversion Agreement — well, it has no function but the parties negotiated that their view, and it’s their view, probation can take a different view, Your Honor can take a different view, their view is the firearms offense should not be considered relevant conduct for calculating the guidelines related to the tax offense, that is all that 5(b) says. It does not incorporate the paragraph 15 or any part of the Diversion Agreement, it simply says our view is the Diversion Agreement, the firearm offense should not be considered relevant conduct in calculating the guidelines. I think practically how this would work, Your Honor, is if Your Honor takes the plea and signs the Diversion Agreement which is what puts it into force as of today, and at some point in the future we were to bring charges that the Defendant thought were encompassed by the factual statement in the Diversion Agreement or the factual statement in the Plea Agreement, they could move to dismiss those charges on the grounds that we had contractually agreed not to bring charges encompassed within the factual statement of the Diversion Agreement or the factual statement of the tax charges.

MR. CLARK: That’s my understanding, Your Honor, we would be enforcing a contract with the Department of Justice.

THE COURT: I don’t understand how you have an agreement not to pursue other charges in the case, the misdemeanor case, and you say that is not part of his Plea Agreement.

MR. WISE: Because the Plea Agreement does not include that.

THE COURT: All right. So let’s talk a little bit more about this. To the extent that the agreement —
you can sit down. To the extent that the agreement not to prosecute is promised, do the parties have some understanding what the scope of that agreement is?

MR. WISE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, tell me, like specifically what does it include. You said that there is an investigation, I don’t know what that is, but you must know that if there are particular charges that could be brought based on the facts that are there.

MR. WISE: So I can tell you what I think we can’t charge. I can’t tell you what the ongoing investigation is. So, for instance, I think based on the terms of the agreement, we cannot bring tax evasion charges for the years described in the factual statement to the Plea Agreement. And I think we cannot bring for the firearms charges based on the firearm identified in the factual statement to the Diversion Agreement.

THE COURT: All right. So there are references to foreign companies, for example, in the facts section. Could the government bring a charge under the Foreign Agents Registration Act?

MR. WISE: Yes.

THE COURT: I’m trying to figure out if there is a meeting of the minds here and I’m not sure that this provision isn’t part of the Plea Agreement and so that’s why I’m asking.

MR. CLARK: Your Honor, the Plea Agreement —

THE COURT: I need you to answer my question if you can. Is there a meeting of the minds on that one?

MR. CLARK: As stated by the government just now, I don’t agree with what the government said.

This was earlier in the hearing; it precedes Noreika’s concerns about the diversion agreement. But it is one reason she was so concerned about her inclusion in the diversion agreement: because the two parties disagreed on the scope of the immunity provided.

Or rather, because Leo Wise had already changed the terms of the agreement, to include an ongoing investigation that Chris Clark had been assured did not exist.

We can now be quite sure what that ongoing investigation is: David Weiss reneged on the terms of the agreement, claiming there was an ongoing investigation when his office had previously assured Clark there was not, after members of Congress made Alexander Smirnov’s FD-1023 public. Faced with renewed attention on it, David Weiss was chasing the lead he was ordered to investigate in 2020, chasing it only to find out it was a false claim of bribery against Joe Biden.

When this dispute started back in December, how these parts fit together was not clear. Since, it has become clear that having been ordered to investigate the FD-1023 days after Donald Trump pressured Bill Barr in October 2020, under pressure from Congress, Weiss reneged on the assurances his office had given Clark in June 2023, which was the understanding on which the diversion agreement was signed, in order to be able to chase the Smirnov lead.

And now Weiss is presiding over an investigation into how Smirnov’s false claims came to be mainstreamed into the investigation of Hunter Biden in which he is a witness, a wildly unethical position to be in.

But by all appearances that is what explains the two breaches here: first, to Leo Wise reneging on the terms agreed before he was party to this prosecution, and then, to Wise’s refusal to brief the diversion agreement that Judge Scarsi says is binding, but instead to strip it of all immunity altogether.

Judge Maryellen Noreika’s decision on the diversion agreement and on the circumstances that led Weiss to renege on assurances he had given Clark is quite different than Scarsi’s. That’s true, in part, because by intervening in a signed contract to which she was not party, she led to the abrogation of that contract.

And then, because she took steps to ensure the rights of Hunter Biden — to ensure that the misdemeanors he thought he was facing were really what he was facing — prosecutors used that opportunity to slap on a bunch of felonies that, evidence before her makes quite clear, they had never bothered to investigate in the years they had investigated Hunter Biden.

I have no idea how she’ll ultimately rule. If she hoped that Scarsi would come up with a solution she could adopt, the prior representations about the status of the agreement, on which she based some decisions last year, may preclude her from simply adopting his weird solution. But she also faces a different legal and ethical position vis a vis the contract than Scarsi, because prosecutors took advantage of her good faith efforts to protect Hunter’s rights as a way to renege on the agreement altogether.

Judge Mark Scarsi’s Quantum Theory of Murdered Contract Law

As expected, Judge Mark Scarsi has denied Hunter Biden’s motions to dismiss.

This post will explain his interpretation of the diversion agreement and his invitation for additional briefing on what even he calls a “Schrödinger’s cat-esque construction of Defendant’s immunity under the Diversion Agreement.”

A follow-up post will show how three errors Scarsi made undermine his otherwise totally defensible decisions on selective and vindictive prosecution and outrageous conduct, in one case in a way that bears on the diversion agreement. Scarsi fails to come close to meeting his own rigorous evidentiary standard on two points, and on a third, Scarsi fails to adopt the legal standard he claims to rely on.

As you read these posts, keep three things in mind.

First, Scarsi issued this order 16 days before he said he would, which would have been April 17 (as noted, he has invited further briefing on a central point that he has nevertheless already ruled on).

Before he docketed yesterday’s order — an order that pointedly refused further briefing — Abbe Lowell filed a motion that addressed two issues Scarsi raised in last week’s hearing which are pertinent to Scarsi’s ruling. Scarsi hasn’t and probably won’t accept Lowell’s bid to file that motion, but it nevertheless was directly on point and, in my opinion, corrected claims that Scarsi reportedly made in last week’s hearing (one of which recurs in this opinion). And it was filed before Scarsi formalized his order rejecting Hunter’s motions.

Even before Judge Scarsi filed yesterday’s order 16 days before he said he would, he was (and remains) on a relentless pace to get this to trial quickly. Meanwhile, Judge Maryellen Noreika appears to be frozen in uncertainty about what to do about motions filed by Hunter. Versions of three of these motions to dismiss have been fully briefed in Delaware since January 30. During that period, Lowell submitted a request in Los Angeles asking Scarsi to hold off until Noreika ruled, because the diversion motion would properly be decided by Noreika, a request Scarsi denied. Then, on February 12, Lowell informed Noreika that Scarsi was not waiting on her decisions on MTDs filed first in her district, what I took to be a soft nudge asking her to rule quickly so she would rule first. In a March 13 status hearing, Lowell made the nudge much more directly, asking her to rule on the diversion agreement first, and do so quickly, noting that it was proper for her to rule given that Delaware contract law probably applied. These issues are relevant, among other reasons, because I think they make Scarsi’s order more vulnerable on appeal, an appeal that Hunter Biden probably would not, however, be able to make until after he were convicted.

More troubling, I have been wondering whether Noreika’s seeming paralysis was an attempt to wait out Scarsi to see what he did with these rulings. So Scarsi’s approach may end up influencing her even though several facts are differently situated before her, including one Scarsi relied on heavily.

Finally, in one place, Scarsi adopted the colloquial, rather than the formal logic meaning, of “begs the question.”

This observation begs a question regarding another provision, the parties’ agreement that the United States District Court for the District of Delaware would play an adjudicative role in any alleged material breach of the agreement by Defendant. (my emphasis)

I’m normally pretty tolerant of this usage; I occasionally fail to avoid it myself. But given that I think Scarsi has adopted an incorrect meaning of the Schrödinger’s cat paradox in an order that adopted a crazy theory to deny Hunter’s immunity claim, I find it notable that he also used a term that, in formal logic, describes someone adopting premises that assume a conclusion to be true, to mean something else. Scarsi’s misuse of these two terms are badges of someone getting logic wrong.

Now to Scarsi’s interpretation that led him to analogize that Hunter Biden’s immunity from the prosecution Scarsi is rushing headlong towards trial is both dead and not-dead. In short, Scarsi ruled that the parties to the contract granting Hunter Biden immunity from this prosecution executed the agreement, but did not yet put it into effect (or performance). As he describes, “the Diversion Agreement is a binding contract but performance of its terms is not yet required.”

To get there, Scarsi first lays out that the legal standards to apply here are uncertain, both as to whether Delaware, US, or California contract law governs, and as to the standard to apply to diversion agreements.

Having rejected Lowell’s request to let Noreika rule first, he applies the Ninth Circuit standard for plea agreements, and only in the next paragraph lays out what should come first: an acknowledgment that the Ninth hasn’t yet applied the standards used for plea agreements to diversion agreements, but other circuits have and so he will here.

The parties have not identified, and the Court has not uncovered, binding circuit authority extending these interpretation principles to pretrial diversion agreements. But several other circuit courts have found diversion agreements analogous to plea agreements and construed them according to similar contract principles. E.g., United States v. Harris, 376 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]his court interprets a pretrial diversion agreement applying the same standards we would use to interpret a plea agreement.”); Aschan v. Auger, 861 F.2d 520, 522 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying contract principles, reasoning that “[t]he pre-trial diversion agreement is analogous to a plea agreement”); cf. Garcia, 519 F.2d at 1345 & n.2 (similarly analogizing a deferred prosecution agreement to a plea bargaining agreement). The Court perceives no meaningful distinction between plea and diversion agreements relevant to the application of these interpretation principles.

These contract law standards may actually matter; they may matter a lot, not least because Scarsi misrepresents the uncontested record about the plea deal that failed (which I’ll get to in my follow-up).

In any case, however, Scarsi claims to be adopting a standard that holds the government responsible for any imprecisions in a plea agreement.

Given concerns about the defendant’s constitutional rights at play, “the honor of the government, public confidence in the fair administration of justice, and the effective administration of justice in a federal scheme of government,” courts “hold[] the Government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant . . . for imprecisions or ambiguities in plea agreements” than they would a drafting party to a commercial contract. Clark, 218 F.3d at 1095 (internal quotation marks omitted). “As a defendant’s liberty is at stake, the government is ordinarily held to the literal terms of the plea agreement it made, so that the government gets what it bargains for but nothing more.”

Having adopted that standard but then having claimed that the diversion agreement is unambiguous, Scarsi then comes up with an interpretation that neither the government nor Hunter Biden have adopted, telling the parties to a contract that he knows better than them what they entered into.

[T]he Court does not reach Defendant’s argument that the Government should be estopped from denying the validity of the agreement or the Probation Officer’s approval. (Immunity Mot. 18–19.) The Diversion Agreement is unambiguous, and the Government’s position on its interpretation cannot change its meaning.

We now have three different interpretations of a diversion agreement that everyone claims is unambiguous. Schrödinger’s cat had just two states of being: dead and not-dead. Scarsi has given this diversion agreement three.

Scarsi’s version says the words “approval” and “execute” are doing different things in the diversion agreement, and while the agreement was executed by the only parties to it, because someone not a party to it did not approve it, the government is not yet required to fulfill the contract.

Approval and approved together appear in three places in the agreement: the provision defining the agreement’s term, (Diversion Agreement § II(1)); the provision defining the diversion period, (id. § II(2)); and the signature block designated for the Probation Officer, (id. at 9). Outside of definition provisions, the only place the agreement uses the approve word stem is in the signature block inviting a formal sanction by the Probation Officer. And obtaining the approval of the Probation Officer makes sense in the context of the agreement, as the parties contemplated as a term of Defendant’s performance his subjection to her supervision. (Id. § II(10)(a).) In other words, the supervision provision would be nugatory if the Probation Officer refused to supervise Defendant.6 The definition provisions require an approval, and the only place in the agreement to which the Court can look to divine the meaning of approval is the signature block for the Probation Officer, compelling an interpretation that ties approval to an act by the Probation Officer.

In contrast, the term execution appears twice in the Diversion Agreement: in the provision defining the diversion period, (id. § II(2)), and in a provision authorizing execution of the agreement in counterparts, (id. § II(18)). Consistent with the definition of execute, the counterparts provision circumscribes the acts of signing the agreement that might validate it; in other words, the parties agreed that signing the same copy of the agreement would have the same effect as signing different copies. Notably, the provision defining the diversion period uses both execution and approval together, indicating each has its own meaning: “The twenty-four (24) month period following the execution and approval of this Agreement shall be known as the ‘Diversion Period.’” (Id. § II(2) (emphases added).) As Defendant’s counsel admitted at the hearing, Defendant’s proffered interpretation would render the phrase “execution and approval” redundant in part. The contrast between sections II(1) and II(2) supports an interpretation that gives each word its own meaning; while “approval” triggers the agreement’s term, the diversion period begins only “following the execution and approval” of the agreement.

Having ruled that the government is wrong that Probation’s approval was precedent to approval to the contract, Scarsi then argued that her approval was precedent to performance, something that had to happen before the agreement went into effect. Prosecutors are wrong that the contract isn’t binding, Scarsi argues, but because probation didn’t also sign the diversion agreement, prosecutors are not yet required to grant Hunter the immunity the agreement grants him.

For this interpretation to end up with Hunter being fucked, Scarsi also has to reject Hunter’s argument that probation already did agree to supervise the diversion agreement before, unbeknownst to Hunter and Judge Noreika, after he and Leo Wise signed the diversion agreement, Delaware head of probation Margaret Bray refused to sign the diversion agreement itself.

The agreement is not reasonably susceptible to an interpretation that the Probation Officer could manifest her approval by issuing a pretrial diversion recommendation consistent with the Diversion Agreement, let alone by any means other than signature on the line reserved for her.9

9 Defendant’s argument would fail on its merits even if the Probation Officer could have manifested her approval by issuing a pretrial diversion report. Defendant submits that the Probation Officer provided a “letter to counsel . . . enclosing her recommendation in favor of the Diversion Agreement and copy of the Agreement.” (Immunity Mot. 18.) The report filed with this Court does not reference or attach a copy of the agreement at all. (See generally Machala Decl. Ex. 5.) That said, the report filed with the motion is incomplete and apparently redacted. Although some of the recommended conditions of pretrial diversion align with the conditions discussed in the Diversion Agreement, they do not mirror each other perfectly. (See, e.g., Machala Decl. Ex. 5 § 38(5) (requiring as a condition of pretrial diversion Defendant’s consent to entry into a criminal background check system, a condition not discussed in the Diversion Agreement).) Further, another document in the motion record indicates that the parties modified the Diversion Agreement after the Probation Officer issued her report in an effort to “more closely match” the report. (Clark Decl. Ex. T (providing July 20, 2023 revisions to Diversion Agreement); cf. Machala Decl. Ex. 5 (dated July 19, 2023).) The Court resists Defendant’s ouroboric theory that the Probation Officer manifested approval of an agreement the parties changed in response to the purported approval. Further, the Court doubts the Probation Officer manifested approval of the revised version of the Diversion Agreement passively by being party to an email circulating the updated draft. (See Clark Decl. Ex. T.) [my emphasis]

In doing so, Scarsi misrepresents the exhibit he relies on.

The parties and Probation have agreed to revisions to the diversion agreement to more closely match the conditions of pretrial release that Probation recommended in the pretrial services report issued yesterday. Attached, please find clean and redline versions of the diversion agreement.

The parties didn’t modify the diversion agreement after probation issued its report; the parties and probation did. And that agreement didn’t happen on that email thread. Scarsi simply invents probation’s passive participation in an email.

That is, to dismiss Hunter’s argument that probation gave approval for the agreement, Scarsi misstates the evidence before him. That’s pretty telling, because if probation did approve the deal (and Hunter had no indication until the same AUSA who wrote an email saying probation had approved it that Bray refused to sign it after Hunter and Wise had), then the immunity deal is in place. Scarsi doesn’t address something he did in the hearing, which is that it made sense for tax crimes to be immunized given the expectation that Hunter would soon plead guilty to misdemeanors (which is one of the two things Lowell addressed in his filing and which was obviously wrong when Scarsi said it), so he seems to cede that if the agreement did go into effect, he can’t be charged with tax felonies.

More importantly, there are several aspects of Scarsi’s interpretation he doesn’t address, having nevertheless denied the motion while inviting further briefing and misusing the term, “begs the question.”

Having severed the execution of the contract from its performance, Scarsi doesn’t consider what those two terms apply to, even though prosecutors can only perform one part of the agreement — the immunity — and probation can only perform another — the diversion supervision. Margaret Bray cannot perform the part that matters here, conferring immunity, but Scarsi has given her veto power over the government fulfilling a contract they entered.

It would seem that if Scarsi were applying the standard he claims to be using — “the government is ordinarily held to the literal terms of the plea agreement [in this case, diversion agreement] it made” — then those who executed the diversion agreement, the prosecutors, should be required to recognize the immunity they agreed to and which they are uniquely situated to deliver.

More importantly, the main reason why probation never revisited approving the diversion agreement is because prosecutors failed to go get her signature. They failed to do so because Hunter did not agree to the terms of the separate plea agreement after Leo Wise changed the terms of the immunity it offered in the hearing itself. As we’ll see, that’s a part of the factual record that Scarsi simply disappears, ignoring it even though prosecutors waived contest to it.

Mark Scarsi rushed to interpret this contract in a way neither party to it agrees with, but did so in such a way that frees prosecutors from the obligation Scarsi himself says they agreed to give. He did so while misusing the term “begs the question” and invoking a metaphor, Schrödinger’s cat, designed to describe an absurd state, while calling Hunter’s correct description of events he misrepresented an ouroboric theory.

Mark Scarsi may be right that the diversion agreement uses two terms to depict two different things, but in doing so, he has upended the authority over prosecutions and arguably misapplied the standard he claims to adhere to.

David Weiss Does Not Contest He Reneged on Hunter Biden’s Plea Agreement to Chase Russian Lies

David Weiss has now had five opportunities to contest former Hunter Biden attorney Chris Clark’s declaration that on June 6, Weiss personally discussed language to provide Hunter immunity from further prosecution, and after that language was incorporated into the plea deal, on June 19, Weiss’ First AUSA told Clark that there was no ongoing investigation into the President’s son.

I requested to speak directly with U.S. Attorney Weiss, whom I was told was the person deciding the issues of the Agreement. Later that afternoon, on June 6, 2023, I spoke directly with U.S. Attorney Weiss. During that call, I conveyed to U.S. Attorney Weiss that the Agreement’s immunity provision must ensure Mr. Biden that there would be finality and closure of this investigation, as I had conveyed repeatedly to AUSA Wolf during our negotiations. I further conveyed to U.S. Attorney Weiss that this provision was a deal-breaker. I noted that U.S. Attorney Weiss had changed the deal several times heretofore, and that I simply could not have this issue be yet another one which Mr. Biden had to compromise. The U.S. Attorney asked me what the problem was with the proposed language, and I explained that the immunity provision must protect Mr. Biden from any future prosecution by a new U.S. Attorney in a different administration. The U.S. Attorney considered the proposal and stated that he would get back to me promptly.

Later that same evening on June 6, 2023, at or around 5:47 PM EST, AUSA Wolf emailed me proposed language for the immunity provision that read: “How about this- The United States agrees not to criminally prosecute Biden, outside of the terms of this Agreement, for any federal crimes encompassed by the attached Statement of Facts (Attachment A) and the Statement of Facts attached as Exhibit 1 to the Memorandum of Plea Agreement filed this same day.” (Emphasis in original.)

[snip]

Shortly after that email, I had another phone call with AUSA Hanson, during which AUSA Hanson requested that the language of Mr. Biden’s press statement be slightly revised. She proposed saying that the investigation would be “resolved” rather than “concluded.” I then asked her directly whether there was any other open or pending investigation of Mr. Biden overseen by the Delaware U.S. Attorney’s Office, and she responded there was not another open or pending investigation.

David Weiss is silent about proof that he reneged on immunity agreement made in June

Weiss has filed five responses to Hunter Biden claims that address how Weiss reneged on this agreement to immunize the President’s son from any further prosecution:

None of them contest those two claims from Chris Clark: That David Weiss was personally involved on June 6 before Lesley Wolf sent language immunizing Hunter for everything “encompassed” by the plea and diversion, and that Shannon Hanson assured Clark on June 19 there were no ongoing investigations.

Instead, these filings simply shift focus temporally. The responses to the selective and vindictive claim focus on earlier negotiations to falsely suggest that David Weiss did not personally buy off on language sent out on June 6.

For example, in an email to defense counsel dated May 18, 2023, about “a potential nontrial resolution,” Document 60-6 at p. 2, the AUSA stated, “As I said during our call, the below list is preliminary in nature and subject to change. We have not discussed or obtained approval for these terms, but are presenting them in an attempt to advance our discussions about a potential non-trial resolution . . .” The following week, in an email to defense counsel dated May 23, 2023, Document 60-9 at p. 3, the AUSA stated, “As we indicated in our emails and discussions we did not have approval for a pre-trial diversion agreement. As you know, that authority rests with the US Attorney who ultimately did not approve continued discussions for diversion related to the tax charges.” In response to this email, defense counsel wrote, “Ok. My client has asked that I speak to you further. Are you able to speak? I may have some slight flexibility.” Far from an agreement or an agency determination that these charges should not be brought, as the defense suggests in their briefing, these discussions merely indicate the parties were engaged in plea discussions at the line prosecutor level and the AUSA repeatedly disclosed that such discussions were subject to review and approval by the U.S. Attorney. [emphasis original]

The response to the IRS agent claim argues that because Gary Shapley and Joseph Ziegler had “ceased to have any role in the investigation” when the actual charging decisions were made in September and December, their media campaign could not have caused the earlier decision to renege on the plea deal and endorse precisely their charging decisions.

Here, the defendant does not argue that Shapley and Ziegler used any law enforcement technique that resulted in the charges currently before the court. In fact, the conduct he complains of occurred after Shapley and Ziegler ceased to have any role in the investigation.

Never mind that the claim conflicts with a Joseph Ziegler affidavit, which claims that, “As seen in these emails, we have continued to assist and turnover the Hunter Biden casefile to the new team,” and the related emails showing him still handing off documents on September 1 (though given document metadata, Ziegler continued to access and release to Congress records after that). What matters are not the charging decisions made in September and December but the earlier decision to renege on the plea deal.

What matters is that when Leo Wise stated, on July 26, that prosecutors could bring FARA charges against Hunter Biden, he was reneging on the terms of the signed plea deal.

What matters is that when David Weiss told Lindsey Graham on July 11 that Alexander Smirnov’s FD-1023 was part of an ongoing investigation, he signaled that he had decided to renege on the plea deal even before the plea hearing to chase the claim that the President of the United States had received a bribe, and that decision had nothing to do with Maryellen Noreika’s concerns about the structure of the diversion agreement.

Indeed, Abbe Lowell submitted proof that that was the intent all along, to renege on the plea deal. Weiss had submitted a heavily redacted copy of a letter Chris Clark wrote in response to Weiss’ proposed way to address Judge Noreika’s concerns, claiming that it showed that prosecutors did not, as Lowell had claimed, immediately demand a felony plea. Weiss was right, to a point. At that point Weiss was not demanding felony pleas. In his selective and vindictive reply, a declaration, and a timeline submitted yesterday, Lowell explained that Weiss started demanding felony pleas later than that, on August 29.

After the exchange cited by DOJ where Biden rejected its counterproposals, DOJ informed Biden the deal was off and made clear it would accept or charge felonies during a meeting with Biden’s counsel on August 29, 2023.

But those same papers and the unredacted copy of Clark’s response letter in question showed what happened instead: David Weiss’ first response to the concerns Judge Noreika expressed at the plea colloquy — partly how the diversion agreement worked with the plea, but also Wise’s claim that he could charge Hunter with FARA even though Hanson had said that would not happen a month earlier — was to eliminate any judicial protection and remove the immunity language entirely.

Second, the Government has proposed, without explanation, completely deleting the immunity provision in Paragraph 15 of the Diversion Agreement. We decline to amend the parties’ existing agreement on immunity. We will rely on this provision, as contained in the bilateral agreement that was signed and entered into between the parties.

The same letter showed that Hunter’s team believed the diversion remained in effect.

[W]e are fully prepared to continue proceeding with the terms of the Diversion Agreement, as executed. If the Court should determine that the breach provision in Paragraph 14 of the Diversion Agreement should be amended, then we would be fine with that, and at such time we would entertain making formal, written modifications pursuant to Paragraph 19. Otherwise the parties remain bound to the terms of the agreement that was signed and entered into.

This “offer” Weiss made, then, amounted to torching the signed plea deal and diversion agreement entirely.

This is the background to — as Lowell described — Weiss’ demand that Hunter either accept that useless deal immediately, before — minutes later — Weiss rolled out his Special Counsel authority.

8/9/23: DOJ responds to Biden’s counsel’s August 7 letter, and argues that neither the PA nor DA are in effect, and neither side is bound. In that letter, DOJ withdraws the PA and the DA it offered Biden on July 31, 2023, and withdraws the PA and the DA presented to the Court on July 26, 2023.

DOJ notifies Biden’s counsel that it intends to move to dismiss the tax information without prejudice and pursue charges in another district where venue lies, and requests Biden’s counsel’s position by no later than August 11, 2023.

8/10/23: Biden’s counsel emails AUSA Wise to inform him they are discussing DOJ’s August 9 letter and the options with Mr. Biden. Biden’s counsel asks if they may respond to DOJ’s requested position by Monday (August 14) instead of by Friday (August 11). Alternatively, Biden’s counsel proposes having a conference with the Court.

8/11/23: At Noon (12:00 pm), AUSA Wise replies to Mr. Clark’s email that the United States declines to extend the time in which it asked for Biden’s position on the motions identified in its August 9 letter, and further declines to have a conference with the Court.

Approximately five minutes later, at 12:05 pm EST, before Biden’s counsel could even respond to DOJ or discuss it with Mr. Biden, DOJ moves to dismiss the criminal tax Information without prejudice against Biden, so that tax charges can be brought in another district.

David Weiss replaced Lesley Wolf, and by doing so, has tried to get away with letting Leo Wise and Derek Hines to renege on the terms of a plea deal he himself signed, as if his signature wasn’t on the deal.

And he did so, it is now clear, to chase a Russian information operation. David Weiss got his ass handed to him by Russian spies and to hide his embarrassment, he’s trying to claim that he didn’t renege on a signed plea.

Neither Weiss nor Lowell has yet addressed Smirnov directly

For reasons I don’t understand, Lowell has not filed any motion specifically addressing the role of Alexander Smirnov in all this, in either Delaware or Los Angeles. As a result, the sum total of discussion about the role of the Smirnov claim in Hunter’s prosecution consists of the following:

First, in Lowell’s Reply Motion to Compel in Delaware, he noted that he had asked for things pertinent to the Scott Brady side channel, and the treatment of the Smirnov allegations made that discovery all the more important.

The fact that Special Counsel Weiss, beginning in July 2023, then elected to chase the goose making these unsubstantiated claims— after several DOJ and FBI officials agreed the matter should be closed—is all the more justification for granting Mr. Biden’s request for these DOJ materials.

In response, Weiss tried to anticipate mention of Smirnov in Lowell’s Reply. imagining that because Weiss is prosecuting Smirnov, it debunks the claim Hunter made in his deposition that Congressional Republicans were duped by a Russian disinformation campaign.

He claimed, “Smirnov, who has made you dupes in carrying out a Russian disinformation campaign waged against my father, has been indicted for his lies.”12 While the defendant testified to Congress that the Special Counsel had undermined the impeachment inquiry conducted by House Republicans, to this Court he argues instead that the Special Counsel is working at the behest of House Republicans. Motion at 13. Which is it? Indeed, the defendant has no evidence to support his shapeshifting claims because the Special Counsel continues to pursue the fair, evenhanded administration of the federal criminal laws.

That same day, in Delaware, Lowell cited the newly-released Scott Brady transcript to argue that Weiss, by continuing to prosecute Hunter, is doing just what Russia wanted with the Smirnov operation: to gin up a prosecution of Hunter.

From the filings in Smirnov and other disclosures, it turns out that a Russian intelligence operation has the same goal of spreading disinformation to influence the U.S. presidential election in Russia’s favor.

[snip]

Mr. Wise explained that Smirnov’s “disinformation story” is part of a Russian intelligence operation “aimed at denigrating President Biden” and “supporting former President Trump.”

[snip]

This case illustrates the very continuing harm identified by the Special Counsel. The Special Counsel tells us Russian intelligence sought to influence the U.S. presidential election by using allegations against Hunter Biden to hurt President Biden’s reelection. 3 And what did the now-Special Counsel do? The Office abandoned the Agreement it signed and filed felony gun and tax charges against Mr. Biden in two jurisdictions, which public records and DOJ policy indicate are not brought against people with similar facts as Mr. Biden. In these actions, the Special Counsel has done exactly what the Russian intelligence operation desired by initiating prosecutions against Mr. Biden.

In yesterday’s filing in Los Angeles, however, Lowell was still pretty circumspect about Smirnov.

In the section describing how Weiss had reneged on a signed deal, he attributed Weiss’ decision to renege on the deal to his pursuit of the Smirnov allegations. Then, in the section on Congress’ usurpation of prosecutorial function, Lowell laid out how stupid it is for Weiss to claim the charges against Smirnov, over three years after Weiss first got this referral, is proof that Weiss didn’t bow to pressure from Congress.

DOJ also chooses this part of its brief to argue its indictment of Alexander Smirnov suggests it is not a puppet of the GOP (perhaps DOJ’s whole inspiration for bringing that indictment). (Id.) Biden never suggested DOJ is a puppet of the GOP, but that DOJ has caved to political pressure several times in ways that specifically violate Biden’s rights. And DOJ indicting someone who falsely accused Biden of serious crimes does not prove it is treating him fairly. Instead, it calls into question why DOJ reopened long debunked allegations by Smirnov in July 2023 (as it was reneging on its agreements with Biden) when, having gone down that rabbit hole, DOJ was then forced to defend its actions by charging Smirnov with offenses it could have bought years earlier.

Lowell doesn’t make several details of the timeline explicit.

First, on the same day that Weiss sent Lindsey Graham that letter stating that the FD-1023 was part of an ongoing investigation, July 11, Shannon Hanson described that “the team,” on which she did not include herself at that point, was in a secure location. As I’ve noted, there was no reason for “the team” to be in a SCIF in preparation for the plea deal. There’s nothing classified about it. It’s evidence that, before Wise reneged on the scope of the plea deal on July 26, “the team” had already decided to chase the Smirnov allegation.

My hunch is that we’ll learn that whatever Weiss told Merrick Garland about needing Special Counsel status (note, he bypassed Brad Weinsheimer to get it), he did not represent the plea negotiations as the current record suggests they happened. My hunch is that Weiss may have claimed Hunter was being a good deal more intransigent then simply demanding that a plea be worth the toilet paper it was written on in the first place.

But to get Special Counsel status, Weiss likely claimed he was going to investigate Joe Biden.

While it’s true that Garland assured Weiss he could get Special Counsel status whenever he asked, investigating the President is the only thing that presents the kind of conflict that would require full Special Counsel status. And, as I’ve noted, Weiss grounds his authority to prosecute Smirnov in the language in the Special Counsel appointment permitting him to investigate anything that comes out of the investigation authorized with the appointment itself, which must, then, have included Joe Biden as well as his son.

Lowell made this point in his Notice of Authority submitted in Delaware.

The connection between the reopening of the Smirnov allegations and the then-U.S. Attorney’s Office’s total rejection of the Agreement it made has, at the least, the appearance of catering to the shouts of extremist Republicans to scuttle the deal and keep an investigation into Mr. Biden alive.

But he has not done so in Los Angeles.

On August 29, prosecutors expressed overconfidence about their investigation

Lowell has declined to do so even though the timeline he lays out — how, on August 29, prosecutors demanded felony pleas — intersects closely with the Smirnov one. Lowell’s declaration describes that at 11AM on August 29 — in what appears the first meeting after Weiss got Special Counsel status and after Judge Noreika dismissed the tax indictment — Leo Wise fully retracted all offers that had been discussed to that point.

3. On August 29, 2023 at approximately 11:00 AM, I (along with my law partner, Christopher Man) met with Assistant United States Attorneys Leo Wise and Derek Hines at the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Wilmington, Delaware. The meeting lasted approximately one hour. Our position was that the Diversion Agreement was in effect, and we sought to work with the government to effectuate the substance of the proposed Plea Agreement by addressing the procedural concerns the Delaware court raised on July 26, 2023.

4. During that meeting, Mr. Wise stated, in sum and substance, that DOJ was no longer willing at this point in time to (i) carry out the misdemeanor tax agreement it had made; (ii) commit to a “no jail” recommendation for Mr. Biden that it also had made; and (iii) maintain the parties’ agreed-to immunity provision. While Mr. Wise said he was only in a “listening mode,” the only type of charge even mentioned at the meeting were felonies, which are exactly what the Office filed about two weeks later in the District of Delaware.

At that same meeting, Lowell requested that he get an exact copy of the laptop.

The defendant’s counsel met with government counsel in Wilmington on August 29, 2023, and made a specific request for an exact forensic copy of the laptop and external hard drive. His defense counsel reiterated this request in an email dated September 25, 2023, in which defense counsel stated “we want to ensure the data we receive is an identical copy as you have it and that the data will retain its native forensic properties (e.g., time and date stamps, file paths, operative system characteristics, user profile information, etc.)” and that the “data loaded on the hard drive is complete and identical in every shape and manner to that obtained by the FBI when it acquired possession” of the laptop and hard drive. The government accommodated this request.

And prosecutors also claimed (erroneously, it now appears) that they had clean sources for everything otherwise found on the laptop.

As to the meeting between Mr. Biden’s counsel and prosecutors in Wilmington on August 29, 2023 (Opp. at 19), Mr. Biden notes that prosecutors indicated, during that meeting, that they possess “independent sources” for any material on the laptop device that would be helpful to the prosecution’s case, presumably referring to material subpoenaed from third parties, such as Apple, Inc. or various cellphone carriers. For this reason, it was curious to Mr. Biden’s counsel when reviewing the prosecution’s response that it elected to cite to and quote from messages and photos contained on the device it possessed (lacking any Bates stamps) rather than from those “independent sources” included in the discovery produced to the defense.

That same day prosecutors mistakenly claimed they wouldn’t have to rely on the laptop to prosecute Hunter Biden, also on August 29, Smirnov’s handler described that he and Smirnov reviewed the allegations against President Biden after the FD-1023 leaked and Smirnov stood by his claims.

43. On August 29, 2023, FBI investigators spoke with the Handler in reference to the 2020 1023. During that conversation, the Handler indicated that he and the Defendant had reviewed the 2020 1023 following its public release by members of Congress in July 2023, and the Defendant reaffirmed the accuracy of the statements contained in it.

Did representations from Smirnov’s handler contribute to prosecutors’ hubris in imagining they had all the evidence they needed against the President’s son? Did they initially pursue particularly draconian charges against Hunter in hopes they could get him to flip against his father?

At some point — the indictment doesn’t reveal whether the handler only came clean about Smirnov’s lies in the following weeks — Smirnov’s handler provided the messages and travel records that made it clear Smirnov was lying.

44. The Handler provided investigators with messages he had with the Defendant, including the ones described above. Additionally, the Handler identified and reviewed with the Defendant travel records associated with both Associate 2 and the Defendant. The travel records were inconsistent with what the Defendant had previously told the Handler that was memorialized in the 2020 1023. The Defendant also provided email communications with both Associate 2 and Burisma personnel beginning in 2017 to the Handler, which the Handler reviewed with the Defendant and shared with FBI investigators.

On the day Weiss discovered Smirnov was lying, he should have called up Merrick Garland, told him he had to recuse from both the Smirnov investigation and — because of the apparent role of the Smirnov 1023 in his decision to renege on the plea agreement — even the Hunter Biden one. On that day, Weiss became a witness to a potential criminal conspiracy.

Weiss’ false claims about discovery into the side channel

Weiss did not do that.

Instead, at least in the months before the Smirnov indictment, he prevaricated over discovery.

On November 7, over a month after the FBI interviewed Smirnov and confirmed his lies, David Weiss told the House Judiciary Committee Chief Counsel Steve Castor that the side channel would only show up in his eventual report.

Q Brady told us that he had such trouble getting ahold of you and your office, that he had to go through the PADAG, and basically the PADAG had to intervene and instruct your office to take a meeting with him.

A Is that a question?

Q Yes. Why wouldn’t you meet with Mr. Brady?

A I’m not at liberty to discuss that at this time. I look forward to the opportunity to addressing this in the special counsel’s report at the appropriate time.

Weiss committed that Brady’s role in this would only appear in the final report after a number of details of Brady’s claims to have vetted the Smirnov claim — which Jerry Nadler referred to both Michael Horowitz and Merrick Garland for potentially criminal investigation — had been publicly aired.

Then, on November 15, Lowell asked for discovery that would cover the side channel and also permission to subpoena those, like Bill Barr, who continued to engage in discussions of the side channel as private citizens, without protection of prosecutorial immunity.

The response to the latter, written in December by then newly promoted “Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel” Leo Wise, repeats Weiss’ silence about his decision to renege on the plea deal. Given the accumulating evidence that Weiss reneged on the plea deal in order to chase the Smirnov allegation, such silence is deafening.

It blows off the request for a subpoena to Bill Barr — who made public representations about the side channel the day after Weiss agreed to immunize Hunter against further investigation, the agreement on which Weiss reneged — by emphasizing that as former Attorney General, Barr could have no influence on Weiss’ actions.

Defendant asks the Court to enter an order directing subpoenas, which seek broadly worded categories of documents across seven years, to former President Donald J. Trump, former Attorney General William P. Barr, and two other former officials in the U.S. Department of Justice. Defendant contends that the requested material “goes to the heart of his pre-trial and trial defense that this is, possibly, a vindictive or selective prosecution that arose out of an incessant pressure campaign that began in the last administration, in violation of Mr. Biden’s constitutional rights.” ECF 58, at 14. It is worth noting from the outset that defendant misunderstands the difference between pretrial arguments to dismiss an indictment and trial defenses. It is black-letter law that claims of vindictive and selective prosecution are not trial defenses and may only be brought and litigated pretrial. They are not defenses and, therefore, are never argued to trial juries.

In any event, both vindictive- and selective-prosecution claims turn on the actual intent of the specific decisionmaker in a defendant’s case: here, the Special Counsel. But not only does defendant’s motion fail to identify any actual evidence of bias, vindictiveness, or discriminatory intent on the Special Counsel’s part, his arguments ignore an inconvenient truth: No charges were brought against defendant during the prior administration when the subpoena recipients actually held office in the Executive Branch.

And in response to the request for a subpoena to Richard Donoghue, the response noted that Donoghue ordered that, “the Delaware investigation receive the information from the Pittsburgh team, which was being closed out.”

Against this backdrop, the gaps in defendant’s motion become glaring: absent is any credible argument that (a) one of the subpoena recipients, rather than the Special Counsel, made the decision to prosecute the defendant and that the Special Counsel merely followed an order, or (b) that the Special Counsel himself has treated similarly situated individuals differently or decided to prosecute for discriminatory purposes. In fact, throughout the defendant’s entire constructed narrative, he barely refers to the actions or motives of the then-U.S. Attorney, nowSpecial Counsel, much less makes Armstrong’s “credible showing” of disparate treatment, discriminatory intent, or retaliatory motive on his part. Nor has defendant addressed the impact of the sitting Attorney General’s subsequent determination that, “to ensure a full and thorough investigation” of these matters, it was necessary to confer the additional jurisdiction and independence outlined in 28 C.F.R. § 600.04–600.10. See Order No. 5730-2023.

Defendant’s attempts to manufacture discriminatory treatment or intent on behalf of the U.S. Attorney fall apart under the most minimal scrutiny. First, defendant obliquely references that “IRS files reveal that [Richard Donoghue] further coordinated with the Pittsburgh Office and with the prosecution team in Delaware, including issuing certain guidance steps regarding overt steps in the investigation.” ECF 58, at 2-3 & n.3. Looking behind the defendant’s ambiguously phrased allegation reveals the actual “overt steps” involved: (1) the U.S. Attorney making an independent assessment of the probable cause underlying a warrant and (2) a direction by Mr. Donoghue that the Delaware investigation receive the information from the Pittsburgh team, which was being closed out. See ECF 58, at 3 n.3 (citing memorandum of conference call). Assessing the validity of a warrant and merely receiving information from other investigating entities does nothing to show any disparate treatment or animus. Next, defendant alleges that “certain investigative decisions were made as a result of guidance provided by, among others, the Deputy Attorney General’s office.” ECF 58, at 3 n.4. In fact, the source cited revealed that the guidance was simply not to conduct any “proactive interviews” yet. Likewise, defendant’s last attempt to create a link involved guidance not to make any “external requests (outside of government),” which followed the long-standing Department of Justice policy to avoid overt investigative steps that might interfere with ongoing elections. See ECF 58, at 3 n.5; cf., e.g., Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses 40 (2d ed. 1980). In other words, the most defendant claims is that the Deputy Attorney General’s office was aware of and involved in some specific investigatory decisions in the most banal fashion possible—by waiting to take specific investigative steps at certain times out of caution.

None of these contacts or events provides any evidence involving either the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals or a discriminatory intent behind the U.S. Attorney’s prosecutorial decision. [my emphasis]

The existence of the side channel alone is testament to disparate treatment of Hunter Biden. Importantly, Donoghue is a fact witness about what Weiss did in 2020.

The response to Lowell’s request for discovery on the side channel, a request that explicitly applied to the diversion agreement as well, was even more non-responsive. It simply ignores Bill Barr’s role entirely.

It’s the response to the subpoena that looks particularly damning, though.

As I’ve noted, there are some key gaps in the Smirnov indictment. First, in describing who set up the side channel in the first place, Weiss claimed Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen set it up, when Brady testified that Barr was personally involved (as Barr’s public comments make clear).

22. In June 2020, the Handler reached out to the Defendant concerning the 2017 1023. This was done at the request of the FBI’s Pittsburgh Field Office (hereafter “FBI Pittsburgh”). In the first half of 2020, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania (hereafter “USAO WDPA”) had been tasked by the Deputy Attorney General of the United States to assist in the “receipt, processing, and preliminary analysis of new information provided by the public that may be relevant to matters relating to Ukraine.” As part of that process, FBI Pittsburgh opened an assessment, 58A-PG-3250958, and in the course of that assessment identified the 2017 1023 in FBI holdings and shared it with USAO WDPA. USAO WDPA then asked FBI Pittsburgh to reach out to the Handler to ask for any further information about the reference in his 2017 1023 that stated, “During this call, there was a brief, non-relevant discussion about former [Public Official 1]’s son, [Businessperson 1], who is currently on the Board of Directors for Burisma Holdings [No Further Information]”

The silence about Barr’s role is particularly telling given persistent misrepresentations of Hunter Biden’s discovery asks about Barr.

More tellingly, the indictment doesn’t confess that Donoghue ordered Weiss to look at the FD-1023 in 2020, days after Trump called up Bill Barr and screamed at him for not investigating Hunter Biden more aggressively.

40. By August 2020, FBI Pittsburgh concluded that all reasonable steps had been completed regarding the Defendant’s allegations and that their assessment, 58A-PG-3250958, should be closed. On August 12, 2020, FBI Pittsburgh was informed that the then-FBI Deputy Director and then-Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United States concurred that it should be closed.

Leo Wise’s description of this process at Smirnov’s first detention hearing was even more dishonest.

[T]he FBI in Pittsburgh took some limited investigative steps, but their steps were limited by the fact that they were only conducting an assessment, which under FBI policies is not an investigation. And it prevents, for instance, the use of compulsory process like grand jury subpoenas or the compulsion of testimony. So based on that limited review, the FBI closed its assessment in August.

Weiss has a problem.

He was ordered to investigate this in 2020, and did nothing, possibly because Lesley Wolf knew the entire side channel project was corrupt. But if that’s why Weiss did nothing in 2020, it makes his decision to renege on a plea deal to go chase this lead inexcusable.

He ignores his earlier receipt of this tip in the indictment to create the illusion that he investigated the FD-1023 for the first time starting in July.

But in the opposition for subpoenas in December, Leo Wise acknowledged that Donoghue issued that order in 2020.

Weiss is saying one thing in the Smirnov prosecution and saying something else in an effort to hide Smirnov discovery from Hunter Biden.

And he’s saying those conflicting things after telling Congress that Brady’s role in this would show up only in his closing report, and not in follow-up indictments for false claims to Congress.

Realistically, the investigation into how Smirnov allegedly framed Joe Biden should go in at least three directions: First, into Russia and Ukraine (and possiblyIsrael)’s specific role in his alleged lies, such as whether Andrii Derkach had ties to Smirnov in 2020. As part of that, the FBI will need to investigate why Smirnov didn’t disclose his earlier ties to Russian Official 5 to his handler, whom he flipped for a third country in 2002, until 2019.

The investigation needs to figure out how Scott Brady came to look for Smirnov’s earlier FD-1023 in the first place, because his claimed explanation makes no sense. It’s possible that arose from some mutual tie between Smirnov and Rudy Giuliani and could implicate Rudy personally. At the first Smirnov detention hearing, Wise at least mentioned Rudy Giuliani’s role in all this, suggesting Weiss’ team might fancy they’re pursuing that angle, at least. But they have no business doing so, because that implicates Weiss’ contacts with Brady. Again, he is a direct witness.

But just as importantly, the investigation needs to examine why Brady claimed the tip had been vetted in 2020, and why Brady created the impression with Congress that Smirnov’s travel records matched his claims, rather than debunked them. The investigation needs to examine whether Barr, or the indictment, is telling the truth about what Weiss was supposed to do with the lead in 2020. Neither Brady nor Barr are immunized as prosecutors anymore. And there’s no reason their attempts to influence the criminal investigation into Joe Biden’s son in advance of an election should evade scrutiny.

That goes right to the heart of why Weiss reneged on the plea deal. It goes to all the discovery and subpoenas that Weiss has already refused, claiming that it had no bearing on diversion or a vindictive prosecution claim. It goes to Weiss’ wildly unsound decision to remain on the case after he became a witness in it.

As it turns out, it has everything to do with Hunter’s diversion and vindictive prosecution claims.